Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMunro, Alistair
dc.contributor.authorKebede, Bereket
dc.contributor.authorTarazona, Marcela
dc.contributor.authorVerschoor, Arjan
dc.identifier.citationThe Lion’s Share: An Experimental Analysis of Polygamy in Northern Nigeria Alistair Munro, Bereket Kebede, Marcela Tarazona, and Arjan Verschoor Economic Development and Cultural Change 2019 67:4, 833-861
dc.description.abstractWe use simple public goods games to investigate spousal behavior in Kano, northern Nigeria, one of the modern heartlands of polygyny. Most partners keep back at least half of their endowment from the common pool, but we find no evidence that polygynous households are less efficient than their monogamous counterparts. When men control the allocation, equal treatment of wives is common, but senior wives often receive more from their husbands, no matter what their contribution. However, the clearest result is that when men control the allocation, polygynous husbands receive a higher payoff compared to their wives and their monogamous counterparts.
dc.publisherThe University of Chicago Press
dc.titleThe Lion's Share: An Experimental Analysis of Polygamy in Northern Nigeria
dc.rights.holder© 2019 by The University of Chicago
dc.identifier.agES/E021654/1, RES-167-25-0251-A
dc.rights.licenseAll rights reserved

Files in this item


There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record