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dc.contributor.authorHassan, Mirza
dc.contributor.authorPrichard, Wilson
dc.coverage.spatialBangladeshen
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-23T11:53:23Z
dc.date.available2016-03-23T11:53:23Z
dc.date.issued2013-11
dc.identifier.citationHassan, M. and Prichard, W. (2013) The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform. ICTD Working Paper 14. Brighton: IDS.en
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-78118-140-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/10248
dc.descriptionpolitical economy, tax reform, political settlementsen
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the political economy of tax reform in Bangladesh over several decades, shedding light on the complex factors that account for unusually effective and sustained resistance to significant reform. We contend that it is necessary to understand both deep-seated formal and informal institutions and the micro-level incentives that shape the negotiation of short-term reform in order to comprehend tax outcomes. We describe a tax system that is highly informal, largely manual and characterised by high levels of discretion and corruption. However, despite appearing highly dysfunctional on the surface, this system serves the core interests of powerful political, economic and administrative actors. Underpinned by robust informal institutions, the current system delivers low and predictable tax rates to businesses, provides extensive discretion and opportunities for corruption to the tax administration, and acts as an important vehicle for political elites to raise funds and distribute patronage and economic rents. While the tax system has not been without reform, individual reform efforts have been constrained by the parameters of this broader settlement, leaving competing interest groups to pursue strategic gains at the margins while seeking to satisfy external reform demands. This tax bargain reflects Bangladesh’s broader political economy, which is characterised by entrenched informal institutions underpinning the combination of generally weak governance and high levels of economic growth – the so-called ‘paradox of Bangladesh’.en
dc.description.sponsorshipDfID, NORADen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute of Development Studiesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesICTD Working Paper;14
dc.rightsA catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may be made only under the following conditions: - with the prior permission of the publisher; or - with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK, or from another national licensing agency; or - under the terms set out below. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher and a fee may be payable. Available from: Communications Unit, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK Tel: +44 (0) 1273 915637 Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202 E-mail: bookshop@ids.ac.uk Web: www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338)en
dc.rights.urihttp://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/IDSOpenDocsStandardTermsOfUse.pdfen
dc.subjectEconomic Developmenten
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reformen
dc.typeIDS Working Paperen
dc.rights.holderInstitute of Development Studiesen
dc.identifier.externalurihttp://www.ictd.ac/ju-download/2-working-papers/83-the-political-economy-of-tax-reform-in-bangladesh-political-settlements-informal-institutions-and-the-negotiation-of-reform


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