• Login
    View Item 
    •   OpenDocs Home
    • Institute of Development Studies Research Repository
    • Impact Initiative
    • Governance
    • View Item
    •   OpenDocs Home
    • Institute of Development Studies Research Repository
    • Impact Initiative
    • Governance
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    The Politics of Central Banking in Kenya: Balancing Political and Developmental Interests

    Thumbnail
    Date
    2019
    Author
    Tyce, Matthew
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Impact
    Abstract
    This paper analyses the performance of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in delivering on its mandate since the organisation gained formal independence in the early-1990s. It utilises a political settlements approach, tracking how the distribution of power has shaped CBK’s effectiveness over time. The paper finds that Kenya’s political settlement has constrained CBK’s performance in certain respects, particularly with regards to financial sector supervision, where the organisation must operate within a tight set of political constraints because of the sector’s importance in enabling vital patronage networks and generating political financing for elections. This has often incentivised CBK governors to undertake incremental reforms that balance developmental and political interests; governors who have not been willing to compromise in this way have undermined the organisation’s independence and autonomy by provoking a backlash. The paper also finds that Kenya’s competitive clientelist political settlement has caused difficulties for CBK in undertaking its price stability mandate. This is particularly the case during election periods, when the organisation faces pressure to adopt a looser stance. Nonetheless, despite these pressures, the paper finds that CBK has, overall, been effective in delivering on its core mandate throughout the period under analysis, to the extent that it can be labelled a long-standing ‘pocket of effectiveness’. This is because three other sets of factors have played a kind of countervailing role, by keeping CBK relatively insulated from the most corrosive aspects of Kenya’s competitive clientelism. These are: transnational factors; ideas and ideology; and organisational-level factors, including CBK’s leadership and its formal and informal sources of autonomy.
    URI
    https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16095
    Citation
    Tyce, M. (2020) The politics of central banking in Kenya: Balancing political and developmental interests? Pockets of Effectiveness Working Paper No. 7. Manchester, UK: The University of Manchester
    More details
    http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/poe_wp_7_tyce.pdf
    Collections
    • Governance [138]

    About OpenDocs | OpenDocs Policy | Help | Contact Us | Send Feedback | Disclaimer and Cookies
     

     

    Browse

    All of OpenDocsCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    About OpenDocs | OpenDocs Policy | Help | Contact Us | Send Feedback | Disclaimer and Cookies