Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBarr, Abigailen
dc.contributor.authorDekker, Marleenen
dc.contributor.authorFafchamps, Marcelen
dc.coverage.spatialsub-Saharan Africa
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-23T14:44:31Z
dc.date.available2016-06-23T14:44:31Z
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.identifier.urihttps://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/11827
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether available enforcement mechanisms affects who shares risk with whom in sub-Saharan Africa by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a lab-type experiment, surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During the experiment participants were invited to form risk sharing groups under three enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic, and extrinsic, i.e., social sanctioning. Dyads similar in age and gender or who belong to the same economic communitybased organizations (CBOs) are more likely to share risk. However, when social sanctioning is possible, co-members in economic CBOs withdraw from group formation and co-religion and marriage ties come to the fore.en
dc.description.abstractBarr, A. et al. (2010) Who shares risk with whom under different enforcement mechanisms? ESRC Working Paper, London: ESRC.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesESRC Working Paperen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en
dc.subjectSocial Protection
dc.titleWho shares risk with whom under different enforcement mechanisms?en
dc.typeSeries paper (non-IDS)en
dc.identifier.externalurihttps://doi.org/10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii045
dc.identifier.agRES-167-25-0372, ES/F027532/1en
dc.identifier.doi10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii045


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/