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dc.contributor.authorPiracha, Mujtaba
dc.contributor.authorMoore, Mick
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-26T12:25:26Z
dc.date.available2018-04-26T12:25:26Z
dc.date.issued2016-05-12
dc.identifier.citationPiracha, M. and Moore, M. (2016) Revenue-Maximising or Revenue-Sacrificing Government? Property Tax in Pakistanen
dc.identifier.urihttp://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/13656
dc.description.abstractThe idea that states seek to maximise their revenue collection has occupied a significant place in contemporary political economy analysis of taxation, and has helped us understand the history of state formation. It is, however, very much at variance with the daily experience of tax policy and practice. Governments are frequently revenue-sacrificers: they fail to use the functioning, legitimate tax collection systems they have available to actually collect much revenue. This paper details the case of property tax collection in Pakistan, and concludes that governments tend to maximise rule before they maximise revenue.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Journal of Development Studies;Vol 52
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en
dc.subjectGovernanceen
dc.titleRevenue-Maximising or Revenue-Sacrificing Government? Property Tax in Pakistanen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.rights.holderTaylor and Francisen
dc.identifier.externalurihttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2016.1153076en
dc.identifier.teamGovernanceen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00220388.2016.1153076
rioxxterms.funderDefault funderen
rioxxterms.identifier.projectDefault projecten
rioxxterms.versionVoRen
rioxxterms.funder.projectd218e59e-c0fb-4cb3-8a07-92a57da72cd1en


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