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dc.contributor.authorPrichard, Wilson
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-03T13:41:01Z
dc.date.available2018-05-03T13:41:01Z
dc.date.issued2016-04-14
dc.identifier.citationPrichard, W. (2016) Electoral Competitiveness, Tax Bargaining and Political Incentives in Developing Countries: Evidence from Political Budget Cycles Affecting Taxation, B.J.Pol.S. 48 , 427 – 457en
dc.identifier.urihttps://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/13713
dc.description.abstractStudies of political budget cycles in developing countries have generally sought to inform understanding of short-term fiscal dynamics, but can also offer unique insight into broader political dynamics in developing countries. This article correspondingly employs markedly improved data in order to study the impact of elections on tax collection, and draw broader lessons. It shows that while elections as a group have had no significant effect on tax collection, the subset of competitive elections has had a significant negative impact on pre-election tax collection; while this effect appears to be largest where incumbents are particularly unpopular. This provides powerful evidence that the impact of elections on political incentives in developing countries is conditioned by the existence of an electorally competitive opposition, while offering preliminary evidence that popular resistance to taxation by unpopular governments may be an important means by which taxpayers may generate pressure for improved governance.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBritish Journal of Political Science;Vol 48
dc.rights© Cambridge University Press 2016. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.en
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subjectGovernanceen
dc.titleElectoral Competitiveness, Tax Bargaining and Political Incentives in Developing Countries: Evidence from Political Budget Cycles Affecting Taxationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.rights.holderCambridge University Pressen
dc.identifier.externalurihttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/electoral-competitiveness-tax-bargaining-and-political-incentives-in-developing-countries-evidence-from-political-budget-cycles-affecting-taxation/2C83B99205AE78B87A710BE3B21E05C2en
dc.identifier.teamGovernanceen
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0007123415000757
rioxxterms.funderDefault funderen
rioxxterms.identifier.projectDefault projecten
rioxxterms.versionNAen
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000757en
rioxxterms.funder.projectd218e59e-c0fb-4cb3-8a07-92a57da72cd1en


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© Cambridge University Press 2016. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © Cambridge University Press 2016. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.