REHABILITATION: Toward Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation for Redevelopment

by

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In celebration of the life and work of

Irene Constance Brown

whose passion for the disposed and for empowering them to win back that which they have lost has informed and guided much of the work which has led into this study.
Time past and time future are both contained in time present wrote T.S. Eliot. Therefore, in one sense, all time is always contained in time present through the influence on it of the past and its influence on the future and all time is therefore unredeemable. But in another sense altering the influence of the past and shaping the future - possible only in time present by redeeming the time, is a normative imperative. The normative imperative underlying this paper's analysis and proposals is restoring and re-empowering households and peoples devastated by war to redeem their livelihoods, their access to basic services and their participation in governance.

Historical R-R-R (Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction) have intellectually and in the North tended to be marginal offshoots of two, at least until recently, themselves marginal areas: Emergency Relief for Calamities (natural disasters) and alleviation (sic) or reduction of poverty. In the South they have tended to be crafted ad hoc in the crucible of crisis management during catastrophes (man - literally - made disasters). The consequences usually - especially in the North - include short termism (undue optimism on the scale and duration of strategic, policy and resource allocations required) and almost total micro or project focus - especially by IFI's and INGOs – while failing to integrate R-R-R into central macro economic strategy. That is somewhat like playing Hamlet without either the Prince of Denmark, Polonius or the late king's ghost. In most of the 50 odd post war or war countries with over 500 million people, Rehabilitation of livelihoods is strategically central in political economic and socio political terms especially, but not only, in those cases in which provinces or whole countries have had one third to one half livelihood destruction and human displacement often with comparable impact on infant and aged mortality, basic services provision, domestic food security, tax revenue and exports.

Rehabilitation is a process - not an event. While one can schematically locate countries along a continuum from survival (albeit even in survival relief substantial rehabilitation and planning for more is sometimes possible) to post R-R-R development (although even a single country is unlikely to reach that point for all districts at the same time). However, the process of rehabilitation is most unlikely to be one of straight line progress along a broadening highway to a New Jerusalem of sustainable, continuous, poor person friendly development within a frame of economic good housekeeping and good governance. Some apparently promising roads will be dead ends, calamities (including terms of trade shocks and debt crises as well as droughts and floods) and
renewed catastrophes (at least partial return to armed violence) are likely - inevitable in respect to calamities. On the potentially positive side, the progress of rehabilitation is likely to open up new, unforeseen opportunities.

The processual nature of rehabilitation, the near inevitability of setbacks, and the potential for new opportunities increase the need for strategic planning and for flexibility. Long term objectives are needed to avert being blown off course by crisis gales and to allow for goal efficient redeployment of resources when cutbacks are needed (or opportunities for additional high return initiatives arise.

Rehabilitation consists primarily a) of enabling households to restore livelihoods; b) of broadening access to basic services including law order and freedom from violence as well as health, education, water and extension services; c) of restoring local level infrastructure especially as to market access, basic services and local governance; d) of providing safety nets with special attention to food and water security to alleviate the initial impact of calamities and to facilitate rapid snap back of livelihoods after then and e) effective participation of households in governance - especially of rehabilitation - through local governance and domestic social actors (religious bodies, community organisations, women's groups, trade unions and domestic NGOs). The last requires local through national 'ownership' of rehabilitation with pre-planned phasing down of external government agency and INGO provision of leadership, personnel and resources in favour of domestic. While these conceptual and strategic generalisations are possible and useful they cannot constitute a rulebook for strategic sectoral or community programming because rehabilitation is very highly contextual. Even pairs of countries assumed to be similar - e.g. Mozambique and Angola; Somalia and Somaliland turn out to be very different in attainments and in prospects for rehabilitation (indeed for sufficient lulls in armed conflict even to attempt it in two cases) which rest on historic, resource course of war, governance and social factors which are in fact radically different. The 'COPE country' experiences - Sri Lanka, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland illustrate the importance of context. They also suggest that the pace and extent of rehabilitation is not inevitable - actors by households, communities, domestic social actors, war riven states and external actors can have substantial influence, for better or for worse (much worse in the cases of non-action in Rwanda in 1994 and intervention in Somalia in 1991-94). Rehabilitation is not replication. What existed pre war was usually part of the cause of the war and was rarely either poor household or female friendly. The fact of war has altered reality e.g. loss of livestock herds, increase in proportion of female headed households. Neither the world
economic systems parameters for poor countries nor best practice in - e.g. - primary health services have stood still during wars, especially as some arguably date back 40 (Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Angola) years with only ephemeral lulls. However, at least in its initial stages return home (often very literally) for up to or over 75% of displaced households and restoration of what has been lost in basic service access and local infrastructure/market access are central and can be checked by quick consultation with returnees and continuous residents. At that stage, the opportunity costs of delay far outweigh those of marginal misallocations or misplaced priorities if (and only if) intended beneficiaries are brought into the decision informing process.

R-R-R interlock. Reconciliation and governance are usually seen as primarily political and rehabilitation as economic. However, participation and accessible deconcentrated and/or decentralised governance are crucial to cost efficient attainment of rehabilitation goals. Further the perceived legitimacy of governments for most people turns to a large extent on their ability to deliver law-order-safety, basic health and education, water and sometimes extension and market access. Capacity, as well as accountability (beginning with oral and numerical accounts) and participation, is crucial to sustainable reconciliation. Reconstruction of major infrastructural and of a direct production and finance enterprises is usually seen as macro economic and distinct from rehabilitation. This is not valid. Household shares in generating GDP, incomes above the poverty line, tax revenue, exports, food are frequently dominant and very rarely distinctly secondary. One purpose of major infrastructure is to support the household and small scale sector, just as a major market for many (not all) large directly productive enterprises and financial institutions is the rural household sector. Rational allocation is not possible unless rehabilitation is integrated into macro strategy.

Recommendations flow fairly directly from this analysis and these summary case studies.

1. Rehabilitation (and R-R-R) needs to be conceptualised and planned strategically at macro, sectoral, district/provincial and household (as well as sometimes cross border regional) levels and to be fully accepted as being central and medium term not short term and marginal;

2. While generalisations are possible and useful, they need to be tested against contextual reality if the sum of rehabilitation efforts are to be cost effective relative to goals set and, indeed, if goals relevant to and prioritised by intended beneficiaries are to be chosen;
3. The importance of context, the need for sustainability and the relatively transitory external interest in any particular post war rehabilitation point to the need for national 'ownership' with government strategic planning leadership and coordination of external as well as domestic actors. Ideally this should be the apex of similar coordination through deconcentrated national and decentralised local governance with substantial participation and accountability. That requires not just a reversal of the use of external programmes to substitute for (and in practice erode) states, domestic social actors and households in favour of INGO's and external agencies, but also strengthening local actors. An immediate acceptance of domestic (state, local government, domestic social actor and household) coordination and leadership with external actors complementary, supportive and participatory needs to be related to planned phasing over in respect to personnel, institutional and knowledge access and financial resources from external to domestic at all levels. Certain INGO's and agencies do act in this strategic approach, others give the impression (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) of prancing pro-consuls determined to perpetuate their leadership roles (if not necessarily their resource input).

4. Strategic medium term rehabilitation budgeting/planning is crucial to attaining positive results. One usually underestimated factor is the need for flexibility. Negative shocks (and usually positive opportunities) are perfectly predictable, but their timing and severity impact are not. Therefore both means to vire resources among programmes, contingency reserves built into budgets and/or pre negotiated lines of additional external resource inflows triggered by pre defined eventualities are needed - and to date very rarely present.

5. External debt service burdens on post war economies pose special problems. Rehabilitation cannot wait six years for low income heavily indebted country debt writedown qualification. Interim suspension of payments is in many cases likely to be crucial. By the same token to demand effective/participatory governance, full economic good housekeeping, restoration of basic services (including law-order-absence of violence) as a pre-condition for substantial rehabilitation aid is both common and a clear example of catch 22. Rehabilitation is a vital component to attaining the pre-conditions and cannot be financed on an adequate scale from domestic resources (with cases of their augmentation by huge - relative to GDP - Diaspora remittances for rehabilitation rare though not unknown).
6. More data is needed. Conceptualisation may no longer be the primary area - if present practice catches up with generalisations now possible. Indeed because of the importance of context, more and deeper case studies may be a necessary condition for more valid and cutting edge conceptualisation and generalisation as well as for better country strategic rehabilitation programmes. More baseline data - pre and post war - from household through macro levels plus more consultations with intended beneficiaries to inform decisions as to temporal and scale priorities are needed in virtually all post war countries as is more personnel and institutional capacity to iterate from macro through sectoral and provincial to local and household data and back relating concepts and generalisations to contextual realities and potentials at all levels.

As some - by no means all - of the COPE cases illustrate, it is possible to go forward with rehabilitation, sometimes very impressively. The ultimate uses of research, data, programme decision and monitoring/review are basically applied - to assist households, communities, social actors and governance institutions to recapacitate themselves to recover that from which they have been dispossessed by war as a sustainable base from which to build.
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Development is about human beings. They need four things. First is water. It is the first thing needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal, or a baby dies. Second is food. Without enough of it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water and food are won is health - otherwise the human being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a human being has water, food and health he needs to learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without these none of the four basic needs can be sustained.

- Somali Elder
Baidoa, 1995

The bird of time has but a little way to fly.
And lo, the bird is on the wing.

Omar Khaiyum

If you want to dismantle a hedge,
Remove one thornbush at a time.

- Somali Proverb
Rehabilitation after armed conflict (sub-national, national or transborder) is of increasing importance both in national rebuilding and in international cooperation policy and resource allocation. The reason is partly a rise in humanitarian concern, partly an increased realisation that lack of rehabilitation can result in or contribute to renewed conflict and partly the reality that over fifty countries - in all continents, slightly under half in sub-Saharan Africa - with over 500 million people have recently experienced or are in the throes of sub-national or national civil wars or of wars crossing national frontiers. If cases such as Mexico (Chiapas plus), Indonesia (beyond East Timor), Nigeria (Delta) and India (Kashmir) are included the total (including only directly affected regions) passes 600 million. On the narrower definition, the probable loss of life (including deaths resulting from war caused famine, dislocation and collapse of health - water - sanitary services) over the last two decades of the 20th century probably exceeds 10 million and the cumulative loss of output $200,000 million.

Rehabilitation is part of a triad-Reconciliation among combatant or ex-combatant factions and those (often the majority) alienated from both (or all), Reconstruction of major infrastructure and production units and of macro economic sustainability and Rehabilitation of household livelihoods and access to basic services as well as to local infrastructure. The three R-R-R elements interact - reconciliation and religitimisation (or legitimisation) of governance are crucial to sustained rehabilitation as are major reconstruction works and macro economic viability. But, without ability to provide effective basic service and local infrastructure access, a government will find it hard to sustain - or even attain - legitimacy just as it will if most households are unable to regain decent livelihoods. Similarly a recovery based only on a few large unit enclaves, even if nominally economically sustainable, is unlikely to have a long political or social life expectancy.

While this study concentrates on post war rehabilitation, elements of rehabilitation can - and should - be incorporated into wartime survival oriented strategies and into programmes for less affected urban and rural areas during wars. In refugee/displaced person contexts camp self organisation for health, education water and child support programmes using camp members could be practiced more widely as could at least partial provisioning by small farming activities.
Rehabilitation - like other aspects of R-R-R is a **process rather than an event**. It is not - much as this might be desirable - a steady, unidirectional highroad because, while war to peace and abject devastation to modest rebuilt sufficiency are logically continua, setbacks from renewed outbreaks of violence, from other exogenous shocks (as varied as drought and terms of trade) and of policy and programme errors, causing slide backs as well as drives forward on the continua, are much more probable than stable peace building, benign physical and economic environmental climates and near perfect public and private decision taking in respect to rehabilitation.⁵

Rehabilitation - like reconciliation and reconstruction - **cannot usefully be read as simple replication** of the pre war situation. At least in the civil or multi country regional cases,⁶ the pre war context almost always contained elements leading to rising levels of tension contribution to the outbreak of armed violence.⁷ Even when these were by no means purely or even dominantly economic, rehabilitation programmes may be able to increase cross group social capital through creating mutual economic or basic service interests⁸ and/or addressing livelihood and service/infrastructure access grievances. Further war creates two new contextual groups - female headed households (especially bereaved ones) many of whom have **severe adult able bodied hands to mouths to feed ratio constraints**, which need to be addressed if they are to climb out of absolute poverty and demobilised combatants who have often been desocialised and usually have few skills other than the use of weaponry and few assets other than tools of violence, implying that in the absence of programmes directly addressing their livelihood creation needs either armed banditry or renewed war or semi war outbreaks are likely.⁹

However, avoiding pure replication should not be interpreted as requiring a *tabula rasa* approach and the delays of totally reconceptualising and replanning as if nothing valid but existed before and been lost during war. For example:¹⁰

1. **most refugees/displaced persons want to 'go home'** (often very literally indeed);

2. **most small farming households wish to resume farming and most urban or rural employees to get wage employment** (whether formal or ‘informal’ again;

3. **criticisms of pre war health, water, primary and continuing education, law and order, veterinary and (perhaps less uniformly) agricultural extension **services are usually dominantly as to
inadequate quality or quantity not disagreement as to their importance or demands for total reconceptualisation.

That suggests that first steps toward rehabilitation can use even limited baseline data plus quick consultation with intended beneficiaries to identify and to prioritise a substantial body of programmes and projects of types for which experience does exist.11

Conceptualisation, Literature, Practice12

Internationally, rehabilitation conceptualisation literature - and less uniformly practice - have grown up as offshoots of calamity (natural disaster) relief and reconstruction work, of conflict theory and - more recently - of poverty alleviation (relief) and reduction thinking. This history has led to distinct limitations and in particular to marginalisation into the relief/safety net and the micro/NGO categories with exclusion from central macro and sectoral policy and programming and from governmental strategic priority coordination.

Arguably it has had further - and also marginalising - consequences in:

a. inadequate examination of interactions with other aspects of achieving an exit from armed conflict e.g. recreation of respected user-friendly police and protecting households from violence.

b. explaining how ex-combatants can be integrated/reintegrated into civilian livelihoods and social/community relationships;13

c. recognising the value of identifying elements which have worked in other emerging from conflicts settings - and why - but

d. avoiding simple generalisation14, even from multiple cases, because contextual (both historic and geographic as well as economic)15 realities are complex, divergent and likely to offer both 'bridge out' and 'no through road' signals for rehabilitation scenarios; as well as

e. generalising somewhat facilely from one or two cases or causally ambiguous correlations.

Nationally conceptualisation has often been intuitive rather than formal and/or limited to identifying a set or shopping list of projects or programmes rather than a strategy. This situation is encouraged by external actor - not least the World Bank - failure to respond to strategic approaches
putting war afflicted livelihood, basic service and infrastructure rehabilitation at the core of political economic strategy from macro through local levels. There are exceptions - though only in Mozambique is there a single document outlining and quantifying rehabilitation strategy and that was simply ignored (more than head on rejected) by external funders. Ethiopia's diverse relief, reconstruction, basic services programmes arguably are an R-R-R strategic approach in a country in which most zones have not suffered serious physical destruction or massive war forced human displacement. Eritrea's centrally controlled strategy and practice for state creation and national reintegration does pay specific attention to reversing displacement and organising resettlement to improve livelihood - basic service access - infrastructure. Somaliland - because of its limited state resource base and lack of large official external flows (as a result of non-recognition) has focussed on recreating security (army-police-courts), political legitimacy (melding traditional and modern), basic service access (coordinating INGO, international agency, domestic social sector and state actors) and - as external support has become less constricted - infrastructure rehabilitation/reconstruction as a minimalist conceptualised strategy which is more evident in dialogue than documentation.

The influence of INGO's (international non-governmental organisations) on conceptualisation and practice has been substantial and less than wholly benign;

1. the link to calamity relief and rapid recovery from - e.g. - drought has limited recognition that rehabilitation can rarely proceed in a straight line or be viewed as a 1 to 2 year programme because exit from armed conflict is substantially different from exit from drought;

2. because INGO's before the 1980's worked largely with community level projects nominally phased for handover after a limited period, their particular orientations and skills are not ideal for strategic macro programming from national through local level nor with effective collaboration with, or acting primarily as support groups for, national or local government or for domestic social actors/civil society groups (e.g. churches, mosques, trade and farmers unions, women's groups and community or district associations);

3. as a direct result of the temporal urgency of disaster (armed conflict) relief work and the pervasive - albeit very uneven - weaknesses of central and local government and of domestic social actors plus, perhaps, their own bureaucratic, social capital and partner procedures and preferences - INGO'S have been funded from the North as alternatives to, more than
complements to or support groups for, domestic actors. However necessary this may be under conditions of chaos and extreme conflict\textsuperscript{18} it frequently corrodes, fragments and delegitimises domestic actors, prevents national R-R-R strategy and practice from being and being seen to be dominant and creates serious problems of disengagement if \textit{de facto} INGO and aid agency parallel government structures outside domestic accountability and also of financial transparency are created, expanded and sustained.\textsuperscript{19}

One clear problem - intellectually and for practitioners - is the limited interaction between postwar political and social economic rebuilding and rehabilitation analysis and programming which is largely weak on political rehabilitation conceptualisation and on links to conflict causation and process\textsuperscript{20} and conflict theory and analysis which is less strong on past (or potentially post) war and on the contribution of economic and basic services programming in the transition to peace.\textsuperscript{21} To some extent projects such as COPE\textsuperscript{22} and "Comprehending and Mastering Conflict"\textsuperscript{23} do move these two strands closer together. Whether they do so by synthesis or simply setting side by side may be more contentious.

\textbf{Main Themes and Issues}

As of 2000's end the intellectual and operational position in respect to Rehabilitation can be summarised relatively briefly:

a. the economic and political important of addressing the livelihoods of literally scores of millions in war ravaged economies in scores of countries is widely recognised, but

b. integration of rehabilitation into sectoral regional\textsuperscript{24} and macro economic strategy formulation and prioritisation is rare,

c. partly because the origins of attention to rehabilitation tend to treat it as a package of short term, micro safety nets under an emergency rubric not as a more central part of political economic renewal; and therefore

d. projects (whether in livelihood basic services or/and local infrastructure access) tend to be small, temporary add ons to central macro economic planning and policy, often contracted out to INGO's and other uncoordinated external actions;
e. varied levels of attention to attempted generalisations (sometimes either from one example or somewhat ambiguous empirical correlations) and to specific contextualities whether historical, social, political or/and economic; resulting in

f. a certain confusion as to the nature of substantive agreements and disagreements and to the applicability of conceputalisation in one context to another.25

The main topics of this paper address ways forward from this relatively unsatisfactory (intellectually, let alone for persons emerging from conflict) position, which is nonetheless much less unsatisfactory than a decade ago when R-R-R received minimal intellectual or specific programming attention.

1. Rehabilitation as Process: Parameters and Interactions;

2. Main Elements in Postwar Rehabilitation;

3. Recurrent Themes and Issues;

4. Country Rehabilitation Heads, Vignettes, Panorama;

5. Flexibility and Margins: Managing Uncertainty.

followed by a brief resume of points and parameters with more than single country applicability.
II

PARAMETERS AND LINKAGES: REHABILITATION AS PROCESS

Rehabilitation is a process (as are Reconciliation and Reconstruction) not a once for all event. It is also a problematic process in that both setbacks in the decline/suspension/ending of armed violence and damaging external shocks (whether literally climatic - e.g. drought - or relating to economic climate - e.g. terms of trade, donor fashions) - are highly probable. Perhaps it would be more illuminating to describe it as processes in the plural – over time and in different regions/districts/zones within one country and among countries at any one time.

Rehabilitation can - probably should under most circumstances - be a component during wars in programmes which are primarily survival support. In the first place there are frequently some major towns and rural areas not physically overwhelmed by war, but suffering from consequential economic (livelihood) and budgetary (basic services) indirect impact. In Mozambique after initial setbacks, mother and child care and primary education in urban areas were pushed beyond 1980 levels and primary health care restored to them while water and sanitation coverage more or less kept pace with urban expansion. Livelihood rehabilitation/augmentation was less marked but opening of large peri urban green zone (allotment) areas and positive preference for women in respect of some allocation processes were important for nutrition (originally in own food grown, later indirectly via cash earned) levels of a not insignificant proportion of very poor households.

Second, displaced person and refugee settlements do offer opportunities for maintaining at least some independent livelihood capacity and for largely displacee staffed basic service provision. Most camps afford some opportunities for agricultural or artisinal production and some residents qualified to provide primary education, health services and basic pure water and sanitation facilities. The potential varies with camp location, general area security, stability of population and degree of self organisation by residents (as well as of the goals of the internal leadership). In Angola and Zambia, SWAPO camps were highly organised in respect to basic service provision, artisinal production (including vehicle repair and small scale construction) and education to underpin and build beyond ongoing service and livelihood levels. Agricultural production was much less successful except when linked to child nutrition.
The three reasons why rehabilitation has usually played a lower role than would have been possible and desirable in refugee/displacee contexts are:

1. relatively high bureaucratic concern with controlling rather than empowering displacees/refugees and frequently underestimation of their skill and organisational capacity;
2. lack of finance, UNHCR, WFP or governmental, to do more than provide minimal - or subminimal - food, shelter, water and basic medical care plus vaccination;
3. leaderships (whether in or outside the refugee/displacee groups) who have objectives and priorities quite different from Rehabilitation (or indeed Reconciliation).

Similarly Rehabilitation is likely to remain relevant to some zones and population groups well after the overall national political and social economic situation can no longer usefully be defined in terms of the post war. Arguably this is the case in much of both Uganda and Somaliland as of 2000. In some zones peace and security came much later than in others (or remain elusive). For some groups - e.g. ex combatants 'warehoused' in the Somaliland armed forces beyond its estimated operational needs - re-entry into civilian livelihoods has proven exceedingly difficult whether for overall economic or retraining cost reasons.

However, the main thrust of this paper turns on the period after (or during a lull which it is hoped to extend and make permanent) war during which R-R-R are central to most households and geographic areas even if not necessarily to Gross Domestic Product.30

### Conditions Conducive To Full Scale Rehabilitation

Strategic components include:

1. cessation, full suspension or a substantial and relatively long lull in armed violence;
2. relative peace and stability interacting with the reemergence of credible law, order and justice systems as perceived by residents;
3. governmental priority to reducing proportions of households in absolute poverty and near absolute lack of access to basic services and local infrastructure combined with institutional, personnel and financial resources to act on that priority to give it credibility;31
4. effective demobilisation of ex combatants into functioning civil society and civilian economy contexts, not into banditry and poverty;

5. an ongoing process of reconciliation (usually multifaceted not simply between two 'sides');

6. a functioning macro economic strategy able to provide a framework within which reconciliation could be pursued (including rehabilitation of large scale infrastructure and production units);

7. limited calamities (natural shocks such as drought or flood as well as external economic debacles whether on terms of trade or donor preferences as to countries or programmes) and catastrophes (reversion to armed violence over substantial areas) combined with at least basic 'trampoline' type survival safety nets to allow households to snap back once the shocks had abated.\textsuperscript{32}

These conditions are \textbf{by no means absolute preconditions} - the outlook for R-R-R would be very bleak if all had to be met in advance or throughout the whole country in all sectors.

However, the more which are blatantly not met, the less likely emergence from war toward a process leading to peace. Once that process starts it can operate cumulatively with attainment of one condition facilitating advance on others. By the same token even relatively favourable initial conditions on several can erode rapidly if rehabilitation is not visibly begun and/or does not begin to produce visible (to war impacted households) results - not least the ability to 'go home' - within perhaps 18 to 24 months.

The type of preceding war and the nature of its conclusion appears to influence the climate for rehabilitation. A liberation war - from perceived colonial rule, e.g. Somaliland, Namibia, Mozambique to 1975 - combined with a serious effort to build legitimate government structures and political processes is probably the most favourable context. A post independence civil war ended by genuine mediation and a broadly accepted election may - e.g. Mozambique after 1992 - also create a relatively favourable context whereas an unresolved conflict (even if a formal 'peace agreement' is nominally in place) - e.g. Sierra Leone, Somalia\textsuperscript{33} is very weak ground for Rehabilitation (not least because it is likely to be characterised both by repetitive outbursts of armed violence or worse and by near total absence of reconciliation).

Beyond this rather general parameter list - and in detail even within it - the conditions for and \textbf{course of Rehabilitation processes is highly contextual}. What is needed depends to a large part
on what has been lost and is seen to be a priority for regaining as well as on what remains and can be used as a base for initial winning back.

Perceived history - which can diabolise but can also, perhaps more positively, gild portions of the past - is highly relevant to how robust a context exists for rehabilitation as well as (more obviously) for reconciliation. For example the somewhat roseate vision of later colonial self governance public service and service provision model and hybrid parliamentary/elders system as recalled from the 1950's\textsuperscript{34} has been at the heart of rebuilding legitimacy and the operational as well as the symbolic and political aspects of governance in Somaliland.

**Rehabilitation (like other not war/not peace and postwar processes) exists in time.** The past necessarily informs the present - especially the perceived past even if 'objectively' inaccurate. The present informs the future and believed perceptions of the future affect the present. Legitimate institutions and processes - especially those with historic legitimacy and renewed life (in a renewed or mutated form) from reconciliation - determine or at least influence what is possible how and how fast.

While rehabilitation - like reconciliation and governance - is a step by step iterative 'project' or process focusing on items identified as both high priority and high immediate possibility, an overall strategic frame or 'project' of medium term future goals is usually fairly crucial to mobilisation and to efficient deployment of resources. The caveat is that rehabilitation - both as to setbacks and as to unforeseen possibilities - is even more uncertain and in more need of flexible implementation and programme revision than non-war economic and social planning and programming.

**Initial Elements**

**What elements should have temporal priority** in a rehabilitation process is in large measure a contextual question. However, four generalisations appear to hold widely:

1. because war leads to large scale displacement of people and because most (whether rural or urban)\textsuperscript{35} wish to return to approximately (or even literally) the places from which they have been forced to flee\textsuperscript{36} return home is usually a vital early step in rehabilitation. Until it happens
rebuilding livelihoods and providing permanent (as opposed to camp) access to basic services is either impossible or small scale;

2. to be viable, return home requires security from violent interference with normal life whether by rebels, border raiders, bandits, 'protecting' troops, police or officials operated with a security force (usually civilian police except for combating formed rebels) and a primary court system which do have civilian credit-credibility;

3. building toward food security both in respect to physical supply and national balances and to household entitlements and food balances. Both the breadth (proportion) and depth (shortfall from minimum acceptable level) of food shortages in SSA are closely related to present and historic presence or absence of war. The direct (production) and indirect (entitlement) gains from peace, return home and perceived security can be large and rapid e.g. within 5 years of 1992 (Rome Agreements) Mozambique had regained national food balance in coarse grains and most returnees could feed themselves, while also selling some food (and/or industrial crops) thereby strengthening commerce, transport and urban production with consequent multiplier entitlement effects. Even in the predominantly pastoral economy of Somaliland small stock herd levels, sales and exports as well as crop production regained pre war (1985) levels by 5 or 6 years after the 1991 victory over the Barre regime's occupation army even though substantial (but lesser and intermittent) insecurity was endemic in many pastoral areas until 1996;

4. basic services which were widely accessible and highly valued before the war are also likely to be high on returnees' demand lists/tests of the competence and legitimacy of the state. The most usual high priorities (in order) are primary health services, nearby water supplies for households (sometimes for livestock as well human use) and (perhaps less uniformly and with a slightly more relaxed time frame for restoration) primary education.

These heads meet the tests of rapid visible payoff to large numbers of households as perceived by them and are usually at least in large part attainable even within very tight resource constraints neither of which holds true for Reconstruction of major infrastructure or large production units.

The initial rehabilitation targets will usually be in large (even predominant) measure replacement/revival/renewal of what existed before, because that is how most war displaced people especially in rural areas, see return home, restoration of food security/entitlements and
regaining access to basic services. They do wish to regain what was lost - and - if asked - can usually spell out what has been lost, which parts are most urgently needed back and what particular changes are seen as immediately needed. It is in subsequent processual steps (and even more in reconstruction and reconciliation)\textsuperscript{41} that changes and transformation diverging from pre war services and local infrastructure become more important.

This is not to say that certain new conditions – often, e.g. up to 25% to 33% versus 5% prewar female headed households and the effective demise of the right of each adult woman to use and on some male headed household allocation - may not require immediate attention. However, when they do, even a quick consultation process is likely to raise - if less likely to offer agreed approaches to - the relevant issues.
III

DEEPENING, BROADENING, REVIEWING THE PROCESS

While it is important to begin Rehabilitation -- and associated Reconciliation and Reconstruction - programming rapidly, it is desirable also to plot out tentative strategic targets and time scales. In principle - though not often in practice (with Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe partial exceptions), the **R-R-R process, goals, sequences and dated targets can be mapped out before peace is won.** If it is not done then, a similar exercise is appropriate parallel to initial action.

The intrinsic difficulties confronting such an exercise are twofold:

a. working through goals and means beyond and/or diverging from replication requires data collecting, analysis and pilot project testing which ranges from identifying and broadening national or regional best practice (especially in agriculture) through identification, screening, importation and adaptation of experience outside the country to approaches which may draw on varied experiences but are basically new departures. Coffee management (as to fertilisation, shade, inter-cropping, harvesting) can be an example of the first, micro-credit of the second and pastoral paramedical services of the third (albeit a half remembered precedent existed in Somaliland from the 1950's to late 1960's with a brief and partial revival in the early 1980's).

b. by definition postwar economies are not stable. In SSA and Asia most were very poor and fragile to start and are prone to climatic and exogenous economic shocks while having few resource margins (domestic or external) on which to draw to alleviate shock impact. Superimposed on that basic set of weakness and uncertainties which are exacerbated as to possible full or partial, national or district continuation or reemergence of armed violence.

The first set of uncertainties and limitations on national coping strategies apply to all poor countries but probably more to post, or emerging from war, areas which are initially particularly dependent on external financial resources, training capacity and - less uniformly - personnel. The second set are unique to them and probably more serious in a majority of cases, although in - e.g. - Mozambique the greatest obstacles to rehabilitation have been IMF constrictions on basic service provision even out of grant aid, too large and intrusive an INGO rule, marginalisation in overall
economic policy and investment by the World Bank and - in 1999/2000 - floods rather than continued or renewed armed conflict which has simply not happened.

The most complicated - conceptually and practically - cases are those in which war is self evidently still an ongoing process with no end in view but substantial areas are relatively peaceful for extended periods and domestic civil society bodies capable of acting in respect to agriculture and basic services exist. The central issues include:

1. whether attempted rehabilitation (and survival support) will exacerbate/elongate war because it is a fact of life and death that one cannot provide adequate food and medical care to civilian populations in war zones while the dominant armed forces in these zones go unfed and untreated. The case that it cannot be justified turns in particular on Interahamwe controlled camps in then Zaire over 1994-1996 which precipitated the Kabila-Rwanda-Uganda alliance to overthrow Mobuto and wipe out IH bases (only very partially successful on the latter head leading to the subsequent Rwanda-Burundi-Congo factions war against President Kabila's regime) and the Sudan. Southern Sudan's Operation Lifeline Sudan, like the food aid to the North, is overwhelmingly survival relief in respect to food and medical services, so that it - like the IH camps - has not, to date, been primarily about Rehabilitation measures prolonging war but relief (survival) food doing so..

2. what is practicable, where. Probably small farming household production, accessible relatively pure war (protected spring waterhole, shallow well, perhaps deep well or borehole) primary health care (vaccination, health education with prenatal, HIV, malaria emphasis, first aid, simple curative) and education (primary and in some contexts secondary) are the main components. These are likely to be feasible and to have relatively low sunk capital costs to be lost if active war zones shift and to have substantial rapid nutrition, health, education and social capital gains. Both the realities of operating in civil war zones and of expatriate costs in SSA suggest domestic civil society actors (community, and/or church or mosque linked in most cases) with some autonomy from military command structures are the likely best main delivery and design detail actors with INGO's in a technical, key professional and logistical (and usually financial) support role;

3. How sustainable are such partial rehabilitation efforts? How resilient in the face of renewed conflict? How useful after the war? Probably the answers are intrinsically contextual and
equally probably highly uncertain \textit{ex ante}. In central Somalia substantial rehabilitation in and around Baidoa was achieved by several INGO's, WFP, domestic civil society actors, somewhat tenuous local governance service committees and UNICEF over 1992-1995. All were swept away overnight when General Aideed's forces conquered the town – a risk the actors knew from the 1993 UN withdrawal. But in Somaliland a similar (perhaps more water centred) programme over 1992-1995 survived three violent uprisings (with all parties very careful not to damage water, health or education facilities). Similarly in 1992 the Mozambique government's giving priority not just to relief food but also to seeds, tools, medical supplies and reopening health posts and primary schools in Renamo controlled areas (largely under WFP, UNICEF and INGO flags, but often with seconded government personnel and always with high publicity) was perceived then as high risk, but probably helped create the suspension of disbelief and the patience needed for the interminably leisurely UN running of demobilisation and elections to be possible and to contribute to a positive result.

Rehabilitation - especially early on - is highly vulnerable to shocks other than (or in addition to) renewed conflict. Drought (e.g. in Somalia), flood (e.g. in Mozambique), terms of trade (e.g. in Rwanda) all have severe impact especially when food security/entitlements livelihood and reserves against calamities, local infrastructure and state resources have not recovered fully from war.

Optimally, calamities should be faced by maintaining core rehabilitation programme components and augmenting resource flows to reverse shock impact. For example WFP food sold to provide wages a) to entitle - say - flood afflicted households to food and b) to rebuild local transport, basic service and administrative infrastructure while sustaining the rural transport/commercial sector (which literal food for work would damage) is a near optimal approach in at least a range of circumstances. It is a \textbf{trampoline safety net} allowing farmers, the rural transport/commerce network and infrastructure to bounce back and is a route through which additional external resources may be mobiliseable.

But not all calamities offer such conceptually 'easy' answers or chances for damage limitation and rehabilitation protection. In Acholiland, Gulu town and three districts (especially Gulu and Kitgum) have been hit by the rare, lethal and panic inducing Ebola fever.\textsuperscript{46} Resources at both of Gulu's two hospitals (for 300,000 to 400,000 persons in the town, adjacent displaced camps and rural areas) are necessarily diverted to disease containment as are national level health resources -
augmented by WHO assistance. Return home is necessarily blocked to prevent spread of the disease. Therefore food security and services build up (even beyond diverted resource impact) are largely suspended. In this and similar cases about the best that can be sought is to limit the period and extent of the calamity setback, improve knowledge of user priorities for future rehabilitation (with the immediate side benefit of maintaining consultation/contact) and continue planning and mobilisation.

Rehabilitation and Reconciliation

Rehabilitation - even plus Reconciliation and Reconstruction - is not the whole of economic policy and praxis even though in post war contexts it should normally be a fully integrated, central set of themes in it. Therefore operation of a rehabilitation process does have implications for priorities in areas which are, in themselves Reconciliation, Reconstruction or Other:

a. **Reconciliation** includes restoring government's capacity - notably in security and basic service delivery. Therefore training personnel and restoring professional and para-professional wages from sub-poverty line levels are crucial to rehabilitation for reasons much broader than direct employment generation or public service poverty reduction;

b. **local infrastructure and services do need provincial and national** superstructure - most evidently in cases such as roads to highways but also health posts and clinics to rural to reference hospitals or primary schools to secondary and tertiary, not least teacher training - to be effective. Such projects are probably better categorised as **reconstruction** because they are larger, more specialised and inherently directly affecting limited numbers of people but a higher proportion of more trained personnel;

c. some categories of **non-poor** (and if rehabilitation succeeds modestly well off or more) households/enterprises' ability to restore their economic roles are crucial to livelihood restoration/poverty reduction. If small family farming households do not have market access via rural traders/transporters they will remain poor. Therefore macro economic policy to ensure such businesses have credit access (e.g. commercial banks to finance inventories and hire purchase/leasing units to purchase transport equipment) is important,
not via subsidised rates but by influencing financial institution policy and perhaps, by initial period partial loan loss guarantees.⁴⁹
COMPONENTS TOWARD REHABILITATION

The components of a rehabilitation strategy are not particularly hard to set out in general terms. However, contextual differences mean that particular projects within broad categories, priorities, sequences and amount of analysis and consultation needed to identify micro content will vary widely, certainly among countries, sometimes among districts within a country and quite probably in a country over time (e.g. immediate prewar/several years on, and also after renewed violence or other setback).

Major components include:

1. livelihood rehabilitation;
2. restoration and enhancement/modernisation of basic service access (including law, order, justice and security);
3. local basic infrastructure repair - restoration - maintenance;
4. market access (on at least a minimally equitable and competitive basis);
5. parallel crisis support and snapback ('safety net' and 'trampoline') structures to alleviate and reverse impact of calamities and catastrophes;
6. overall macro economic ('adjustment'), micro and macro political (reconciliation) and large infrastructural and production unit restoration (reconstruction) strategies/programmes/policies interacting with rehabilitation in a positive way and sustainable in their own terms as well as contributing to the sustainability of rehabilitation.
7. governance units capable of providing inputs into a/d (both financially and in respect to personnel);
8. involvement of local government units, civil society actors and intended programme beneficiaries in data collection, programme design, decision taking, on-going evaluation and review in parallel to involvement in mobilising human-physical-financial and organisational inputs;
9. **relationships with external bodies** (national governments, INGO's national bilateral and multilateral agency donor) which are **conducive to rebuilding** (not further dividing and eroding) local and national capacity;

**Livelihood rehabilitation** can be defined as enabling households to achieve incomes (including production used within the household) at or above the absolute poverty line.\(^{50}\) In the case of perhaps 70% of displaced households in both the past and future, livelihood is primarily small farming production possibly augmented by one or more urban or overseas working (and remitting) members and, more frequently in some but not all contexts seasonal wage labour in agriculture or construction.\(^{51}\) Urban livelihoods and their rehabilitation are more diverse, problematic and contextual with a majority likely to be informal and especially so called informal wage employment\(^{52}\) and a significant minority artisinal producers or semi fixed (barrow or stall) place of business.

Support needs (and need to support) may vary by type of household. **Demobilised combatants** - especially if young - frequently have limited non violent skills or social capital and experience but the potential for being very dangerous if not reintegrated into civil society and the civilian economy. What is appropriate varies, but the needs are special enough, and the risks of not meeting them high enough, to justify particular analysis and resource allocation (including training programmes as well as tools - urban or rural - for demobilisees). **Returnees** from exile or displacement are almost always the majority of war impoverished households. The special need of 'going home' has been addressed above.

**Female headed households** are likely to have two types of special needs:

a. bad productive ratios of able bodied hands to hungry mouths because - unlike male headed households - they usually have only one able bodied adult earner;

b. specific cultural - economic problems which may include, e.g., access to land use rights, to drought animals for ploughing (likely to be especially important to such households because of 'a'), to knowledge of how to manage large stock (sheep, goats and above) which - especially in SSA - usually falls on the male (including boys) side of the gender division of labour.

**Traumatised, physically or mentally partially or fully disabled and/or isolated** (as orphans or old persons) individuals require particular programmes. Their present livelihood generation
capacity is likely to be low, but except for the severely disabled and the aged, recovery is possible. The first step however (humanly and economically) is treatment (which includes even semi trained 'tender loving care in community') and integration into an economically viable household unit, whether their original one or a (usually related) successor. In the case of orphans the largest numbers in SSA may be HIV/AIDS not war orphans but the needs and programmatic implications are largely the same.

Identification specifically on the basis of pre war below poverty line income is not self evidently useful unless to highlight clusters of causal factors - e.g. no negligible access to land and/or - in pastoral districts - core livestock to set up a herd. A literal and formalistic policy to seek to restore livelihoods only to pre war levels of livelihood would raise serious ethical and political problems with no very evident likelihood of positive economic efficiency tradeoff gains.

**Basic services** in the context of rehabilitation virtually always include:

1. **law, order, peace, security and justice** as perceived by ordinary households.
2. access to nearby relatively pure **water** - household which may include livestock and small plot irrigation depending on their economic system;
3. preventative, educational (not least in respect to HIV and malaria as well as mother and child), first aid and simple curative **health services**;
4. primary and frequently applied adult, **education**.

**Agricultural extension** and **veterinary** services appear as priorities in some areas, but not all - apparently depending on pre war coverage and perceived usefulness of such services.

The short list is not definitive in the sense that frequently some districts or portions of districts will have special priorities which are genuinely key to them, but are not relevant to other areas e.g. baboon and crocodile control (to protect endangered crops and children respectively). Flood control (more accurately perhaps preemptive flood damage limitation) is also highly specific (e.g. deltas) possible priority.

The particular form of service needed/desired may vary and have extensive - not always self evident - ramifications. An example is draught power (whether oxen or donkeys - a choice related to heaviness or lightness of soil):
a. in some districts and sub-districts it has been widely used and is usually a war casualty since draught animals can provide military or bandit transport, food and loot (or refugee transport, food and survival assets);

b. the patterns of use are peculiar, apparently relating to historical presence of dedicated veterinary/agricultural staff and successful initial users more than to ecological or crop pattern divergences;

c. both draught animals and their users (at least for ploughing) require significant specialist training courses;

d. the cost of draught animals and ploughs (plus carts if used for transporting goods) is substantial - massive for very poor, war ravaged returnees;

e. women headed households in principle are in most need of draught power to plough because of limited adult hand power, but in practice animal drawn ploughing has historically usually been virtually entirely on the male side of the gender division of labour.

The operational implications include:

1. recovering (whether from agricultural district records or interviews with farmers) baseline data on whether? how commonly? for what? how trained? who used?

2. determining whether in terms of benefit/cost tradeoffs, support for reintroduction of draught animals would be an efficient use of scarce resources and, if so, how they (plus ploughs, carts) could be made accessible to poor households and, in particular, female headed ones;

3. identifying personnel, promotion and training issues.

In many post war rehabilitation contexts, draught power will not be a priority issue. In Acholiland both some officials and politicians and some researchers and small farming households believe that it is. Pre war 50,000 draught animals were estimated to be in service in Gulu and Kitgum Districts i.e. about one per five households which would imply up to half the agricultural land could have been ploughed by them. However, coverage appears to have been patchy. The heavy black cotton soil of the two districts is unsuitable for hand hoeing, suggesting reintroduction should be economically viable - and a potential breakthrough for 'best local known practice' focussed
agricultural extension. Oxen cost perhaps $1,000 each. Women rarely ploughed. At most 1,500 - 2,500 oxen have survived.

That is not enough data to act, but it is enough to suggest guidelines for consultation (especially with would be/returnee small farm households), data refining, training and access (e.g. 3 to 5 women 'user teams') conceptualisation, and funds plus personnel (plus oxen) mobilisation if prior steps yield positive answers.

This example is not only not intended to imply animal draught power is central in all or most rehabilitation contexts but also not to conclude that it should/can be a top priority in Acholiland. Rather it serves to illustrate contextual diversity and multiple interacting issues within an apparently simple (or perhaps pair of) basic services - agricultural veterinary support - and to exemplify identifying an issue for urgent study and a study process capable of leading to a quick, informed decision.

**Local basic infrastructure** repair, reconstruction will usually need to focus on roads - bridges - culverts, health posts and clinics, primary schools, wells and other local and small town waterworks plus police stations and other local level governmental buildings. In some cases other facilities, e.g. small scale irrigation will also be key. These facilities/infrastructures are usually heavily debilitated by lack of maintenance during conflict, as well as, or more than - by war time attacks.

The risk is usually not so much in repairing/rebuilding rapidly to previous standards in previous locations. That is broadly correct if most people go home. Even raising size and numbers of facilities to increase access can often be determined to be a priority after quite brief consultations. Rather it lies in long initial delays - hampering livelihood recovery and basic service access restoration - followed by over enthusiastic upgrading. Both result in draining basic services including infrastructure maintenance - resources\(^{57}\) and creating a serious recurrent/capital budget imbalance.

There is a significant interaction between Rehabilitation of local infrastructure and national infrastructure Reconstruction. The latter poses more need for detailed analysis and more cases for altering pre war patterns, e.g. in Mozambique only the three main rail lines from Maputo, Beira and Ncala would appear to have strong cases for reconstruction. In the case of the Nampula -
Lichinga link there is little case for long term continued use. Unless a major coal development at Moatize justifies a line to a new deep water port (not Beira), with links to Beira and Malawi where it intersects existing lines, reconstruction of the Zambesi delta – Malawi – Moatize line is not on. Beyond a highway replacing the Nampula-Lichinga rail line, the key highway questions in Mozambique do not concern the broad national/provincial highway net but what standards and what maintenance strategies are appropriate.\(^5^8\)

It is not self evident 'old' basic transport infrastructures were usually inappropriate even if most main routes linked to the main ports. SSA does need to engage more, not less, intensively in international trade. e.g. The 1980's Somaliland highway grid was T shaped with the perpendicular stroke Berbera-Hargeisa and the horizontal the Boramo (Ethiopian Frontier) -Hargeisa - Ethiopian branch to Jijiga - Burao - Erigavo/Las Anod-Somalia route. These broadly follow several century old caravan routes: an Ethiopian Highlands to Red Sea trade route and an internal (and trade route feeder) one linking most of Somaliland's towns and productive rural areas. The ongoing, largely EU (and EU member state) financed, bridge, culvert and other repairs especially on the two routes to Ethiopia (Addis and Djjiga respectively) does relate positively to the needs of livelihood rehabilitation and local infrastructure utilisation as well as to macro commercial and financial (and Ethiopian famine prevention/alleviation as well as international trade) concerns.\(^5^9\)

The main purpose of transport and communications restoration is to rehabilitate market access and thus livelihood beyond basic food security. That purpose requires a rehabilitated rural trading network linking food, raw material and labour flows to towns; return flows of processed and manufactured goods and both inter and intra district rural trade. The **overriding issue is not public versus private sector but rather small farming household access to reasonably fair price buyers/sellers.** That may well usually be met better by relatively competitive private (or private and voluntary co-op) traders than by state crop purchasing and consumer goods trading corporations. Similarly the issue is not one of subsidising merchants but of ensuring (which may require initial state guarantees to commercial banks or participation in joint venture leasing/hire purchase companies) that enterprises do have access to credit for vehicles and working capital (inventories).

**Crisis** (especially food crisis) safety nets are an important part of sustaining rehabilitation. Droughts and floods are not suspended because hostilities are. Even low level attacks can rupture
fragile market networks in the process of rehabilitation. During farm rehabilitation outside income from work for (cash for) food projects may often be needed. Food/food aid requirements certainly last at least until the end of the first complete crop cycle after war and are likely to be renewed at one or more points during the rehabilitation process by exogenous events.

**Economic Good Housekeeping And Rehabilitation**

None of the foregoing denies the necessity of macro economic good housekeeping ('structural adjustment' or 'prudence with a purpose' to use alternative presentational styles). Fiscal, price, foreign exchange imbalances need to be held to sustainable levels; incentives (not least peace, law and order) provided for large as well as small businessmen; large scale strategic infrastructure and enterprises reconstructed and/or pioneered (by both public and private sectors). Without this macro context, livelihoods/basic human need costs imbalances will remain unsustainable, basic service access will stagnate and rehabilitation will stall or disintegrate. That, however, is an interface/background issue rather than a part of rehabilitation operational programming.

To act on the previously noted elements of rehabilitation requires several aspects of governance (largely rather boring and tedious ones) be strengthened. Whatever may remain at the time of peace it rarely includes robust, decentralised civil governance with a high capacity to deliver basic services and infrastructure, to analyse in order to determine a policy set which will enhance livelihood and rural/small town market network recovery or to collect data and insites and interact in decision taking, resource mobilisation and programme management with domestic civil society actors. Therefore - because these capacities are crucial to R-R-R and turn largely on government financing, staffing, training and openness to participation and to coordination - their recreation (or creation\textsuperscript{60} is central to rehabilitation. Because ability to deliver is a (perhaps often the) major test of legitimacy, these capacity aspects of governance - however a political, technical or micro they may seem at first glance - are crucial to maintaining political legitimacy and sustaining reconciliation.

Involvement of local government, communities, civil society bodies and domestic NGO's in data collection, decision taking and implementation for mobilisation, social capital and efficiency of
resource use is important to speed and efficiency of resource allocation and use as well as 'political' reasons.

The strategy for external actor relations needs to be national. But without local capacity to interact/negotiate with INGO's and to present proposals or data to go into them for presentation to bilateral donors and international agencies no such self determination, self respect and honest negotiation strategy can work in a way which is user friendly for poor households in general or those returning from war displacement in particular.
RECURRENT ISSUES

R-R-R cannot be reduced to R as in Replication for several reasons:

1. **flaws in what existed** before the war are likely to have contributed to it;

2. **war by its nature creates new facts** which R-R-R must face - e.g. a qualitative as well as quantitative increase in female headed households;

3. certain groups e.g. rank and file **combattants** and **entrepreneurs who have adjusted** to war contexts will often (not always) lose from peace unless attention is given and support (e.g. training, credit access) provided for their rebasing their livelihoods in an economy of peace;

4. **the world's structural shifts are not halted during war** - e.g. the explosive post 1975 rise of HIV and post mid 1980's resurgence of malaria as well as the refocusing of health services on decentralised primary units with more emphasis on education, prevention (including vaccination), mother and child care mean that, while rehabilitation in Mozambique can build from 1975-80 strategy and praxis, health sector rehabilitation in e.g. Somaliland, Rwanda, Ethiopia or even Acholiland (where the suspension of positive change dates back to 1970) would be ill advised to replicate, and have not done so.

5. **certain issues by their nature are integral to war and its settlement** including e.g. justice, amnesty, forgiveness and peace.

**Resource Access - Land**

Access to **resources** is central to livelihood rehabilitation. Similarly in respect to governmental institutions, to basic service and infrastructure and, in respect to enterprises beyond household level, to market and general productive/trading/transport economy recovery. The central resources for most displaced persons in most post war contexts is **land**. This is most true for the usually rural 60%-80%, but may also apply to urban displacees who do need secure residence or business sites. However, **land is not the only relevant resource**. Basic services and market access can be considered resources, but have been treated above. Others are input access (e.g. tools, seeds, cutlasses, artisinal raw materials) and credit access.
Whatever the pre war access to resources system, it is most unlikely to have been poor person friendly. This feature means pure replication in all respects would probably increase inequality, render wartime loss of resources likely to be permanent (e.g. land grabbing) and - because almost all returnee households are absolutely poor - discriminate against war afflicted households.

**Peri urban** land is frequently the most confused as to status and the least secure because both agricultural historic household right holders and government units claim title while actual occupiers have frequently settled on ill delineated plots with dubious and ill documented transfers (or terms and conditions of continued use) from either. The need for security of use in these areas suggest either documented 39 year (or longer) transferable leasehold to demarcated plots or similar freehold together with programming orderly basic service extension (at least to the extent of keeping plots and access routes for them clear - e.g. something a typical Makonde concentric circle village layout in a peri urban neighbourhood does not do whether its incomers are ordinary migrants or war displaced persons).

**Access to land** is partly contextual - urban (usually freehold and relatively clearly and stably demarcated pre war) is different from rural which varies with the nature of the pre war system (e.g. historic household secure household vs individual freehold) and how well - for whom - it worked pre war.

In the urban context, returnee claims in land/improvements should be clarifiable and the return of property should usually be practicable. The problems arise if:

a. settlement of claims of elites who fled (e.g. from Mozambique) comes long after reallocation and a substantial number of low income households would be negatively affected;

b. the returnees (as in Rwanda) are associated with (even if not necessarily part of) the losers of a civil war and those occupying the property are associated with the winners and are themselves returnees from an earlier body of refugees.61

**Rural** land is usually held either on a freehold basis, on an historic secure household usehold tenure basis or on a mix of both. Mix cases may or may not demarcate clearly between freehold and historic tenure and may or may not record both types of rights. If they do not, as in Mozambique's largely unreformed Portuguese imperial registration system designed to facilitate
land grabbing, very serious risks arise for historic tenure holders especially if they return after absence, the standard case of refugees and internally displaced households coming home.

The issue of secure, hereditable, leaseable *usehold* versus *freehold* has little to do with security of return, of rehabilitation of livelihoods or of access for female headed households. For none is it either a necessary or a sufficient condition. Freehold may increase small farming household security of tenure (or via debt accumulation the reverse), may increase ability to borrow (implying rather foolish banks in many contexts) and/or incentivate higher productivity albeit why, unless prior usehold tenure was insecure and/or credit on crops not well developed, is unclear. However, the enormous personnel, educational and institutional capacity requirements of transition to freehold suggest it is better put further down the phasing list and probably after the rehabilitation process has largely run its course.

What is key - and urgent - is to record both freehold and historic titles, to set up procedures that prevent one encroaching on the other, to record historic rules and processes to allow central and local government to relate to them and to avoid assuming that any land is 'vacant' until after return to prevent opportunistic land grabbing. A particular additional problem may arise - as it has in Guinea-Bissau in a pre or inter war context - if long rotation (so called 'shifting cultivation') is practiced with apparently vacant lands those fallow/reforesting prior to rotating back into use. The issue of equal access for female headed households - which often, not always, needs adjustment of the existing versions of historic systems - is treated below.

**Return may not lead to serious conflict.** One positive example is Mozambique historic tenure areas. There the basic conflicts are freehold encroachment on historic tenure land and returnee self resettlement on long abandoned - often up to 10-15 years - freehold land in their home districts. In the historic tenure areas about 10,000,000 people in 2,000,000 households have gone home from refugee, internally displaced or pauperised/hiding in old home areas status. These include 8,000,000 - 9,000,000 small farming sector persons. The number of serious conflicts have been low with sustained, wide reaching violence apparently unknown. Returnees and elders have been able either to identify which household (often by inheritance from a war dead prior designated holder) had a right to which land or/and which household had valid claims for how much/how good alternative or new land. This process was usually facilitated by District and Provincial governments, but carried out by the households and their representatives, especially elders.
Another positive case is Somaliland. Pastoral land (and water) use rights on return from 1991 have not led to more quarrels than usual and none (at least in respect to pastoral rights *per se* as opposed to 'rent' due for their use for an airport or port) of them violent or large scale despite (as in Mozambique) over 50% wartime displacements.

In Somaliland agro-pastoral areas recorded titles have existed since the post war British period. Again return has not led to a higher or more violent level of quarrels even though a number of holders are Somalians who came in and got title during the Barre regime. When a satellite based cadastral survey was launched it was welcomed. In fact so eager to know exact boundaries and to receive updated certificates were the household heads that they quickly compromised cross claims. The macro goal was to avert agro pastoral encroachment on neighbouring pastoral areas partly because this would threaten drought year fallback grazing capacity and partly because it would in some cases lead to servous inter lineage group and sub clan conflict.

Uganda which had a semi registered/semi historic title system in Acholiland has adopted freehold registration nationally but - partly because of the very real risk better educated, better connected Kampalans can come up faster with 'better' papers than actual displaced historic users - has deferred its application. That should allow local government and elders time both to sort quarrels on return and to address the female headed household issue (to avert all freehold in practice going to men and extinguishing women's traditional rights on household land held in a male name).

In Mozambique the risk - general to parallel historic theme/freehold systems as, e.g., in the Philippines - is that continued allocation of titles (including 'concessions' which by giving all or one crop marketing monopolies to concessionaires positively cry out that they are unconstitutionally abrogating historic 'secure' small farming household use rights!) with no reference to prior occupation, not disputes over or reallocation of historic tenure, is the basic land law obstacle to sustaining the success of returning home. This is all the more true because it is a visible symbol of a belief (belied by output, food supply and export figures) that only large farms and foreign farm operators could be productive. That myth runs for over 500 years from Portuguese prazeiros, plantation and settler farmers through independence era state farms to sustain abandoned Portuguese unit production and to introduce large scale irrigation and support for -in British colonial policy terms - 'yeoman farmers' and replacement estate operators to the present search for 'good' South African farmers eager to leave the 'Rainbow Nation' and set up on 'virgin soil' in
Mozambique. While there have been successes - at least in production - in general the history has been one of violence, insecurity for small farming households, mediocre output trends and much social and political grief. On the face of it return home/rehabilitation are a time to suspend not replicate or seek to transform such 'modernisation'.

Resource Access: Tools, Food Inputs

Seeds, tools and, in many cases, livestock access are crucial to livelihood recovery as is food 'working capital' for the rehabilitation of land and housing and awaiting first crop harvest period after return home. Beyond highlighting the need there is not too much cross country generalisation can offer beyond the warning that contexts vary widely.

Seed-tool-food 'packages' should logically be provided in areas of return - if these can in practice be pre-identified and distribution nets set up. Who distributes (INGO's, local government, central government, WFP, UNHCR) matters less. Second best is provision of 'packages' in refugee and displaced person camps/settlements before return. In this variant, structures for identification and delivery exist but coverage is likely to be very incomplete (self or family - community help refugees and displaced persons are in practice excluded) and the 9-15 months likely food needs to first harvest are hardly best provided in a single 'package'. Loans are unsuitable - primarily for administrative reasons in respect to recovery.

Food access is in fact a larger and longer lasting challenge than that of seeds and tools. Usually - at least if the war period and displacement exceeded 18 months - 9 to 15 months are needed to reclaim (e.g. re-clear, re-drain) land, restore housing, plant, tend and achieve (drought and flood permitting) a harvest. In the case of plantations this is comprised in labour cost (wages) and treated as investment in fixed asset restoration. The same logic applies to 'return home'. The households - on return very rarely have the 'entitlements' to secure food (nor - less uniformly - close household members earning elsewhere and remitting). The logical general solution is work for cash to buy food (e.g. via WFP and ILO guided labour intensive small to medium scale construction/civil engineering) to restore food entitlements, local infrastructure and the rural commerce/transport network.
In practice, because such logical solutions have proven very hard to get in place in time, the actual system is ‘phased return’. Refugees/displaced persons remain on camp registers but most able bodied, adult household members go home to reclaim land/rebuild houses/plant crops while returning monthly to pick up rations collected by wives and children staying on in camp. That practice is not fraud, but a sensible way of coping with slow, rigid bureaucracy to secure the means to restore livelihood bases.

Analogous issues can arise for artisans and - as noted earlier - rural commercial operators. These are quite context specific. Urban artisans may or may not have had to sell their tools, demobilisees graduating from training courses presumably need tool kits to benefit. On the face of it local government or domestic social actor operated identification of beneficiaries and grants of tools would seem appropriate as the administration (including personnel and institutional) costs of tiny loan collection outweigh plausible benefits and local level actors can probably identify appropriate recipients. In practice few such programmes have been mounted in post war rehabilitation contexts though they do exist with some results in non war contexts - e.g. in Tanzania linked to vocational education.

Livestock access is often an intractable issue in contexts in which pastoral income was dominant pre war and most of the herds failed to survive requisition, theft, disease and displacement. Community/lineage mutual insurance schemes break down when loss levels are over 50% (perhaps over 25%). Viable sources of replacement livestock may be hard or impossible to identify and tap. Somaliland’s 1991-99 success in near total restoration of sheep and goat and - probably - 75% plus of cattle and camel herds is not widely replicable:

a. a significant proportion of flocks and herds had been safeguarded in exile in Ethiopia;
b. kinship mutual insurance systems were strong;
c. sheep and goats breed much faster than cattle allowing shorter flock than herd recovery cycles;
d. diaspora remittances provided many households the cash to buy (or not to sell during recovery period) cattle and in Ethiopia's Somali region there was a suitable source (genetically and commercially) of cattle and camels.
In Acholiland (Uganda) a head on state assault on replacing the $200 million plus herd loss (90% of cattle and drought oxen) is not practicable because neither the finance nor the beasts to buy can be identified. But selective 3 to 5 year programmes focussed - e.g. - on drought oxen (up to 50,000 and $50 million) and on artificial insemination might be viable and meet the clear Acholi need-demand-priority for means to enable them to restore herds and therefore the majority of their pre-war cash income from livestock sales.

The cattle (and to a lesser extent sheep, goats, camels) problem is at the core of the reason that calamity or catastrophe afflicted pastoralists face greater barriers to returning home and restoring livelihoods than do agriculturalists or agro pastoralists. The Somali pastoralist's lament to the reporter who in the early 1990's noted that the rains and the pasture had returned: 'Yes, the rains have come and brought back the grass, but they have not brought my dead camels back to life' is relevant to the end of hostilities and insecurity - access to grazing land and water points, yes, the herds to utilise them, no.

Access to credit is important to rehabilitation - including as noted earlier commercial credit to the rural transport and merchant sectors vital to restore market access and therefore, the cash income element of small farming household livelihoods. The same considerations apply to medium and small enterprises (urban and rural) in construction, manufacturing, property operation or rental, services and trade.

For micro enterprises and households (overlapping categories, but given usual separation of incomes and budgets quite possibly often two micro enterprises in one household) different concerns and approaches arise. 'Normal' commercial banks, leasing/hire purchase companies and their analogues cannot lend viably to such enterprises:

1. their operating procedures for risk analysis as well as for loan management and collection lead to costs per loan which cannot be covered by interest on micro loans;

2. as large, impersonal, 'they' entities, such enterprises have few social claims on borrowers and the costs of legal processes exceed any possible recoveries on micro loans. Thus they are likely to have medium to high non-recovery rates.
Specialised micro credit institutions may or may not be able to overcome those barriers:

1. to the extent they are embedded in institutions also providing technical and operational information/advice and facilitating access to inputs and markets they may be able to spread overhead costs over a wider base;

2. to the extent the lending body (directly or via an intermediary) is perceived as 'us', part of society, morally valid and that it lends largely to members or to small groups whose links mean an individual's default would lead to significant losses of social capital and of community respect. they can often reduce loss rates dramatically.

These factors suggest a large state, enterprise or INGO single purpose micro credit provider may have many of the problems of a bank. It can probably only avert these by operating through a domestic social sector (mosque, church, trade union, women's group, community organisation voluntary small farmers' co-op) which does have social ethical status and, therefore, leverage and also a multipurpose programme to provide sharing of overheads.\textsuperscript{71}

These credit access issues are not unique to post war rehabilitation and adequate access to poor persons/households and appropriate enterprises rarely existed pre war. But with very large numbers of 'old' and 'new' poor households and for rebuilding social capital parallel to livelihoods they are potentially crucial in many such contexts.

**Basic Services And Safety Nets**

Access to basic services and to safety nets are crucial to rehabilitation. Increased health, knowledge and access to water (to increase time available for other uses - not least school for girls - as well as to increase pastoral and garden plot productivity and health) are relevant to present as well as to future ability to enhance household livelihoods. So is an assured work for cash for food or, if that is administratively impracticable, distribution of rations after floods and droughts. Without it rehabilitation will certainly be subject to setbacks and the process may collapse.

Basic services and safety nets have in general been discussed in other sections. Special access areas relevant in particular to demobilisees and, in some cases, returning small farming households are vocational training and agricultural extension (backed by veterinary services and market
availability of the - usually 4 to 6 - key veterinary products, including rock salt, relevant to common disease control in particular zones).

**Demobilisees** usually have little pre-war vocational experience or training. Both those (often a large majority) intending to return to their family background of farming and those seeking artisanal or semi skilled employment can benefit from training. Food, housing, (in barracks or camps where practicable) and six months training (based on an employment/self employment potential survey) can - judging by Zimbabwe experience - reintegrate/integrate two thirds to three quarters of demobilisees into viable civilian livelihoods. The alternatives of abject poverty, 'self help' use of guns and 'stockpiling' in the armed forces (practiced by Ghana in the 1970's and Somaliland from 1995) are less attractive and ultimately more costly.

What **agricultural extension** can offer varies widely. Probably **generalisation of 'domestic best practice'** (an approach Mozambican sources suggest is central to results obtained beyond cotton and cashew) has the most general quick payoff potential if field officers are (or can rapidly be trained to be) competent to identify, comprehend and extend. For some crops there may be other shelf/pipeline knowledge and techniques. Many extension services in SSA have next to no adapted/locally field tested knowledge to extend. That does underline the case for more research and adaptation/testing of internationally available knowledge, but that is a process largely outside of, and over a longer time span than, rehabilitation proper.

**Access Barriers - Fees And Charges**

**Charges and fees** to returnees engaged in initial livelihood rehabilitation are a **mirror image access issue**. They create obstacles to access for poor households in general and for rural rehabilitees, who have very low cash incomes even after restoring basic household food security, in particular.

Water to a degree poses different considerations than health and education. In urban areas alternatives to public sector supply normally carry significant cash and/or opportunity (time) costs. In rural areas the main cost is likely to be time. In both cases the time cost is likely to reduce ability to work or to produce for cash - especially in pastoral or irrigation contexts so that a cash and/or time water burden sharing arrangement may be both acceptable to users and practicable.
Timing and structuring of charges to fit with seasonal income stream patterns is apparently easier than for health and education whose point of use timings tend to correspond to low income periods. A substantial portion of user contributions can be via user committee mobilisation of labour and materials for routine management/maintenance. Even so, in the early stages of rehabilitation a case can be made for temporary waiver of the cash (not the labour and materials) element of both recurrent and - especially - establishment or reconstruction capital costs.

**Fees, charges and cost sharing** issues have to date rarely been raised in the specific context of rehabilitation, but do have special significance during its early years. Even in general fees for health and education by central governments have relatively poor success records: revenues below targets (and often under 5% of total primary level costs, or - say - ten cents per bottle of beer or pack of cigarettes), widespread corruption, high collection cost to revenue ratios, very high exclusion of potential user rates even when waiver schemes exist in principle (or alternatively very patchy efforts to collect). The World Bank (based on *ex post* studies) has become less enthusiastic, albeit the IMF has not. Especially in SSA schemes are still expanding.

Highly *decentralised* systems with more *flexible* waiver, contribution (not necessarily primarily at point of use or all in cash) and decision taking structures at local government, community and domestic civil society group level do have more cases of success, but such cash and participation sharing approaches appear to need *substantial social capital bases and institutions which are both technically competent in respect to financial management and respected as service deliverers*. They are all more successful in respect to water than to health and education.

The initial rehabilitation period appears unlikely to be one in which these conditions can usually be met:

1. household cash incomes - especially in isolated areas - are very low while - with poor transport and sparse service coverage - the time opportunity costs of using services are higher than in other areas, often absolutely and certainly relative to cash income;

2. social capital has usually been war eroded even in areas in which ethnic cleavages are not prominent. While successful rehabilitation processes do tend to have a two directional positive relation with such cleavages, it is unlikely that joint fee collection is an optimal starting point;
3. Local government and - less uniformly - local civil society bodies are still building or rebuilding from low levels of service delivery and financial managerial capacity and may (e.g. in Rwanda where pre 1994 local government seems to have been more about security policing than service delivery) have previous negative histories to overcome. 74

However, Somaliland75 can be cited as case in which domestic NGO social actors have played a major role in health and education recovery with fees (and exemptions) prominent in their financial operations, while local governments have used urban water (largely UNICEF/INGO restored on the capital works side) as a means to build credibility and also to achieve modest surpluses for - e.g. - sanitation. However, in respect to health and education coverage - while above 1985 levels - is very low and appears to exclude (however unintended) poor persons and also most pastoral households because adequate clinic or school size (except mobile school and community paramedic) for fee based viability cannot be achieved. Moreover, Somaliland's partial success is probably heavily dependent on very high remittance levels which inject cash into household and domestic NGO budgets.

Possible approaches include:

1. A strategic decision that all charges be at local governance/social actor level with freedom to determine timing, level, nature (cash and/or agreed services such as maintenance and goods such as food, building materials, furniture) and exemption provisions;

2. Special grants in rehabilitation zones to allow local government units to waive most fees (or charge at very low levels) during the initial rehabilitation period;

3. Where overseas remittances are actually or potentially substantial, systematically promote diaspora member contributions to civil society/domestic NGO and local governance basic service provision to reduce fee levels needed;

4. Develop government/civil society actor partnerships to augment domestic civil society group service provision if these groups have perceived capacity and legitimacy and state service provider coverage will necessarily remain limited for an extended period.76
Rehabilitation And Gender

Gender and patterns of women's participation issues arise in the rehabilitation context for three reasons:

1. Wars have disproportionately negative affects on women (and children and aged who are usually particular concerns of women), creating particular needs for redress/restitution in the R-R process. That factor is enhanced because war creates greater 'enforced opportunities' - men dead or away at war - for women leading to greater post than pre war organisation, clarity of agendas and - often - self-confidence;

2. The increase (often of the order of 5% to 25%) of female headed rural households during civil wars requires attention to women's access to land as a foundation for livelihood opportunities if these households including their children are not to be locked into absolute poverty;

3. Time, attitudes and knowledge (including knowledge by women returning home) have not stood still during war. Therefore, the replication of pre war social, economic and household relations will rarely be desirable and often would be impracticable.

In principle a fourth category would be inequitable, oppressive or iniquitous gender relations which had been significant contributing causes to war. In practice such relations have indeed existed in some contexts, but do not appear in themselves to have contributed to armed conflict.

The most general gender 'issue' requiring special attention and priority is the increased proportion of female headed households. These - unless headed by wage employed full or semi professionals - are particularly likely to be caught in an absolute poverty trap. The reason is not primarily that they are female headed, but that they have a poor able bodied hands to earn/hungry mouths to feed ratio because they are overwhelmingly single able bodied adult/multiple dependent (children, disabled, aged) households. This indicates a need not just for access to land but also for techniques/technology to reduce the working time availability disadvantages facing these households. These are likely to be context specific:

a. The example of animal traction power and the complexities of introducing it have been discussed in other sections of this paper;
b. increased access to nearby water saves women's and girls' time for household, directly income generating, educational and other purposes;

c. small scale, inexpensive units to mill maize, decorticate millet and sorghum, crush oilseeds can offer reduced labour time, low cost (versus shop purchase) nutritious weaning food and cash income if training, microcredit and women's self organisation can be promoted jointly.

None of the above relate only to female headed households or only in the context of rehabilitation. All are of special concern to women and to children because they fall almost totally on the female side of African gender divisions of labour and of incomes (and children - except in many cases for school fees - on the female side of budget obligations). Evidently when successful such innovations benefit not so poor households (including their male members) in non war contexts. The reason for their coverage here is that they and similar innovations and access broadening discussed above can be of particular benefit to female headed households in rehabilitation processes.

**Rehabilitation is not a magic bullet** - given what came before an unsettling analogy! - to resolve all issues and to reverse all inequities. Rehabilitation - and even R-R-R- agendas - are not identical to gender agendas even if they overlap. Rehabilitation's contribution lies primarily in the areas of livelihood and access empowerment. To play those roles effectively, requires attention to actual gender divisions of labour, of household budget obligations on input of labour time and meeting certain cash expenditure categories and claims on labour time and categories of cash income receipt. African household budget patterns vary widely, but are rarely one household/one budget forms and similarly while gender obligations/claims balances are frequently highly unequal, unilateral male claim/female obligation patterns are virtually unknown. For example, in some contexts increased male calls for female labour input into crops whole sale proceeds the men keep have resulted in parallel food crop (for household use or sale with proceeds to women) labour inputs from men or the husband paying wages to his wife directly or via a more complex multi household circuit.79

Because patterns vary - e.g. as to whether men or women are obligated to pay school fees - the determination of gender impact of particular measures requires contextual knowledge. Division of labour patterns - e.g. that girls and women collect water and do routine water point (and household) maintenance but men do contribute in cash and labour to water system initial construction - also
can have a major impact on the gender gains division of particular programmes. Given the labour
time scarcity in many female headed households noted above, rehabilitation measures should seek
to balance labour savings in favour of women.

While access to resources (including basic services) and economic opportunities is probably the
focal rehabilitation contribution to gender issues, empowerment on one front can be relevant to
others. For example, because water collection, water point maintenance and
collection/management of water use area are 'womens' work' (with male mobilisation usually
limited to labour and/or cash to establish facilities), men may well accept women taking a leading
role in User Committees to manage - maintain - collect funds for spares and servicing by technical
personnel. In turn success by women in one area is likely - not certain - to lead to increased access
to leadership roles in others.

**Food Aid - Uses And Problems**

**Food aid** and its relation to **food security** are recurrent issues in respect to rehabilitation as well as
to survival assistance during catastrophes or calamities. The debate tends to comprise several sub-
issues:

a. national physical availability and capacity to distribute related to hungry household
   entitlements (which may lead to similar conclusions in the case of very poor persons in a poor,
   food short, war torn - whether at war or just after - context);

b. quantity of food provided versus timing (i.e. late food aid may fail to avert dearth or even
   famine, but later damage farming household income recovery in a subsequent good harvest year
during which the late 'aid' creates a glut);

c. appropriate place and timing of food supply to returnee households vs. the naïve argument that
   0 to 6 months food provided at camps for use after 'return home' will normally be adequate;

d. balancing administrative feasibility, avoidance of leakage and support for (damage to)
   commercial food network in evaluating issuing rations, providing food for work, employing to
   work for cash for food. Failure to recognise that, when feasible, the last should have the most
   positive impact on infrastructure and rural commercial sector rehabilitation and - if paralleled
by food rations and/or meals (perhaps via local domestic social actions to aged, disabled and other unable to work groups - should have few offsetting negative effects is likely to lead to poorer actual than possible programmes.

True the case for food aid rests on two assumptions:

1. food aid is given for mixed reasons (including Northern farmer interests) and its termination would not lead to substantial increases in cash grants;

2. in some countries food aid is harder to divert and more likely to reach poor persons than is cash.

The first proposition almost certainly is valid - in whole or in large part - for the USA, the EU and a majority of its members and for Canada, Australia and Japan. The second is not as robust as it might seem - the potential for diversion of food and the leakiness of food delivery pipelines can be very high - but is at least partly valid.

The general - subject to contextual modification - rehabilitation position vis a vis food aid may include:

1. **Rehabilitation usually requires substantial external grant inputs** into countries/regions with substantial overall physical shortages of food. Therefore grant food aid in basic staples or readily saleable deficit commodities (e.g. sugar, vegetable oil, dried milk) can be useful;

2. **Food aid to be clearly positive requires a strategy for appropriate timing and location of delivery** over the rehabilitation process with by steps to achieve provider compliance (as to amount, timing and quality and actual recipient logistical and delivery implementation capacity.

3. **building interaction among rehabilitation process infrastructure renewal, rural commercial network recovery, household cash income regeneration and household/personal food entitlements by selling donated food to provide cash for wages and tools in support of seasonal employment for returning households**,80
Governance And All That

Governance issues raised repeatedly in the R-R-R context include:

a. capacity and efficiency
b. probity and user friendliness;
c. participation and decentralisation
d. community, local government, central government, INGO, external agency relationships.

Capacity is clearly a functional issue. Most post conflict governments, especially in rural areas which were previously conflict or insurgent controlled zones, are weak in respect to personnel and institutional capacity. All are weak financially and, almost always, logistically. R-R-R - not least in food security - and even sketchy basic service access in 'return home' poses heavy, complex and largely new burdens.

The central issue is how to restore capacity (especially if it had collapsed pre war or the war had extended for half a decade or more). None of the R-R-R heads is one in which there is room for total spin-off to the household, civil society and/or enterprise sectors.

But in the short run the goals of capacity building and dependence reduction may well not coincide. Rapid external - agency and INGO - injections are simpler to organise (although much more expensive per unit of services delivered)\textsuperscript{81} than local social actor or government capacity restoration. In principle they can complement current public and domestic NGO activity and train personnel for them. In practice there is a high risk of their substituting for, fragmenting and eroding domestic capacity - both public and private. Contextual patterns vary widely - Uganda (Acholiland) and Somaliland appear to have achieved broadly complementary and capacity building relationships\textsuperscript{82} whereas UNOSOM in Somalia\textsuperscript{83} and most - not all - INGO's/agencies in Mozambique illustrate a substitution, fragmentation and erosion process.\textsuperscript{84}

In respect to rehabilitation capacity the issue is not the need for greater efficiency but how to define efficiency (or efficiencies?) - within a cost ceiling? unit cost of services? number of units of services delivered? lives saved? degree of poverty reduction? All can be valid targets, but efficiency toward one may entail a negative tradeoff with another. Similarly present capacity and
capacity building - i.e. present and future efficiency may well have tradeoffs (especially in centrality and pervasiveness of foreign institutional and personnel roles).

Capacity is not only a technical question - it goes to the heart of political legitimacy. A government perceived as unable to provide an absence of recurrent violence and disorder at least significant health, education and water services and calamity alleviation oriented food security will - at the best - have conditional and challenged legitimacy. Improved service delivery - in coverage and in quality - can consolidate, deepen and broaden legitimacy. Both African governments and insurgents often act on that premise - targeting basic services and food security logistics, to protect on the government side and to destroy (including mutilation, kidnapping and killing of personnel) on the insurgent.\(^{85}\)

Probit (absence of pervasive corruption especially when it limits and distorts access as well as leaking away resources) and user friendliness (a civilian police force open to the public and perceived as seeking to avert disorder and violence and to catch as well as deter criminals - as in Somaliland\(^ {86}\) - is an example) are objectives which most R-R-R users, most SSA governments and most outside agencies and INGO's endorse. The differences relate to interpretation of causes, to priorities and to workable means to improve matters.

'Corruption' by personnel paid much less than the household poverty line wage is arguably a form of 'privatised, decentralised, flexible' user fees enforced by 'need'. While undesirable, it may have limited distorting effects and be better than having no staff on the job. The only cure involves phased recovery of wages to the household basic poverty line parallel to training, professional and procedural regulations and provision of better tools for the job'. Pay is not a sufficient condition to restore probity and enhance efficiency but it is - except in the very short term - a necessary one.

'User Friendliness' - as perceived by users - who do not necessarily have identical perceptions to expatriate, or even highly educated urban based national, experts - is a factor in capacity to deliver useful services, in efficiency (useful service unity cost) and in rehabilitation legitimacy. It appears to be highly contextual in part relating to what was delivered - and valued - before the war and to perceived beneficiary groups.\(^ {87}\)

Accountability is sometimes linked to probity and sometimes to participation/user friendliness. Perhaps oddly it is less frequently viewed as a background from which to increase efficiency.
Accountability - especially in community R-R-R contexts - should begin literally. The presentation of oral and written verbal and numerical accounts (in the technical sense). Without these civil society (and senior officials or politicians) cannot 'call to account', identify areas of gross inefficiency (in respect to their goals) and pinpoint opportunities for reallocation (away from - probably 'traditional' - activities of low or low immediate priority to potential users, or non-users as the case may be).

Decentralisation is frequently (perhaps usually in SSA) persued on two points: deconcentration of central government operations with more delegated authority to act at provincial, district and city level and decentralisation to elected local governance units. The logic appears to be that new or renewed local government units cannot, or cannot yet administer large programmes or large units and therefore - for speed, flexibility, user friendliness reasons - local governance needs parallel decentralised central government units. While - especially in R-R-R contexts - there is a not inconsiderable element of realism to this logic it is also arguable that political and official (professional/bureaucratic power division) conflicts of interest play a large role.

Whether new institutions and especially two parallel sets are a resource allocation priority under R-R-R depends on the context both as to what functioning institutions exist, how close to the civil society pre war institutions were and whether (as in Mozambique) war has led to substantial de facto deconcentration to provinces and districts.

Participation should go beyond consultation (even if the latter is taken into account in programme design) and approach co-determination, especially when local government structures are weak. The case for it is three fold: efficiency in programme and project selection, design and operation (ordinary local households know a great deal which officials and experts do not, as well as sometimes visa versa); mobilisation of user community resources to augment governmental (much more practicable when users feel their views are taken into account and they share in management); good governance (which as normally defined, goes beyond elections, accountability as to use of funds and petitioning).

The problems with instituting, sustaining and building participation turn on the fact that it has significant time costs - before decisions and their implementation and to all those participating. External actors - however pro participation in principle - clearly resent the delays; officials and professionals are none too keen to spend many hours in dialogue; poor households and women in
particular are short of time so that participation often has quite high opportunity costs for them and will not be sustained unless payoffs are apparent.

The immediate aftermath of war is a time at which participation can be especially valuable:

1. those returning home can help fill in both pre war baseline data (likely to have been incomplete and/or lost) and a revived baseline for the present deteriorated position;
2. they can also indicate their capacities, lacks and priorities as a set of parameters within which to allocate resources more efficiently from broad strategy to programmatic, policy and project packages;
3. as well as indicating what material and labour contributions to cost sharing and what work for cash for food time are likely to be available.

This process, at least first time around, needs to be rapid even at the expense of approximation of data (which can later be refined by further rounds of dialogue) and use of less than optimal survey/observation techniques. The results will usually include 'non obvious' - particularly historical and environmental context linked - elements.

External-Civil Society-Government Interaction

In rehabilitation (in some cases unlike survival support) the case for domestic leadership combined with supporting (hopefully on a medium term phase down basis) external actor participation is strong. Sustainability cannot be based on permanent external dominance in finance, top personnel, knowledge and research. Rehabilitation is not a very fashionable area in the first phase and tends to have a short shelf life - e.g. no war for two years, no real external memory of the need for rehabilitation may not be an unreasonable rule of thumb.

Government to government (at strategic priorities and transfer levels) negotiated agreements on broad 3 to 6 year programmes with main policy, sectoral and project clusters identified may be the most feasible route to a coordinated, medium term approach with pre determined phasing from external and domestic sources.90

Governmental (and IFI) services - except for special small project funds91 which can be very useful within a strategic frame but are unlikely to form an adequate whole - are bureaucratically and in
respect to personnel ill fitted to negotiating with and - less uniformly - to working alongside local
government and domestic social sector (whether religious group, women's organisation, domestic
NGO or trade/peasants' union) actors because of contextual, language, accounting, knowledge and
outlook barriers.

In theory INGO's should be able to work both with domestic governments and with local social
sector actors. In practice this is by no means uniformly the case either in all countries or for all
INGOs. Action Aid, CIIR, in many cases Oxfam, and SCF and - among international agencies
which to a degree operate on the ground in the South (and raise funds in the North) as if they were
INGOs - UNICEF are evidence that the theory is not totally aberrant. Others - e.g. World Vision,
Medicins sans Frontieres (France)\textsuperscript{92}, CARE (USA) - are evidence that disastrous fragmentation and
erosion of domestic capacity (both government and social actor) can result.

The negative result is particularly likely if there is an 'overload' of external funds designated for use
via INGOs, weak government capacity to negotiate (frequently because of lack of alternative
resource flows, not of negotiators nor of ability to design programmes) and/or domestic social
actors whose outlook, style and bureaucratic/managerial process are very different from those of
INGOs and whose desperate need for financial resources, training and - usually - specialised
personnel\textsuperscript{93} makes bargaining between each of them and a large INGO no less unequal than
between a weak national government and the World Bank or its largest bilateral aid agency partner.
This catalogue of problems is not in itself anybody's 'fault' - it is a consequence of past war and
present inherent inequality of bargaining strength. But it is a warning to seek to include:

a. honest dialogue - including two way criticism - to lead to clearer understanding of problems
   and of divergent perceptions;

b. accepting that national coordination (at least during post war periods other than in respect to
   some calamity survival crises) is only possible if either domestic government led or co led by
   the national government and a resident external agency (or INGO) head acceptable to them;

c. building in training to reduce professional, managerial and accounting weaknesses of
   domestic social actors and local government units as well as at central government level;

d. engaging in realistic analysis of buildup of user social actor, local government and central
government possible fund buildup and of parallel expenditure requirements to achieve
manageable phase downs of financial flow scheduling (possibly in part substituting domestic governance unit for INGO or donor agency financing for domestic social actors).

After Such Conflict What Forgiveness?

Justice/amnesty, impunity/immunity and redress/forgiveness are not primarily rehabilitation issues as rehabilitation is defined here. They relate primarily to achieving and sustaining valid processes of reconciliation in particular country (or zone within a country) and time contexts.

However, for precisely that reason they are directly relevant to forwarding or impeding the process of rehabilitation. Unless former combatants and their core supporters are willing to co-exist, talk, work, and - preferably⁹⁴ - live together, neither rehabilitation nor local governance prospects are positive and recurrence of armed conflict - perhaps escalation out of individual clashes which in other contexts would be contained quickly - is all too likely. Neither pursuit of total justice (with the margin of error tilted against unwilling or at least pressured participants on the losing side) nor mindless pragmatism seeking to wipe out the memory of the war is particularly likely to work well. What is morally, administratively, emotionally and economically feasible is much less self evident and would appear to be very context specific.

If justice is taken to mean systematic trials of all offenders on the losing side - and preferably gross offenders among the winners - then it is likely to be practicable only in cases of total military victory, limited numbers of overt opponents of the new government and general stability. Even so commitment to reconciliation has led e.g. Mozambique (in 1975), Somaliland and Ethiopia to mount quite limited - or in the case of Somaliland to date no⁹⁵ - war crimes trials of top leaders of the former regime and notorious perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

Rwanda is an exception and one which illustrates the problems which arise when the defeated side remains capable of armed attacks, the majority of the population while not openly antagonistic are at best passive supporters of the new regime and the number of accused is very large.

Realistically 500,000 odd Rwandans participated in genocide from running with killer mobs (often in the fear that holding back would put their own lives at risk) and up to 150,000 have been arrested. Commitment to due process means than on realistic estimates trying all of them would take 25 to 50 years. Lack of resources means prison conditions are very bad so that well before the
trials were completed at least half the accused would have died, charged but untried. Division of
the charges into three classes: capital genocide, follower participation in genocide and mob
participation with local courts to try the last category having powers to fine, reprimand and impose
limited imprisonment (usually less than served awaiting trial) have not worked well because of fear
of what would actually happen to fringe participants who confessed and faced local courts. From
both reconciliation and economic perspectives the outcome is deeply unsatisfactory. Since the
alternative was seen - probably correctly - as mob 'justice' against suspects this gloomy comment
on the 1994-00 results is not a condemnation of the choices made but a comment on the deepness
of the dilemmas.

Attempting such trials during a war - as Sierra Leone did in 1997-8 - is very unlikely to be
productive. It tends to hamper subsequent negotiations for 'peace with amnesty' as well as being
likely to be very uneven justice with most of the worst offenders not in hand to be tried.

Truth and justice hearings following a negotiated settlement with amnesties are an option rarely
taken after civil wars - the notable exception being South Africa. Rehabilitation conceptualisation
and logic throws little light on when such processes are feasible or desirable, let alone on the basic
dilemma of whether to call to account crimes against humanity on the part of those who were
armed supporters of the present governments.

Redress - in respect to economic loss - is unlikely to be a practicable twin to amnesty on the
criminal front. First, a real risk of massive judgements can only deter negotiating peace or taking
up an amnesty offer. Second the judicial processes and divisions of liability pose massive
problems. Third it is exceedingly unlikely that any substantial resources for family capital or more
general rehabilitation can be won in this way except under very unusual circumstances.

In Acholiland in 1999 most Acholi did favour a universal amnesty but also the right to sue ex
Lord's Resistance Army members for damages. The fact that this would deter taking the amnesty,
would be embarraged, prolonged and expensive judicially and could hardly make a dent in the
$300 million plus (two thirds livestock) war losses were perceived and indeed informed
government policy, but did not override a deep desire for redress. In Somaliland per contra where
agro-pastoral land rights had been sold under the Barre regime to Oromo and to Southern Somalis
these transfers have been accepted if proper procedures and payments to the then government
authorities were made.
Forgiveness through historic (evolving traditional) methods has been highly and perhaps surprisingly effective in Mozambique and Acholiland. It has been both communal and religious group and has been linked to trauma counselling and resocialisation for, e.g., child soldiers, girl slaves and initially kidnapped ex-combatants. The key elements appear to be acceptability to the community and a sense of re-entry into the community by returning persons.

Somaliland - partly via the sub clan and lineage/blood' group systems and partly by general tacit agreement on what past conduct to 'forget' - has achieved similar results. Probably luckily, Barre's 'divide and rule' practices meant Somaliland troops had not served in Somaliland nor, in general, in Puntland. Therefore their reentry as coerced victims who had done Somalilanders no harm was easy - indeed they are at the core of the present Somaliland Army. Similarly Somaliland merchants who prospered in Mogadishu under Barre (necessarily involving 'side payments') are accepted as are civil side ex public servants and even ministers (excluding defense and interior). For example the last Barre Prime Minister heads a mobile telephone company, albeit his rehabilitation would not extend to his being a politician or an elder.

The limits to this type of reconciliation probably arise primarily in cases of crimes against humanity by the ex-combatants within their own local community (e.g. Sierra Leone) and ethnic conflict bordering on or being genocide (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi). Personal knowledge of atrocities against persons close to oneself presumably make forgiveness much harder (and less general) while historic (albeit not necessarily Christian and Muslim) forgiveness/reentry process are limited by ethnic groups and can hardly be expected to transcend them after genocide.
VI

COUNTRY REHABILITATION HEADS, VIGNETTES, PANORAMAS

The records of rehabilitation perceptual strategies, analyses, programmes - policies - projects and results/prognoses vary widely among COPE countries. This is in part because in Sri Lanka and Uganda the actual area studied is a domestic region not a whole country. However, the basic reasons for divergence are contested history, results of conflict, probable finality of settlements to and/or durability of lulls in, conflict and the priority to Reconciliation/Rehabilitation/Reconstruction (R-R-R) accorded by dominant state decision takers and effectiveness of action on that priority.

Sri Lanka

North and East Sri Lanka has seen very limited R-R-R. Indeed the trend probably remains downwards, especially after the mid 2000 Tamil Tiger resurgence on the Jaffna Peninsula.

The absence of stable lines of control, the presence of a large contested area between usually Tiger and usually government controlled villages and the lack of any consensus as to when or how the Tiger/Lanka State conflict would be resolved has created a very unpropitious context for rehabilitation as well as for reconciliation. Further, neither domestic nor foreign non-governmental organisations have focussed either on social capital preservation nor on even limited livelihood strengthening linked to relief. Social capital has eroded because historically multi-ethnic villages have splintered into up to four groups (Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim, Christian) and because even within these fragments self organisation and networks have eroded.

Neither government nor non-government survival support has sought to identify possible links to partial earned livelihood rehabilitation systematically. While instability, uncertainty and duration (already two decades) have contributed, so has the state model of seeking to provide rice rations, pensions and, at least some primary education and health - even in contested and Tiger controlled zones. This approach has created a dominant perspective of wartime survival support as a cut down variant of the low level welfare state which has - even under conservative governments -
dominated Sri Lankan politics for two-thirds of a century. The INGO/NGO role is seen as gap
filling and state provision channelling.

This pattern may be useful to sustaining belief in the state as an underwriter of certain basic
entitlements and - specifically for the present Sinhala dominated state - embodying a commitment
to serve (and a claim to legitimate rule over) all Sri Lankans. Ironically it increases Tiger
controlled area food supplies (these are, even without war, dominantly food deficit areas) while
directly (e.g. via a proportional tax in kind on rice rations) and indirectly (e.g. via sales tax)
augmenting Tiger fiscal revenues and foreign exchange flows which may make it easier for the
Tigers to prosecute armed struggle with all its other resources devoting very few to basic survival
support for its civilian base (controlled area population). Perhaps more serious it is dependency
promoting and social capital demobilising - neither conducive to present nor future rehabilitation
and development.

A related issue is inadequately conceptualised and still less debated or articulated toward livelihood
rehabilitation programming. The Southwest of Sri Lanka has been characterised by economic
stagnation, rising pauperisation (particularly of unemployable educated youth) and a recurrent
violent neo-fascist jacquerie termed JVP. The past repression of the JVP (much more uniformly
vicious than the war against Tamil rebels) was followed by the recruitment into the Army of up to
60,000 young Sinhala from these districts. In many villages their remittances are now the main
sources of cash income. If they are demobilised into poverty and hopelessness as trained soldiers
(realistically not surrendering their arms), rather than channelled toward economic rehabilitation
for demobilised livelihood (not to date fully successfully carried out on a comparable scale by any
country in the South), the JVP will rapidly re-emerge more virulent and militarily dangerous than
before. That implies the waves of bloodshed, which reached Colombo's southern suburbs in the
early 1990s, will this time wash over the whole metropolis.

Northern Uganda

Acholiland (Northern Uganda), despite also being a domestic region, provides a very different
panorama than Eastern Sri Lanka. This is partly out of the different - briefer and shallower -
historic context of armed conflict, but also of higher Uganda State and majority Acholi community
priority to reconciliation and rehabilitation. In addition no Ugandan government has ever been able to provide even a low level welfare state, forcing relatively much more attention to social capital, civil society and to household and larger enterprise production. Finally the Lord's Resistance Army is a much weaker force militarily and one with a much narrower support base (whether spontaneous, mobilised or/and coerced) than the Tamil Tigers.

Over 1986-2000 a series of conflicts in Acholiland have been violent and been perceived - not necessarily accurately - as basic cleavages between the Acholi and the Government of Uganda. These have successively been characterised by insurrection/repression and subsequently dialogue/reconciliation/re-inclusion. Characteristics of and elements in reconciliation/rehabilitation include structures and strategies instituted in regard to Uganda as a whole and/or to the 14 districts characterised as 'Northern' and thereby needing rehabilitation of which Acholiland comprises two (Gulu, Kitgum).

**Reconciliation, including civil society building and social capital rehabilitation, progressed rapidly from late 1997 through late 1999** but was set back by the Christmasstide 1999 Lord's Resistance Army raid bamboozling the government to believe its purpose was to accept the statutory amnesty accepted on the urging of (anti-LRA) Acholi. That raid and the weak security force response to it eroded Acholi trust in government ability to defend them and also Acholi willingness to trust already semi-demobilised LRA cadres in Acholiland when they seek to return home peacefully.¹⁰²

The present situation - despite the setback - is of reasonably well advanced and potentially self-sustainable reconciliation and of some social capital, local governance and basic service rehabilitation - but to date very little economic rehabilitation beyond the southern fringe parishes:

1. Relatively functional decentralised central and local governance structures exist and are moderately restoring access to basic services with their further advance now most severely limited by lack of household production (and thus community and local government revenue) rehabilitation;

2. law, order and stability - as perceived by Acholi - over 1997-99 improved markedly as has government reconceptualisation of its core security problem as government plus Acholi
majority vs the LRA not government vs Acholi. However, raids continue after a 1998-9 lull and there is unease about the implications/costs for Acholiland of Uganda's over all Congo and Sudan policies (including Sudanese backing of violent incursions into Kitgum and Gulu);

3. The basic barrier to sustained reconciliation and to continued advances in other aspects of rehabilitation (e.g. basic services, local governance, infrastructure) is the 1984-1996 collapse of livelihoods with output per household down about two-thirds in constant price returns, household capital losses of the order of $300 million (for 150,000-195,000 households) including $200 million for a 90% fall in livestock previously the largest source of cash income and a major component of many farming systems relying on ox ploughing of heavy black soils;

4. Livelihood rehabilitation requires 'going home' for over 400,000 Acholi in 'protected villages' (actually camps, some larger than 20,000) because they can neither walk to and from their farms daily and do much farming nor operate their pastoral activities from the 'villages'. At the peak of LRA attacks, the villages may well have been necessary for security reasons - now return home is crucial to rehabilitation and to future security (broadly defined to include, e.g., food), a conclusion shared by at least some senior military personnel;

5. Over 1997-1999 the period of lull in relation to LRA action was utilised by the Acholi and the Uganda Government to institute, explore and advance a significant process of reconciliation and to begin to outline aspects of rehabilitation and to implement some of them especially as to basic services and local governance;

6. These processes were set back by the Christmas tide 1999 LRA raids especially because they raise doubts as to Army ability to protect and to either Acholi or Government commitment to radical 'return home' (camp to farm) action to restore livelihoods. This check is likely to be overcome but with how much loss of momentum is less clear;

7. The present Uganda government has given priority to rehabilitation since it achieved power in 1986. But this has been area (district cluster) by area, not in all districts at one time, and has not been specifically conceptualised, analysed or articulated economic/livelihood rehabilitation in the 14 (by government count) most war afflicted districts or in respect to their macro economic contribution;
8. Data and articulation - even when logically possible e.g. use of pre 1980 farm system and output data to identify key crop, livestock and ox traction issues and, back by interviews, specific needs of female headed households - remain weak. This gap is especially dangerous for prompt, Acholi friendly action because the specific needs and the stages of recovery (from nearly complete - e.g. Tororo area - to still endemic armed conflict - e.g. much of West Nile area) among the 14 post war districts vary very widely. 'One size suits all' fourteen district rehabilitation plans are in danger of being 'single size suits none' if there is not more creative user consultation linked to data collection (or recovery) and analysis;

9. **Resource allocation and mobilisation** by the Uganda Government do confirm that rehabilitation **is a priority**. Substantial external programme support has been mobilised and domestic revenue commitments made as well as major allocations of senior civil and political personnel to reconciliation and rehabilitation articulation. But - perhaps because of the lack of articulated district prioritised project/programme/policy packages - the **totals when divided among 14 districts appear seriously inadequate**. Acholiland (Gulu and Kitgum districts) rehabilitation probably needs of the order of $10 million a year of additional (to 1998-9 levels) state and state channeled funds, but only about one third of that appears to be in the pipeline and - more serious - the scale of the gap is neither self evident from broad 14 district summaries nor clearly identified by the state as a crucial area for corrective action.

**Rwanda**

**Rwanda**103 remains in a **war, not a post war, situation**. This is the greatest single constraint on reconciliation and rehabilitation:

1. it diverts resources to war because Interahamwe is still a politico military macro survival threat to the Government and a micro source of near countrywide endemic instability;

2. as well as reducing revenues (from household to governmental) by reducing output (and thus tax revenue), deterring external support and focussing what is provided on external NGOs which - whatever else they can do - are institutionally unable to provide the staff, service delivery, user-government-staff interactions which could build up trust, interaction and social capital toward reconciliation;
3. creates distrust because soldiers (largely wa Tutsi) cannot readily separate attackers from bystanders (both largely wa Hutu) and because IH's omnipresent menace constrains wa Hutu participation in government led projects. Such cooperation, let alone providing information on impending threats to peace, can very literally become a death sentence;

4. diverts leadership attention away from articulating rehabilitation strategy and taking more care to meet the needs of at least five groups '1959er' and later flight 'returnee' wa Tutsi; resident wa Tutsi; 'moderate' wa Hutu; uncommitted (to a non-communal state, to IH or to the RPF led government) wa Hutu. Their needs and grievances are not identical and create problems in respect to overly generalised policies in respect to farm, housing, urban land and related issues.

The second greatest constraint is history. Half a millennium can be traced since the wa Tutsi conquest more or less contemporaneous with European entry on the coast and - more particularly - forty since the 1959-61 Jacquerie, the 1959-90 low level civil war by wa Tutsi exiles, the 1990 invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army, the 1986-94 buildup to and implementation of genocide by the wa Hutu Interahamwe (literally 'we who stand together', colloquially 'we who kill together') of probably about 800,000 wa Tutsi and 'moderate' wa Hutu, the 1994 RPA conquest and the arrest over 1994-6 of 150,000 wa Hutu on genocide charges with an agonisingly slow (to provide due process) judicial system and terrible prison conditions. Efforts to recast Rwanda history in less chauvinistic terms has arguably overstated the exaggerations of polemic versions and, to date, have convinced few not already committed to reconciliation.

Physical destruction in Rwanda during the war was surprisingly low. Basic infrastructure and most buildings were not severely damaged, let alone destroyed. The overall order of magnitude was that of serious deferred maintenance. The largest single capital loss was probably (as in Acholiland) depletion of the national livestock herd. Failure of rural output to recover fully over 1995-99 relates primarily to lack of security, secondarily to uncertainty of tenure in respect to wa Tutsi returnees who are - at least nominally - interim occupiers and tertiarily to an apparent population balance shift to towns and cities.

Community social capital damage has not been restored. Previous to 1994, most villages and many town/urban neighbourhoods were ethnically mixed. This is much (although unevenly) less so today - a clear sign of continued lack of trust. Trans ethnic civil society bodies do exist - women's
and social service groups plus religious groups. However, both the Anglican and Catholic Churches were deeply divided along ethnic lines and the plurality of their hierarchies were perceived to be anti Tutsi. While genuine efforts at reconciliation have been and are being carried on - perhaps more so in the Anglican Church - many congregations are still ethnically homogenous and deeply distrustful of each other.

The RPF government has sought to address the reconciliation requirement in several ways:

1. seeking to avert massive revenge killings by sweeping arrests of accused planners, leaders and participants in genocide - with 1994-99 totals of the order of 150,000. Parallel to this 'arrests not assaults' policy has been one of rehabilitation of courts and trial procedures to allow justice to be done and seen to be done. This has been followed up with review and release of apparent wrong arrests (20-25% of prisoners are thought to be innocent by senior legal officials and at least some ministers) and allowing downgrading of charges on confession - except for planners and leaders - and turning these cases over to paralegal community courts with powers to fine or to sentence to prison for terms more or less equal to time served on remand. The last two initiatives are intended to avoid a 25 to 50 year trial process with festering resentment and most defendants literally dying untried under remand;

2. acting to avert mass wa Tutsi returnee seizure of 1959 (or subsequent departure) losses of land and buildings by providing temporary use of abandoned farms/premises (of refugees and IH ravanchist exiles) until their 1994 owners' return and developing programmes to facilitate securing land for housing;

3. creating a governmental personnel pattern at political and senior official level which could be seen to be supra ethnic. At one point the President, Prime Minister, almost half the cabinet, and a majority of the Parliament (which is more than symbolic if less than a fully empowered legislative branch)\textsuperscript{10b} were wa Hutu;

4. attempting to rebuild and extend primary education and health services through re-employing the two thirds of staff (largely wa Hutu) not in place in 1995. The purpose was to create universal access (or broad access moving toward universality) services and to recreate a non-ethnic/trans ethnic public service seen as confidence restoring/reconciliation promoting as well as directly crucial to rehabilitation;
5. restoring law, order, peace within Rwanda with return home by displaced and returning refugee wa Hutu and border protection to prevent raids/externally based insurgency. Because operation Turquoise and the humanitarian assistance programme in Zaire (though not in Tanzania) provided (whatever their intent) safe passage abroad and regroupment plus base facilities for IH, the border cordon strategy has escalated into two wars in the Congo and to heavy military involvement there with no exit in sight, but not to radical reduction of external IH incursions;

6. seeking to revise chauvinist history (wa Hutu but also wa Tutsi) to demonstrate elements of past, and potential for present, harmony (oddly underplaying the Ankole in Uganda and Kagera in Tanzania cases in which radically lower levels of stress, more cooperation and, in Tanzania 'normal' relations among people rather than 'tribes' and even more surprisingly almost overlooking the 1994 reality that a high proportion of genocide victims were 'moderate' wa Hutu) and to organise rehabilitation programmes on formulations which were at least nominally non-ethnic (e.g. differentiated short versus long stay returnees not specifically wa Tutsi '59ers' vs. 1994 wa Hutu camp refugees/displaced persons).

The building together of reconciliation and rehabilitation measures is strategic and high profile in Rwanda than elsewhere because of the history of genocide and the resultant heritage of distrust. While none of the five major thrusts has failed, none has been totally or even near totally successful;

1. revenge killings and rigged trials have been averted. But the prison count is still over 125,000 - only 5,000 odd have been released under no or weak case provisions - though the new arrest flow is now a trickle. The cost in terms of continued grievances (of accusers and accused) and of government resources (even though prisoner's relatives must feed and clothe them) is very high. The polarisation of perceptions has meant almost no confessions - presumably from distrust of community courts;

2. IMF - and other donor - fiscal conditions have blocked rapid rehabilitation of state education and health services. Donor funding has to a large extent been channeled via INGO's which are more expensive (per unit of service delivered) because of higher expatriate (and often citizen) pay and greater supporting facilities (e.g. vehicles, staff housing) costs and cannot by definition play the reconciling role of joint Hutu/Tutsi public service cadres delivering services to all Rwandans via state programmes;
3. the result of the leader focussed genocide of moderate wa Hutu has been that many appointees from this community are less than impressive. Further they create resentment among resident wa Tutsi because wa Tutsi appointments have been largely by merit so have gone overwhelmingly to returnees. Recent wa Hutu resignations and removals for corruption (even through some wa Tutsi were also removed) have aggravated this situation, further reducing the credibility and cohesiveness of a non-ethnic pattern of governance;

4. to a degree mass '59er' seizure of 1994-5 refugee/displaced person land has been averted. But once in temporary possession, returnees have proven hard to 'move on' and both local level officials and some INGO's (presumably for different reasons) do not seem to be following the Kigali government's strategy very closely;

5. while violence by IH in Rwanda may be slightly lower than in 1995 but it remains high and linked to continuing external bases. The operations in the Congo have been highly expensive, prone to trying to dominate that country or at least its Eastern half and of limited success in weakening IH. Prospects for greater future success are dim and the operations have worsened Congolese animosity to the (Rwandan by origin) Banyamulenge so Rwanda may find itself with up to 500,000 new refugees;

6. the historical revisionism - whatever its accuracy - has not been widely accepted by those with entrenched animosities and therefore has not been particularly useful as a reconciling tool. The non-ethnic terminology as to problems has suffered both from lack of transparency and from limiting attention to resident/returnee wa Tutsi and ex-majority party/'moderate'/ambivalent wa Hutu cleavages.

The result of the limited success and high costs of the reconciliation/rehabilitation strategic components has been that rehabilitation has moved slowly. That outcome has been reinforced by donor holding back even from delivering committed funding until peace, stability and good governance (including capacity to deliver) is seen to be achieved. From a Rwanda government perspective that is 'Catch 22'. The use of INGO's as channels for what finance has been released has further limitations in respect to reconciliation and domestic service capacity rehabilitation. Unit cost and the lower reconciling capacity of foreign agency than national government programmes have been cited. In addition:
a. there are too many INGOs for the government to coordinate even if many did not act as accountable to their own vision and that of their resource providers for Rwanda rather than to those of the government of Rwanda or Rwandan communities;
b. many INGO's and many of their expatriate personnel do not comprehend the complex history and present tensions of Rwanda well enough to act fully effectively;
c. Rwanda's is a conflict which tends to polarise many expatriates as fiercely wa Hutu or wa Tutsi which is not particularly consistent with government strategy nor with rehabilitation or reconciliation.

The present status of rehabilitation is that most physical war damage has been made good with homes/farms in areas of severe instability/lack of peace and the national livestock herd the main exceptions. Government service delivery capacity is still well below pre war levels and public service pay is low enough (and eroding) to threaten productivity, professionalism and probity.

Some economic sectors - notably commerce - have recovered fully, agriculture has not. With 1998 output was estimated at 70% of 1990 levels (for a similar or slightly higher population). 1999 - 2001 levels are likely to be still lower because of drought in parts of the country.

This is a full blown disaster in terms of poverty and nutrition. Most Rwandan households are small farmers. Even in 1990 between a third and a half were absolutely poor, malnutrition levels were high and poor farming households were net food buyers. The 30% total and per household fall (which is quite uneven by district and apparently related to 1994 killing and present instability levels) implies well over 50% absolute poverty and - despite food aid - alarmingly high levels of malnutrition. Whatever the virtues of long term farming systems transformation proposals, these are not relevant to the present challenge. As the post 1992 Mozambique experience demonstrates, an end of violence against producers and transporters should and can result in regaining or moderately exceeding pre-war output within 2 to 4 years.

Somalia

Somalia since 1990 is not a single territorial unit but a jigsaw of small, shifting, unstable provincial (e.g. Puntland), multiprovincial (e.g. the Rahanweyn Confederation over 1999-00 advancing from Bakhool and Bay down to the sea between the Juba and Shibelle rivers), district
(e.g. Bardhere, Belet Wein), sub-district (in the Shibelle Valley districts) and sub-metropolitan (five to eight fragments of Mogadishu) geographic and political artifacts. It is certainly not overall a post war but a continuing war situation and has no territory wide political entities, few coherent elder led governmental processes and a plethora of fragmenting militias, financed by decreasingly profitable looting and 'taxation'/protection money. Some militias are merging/disintegrating into armed bandit gangs in kaleidoscopic patterns.112

Not very surprisingly there has been little opportunity for rehabilitation (or reconciliation) outside a few stable enclaves and - up to a point - Puntland and perhaps from 1999 around Baidoa.113 The radical shifting of control lines - Baidoa has changed hands at least seven times since Barre's forces were first expelled; the Rahanweyn Confederation has swung from losing Merka-Brava on the coast, a share of the lower Shibelle Valley and of the inter river Shibelle/Juba area and Baidoa plus most of Bay district by the end of 1995 to regaining Bay/Baidoa, advancing down between the rivers and positioning themselves for advances up the Shibelle and the coast to Merka-Brava and perhaps driving past captured Bir Hakaba toward Baladogli Airport and greater Mogadishu. Inversely the high noon of General (Barre Army) Aideed's militia is guttering out under his successor and son Sergeant (US Marine Corps) Aideed, the Richard Cromwell of Somalian politics. But every rise and every fall increases destruction of livelihoods, of assets (especially livestock and homes) and of trust and therefore raises the barriers to regaining any form of stability, peace and recreation of socio economic and political economic linkages dense and resilient enough to be self sustainable.

There is no political uniformity within Somalia. Puntland is ruled by a multi sub clan elders' council in alliance with a militia with an Islamic organisation (al Itihaad) theocratic opposition. It has created at least minimal law, order and security for commerce but very little more except for management of Bosasso harbour and market - the vital focus for commerce. At least one half of the urban population are internal exiles from Mogadishu who hope to return. With peace the dominant economic activity - external trade substituting for war closed Mogadishu harbour - will also return to Mogadishu and the second most important - shrimp fishing - is already in decline because of gross over exploitation. As a result there is little commitment to basic services infrastructure or locally sustainable livelihood reconstruction - albeit great willingness to allow
foreign NGO's and agencies to provide basic services, relief and transport infrastructure maintenance.

The Rahanweyn are a loose two clan confederation now on the offensive (with Ethiopian assistance because they oppose al Itihaad as well as Ethiopian Oromian rebels and Ogadeni irredentists). Until they regain most of their 1991-95 losses and reach a settlement with the Gebr Gedir elders/merchants of the valley and of Mogadishu (with whom, unlike the militias - especially Aideed's - they are willing to negotiate) their polity's resources are focused on external (to their present territory) war plus internal law, order, commerce protection and - probably - relief facilitation during the presently three year old drought. Because of the loss of substantial effort and resources when (General) Aideed seized Baidoa in 1995, INGO's and external agencies are still reluctant to venture back to Baidoa. They would be welcome not least to local mosque, professional and civil society groups who have human and mobilisation capacity in respect to water, sanitation, education and health but next to no access to finance or supplies INGO/agency reentry would speed up the limited rehabilitation of services lost with 1995 Aideed capture.

Mogadishu, per contra, is steadily refragmenting and sinking into chaos (less so in Mogadishu North than in Mogadishu South, and the Afgoi and Baladogli peripheral foci) with increasing numbers of militias, the newer ones more merchant led than sub-clan in base and also of both civil and quasi armed mosque based bodies plus some professional service focused civil society groups and an eroding merchant/elder governing coalition in Mogadishu North.

The Djibouti Conference has not resolved this process. It was largely a conference of exiles and of dissident fractions from within Somalia (and peripherally Somaliland). Its 'President' anoint is a former Barre Defense Minister and the committee from which he 'emerged' included General Morgan, Col. Jess (Security Police) and Barre's last Chief of Staff - all four very much men with blood on their hands and prime candidates for war crimes trial star status. The hired (by printing press currency emission) militias who protect their - somewhat ephemeral to date - excursions to Mogadishu North do not constitute a broad political, nor a dependable military, base.

Detailed taxonomic description is of limited use as conditions are highly unstable. What rehabilitation is possible depends very much on when, as well as where, with whom and what.
Certain characteristics and proto-trends may be worth summary listing:

1. processes of disintegration and partial restabilisation seem to be at different stages - more isolated zones and places - e.g. Puntland, Bardhere, Belet Wein, probably Baidoa - tend to be nearer reemergence as stable with some law and order plus commerce facilitation;

2. the keys to restabilisation - i.e. a base for more rehabilitation in most fractions of Somalia - are a Rahanweyn/Gebre Gedir settlement and the complete collapse of militia power in Mogadishu followed (which may neither be inevitable nor speedy) by interim functional metropolitan governance by elder/merchant led groups with mosque backing (probably in four zones plus a port/airport access and management coalition at first). Neither can be foreseen as imminent but over two to five years each is reasonably probable;

3. political forces based on elders, merchants and mosques - backed by armed forces under substantial elder/merchant influences - are much more likely both to achieve stability in an area and viable non violent relations with neighbours than those based on leader raised, loot and levy financed, 'autonomous' militias and/or al Itihaad as contrasted with less politicised Islamic institutions;

4. the Ethiopian/Eritrean war, Oromia insurgency and Ogadeni irredentism (both Somalian and Ethiopian) have contributed to destabilisation. Ethiopia's interests have been limited - a quiet border - but have led to raids and support for Somalian political fractions, now focused on the Rahanweyn. Eritrea - with no real interests in respect to Somalia - has sought to arm Oromian separatist rebels and Ogadeni irridentists and rebels as a second front against Ethiopia with the primary result of rearming Sergeant Aideed's militia (not the Oromians and Ogadenis to whom the Aideed group did not - possibly could not - turn over most of the arms) and (through the Ethiopian reaction) facilitating and capacitating the Rahanweyn military resurgence;

5. In most zones mosque linked, professional (former health education, water staff) and community civil bodies able to provide advice, staff and mobilisation for rehabilitation of services exist but lack funds and supplies. How much they can do even with external help depends on:
a. **how likely renewed violence** is in their immediate area;

b. **whether their polities broadly favour** (but do not/cannot finance) service provision (e.g. Puntland, Belet Wein, Rahanweyn and indeed most elder/merchant influenced groups) or **see providers as a source of loot** (e.g. the 'self accountable' militias);

c. **how stable** - seeing a future in the area in which they now live - as opposed to return to pre-war areas of residence oriented civil populations are e.g. most in Baidoa do see themselves as Baidoans but far fewer in Bosasso where both the external trade and the main trading community are displaced from Mogadishu;

d. **no territory wide rehabilitation programme is now possible** and even in the most favourable locations - Puntland and Bay/Baidoa - **nothing comparable to what is practicable in Somaliland can currently be achieved** because the instability is greater, the civil society weaker and the governmental functions beyond law, order and commerce protection (at a price) nearly non existent.

**Somaliland**

*Somaliland*\(^{14}\) contrasts very sharply with Somalia. Rehabilitation as a process is well advanced and based on cumulative reconciliation. Because of non-recognition and a weak revenue base state rehabilitation has been focused on constitutional and representational reconstruction, law-order-justice provision, facilitation of trade and of remittances and - with much more fragility - rehabilitation of a professional public service and of basic service provision.

Somaliland reconciliation and rehabilitation have been assisted rather than hampered by cross border linkages. Conflict has been minimal and external support for insurgency low. The key interstate relationship - with Ethiopia - has been positive (probably for the first time in Ethiopian/Somali history). The dominant relationship with Somalilanders abroad (contract workers, old East African diaspora and recent Barre avoiding wider diaspora) has been positive leading to very substantial remittances and not insubstantial business development and to a return of entrepreneurs and professionals. This balance is markedly different not only from Somalia but also from Acholiland, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Eritrea and - *a fortiori* - Rwanda. Official external
support for rehabilitation (and more generally) has however been relatively low (albeit increasing in 1999) because of international and OAU\textsuperscript{115} non-recognition of the Hargeisa government. Somaliland since the defeat of the Barre forces - in Somaliland terms 'the liberation' - has had virtually no negative cross border involvements. Arguably this is partly by luck and location, but in part it represents deliberate state rehabilitation/consolidation strategy. While in the early post 1945 years the Issak did develop or at least conceptualise modern Pan Somaliism from poetry to politics, their experience with the URS (United Republic of Somalia) and the Mengistu regime has led to a good borders/good neighbours approach with no irridentist claims in either direction (quite unlike the Ogaden, the southern half of Ethiopia's Somali Region which is plagued by separatism and irridentism). Autonomy in Djijiga and power sharing in Addis is accepted by the Issak of Ethiopia. Somaliland makes no claim to Ethiopian Somali Region territory which (despite a formal transfer of sovereignty to Ethiopia in the interwar period) the UK recoccupied in 1942 and only evacuated in the early 1950's. Its claim is - in President Egal's words\textsuperscript{116} - "our frontiers at independence from the UK, not one inch more and not one inch less" - borders which are in fact agreed and almost totally demarcated. Similarly no disputes exist with Djibouti. The wealthy Somaliland merchants there are ex-refugees from Barre. They are returning portions of their business to Somaliland and are supportive not hostile. That stance - of support and transfer of funds to relatives, to home building, to business - is typical of long and short stay Somalilander diaspora in East Africa, 'over the water' in the Arabian peninsula, in Europe (especially the UK), North America and elsewhere. Numbering up to 500,000, including family members of the longer stay diaspora, they transfer on the order of $500 million a year – over 40\% of GNP and almost equal to GDP - which funds most imports and much personal consumption thereby holding poverty levels below the African average. With improvement in customs management strengthening government revenue, begun in 1999, it should also make possible less fragile basic service and infrastructure provision. The frontier with Puntland (Somalia) is potentially one of transborder problems. In practice there has been no substantial separatist movement even in Las Anod whose main sub-clan is largely resident in Puntland. Further, despite occasionally flamboyant rhetoric, neither Somaliland nor Puntland has sought to escalate conflict, quite the reverse. For example, Las Anod at one point had two police forces - Somaliland on duty in uniform, Puntland out of uniform quietly living with kin
and Puntland's real goal seems to be to encourage Somaliland to back a multi-state confederation (not a unitary government based in Mogadishu) of former Italian Somalia and British Somaliland because Puntland's own weight in such a confederation would be much greater if Somaliland were within it rather than a separate state. This frontier is fully agreed, but a small (physically near inaccessible) portion is not delineated on the ground.

Somaliland has had three major and two recurrent minor instances of armed conflict against the government. Of the main three (all involving Issak sub-clans) the Hargeisa Airport and Berbera Port cases of 1995 turned on political weight and economic benefits to go to residents living at and around key transport assets. In each case Somaliland troops blocked the advance of the insurgents, councils of elders negotiated a settlement, the former insurgent militias were incorporated into the Somaliland uniformed services. In neither case was transborder support significant. In the case of the longer running Burao insurgency (also intra Issak and about power sharing in Somaliland, not secession nor about reunion with Somalia except in General Aideed's dreams) there was an external involvement. General Aideed provided some arms, supplies and funds to bolster his claims to 'national' leadership, but there is no reason to suppose the bulk of the Burao leadership actually supported that. Again a conciliar process negotiated a settlement (in 1996) and the militias were incorporated in the national forces.

Somaliland has consistently taken an amiable, but arms length attitude to UN, Ethiopian, Egyptian and Djiboutian sponsored peace conferences. It has sometimes sent observers, but underlined the view that Somalia reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation were for Somalians whereas Somaliland had become independent from the UK in 1960, been occupied by the URS in 1961 after voting against union and won back its independence from the Barre regime in 1991. There has been a slight ambiguity as to whether, if a Federal Somalia were recreated and proven viable, Somaliland would consider confederation as well as close economic and cultural cooperation. There has been no ambiguity that experience with a viable decentralised Somalia was a precondition for considering anything beyond developing Somaliland and its economic/cultural relations with its neighbours.

Somaliland was not officially represented at the Djibouti Conference. Some exiles/dissidents - from the diaspora and the Aideed camp - were present. Somaliland, Puntland, some Mogadishu North leaders and the Rahanweyn have taken a de facto coordinated position against both the
leadership emerging from the Conference and its constitutional project for a unitary centralised state.

Somaliland has sedulously cultivated good relations with Ethiopia both at Addis (national) and Djijiga (Somali Regional) levels while making clear it has no claims on the old "reserved grazing lands". let alone the whole or Northern half of the Region. The historic transit trade and cross border grazing links have been fully rehabilitated. Hargeisa and Addis both wish to build up the Berbera -Ethiopia trade corridor and have secured EU regional funding to this end. The one exception to the open corridor policy has been to make clear - in a low profile way - that arms shipments were unwelcome.

Somaliland has sought good relations with Eritrea, though with no common border both trade and transport links are limited. This initiative was presumably partly to build wider support for Horn and African recognition and a process toward IGAD and OAU membership. In respect to the Eritrean - Ethiopian war Hargeisa has made no statements beyond general support for peace.

In part this diplomatic strategy is directed to securing recognition and in part to ensuring that there is little scope for interaction between potentially violent domestic conflicts and cross border support or manipulation - i.e. to creating a climate conducive to national/territorial consolidation and reconciliation. But it is also directed to restoring and developing the historic highlands - coast and remittances economic arteries and thus rehabilitating the economy and government revenue.

Somaliland's national project also turns on reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction (Hargeisa was virtually levelled and livestock herds ravaged by over half during the 1986-90 liberation struggle). These three goals have been seen as interlocking and as drawing on four strands: the old **highlands to the coast coalition state** to provide law order, justice and pastoralism/commerce facilitation; the historic clan/sub clan elders system and especially the **national council of elders**; the **late British colonial basic services** by a professional public service and **accountability for state operations to an elected legislature**; the long standing **contract labour/Diaspora support of the home economy, society and households** through remittances. These have - especially since 1993 when the Somali National Movement (the civilian ruling body of the insurgency against Barre) in effect decided that the gruelling burdens of winning a war and stabilising a peace had worn it out and more or less voluntarily relinquished power to President Egal – consistently formed a coherent core of government strategy, policy and praxis.
The main elements in the project have been:

1. using the National Council of Elders (including 13 added members for largely non Somali minority groups) to negotiate settlements of disputes that threatened national coherence (near Hargeisa, at Berbera in the two Eastern Provinces and - especially at Burao) to devise the outlines of a constitution (now under review by the Executive and the Houses of Elders and of Assembly) and to elect the Houses of Elders and of Assembly as well as the President pending a direct general election probably in 2002;

2. recreating a professional, paid (albeit on a $20-100 a month range until major improvements in 1999 raised it to perhaps $50-250) public service;

3. reconstituting basic services beyond law - order - justice focussing on health, education, water and veterinary - which, however limited, have regained and probably surpassed 1985 (Barre regime pre Somaliland liberation war) levels;

4. encouraging domestic civil society groups, those UN agencies willing to cooperate/coordinate with Hargeisa ministries and selected INGOs to act in the basic services field and also in infrastructure rehabilitation (now also supported by the EU regional fund for the Horn and some EU Member States on Berbera to Addis and Djijiga interstate transport arteries);

5. creating technical authorities to deal with infrastructure (Berbera Port and Hargeisa Airport) and other specialised units (e.g. demining with UNDP);

6. recreated local governance - on a mix of historic and British lines - based on nationally appointed but autonomous mayors with advisory councils, substantial service responsibilities and not inconsiderable revenue bases and actual provision of services (e.g. water, sanitation/waste collection, urban planning);

7. established a 5,000 member uniformed, civilian police force (Ministry of Interior, not Defence) which is perceived as user friendly and able both to limit crime (and keep guns off urban and town streets) and to prevent disputes between individuals escalating into lineage group or sub-clan hostilities;

8. scooped up at least 90% of militias into the Somaliland Army where they are housed, fed, clothed and paid pocket money under national discipline. This has the problems of having
5,000 needed troops and 12,500 to 15,000 ‘warehoused’ personnel whom the government believes cannot safely be demobilised until training and demobilisation into livelihood, not poverty can be achieved. The earlier demobilisation (1991-2) was partly of men with livelihoods to resume and partly funded by merchants (in contrast to Somalia where merchants financed warlords) and the current small scale demobilisation via vocational training is also civil society financed;

9. established a respected, moderately rapid and transparent primary court system based on a synthesis of British Statute/Common, Sharia and Italian Law;

10. thereby creating a climate in which livestock and exports (with a hiatus when the FAO falsely declared a Rift Valley Fever epidemic and Saudi Arabia not unreasonably blocked imports) have fully recovered, transit trade with Ethiopia is at levels not seen since the early 1970s and commerce and services (e.g. mobile phones) are at or above pre-war levels (except for electricity);

11. and also encouraging remittances which have reached an all time high of about $500 million a year (half of household income) and are the core of many households' consumption entitlements, of national import capacity and (indirectly via customs duty) of government revenue;

12. while making a beginning (very weak until 1999) at recreating a tax structure and tax collection system focused on customs and (rather unwisely) export duties;

13. and in 2000 using - in response to initiatives by the House of Elders (which with the House of Assembly is relatively assertive and questioning of the Executive although not organised on partisan nor other permanent fractional lines) - government funds for water supply aspects of drought relief as well as coordinating with WFP and INGO's in respect of food aid. (The Somaliland and adjacent Ethiopian Somali Region south to Djijiga drought is apparently much less severe and its effects better mitigated than in the Ethiopian Ogaden, or Somalian Ogaden and Bay zones.)

The need and the possibility for these packages of strategic steps by Somaliland very much turn on its own context - not least historic context - which is (and is perceived to be) quite distinct from that of Somalia.
The Ethiopian Issak-Hargeisa Highlands-Gulf of Suez Zones have historically had well developed pastoral and commercial links. These were vital to household, local and sub-clan economies and required peace and predictable law-order-adjudication. The result was law-order-trade facilitation states which were coalitions of sub-clans over most of Somaliland the northern half of Ethiopia's Somali Region. These states did not provide basic services (beyond law and order), much infrastructure (few states anywhere did so until the 19th Century) nor were they particularly long lasting individually, but the general pattern endured for several centuries prior to late 19th Century European conquest.

Somalilanders perceive themselves as having achieved independence within their current borders from the UK in 1960; voted 'No' on union with Somalia, but been militarily occupied; then having won back their independence from Mogadishu/Barre in the second half of the 1980s. This is a liberation (not civil) war perception (especially since no problem with a neighbour arises as it does for Ethiopia with Eritrea, because Somalia is not a going concern and Puntland favours a de facto confederal system in Somalia). It is both conducive to national reconciliation and consolidation and a base from which to mobilise toward rehabilitation and development.

UNOSOM never had a major presence in Somaliland (if only because it would have had to fight its way in to act as proconsul or else to have de facto recognised the Hargeisa authorities to provide a range of support, relief and rehabilitation service parallel to those it attempted in Somalia). This did limit resources, but it also forced Somalilanders to handle their own political cleavages - not play them off against UNOSOM - and to follow an extended, elder based political reconciliation process, excluding self anointed militia. That process was totally unlike UNOSOM's approach on each key point. Unfortunately despite - or because? - results in Somaliland were clearly more positive than in Somalia, this 'go it alone' approach has led to substantial institutionalised aversion to Somaliland within some fractions of the UN system.

All of these contextual factors are unique to Somaliland. They have been bolstered by the - not self evidently predictable - emergence of the Ethiopian Issak Somali leadership as significant, relatively satisfied participants in the governing coalition in Addis Ababa and in the Ethiopian Somali Region. As a result Pan Somalianism among the Issak (as opposed to many of the Ogadeni) has again become cultural and economic and the enduring Ethiopian Somali Region-Hargeisa Highlands-Coast links pursued across a basically open border not through any attempt (which
would have been disastrous) to revert to the position of (then British) rule over the Ethiopian Issak area from Somaliland which pertained to the early 1950's.

The combination of the territorial/national council of elders and the remembered (perhaps in somewhat roseate terms) late British colonial governance/service provision model has proven to be a positive influence with elders' legitimacy combined with an elected parliament and semi autonomous local government as well as attempts to provide basic services and infrastructure through a professional public service with substantial space for enterprises and for civil society (a modernised development from the space for lineage groups to sub-clans left open by British indirect rule). The point is not any desire to see British rule return, but the ability to use elements from both historical ('traditional') and colonial institutions and processes in the quest for new syntheses. Italian rule (under military and, later, fascist auspices and with far more colonisation by Italians) did not (or is not so perceived by most Somalians) to offer any similar legacy.

Therefore, to attempt to apply Somaliland 'lessons' to Somalia, let alone to post war situations more generally, would be obtuse. However, some of the strategic elements used - and the importance of genuine 'national ownership' and design of rehabilitation and reconciliation are of broader significance. Somaliland - like Mozambique and Namibia - is a success in reconciliation/rehabilitation terms. But while many of the rehabilitation components are similar or the same, the overall strategic packages are not, and would have been less effective had they been, identical.

However, the very considerable reconciliation - rehabilitation - reconstruction achievements of Somaliland, not least a positive trend toward self sustaining processes, remain at risk and face severe challenges:

1. the state/nation remains fragile, not so much in respect to the likelihood of sub-group commitment unravelling as of limited financial and personnel capacity to deliver basic services and infrastructure;

2. the financial problem turns on a still very weak government fiscal position (despite 1998-00 reforms which may well have raised the revenue base from $25 million to $50 million) for two reasons:
a. **non recognition** which gravely limits external assistance channelled via the government (an especially severe constraint on infrastructure and demobilisation/rehabilitation into livelihood programmes) and also foreign enterprise involvement;

b. a still **weak customs and excise body** because of lack of trained personnel and procedures partly linked to very little technical assistance to institutional reconstruction and training;

3. **personnel constraints** in the short run turn on **ability to pay** (again slightly relaxed - to $50 a month general minimum but $100 in the customs service) to ensure present staff can afford to/have incentives to work full time and that former public servants and diaspora educated younger staff can be recruited. In the longer term a **public service training programme** - in Somaliland at basic levels and in - say - Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa plus Europe and North America at technical, para professional and professional levels - is vital because there have been few new recruits - especially of professionals and para professionals - since about 1970;

4. more **private enterprise fixed investment** is needed and is now constricted because non-recognition creates serious barriers for **banks** and for **non Somali business in general**, but also to a degree even for Somalilanders (albeit Djibouti/Somaliland and, in principle, Addis or Dijjiga/Somaliland linked operations can mitigate the latter);

5. **'warehousing' up to 15,000 ex militia** in the national army is a successful step toward reconciliation but hardly a permanent solution and is a very serious drain on public finance. Neither in terms of finance, programme design nor at least some of the training personnel is Somaliland in a position to 'go it alone' and - to date - non recognition has blocked external involvement;

6. **how Somaliland is to achieve non-sub clan grounded, national parties is unclear.** The Somali National Party has a certain claim to such status but is - and is perceived to be - predominantly Issak. The governing coalition led by President Egal is cross sub clan and collectively is broad based but is not institutionalised and is not actually a political party so much as 'the President's men'.

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Ethiopia

Ethiopia's three Rs have been Relief, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. This R-R-R, however, was at least nominally on his part, genuinely by R-R-R professionals - devised as a strategic approach to drought during the Mengistu period albeit initially conceptualised and run throughout by a quasi autonomous, professional commission. The present government has a strategic political economic project focused on regional autonomy, basic public service extension, effective mitigation of drought caused dearth and absolute poverty reduction especially in rural areas. This package - and its operational entrustment to a public service including major quasi-autonomous agencies (which have clear lines of continuity of nearly half a century) turns on the historic context of Ethiopia in 1992 and the political imperatives of deconstructing the centralised, exclusivist (upper class Amhara) empire (in the classical sense of that term) and reconstructing a regionalised inclusivist Ethiopian nation:

1. the Amhara dominated centralised New Empire flowing from Menelik (or arguably Tewedros) through Mengisti (a blood descendant of Menelik and very much in the New Empire style) had wrenched Ethiopia from the 17th to the early 20th century and - with unintended Italian help - created a basis for a nation, but had also created explosive separatist tendencies by the majority frozen out (notably the Oromo, the Galla/Muslim Amhara, the Somalis, the Tigreans and the Eritreans);

2. the public service - created under HIH Hailie Selassie - was professional and functionally apolitical. As a result it - including quasi autonomous bodies like the Highway Authority and R-R-R Commission - was used largely unchanged by Mengistu. However, each regime (now including the present government) has set rather detailed political tests for policy and, on occasion - notably Mengistu's horrible perversion of an inherently not unsound resettlement programme out of the most densely populated and most eroded, but more relevant to him also most anti-Mengistu areas - clearly used genuine technical professionalism as a mask for much less benign political projects (in the case cited seeking to empty the Tigrayan civil society lake in which the TPLF swam). After a brief confusion over the meaning of nominal membership in Mengistu's party the present government has continued (as have the stronger regional ones) the strategy of a strong, professional, technically independent (as to advice and, usually, agreed
policy implementation) public service within a (now more transparent) set of political or
political economic objectives and parameters;

3. direct physical **war damage outside Eritrea and parts of Tigriynye was very limited** - the Mengiustu regime crumbled very fast when the TPLF/EPLF liberation forces broke out of those two (then) provinces;

4. for most Ethiopians (including the Galla/Muslim Amhara and - perhaps - the poor Amhara) the fall of the Empire was at least potentially a **liberation event** and the new Government perceived building on that potential as essential to survival because a Tigrayan dominated centralised state was seen (almost certainly correctly) as unviable;

5. **absolute poverty** together with absence of basic services in rural areas (whether caused by the 13% of GDP going into the military or by other factors) was seen as the **basic developmental challenge** but livelihood rehabilitation was not particularly linked to demobilisee, refugee or otherwise absolutely poor status (at least outside parts of Tigriynye and Eritrea). Relief to ensure that drought and consequent dearth did not lead to mass death was given a high priority in this context. Mass death by starvation had catalyzed the fall of HIH Haile Selasse and weakened Mengistu (and the TPLF and EPLF had operated effective food relief systems). Urban employment/livelihood expansion apparently was still viewed as beyond state ability to achieve (as under Hailie Selassie and Menelik) despite urban unemployment (not informal employment but none), especially in Addis, from at least the 1960's at levels well above any other non-war SSA case and greatly exacerbated by war displacement and postwar demobilisation.

The main components of Ethiopian reconciliation/rehabilitation turned on broadening of access to power in Addis Ababa combined with decentralisation of substantial powers to over a dozen ethnically based regions backed by efforts to provide broader access to basic services, strengthening of rural livelihoods, effective interim survival/relief for displaced/demobilised and drought afflicted households and a macroeconomic and infrastructure provision policy frame to further rapid growth to reinforce fiscal and foreign exchange resource flows as well as to expand urban employment/household livelihoods.

The **regions have substantial powers** in respect to almost all areas of day to day concern to residents. While ethnically defined, they do not - in most cases - discriminate against long resident
minorities either in the public service or elections. The Somali and Oromia Regions together with the Tigrinye underpin the same ethnic groups' support base for the central government. Potentially, and to a degree actually, the Amhara (who have elite, poor and Muslim factions with the first - except for its senior public servant component - the immediate core of opposition) and southern (Ogaden) half of the Somali Region plus several small, peripheral regions whose peoples had more in common with some similarly peripheral Kenyans and Sudanese peoples than with Highland Ethiopians are negatively disposed, as is a pro-independence Oromo minority. The peripheral regions are hard to reconcile and rehabilitate because of geography, history and few 'own' personnel either to serve regionally and/or to give a visible presence in Addis.

The senior public service remains both predominately Amhara and technico professional - not political. The division between expert advice before and implementation after political decisions is, if anything, sharper than under Hailie Selassie or Mengistu but also more transparent. Public service restructuring (more front line professionals, e.g. primary teachers, and less support staff, e.g. janitors), re-professionalising (a sector by sector technico political process led by education and health) and paying more (by 1997 to a broad range of $50-500 a month up from a third that in the early 1990s) have been central.

Up to 1998 extra state finance for priority objectives came primarily from the peace dividend - a cut from 13% plus to 3.5% of GDP - and a rise in external cooperation flows as well as their partial redirection from INGO channeled pure relief to Ethiopian government channeled poverty reduction.121.

Interim relief/rehabilitation for refugees - displaced persons - excombatants (perhaps 2,500,000 including soldiers' immediate families at the end of the war against Mengistu) dominated by the latter were eligible for interim food and other immediate assistance; food for work or work (for wages) for food project employment and household land allocation in home areas. For the 65%-70% from rural areas this approach has usually worked (with a lag until ex Mengistu soldiers reassured themselves it was an opportunity not a trap). In parallel , proactive data collection and analysis to warn early and to respond rapidly with food mobilisation and delivery approaches were designed to avert future mass famines largely successfully in 1994-95 but less so in 1997-00 because the war with Eritrea diverted state attention and resources and reduced
external support for financing operations comparable to 1994-95. In both sectors the present government has welcomed INGO participation on conditions:

a. within government parameters and coordinated with government and Ethiopian civil society group projects;

b. phasing down in the medium term as state/civil society capacity rose;

c. manageable in numbers to be seen and coordinated and also limited to INGO's with relevant expertise;

d. not perceived by donors or INGOs as an alternative to Ethiopian action or a means to erode the state (which had quite overtly been the case during the Mengistu period).

Reordering of relationships has been surprisingly good. Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia has not moved toward a general INGO ban nor even a ban on the INGO's who had been prominent in working with the R-R-R under Mengistu even if then seeking overtly to erode state capacity and legitimacy. Equally - unlike the experience in Mozambique - INGO's and donors have accepted that the central and coordinating roles in basic services and in relief should be state ones and that INGO's should neither be alternatives funded externally to erode those roles nor operate without reference to (or excluding) state institutions and programmes.

Until 1998 the strategic project was moving ahead and developing momentum. The outbreak of war with Eritrea led to massive diversion of financial resources, key personnel and political attention as well as to reduced external resource inflows even for disaster relief (most unfortunately paralleling a well documented 1997-2000 drought build up in the southern half of Ethiopia' Somali region and several other lowland areas plus parts of Tigrinye). The overall economic impact is hard to calculate. Export falls relate more to coffee price and volume falls than to war and the limited direct physical damage (as distinct from the 75,000 probable death toll). But Ethiopia appears to have paid cash for its weaponry and substantially augmented its armed forces suggesting that up to $2,000 million has been diverted from basic service expansion, public service strengthening and investment over 1998-2000 even excluding perhaps $250 million lost external cooperation financing.

Ethiopia's external policy linked to creating a peaceful setting for rehabilitation and to facilitating it via trade and transport links has been variable, kaleidoscopic and not self
evidently consistent. In the case of Somaliland it has sought to build up transport, transit and export trade and to maintain amicable relations with the Hargeisa government, aims successfully achieved at least partly because their Issak brothers in Ethiopia's Somali Region are a crucial and relatively content part of the ruling coalition in Addis. In respect to Somalia the priority goal has been a peaceful border with no bases for the separatist (a minority) Oromo and the (also minority) Ethiopian Ogadeni fighters for a united Ogaden and no border statelets controlled by irredentist Somalian Ogadeni (however branded e.g. as Muslim theocratic purists). It is well aware of its unpopularity in Somalia (in contrast to Somaliland), has no territorial ambitions and sees no prospects of short or medium term trade or Mogadishu port use. A minor secondary theme has been amiability toward Puntland and - rather trivial - use of Bosasso port. That goal in Somlia has led to brief invasions against al Itihaad area influenced statelets, attempts to create a peaceably inclined local government at Lugh and ultimately to substantial equipment, probably finance and training and perhaps a few field advisors for the Rahanweyn (and thus open, if indirect, war with the Aideed militia rearmed by Eritrea).^{123}

Sudanese policy has swung widely. Initially, because the SPLA had had support from the Mengistu regime, Addis sought a détente with Khartoum and an end to cross border operations. As Khartoum's response (other than desultory talks) was the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarrak in Addis and based on a reanalysis - somewhat ironically partly on Eritrean advice - it shifted to substantial backing for the SPLA - Northern Democratic Party alliance (with their secretariat in Asmara). The 1998-2000 wars with Eritrea has led to a pragmatic lull in expressions of enmity with Khartoum. The military's expulsion of its civilian partner - Sheikh al Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood - has created a crisis of legitimacy in Northern Sudan and, for that reason, led to Sudanese government tactical attempts to negotiate partial accommodations with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Irrigation on the plateau south and east of Lake Tana - tapping Blue Nile waters -is a significant theme in medium term Ethiopian agricultural rehabilitation, environmental protection, material food security and rural poverty reduction strategy. Since Ethiopia provides over half of effective Nile water flow, it is also a potential casus belli with Egypt and the Sudan. Ethiopia is not a party to the Nile Waters Agreement, but its announcement of medium term plans to draw and abstract water without consultation with Cairo or Khartoum can hardly be conducive to good relations with
the two Lower Nile Valley states. **Egyptian policy** toward the Sudan, the Horn and East Africa is heavily influenced by the **vital objective of continued access to guaranteed - preferably growing - levels of Nile water.** Only in respect to the Sudan are upstream state use limits and transborder flow minima set. Very loose agreements include Uganda and Kenya but Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi -like Ethiopia - have no treaty agreements relative to the Nile and all (as well as Kenya and Uganda) are likely in the foreseeable future to seek to irrigate from rivers and/or lakes feeding into the Nile. This is an explosive situation. It would appear to be resolvable only by negotiation leading to agreed limits to upstream abstraction and to cross border flow guarantees and in parallel reducing the 50% water loss from the White Nile by transpiration in the Sudan' Suud swamp so Egypt and the Sudan can have guaranteed stable or slightly higher levels consistent with some Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia use.

**Eritrean relations - a massive setback to rehabilitation and reconciliation in the Horn** - are apparently perceived by Addis as more inter (Ethiopian) regional than interstate. While Ethiopia readily implemented the TPLF pledge to the EPLF to allow a referendum on independence and - in the event - independence, **it apparently perceived Eritrea as a slightly more separate (for a time) region** with common currency, monetary and fiscal policy and with its economy significantly dependent on Assab and Massawa as basically Ethiopian ports with the Assab oil refinery in a similar role. That view was not shared by Eritrea whose prickly nationalism rejected it and whose programme of national rehabilitation and development included *inter alia* an Eritrean currency. This clash of view - bolstered by none too civil relations between the closely culturally and ethnically (indeed familiar in some cases) related Tigrinye and Highland Eritrean peoples led to increasing acrimony.

The **'border war' is not about undemarcated frontiers.** These account for little land and in most cases areas very hard, possibly impossible in parts of the Danakil Depression, to reach. The areas under dispute - especially two small towns and adjacent agropastoral areas with mixed but majority Ethiopian 1990's populations - are territory undoubtedly part of Italian Eritrea but since the early 1940s administered from Addis (first by the British Military Administration and subsequently by Ethiopia). The issue was simply not resolved in the run up to Eritrea's independence (for a few minutes) before accepting confederacy under the Imperial Crown nor in 1992-93 in the preparations for the referendum and renewed independence. The Eritrean case is colonial
boundaries (the OAU formulation) and the Ethiopian one over 50 years undisputed administration/development and - by the 1990's - an Ethiopian population majority. Whether it is itself the casus belli, as opposed to a catalyst is doubtful. Eritrea's seizure of land shown on even the present Ethiopian government's maps (1995) as Eritrean under Ethiopian administration was initially at least largely a reaction to Ethiopian exchange control and trade restriction measures Asmara perceived as bullying while to Addis the measures were a response to Asmara's 'unfriendly' institution of a national currency.

The Eritrean war has clearly set back rehabilitation through eating up perhaps $2,000 to $2,500 million with up to 75,000 lives snuffed out in the periods of open war (in arguably the most sanguinary trench warfare since Field Marshal Hague's Flanders campaign) and as many severely injured. It has also diverted leadership attention from rehabilitation and relief (resettlement, basic services, combatting drought imposed hunger and poverty) as well as constricting foreign development and emergency support. Ironically the 2000 Ethiopian assertion that it raised the scale of the war beyond the costs level the smaller, economically weaker Eritrea could match in order to be able to return to development at home is not necessarily disingenuous. A long running medium level war with Ethiopian human wave assaults broken by Eritrean artillery and trench lines would have been even worse for Ethiopian rehabilitation.

However, an indefinite cease fire with no final peace treaty will end any chance of transport, trade and general economic development of Eritrea as if it were an Ethiopian Region - the original strategic aim of Ethiopian policy re Eritrea. It is also likely to prolong the inability of IGAD to be an effective regional organisation, to delay the collapse of the present Khartoum military regime by hampering coordinated action by the SPLA-Northern Democratic Parties alliance especially on the corridors from Port Sudan to the Gezira and to the 'Unity' oil field (overlapping the North/South border linne) and to increase the risk of external dabbling in Somalian conflicts. That context will raise fears leading to military budgeting above mid 1990's levels with rehabilitation, basic service provision and poverty reduction in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and perhaps Somalia and Somaliland less rapid than otherwise attainable.
Eritrea

Eritrea\textsuperscript{125} is often seen as either a somewhat accidentally independent Ethiopian region or as a miniature (five million vs sixty million people) Ethiopia and its 1993 independence as vaguely analogous to Slovakia's 'velvet divorce' from the Czech Lands. The first understates the complex differences flowing from up to a thousand years of history and the second the convoluted love-hate relationship between the Tigrinye and Highland Eritrean elites.

Eritrea:

a. was not part of Ethiopia between the waning of the Axum Empire and its transition - via minutes of independence - from British Occupied Italian Colony to confederation with Ethiopia through acceding to the suzerainty of the Emperor. Until 1960 it had separate institutions including an elected legislature - all suppressed in 1961 by Emperor Hailie Selassie;

b. as a result Eritrea had thirty years of armed insurrection before the fall of the Mengistu regime - a struggle which increasingly debilitated that regime fiscally and militarily in Ethiopia proper;

c. the initial 1974 Ethiopian revolution (against the Emperor) included senior Eritrean officers who sought recreation of the pre 1961 confederal relations. Mengistu's assassination of their leader - the General who was at least nominally the head of the Dergue - precisely because of his pursuit of confederal peace put paid to any Eritrean compromise on independence;

d. Eritrea prior to the 1961-1992 liberation struggle had never been a national (or imperial) state but a border zone fought over by other states. Its boundaries as Italian Eritrea included most of its historic heartland but also the Danakil Depression/Asab coastal strip which was not part of historic Eritrea;

e. Eritrea - unlike Ethiopian regions - is not characterised by a large majority of one ethnic/cultural group. It - like Ethiopia - has a Highland Coptic/Lowland Muslim divide (with the same qualifications that not all Highlanders are Coptic and some groups straddle both altitudes). Its initial liberation warriors - the EPF - were largely Lowland Muslims. They were overwhelmed militarily by the EPLF which is cross faith and cross altitude but with a largely Highland Coptic leadership. As a result, \textbf{the EPLF has always feared pluralism and}
condition of the people of Sudan. The post 1997 military regime in Khartoum is perceived as analogous to Mengistu's, while Sheikh al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood are seen as promoting and exporting doctrines inimical to peace and unity in Eritrea. This led to serving as a catalyst for the SDLP - Northern Democratic Parties liberation alliance (Sudan Democratic Front) based in Asmara while the Sudan based attempt to assassinate the President of Egypt in Addis provided an opening for Eritrea to convince Ethiopia (previously hostile to the SDLP because Mengistu had assisted it) to back it;

4. because it saw food aid as dependence creating and market destabilising, Eritrea negotiated (successfully) to reduce food aid in non drought years and (less successfully) to convert it to cash aid for mechanised development resettlement. That process was reversed (consistently with Eritrean strategy but confusing to WFP) in 1999 as a result of drought (exacerbated in 2000 by war displaced persons);

5. because it perceived local rehabilitation and development as best carried out by Eritreans within an Eritrean government articulated strategy, Eritrea saw no long term role for INGO's - a perception exacerbated by the impression some were unwilling to coordinate or cooperate with anyone. Interestingly the INGO inputs it most valued were survey, data collection and analysis to be fed into its programmes. Near total expulsion by 1996 had begun to be shifted to selective use before the Ethiopian war. The war - by creating resource gaps - made INGO's (again presumptively ad interim) much more acceptable to Eritrea;

6. Disagreements with donors - reducing aid flows - turned on unwillingness to accept broad front, multi parameter conditionality. It has also presented project proposals which tended to be rigid and less than usually (even in SSA terms) backed by hard numbers and rigorous analysis even when probably sound. There has also been a serious misunderstanding over accounts - Eritrea lacks accountants, probably wants accountancy training, but took criticism of accounts to be charges of fraud.

In the long term a democratic Sudan not acting to destabilise its neighbours would be conducive to stable rehabilitation. Eritrea has, in practice, avoided armed clashes with the Sudan but has quite overtly supported the Democratic Alliance as the only route to reach R-R-R in the Sudan. The stress on food production, Eritrean community action in national strategic parameters and avoiding
overly time intensive collation of weak (nil prior to 1993) statistics and (consequently) analysis have plusses as well as minuses.

The war with Ethiopia - arising out of the growing hostility and consequential secondary disputes not just over the ex-Eritrean/near fifty year Ethiopian administered lands - has been an unmitigated disaster for rehabilitation (albeit it has apparently not weakened the success of intra Eritrean reconciliation). The bases of the two claims - Eritrea's on Italian boundaries and asserted 1940 population pattern, Ethiopia's resting on near fifty years of actual Ethiopian rule and a mid 1990's Ethiopian population majority - are clear but clear in ways making resolution very difficult especially after war. With substantial economic disruption, up to 500,000 displaced persons/refugees and a de facto two year gap in development/rehabilitation spending to fund the military, renewed rehabilitation in Eritrea requires at least a stable cease fire/truce and preferably an internationally endorsed and monitored peace treaty. Whether this will eventuate and whether it will convince the governments to demobilise conscripts (probably several hundred thousand on each side) and reduce arms buying are highly problematic.

Particular components of rehabilitation conceptualisation and praxis have flowed quite directly from the historic context, centralised regime allowing limited space for civil society initiatives because of fear of wilful attempts to reverse domestic reconciliation (this despite genuine concern for participation and poverty reduction) and prickly materialism sketched above:

1. creation of a state administrative structure from central to village level (in practice EPLF, not Ethiopia, governed from the fall of Mengistu, not only after independence) with a parallel/interlocking party structure;

2. creation of a civil service, initially paid room and food but transformed to a paid and more professionally structured basis in 1995 - necessarily from scratch because, while Eritreans were from the 1960's to 1998 the second largest cadre at middle and upper levels in the Ethiopian service, most Eritreans in that service did not serve in Eritrea and few were willing to risk rank and give up pay by returning home. The new Ethiopian regime trusted them as a counterweight to the Amhara plurality in the senior public service because they were not linked to any political fraction in Ethiopia so, until 1998, they were welcome to stay;
3. a detailed, planned, controlled, serviced resettlement programme for displaced persons and refugees phased over four years with few returning before being 'called up' and many 'relocated' from their previous (sometimes over twenty years previous) home villages. This was in part to maintain control, in part to provide basic (health, education, water) and livelihood support (extension, transport) services and in part to avoid uncontrolled return of refugees in the Sudan who were remnants of the broken EPF who had fled the EPLF as much as, or more than, Mengistu and were perceived as a possible threat;

4. creation of participatory channels by location (from village up) and through other (e.g. women, peasants, urban workers) groups within the EPLF umbrella and controlled by it so far as strategic parameters and major policies went, but with some flexibility as to local projects. Participation - including knowledge provision and need elucidation - was desired, but only within civil society space set by the state/party and subject to boundary adjustment by them. Much participation in rehabilitation work was/is genuine, some is under social pressure and some probably from tacit coercion. It would be inaccurate to describe it as a corvee system or analogous to the 'voluntary' labour system of Mengistu (although that too had genuine support for some projects in some areas);

5. concentration on primary health care and education, water (human and livestock), agricultural extension and transport, infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance in the national through village public sector and livelihood rehabilitation (using the public sector services) in the household and medium/small enterprise sector;

6. while avoiding a state trading economy Eritrea operates macro and sectoral economic policies characterised by intervention e.g. in agriculture which was initially marked by an emphasis on basic food self sufficiency from small farming household production, but was then radically (and suddenly) shifted to focus on high value export crops (horticultural) from large, mechanised farms;

7. both public and private physical rehabilitation through reconstruction since almost all asset categories (from houses through land improvements and livestock to basic infrastructure) had been damaged or destroyed during the war against the Mengistu regime except in Asmara proper, a situation quite different from most of rural Ethiopia, let alone Addis Ababa;
8. Mobilising diaspora remittance, domestic tax/labour contribution and external resources - probably in that order - to sustain the financial requirements of strategic programmes (radically shifted to war over 1997-00). Remittances have provided several hundred million dollars a year financing household/small business rehabilitation and reconstruction indirect tax flows to the state and voluntary contributions. The tax revenues are primarily customs and excise while external resources have largely been food aid and related resettlement support falling away well before the 1998 war as coarse grain production neared national self sufficiency;

9. prior to the 1998 war output and service provision were rising significantly - probably on a 5% to 6% trend. In part this may have reflected initial reversal of the near non-functionality of much of the economy after 30 years of war marked by the displacement or driving into exile of over half the population. With the exception of sugar, cooking oil, wheat and rice (the latter two preferred but not dominant staples), Eritrea probably had reached non-drought year self sufficiency by 1997. Both drought and war have knocked it back into deficit. Before the Ethiopian war, Eritrea had arguably achieved the least bad primary health, education, water and extension coverage in the Horn (excluding the city state of Djibouti albeit even in that case arguably Asmara, Massawa and many rural areas are better served than Djibouti, Obock and rural Djibouti respectively). The war impact has clearly been serious but how long lasting it is depends on how rapidly people can return home and how fully basic service financing can be restarted.

Eritrea provides a continuing lessons for early warning/early mediation advocates. In retrospect, the road to war with Ethiopia and the reasons for it (as separately perceived in Addis and Asmara) can be identified and comprehended. However, it is not easy to see how the chasm between Eritrean and Ethiopian perceptions of actual and normatively desirable interstate relations could have been bridged. Neither does the 'democracies do not go to war' rubric help. While neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea is a full democracy each is responsive to public opinion and in each case governmental nationalism has been at least matched by popular. Nor would clearer explanation of the costs of preparing for - let alone engaging in - war have been likely to sustain peace. The reason is not that the Addis and Asmara authorities gave a low priority to rehabilitation, but that they perceived nationalism, self determination and populist/mass
support for national self assertion as necessary to protect space for and to provide national support to sustain material rehabilitation.
FLEXIBILITY AND MARGINS: MANAGING UNCERTAINTY

One nearly omnipresent feature of rehabilitation strategic design and programming has been lack of forward resource allocation stability. This includes not merely resource allocations doubtfully adequate to achieve significant results within a two year time frame, but also with no contingency reserves to compensate for unprojected (and often unprojectable) negative contingencies and to act on unanticipated opportunities. That weakness is often compounded (especially when no specific strategic frame or prism for ordering programmes to further objectives has been set out) by relative rigidity in programme design and articulation rendering viring resources among uses to side-step blockages and accentuate action in areas of unexpected (whether as to time, scope, volume or ease) opportunities difficult and delayed.

True, those criticisms apply to a majority of strategic and programmatic operations in Africa under structural adjustment rubrics, not only to R-R-R. But they are probably more telling in respect to rehabilitation because uncertainties which cannot be resolved ex ante are more numerous and basic in respect to rehabilitation than - say - overall fiscal management or non-conflict area infrastructure maintenance, restoration and development. Both for rehabilitation, and African economic management more generally, the principle that the greater the uncertainty, the greater the need for contingency reserves (either mobilised but initially unallocated resources or pre negotiated, rapidly accessible, specified event contingent facilities) is very evidently not being acted upon and apparently not even seriously considered. The basic reasons are clear enough:

a. with demands/needs above projectable/budgetable resources (not only in financial, but also analytical, institutional and personnel terms) to hold back reserves appears both economically wasteful and politically imprudent;

b. donors in general are unwilling to provide - say - 10% of ongoing funding on the basis of allocation during a budget year to meet unanticipated needs/opportunities or to provide for quick, easy viring within and among programme packages, let alone to pre negotiate rapidly drawable 'standby'/contingency allocations.

These reasons do have internal logics of varying degrees of coherence, but result in inefficient allocations. unusable resources, inability to respond actively to uncertainties and significant delays
in implementing at all. **Very poor countries recently wracked by armed conflict are economically, socially and politically least able to bear these cost burdens/positive result delays.**

Among the key uncertainties likely to impact on any rehabilitation and/or reconciliation process are:

1. **calamities** - both in the sense of climatic (drought, flood) disasters and of external economic shocks quite beyond any short term state or directly productive sector ability to manage and also not subject to accurate projection;

2. domestic **catastrophes** - basically return to armed conflict flowing from primarily domestic causes;

3. **trans border/catastrophes** in which externally based domestic fractions and/or their foreign associates 'restore' armed conflict which would not otherwise be sustainable;

4. failure to identify or to capitalise rapidly enough on a **lull** in hostilities which, if used, may create a reconciliation/trust building process able to block renewed widespread violence but if not perceived or missed may prove to be merely the eye of a hurricane. This is especially true if key areas of potential future violent conflict - e.g. land ownership in Southern Africa - are postponed (initially perhaps quite validly) and then left as sleeping dogs rather than kept on the agenda for early action. Unfortunately such sleeping dogs are then available to be kicked to manipulate attitudes and confuse realities on other issues and have a tendency to be, at the least, vicious and often rabid. The Zimbabwe settler land issue and its systematic postponement and reactivation for varying reasons - not always closely related to land ownership as such - on several occasions since Lancaster House is an obvious example.  

**Calamities**

**Calamities** reduce resources (physical and financial) available and/or increase costs. Drought (or flood) creates scarcity of food accessible to poor persons - especially drought or flood afflicted farmers - and reduced industrial input/export crop production while also reducing poor producer entitlements to food as well as national foreign exchange and fiscal revenues. Terms of trade
have similar results (poor producers lose on unit value as well as volume falls). In Kenya-Uganda-
Tanzania-Rwanda 1999-2000 is likely to record substantial fall in coffee output paralleled (at least
in respect of robusta) by a 30% to 50% dollar unit price collapse; a combined weather/terms of
trade calamity far outweighing more limited drought impact on staple food production.

Calamities may or may not be natural (markets as human artefacts are somewhat hard to define in
that way and water offtake/deforestation erosion do affect droughts and floods). They are not
basically susceptible to accurate projection nor to short term national action to manage or to
prevent/reduce, as opposed to alleviate after the event. It is valid to argue that SADC (Southern
Africa Development Community) can in the medium term manage water flows/reservoir levels and
releases in a way modestly reducing severity of droughts and floods. It is technically possible - if
politically harder - for it to coordinate levels of use, water allocation (by price or mixed
instruments), erosion control, selective reafforestation to decrease (at least relative to inaction)
water drawings and loss by transpiration and to delay runoff from heavy rains reducing drought
impact and flood surges. How the IGAD (Horn) countries could act similarly - even together and
even assuming political harmony - is much less clear. They do not comprise all the Nile basin
countries and the conflict of interests between Egypt (not an IGAD member) and the upstream
riparian states therefore cannot effectively be managed within the present IGAD. Similarly, while
the extreme volatility of the world coffee market imposes net losses on producers/exporting
economies and consumers/importing economies (and probably on manufacturers), efficient and
cost feasible methods of intervention have not to date been attainable and the initial impact of
exporting country buy up and retention schemes are quite likely to be several months of lower
export earnings and fiscal resource availability with very limited price gains at the end.

The relevant point is that lessened domestic resource availability and reconstruction/survival
support costs reduce funding for rehabilitation directly and by blocking the use of eternal funds
contingent on domestic contributions, at least if the country is bound by external commitments on
fiscal and trade deficits (as a large majority of African countries are).
Catastrophes

Catastrophes have the same resource reduction/cost expansion impact as calamities. This is true even if the catastrophe relates to a different conflict (e.g. Ethiopia - Eritrea war or Uganda - Congo armed conflict) than the one whose consequences are addressed by the rehabilitation programme.

If the new/renewed war is full scale (in terms of the afflicted state), as is arguably the case for Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda, certainly for Ethiopia and DRC and a fortiori for Eritrea, genuine government priority for rehabilitation (or even preventing drought and dearth from becoming famine and death) will be unable to override war economy strategic 'necessities'. Negative donor reaction to any/all appeals from such war embrangled states is likely to accentuate the shortfall.

One significant (but partial) exception illustrates the generalisation. Since 1994 Tanzania has increased military expenditure and 'accepted' substantial spillover conflict costs from refugee tidal waves. It has succeeded in mobilising at least partially incremental external funds toward offsetting/reversing the impact of the latter but not the former. Why? Because the armed conflicts involved are the complex Rwanda-Burundi-Eastern Congo wars and the costs the impact of refugees on basic services, water supplies, environment (especially trees and bushes) and women's work load, whereas the military costs relate to (successful) deployment of existing forces on or near borders to prevent armed violence spilling into Tanzania.

The additional costs of catastrophes in respect to rehabilitation - at least if they reopen the same armed conflict and/or are in the same areas - is physical damage to achieved results and reversal of forward progress, not merely in respect to physical and institutional rehabilitation but also in respect to processes of reconciliation and trust building which are key inputs into and whose sustainability is usually contingent on progress in rehabilitation.

For that reason Uganda's and Rwanda's desire to combat Interahamwe (primarily) in its Congo base areas (achieving relative peace and stability at home) and Uganda's to build up forces on or near its Acholiland border and roads to increase ability to respond to raids rapidly to keep the LRA away from Acholi reconciliation and rehabilitation, are inherently economically as well as politically and militarily rational. The particular strategies and tactics in respect to anti IH interventions in the Congo may however have unsustainable political, economic and military capacity costs and - at least to date - neither they nor Acholiland border protection have been even substantially effective.
Lull Utilisation

Lull utilisation has a very uneven record. **Prior to the outbreak of armed conflicts** (or at least new ones) that event is often unforeseen and rarely identifiable with much accuracy as to catalyst, timing, geographical extent or intensity. In general **over-optimism has been characteristic of what evaluations have been tried** - especially when manifestly internally contradictory and unsustainable pauses have been negotiated - as was very notably the case in Sierra Leone. This has also been true of inherent contradictions likely to re-emerge as causes or catalysts (e.g. the settler land issue in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. These include, the Italian Eritrean border areas placed under Ethiopian management by the British Military Administration in the early 1940's and not resolved - one way or the other - either at the time of the Ethiopian-Eritrean federation under one crown nor in the 1992-94 Eritrean independence process. There may have been too much willingness set aside or overlook on the 'let sleeping dogs lie' principle. Such 'dogs' have a tendency to be kicked - accidentally or on purpose, to awake biting and to turn out to be rabid.

**During armed conflict** some reconciliation and rehabilitation initiatives are usually possible, but partial, local, fragile and unlikely to be self sustaining/expanding. One partial exception - in respect to Renamo forces in Southern Mozambique is illustrative. Renamo's forces there were starving in 1992. Their discovery that the State gave priority to food relief (and vaccination/immunisation) for them and their families and knew the size and location of their civilian (as opposed to military exercise launching) base camps (and thus could, if it had wished, have wiped out their families) did start a process of trust building which certainly facilitated demobilisation in the four Southern provinces. Arguably it also led to deeper civil reconciliation and to voters there (unlike the Northern and Central Zones) voting for Renamo only if they truly desired Dhlakama as President and Renamo as Government, not as a catchall protest against limited service delivery and manifest corruption by the Frelimo Government with no real desire for/faith in a Renamo alternative. However, the case is partial because the Southern Renamo leaders only became aware of these facts at about the time of the cease fire/Rome Accords i.e. the beginning of the lull. They had existed for at least 12 to 18 months before, but Mozambique government and UN agency cautiousness plus opposition by Renamo's central leadership delayed action.
To capitalise on a lull to set in motion self-re-enforcing processes of rehabilitation and reconciliation requires willingness to take risks and identifications of social/political cleavages (and their causes) contributing to past armed violence and in danger—unless treated by reconciliation backed by rehabilitation—of leading to its renewal.

The risk of renewed armed conflict is often evident. So long as trust is low it may be even more nakedly apparent than real. Renewed armed conflict can sweep away physical, service and institutional rehabilitation virtually literally overnight—e.g. Baidoa, Somalia in the fall of 1995 and partially (and much more transitorily because all parties sought to avoid damaging key assets) in Hargeisa and Berbera, Somaliland a few weeks later.

Collapsed reconciliation increases distrust and can make new efforts harder than if there had been no earlier attempt. For example, early 2000 events in Sierra Leone have hardened broad public opposition (especially in Freetown) to any reconciliation with the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) and specifically put paid to any role for Foday Sankoh in a viable government of reconciliation (not necessarily a bad thing, but a limitation on ways and means). Per contra because the 1997 ex-army rebels (Koromah Group) have rallied to the government against the RUF, reconciliation with and political participation by them is now more likely to prove acceptable.

Capitalising on a lull requires reasonably accurate and (however hard) dispassionate identification of cleavages which are rarely simple dichotomies. It is true that perceived history is a cause of conflict and alteration of perceptions can facilitate reconciliation. But historical revisionism which attempts by selective use of sources to suggest historic conflicts have been fairly secondary and exacerbation largely the result of colonial rule and of manipulation by unscrupulous politicians—clearly exemplified by the present government of Rwanda's 'strategic history project'—have distinct limitations. They tend to overstate their case—which frequently (including in Rwanda) has a substantial valid component. Even if correct, they are effective tools to reconciliation only if they result in changes of perception and behaviour by many of those previously committed to conflict.

In Rwanda to characterise present conflictual and actually or potentially armed conflictual cleavages as simply wa Hutu/wa Tutsi is dangerously simplistic, especially in respect to rehabilitation. On the other hand, to state all conflicts of interest in ways obscuring (verbally, but
probably only verbally) the fact that (if only as a result of the past and present realities of Interahamwe and of the Rwanda Patriotic Army invasion and conquest) the most basic divide is wa Tutsi/wa Hutu is equally unhelpful.

Within the wa Tutsi there are two very differently placed fractions - the abiding residents and the long absence returnees (now probably each of the order of 600,000-750,000). The former lost up to half their numbers in the 1994 genocide but the latter lost very few in conflict over the past 30 years (since the initial 1959 jacquerie). The genocide focused on leaders first - therefore pre war resident wa Tutsi are very thin on the ground in middle to senior government or enterprise ranks. On the other hand they have - by and large - been able to reclaim their and their relative's pre 1994 land and buildings. The returnees - who unlike the long time residents are anglophone - dominate political and military leadership, middle level business and government and professional positions. On the other hand - in principle if not so uniformly in practice - they have not been allowed to reclaim land or buildings (the majority of which were lost in 1959-61) to avert pauperisation of and consequent irreconciliability with wa Hutu. The wa Hutu have three fractions - 'Moderates' who supported the minority parties, a majority now committed neither to IH nor to reconciliation and last ditch ('Gun in hand we left our country, gun in hand we shall return')110 IH supporters in the Congo and in exile/raiding into Rwanda.

The 'moderate Hutu' hold a high proportion of senior governmental and para governmental posts (at one point President, Prime Minister and a majority in Parliament) but have only moderate to marginal influence. They are not prominent in professional services, nor the private sector. The reasons are first that their leadership was almost totally wiped out in the genocide and they - unlike the wa Tutsi - had no flow of returnees to regenerate leadership, professional and entrepreneurial cadres and second that the moderate wa Hutu or wa Hutu/wa Tutsi parties failed to influence the last pre genocide government (in which they held the Prime Ministership and a plurality of cabinet seats) and were rescued from annihilation during and after the IH genocide as a by-product of the armed conquest by the RPF/RPA. They share the losses of the resident wa Tutsi without being fully linked to, or trusted by, wa Tutsi or by other wa Hutu and many of their political 'leaders' are not impressive nor influential (because many are random survivors now promoted far beyond experience or - in some cases - capacity).
The wa Hutu uncommitted and/or withdrawing from attention by not occupying public space (whether IH or RPF dominated) are predominately motivated by fear. They have lost any substantial political role and are caught between IH terrorism and attempted reoccupation and RPF inability (and an occasion disinclination) to differentiate between IH cadres and supporters and silent bystanders who dare not openly endorse or assist against IH by day because to do so is frequently a death sentence when night falls. They perceive a need for peace (absence of IH) and more sustained rehabilitation especially of rural livelihoods, but also of basic services and of avenues to participate in governance. In general professionals and urban merchants in this group have retained their positions and property as have farmers who never fled but - despite government policy - those who were displaced domestically or into exile have frequently lost it to wa Tutsi 'returnees'.

The IH core - partly on the ground in Rwanda backed up by larger cadres and bases in Congo - is in no way interested in reconciliation (even with total amnesty and a major role in the government). Until defeated militarily (or by a generation change and despair over quasi permanent exile) the IH are an insuperable barrier to peace and stability and therefore a major limitation on reconciliation and rehabilitation particularly in respect to social capital and to institutional and self generating expansion aspects. They also are a virtual guarantee of transborder conflict because no likely Congo government will have resources and priorities consonant with breaking them and no international peace keeping force is likely to have the 'seek and destroy' mandate nor the 15,000 to 25,000 well trained, well armed, mobile, heli gunship led force needed to put IH out of business once and for all (or at least for a decade).

Even this snapshot sketching of characteristics indicates that the conflicts of interest and potential violent cleavage lines are multiple. Needs/concerns in respect to land access, land/building return, prompt, transparently just resolution of the 150,000 genocide charges resulting in imprisonment pending trial, stability in terms of ending of credible armed threats to the government vary widely among these five fractions.

A cross cutting set of cleavages are social - youth, women (and especially female household heads) rural and urban residents have significantly different livelihood needs and capacities. These are unlikely to be well served by uniform rehabilitation programmes failing to examine either
national/sub national contexts or particular operational requirements of different social and ethnic fractions.

The **nature and timing of lulls** - as opposed to their appearance, passing and re-emergence - are **highly contextual and historically influenced/bounded**. General principles relate to their providing opportunities to mutually supporting/self reinforcing reconciliation and rehabilitation; to the need to identify historic and present cleavages which have led to armed conflict; to possible entry points for reducing these cleavages in articulated ways relevant to particular social groups. But to take advantage of such analysis and insights requires flexibility in resource levels and allocations not one size fits all procedures or parameters whether development assistance bureaucratic or macro economic.

Like **alleviating the downside** of calamities and catastrophes, the **exploitation of lulls** requires flexibility in resource use and standby/contingency lines of finance. For them to be available requires that R-R-R be prioritised as part of the strategic core of macro economic (as well as macro political) policy by external resource providers as well as by domestic governments. To date that is manifestly not the case.
BY WHAT MEANS? ON WHAT PATHS? TO WHAT ENDS?

A series of conclusions appear to flow from this study. Post war situations with many - often a majority - of households severely deprived in respect of livelihood, access to basic services, existence of local infrastructure (and therefore aces to markets), to existence of effective - let alone participatory and accountable - governance and to robust social capital networks (especially across ethnic division where these have been integral to armed conflict) are numerous, in all continents except Antarctica and Australia, and afflict scores of millions of households. Empowerment of households, communities, social actors, national economies and states to recover cannot be expected to take place as a matter of course. Nor - because many of the gains flow from inherently public goods, are from programmes with large external economies or relate directly to enabling poor people to become less poor - can the market alone initiate and drive recovery.

While some aspects of Reconciliation-Rehabilitation-Reconstruction after war are analogous to recovery after calamities (natural disasters and external economic shocks) and/or poor person friendly growth and development initiatives others are different because of the depth, breadth and duration of the losses sustained.

Rehabilitation needs to be in a context of Reconciliation and Reconstruction with which it interacts because state capacity is a key element in perceived legitimacy and because large scale infrastructural, directly productive and financial enterprises in many cases depend on purchases by and inputs from the urban and rural household sectors. Rehabilitation is a process not an event if only because setbacks from calamities, apparent opportunities which turn out to be dead ends, partial rekindling of armed conflict and/or plain mistakes are inevitable. It is not a short term process but a medium term one - five to seven years might be a plausible estimate if delayed starts, marginalisation and/or massive repetitive setbacks can be avoided.

Rehabilitation comprises of five main elements:

1. facilitating restoration of livelihoods (to which a precondition is normally ability to 'go home');
2. **restoring (or providing) broad access**, with universality as a target, **to basic services**: law - order - absence of violence, primary and, often, applied adult education, primary health services (with emphasis on prevention - education - nutrition as well as basic curative capacity), water (often including livestock and small scale irrigation), frequently extension (agricultural, veterinary and their urban analogues);

3. **repairing/extending local infrastructure** with special emphasis on that needed for **market access**, basic service delivery and local governance;

4. Providing **effective safety nets** (preferably of the trampoline or 'bounce back' type) with particular reference to food (and public works employment to buy food) and water to ensure that episodic calamities do not implode the rehabilitation process;

5. **Deconcentrated central and decentralised local governance with capacity to deliver which is increasingly participatory** (not least in articulating from strategy to policies, programmes projects, priorities, and in providing data on household goals, capacities and needs for outside inputs into empowerment) and **accountable** (beginning with intelligible oral and numerical accounts).

Rehabilitation (like Reconciliation and especially Reconstruction) is **not replication** of the pre war situation. Elements in that situation usually contributed to the tensions erupting in armed conflict. the system was unlikely to have been either poor household or female headed household friendly. war itself causes changes which need to be addressed e.g. the increase in the proportion of female headed households (with weak able bodied hands to hungry mouths ratios and problematic access to land) and - to a degree - HIV and malaria epidemics. The world has not stood still during the wars. For better (e.g. present understanding of primary health care) or for worse (e.g. international economic constraints including increasing volatility and trend decline in grant aid) what is possible now diverges from what was possible pre war.

However, this need to build anew can be seen as more of an obstacle to speedy action than it is. The **overriding goals of war afflicted households are to recover that which was valued and has been lost**. Most - not all - basic services units and local infrastructure were valued and suffered more from paucity than inappropriateness. Even quick participatory exercises can usually elucidate clear priorities for initial action.
To this degree it is practicable to conceptualise Rehabilitation and to generalise across countries. However, context is usually of overriding or at least substantial importance so that a universal action blueprint is highly inappropriate. The nature of the war, its duration, the physical damage done, the survival of social capital, the specific nature of civil society and social actors, the continuation of hatred between ex warring parties especially if perceived by them as ethnically based, the presence or (more usually) absence of massive remittance flows, the safety of the neighbourhood (e.g. borders with Tanzania or Somaliland are very different propositions from ones with the Congo or Somalia), the key sectors of the household economy are all important. Local knowledge in details and indepth is needed to capitalise opportunities and avoid debacles, e.g. Somalia/Somaliland all water is - in historic law - owned by someone and others must pay for its use; a fact UNOSOM overlooked with serious consequences because the Mogadishu wellfield community, who had protected it during the war, viewed UNOSOM's unilateral restoration actions and failure to offer rents, jobs or basic services as blatant armed robbery.

The cost of full scale rehabilitation is not low. For deeply impacted areas the combined capital and additional basic services/local governance bill is likely to be of the order of $50 per war afflicted person per year for five years (plus additional safety net and delay outlays) after which local and central government revenue (from multiplier effects and indirect taxes much more than fees or poll taxes) should balance recurrent spending while basically rehabilitation capital spending should be largely complete.

However, neither are the potential gains negligible. If the household (and especially rural small farming household) sector is large and the overall war devastation severe doubling of national output (including multiplier effects) may be the order of the five to seven year payoff quite apart from improved health, education, per cent of households above poverty lines, national food security (physical) and household food security (entitlements) and government fiscal and national external (im)balance positions.

The complexity of the rehabilitation process and its content together with its resource allocation requirements, interaction with other sectors and economic potential argue for its inclusion as a strategic component at the core of macro economic planning, programming and budgeting. Unless this is done Rehabilitation is likely to be marginalized, trade offs with other sectors will be based
on very inadequate perceptions and contributions to overall economic, revenue, export, food security and sustainable household poverty reduction will be underestimated and/or misestimated.

Rehabilitating designing, planning, programming and articulating as well as monitoring and review should to the maximum extent practicable be nationally led with both domestic and external actors coordinated by the central government. This is not a feature unique to R-R-R but it is probably of higher importance than in some other areas because contextual differences make external knowledge likely to be highly limited and presumed ‘knowledge’ from generalizations or particular experiences in other countries misleading and because a state needing full scale R-R-R is by definition weak and fragile with great danger of fragmentation and erosion if a multitude of INGOs and external official agencies engage in direct programmatic activity outside of government parameters and coordination. However because of extreme immediate post war resource scarcity R-R-R (especially the second and third) will usually require significant new resource inflows and/or writedown of war period incurred external debt.

Selected Signposts For Action

1. Rehabilitation should be seen by postwar governments (central and local), domestic social actors, INGO’s and external agencies as politically, socially and economically central, not marginal;

2. Therefore it should be treated as a strategic component of macro and sectoral, policy and programme as well as local and project analysis, planning, budgeting (in terms of decision taking time institutional capacity and personnel as well as finance), articulation up from and down to specific projects and monitoring/review for the medium term (initially five to six years may be a generally suitable working estimate);

3. With at least an analysis and monitoring unit nationally with key regional/district sub-units and some programmes (and domestic social actors plus INGO’s) quite specifically charged with reconstruction even if others – e.g. basic service provision – will normally be more suited to implementation by line ministries and local governance bodies;

4. Because Rehabilitation is key to reestablishment of government legitimacy and should be highly influenced and informed by contextual factors which are unlikely to be external experts
areas of comparative advantage national ownership led and coordinated by the central government is of special importance in Rehabilitation (as well as Reconciliation) even though a mix of national and local government, domestic social act on and INGO operational involvement will usually be desirable;

5. With early attention to sustainability through phased enhancement of domestic institutional and personnel capacity (especially through built in training elements in all external programmes whether as to road maintenance of simple, functional domestic social actor accounting systems and bookkeepers to operate them) and phased reduction of external financial support;

6. Backed by pre-agreed flexibility finance to meet direct (e.g. safety net, emergency repairs) and indirect (e.g. revenue loss from climatic or terms of trade calamities). Pre-arrangement is crucial because the lag involved in negotiating new support from a tabula rasa after a crisis hits will seriously impair the pace of rehabilitation (and past calamity recovery) and can collapse the R-R-R process;

7. Recognition is needed that time is crucial to R-R-R and that detailed good governance/basic service provision preconditions are normally not merely unrealistic but self defeating because without R-R-R good governance and legitimacy, basic service provision/household livelihood restoration are impossible and that – in most cases – external finance and often some specialist expatriate personnel are a precondition to full scale R-R-R;

8. This implies that once a serious postwar government with a start toward coherent R-R-R strategy and implementation is in place external debt service should be suspended pending more formal qualification for and provision of HIPC (highly indebted poor country) debt writedown;

9. Because one goal of R-R-R (for domestic as well as foreign actors) is usually enhanced participation in user friendly forms external actors need to avoid actions which fragment and erode domestic capacity – governmental, civil society and household. The massive injection of INGO’s with broad, heavily funded programmes at best parallel to and often competitive with domestic (public, social sector or private) ones is a serious weakness
characterizing post war ‘support’ in several countries and one producing rising (in depth and breadth) resentment;

10. **Research** on Rehabilitation to date is relatively limited – especially at country strategic level. Probably there is enough work on conceptualisation and generalization to suggest that – operationally at least – **more in depth country studies** are the first priority net refining conceptualization or drawing up more detailed checklist. Another priority may well be closer cooperation of **Peace Studies/Sustainable Peace research with that on Rehabilitation** which is usually understressed and in particular underarticulated in respect to potentially operational prolegomena.

Rehabilitation is frequently a strategic necessity for post war economies, polities and societies. It is never a silver bullet, an easy highroad to utopia nor a complete monist strategy. Basically it turns (echoing T.S. Eliott) on the quest to recover what was lost and won and lost again and now in times and places which rarely seem propitious.

The case made here is for **including Rehabilitation** (and R-R-R) **not excluding or marginalizing** ‘economic good housekeeping’ (medium term sustainable imbalance and growth management as the successor to short term structural adjustment to end unsustainably rising imbalances and sinking growth rates). A focus on the war dispossessed need not preclude attention to attention to non war aspects of poverty nor should one with a priority to restoring displaced household incomes bar attention to continued progress in less poor/less war eroded areas or capitalizing on new large scale economic activities (both of which can contribute fiscal and external account gains toward R-R-R). The real strategic issues are of balance and of priority – i.e. of allocation of scarce resources toward multiple ends to achieve at least minimal acceptable progress toward each. At strategic (vs. marginal programme scope or project choice level) seeking to answer either/or formulation is to ask the wrong questions. **Rehabilitation** has been **excluded strategically** and/or **marginalized** in resource allocations. **Reversing that misconceptualisation/malprioritisation** should not be marred by a Foucault’s Pendulum (or similar deconstructionist) exclusion of all other elements from possible/possibly desirable overall policy and allocation strategies.
Preemptive Rehabilitation? An Epilogue

The importance of rehabilitation to making lulls in armed conflict permanent and peace settlements sustainable raises the question: Can Rehabilitation be used to avert or to preempt armed conflict during periods of rising tensions?

In principle the answer should be ‘yes’. In practice it is more likely to be ‘usually no, sometimes perhaps’. A quick look at several cases suggests why:

1. the Barre (Somalia, Somaliland), Mengistu (Ethiopia, Eritrea) Liberia (Libero-American elite/Sammy Doe army) and Zaire (Mobutu) regimes clearly had no interest in rehabilitation to redress inequities (albeit the Mengistu regime did apply several aspects of it to favoured areas and groups). Further the first two had for years prior to their overthrow lost the institutional, personnel and resource capacity to implement serious strategic rehabilitation programming and the Liberian state had arguably never had it;

2. the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda, while during lulls in the long run guerilla war from the 1960’s to 1990 rather less repressive than Barre-Mengistu-Mobutu-Doe quartet as well as less corrupt and with greater state capacity was not inclined to seek to redress wa Tutsi grievances and in particular not those of the million odd exiles (and children of exiles) whose plaints were focused on participation in governance and freedom to return;

3. From a few years after independence (say 1965) the Sierra Leone government eroded into a morasses of corruption and incapacity so that neither it rulers’ key motivation (theft) nor the tools of service provision available to them were relevant to rehabilitation, a situation not too dissimilar to the second (post Amin) Obote regime in Uganda.

4. Mozambique’s 1975-81 strategy (before full scale civil war) did include most features of rehabilitation strategy. Arguably broader participation and less focus on modernization and large scale productive units (relative to the small farming household sector) would have reduced tensions. But given the catalytic role of Rhodesia and subsequently South Africa in creating and sustaining Renamo, avoidance of armed conflict via more inclusive, higher priority rehabilitation was never possible.
Rehabilitation As Prevention: Conditions And Cases

If Preemptive Rehabilitation is to be effective, several conditions would need to be met:

a. a state whose leadership wished to reduce tensions and to redress inequities with special reference to poor disadvantaged groups;

b. was willing to interact with/build a network of social capital contacts including these groups;

c. was willing and able to prioritise resource allocation for those purposes even if that potentially reduced benefits to core supporters;

d. still enjoyed at least a suspension of disbelief in respect to even opponents’ perceptions of its legitimacy and commitment to order under a rule of law;

e. had enough institutional, personnel, knowledge and financial resources to launch and to sustain a significant Reconciliation and Rehabilitation initiative; implying

f. enough international credibility to mobilize external funding.

To set out the conditions is to reduce optimism as to how often they can be met even by a new or partially new leadership which has evolved by non violent means (perhaps in response to crises and war or near war) and does not carry the full historical baggage of its predecessors.134

However, given the appalling human, economic and regional security costs of civil wars for afflicted states and their neighbours, it is certainly worth canvassing potential pre-civil war cases to seek to identify opportunities. The two evident cases in SSA are Kenya and the Delta Zone of Nigeria.136

In Kenya the rule of law has collapsed – the police and the ‘justice’ system are widely perceived as enemies of the poor and of decent civil society. Corruption – and consequential external public and private resource flow loss – in gutting state capacity to deliver. Rigged (even if by ‘constitutional law’ more than direct fraud) elections have eroded legitimacy. Unless an electoral change of government is allowed/achieved in the risk of massive violence is very real.

But it must be questioned whether the ruling elite’s leadership can afford even the physical aspects of rehabilitation let alone the participatory given the uses of state ‘aid’ for key supporters (whether projects, contracts, jobs or ‘licensed’ corruption). If it does surrender power in reasonably fair elections in 2002 (to avert civil war) a window of opportunity may open. May because the leaders
of the anti Moi coalition are very diverse and their political leadership element often appears at least as interested in power and distribution of the spoils of office as in economic and social rehabilitation. Assisting civil society (religious, women’s, trade union, domestic NGO) actors and seeking to influence (by seminars and study trips?) selected politicians to take a wider view of governance and resource allocation may be possible – how would be worth researching with a view to informing action.

The prospects in respect to the Nigerian Delta Zone – while problematic – may offer more scope for Rehabilitation as a reconciling, relegitimising and peace restoring/sustaining strategy at least largely because President Obasanjo and other key political leaders are clearly sympathetic to such an approach and have taken some steps toward it and because civil war in the Delta would devastate the macro economy of Nigeria – oil burns, pipes puncture, technical personnel bleed.

The general grievances of the Delta peoples are not hard to catalogue:

a. **inequitably low access to basic services** and – until very recently – **an iniquitously low share in the oil revenues** derived from their areas;

b. a **negligible share in the employment** (direct and indirect) generated by oil even in their own zone;

c. **Blatant manipulation of local governance to serve as a tool of control of rather than empowerment** of Delta peoples secured in large part by ‘licensing’ them to steal or misallocate what state funds did flow to the Delta;

d. **Massive environmental destruction** by oil leaks, flare gases, forest destruction, poisoning creeks (destroying fishing), land (devastating crop growing and health), air (degrading of health) flowing directly from petroleum exploration, developing and transport;

e. **Violent repression** (including rigged trials) of all dissent in the Delta let alone mobilization against state or company.\(^{137}\)

New legislation does allocate a significant proportion of oil revenues to producing areas and provide for a new, independent body to handle the logistics of getting them to ordinary people in the Delta. The oil companies are now – at least rhetorically – agreeable to cleaning up past and reducing future spillages as well as ending gas flaring (by turning it into marketable liquefied
petroleum gas). In principle the 1998-99 electoral cycle should have produced accountable State and District legislators. But:

a. the new money has been slow to flow and mutual distrust is so high that the new independent allocation body does not enjoy even an initial suspension of disbelief;

b. company dialogue with communities on cleanup, preventative maintenance and training for employment is still noticeable by its absence or by company choices of dubious interlocuteurs. The quite real (apparently of the order of $50 million in 1999/00 by Shell) expenditures on services and environmental action are not effective on the ground and appear to be in large part going lost, strayed and/or stolen) and are certainly not in the parameters of a national Government – Local Government – Social Actors – Companies coordinated strategic livelihood employment, environmental, basic services, local infrastructure strategic rehabilitation plan;

c. police (and company response) to mobilized dissent remains intolerant and on occasion brutal;

d. many local governance and some civil society units are still perceived as hopelessly self serving and corrupt.

The ‘buts’ do not appear to be insurmountable if priority is given (not least by the Federal government at Presidential and the oil companies at Board and Nigerian territorial chief executive levels). But the ‘hows’ (especially ‘how to speed up’ and how to engage in dialogue with whom to achieve first suspension of disbelief and then a beginning of social capital building) are complex and problematic. Again applied research is needed (and the present Nigerian government and the Nigerian research community should take the lead in sketching parameters and seeking partners and resources).

So – No, Rehabilitation is no silver bullet for preempting armed conflict but Yes, in some contexts it may be part of the answer.
NOTES


2 Rough estimation and extrapolation along the lines of UNICEF's *Children On The Front Line* (New York, 1987, 1989) which indicate well over 2 million lives and $70,000 million output lost in the SADCC (excluding South Africa) countries over 1980-1992 concentrated on, but by no means (especially in respect to lost GDP) solely in, Angola and Mozambique.

3 UNICEF, *op. cit.*, formulated such elements in respect to Southern Africa in some detail.

4 Except for farming (which was unpopular except when related to child nutrition) SWAPO's 1989's camps in Angola and Namibia illustrate what can be done. For farming the experience of non-camp Mozambican refugees in 'relative' peopled districts in Malawi and Tanzania is illustrative.

5 Shocks and policy errors are not unique to R-R-R contexts. However because political legitimacy human and economic resource availability, and household margins above survival are usually - though not always e.g. post liberation war political legitimacy is usually high - especially constrained in post war situations their impact - especially on already war afflicted poor, households and on national political - economic stability are more severe than in non-war economic and public provision crises contexts - e.g. Mozambique versus Tanzania in relation to adverse weather shocks at the turn of the millennium.

6 This proposition may be less true in border war cases. Reconstruction of what has been lost since 1998 is likely - if possible - to be an appropriate strategy in the Ethiopian and Eritrean border areas.

7 The 1959-90 histories of Burundi and of Rwanda leading to the explosive escalation of war in both - especially Rwanda - are illustrative.

8 For example, in 1995 a top priority of the new Rwandais Government was rehiring its 'missing' two thirds of health workers (mostly wa Hutu) and reactivation of a reformed (toward primary health services with rural plus mother and child clinic emphasis) health sector. The perceived
value of a common, cross ethnic public service and of universal access to a highly desired service as evidence of the states will and ability to serve all Rwandans were seen by the Minister of Health as important in themselves and complementary to the priority he attached to universal primary health services.

9 Well designed and organised retraining can - e.g. Zimbabwe - facilitate entry or reentry into viable livelihoods for at least two thirds of ex-combatants but is not cheap. Ironically the lowest cost 'safe' approach is 'stockpiling' ex-combatants with food, clothing, pocket money, barracks housing (if desired) and permission to develop parallel civilian livelihoods. Both Ghana in the 1980's and Somaliland since 1991 have practiced variants of this approach with positive results, albeit Somaliland since 1998 has attached priority to mobilising external resources to permit a training - public works transition to civilian livelihoods for 12,500 to 15,000 'spare' soldiers (versus 5,000 soldiers, 5,000 civilian police and 1,500 prison custodians seen as needed by the three separate uniformed services).

10 This list is based on observations and interviews in several SSA countries as well as on observed actions and demands by returnees. The basic service priority list is relatively uniform across war and non-war surveys and participatory assessments with poor people in several SSA countries (including non-war cases such as Tanzania and Zambia).

11 That proposition may appear self evident. In practice, it is not. Even the desire to 'return home' and the centrality of such return to livelihood reconstruction and to geographic programming of service rehabilitation is frequently seriously underestimated - e.g. Acholiland in Uganda prior to the 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda meetings.

12 For a much fuller review of strands in conceptualisation and of rehabilitation literature see Green and Ahmed (Cope Working Paper, op. cit.)

13 Conflict theory work on gainers and losers from war is potentially relevant but - to date - not operationally linked. Fear of loss is the key economic (and social and physical) reason to hesitate at the prospect of peace for most combatants. Assured safe return home, reintegration into civilian society and social - basic service - infrastructure access are likely to be key instruments for allaying such fears.

14 This paper leans on the author's personal experience with about fifteen (including two in Asia) countries from operational and observational as well as research perspectives particularly in the COPE and 'Conflict Comprehension and Mastery' (ACDESS) programmes and as a 1986-94 part time Mozambican civil servant.

15 While simple economic correlation's - e.g. high ratio of commodity exports/high risk of civil war - can be partial or misleading, they can also yield insites. Major commodity resources (e.g. diamonds and petroleum in Angola) can create both the motivation for seeking central power at almost any price and the means to sustain both governmental and insurgent military machines. Land shortage can lead to violent conflict over present allocation, potential land loss and/or local governmental structures with powers over future allocation.

16 The separation of 'development' from 'emergency' has tended to lump R-R-R with calamity relief and therefore with safety nets to alleviate poverty caused by shocks and to facilitate
emergence from relatively short, self limiting and reversing shocks affecting a relatively limited, proportion of a nations households.


18 In such cases saving life in the short run requires using all experienced capacity e.g. in 1991-3 Somalia refugee camps with monthly infant mortality in excess of 100 UNICEF did - and was right to - concentrate on grab (and house), dab (of food), jab (vaccination). Similarly Medicin Sans Frontieres precisely because it is syndico anarchist in philosophy and simple curative care focussed is possibly the body most able to work in active, disputed war zones and across firing lines, but the same characteristics limit its suitability for postwar rehabilitation of a national health system with high priority to preventative, educational, environmental and nutritional aspects and with government coordination.

19 If external actors are perceived as complementary to, and work within parameters set by, domestic actors (including social sector actors) phasing down of external resource inflows may be painful, tedious and slow but poses few conceptual snags. But if multiple, parallel, externally designed headed and financed service systems have been implanted, it is hard to see how phased handover to whom can be arranged. In poor countries domesticating INGO national unit staff and programme design may be possible - if rare to date - but even then no firm civil society resource base can readily be identified.


21 The War Torn Societies project illustrates this. Its flagship Mozambique study is, in general, weakest on economics and does not address rehabilitation of livelihoods or of local level infrastructure while its basic services chapters (which exclude consideration of the role of police and primary courts) do not address the gaps and priorities resulting from finance and access constraints during the war.


24 In a number of countries recurrent near war or war conditions characterise certain regions but not the whole country e.g. the Eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region; Acholiland and certain other Regions of Northern and Western Uganda the Casamance in Senegal, arguably the Delta in Nigeria. Even if these do not constitute national level civil wars (and at least the Nigerian
case could become that because of the location of hydrocarbon fields and the parallel Southwestern 'opt out' movement), they are central to regional macro and sectoral economics and can rarely be dealt with by short term safety nets.

25 It is perfectly plausible to argue on available data both that Somaliland is making sustained process on political reconciliation and institutional (re) construction on economic and service rehabilitation and - more recently – on main infrastructure rehabilitation while also perceiving the Sudan to constitute a complex, intensifying crisis (or set of overlapping crises) in which only limited livelihood/service rehabilitation within a basically survival under war frame are possible. It is not plausible to argue that the political base of a won liberation war (as perceived by Somalilanders) in Somaliland is now available to Sudanese or, indeed, that the remittance economic lifeline enabling R-R-R to proceed in Somaliland can be paralleled in the Sudan so long as the Khartoum Junta lacks both Northern and Southern legitimacy and the interactions of and within Southern and Northern Democratic fractions on the insurgent side(s) remain highly complicated and fraught with tensions - in the South recurrently breaking out in violence. But per contra there is no evident reason the constraints - contextual parameters - applying in the Sudan should be assumed to be particularly relevant to Somaliland nor necessarily a guide to the restrictions on R-R-R in Somalia.


27 This is a poorly researched area. Fragments of data exist in scattered Mozambique studies and internal papers on other topics.

28 For example, Interahamwe organised camps as bases for current (in then Zaire) or potential future (in Tanzania) revenge against the Rwanda Patriotic Front led government and discouraged diversion of energy toward rehabilitation, especially if organised outside the IH command structure.

29 The apparent reason for the disinterest in general agriculture according to the then Deputy Secretary for Health was the difference in climatic and soil patterns from those in Namibia plus the relatively adequate supplies of basic rations available from WFP via the SWAPO governmental structure.

30 In Mozambique restoration of displaced small farming households to Tanzanian levels of output could - with direct multiplier effects - have raised national product 50%. In Angola and Namibia the potential was - as of 1990 - probably 10% to 15% and 2.5% respectively because oil and diamonds in Angola and mining, large scale ranching and fishing in Namibia dominated GDP. However, in Angola the proportion of households dependent on small scale farming rehabilitation was at least 40% and in Namibia perhaps 25% so that the political and socio economic potential impact of livelihood rehabilitation, as well as that in many districts, was potentially comparable to that in Mozambique. In one sense it might be easier as the large scale sectors – especially in Angola – yield fiscal flows per capita qualitatively higher than in Mozambique.

31 This condition poses particular problems in respect to new governments in previously 'failed states' (e.g. then Zaire, Sierra Leone) as contrasted with those which had maintained at least some operational capacity (beyond waging war) throughout the period of conflict (e.g.
Mozambique) and to liberation movements which had the experience of operating significant programmes in liberated areas or in exile (e.g. Namibia, Eritrea).

32 Usually such safety nets have had to be official donor financed - including indirectly via INGO's - but in the cases of Eritrea and Somaliland diaspora remittances have been dominant.

33 The 'Parliament', 'Executive' and 'President' emerging from the 1999-2000 Somalia Conference in Djibouti have not to date altered the Somalia situation in any basic way. A majority of delegates were exiles. Somaliland, but also Puntland and Baidoa (Rahanweyn Confederacy) which are much less unstable than the balance of Somalia, were 'represented' only by exiles and dissidents. From the point of view of each of these zones (and not only of their present leaders) the new 'President' (Barre's last Defense Minister) and three of the 'executive' from which his nomination emerged (General Morgan, Barre Security Police head Col. Omar Jess and Barre's last Chief of Staff) are quite literally war criminals guilty of "crimes against humanity" in the present international law meaning of that term. Their initial fleeting visits to Mogadishu like those of their 'Parliament' were covered by multiple hired merchant militias who do not necessarily support them politically.

34 Because of the 30 year gap between the Somalia conquest of the then Republic of Somaliland in 1961 after it voted overwhelmingly not to join in the United Republic of Somalia and the 1991 armed liberation from Barre forces, relatively few present political and even fewer senior civil servants have much first hand experience from within that system. The accuracy of recreation on the operational ministerial side is surprisingly high - the *deja vu* recollection of Anglophone West Africa of the early 1960's can be very strong for any observer who has experienced both. The will to obliterate the intervening URS structures and procedures is, in this case, a positive Rehabilitation/Reconciliation force e.g. in the recreation of a uniformed, civilian (separate from the Army and the Defense Ministry) police force and of a magistrates' court system using primarily (British) Somaliland Code Law, common law and some civil law elements of Sharia law with former URS code law (derived directly from Mussolini's Italian Code) used only for gap filling.

35. Persons displaced to towns and (usually via relatives) integrated socially and economically are exceptions, but it is often open to question whether they would have migrated to cities war or no war. e.g. Mozambique's urban population indeed rose from 10% to 30% over 1975-95. But Portuguese policy limited black urban residence so that 10% was artificially low and the Tanzanian urban proportion (in that case in the absence of war or famine) is also 30% suggesting the 1995 Mozambique figure is not abnormally high.

36. Demobilised combatants - at least below officer level - also tend to choose to return to pre war homes and occupations e.g. Mozambique and the two failed lulls/demobilisations in Angola. Eritrea is an exception because state policy is to resettle both returnees and demobilisees in patterns unlike previous district and village ones.

37. This is a contextual question. In general civilians tend to prefer civilian to military policing e.g. the priority to civilian police restoration/separation from army in Somaliland. But, if police have an history of oppressive, violence and corruption there may be no great preference for
them over the army e.g. Acholiland at the turn of the millennium because the Uganda police force has (throughout Uganda) had a very bad reputation for over a third of a century. The (British) Somaliland civilian police, however, were largely respected and trusted unlike their Italian style military police successors of the United Republic of Somalia.


39. For example in Somalia surveys do not show primary health services - especially by the state - as high priority because of lack effective colonial or URS provision and because there has been what would elsewhere be regarded as over emphasis on hospital curative services. In Somaliland because the late British period did feature a more robust and primary oriented health service health stands with water as a key and relatively well staffed ministry and one which (under UNICEF guidance) has focussed on vaccinations, oral rehydration, mother and child and clinic oriented primary services, although it has yet to restore the pastoral area paramedical network which was arguably the crown jewel of the postwar British colonial health service development.

40. In several cases - e.g. Sierra Leone in 1996-97 before the military/RUF coup - concentration was on urban road, sewer and related works. These may meet the tests of lesser vulnerability to renewed outbreaks of violence and of 'safe' project designs 'on the shelf' but it is hard to believe that even urban residents (let alone the 80% plus of displaced persons who are usually rural) would put them high on priority lists. Nor are they 'sustainable' in the sense of generating entitlements not dependent on continuing external finance - unlike, say, restoration of crop/livestock production. As humanitarian intervention the traffic circles, gutters and carriageways of Freetown seemed to be analogues of ineffective humanitarian randomness paralleling Joseph Conrad's French cruiser firing untargeted salvos into the Congo jungle as an example of military intervention in the early stages of his exploration of the (European) *Heart of Darkness* in the Congo ultimately symbolised by Mister Kurtz and his driveway lined with human (African) skull topped posts. One need not imply bad faith or ill will to point to the potential for disaster in misuse of very scarce resources.

41. The danger - because of rehabilitation marginalisation - is that these large, long payofﬁ limited livelihood/entitlement generation reconstruction projects will be disproportionately central to macro economic investment policy and allocation as in the case of the ROCS (major highways) project in Mozambique (see Hanlon, *op. cit.*).

42. The actual expatriate personnel figures would suggest uniformly high requirements. However, they may mislead. In Mozambique 3,000 1992-95 expatriates at a cost of over $300 million a year in large part replaced 3,000 tertiary educated Mozambicans working at lower levels abroad because of sub-subistence to sub-lower middle class domestic salaries. They would be returnees at a gross cost of perhaps $12.5 to $20 million a year. Aid finance for technical assistance or INGO's is not in practice fungible into even bridging domestic salary support whatever the benefit/cost ratios. Mozambique's Ministry of Health actually asked for a controlled test between a government and an INGO primary health care programme at district or provincial level to compare cost and care efficiency and was turned down out of hand. As
the unit cost of INGO PHC seems to be tenfold (at least fivefold allowing for maximum unrecorded health goods transfers to state health services) that of the Ministry of Health and the quality little, if any, better (arguably worse on prevention and education) the challenge and response are both interesting. Somaliland per capita is a relatively successful R-R-R case with only 250 expatriates (because it is not recognised), but could certainly use rather more specialists (perhaps 100-150), plus training courses to avoid massive gaps in citizen personnel when present senior officials retire well before a full scale universally/public service institute will be on stream.

43. In practice food for armed forces viewed with some approval, or at least not severe disapproval, by donors is often donor financed using Nelsonian ‘blind eye’ techniques whether with budget support and food aid to be sold or bloc distribution to camp systems including basic civil governance but also army elements e.g. Mozambique and SWAPO’s camp system in Angola respectively. If the armed forces are seen as deeply unacceptable, either food is not provided to anyone (rare) or substantial debate and partial withdrawal combined with food seizure by the military units results (e.g. the then Zaire Interahamwe controlled Rwandan’s refugee camps and the Red Cross food supplies to Renamo controlled zones in Mozambique).

44. The case against relief/rehabilitation support in the Sudan has been most cogently argued by Joanna Macrae and Mark Duffield. The case for has been spearheaded by Oxfam and Christian Aid (in conjunction with South Sudanese civil society actors) e.g. Roger Riddell and David Bryll, Guardian, 16 October 2000, p20 who argue that there can be INGO and civil society access to most people most of the time, are substantial pockets of relative and relatively lasting peace and growing numbers and capacity of domestic civil society actors autonomous from the SPLA military. Therefore initial food production, medical, water and education rehabilitation are both feasible and desirable both in terms of present human welfare and the post war base for full R-R-R (whatever the military/political end game and outcome). In the IH case the logical alternative to allowing the use of the camps as reorganisation, retraining and reinvasion bases was not necessarily starving all Rwanda’s refugees and exiles alike, but inserting a UN armed guard contingent to control the camps - an exercise the Security Council rejected. Of the three options - forcing civilian refugees to return to Rwanda to be fed, controlling the camps to extrude IH/Exide ‘Government’ elements and letting IH rebuild it appeared even at the time - and much more so today - that the international community was choosing the worst.

45 In the South Sudan case such bodies exist and are becoming stronger as well as increasingly tolerated and welcomed by the SPLA. See Guardian, op cit, loc cit, and also passim articles on Sudan previous two weeks. In the Rwanda camps case IH took good care to suppress them in then Zaire and sought to do so in Tanzania camps which were cordoned and policed by day by Tanzania but under LH control at night. Interestingly even under those unfavourable conditions, autonomous mother and child care and, less overtly, Anglican ‘civil society’ type groups emerged and operated.

46. Arguably Ebola fever is a war catastrophe. The strain in Gulu is South Sudanese (not Congolese) so that the most probable entry is via Lord’s Resistance Army raiders, deserters or escaped captives and/or refugees returning from Sudan. The problem in coping even beyond
the absence of preventative or curative treatment is lack of knowledge of the host animal (both human beings and other primates die once they contract Ebola) so that predicting outbreaks, designing ways to avoid them and developing spread limitation and initial contagion minimisation are virtually non-feasible.

47. This may be a sector with potential for preparation during war. For example from the mid 1980's to early 1990's several thousand Mozambican primary school teachers fled to refugee or displaced person camps or urban areas. Most were in known locations and in receipt of pay but not fully employed. Most were also less than fully qualified. Despite earlier internal suggestions, only in 1992 did the approach of large scale further training while waiting for the ability to redeploy to rural areas build up substantial momentum and then on the initiatives of two or three Provincial Directorates not the national Ministry. The problem is most acute where - as in Mozambique - a high proportion of basic service personnel before war were not qualified or where - as in Somalia and Somaliland - there has been minimal professional or para professional training and recruitment for over a decade and a half so that restoration/maintenance of previous levels, let alone expansion, faces a growing crisis even after war because of unreplaced retirements.

48. See A. Adedeji, R.H. Green and V. Jamal, *Pay, Professionalism and Productivity* UNICEF, UNDP, (New York 1997) for fuller case on the negative results of paying front line professional 'salaries' as low as one quarter the household absolute poverty line.

49. Banks in SSA - especially when they have just engaged in financial and loan procedure reconstruction - are often so cautious as to rural loans or new credit instruments (e.g. leasing) as to threaten to constrict economic revival especially in rural areas led by small and medium enterprises. This can justify risk sharing type partial guarantees (preferably for a fee) to encourage priority lending flows, but neither justifies nor creates a need to subsidise either merchant transporters or the banks.

50. The $1 standardised purchasing power per capita per day yardstick used by the World Bank for international comparisons and aggregations has severe limitations for operational country use. A specified absolute poverty line budget for a household of 5 or 6 costing stated goods/services and - probably - converting to $ on a relatively free (which may mean parallel) market basis to have a less unstable one country measurement over time is preferable, where possible, partly because IMF/UNDP conversions to standard purchasing power - especially within SSA - are often open to grave reservations.

51. In 1960's East Africa access to seasonal wage labour income tended to be a key determinant of poor or not so poor household income status. In Southern Mozambique from the 1940's migrant labour in South African mines was key to building up tools, herds and other assets needed to raise a farm's production capacity above the household poverty line.

52. While the typical sizes vary, except for street trading the typical informal business has substantially more employers than owner managers (up to an average of 7 times as many in West Africa).
53. Mozambique, for example, placed at least 200,000 orphans (including *de facto* orphans who may have had living parents but with no evidence where they were) in new households as members with quite limited use of initial, and no continuing, material incentives.

54. However, a special problem arises for HIV/AIDS orphans who may be or are HIV positive. Only close relatives - and not always they - are likely to accept the risk of accepting/loosing a new son or daughter let alone taking in a new household member with a maximum realistic life expectancy of 3 to 4 years.

55. These represent a shift in emphasis from most pre-war systems which relates to general rethinking and redesign of poor country health services beginning in the 1970's.

56. Discussions with researchers and participants at September 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda Workshop.

57. Labour intensive approaches can reduce cost and maximise cost sharing with returnee communities for seasonal labour and local building materials are likely to be easier to mobilise than cash.

58. Cf Hanlon *op. cit.* for perceptions of the World Bank's flagship ROCS national highway project turning on these issues and the related diversion of potential local infrastructure and services programmes to the highways combined with a continuity in not conceptualizing or integrating a viable maintenance strategy.

59. The upgrading of several of these routes as war roads by President Barre, whose aim was to suppress Somaliland, does not invalidate their present value for rebuilding pastoralism, internal and external commerce. Similarly in Acholiland, roads in several areas are now denser, more accessible and better maintained to facilitate military response to the Lord's Resistance Army. Their existence and location are key to local infrastructure rehabilitation planning and may alter patterns of farming household settlement.

60. Very often both capacity in general and decentralised capacity accountable to users in particular were defective long prior to the outbreak of war. In cases such as Sierra Leone and (then) Zaire that decay of capacity was at least a substantial background factor in the loss of legitimacy facilitating the rise of civil war. It would be otiose in rehabilitation to seek to replicate capacity only up to the pre war levels if these were manifestly a major 'part of the problem', not of the answer. It is arguable that government supply of cement and roofing, community building of floor slabs, pole frames and temporary walls plus wooden desks, benches, cabinets for books/materials - i.e. downgrading primary school buildings - to concentrate on teachers' salaries and training together with books, writing materials, chalk and blackboards is appropriate to the initial phases of rehabilitation. But if pre war district and local bookkeeping/bookkeepers meant 50% of spending was unallocable because initial entries were incorrigibly unintelligible, another 25% went lost-strayed-stolen (facilitated by opaque bookkeeping) and only 25% clearly went to intended uses, it is folly not to include properly
trained bookkeepers and transparent bookkeeping systems in first stage rehabilitation as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to the rapid reduction of corruption and increase of accountability. 'No accountability without accounts’ deserves to be a more important good governance rallying cry than is usually the case.

61. In Rwanda returning wa Tutsi (including descendants as the majority of refugees date to 1959-60) have been temporarily - at least in terms of policy goal - housed in 'vacant' urban/peri urban buildings and to a lesser extent on 'vacant' peri urban and rural farm plots. These are recognised officially to be the property of wa Hutu who fled in 1974. On their return they have - not surprisingly - found those in possession unwilling to relinquish buildings or farms, local level authorities less than energetic in supporting them and alternative plot/home provision lagging badly.

62. For example in Angonia District in Tete (a maize and potato basket) colonial settler freeholds were turned into state farms (after settler abandonment) which were then abandoned in the early 1980’s during the upsurge of the civil war. In large part these have been occupied by returnees step by step over 1986-1994. Both some ex settlers and the Lands Commission (for new freehold grants) have called for their expulsion with obvious probable conflictual results, not least because these farmers have rehabilitated their livelihoods and made a large contribution to national (especially Beira) food security.

63. Discussions on site and later with John Drysdale who headed the survey.

64. No farm could be demarcated unless the occupier and all adjacent holders agreed on boundary points. This procedure rapidly diffused cross claims (which may have been as much game playing as fully serious) because holders wanted clear, up to date entitlement documents.

65. Uganda has a very diverse mix of de facto rural tenures. Feudal recorded tenure - notably in Buganda and Bunyoro - has partially (but oftenopaquely and contestedly) transmuted into individual freehold tenure. So in practice has historical secure, heritable household usehold tenure in some areas, especially if tree and bush crop (coffee, tea) are dominant. A variety of such household, usehold tenures survive - some formally recorded but with gaps and dubious entries in registers. In pastoral and peripheral areas some more communal/more frequent reallocation systems survive. Dotted in are plantation (and urban) freehold enclaves e.g. sugar, tea. Standardising, re-recording and arbitrating a generalised transition to freehold will be a major exercise entailing substantial personnel, institution erection and consultation costs and one which does not (at least in immediate post war areas as contrasted to those with limited violence for the last decade and a half) appear to have high temporal priority. The deferral of implementation suggests that position has support within the Uganda government with the apparent contrary signal of early passage of an Act relating at least as much to USAID and World Bank agendas and leverage as it does to Uganda government and/or interest group concerns.

66. Most of the changes in tenure from the prazeiro (feudal 'knights' of the sword) through chartered company to empressa (state farm) modes have been injected by war with the lesser
recent resistance to tenure change partly because the general 1981-1992 phase of the 1963-1992 war subsumed land tenure conflict and partly because many freehold grant holders, seeing they could not secure and enforce 'quiet possession' have not sought to push their claims. However, the situation remains volatile if large numbers of 'concessions' and large family farm freeholds were to be created and attempted to be enforced. The economic doubts about general freehold/mechanisation driven modernised agriculture are underlined by the pre 1970 (and apparently post 1995) record of 90% of domestic food and 60% of agricultural exports flowing from the (disfavoured) historic household tenure small farming sector familial (household sector).

67. On the southern (Zambesi River) border of Malawi and Mozambique literally hundreds of thousands of refugees rotated from camps to rehabilitation of farms and back to camp to collect rations during 1992-1994. This greatly puzzled some observers who, erroneously, thought the massive 'return' flow to Malawi was of refugees who had given up and were returning to camp to stay.

68. Evidently return to camp for food to rebuild by many does create a cover for fraud by others. It also wastes time and energy on treks, disrupts families yet again and reduces the working time deployable so long as some adults need to stay in camp to collect rations and care for children.

69. See Somaliland country discussion elsewhere for fuller contextual setting.

70. The largely expatriate - or at least non-Acholi - suggestion that cattle restoration in general is ecologically undesirable is not shared by Acholi households nor does it appear likely to be valid ecologically. Under interior east African upland plain conditions, livestock, annual crops and - less uniformly - tree crops can be symbiotic with livestock on land unsuitable for crops, or under grass fallow and contributing manure to tree crops (e.g. bananas in Kagera Region of Tanzania) and horticultural plots.

71. See J. Fairly 'New Strategies For Micro enterprise Development, Integration and the Trickle Up Approach' in Journal of International Affairs, op. cit. for fuller reflections on micro credit in general and the case for its institutional integration with knowledge and service delivery in particular.


73. Water is probably easier to run on a cooperative basis because user management/maintenance committees can reduce cash maintenance costs substantially, the cash as well as opportunity costs of no or non functional nearly water delivery are perceived as high by households and - like health - fees can be projected equally across the year and can rarely literally be collected at point of use (albeit they are in some Somaliland systems).
74. In respect to local (and central) government in Uganda, see E.A. Brett "Responding to Poverty in Uganda" in *International Affairs*, op. cit.


76. Mozambique has sought to adopt this approach with respect to religious institution schools and clinics from 1992-3 but has been limited by financial constraints as has Tanzania in respect to religious body (almost all Christian in practice but with a few Islamic) secondary schools and hospitals which it has partially subsidised (as well as providing staff training) for four decades.

77. See COPE Working Papers specifically focussed on women in conflict listed in bibliography for a fuller discussion.

78. Male headed single adult/multiple dependent households could in principle be a similarly disadvantaged category. However, it is in practice virtually an empty box. Men who have lost/been separated from their spouses and have dependents in practice remarry.

79. Discussions with African gender researchers in both East and West Africa.

80. Hard to do - need to plan ahead - costs are greater than pure pre food aid variant and perhaps greater than commercial builder cost (with no food aid) but less than food for survival plus contract infrastructure building e.g. Botswana regular PWD and Drought infrastructure programmes.

81. The INGOs' higher unit costs relate primarily to the cost of expatriate personnel and the logistics of supporting them, as well as to a tendency to desirable but higher than essential material infrastructure (e.g. four wheel drive vehicles).

82. Observation and discussions on several visits for diverse sponsors over 1994-1999 and especially at the 1998 Somaliland and 1999 (Acholiland) R-R-R/Peace Agenda workshops.

83. Observation and discussions in Mogadishu and Baidoa in 1993 and 1995.

84. For a detailed - if slightly overstated - account of this process in Mozambique see Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique - Who Calls The Shots?*, Zed Press, London 1994 and Hanlon op. cit. Hanlon underestimates the coping processes used at all levels in dealing with donors/outsiders whom it is seen as dangerous to refuse or to criticise harshly head on. These are by no means negligible in impact. But many are inefficient in resource cost/desired outputs terms. A common example is to accept external agency desired programmes and personnel which are not domestic priorities, and/or cannot be used, in order to gain funding for priority programmes and technical assistance. This approach 'works' but - at least as perceived by Mozambicans - wastes potentially more fruitful resource use. Donors may well have a mirror image view having accepted the Mozambican priority elements to achieve Mozambican acceptance of theirs. The problem is much more general than R-R-R and does not (as is sometimes asserted) rest on
donor conspiracy nor recipient duplicitousness but on inequalities of power, lack of flexibility and divergent perceptions in contexts more often than not characterised by opacity.

85. In Mozambique Renamo focused on rural terrorism to prevent family farming for self provisioning and urban food supply and on destruction of primary schools, water systems and health posts and centres while the government prioritised getting food through and repairing/rebuilding health - education water facilities and protecting their personnel. Legitimacy/capacity more than direct military gains were at stake in these priority campaigns.

86. Discussion and observation in 1995 and 1998. Civilian police are armed but on normal duty keep the arms out of sight. They are perceived as polite to Somalilanders as well as expatriates and do appear to be successful in halting escalation of minor clashes between individuals into larger lineage group to sub clan armed conflicts, a 'progress' which is historically the most volatile feature of Somali socio-political interaction. Vendors and chatters congregate outside Hargeisa's Central Police Station and exchange greetings with police. With a contextual translation one is in the world of Dixon of Dock Green and 'Here-Here! What's All This?'

87. Except in open ended participatory dialogue - whether in R-R-R or other contexts - users are unlikely to prioritise services they have never received from the state (e.g. low stress on desire for state primary health services in Somalia in 1985 and subsequently).

88. For a brief - and more positive than most - survey of post war Uganda see E.A. Brett 'Responding to Poverty in Uganda: structures, processes and prospects' in *Journal of International Affairs*, *op. cit.*

89. Mozambican provinces have very substantial *de facto* powers at Executive (Governor) and Official (Provincial Commissioner) levels including (within tight overall and looser sectoral ceilings/floors) Recurrent Budget. By distracting central attention and disrupting communications *war substantially increased autonomy*. For example the *de facto* province of Maputo Cidade was much more closely overseen and much less autonomous precisely because ministries had easy access and tended to teleguide even areas (e.g. primary education and health) in which substantial (if fuzzy) powers had been delegated to provinces and were exercised by those less close to Ministerial headquarters.

90. This problem is not unique to rehabilitation. In Mozambique many projects - e.g. provincial hospitals, agricultural infrastructure schemes - were negotiated by the central government with associated 3 to 5 year grants toward early year recurrent costs. The central government ministries administrated during the 3 to 5 year period intending to hand over to provincial governments thereafter. As the latter had - up to that point - not been integrally involved in the projects and received no sudden income boost to meet the recurrent cost burden, the process, predictably, has worked very badly.

91. These can be very innovative and small user friendly. Overall this may be particularly true of UK operations (and least of EU) albeit variation is high within donor programmes because the
attitudes of the head of the mission in a country and of his/her small projects assessment/disbursement officer are crucial.

92. In two of these cases the convictions of the INGOs (neo-Christian theocratic in one case and syndico-anarchist in the other) are central to the problems of cooperation and coordination. Each is humanly concerned and usually highly professionally competent/motivated but normal relationships with governments or domestic social actors are inherently virtually unattainable.

93. The gaps need case by case scrutiny. Middle level management, secretarial and book keeping/accounting weaknesses are often at least as great as (or greater than) those of professionals or top managers. That applies to local governments - and sometimes central governments - as well as to domestic social actors.

94. In Rwanda it has proven impossible in some areas to maintain or restore non ethnic villages in the aftermath of genocide even though of 800,000 dead up to 300,000 were 'moderate' wa Hutu. Many pre war mixed villages have been recreated as neighbouring wa Hutu and wa Tutsi villages and at least several urban neighbourhoods have become homogenous. The motive is fear - exacerbated by continued IH attacks which use resident supporters and informants.

95. Somaliland would prosecute senior military and security police personnel guilty of crimes against humanity in Somaliland as well as some associated political figures, but none has been Somaliland.

96. This seems to have been facilitated by Renamo's practices of kidnapping many of its combatants (making them perceived as victims as well as perpetrators) and rarely deploying them against their own villages or immediate areas (making returnees relatively innocent of attacks against the community to which they sought reentry).

97. Community (almost always intra ethnic group), as well as religious, procedures often involve public 'accounting' of/for past actions even if compelled to do them. Expatriate professionals have queried these - especially for girls/young women kidnapped as porters/prostitutes. However, it is unclear that the returnees have similar objections if the ordeal leads to full 'return home' to their locality and religious congregation communities. Nor in the absence of an alternative acceptable to civil society is criticism necessarily in returnee interests.

98. An irregular declension problem arises: liberation forces 'mobilise'; governments recruit/conscript; insurgents 'kidnap'. The boundaries are often in the eye of the observer and the judgement of history on the movement. In Mozambique, however, 'kidnap' is widely (and accurately) used in respect to Renamo's methods which are seen as distinctly unlike the government's even by persons not particularly supportive of Frelimo.


100. This section draws on discussions at two 1999 COPE related conferences in Sri Lanka as well as on the Bradford studies in COPE working papers.

102. In late 2000 an Ebola Fever outbreak (probably transmitted by escapees from or cadres of the LRA in the Sudan or Uganda soldiers returning from the Northeast Congo) further isolated Acholiland and disrupted R-R-R processes.

103. Based on 1995 UNICEF/UNDP Mission led by Professor Adedeji and discussions with Rwanda participants at 1997 UNDP/ACDESS Bamako Workshop on conflict as well as at meetings in UK and COPE Working Papers on Rwanda.

104. Those wa Hutu supporting peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict political power sharing with wa Tutsi and return of wa Tutsi refugees/emigres.

105. The pre-colonial history of the Interlake Kingdoms - Burundi, Rwanda, Kivu, Ankole, Kagera sometimes united under a Rwanda based Great Mwame - is highly contested territory. The presentation here is relatively 'middle of the road'.

106. The parliament represents all parties to the pre - 1994 parliament more or less in relation to their then members except for the late President Habyarimana's majority wa Hutu chauvinist party. In addition there is a minority of RPF appointees. In fact almost all members are appointees of their parties, because the elected MPs fell victim to the 1994 genocide. The Parliament has increasingly raised issues, challenged legislation and, on some occasions, caused it to be significantly revised.

107. Economically the impact of pauperising over 100,000 households and of taking up to 150,000 able bodied persons (by no means all are men) out of production are significant at agricultural production and food security at macro, as well as micro household, levels.

108. The Eastern Congo, especially along the relevant borders, is marked by very dense tropical forests with thick ground level as well as canopy vegetation. The problems of 'clearing' it of IH are in many respects physically analogous to those which faced USA forces in parts of Vietnam.

109. Uganda's vital interests in the Congo are blocking IH raids and infiltration by rebel or terrorist groups from the Congo. Rwanda's are the same (but more crucial) in respect to IH but also include the survival of the Banyamulenge and, at least up to 1997-8, were defined to include the exercise of substantial influence in the overall governance of the Congo as a whole as part of a Eritrea - Ethiopia - Uganda - Rwanda - Burundi ideologically and supposedly ethnically allied arc of power.

110. The evidence that by the 1700's there were wa Hutu sub-kings and court members and that individuals could leave their own birth group and be adopted into the other, as well as that
intermarriage was not rare (less so than from 1920 through 2000) is convincing. But it suggests a post conquest state such as Norman England in - say - 1300 which also had Saxon and Celtic secondary leaders and courtiers, overlap in levels of freedom (or serfdom) and livelihood and significant intermarriage not a fully integrated nation state more or less at ease with itself.

111. This section draws on discussion during and reports from UNICEF missions in 1985, 1993 and 1995 as well as interviews with John Drysdale who as British Colonial and Diplomatic Officer, UN Advisor and Advisor to various Somali and Somaliland governments has served in Somalia/Somaliland for over half a century, Ismail Ahmed and ACCORD resident Somali personnel.

112. This is especially true in the lower Juba valley, the inter river area (at least prior to the 1999-00 Rahanweyn drive toward the sea) and Mogadishu. The Djibouti Conference named President’s ‘Army’ seems to be a congeries drawn from several militias and paid by unbacked, printing press' currency emissions which are highly politically and militarily polluting but likely to be ephemeral as the currency can hardly retain credibility since the expected hundreds of millions of UN, EU and Arab state dollars expected are simply not materialising.

113. The Rahanweyn authorities would verbally support basic service professional committees backed by INGO, UNICEF, other agency funding and personnel but to date both decision taking and resources have been focused on restoring security and reversing 1991-95 territorial losses.


115. The OAU position is ironic. The 'colonial boundaries at independence' clause in its 1964 Charter was in large part directed against the irredentism of the then United Republic of Somalia and its five star flag (Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, what is now Ethiopia's Somali Region, Kenya's then Northwest Frontier District). While it did not seek to roll back the conquest of Somaliland, the OAU saw it (as well as infiltration of guerillas into Kenya) as evidence of dangerous, militarist Pan Somali Adventurism. In 1997 President Nyerere confirmed this view of the 1964 OAU Charter and the Heads of State's perceptions.


117. Many of the 12,500 are sometimes termed 'ghosts'. However this is not because they do not exist. Those with families in Hargeisa are allowed to live at home reporting on rations parade weekly and pay parade monthly.

118. Men - sic. Women are still virtually excluded from public political posts. One or two have served as junior ministers and one or two on the appointed advisory council to the Mayor of Hargeisa. While women can be elected to the House of Assembly (but not the House of Elders) none were. Similarly the female public service role is very limited in numbers and formal positions. Especially since 1991 women’s economic roles have broadened (even in respect to
owning a few large enterprises) as have their professional positions. Women's groups are now active in urban areas and do receive a hearing - a development partly catalyzed by experience in the UK/USA diaspora and on the large delegations UNDP sent to several Women's Decade international conferences.

119. This section draws on a 1995 UNICEF/UNDP Missions headed by Professor Bayo Adedeji on which the author served and on the ECA/RRR 10th Anniversary Conference on the 1974-75 drought and famine.

120. Humanitarian alleviation of dearth/reduction of famine death toll in 1970’s Ethiopia was highly politicised. Mengistu wished to use it to strengthen his fiscal position and to limit 'diversion' of resources from military to drought relief purposes. Certain donors - notably the USA - wanted to use food relief channeled via their INGOs from port to consumer to save lives but also to discredit the Mengistu regime and its Soviet and Cuban allies.

121. Ethiopia has not sought to exclude or extrude INGO's but to coordinate their activities within state set parameters and to phase down their activities relative to domestic public and - to a limited degree - civil society actors.

122. The southern (Ogadeni) half of Ethiopia's Somali Region also posed special problems. The most direct highway - Berbera to Hargeisa to border near Burao to Dijijiga and the Ethiopian Ogaden - was in very poor condition and (because of non-recognition of Somaliland) repairs were not internationally supported until well into the drought. The Ethiopian Ogadendi are in part secessionist and in large part dissatisfied with their place in the regional as well as the national government.

123. Ethiopia has taken a semi agnostic position on the Djibouti Conference and the 'President' it has thrown up. As its friends in the Eastern Horn - Somaliland, Puntland and the Rahanweyn are all deeply antagonistic to him and his project for recreation of a unitary centralised state based in Mogadiscu while the UN, OAU and Arab League wish the Djibouti process well (albeit in floods of words and trickles of material support) that is perhaps to be expected.

124. The British action was almost certainly purely for logistical/administrative convenience. Such administering of border areas of one territory by another was not uncommon among adjacent British colonies, but was regularly sorted out before independence sometimes by reversion but on occasion by transfer.

125. This section draws on discussion with Lionel Cliffe and with Eritrean participants in IDS (Sussex) course and in the concluding COPE workshop in 2000.

126. The over 50% share of 'settler' holdings in good quality land is not sustainable politically nor economically, especially given that about one third is typically farmed intensively, one third far from fully and one third held as a 'land bank' (usually with some of each on each farm). Either rapid entry on to all abandoned farms in 1975, or a tax on rated (not actual) output offsettable against income tax but making desultory or 'land bank' use ruinously expensive proposed in the
mid 1980's, could have been used to start a process of transition including in it the 400,000 odd
large farm worker households (who are predominately Zimbabwean not foreign as sometimes
politically asserted) who are the most landless of all rural Zimbabwean households, the key to
continued higher productivity and the most overlooked (or rather deliberately disregarded) in

127. Drought reduces agro industrial output directly and consumer goods output by destruction of
rural entitlements (demand out of crop sales). In 1992 Zimbabwean manufacturing sector
output was, for these reasons, estimated at 25% below what it would have been without
drought.

128. Based on internal discussions in the Planning Commission and with UNICEF in 1991-93
when the author was a part time Mozambican public servant advising on poverty reduction and
on planning for post war rehabilitation.

129. That was certainly the case in Mozambique where the degree of war weariness and the very
real willingness of most supporters of both sides to seek to live together again was distinctly
underestimated. Even organised banditry by ex soldiers proved to be relatively limited in
quantity and in territorial spread.

130. Monsignor the Chief Chaplain to former government's Rwanda Army and to Interahamwe in
1994 TV interview in Goma, then Zaire.

131. For example the 2000 Mozambique floods require substantial basic service and local
infrastructure funding by local (municipal) and central government to claw back 1992-1999
Rehabilitation now set back as well as emergency medical/logistical and 2000-2001 food
security support. These orders of magnitude exclude household contributions out of own
labour, sales and remittances and domestic social sector mobilized resources other than central
government and related external flows. These might raise 5-6 year basic rehabilitation costs per
household of five to $1,500-$2,500 with an annual household increased earned income payoff
of $500-$1,000 and a public services annual flow of – say - $50-$100 per household. It is
worth noting that these relatively fast payoff benefit/cost ratios are attractive in purely
economic terms (particularly if a plausible multiplier effect on sellers to and buyers from
rehabilitating households/localities is factored in).

132. The reasons vary. In some cases pure venality, in other willful disempowerment of
disfavoured groups, in others provision of ‘services’/’opportunities’ to key support groups and
in one or two all three are important to making a commitment by the late regime to preemptive
rehabilitation a thoroughly surreal concept.

133. In such cases violence and human rights abuse tend to grow even if – as in both cases and
especially Sierra Leone – venality and lack of state capacity were initially much more
characteristic than systematic oppression and brutality.
134. For example the Algerian President at the time the Islamist tensions exploded during and after the aborted election was relatively new in office, was not an old line politician, and had a cabinet many of whose members shared these characteristics. However his army background led the Islamic groups to distrust him while his attempts to negotiate with them on economic, social and political issues led to his prompt ouster by harder line, more senior army personages.

135. For example, Tanzania’s Kagera Region (and especially Ngara District) was subjected to severe economic infrastructure damage from overuse and environmental costs as well as those of enhanced security. In Ngara the net costs (non-intuitively heavily in women’s and girls’ time because refugee demands forced more time use to retrieve water and fuel over greater distances) over 1994-96 were up to $150 per capita, over average rural Ngara annual per capita income. (see R.H. Green (1994) 'That they may be whole again: offsetting refugee influx burdens on Ngara and Karagwe districts', A Report for UNICEF, Ngara and Dar es Salaam, September.

136. The Southwestern (Yoruba) separatist tensions, which have indeed led to violent civil disorder are less pre-emptable by rehabilitation. They relate to the past reality of political repression and dispossession and a fear that the present is only marginally better (despite a Yoruba president) and the future potentially even worse.

137. The degree of Shell/Military Regime (or indeed present civilian government) cooperation/collaboration/collusion is somewhat obscure but – in terms of tensions – largely irrelevant. At the least Shell wanted a quiet life for exploration and production with few environmental damage restrictions and turned a blind (or perhaps 20/800) eye to how the state sought to deliver them. That this was economically both myopic and tunnel vision (e.g. Shell has been forced to abandon its Ogoni operations of over 200 wells) is also irrelevant in respect to tensions – if not to its change in attitudes and perceptions (whether principled or pragmatic or a mix of both).
AUTHOR NOTE
Reg Green has been a student of the applied political economy of Africa for over forty years observing researching, teaching, advising and acting as a civil servant in forty eight countries. He has been a faculty member at the Universities of Ghana, Congo (then Zaire), East Africa (Institute of Social and Economic Research), Dar es Salaam, Yale and the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex from which he has just retired after twenty six years. He has advised the governments of Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Mozambique and Somaliland as well as SWAPO of Namibia, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Commission for Africa, UNICEF, the ILO and UNDP. He has worked with/advised the World Council of Churches, the British Council of Churches, the Catholic Institute for International Affairs, the (Philippine) Freedom From Debt Coalition, the International Centre for Law in Development, the African Development Bank and the African Centre for Development, Economic and Security Studies. His work on rehabilitation grew from the mid 1980's out of poverty, wartime survival, economic community calamity response (drought) and national economic strategy work for UNICEF, Mozambique, Tanzania, ACDESS, SADC, ADB, ECA in a dozen African countries.
Means And Methods

While this paper flows directly from the 1997-2000 COPE project, it has a broader and longer background affecting/informing its methodology and sources and its applied focus. The earliest components flow from 1960's experience and observation in Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania while working on quite different themes and from a 1979 Commonwealth Secretariat Mission to Uganda as part of the failed effort at governance reconstruction and macro economic capacity rebuilding undertaken in the immediate post Amin era.

However of the three main streams into it, the first relates to a series of Southern African consultancies and operational assignments in and for Mozambique and SADC (then SADCC) covering both war time catastrophe and post war drought catastrophe survival support and rehabilitation analyses, strategic frames, policies and programme development. Via UNICEF consultancies in respect to the impact of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi on Tanzania and on Somalia/Somaliland (the first from 1987 as well as 1993 and 1994 and the second in 1995) the conflict oriented work extended to the Great Lakes and the Horn.

The second main input was two missions led by Professor Adedeji of ACDESS - the first on a semi related topic and the second ACDESS' ongoing 'Crisis Comprehension and Mastery' project in 1995 and 1997 followed by an ACDESS/UNDP conflict workshop in Mali in 1998. These covered Southern Africa (Mozambique and Angola), Central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi), the Horn (Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali).

The third was COPE proper with two project workshops and participation in national workshops in Uganda, Somaliland and Sri Lanka as well as related panels and presentations in the UK and at the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

Much of the material on which this paper is based is published in UNICEF, ACDESS, COPE and Mozambique work cited below.
Other portions came from discussions at workshops and in the field ranging from a President, a Prime Minister, an Archbishop, Bishops, Ministers through government officials, elected local government leaders, domestic social actors, INGO staff to ordinary camp residents and returnees. Other contributions come from students from countries surveyed participating in IDS (Sussex) seminars and courses. Much of this material is - by its nature - not published nor directly citable. Also not citable directly are several memos on 'what is to be done' prepared for governments and institutions in four countries.

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