Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorPrichard, Wilson
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-11T11:37:24Z
dc.date.available2016-04-11T11:37:24Z
dc.date.issued2014-09
dc.identifier.citationPrichard, W. (2014) Electoral Competitiveness, Political Budget Cycles and Taxation in Developing Countries. ICTD Working Paper 24. Brighton: IDS.en
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-78118-191-1
dc.identifier.urihttps://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/11173
dc.descriptionpolitical budget cycles; fiscal policy; taxation; political economy.en
dc.description.abstractDespite significant evidence of ‘political budget cycles’ affecting public expenditure, studies of the impact of elections on tax collection have reached mixed conclusions. Drawing on significantly improved government revenue data, this paper finds, contrary to earlier research, that when we focus on all executive elections in developing countries there is no significant effect on levels of tax collection. Instead, the impact of elections on tax collection is conditional on elections being competitive, with competitive elections resulting in a negative impact on pre-election tax collection, split relatively evenly between direct and indirect taxes. The magnitude of the effect is large, reaching as much as 0.5 per cent of GDP in some specifications, and has important implications for understanding the incentive effects of elections and the connections between elections and effective governance.en
dc.description.sponsorshipDfID, NORADen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisher© Institute of Development Studiesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesICTD Working Paper;24
dc.rightsElectoral Competitiveness, Political Budget Cycles and Taxation in Developing Countries Wilson Prichard ICTD Working Paper 24 First published by the Institute of Development Studies in September 2014 © Institute of Development Studies 2014 ISBN: 978-1-78118-191-1 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may be made only under the following conditions: - with the prior permission of the publisher; or - with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK, or from another national licensing agency; or - under the terms set out below. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher and a fee may be payable. Available from: The International Centre for Tax and Development at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261 Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202 E-mail: info@ictd.ac.uk Web: www.ictd/en/publicationsen
dc.rights.urihttp://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/IDSOpenDocsStandardTermsOfUse.pdfen
dc.subjectEconomic Developmenten
dc.titleElectoral Competitiveness, Political Budget Cycles and Taxation in Developing Countriesen
dc.typeIDS Working Paperen
dc.rights.holder© Institute of Development Studies 2014en
dc.identifier.externalurihttp://www.ictd.ac/publication/2-working-papers/17-electoral-competitiveness-political-budget-cycles-and-taxation-in-developing-countriesen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record