

**UNMANAGEABLE - TOWARD SUB SAHARAN
AFRICAN DEBT BARGAINING?**

Reginald Herbold Green

Per capita output in low-income Africa has declined so drastically over the last 15 years that most of the gains of the modern era have been wiped out. Today, low-income Africa is poorer than it was in 1910.

- A. W. Clausen, World Bank, 1986

Internal...growth should be seen as the foundation which makes sustained debt service economically possible and politically acceptable. No country will immiserize itself year after year to meet external debt obligations; on the other hand meeting debt payments out of growing gross domestic product and export flows is socially and politically acceptable.

- Philip Ndegwa, Central Bank of Kenya, 1986

To describe African debt as unmanageable is to assert that there is no known strategy whereby Africa can hope to combine a reversal of its tragic economic decline with service of its existing debt (except by new grants that have the same economic effect as debt relief). It is to diagnose the situation of most African countries as one of insolvency rather than simply illiquidity.

- John Williamson, Institute for International Economics, 1986

Africa's debt burden is now intolerable. We cannot pay. You know it and all our other creditors know it. It is not a rhetorical question when I ask, should we really let our people starve so that we can pay our debts?

- Julius K. Nyerere, OAU Chairman, 1985

The Invisibility Of An Iceberg: SSA External Debt 1960-84

The term "debt crisis" has, at least in the North and among bankers or academic specialists, tended to mean crises threatening the solvency of major commercial banks and the stability of the international monetary system. In

those terms it is reasonable to argue that Sub-Saharan African states (even collectively) do not pose a "debt crisis" because their gross commercial bank borrowing is of the order of \$25 billion, even excluding write-offs or reserves already provided and potentially off-settable deposits.

On the other hand, in SSA, the term "debt crisis" is taken to mean levels of external debt to all creditors whose servicing imposes unmanageable burdens relative to export earnings if paid, and almost equally unattractive loss not only of commercial credit but also of concessional finance if allowed to go into or remain in default. By that definition - which is the one used in this paper - about three fourths of SSA's 46 states have either a fully fledged external debt crisis or are on the brink of one.

The only SSA economies one could seriously propose as both truly plausible credit risks from a commercial bank lender's point of view and prudent potential borrowers for general purposes from their own are Botswana and Cameroon. A few more may be plausible cases for consolidation and rollover loans or for commercial borrowing (preferably on a non-recourse project tied basis) for fairly safe, high yield export oriented projects. Zimbabwe and Kenya may be examples on a general basis and non-recourse project tied loans (albeit realistically more likely to be export credit agency than commercial bank financed) may be sound for lenders and borrowers for very strong projects even in very weak economies, e.g. the Songo Songo/Kilwa natural gas to ammonia/urea project in Tanzania and gold mining rehabilitation and expansion in Ghana.

This perception of an SSA debt crisis is a recent one - at least outside the chronic de facto default cases such as Zaire and the Sudan. Even at continental level within SSA it dates only from 1982/83. At international agency and academic level general recognition began to develop only from 1984/85.

The basic available data on SSA external debt and debt service are set out in the tables annexed to this paper. As noted below they are even now not very accurate (in some cases not at all accurate), but they do demonstrate that continentally, and for most countries, SSA has a nearly unmanageable debt burden.

The Parameters of the Invisible

SSA external debt was small and its service - with a few exceptions - sustainable and sustained until 1974. Most of the countries had become independent in 1960 or later and, in retrospect, in the 1960s SSA faced much less unfavourable international economic contexts than over 1971-75 or from 1979 to date. External debt was rising rapidly but from a low base and, except for a handful of countries with strong export bases, most of it was from governments (including their export credit agencies) or multilateral development finance institutions.

Even as of 1986 total SSA external debt (including all arrears and short term financial institutional credit, as well as all medium and long term obligations) was in the range of \$100 to \$140 billion or under 15% of total South external debt. Commercial bank debt stood at about 25% of the total (\$25 to \$35 billion) or perhaps 5% of total commercial banks South exposure. At country level it was still smaller - looked at from a global perspective - with no debtor over \$25 billion, only 3 over \$10 billion and only 5 over \$5 billion.

The 1986 levels of debt however were - as shown in the tables - high relative to GDP as was the debt service level of almost \$10 billion relative to exports of goods and services of the order of \$20 billion.

The 1973-1986 debt buildup has had four phases:

1. 1974-75 borrowing to ride out 1973/75 drought and terms of trade (including, but not limited to, oil) shocks;
2. 1976-79 borrowing to speed up growth (which did indeed rise to a sustained four year rate of over 5% a year - SSA's best period) made possible by sharply 'improved export earnings and commercial banks' willingness to lend less selectively especially to countries with low initial debt service ratios;
3. 1980-82 borrowing to ride out what was at first believed to be a short term shock like 1974-75;

4. Post 1982 borrowing - substantially from arrears and/or rescheduling - to avert import strangulation or open default.

The SSA debt profile has - relative to other regions - higher proportions of multilateral agency loans, IMF drawings, short term credits and arrears. This worsens the debt management problem. The first two categories are formally non-reschedulable and the last two are peculiarly hard to reschedule in practice. The latter three are also omitted from, or only partially recorded in, many international debt tabulations.

Other parameters of invisibility include very incomplete national recording with pre-crisis estimates in several cases at or under 50% of post crisis tabulations (admittedly in large part because of very rapid arrears buildups especially on trade credits) as well as a case by case approach concentrating on one country at a time. In addition to obscuring the continental nature of the problem, this approach tended to cause attention to be focused almost totally on what the debtor had done wrong. Arguably this was a plausible focus to the early 1970s when only a handful of countries - e.g. Ghana, Sudan, Zaire - had congenitally dismal economic performance records, but it has become palpably unrealistic since 1979.

The View From SSA

As noted above, SSA debt service to export ratios are approaching 50%. By IMF calculations they were about 40% in 1985 (including IMF and short term debt service). By 1987 low income SSA economies are likely to be paying 20% of export earnings in interest on external debt alone. In extreme cases scheduled interest and repayments - even with most debt concessional - actually exceed export levels and in many - e.g. Ghana - they amount to over 60% of gross grant and loan inflows even in the context of substantial World Bank/IMF backed structural adjustment programmes.

Despite the relatively low pre-1974 debt levels, the external debt service problems of some SSA economies are not new. Prior to 1975 over half of all rescheduling agreements involved SSA economies and over 1975-85 about 40%. In 1986 over 20 SSA states sought Paris Club reschedulings, some for the eighth or ninth time.

The perception and actual levels of debt service burdens in SSA are not uniform. At one extreme, Botswana has less external debt than external reserves and only moderately more interest due on debt than receivable on reserves. At the other extreme are twelve low income economies which the World Bank indicated in 1986 could never in fact repay their external debt. The 12 are Benin, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. However, if one takes all poor countries with 1986-87 debt service ratios over 30% on the World Bank's basis (which is probably one third below the total actually payable), Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zaire and Mozambique enter this category. Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Gabon have similar debt service ratios but are less poor and arguably could eventually repay subject to extended reschedulings.

Some Tactical Implications

For most SSA economies grants and new loans exceed interest and amortisation actually paid (which is substantially less than payable). The net flow has - according to Overseas Development Council estimates - fallen from \$10 billion in 1980 to \$4.9 billion in 1985. The 1987 estimated recovery to \$7.3 billion (partly due to reschedulings) seems unlikely to be sustained unless very substantial extended reschedulings become the norm. World Bank data for IDA eligible countries (excluding Mozambique) show a net inflow before rescheduling of \$5.1 billion annual average over 1980-82, \$3.0 billion over 1983-84 and \$2.7 billion projected over 1986-90. Including rescheduling, the annual net flows become \$6.2 billion, \$4.8 billion and \$5.0 billion respectively. However, both non-concessional and IMF flows had already gone negative by 1985.

The SSA and individual net resource inflow countries cannot afford to institute unilateral rescheduling/servicing action beyond the point at which this would seriously jeopardise new flows. As a result, they have tended to build up commercial (trade) and subsequently government debt service arrears quietly on a semi-ignored, semi-condoned basis rather than take Peru-like initiatives. Nigeria - a net outflow country - did take a tentative Peruvian stance, but with a 40% of exports proposed ceiling, it was when promulgated adequate to pay all interest and about half of principal amortisation. In the

event it came unstuck because of the 1986 oil price collapse. The 1985 Sudanese statement of a per cent of export earnings ceiling was really a rephrased "won't pay because can't pay" cry of pain and the Zairean declaration is widely seen as a bluff or negotiating gambit not a statement of real intent.

For the least developed and some other low income SSA economies, full write-off of some bilateral concessional debt has proven attainable. Except for the USSR, USA and Japan, major creditor governments have retrospectively converted loans to these states into grants. However, since some - e.g. the UK - charged the stream of waived repayments against their aid budget, the degree of additionality is somewhat problematic.

But non-reschedulable borrowing from multilateral agencies (basically the World Bank/ODA, IMF and African Development Bank) represent a high proportion of SSA borrowing and debt service. For the IDA eligible group they represented 17.5% before (25% after) rescheduling over 1980-82 and 22% before (29% after) rescheduling over 1980-84 with 1986-90 projections of 29% (44%) respectively.

While in principle humanitarian considerations (in respect to bilateral and IDA concessional finance) and support for Bank/Fund approved stabilisation/structural adjustment programmes can be used to press for substantial reschedulings, in practice coordination is hard. Indeed the World Bank has been sharply critical of bilateral representatives at Consultative Group meetings adopting rescheduling targets which the same governments then declined to meet at subsequent Paris Club sessions.

1986-1995: Projections and Premonitions

There is little reason to project any substantial improvement in the external economic context confronting SSA and most of its national economies over the period to 1995. External balance improvements since 1981 relate overwhelmingly to import cuts, which are by now eroding not only national product but also attainable export levels.

Real interest rates for SSA are even higher than global totals suggest.

External interest and principal are paid in (or literally from the proceeds of) exports. Therefore the nominal interest rate needs to be adjusted by the nominal export price change to determine real interest, e.g. if interest is 10% nominal and export prices fall 10% then the effective real interest rate from the debtors' perspective is 20% even if creditor country inflation of 4% makes the real interest rate from their perspective 6%. Export price changes have a similar effect on amortisation. With few exceptions SSA exports have poor nominal, let alone real, price prospects. They may stabilise or fluctuate around 1987 levels, but even in nominal terms these are frequently 40-50% below mid-1970s highs.

The 1986 oil price fall may be a marginal to substantial windfall for a majority of SSA economies. But for SSA as a region - and for Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria individually (i.e. a third of SSA's population) - the net result is a substantial loss of export value and earned import capacity.

To date special facilities and structural adjustment programmes have been seriously under-financed. With the number of SAPs rising and the use of IMF credit to plug shortfalls in other finance less and less adequate, this problem seems more likely to become worse rather than better over 1987-95.

Overall World Bank projections for SSA show negligible or negative real per capita GDP growth to 1995 - from a 1985 per capita base averaging about 25% per capita less than the late 1970s. The debt service/export and debt/GDP ratios also either improve very slowly or worsen in these projections. For the low income countries even after more generous rescheduling than has typified 1980-86, the World Bank projects 1986-90 import capacity per capita as below either that of 1980-82 or of the mid-1970s. The same applies to Nigeria and Angola and probably to Gabon and the Cameroon.

Preludes To Negotiations - National

It is hard to describe SSA debt negotiations to date as satisfactory to anybody with the possible exception of commercial banks in some of the London Club reschedulings. That several countries are now seeking their eighth or ninth rescheduling is perhaps in itself adequate evidence - the breathing

space is not large or long enough for revival of the economies; the creditors remain largely unpaid. The IMF record is rather parallel. With the potential exception of Zimbabwe, no major post 1978 higher credit tranche drawer has been able to restore adequate growth levels while repaying IMF drawings on time other than by re-drawing.

SSA Paris and London Club renegotiations have not been innovative even by the standards of these bodies. Until 1986 the central tendency for Paris Club reschedulings was to roll forward official debt arrears plus 18 to 24 months payments of principal (and sometimes interest) with 5 years grace and 5 further years to repay principal (less for interest and arrears). While good faith clauses on subsequent reschedulings of further years of payments on the rescheduled loans are common, their actual utilisation has been much less so.

Several multi-stage (12 to 18 months payments rolled forward each time) reschedulings have been concluded, e.g. for Zaire and the Sudan. Each has had elaborate conditionality and monitoring. Their defects include: the massive misallocation of debtor personnel time required to monitor, report, confer, renegotiate them; gross under-financing (even on paper) of accompanying new financial packages; total absence of lender performance monitoring; overall macro-economic assumptions which are - taken together - frequently so optimistic as to make the arrangements about as stable as a house of cards in a typhoon.

While Paris Club reschedulings now usually follow a consultative group financing meeting, they are not institutionally linked to it. More seriously, they rarely provide even short term debt service burden reduction equal to the amounts set down - by the same governments wearing their consultative group (or con group?) hats - in the macro-economic and balance of payments projections agreed by the group and very often authored by the World Bank. The World Bank has explicitly blamed at least one adjustment programme collapse - Zambia 1984 - on this non-coordination.

The IMF does not formally reschedule but in practice seems to have become locked in with respect to its larger SSA drawers. The only way most of them - e.g. Ghana - can repurchase on time is likely to be by immediately redrawing. While this may maximise long term IMF influence, it is a peculiar way either to provide long term structural adjustment or short term bridging finance. In

the better funded structural adjustment programmes - e.g. Ghana - heavy IMF drawings in early years are used to cover a general lag in initial bilateral pledging and disbursement but from year four on (when the grace period expires) IMF scheduled repurchases tend to be similar to the projected financing gap.

As a result, the IMF seems rather disposed to use its Structural Adjustment Fund (retreaded Trust Fund with concessional interest rates and longer repayment periods) primarily to refinance part of maturing standby drawings, which is arguably not the most efficient allocation. It does admittedly reduce pressure on both the Fund and the borrower, albeit the Fund is now seeking tougher conditionality on SAF use than on second credit tranche drawings, which is not what most observers believed to be the intent when SAF was created.

Commercial arrears have proven to be a very costly form of external borrowing. In extreme cases they have the result of forcing an economy to revert to cash payments on or before arrival or to externally confirmed letters of credit fully offset by counter deposits. Even more generally they result in premiums of up to 30% on goods sent on credit because of non- or delayed payment risk with consequential losses of principal or extra interest charges for the un- or late paid seller.

They have also proven to be almost impossible to reschedule except in respect to insured arrears taken over by government export credit guarantee agencies which have been covered under the Paris Club umbrella. Nigeria did negotiate rescheduling, but the agreement broke down within two years in a welter of principal and amortisation defaults. The initial problem with rescheduling is the number of creditors but the ultimate one is cost. Many SSA economies have outstanding commercial arrears of 50% to over 100% of annual export earnings. The best terms an SSA team is likely to be able to negotiate are 6% to 10% interest on remaining balance, 2 years grace, and 6 years to pay consolidation notes substituted for the arrears. But in year three, the interest (6-10%) and amortisation (16.2/3%) on a 100% of exports arrears backlog would raise the external debt service ratio by 22.67% to 36.67% of export earnings. That is hardly a position likely to prove tenable for the debtor.

Do-it-yourself reschedulings have been rare and with one special exception

rather unsatisfactory. Nigeria's attempt to reschedule (especially on short term bank lines of credit and on commercial arrears) and to set a 30% to 40% of export earnings debt service to exports cap, without a prior Fund (or Bank) agreement rapidly unravelled.

A more common form of do-it-yourself has been semi-selective massive run-up of arrears on medium and long term debt service, as a semi-condoned partial default or debt service cap. While one may suspect some of the run-ups represented inability to manage rather than conscious management, others - e.g. Tanzania from 1982 - were seen as interim debt service burden limitation tactics. This approach has in several cases bought time but it is hard to see how at least the commercial arrears portion of the overhang can be unwound. That problem is even more acute when - as in Sudan, Zambia and Liberia - substantial repurchase arrears with the IMF block a new IMF agreement until cleared and thereby, as a second step, block any general, formal rescheduling.

Zimbabwe did manage a "take it or leave it" rescheduling in 1984 which was both inventive and largely successful. It related to blocked balances awaiting remittance at some unspecified future date which prior to that point could be deposited - at up to 15% in 1984 - and the interest remitted immediately. These were converted into 4% government stock with 8 to 12 years maturity. The net present value, as well as the current debt service, were evidently very sharply reduced so that the official presentation of the measures as safeguarding convertibility of interest and liquidation of principal would appear to be a none too subtle piece of sarcasm. Amazingly the creditors - and even financial journals - accepted this rescheduling with little adverse comment.

In addition the blocked balances could be used to finance approved domestic investment - de facto a form of equitisation. In that event dividends (as on all post September 1979 approved foreign equity investment) would be remittable.

The reason for external acceptance would appear to be the history of the specific debts (or arrears) in question. They represented interest, rent, dividend and amortisation or asset liquidation payments due under the illegal Rhodesian regime which were blocked by that regime's exchange controls. Zimbabwe's initial 1980 action of allowing interest on them to be remitted was

actually a significant liberalisation. Because of their origins and the total inconvertibility of principal and interest from the mid-1960s to 1980, it is likely that these arrears were considered to be a special case and that similar treatment of other external debts (by Zimbabwe or any other SSA state) would not be received equally benignly.

Since 1984 Zimbabwe has been seeking to avoid a standard Paris Club rescheduling - at least partly because with a large budgetary deficit which is primarily the counterpart of defence expenditure imposed by South African aggression against Zimbabwe and its neighbours, an IMF agreement on standard terms is seen by Zimbabwe as dangerously inappropriate to its circumstances. The result of this stance, very limited concessional finance flows, a 1980-82 post-independence borrowing spree and a 1984 on strategy of accepting only quite concessional or very long term loans has created a debt service crunch. If Zimbabwe could achieve a moderate current account surplus through 1990, the repayment hump would be over but the price of doing that would be drastic intermediate and capital goods imports cuts, quite possibly reducing output by up to 20%.

While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has always perceived debt service as an absolute prior claim to imports, the Ministry of Finance does not fully agree. Faced with substantial declines in forex available for allocation to enterprises in the first half of 1987 (and an economy already constrained to near stagnation of output by 1986 cuts) it has begun to negotiate about £160 million of six year libor plus 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ % commercial bank loans, de facto to replace maturing 1980-82 commercial bank and supplier credit finance. This buys time while Zimbabwe seeks to sort out major World Bank export sector development and finance loans caught up in the debate over macro-economic policies including the defence related deficit and restructuring loss making parastatals (basically railways, steel and agricultural marketing - the last two on export but not domestic sales).

In the meantime Zimbabwe is steadily repaying its IMF drawings and propose to liquidate them. It argues that six year 8% money is not particularly desirable and, perhaps more convincing, that it needs to restore first line liquidity to have it available when a genuine shock (e.g. drought) impact needs to be bridged. The peculiarity is that the Fund, Bank and several bilaterals oppose this apparently orthodox approach to the use of Fund credit

presumably because it would limit macro-economic conditionality leverage especially if Zimbabwe sought neither a SAP nor a Paris Club rescheduling.

Tanzania's alternative strategy approaches have related much more to adjustment than to rescheduling as such. Until 1984 they were somewhat hard to decipher because internal dialogue blunted their thrust. Their chief differences from standard versions appear to turn on avoidance, where practicable, of massive shocks; institutionalisation of small, frequent changes (e.g. in respect to the exchange rate, a sector in which Tanzania has adopted an approach very similar to Zimbabwe's); protection of mass access basic services and lower income households; priority for rehabilitation over new projects (now conventional wisdom but not so in 1979 when Tanzania first emphasised it), a very high priority to avoiding major inflationary pressures and determination to avoid if at all possible rates above 30% while seeing 10% as a short to medium (3 year) target.

By 1985 it had adopted two further planks - basing its external finance package on an articulated projection of import requirements for rehabilitation and 4% annual growth beyond those financeable from export earnings and reaching agreement with the Bank and bilaterals on firm financial commitments before seriously seeking to reach final agreement with the Fund.

Tanzania eschewed rescheduling attempts - other than partial, semi-condoned building up of arrears - prior to 1986 for two reasons. In the absence of an IMF agreement a Paris Club one clearly could not be obtained and in any event a 12 to 18 month roll-forward would need constant renegotiation. In 1986 Tanzania shifted its stance because consultative group pledges fell short of meeting minimum import requirements by the order of \$300 million (or nearly 30% of the import target) and the consultative group was willing to call for a multi-year rescheduling.

Tanzania's proposals for ten years roll-forward of interest and principal payments including arrears - i.e. all 1985-1995 service on Paris Club covered debt - with repayment spread over the next ten years were serious ones but proved non-negotiable. However it did get arrears and 1986/87 principal and interest payments rolled forward (to the extent of 97.5% of all payments otherwise due including arrears) with five years grace and five to repay (i.e. repayment over 1992-2002). While a new roll-forward of 1987-1997 (or 2002)

payments on these loans will fairly clearly be needed, one year guaranteed and two more implicitly promised on the same terms if the 1987 and 1988 Consultative Group meetings so recommend, was seen as a long enough initial breathing space to be worth agreeing upon, especially as the 1986/87 reduction of debt service was estimated as of the order of \$276 million (almost 70% of probable visible export earnings).

Preludes To Negotiations - Regional

OAU efforts to organise an SSA-Creditor regional debt conference to agree guidelines for rescheduling/partial writedown/new funds allocation have not succeeded to date. The 1986 General Assembly Special Session was on African economy in general, not external debt in particular. Proposals to Special Session did call for at least \$35-40 billion rescheduling to complement \$45 billion new money over 1986-90 but did not make the total of \$80-85 billion (of \$125 billion proposed total fixed investment) external support clear to the reader. In the event - unlike most of the rest of proposals - the debt ones (as a result of a de facto OECD, Latin American, Socialist European 'coalition' of very different objections) were not adopted in General Assembly Resolution. That resolution does recognise the existence of a debt problem but its only creditor commitment is to avoid net financial transfers from an SSA economy to a creditor economy.

There have been some subsequent responses. One has been to seek to set up a monitoring system to cover creditor as well as debtor performance (more generally North as well as SSA performance) since the resolution is in quasi-contractual form. Some confusion has arisen as UNDP - using the World Bank as its contractor - appears to view itself as the logical monitoring agency while the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank and most African states think a World Bank/ECA or World Bank/ADB monitoring team would be more appropriate.

EEC countries have responded with - and gained OECD blessing for - longer grace periods and repayment phasing up to perhaps ten plus ten years subject to some (apparently not necessarily IMF) policy conditionality. There is also broad agreement on the need to lower interest rates which would apply primarily to export credits and other non-ODA loans. While the EEC favours

retrospective conversion of development loans to grants for poor SSA countries this is still not favoured by the two major OECD members - USA, Japan - who have not done it already.

A related French proposal deals with rescheduled payments due and not actually payable. To protect the Paris Club principle of never rescheduling the same payment twice, it is proposed to set up a special IMF "disindebtment" facility. This would presumably be on concessional and long repayment terms - how it is to be financed is somewhat less clear.

Attempts - surprisingly by the usually cautiously conservative UMOA (the West African CFA franc states) - to create a united front representation to the Bank/Fund have been deferred. However, Zimbabwe Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero has used his Development Committee chairmanship to push the African debt term lengthening and interest lowering case, one which appears to be gaining a more favourable hearing since the middle of 1986.

A Review Of Negotiations To Date

Most SSA external debt renegotiations have been aimed at preventing import strangulation. In some cases, e.g. the Cote d'Ivoire, this end was sought before massive arrears had been piled up or imports had been cut below the minimum levels necessary to operate the economy. In others - e.g. Nigeria - it was taken after a crisis had recently broken out with arrears piling up and imports falling away but before a process of decline had taken firm hold. A third set of cases, e.g. Zambia, came well after such a process had taken hold with arrears very high, imports very low and even 90 day commercial (bank or other) trade credit virtually a thing of the past. A final category, e.g. the Sudan involves repeated reschedulings following the failure of successive previous ones to yield a breathing space or even approximate retoration of debt service.

Intellectually there has been a shift to defining goals in terms of the amount, period of deferral, grace period and repayment period which would provide time and economic space to restore imports, economic growth and (usually less articulatedly spelled out) exports adequate to resuming debt service. In fact this goal has rarely been acceptable to creditors so that,

while partially reflected in the 1986 Tanzania Paris Club agreement, it is more prominent in submissions such as that of the OAU to the 1986 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on SSA than in actual reschedulings.

Quite frankly the majority of the reschedulings have been viewed as buying time - usually a little time - by debtors and creditors. Neither usually really believed they solved the problem, but they did avert collapse and provide a few quarters for something good to turn up.

The reduction in gross transfers of financial resources payable in debt service as a proportion of exports have usually been in the 15% to 25% range during the effective period which has usually been one and one half to three years. However, five years roll-forward and an initial reduction in gross external debt service of over two thirds of visible exports has been achieved in the 1986 Tanzania rescheduling.

The present discounted value of the future debt service streams has in general been reduced by 10 to 20% because most of the debt rescheduled has been government to government or government guaranteed export credits with interest rates rather to substantially below commercial levels. Because grace periods have tended to be limited (up to five years) as have those for repayment (usually not in excess of five years after the grace period) the time profile of external debt and the repayment hump in it has been rolled forward more than lengthened. No significant gains have been made on the financial terms of commercial borrowings - indeed on balance they have worsened. That result is all the greater in cases in which non-interest bearing arrears have been consolidated into interest bearing notes, e.g. Nigeria.

Private sector external loans are a relatively small portion of SSA external debt. Apart from a handful protected by external escrow accounts, e.g. to Valco (Volta power and aluminium) and Mobil Zaire (offshore oil field) they have probably fared about as well or badly as official or officially guaranteed state enterprise borrowing. In general SSA states have not taken on obligations to repay if the private borrower is unable to meet the local currency equivalent of debt service due. However, in the case of commercial arrears there have been cases - e.g. Nigeria - of substituting a government obligation for a private sector one, but more because the private borrower had discharged his obligation in local currency but remittance to the creditor had

not been possible then because the state accepted liability for unpaid, non-guaranteed private (or parastatal) debts.

Almost all Paris Club and the post 1980 commercial bank renegotiations have been tied to an IMF upper credit tranche agreement as a pre-condition for opening negotiations. Since 1982 there has generally - but not universally - been a link to a World Bank structural adjustment programme. Indeed in two 1986 cases - Tanzania and Nigeria - the basic agreement was with the Bank and the Fund one was consequential on it.

The amount of adjustment required is hard to measure empirically. Because most agreements since 1970 have been in a context of import strangulation, increased imports, reduced gross debt service and increased gross inflows (largely on concessional terms at least in principle) have been standard goals even on the part of creditors. The devaluation, credit expansion limitation and government bank financing requirement reduction goals have usually been quite stringent. The partial exceptions - e.g. Tanzania 1986 - have been ones in which substantial action had been taken nationally prior to actual Bank, Fund or Paris Club negotiations.

The snag is that the amount and period of adjustment upward of possible imports has usually been self-evidently too low and too short to allow restoration of growth and of sustaining it after resumption of debt service. In several cases quite clearly the fact that rolling repayment forward solves nothing because a substantial portion can never again be serviced has been quite deliberately fudged.

The deals to date have - with few exceptions - been good only in terms of objectives defined as putting collapse or at least rapid economic decline a few quarters forward. Even in that sense some have been unsuccessful, e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and earlier Zambia and Zaire reschedulings. The main causes were lack of options - or of a clear negotiating position based on coherent medium term projects and strategies - on the SSA side and a lack of willingness to set precedents or accept that much of the debt was irrevocably bad on the lenders' side. The World Bank has sought to redress this imbalance by providing scenarios, but the Paris Club has been rather unwilling to accept their implications as to length of rescheduling, grace, repayment let alone increased conditionality and/or open partial or full writeoffs.

Whether most of the deals served anybody's interests is a moot point. In general at the end of the day the debtors had heavier debt burdens and lower real imports and the creditors more debt outstanding and in quasi-default and lower real exports to the debtors. Commercial banks in some cases, e.g. Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Gabon, Mauritius have been able to claw down their exposure and in others, e.g. Sudan, Zaire, Zambia have had more time to write it down gradually by setting up reserves over a period of years.

A Background And Contextual Review Of Results

Most SSA governments - reading World Bank, IMF and OECD forecasts - expected 1979/80 to be followed by a rapid recovery (analagous to that following 1974/75). This did lead to ex post imprudence in borrowing - especially borrowing short - and in running up trade credit arrears and IMF drawings to "ride out" the storm. Whether it really affected most rescheduling approaches is unclear - they were in large measure desperate crisis management (or juggling) sorties rather than reasoned bridges to recovery attempts. The handful of pre-1979 substantial users of commercial bank credit - e.g. Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Gabon - may have hoped for resumption of normal lending by the banks up to, say, 1982 but probably did not put much faith in it, especially as they could hardly afford to use much more of such expensive money.

At one level net transfers have influenced or even dominated tactics. Because SSA as a whole has (including grant aid) a positive overall financial resource transfer position, true go-it-alone positions have been very rare. The one true exception was Nigeria over 1983-85 when it was making unilateral proposals from a position of net resource outflows. By 1986 its (oil) exports had fallen so sharply in import capacity terms that it felt forced to turn to rescheduling on an agreed basis plus massive World Bank borrowing to approach an ex ante balanced financial transfer position. The Sudan's nominal following of Peru's approach is slightly unreal - the Sudan was not actually paying as much as it promised, has been unable to meet its own ceiling (i.e. to pay that much) and is hopelessly in default to the IMF.

In a different sense falling net inward transfers and limited debt

renegotiation prospects (at least through 1985) have led some countries - notably Tanzania - to use quasi-condoned arrears buildup as an alternative to formal rescheduling so long as it did not affect grant bilateral aid. In these cases World Bank - and less uniformly IMF - service has had priority to achieve inflows from the Bank and to keep open the possibility of a subsequent agreement with the Fund.

SSA states until 1984 at the earliest were not very creative in proposing non-standard debt reschedulings. Those that saw them as necessary, like Tanzania, also viewed them as unattainable and preferred semi-condoned, quasi-default to even more unsatisfactory Paris Club model reschedulings which would have broken down as soon as grace periods began to expire if not before. The OAU submission to the Special Session and the Tanzania Paris Club proposals in 1986 do represent a more innovative and assertive stance. Both tend to concentrate on long (five to ten year) interest, arrears and principle rollforwards with at least five years grace on each rolled amount and ten years subsequent repayment. Interest rate reductions have not featured equally prominently in these proposals and write-offs have been posed as a challenge to the handful of major governments (USA, Japan, USSR) who have not acted on the 1979 agreement to convert loans to low income economies retrospectively into grants.

These post 1984 proposals arguably attempt to make a virtue out of weakness and smallness. That is they argue that unless SSA is to remain forever dependent on emergency aid, forever in danger of starvation, forever a shrinking export market for creditors and forever prone to extreme insecurity, then, both massively larger concessional resource inflows and very substantial grace periods on over half external debt payments are needed. Without them rehabilitation, recovery and structural adjustment to higher earned import (export) levels are seen as unattainable.

Pressure for open unilateral action has rarely been high. This is partly because mass public opinion on this type of issue is rarely mobilised in SSA and partly because unilateral action - except debt service capping to spread out a repayment hump as in Nigeria - was usually perceived by those looking at the issue as likely to reduce inflows more than outflows. In other words the cost/benefit analysis tended to be negative. Pressure for de facto unilateral action, i.e. can't pay, don't pay, has been more common and when governments

beleived it would be condoned (especially by commercial non-bank trade creditors and export credit agencies) has been effective, but perhaps more often because it pushed on an open door than because it changed government minds.

Some Salient Characteristics Of Rescheduling

No SSA economy has secured a rescheduling without a prior IMF agreement. The supposed Nigerian exception is unreal - Nigeria did negotiate a standby on higher credit tranche terms but for a maximum drawing level of zero. Tanzania in 1986 negotiated an agreement with the World Bank which also convened a consultative group meeting before an IMF agreement was reached. While this sequence clearly led to modifications in the Fund's position, it did not affect the Paris Club's insistence that the agreement be in place before a reheduling meeting could be convened.

Clear alternative adjustment strategies have not been very common in SSA. Ghana's in 1982 caved in as did Tanzania's over 1981-84. Zimbabwe's has precluded a new Fund agreement and imperilled the World Bank's financing new programmes which, taken by themselves, it actually endorses. Nigeria's and Tanzania's alternative strategies - and their apparent ability to persevere in them despite costs - do appear to have resulted in somewhat less conventional IMF agreements; less dependence on short term high interest IMF finance; a greater share of World Bank finance (on Bank terms for Nigeria and IDA for Tanzania) and - perhaps - somewhat less limited easing of short to medium term debt service burdens than have typified other reschedulings. But both have been quite tough in their overall adjustment packages even though Tanzania has insisted on and won considerably more flexibility in timing, a near avoidance of an overtly externally imposed initial "big shock" adjustment and a bias in expenditure toward basic services for poor people.

The cost of winning some independence of structuring adjustment was high for Nigeria and Tanzania and remains high for Zimbabwe. Whether the freedom of manoeuvre won will recover the cost remains to be seen. In the case of both Nigeria and Tanzania the alternative strategy clearly could not be made to work without an additional import capacity from reduced debt service outflows and/or increased financial inflows. But because both states appeared willing

and to some degree able to struggle on without a conventional rescheduling, mounted energetic (if not very successful) real external and fiscal deficit reduction programmes and did adjust prices (including the exchange rate) significantly and on a processual, not a one off, basis the Bank and the bilateral sources came to see their efforts as worth backing and the Fund, rather more grudgingly, went along.

This would not have worked however had either wanted large IMF drawings. Nigeria will not in fact draw under its standby. It has negotiated toward borrowing comparable amounts at similar interest rates but with longer grace and repayment periods from the World Bank. Tanzania's drawings are also low for the start up of a structural adjustment programme. In effect they are to retire a bridging loan taken to clear arrears to the IMF and to reduce arrears to international financial institutions. For their own reasons neither state wanted any substantial proportion of new inflows to be IMF resources.

Debt rescheduling as opposed to devaluation - has rarely been highly politicised in SSA except in the sense of affirming that debt service does not have a higher priority than averting starvation. Devaluation has been politicised, but possibly more in a mirror image macho response of "no devaluation, now or ever" in reaction to the IMF's apparent "devaluation is good for your soul and cures all ills" recipe than as a genuinely internal debate. Certainly that seems to have been the case both in Nigeria and Tanzania in which rather rapid initial and subsequent sliding devaluation proved politically attainable and sustainable once it could be seen as backed by a domestic case and not as a response to IMF demands. Rescheduling decisions and negotiating parameters have in almost all cases been taken/set up by a limited number of ministers, senior officials and expatriate advisors in Treasuries and Central Banks. In some cases these may have been teleguided by hired merchant bank advisors, but the degree to which their influence went further than tactics and data organisation is a moot point - the banks and the Treasuries/Central Banks, perhaps predictably, tell quite different stories.

Oddly the most politicised rescheduling - or at any rate rolling over - case is Zimbabwe which has not rescheduled. The internal lineup is not stable - the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has for some years seen external debt service and external debt reduction as absolute priorities, while enterprises (who face reduced import allocations) back either rescheduling or replacement borrowing

with Finance and Planning holding the balance and apparently somewhat variable on how much import - and thus output - reduction it is willing to pay to "get over the external debt hump".

The "precedent" argument is beginning to fall away in SSA. SSA is now perceived as a continent in structural economic crisis requiring special treatment. Admittedly this is a government rather than a commercial bank perception and is only now approaching possible implementation so far as debt rescheduling is concerned. However, creditor government and government guaranteed loans are dominant in SSA and commercial banks might follow a Paris Club lead. That is a plausible scenario at least in cases - e.g. Sudan, Zambia, Zaire - in which they know that standard approaches will fail to secure even full interest service much less debt repayment unless in fact grant aid is used for that purpose which is unlikely.

Arguably the Tanzanian and Nigerian deals are significantly better than average - especially if macro and sectoral adjustment freedom of manoeuvre is taken into account. Because of the cost of holding out until they were achieved it is unclear how many governments will choose to seek to follow them if citing their parameters as precedents does not by itself produce some softening of terms. A government needs to perceive itself as having a strong support base (military in Nigeria, mass in Tanzania) to venture down that road. Learning has probably been largely from what went wrong with other countries' reschedulings (too little, too late, too short) but only in Tanzania and Zimbabwe has this evidently influenced strategy and tactics. Both have chosen to delay formal debt rescheduling proposals until they believed they had the rest of an adequate financial resource transfer package in place i.e. Zimbabwe is still formally resisting the idea of a Paris Club rescheduling.

Until 1985 it is hard to argue that rescheduling terms changed much either continentally or for individual states. From 1985 there are some signs that World Bank and consultative group projections of short to medium term debt service reductions necessary to allow structural adjustment are influencing the Paris Club toward longer rollforward, grace and repayment periods and may in the future result in some concessions on interest rates.

Selected Issues and Targets: National

From the balance of payments projections the 18 to 20 most seriously indebted SSA economies the following appear to be the minimum conditions for a stable rescheduling which would have a good chance of holding up without a series of subsequent additional reschedulings:

1. all official arrears plus five years (in the worst affected eighteen ten years) of principal and interest payments to be rolled forward;
2. the grace period on each rescheduled payment to be ten years;
3. repayment to be phased over the ten years following expiry of the grace period;
4. interest on all rescheduled items to be held to 3% or the initial rate whichever is lower i.e. a reduction of 50 to 67% in guaranteed or governmental export credit rates.
5. at least for the low income category (defined either in World Bank terms or more broadly as under \$1,000 per capita in 1984) past development loans to be converted into retrospective grants by the USA, Japan, CMEA countries and - for the SSA debtor countries in respect to which conversion have not yet been made - Federal Germany.
6. and at least some export and supplier credits (especially those supporting inherently unsatisfactory projects) to be written off (as Sweden has done in the case of Tanzania).

Rather less drastic steps may be adequate for middle income countries whose bottom line problems are a hump in their debt profiles and, in several cases, a heavy backlog of commercial arrears. Roll forwards of three to five years annual principal (but possibly not interest) with repayment over the next seven to ten might well be enough for e.g. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria.

Formula related debt service or more accurately formulae with trigger points setting off rescheduling would be useful. However, a tie of gross debt service to export earnings is too blunt an instrument. At least two measures

would be needed - gross debt service to exports and net financial resource inflows relative to GDP or GDP per capita.

Commercial arrears whether to financial or new financial institutions need to be consolidated and rescheduled. The problem is that in the cases in which they are large no very satisfactory way forward now exists. 6% interest two years grace plus six years repayment packages would consolidate but without good luck would quickly slide into de facto default again - vide Nigeria. 2% five plus five year rescheduling could not be imposed unless the main bilateral sources and the World Bank gave that approach at least a nihil obstat and preferably a positive endorsement - which is far from the case today. Refinancing by use of IMF drawings amounts to consolidation into 8%, three plus three year obligations and - if pursued systematically - can easily use up all attainable IMF drawings. There may be a case for letting such arrears remain, paying all new import bills on time and waiting for a more prosperous context to launch serious rescheduling talks on this component of external debt.

To operate debt management convincingly enough to encourage creditors, to agree to multi year or quasi automatic successive 18 month reschedulings requires much fuller and more accessible data than most SSA states have. That data needs to be held in a form allowing simple programming of new debt levels in local currencies, SDR's or USA dollars when exchange rates alter - a test many present recording and retrieval systems do not pass.

Regional Initiatives: Toward Ambiances and Guidelines

Individual SSA economies are not large enough nor individual SSA governments audible (nor well staffed enough) to argue the macro (or mega) economic case for larger reschedulings, interest rate reductions and partial, selective writeoffs. To create a climate of opinion open to such proposals is a process which the 1985 OAU economic summit and the 1986 Special Session may have begun albeit more in putting across the general economic malaise and African states determination to take a lead in restructuring than in respect to external debt and its rescheduling as such.

Guideline formulation - and dialogue with OECD, CMEA, OPEC and large South economy creditors - is an area for regional coordination. The first step would be for SSA states to agree on negotiable guidelines. The ECA, ADB or Centre for African Monetary Studies (or all three) could provide inputs including data and options. The OAU would probably be the most appropriate conference convenor, but the three specialist bodies would need to staff the professional levels of its secretariat.

Negotiable guidelines will probably need to be differentiated. GDP and external debt per capita, adequacy of import levels and debt service/exports ratios, degree of import strangulation and gaps between actual and nominally possible production and population and output growth should probably be among the organising characteristics.

Presentationally SSA/Africa needs a clearcut, simple approach backed by respectable data summaries and technical annexes. But it also needs spokespersons and a team - of significantly less than fifty one - to carry on dialogue in actual working groups which would presumably then report back to a larger, higher level body empowered to promulgate the guidelines. Whether that body should be UNCTAD's Trade and Development Committee, the Fund/Bank Development Committee or the UN General or ECOSOC Assembly requires further consideration.

Regionally, greater monitoring capacity in respect to creditors is needed - few African countries can monitor creditor action in a timely way and ECA or OAU should be able to gain economies of scale. However, there is still not full acceptance that monitoring should be a two way process with representatives or organisations of both creditors and debtors participating.

Where Now? A Tactical Review

1. SSA needs substantial de facto writeoffs for up to 20 economies. Whether they are to be higher levels of very concessional or grant aid used to repay harder loans (e.g. IMF Trust Fund credits to repay normal drawings); open writeoffs (as with Sweden taking over payment of commercial loans to Tanzania from its enterprise sector or the USA and Japan adopting the consensus on retrospective grant aid to the least

developed/other low income); and/or rescheduling with long grace and repayment periods and reduced interest which combine to reduce net present value significantly is secondary.

2. For a much broader group of countries - who may need rescheduling for fairly extended periods plus modest concessions on interest not wholesale writeoffs on medium and long term obligations - some means to achieve practicable rescheduling management for commercial arrears is needed. What is practicable varies from the generally insolvent to the substantially illiquid and also depends on how willing Consultative Groups and the Paris Club (hopefully merged for SSA reconstruction and rehabilitation work) are to accept substantial use of forex to clear these arrears, necessarily at the price of further deferring official debt service or of increasing the minimum levels of new money needed. The import cost, trade finance and routing convenience and even availability costs of operating with substantial levels of such arrears are so high that this topic deserves far more attention - especially by creditor governments - than it has received to date.
3. SSA is so small that to have the weight to negotiate guidelines for external debt reconstruction (indeed to call attention to the fact its concerns really do have an objective counterpart in the interests of creditor economies) it needs to achieve a form of SSA (perhaps under OAU serviced by ADB and ECA auspices) - Creditor (including Bank/Fund) strategic negotiations. These would seek to:
 - a. agree on parameters of problem as they confront different actors; and
 - b. on requirements for resolving it acceptably to all (or most) actors; as well as
 - c. instruments for doing so; for
 - d. two to four categories of economy (e.g. hopelessly indebted low and lower middle income, over-indebted lower middle income, temporarily insolvent lower middle income, viable);

- e. define criteria for categorisation and application of instruments.
4. How to achieve the above needs articulation. For example, a one off all actor conference by itself (as opposed to a series of working groups and consultations leading to a broadly agreed package presented to such a conference for ratification) is not a realistic way forward. Any single meeting would almost certainly be incompletely factually grounded on both sides and would also probably begin from very different - and partly inaccurate - perceptions by all actors both of their own and others' interests and possible areas of overlapping interest. Therefore it would hardly be likely to be adequate for reaching an articulated set of operational decisions. However, an initial commitment to go beyond mere consultation and an interim one as to principles to be worked out are probably needed to get the process started and to underpin its actually producing results not an unending series of interim reports.
5. The process - for both political practicability and technical feasibility reasons - needs to be presented, and actually viewed, as a complement to country level negotiations setting a set of parameters within which such country negotiations are to take place and as a central monitoring point for negotiations, agreements, implementations and results rather than as a substitute for them. Nobody envisages a single negotiation covering the diverse (and to a substantial extent unknown) external debt of forty odd economies and arriving at directly implementable results for each. The sooner this is made clear, the sooner partly misinformed and partly disinformed opposition to general regional negotiations as such can be ended and debate focused on real issues.
6. SSA negotiations and agreements on principle for categories of debtors should be defined formally as having no direct linkage to other regions and categories. (By demanding such linkage at the 1986 General Assembly Special Session the Latin American states in effect ensured that OECD and CMEA creditor country opposition to including any formal forward progress on SSA's external debt in the final resolution would prevail.) The linkage value will, in fact, exist but by analogy and more for the Bolivia's, probably the Paraguay's and perhaps the Peru's, not the

Mexico's or the Brazil's. Logically the OAU and the Cartagena Group might usefully have an early technical level meeting followed by a joint ministerial one to reach an agreed modus vivendi in this area.

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TABLE 1 COUNTRY GROUPINGS, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

| <i>Market borrowers^a</i> | <i>Official borrowers^c (30)</i> | | <i>Diversified borrowers^d (10)</i> |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|---|
| Congo | Burkina Faso ^e | Mali ^e | Benin ^e |
| Gabon ^b | Burundi ^{b,c} | Mauritania ^e | Botswana |
| Ivory Coast | Cape Verde ^b | Rwanda ^{b,c} | Cameroon |
| Nigeria | Central African Republic ^e | São Tomé and Príncipe ^b | Ethiopia ^e |
| | Chad ^e | Senegal ^e | Kenya ^e |
| | Comoros | Seychelles ^b | Lesotho ^{b,c} |
| | Djibouti ^b | Sierra Leone ^e | Mauritius ^b |
| | Equatorial Guinea ^b | Somalia ^e | Mozambique ^e |
| | Gambia ^e | Sudan ^e | Niger ^e |
| | Ghana ^e | Swaziland ^b | Zimbabwe ^b |
| | Guinea ^e | Tanzania ^e | |
| | Guinea-Bissau ^e | Togo ^e | |
| | Liberia ^e | Uganda ^e | |
| | Madagascar ^e | Zaire ^e | |
| | Malawi ^e | Zambia ^e | |

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, October 1985.

a. Countries that obtained at least two-thirds of their external borrowings from commercial sources from 1978 to 1982.

b. Countries with no rescheduling and no external arrears during 1980-85.

c. Countries that obtained two-thirds or more of their external borrowings from official creditors from 1978 to 1982.

d. Countries that obtained at least one-third of their external borrowing from both commercial and official creditors in 1978-82.

e. Low-income countries included in World Bank study referred to by Agarwala.

TABLE 2 INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT RELATIVE TO EXPORTS AND TO GDP, 1978-85* (percentage)

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>Ratio of external debt to exports of goods and services^b</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Indebted developing countries | 132.4 | 120.4 | 110.4 | 122.8 | 148.6 | 159.0 | 153.0 | 160.1 |
| <i>By region</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Africa ^c | 124.2 | 106.6 | 87.6 | 112.3 | 148.6 | 164.7 | 167.7 | 166.0 |
| Asia | 81.0 | 74.1 | 70.0 | 71.5 | 84.0 | 89.2 | 84.1 | 92.1 |
| Europe | 126.8 | 118.4 | 117.9 | 114.7 | 122.8 | 129.5 | 126.0 | 131.1 |
| Nonoil Middle East | 161.5 | 154.4 | 127.7 | 139.9 | 162.8 | 195.7 | 204.8 | 225.3 |
| Western Hemisphere | 217.2 | 197.8 | 182.8 | 208.8 | 267.2 | 288.2 | 273.9 | 289.4 |
| <i>By predominant export</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Primary product exporters | 180.2 | 164.5 | 157.7 | 190.5 | 237.7 | 253.2 | 250.5 | 262.7 |
| Exporters of manufactures | 69.7 | 68.9 | 65.8 | 62.1 | 66.9 | 68.4 | 62.4 | 65.6 |
| Service and remittance countries | 144.7 | 131.2 | 115.2 | 129.4 | 155.4 | 178.0 | 188.8 | 214.9 |
| <i>By financial criteria</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Market borrowers | 126.1 | 112.6 | 102.8 | 117.7 | 146.5 | 154.8 | 146.7 | 151.1 |
| Official borrowers | 162.2 | 152.2 | 155.9 | 178.5 | 215.2 | 239.2 | 258.6 | 275.1 |
| Diversified borrowers | 140.8 | 135.0 | 120.6 | 121.7 | 133.8 | 146.9 | 142.7 | 155.0 |

TABLE 2 INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM
(cont'd) EXTERNAL DEBT RELATIVE TO EXPORTS AND TO GDP, 1978-85^a
(percentage) (continued)

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Countries with recent debt servicing problems | 179.1 | 162.9 | 148.9 | 180.2 | 234.5 | 252.8 | 244.6 | 255.7 |
| Countries without debt servicing problems | 94.8 | 85.5 | 77.3 | 78.0 | 88.6 | 95.8 | 93.0 | 100.6 |
| <i>By miscellaneous criteria</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Small low-income countries | 225.5 | 220.4 | 222.6 | 269.4 | 320.9 | 334.6 | 344.5 | 375.4 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 99.3 | 93.1 | 82.4 | 116.7 | 167.7 | 200.8 | 193.7 | 203.0 |
| <i>By alternative analytical categories</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Nonoil developing countries | 131.6 | 122.0 | 114.6 | 127.1 | 151.4 | 159.6 | 154.3 | 161.3 |
| Net oil exporters | 180.6 | 149.7 | 133.9 | 165.0 | 206.6 | 218.9 | 207.0 | 226.4 |
| Net oil importers | 123.0 | 116.5 | 110.5 | 118.9 | 139.5 | 146.8 | 142.7 | 148.0 |
| <i>Ratio of external debt to GDP^b</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Indebted developing countries | 25.6 | 25.4 | 25.7 | 28.8 | 32.9 | 35.6 | 36.3 | 36.7 |
| <i>By region</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Africa | 32.4 | 30.3 | 26.6 | 30.5 | 35.9 | 38.0 | 39.9 | 40.8 |
| Asia | 15.9 | 16.1 | 16.5 | 18.3 | 20.9 | 22.0 | 22.8 | 25.1 |
| Europe | 23.7 | 21.4 | 25.6 | 28.9 | 30.3 | 35.1 | 39.4 | 39.6 |
| Nonoil Middle East | 52.9 | 62.9 | 59.1 | 62.0 | 65.7 | 67.1 | 69.6 | 69.4 |
| Western Hemisphere | 31.8 | 27.2 | 28.4 | 32.0 | 43.1 | 48.1 | 46.8 | 45.4 |
| <i>By predominant export</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Primary product exporters | 29.7 | 25.5 | 26.9 | 31.3 | 40.4 | 42.9 | 44.6 | 46.9 |
| Exporters of manufacturer service and remittance countries | 14.5 | 14.9 | 15.6 | 16.8 | 17.8 | 18.1 | 18.5 | 19.2 |
| | 32.8 | 35.7 | 37.1 | 42.2 | 48.2 | 52.6 | 55.6 | 59.4 |
| <i>By financial criteria</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Market borrowers | 29.7 | 26.6 | 27.0 | 30.0 | 37.9 | 42.4 | 41.8 | 41.9 |
| Official borrowers | 31.9 | 32.2 | 33.1 | 38.6 | 42.5 | 44.3 | 49.3 | 55.5 |
| Diversified borrowers | 16.9 | 17.2 | 17.3 | 19.5 | 21.3 | 21.8 | 23.5 | 24.8 |
| Countries with recent debt-servicing problems | 31.3 | 27.9 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 42.6 | 47.5 | 47.6 | 47.4 |
| Countries without debt-servicing problems | 20.1 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 21.2 | 23.6 | 25.0 | 26.3 | 28.2 |
| <i>By miscellaneous criteria</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Small low-income countries | 32.3 | 32.5 | 33.2 | 40.6 | 44.8 | 46.2 | 50.4 | 57.6 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 24.3 | 24.5 | 23.5 | 29.2 | 35.4 | 40.4 | 41.9 | 43.4 |
| <i>By alternative analytical categories</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Nonoil developing countries | 24.7 | 23.0 | 23.9 | 27.4 | 33.4 | 35.7 | 36.7 | 37.6 |
| Net oil exporters | 40.2 | 39.3 | 36.2 | 39.3 | 52.7 | 65.2 | 60.0 | 58.2 |
| Net oil importers | 22.5 | 20.8 | 22.0 | 25.0 | 29.9 | 31.1 | 32.6 | 33.9 |

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*.

a. Does not include debt owed to the Fund.

b. Ratio of year-end debt to exports of goods and services or GDP for year indicated.

c. Includes South Africa.

TABLE 3

SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA^a
(billion dollars and percentage change)

| | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>Imports</i> | | | | |
| Value of goods and services | 20.6 | 23.3 | 28.2 | 32.5 |
| Unit value price index | 57.9 | 63.4 | 71.3 | 83.9 |
| Value of goods and services (including Nigeria) | 31.7 | 37.8 | 43.3 | 48.6 |
| Volume, annual change | -4.6 | 5.7 | 8.5 | -4.9 |
| <i>Exports</i> | | | | |
| Value of goods and services | 16.9 | 19.8 | 20.9 | 25.2 |
| Unit value price index | 58.3 | 73.3 | 74.8 | 88.7 |
| Value of goods and services (including Nigeria) | 27.8 | 32.5 | 32.5 | 43.2 |
| Volume, annual change | 5.4 | -6.1 | 3.9 | 1.3 |
| Real GDP growth | 3.8 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Change in consumer prices ^b | 20.0 | 28.0 | 22.2 | 26.7 |
| <i>Terms of trade</i> | | | | |
| Index | 100.7 | 115.7 | 104.9 | 105.7 |
| Annual change | 9.6 | 14.9 | -9.3 | 0.8 |
| <i>Nonoil commodity prices</i> | | | | |
| Annual change | 32.1 | 36.6 | -13.1 | 14.4 |
| <i>Reserves</i> | | | | |
| Ratio to short-term debt | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 |

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*

a. Excludes Nigeria, unless otherwise indicated.

b. Weighted averages.

TABLE 4 EXTERNAL FINANCING, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(billion dollars)

| | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|---|------|------|-------|------|
| Current account deficit | -4.5 | -6.0 | -11.4 | -6.4 |
| Nondebt creating flows, net | 2.1 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 4.3 |
| Official transfers | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.6 |
| Direct investment | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| SDR allocations, valuation adjustments, and gold monetization | — | — | 0.2 | 0.8 |
| Use of reserves | — | 0.3 | 2.3 | -3.7 |
| Asset transactions, net ^a | -0.8 | -0.8 | -0.3 | -0.3 |
| Recorded errors and omissions ^b | -0.4 | -0.2 | 0.4 | -0.4 |
| Net external borrowing | 3.4 | 4.2 | 5.9 | 6.5 |
| Reserve-related liabilities | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.3 |
| Liabilities constituting foreign authorities reserves ^c | — | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Use of Fund credit | 0.3 | — | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Arrears | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.2 |
| Long-term borrowing from official creditors ^d | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 4.9 |
| Other borrowing ^e | 0.8 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1.2 |

—Zero or negligible.

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*.

a. Pertains primarily to export credits.

b. Positioned here on the presumption that estimates reflect primarily unrecorded capital outflows.

c. Comprises short-term borrowing by monetary authorities from other monetary authorities.

| 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|
| 40.7 | 39.1 | 36.4 | 33.8 | 33.0 | 33.1 |
| 100.0 | 98.0 | 93.5 | 89.5 | 87.2 | 86.7 |
| 63.4 | 64.0 | 56.2 | 48.7 | 44.8 | 44.5 |
| 5.0 | -6.0 | -4.5 | -9.5 | -0.1 | 2.1 |
| 30.1 | 27.1 | 25.2 | 24.5 | 25.7 | 25.3 |
| 100.0 | 90.9 | 81.0 | 78.5 | 80.4 | 78.3 |
| 57.7 | 46.5 | 38.1 | 35.5 | 38.1 | 37.6 |
| 2.8 | -0.5 | 5.1 | 0.3 | 8.7 | 3.2 |
| 3.2 | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 3.1 |
| 26.1 | 30.9 | 19.6 | 30.2 | 18.3 | 18.6 |
| 100.0 | 92.7 | 86.7 | 87.7 | 92.2 | 90.3 |
| -5.4 | -7.3 | -6.5 | 1.2 | 5.0 | -2.0 |
| 1.2 | -18.2 | -8.3 | 7.8 | 4.5 | -8.3 |
| 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 |

| 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|
| -6.9 | -18.4 | -18.7 | -13.6 | -7.0 | -6.9 |
| 3.6 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.5 |
| 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| -0.1 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| 0.6 | -1.0 | — | — | — | — |
| -4.3 | 6.5 | 2.9 | 0.3 | -0.6 | 0.6 |
| -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| 0.2 | — | -1.9 | -2.0 | -0.2 | -0.5 |
| 8.2 | 9.5 | 13.6 | 11.2 | 3.8 | 2.4 |
| 1.7 | 2.4 | 6.3 | 5.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | -0.7 |
| 0.4 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.6 | — |
| 0.6 | 0.6 | 5.4 | 4.2 | 0.2 | 1.2 |
| 5.0 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 6.3 | 5.0 | 2.5 |
| 1.5 | 1.4 | 3.4 | -0.7 | -2.0 | -0.7 |

TABLE 5

CONCESSIONALITY STRUCTURE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN DEBT
(percentage)

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>Multilateral</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Conces- sional | 58.26 | 57.52 | 55.41 | 58.15 | 59.34 | 60.51 | 60.30 | 59.41 | 56.54 | 57.61 | 58.54 |
| Nonconces- sional | 41.74 | 42.48 | 44.59 | 41.85 | 40.66 | 39.49 | 39.70 | 40.59 | 43.46 | 42.39 | 41.46 |
| <i>Bilateral</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Conces- sional | 84.31 | 81.46 | 82.05 | 80.15 | 70.75 | 67.13 | 66.39 | 64.78 | 58.11 | 58.51 | 61.92 |
| Nonconces- sional | 15.69 | 18.54 | 17.95 | 19.85 | 29.25 | 32.87 | 33.61 | 35.22 | 41.89 | 41.49 | 38.08 |

NOTE: This table is based on new disbursements data for 24 sub-Saharan African countries, which accounted for 95 percent of total sub-Saharan African debt at the end of 1985.

SOURCE: World Bank.

TABLE 6 EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING
(billion dollars, unless otherwise noted)

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total debt | 16.2 | 20.7 | 26.3 | 33.5 | 41.9 | 53.7 | 62.4 | 77.7 | 85.6 | 88.9 | n.a. |
| Medium- and long-term | 15.4 | 18.7 | 23.7 | 30.3 | 38.2 | 45.1 | 51.3 | 56.7 | 64.4 | 70.3 | 72.8 |
| Publicly guaranteed | 14.0 | 17.3 | 21.9 | 28.5 | 35.8 | 42.2 | 48.2 | 54.9 | 66.6 | 68.5 | 70.9 |
| Of which (percentage share) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Multilateral ^a | 18.9 | 19.3 | 19.7 | 20.4 | 20.0 | 21.3 | 21.5 | 21.8 | 20.2 | 22.0 | 24.3 |
| Bilateral ^b | 48.0 | 48.6 | 44.7 | 40.6 | 42.9 | 42.8 | 43.2 | 40.2 | 38.6 | 40.5 | 41.2 |
| Financial institutions ^c | 17.2 | 19.0 | 22.0 | 26.6 | 28.2 | 27.6 | 28.4 | 32.7 | 30.8 | 27.2 | 24.4 |
| Other ^d | 16.0 | 13.0 | 13.6 | 12.4 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 6.9 | 5.3 | 10.4 | 10.3 | 10.1 |
| Nonpublicly guaranteed | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| Short-term | 0.1 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 7.2 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Outstanding use of Fund credit | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 6.0 |
| Arrears | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 4.2 | 4.8 | 9.8 | 9.2 | 9.9 | n.a. |
| (number of countries) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (19) | (22) | (23) | (21) | (22) | n.a. |
| Market borrowers | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total debt | 3.4 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 8.5 | 11.4 | 14.0 | 17.1 | 26.8 | 33.5 | 33.9 | n.a. |
| Medium- and long-term | 3.4 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 8.2 | 11.0 | 13.5 | 16.3 | 17.6 | 26.3 | 25.5 | 25.1 |
| Publicly guaranteed | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 7.4 | 9.7 | 11.5 | 13.9 | 16.5 | 25.2 | 24.1 | 24.0 |
| Of which (percentage share) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Multilateral | 18.3 | 18.3 | 16.7 | 13.4 | 11.6 | 11.7 | 10.5 | 11.4 | 9.0 | 10.3 | 13.5 |
| Bilateral | 31.0 | 30.1 | 27.9 | 28.0 | 28.1 | 28.0 | 27.2 | 12.6 | 17.8 | 20.8 | 21.9 |
| Financial institutions | 20.9 | 29.4 | 38.2 | 47.2 | 51.4 | 53.4 | 56.8 | 71.8 | 54.7 | 49.5 | 44.8 |
| Other | 29.7 | 22.2 | 17.2 | 11.4 | 8.8 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 4.3 | 18.5 | 19.3 | 19.8 |
| Nonpublicly guaranteed | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Short-term | — | — | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 4.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Outstanding use of Fund credit | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Arrears | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | — | 0.1 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 7.0 | n.a. |
| (number of countries) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (3) | (3) | n.a. |
| Official borrowers | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total debt | 10.2 | 13.8 | 16.4 | 19.1 | 22.8 | 30.5 | 34.9 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 41.1 | n.a. |
| Medium- and long-term | 9.6 | 12.0 | 14.2 | 16.5 | 20.0 | 23.0 | 25.7 | 28.8 | 30.7 | 32.4 | 34.3 |
| Publicly guaranteed | 9.0 | 11.3 | 13.3 | 16.1 | 19.6 | 22.7 | 25.5 | 28.6 | 30.6 | 32.1 | 34.0 |
| Of which (percentage share) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Multilateral | 15.7 | 16.1 | 18.2 | 20.4 | 21.2 | 23.7 | 24.6 | 24.8 | 25.8 | 27.2 | 28.3 |
| Bilateral | 53.1 | 54.5 | 49.4 | 47.0 | 52.4 | 53.0 | 54.6 | 57.6 | 57.2 | 57.4 | 57.3 |
| Financial institutions | 17.9 | 17.5 | 19.4 | 20.5 | 19.0 | 15.8 | 14.1 | 12.3 | 12.0 | 11.1 | 10.4 |
| Other | 13.3 | 11.9 | 13.0 | 12.1 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 6.6 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 4.2 | 4.0 |
| Nonpublicly guaranteed | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Short-term | 0.1 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Outstanding use of Fund credit | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.4 |
| Arrears | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 4.2 | 4.7 | 5.6 | 3.1 | 2.8 | n.a. |
| (number of countries) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (18) | (19) | (19) | (17) | (18) | (n.a.) |
| Diversified borrowers | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total debt | 2.5 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 9.2 | 10.4 | 11.5 | 12.8 | 13.9 | n.a. |
| Medium- and long-term | 2.4 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 11.3 | 12.4 | 13.4 |
| Publicly guaranteed | 1.9 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 10.8 | 11.9 | 12.9 |
| Of which (percentage share) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Multilateral | 35.0 | 36.3 | 28.5 | 30.4 | 28.6 | 28.8 | 29.9 | 30.5 | 30.2 | 31.7 | 33.5 |
| Bilateral | 52.4 | 48.7 | 49.2 | 39.0 | 36.5 | 34.9 | 35.3 | 35.8 | 34.6 | 35.0 | 34.7 |
| Financial institutions | 7.6 | 10.5 | 11.1 | 15.7 | 21.1 | 23.8 | 25.1 | 26.5 | 28.1 | 24.8 | 23.7 |
| Other | 5.0 | 4.4 | 11.1 | 14.9 | 13.8 | 12.5 | 9.6 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 8.5 | 8.1 |
| Nonpublicly guaranteed | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Short-term | — | — | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| Outstanding use of Fund credit | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Arrears | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | — | — | — | 0.1 | 0.1 | n.a. |
| (number of countries) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (n.a.) | (—) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (n.a.) |

— Zero or negligible.

n.a. Not available.

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*.

a. Loans and credits from the World Bank, regional development banks and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies.

b. Loans from governments and their agencies (including central banks) and loans from autonomous public bodies.

c. Loans from private banks and other private financial institutions and publicly issued and privately placed bonds.

d. Suppliers' credits, external liabilities on account of nationalized properties and unclassified debt to private creditors.

TABLE 7 AVERAGE TERMS OF NEW PUBLIC DEBT COMMITMENTS^a

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest (percentage) | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 7.6 | 7.3 | 9.3 | 7.9 | 8.1 | 5.8 |
| Maturity (years) | 19.9 | 18.8 | 18.2 | 16.5 | 15.4 | 17.5 | 15.3 | 18.5 | 15.9 | 23.6 |
| Grace period (years) | 5.3 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 5.6 |
| Grant element (percentage) | 30.0 | 30.3 | 29.0 | 23.2 | 16.9 | 21.2 | 9.2 | 18.0 | 16.7 | 33.3 |
| <i>Low-income Africa</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest (percentage) | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| Maturity (years) | 23.6 | 23.1 | 23.4 | 22.4 | 20.4 | 22.4 | 23.8 | 28.2 | 28.6 | 30.2 |
| Grace period (years) | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.9 |
| Grant element (percentage) | 38.7 | 41.2 | 42.0 | 38.4 | 33.2 | 38.7 | 38.0 | 44.4 | 50.6 | 49.4 |
| <i>Low-income Asia</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest (percentage) | 2.5 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 5.4 |
| Maturity (years) | 31.5 | 27.9 | 34.1 | 38.2 | 32.5 | 30.3 | 30.6 | 28.8 | 27.5 | 29.5 |
| Grace period (years) | 8.1 | 7.2 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 6.4 | 7.2 |
| Grant element (percentage) | 59.2 | 49.5 | 59.2 | 66.7 | 58.2 | 49.6 | 45.4 | 37.4 | 40.3 | 39.3 |

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Debt Tables*; and Fund staff estimates.

a. Average terms of borrowing for new loans contracted during the year.

TABLE 8 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: RANKING ACCORDING TO DEBT OUTSTANDING, END-1985

| Country | Debt outstanding | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Distribution of medium- and long-term publicly guaranteed debt (percentage share) | | | | | | | |
| | Total ^a (billion dollars) | Use of Fund credit (million dollars) | Multi-lateral creditors | Bilat-eral creditors | Financial institu-tions and other | Scheduled interest payments ratio ^b | Debt-export ratio ^c | Debt-GDP ratio ^d |
| Nigeria | 16.6 | (0.0) | 8.3 | 17.9 | 73.8 | 13.0 | 134.6 | 21.5 |
| Sudan | 8.3 | (664.9) | 15.5 | 67.6 | 16.9 | 68.8 | 1,232.4 | 100.1 |
| Ivory Coast | 8.0 | (621.7) | 26.0 | 28.2 | 45.9 | 16.6 | 238.1 | 116.9 |
| Zaire | 5.3 | (721.0) | 15.1 | 65.2 | 19.7 | 17.3 | 258.3 | 203.5 |
| Zambia | 4.2 | (761.6) | 21.0 | 58.0 | 21.0 | 39.7 | 464.0 | 455.3 |
| Kenya | 3.5 | (485.7) | 54.2 | 27.1 | 18.7 | 8.7 | 224.8 | 57.3 |
| Tanzania | 3.4 | (21.1) | 39.7 | 56.0 | 4.2 | 23.3 | 743.3 | 62.5 |
| Mozambique | 2.6 | (0.0) | 8.9 | 55.7 | 35.4 | 68.6 | 1,518.6 | 129.2 |
| Zimbabwe | 2.4 | (264.1) | 11.1 | 17.6 | 71.3 | 12.5 | 164.3 | 20.0 |
| Madagascar | 2.3 | (161.4) | 22.1 | 59.7 | 18.1 | 21.9 | 634.1 | 101.8 |
| Senegal | 2.3 | (241.1) | 28.4 | 54.8 | 16.8 | 18.5 | 285.1 | 93.4 |
| Ghana | 2.2 | (656.0) | 36.0 | 43.9 | 20.1 | 21.6 | 324.9 | 21.2 |
| Ethiopia | 1.9 | (49.5) | 46.8 | 41.4 | 11.8 | 9.0 | 339.4 | 36.5 |
| Cameroon | 1.8 | (0.0) | 34.8 | 41.8 | 23.4 | 4.2 | 74.0 | 21.7 |
| Somalia | 1.5 | (142.2) | 30.2 | 65.5 | 4.4 | 7.5 | 909.1 | 205.1 |
| Mauritania | 1.4 | (30.3) | 26.8 | 62.6 | 10.7 | 15.8 | 378.5 | 215.0 |
| Guinea | 1.3 | (12.6) | 20.4 | 66.0 | 13.7 | 3.2 | 254.7 | 74.4 |
| Congo | 1.3 | (0.0) | 22.4 | 36.7 | 40.9 | 7.2 | 105.2 | 60.9 |
| Mali | 1.2 | (80.7) | 34.2 | 63.3 | 2.6 | 10.4 | 563.8 | 138.4 |
| Uganda | 1.2 | (282.4) | 51.0 | 38.8 | 10.2 | 12.4 | 279.2 | 33.1 |
| Liberia | 1.0 | (225.6) | 34.3 | 46.2 | 19.5 | 9.9 | 215.6 | 103.8 |
| Niger | 1.0 | (66.7) | 36.3 | 37.8 | 26.0 | 21.2 | 322.3 | 64.0 |
| Malawi | 0.9 | (133.9) | 63.3 | 23.2 | 13.5 | 18.6 | 343.0 | 78.7 |
| Benin | 0.8 | (0.0) | 35.6 | 12.6 | 51.8 | 16.4 | 326.0 | 78.9 |
| Togo | 0.8 | (62.5) | 39.5 | 54.0 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 315.7 | 114.7 |
| Gabon | 0.7 | (0.0) | 6.6 | 31.9 | 61.5 | 3.3 | 34.3 | 21.5 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.6 | (0.0) | 68.3 | 27.4 | 4.3 | 9.2 | 366.6 | 73.4 |
| Mauritius | 0.6 | (159.3) | 45.0 | 29.4 | 25.6 | 10.7 | 103.5 | 63.1 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.4 | (78.4) | 38.2 | 41.1 | 20.7 | 23.2 | 314.9 | 57.2 |
| Burundi | 0.4 | (0.0) | 62.8 | 29.3 | 7.8 | 9.8 | 312.3 | 40.2 |
| Botswana | 0.3 | (0.0) | 56.2 | 28.7 | 15.1 | 3.3 | 38.8 | 40.8 |
| Rwanda | 0.3 | (0.0) | 78.0 | 22.0 | — | 4.8 | 175.5 | 19.6 |
| Central African Republic | 0.3 | (28.4) | 49.8 | 41.4 | 8.8 | 6.7 | 169.1 | 58.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.3 | (3.1) | 46.9 | 41.3 | 11.7 | 38.6 | 1,042.0 | 129.4 |
| Swaziland | 0.2 | (9.9) | 51.0 | 33.8 | 15.2 | 4.9 | 75.6 | 57.8 |
| Gambia | 0.2 | (27.2) | 52.5 | 30.9 | 16.6 | 9.8 | 271.3 | 109.6 |
| Chad | 0.2 | (8.7) | 65.4 | 25.4 | 9.1 | 3.3 | 197.7 | 256.0 |
| Lesotho | 0.1 | (0.0) | 90.8 | 7.1 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 45.3 | 59.1 |
| Comoros | 0.1 | (0.0) | 47.1 | 52.9 | 0.1 | 9.1 | 625.9 | 123.1 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.1 | (7.9) | 19.6 | 55.9 | 24.5 | 16.7 | 473.9 | 125.7 |
| Djibouti | 0.1 | (0.0) | 18.8 | 24.0 | 57.3 | 1.1 | 53.0 | 23.8 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 0.1 | (0.0) | 48.4 | 45.1 | 6.6 | 12.7 | 579.0 | 295.1 |
| Cape Verde | 0.1 | (0.0) | 50.6 | 49.4 | — | 7.7 | 212.8 | 96.7 |
| Seychelles | 0.1 | (0.0) | 16.0 | 76.5 | 7.4 | — | 90.0 | 51.7 |

— Zero or negligible.

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; and Fund staff estimates.

a. Excludes arrears, includes medium-, long-, and short-term, publicly guaranteed and unguaranteed debt, plus outstanding use of Fund credit.

b. Scheduled interest payments and charges for use of Fund credit over exports of goods and services.

c. Total debt outstanding plus outstanding use of Fund credit over exports of goods and services.

d. Total debt outstanding plus outstanding use of Fund credit over nominal GDP.

TABLE 9 EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE
(billion dollars, unless otherwise noted)

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i> | | | | | |
| Interest ^a | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.9 |
| Amortization ^b | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
| Total | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| As percentage of exports of goods and services | 8.8 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 10.9 | 10.2 |
| Interest payments ratio ^c | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 4.5 |
| Debt-export ratio ^d | 66.7 | 74.0 | 80.3 | 102.3 | 96.1 |
| Implicit average interest rate ^e | 5.8 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| <i>Market borrowers</i> | | | | | |
| Interest | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| Amortization | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Total | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.9 |
| As percentage of exports of goods and services | 3.6 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 8.1 | 7.8 |
| Interest payments ratio | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 3.5 |
| Debt-export ratio | 28.2 | 26.7 | 31.2 | 51.2 | 47.4 |
| Implicit average interest rate | 3.5 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 7.5 |
| <i>Official borrowers</i> | | | | | |
| Interest | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Amortization | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Total | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| As percentage of exports of goods and services | 19.5 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 17.7 | 15.7 |
| Interest payments ratio | 7.7 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 7.0 | 6.4 |
| Debt-export ratio | 134.9 | 160.4 | 169.1 | 194.4 | 191.6 |
| Implicit average interest rate | 5.7 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 3.3 |
| <i>Diversified borrowers</i> | | | | | |
| Interest | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Amortization | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Total | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| As percentage of exports of goods and services | 5.2 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 7.8 | 9.4 |
| Interest payments ratio | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 4.4 |
| Debt-export ratio | 57.1 | 64.2 | 79.6 | 94.3 | 101.1 |
| Implicit average interest rate | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 4.3 |

n.a. Not available.

SOURCE: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*.

a. Includes charges on use of Fund credit.

b. Includes IMF repurchases.

c. Interest payments over exports of goods and services.

d. Total debt outstanding over exports of goods and services.

e. Interest payments ratio over debt ratio.

| <i>Actual</i> | | | | | | <i>Scheduled</i> | |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| <i>1980</i> | <i>1981</i> | <i>1982</i> | <i>1983</i> | <i>1984</i> | <i>1985</i> | <i>1986</i> | <i>1987</i> |
| 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 6.0 |
| 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 6.1 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 9.2 |
| 6.2 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 8.1 | 10.2 | 13.0 | 15.2 | 15.2 |
| 10.8 | 14.2 | 17.8 | 22.9 | 26.9 | 34.7 | 39.4 | 37.9 |
| 4.7 | 6.0 | 9.1 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 13.7 | 17.2 | 15.0 |
| 85.0 | 123.0 | 177.2 | 214.5 | 207.7 | 217.6 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 5.5 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 6.3 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 2.3 |
| 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
| 3.0 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 6.5 |
| 8.4 | 11.6 | 15.0 | 24.6 | 27.3 | 35.3 | 45.4 | 38.0 |
| 3.6 | 4.5 | 7.3 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 12.3 | 19.5 | 13.5 |
| 39.7 | 64.4 | 116.0 | 161.6 | 141.7 | 140.1 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 9.1 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 7.3 | 8.7 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.7 |
| 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 6.4 |
| 18.2 | 21.7 | 23.6 | 24.4 | 33.4 | 44.1 | 45.8 | 49.7 |
| 7.5 | 9.2 | 12.6 | 12.2 | 14.9 | 20.1 | 20.3 | 21.0 |
| 202.8 | 272.8 | 327.1 | 350.8 | 366.2 | 395.9 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 5.1 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| 9.4 | 12.6 | 17.2 | 18.8 | 18.1 | 22.1 | 21.4 | 21.9 |
| 4.8 | 6.5 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 9.6 |
| 93.8 | 112.5 | 136.0 | 153.4 | 161.0 | 176.0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 5.1 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 5.3 | n.a. | n.a. |

TABLE 10 OFFICIAL MULTILATERAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK DEBT
RESTRUCTURING, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1980-85
AMOUNT RESTRUCTURED
(million dollars)

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| Central African Republic | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 72 | — | 13 | — | 8 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Equatorial Guinea | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | — | 36 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Ivory Coast | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | 356 | 234 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | 501 |
| Liberia | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | 35 | 30 | — | 17 | 17 | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | 30 | — | — | 35 |
| Madagascar | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 140 | 107 | — | 89 | 135 |
| Commercial banks | — | 147 | — | — | 195 | — |
| Malawi | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | 25 | 26 | — | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | 57 | — | — |
| Mauritania | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | — | 78 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Mozambique | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | 404 | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | 213 | 192 |
| Niger | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | 36 | 26 | 40 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | 26 | — |
| Nigeria | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | 1,935 | — | — |
| Senegal | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 75 | 74 | 72 | — | 117 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | 78 | 20 |
| Sierra Leone | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | 37 | — | — | — | 25 | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | 25 | — |
| Somalia | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | — | — | 122 |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Sudan | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | 80 | 536 | 269 | — |
| Commercial banks | — | 498 | 55 | 790 | 838 | — |
| Togo | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 232 | — | 300 | 75 | 35 |
| Commercial banks | 69 | — | — | 84 | — | — |
| Uganda | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 30 | 19 | — | — | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Zaire | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | 500 | — | 1,497 | — | 400 |
| Commercial banks | 402 | — | — | 58 | 64 | — |
| Zambia | | | | | | |
| Paris Club | — | — | — | 375 | 253 | — |
| Commercial banks | — | — | — | — | 73 | 61 |

— Zero or negligible.

SOURCE: Fund staff estimates.

TABLE 11 COMPONENTS OF PER CAPITA INCOME GROWTH, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA, 1960-81
(annual percentage change)

| <i>Region and indicator</i> | <i>1960-70 (1)</i> | <i>1970-81 (2)</i> | <i>Difference between (2) and (1)</i> |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---|
| (A) Sub-Saharan Africa | | | |
| Real GDP growth | 3.8 | 3.2 | -0.6 |
| Population growth | 2.4 | 2.8 | 0.4 |
| Per capita income growth | 1.4 | 0.4 | -1.0 |
| Investment as a percentage of GDP | 15.6 | 21.8 | 6.2 |
| (B) South Asia | | | |
| Real GDP growth | 4.0 | 3.9 | -0.1 |
| Population growth | 2.4 | 2.2 | -0.2 |
| Per capita income growth | 1.6 | 1.7 | 0.1 |
| Investment as a percentage of GDP | 16.7 | 19.4 | 2.7 |
| Difference between (B) and (A) | | | |
| Real GDP growth | 0.2 | 0.7 | |
| Population growth | 0.0 | -0.6 | |
| Per capita income growth | 0.2 | 1.3 | |
| Investment as a percentage of GDP | 1.1 | -2.4 | |

SOURCE: World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action*, Washington, 1984.

TABLE 12 PERFORMANCE, EXTERNAL SHOCKS, AND AVAILABILITY OF INVESTMENT RESOURCES, SELECTED INDICATORS

| Countries | Performance indicators | | | | | External shocks | | | Investment resources | | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|------|-------|--|---|------------------|--|------|-----------------|---|------|-----------------|
| | GDP per capita, average annual growth (percentage) 1970-81 | Incidence of debt rescheduling (years) | Growth rate of GDP (percentage), five-year average ended in | | | Loss of income due to deterioration in terms of trade annual average, 1971-81 (percentage) | Average interest rate, medium-and long-term loans (percentage) 1982 | | Investment (percentage of GDP), five-year average ended in | | | Resource inflow (percentage of GDP), five-year average ended in | | |
| | | | 1971 | 1976 | 1981 | | New commitments | Debt outstanding | 1971 | 1976 | 1981 | 1971 | 1976 | 1981 |
| Chad | -4.6 | | 1.4 | 1.9 | -8.1 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 15 | 28 |
| Mali | 1.8 | | 3.3 | 5.4 | 2.2 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 10 | 18 | 18 |
| Burkina Faso | 1.6 | | 3.1 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 11 | 23 | 18 | 12 | 21 | 25 |
| Somalia | 1.0 | | 2.7 | 3.8 | 4.6 | -3.1 ^a | 1.7 | 1.2 | 12 | 18 | 18 ^b | 7 | 14 | 13 ^c |
| Niger | -0.1 | 1983 | 1.3 | -1.7 | 7.5 | -2.8 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 15 | 25 | 32 | 8 | 15 | 10 |
| Gambia, The | 1.7 | | 3.5 | 7.4 | 0.2 | 6.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 8 | 9 | 26 | 4 | 1 | 29 |
| Ethiopia | 0.6 | | 4.0 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 13 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Guinea-Bissau | n.a. | | n.a. | 5.0 | 1.8 | n.a. | 6.4 | 1.0 | n.a. | 23 | 26 | n.a. | 43 | 36 |
| Zaire | -3.1 | 1976-81, 83 | 3.7 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.3 ^c | 2.2 | 1.0 | 26 | 32 | 29 | -2 | 13 | 13 ^d |
| Malawi | 2.6 | 1982-83 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 19 | 27 | 30 | 12 | 12 | 13 |
| Uganda | -4.3 | 1981-82 | 4.8 | -0.4 | -2.5 | n.a. | 2.9 | 2.2 | 14 | 9 | 4 ^d | -1 | -1 | 1 |
| Rwanda | 1.8 | | 7.4 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 8 | 12 | 22 | 6 | 8 | 11 |
| Burundi | 1.4 | | 7.3 | 1.9 | 5.1 | 0.6 | 5.4 | 1.6 | 8 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 9 |
| Tanzania | 0.8 | | 4.7 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 0.1 ^c | 4.0 | 2.5 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 11 |
| Benin | 0.6 | | 2.6 | 2.3 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 7.2 | 5.0 | 16 | 16 | 23 | 10 | 15 | 24 |
| Central African Republic | -0.6 | 1981,83 | 3.5 | 2.7 | -0.3 | 10.8 | 3.5 | 1.1 | 20 | 17 | 10 | 16 | 13 | 14 |
| Guinea | 0.9 | | 3.1 | 5.5 | 1.0 | n.a. | 3.4 | 1.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 14 | n.a. | n.a. | -3 |
| Madagascar | -2.2 | 1981-84 | 5.1 | -0.7 | 0.2 | 6.2 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 17 | 14 | 19 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| Togo | 0.7 | 1979-81, 83 | 6.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 | -5.8 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 15 | 22 | 39 | 1 | 5 | 22 |
| Ghana | -3.2 | | 4.9 | -1.7 | 1.2 | -1.4 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 13 | 10 | 6 | 2 | -2 | 1 |
| Kenya | 2.1 | | 7.4 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 22 | 23 | 28 | 1 | 3 | 7 |
| Sierra Leone | -0.8 | 1977, 80, 84 | 4.4 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 0.7 | 2.5 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 3 | 9 | 10 |
| Sudan | 3.1 | 1979, 81-83 | 2.6 | 6.2 | 4.1 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 0.2 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 10 |
| Mauritania | -0.6 | | 4.3 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 25 | 32 | 36 | -9 | 15 | 35 |
| Liberia | -1.8 | 1980-83 | 6.1 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 2.3 | 25 | 30 | 32 | -29 | -14 | 4 |
| Senegal | 0.1 | 1981-84 | 1.4 | 4.0 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 4.3 | 6.7 | 14 | 19 | 19 | 6 | 7 | 15 |
| Lesotho | 5.7 | | 1.0 | 11.9 | 7.3 | -1.5 | 13.0 | 3.2 | 9 | 13 | 22 | 33 | 52 | 63 |
| Zambia | -2.7 | 1983 | 2.9 | 3.4 | -1.8 | 25.5 | 6.8 | 3.9 | 32 | 36 | 23 | -12 | -3 | 3 |
| Zimbabwe | -0.3 | | 7.2 | 4.4 | 4.8 | n.a. | 8.9 | 10.1 | 22 | 26 | 18 | 1 | -1 | 1 |
| Botswana | 8.3 | | 12.1 | 17.7 | 9.7 | 4.2 | 9.7 | 7.9 | 36 | 55 | 42 | 38 | 26 | 20 |
| Swaziland | 1.2 | | 8.6 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 8.5 ^e | 3.2 | 5.4 | 21 | 26 | 37 | -3 | -15 | 23 |
| Ivory Coast | 1.1 | 1983-84 | 7.1 | 6.8 | 4.7 | -5.1 | 13.5 | 10.3 | 19 | 21 | 27 | -3 | -2 | 2 |
| Mauritius | 4.4 | | 1.3 | 8.4 | 3.1 | -9.9 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 13 | 25 | 28 | 2 | -1 | 11 |
| Nigeria | 1.9 | 1983 | 10.6 | 6.6 | 0.4 | -14.7 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 17 | 24 | 27 | 1 | -6 | -2 |
| Cameroon | 4.0 | | 4.2 | 4.5 | 9.1 | 2.1 | 9.2 | 5.6 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Congo, People's Republic of the | 2.5 | | 6.7 | 6.6 | 8.6 | 1.0 | 10.4 | 8.1 | 28 | 35 | 32 | 25 | 20 | 7 |
| Gabon | 2.9 | 1978 | 6.7 | 21.4 | -10.5 | | 8.8 | 9.3 | 38 | 53 | 41 | -2 | -9 | -21 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa* (37 countries) | n.a. | | 6.5 | 5.3 | 1.6 | -5.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 18 | 23 | 21 | 1 | -7 | 33 |
| Countries with below average growth in per capita income ^f | -1.0 | | 3.8 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 5.0 | n.a. | n.a. | 21 | 23 | 23 | -07 | 56 | 109 |

n.a. Not available.

SOURCE: World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in sub-Saharan Africa*.

a. Average for 1971-79

b. Five-year average ending in 1979

c. Average for 1971-80

d. Five-year average ending in 1980

e. Excludes Angola and Mozambique, averages in this row relate to the countries for which data are presented in the table.

f. Consists of Niger, Ethiopia, Zaire, Tanzania, Benin, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Togo, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Liberia, Senegal, and Zambia

Includes all countries with below average annual per capita income growth during 1970-81, excluding Chad, Uganda, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, which were severely unsettled politically during this period.

TABLE 13 INVESTMENT, SAVINGS, AND RESOURCE BALANCE, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(percentage of GDP at current prices)

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| Gross domestic investment | 22.5 | 24.8 | 21.2 | 18.5 | 14.5 |
| Gross domestic savings | 21.9 | 17.2 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 13.9 |
| Resource balance | -0.8 | -7.9 | -8.0 | -5.7 | -0.6 |
| <i>Memorandum item</i> | | | | | |
| Gross domestic investment (percentage of GDP) in South Asia | 23.4 | 23.0 | 23.2 | 22.9 | 22.9 |

SOURCE: World Bank data.

TABLE 14 EXTERNAL DEBT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, REVISED ESTIMATE, 1984
(billion dollars)

| | IMF | | Total |
|------------------------------------|----------|----------|-------|
| | Estimate | Revision | |
| Long- and medium-term ^a | 68.8 | 10.3 | 79.1 |
| Short-term ^b | 4.8 | 21.6 | 26.4 |
| Arrears ^c | 9.4 | 5.6 | 15.0 |
| IMF | 5.1 | — | 5.1 |
| Total | 88.1 | 37.5 | 125.6 |

SOURCE: Reginal Herbold Green and S. Griffith Jones, "Sub-Saharan Africa's External Debt Crisis," in *Third World Affairs—1986* (London: Third World Foundation, 1986), p. 26.

a. Revision of 15 percent estimated on recorded government guaranteed debt, due to general omissions, failure to update for currency fluctuations, and private external debt.

b. Estimated at 25 percent of long-term debt (excluding normal 90 day or less commercial bills). That estimate corresponds roughly to data for a handful of countries for which detailed studies have been done, e.g., by the World Bank.

c. Reestimated on fragmentary data. Includes arrears of interest as well as principal, of commercial payments not financially intermediated and of invisibles (e.g., airline ticket sales).

TABLE 15 Debt service payments (including IMF repurchases and charges) due on public debt outstanding at the end of 1984

| IDB-eligible countries with prolonged debt problems | 1984 debt service ^a | | | | Scheduled debt service, 1986-87 | | | | Percentage share of total debt service due in 1986-87 | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--------|--|--|--|-----------|--------|-------|---|------|---------|-------|------|-----------------------|------------------------|------|
| | Actual | | As a percentage of exports of goods and services | | As a percentage of projected exports of goods and services | | Total | | Official | | Private | | IMF | | | |
| | Scheduled | Actual | As a percentage of exports of goods and services | As a percentage of projected exports of goods and services | DAC | Bilateral | Others | Total | IBRD | IDA | Other | Total | | Suppliers' facilities | Financial institutions | |
| Benin | 36.3/ | 9.5 | 16.4 | 86 | 34.9 | 7.4 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 10.8 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 14.7 | 16.4 | 2.2 | 70.6 | 0.0 |
| Gambia | 20.8 | 10.9 | 13.6 | 25 | 30.8 | 3.2 | 13.1 | 0.0 | 16.3 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 23.9 | 25.5 | 7.5 | 18.8 | 31.9 |
| Liberia | 20.8 | 9.2 | 16.7 | 184 | 35.1 | 13.7 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 17.1 | 9.2 | 0.5 | 10.3 | 20.0 | 0.6 | 28.8 | 33.5 |
| Madagascar | 80.9 | 12.5 | 40.5 | 285 | 59.3 | 11.1 | 7.9 | 24.7 | 43.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 5.5 | 9.0 | 5.1 | 27.9 | 14.2 |
| Mali | 33.3 | 7.3 | 11.4 | 109 | 53.1 | 3.6 | 16.0 | 39.4 | 59.0 | 0.0 | 2.8 | 15.0 | 17.8 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 17.4 |
| Mauritania | 30.7 | 14.7 | 16.1 | 176 | 45.7 | 3.4 | 51.5 | 8.5 | 63.4 | 4.7 | 0.7 | 14.9 | 20.3 | 4.6 | 7.1 | 4.6 |
| Niger | 17.8 | 5.7 | 18.3 | 110 | 30.4 | 22.7 | 6.7 | 1.7 | 31.1 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 14.4 | 16.1 | 2.8 | 39.5 | 10.4 |
| Somalia | 145.9 | 9.9 | 25.7 | 185 | 97.2 | 4.4 | 19.6 | 11.4 | 35.4 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 42.8 | 44.1 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 16.3 |
| Sudan | 96.4 | 8.4 | 25.0 | 948 | 150.9 | 15.1 | 23.1 | 6.7 | 44.9 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 5.8 | 7.1 | 0.6 | 30.5 | 16.9 |
| Tanzania | 47.1 | 5.6 | 22.0 | 279 | 50.4 | 13.0 | 15.1 | 18.4 | 46.4 | 14.3 | 4.7 | 8.6 | 27.7 | 9.7 | 14.6 | 1.6 |
| Togo | 55.8 | 21.0 | 29.9 | 114 | 33.1 | 47.6 | 2.0 | 8.7 | 58.3 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 8.3 | 10.2 | 0.3 | 22.6 | 8.6 |
| Zambia | 33.2 | 20.9 | 24.6 | 620 | 59.0 | 16.2 | 3.4 | 7.9 | 27.5 | 8.4 | 0.1 | 6.8 | 15.1 | 9.7 | 15.1 | 32.6 |
| Subtotal | 34.4 | 10.2 | 22.8 | 3,122 | 61.8 | 14.1 | 14.9 | 10.6 | 39.6 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 10.3 | 15.6 | 4.1 | 22.9 | 17.8 |
| Other IDB-eligible countries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Burkina Faso | 20.9 | 4.0 | 12.7 | 38 | 19.4 | 17.5 | 3.8 | 8.3 | 29.6 | 0.0 | 5.9 | 43.5 | 49.3 | 5.1 | 16.0 | 0.0 |
| Burundi | 18.9 | 2.5 | 17.5 | 32 | 16.3 | 7.6 | 14.9 | 14.2 | 36.7 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 38.2 | 42.5 | 0.0 | 20.9 | 0.0 |
| Central African Rep. | 17.7 | 4.7 | 13.1 | 26 | 12.9 | 35.1 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 45.6 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 20.8 | 23.3 | 13.5 | 0.2 | 17.4 |
| Chad | 8.8 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 5 | 5.4 | 11.5 | 10.8 | 12.2 | 34.5 | 0.0 | 15.5 | 46.5 | 62.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ethiopia | 20.1 | 2.6 | 19.3 | 149 | 19.9 | 11.2 | 1.6 | 30.1 | 42.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 6.7 | 15.7 | 9.5 | 18.5 | 13.4 |
| Ghana | 19.0 | 2.4 | 18.6 | 217 | 25.9 | 16.1 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 23.1 | 8.4 | 1.5 | 10.8 | 20.7 | 5.0 | 0.3 | 50.9 |
| Guinea | 31.0 | 6.1 | 27.2 | 151 | 20.2 | 11.4 | 7.2 | 47.9 | 66.4 | 4.5 | 0.8 | 9.9 | 15.1 | 10.9 | 3.6 | 4.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 4.3 | 0.4 | 27.9 | 16 | 84.6 | 0.8 | 13.8 | 26.7 | 41.3 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 31.5 | 34.1 | 14.4 | 6.4 | 3.8 |
| Kenya | 26.9 | 7.4 | 26.8 | 470 | 25.5 | 11.2 | 1.9 | 5.7 | 18.8 | 23.5 | 1.2 | 6.1 | 30.9 | 3.9 | 23.1 | 23.3 |
| Lesotho | 4.7 | 6.6 | 5.0 | 10 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 6.1 | 3.3 | 11.7 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 64.8 | 72.8 | 4.0 | 11.5 | 0.0 |
| Mali | 29.1 | 8.3 | 29.4 | 104 | 25.3 | 11.3 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 15.5 | 9.1 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 24.1 | 4.1 | 28.3 | 28.0 |
| Rwanda | 3.7 | 0.4 | 3.3 | 13 | 6.4 | 16.1 | 17.9 | 4.2 | 38.2 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 45.8 | 61.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Senegal | 29.0 | 9.1 | 16.9 | 294 | 31.9 | 20.4 | 13.2 | 6.1 | 39.8 | 5.1 | 1.3 | 10.4 | 16.8 | 0.7 | 23.2 | 19.6 |
| Sierra Leone | 33.1 | 5.1 | 20.2 | 57 | 29.2 | 16.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 22.0 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 16.2 | 20.3 | 14.0 | 5.0 | 38.7 |
| Uganda | 36.1 | 3.2 | 35.1 | 192 | 30.2 | 8.3 | 4.5 | 15.1 | 27.9 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 8.0 | 4.5 | 46.7 |
| Zaire | 24.1 | 14.6 | 24.0 | 766 | 36.0 | 46.2 | 3.7 | 1.1 | 50.9 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 5.1 | 7.5 | 5.1 | 18.2 | 18.2 |
| Subtotal | 23.8 | 5.5 | 21.7 | 2,539 | 25.7 | 23.4 | 4.6 | 9.1 | 37.1 | 7.3 | 1.6 | 9.6 | 18.5 | 5.4 | 16.0 | 23.0 |
| Total: IDB-eligible countries | 35.0 | 7.4 | 22.1 | 5,661 | 37.9 | 18.3 | 10.3 | 9.9 | 38.5 | 5.6 | 1.4 | 10.0 | 16.9 | 4.7 | 19.8 | 20.1 |
| Other countries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cameroon | 11.3 | 3.9 | 8.9 | 275 | 9.9 | 27.2 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 32.6 | 19.8 | 1.1 | 10.6 | 31.5 | 8.0 | 27.9 | 0.0 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 40.1 | 18.3 | 35.9 | 1,173 | 32.6 | 9.6 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 11.2 | 13.4 | (-) | 3.0 | 16.5 | 6.0 | 54.2 | 12.1 |
| Nigeria | 28.3 | 4.6 | 25.5 | 3,670 | 36.2 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 5.0 | 7.6 | (-) | 0.2 | 6.3 | 3.3 | 85.4 | 0.0 |
| Zimbabwe | 26.3 | 7.2 | 22.4 | 408 | 25.6 | 7.9 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 9.0 | 6.1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 8.8 | 1.1 | 61.2 | 19.8 |
| Subtotal | 27.8 | 5.6 | 24.8 | 5,526 | 30.6 | 6.1 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 9.9 | 3.9 | 74.1 | 4.0 |
| Botswana | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 48 | 4.3 | 17.4 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 22.5 | 44.2 | 0.7 | 23.1 | 68.1 | 2.0 | 7.3 | 0.0 |
| Congo | 24.0 | 15.7 | 19.4 | 324 | 30.3 | 5.4 | 1.6 | 13.6 | 20.6 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 7.4 | 10.0 | 5.9 | 63.3 | 0.0 |
| Gabon | 11.7 | 7.7 | 11.4 | 189 | 9.7 | 14.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 17.3 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 4.8 | 5.9 | 8.9 | 67.8 | 0.0 |
| Mauritius | 23.2 | 11.6 | 24.6 | 102 | 16.4 | 9.5 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 13.4 | 16.6 | 0.3 | 10.3 | 27.2 | 0.0 | 20.5 | 38.8 |
| Swaziland | 5.8 | 4.5 | 5.6 | 27 | 7.1 | 15.1 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 18.5 | 27.3 | 0.8 | 28.8 | 56.9 | 0.7 | 8.2 | 15.6 |
| Subtotal | 14.2 | 9.5 | 13.0 | 689 | 13.5 | 9.7 | 1.8 | 7.2 | 18.7 | 8.0 | 0.2 | 9.0 | 17.3 | 5.4 | 52.2 | 6.4 |
| Total: Other countries | 24.8 | 5.9 | 22.2 | 6,215 | 26.8 | 6.5 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 9.2 | 8.4 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 10.7 | 4.1 | 71.7 | 4.3 |
| TOTAL | 28.3 | 6.5 | 22.2 | 11,875 | 31.1 | 12.1 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 23.2 | 7.1 | 0.7 | 5.9 | 13.7 | 4.4 | 46.9 | 11.8 |

Note: Debt service excludes interest on short-term debt and arrears and payments on private nonguaranteed debt. Rows may not add to totals because of rounding.
 a. Interest and exchange rate fluctuations, as well as rescheduling, debt forgiveness, and the accumulation of arrears, affect the difference between scheduled debt service and actual payments.

Source: The World Bank, Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90

TABLE 16

Total debt service (including IMF repurchases and charges) and projected import capacity of IDA-eligible sub-Saharan African countries (annual average in millions of dollars)

| | Actual debt service, 1980-82 | | | Scheduled debt service, 1985-90 | | | Projected debt service, 1986-90 | | | Scheduled debt service, 1991 | | | Annual imports of goods and noninterest services in 1980 dollars | | | | |
|--|------------------------------|-----------|-------|---|----------|-----------|---------------------------------|---|----------|------------------------------|--------|---|--|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | Interest | Principal | Total | As per-centage of exports of goods and services | Interest | Principal | Total | As per-centage of exports of goods and services | Interest | Principal | Total | As per-centage of exports of goods and services | | | | | |
| IDA-eligible countries with prolonged debt problems | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Benin | 10 | 9 | 19 | 5.2 | 52 | 62 | 115 | 43.5 | 47 | 11 | 58 | 21.9 | 73 | 132 | 44.4 | 488 | |
| Gambia | 5 | 4 | 9 | 13.4 | 18 | 17 | 35 | 37.7 | 17 | 9 | 26 | 28.2 | 27 | 47 | 41.3 | 170 | |
| Liberia | 32 | 16 | 48 | 8.7 | 75 | 115 | 190 | 35.8 | 69 | 59 | 128 | 24.2 | 80 | 158 | 26.8 | 700 | |
| Madagascar | 52 | 44 | 97 | 22.4 | 151 | 231 | 383 | 68.4 | 130 | 55 | 185 | 33.0 | 184 | 395 | 52.5 | 1,159 | |
| Mali | 10 | 7 | 17 | 7.8 | 46 | 87 | 133 | 50.3 | 40 | 27 | 67 | 25.3 | 111 | 166 | 43.6 | 495 | |
| Mauritania | 30 | 26 | 56 | 17.7 | 67 | 133 | 200 | 47.0 | 57 | 42 | 99 | 23.3 | 83 | 123 | 20.6 | 600 | |
| Niger | 83 | 100 | 183 | 33.3 | 79 | 108 | 187 | 45.3 | 70 | 52 | 121 | 29.5 | 96 | 188 | 36.0 | 1,103 | |
| Somalia | 10 | 22 | 32 | 13.5 | 64 | 124 | 188 | 79 | 58 | 66 | 123 | 50.8 | 154 | 233 | 67.2 | 569 | |
| Sudan | 171 | 104 | 276 | 25.7 | 374 | 562 | 1,135 | 128.0 | 475 | 157 | 632 | 71.3 | 579 | 1,278 | 88.5 | 1,639 | |
| Tanzania | 83 | 77 | 160 | 22.0 | 181 | 208 | 389 | 60.0 | 165 | 69 | 234 | 36.1 | 201 | 274 | 34.8 | 1,293 | |
| Togo | 33 | 14 | 47 | 10.3 | 60 | 80 | 140 | 35.3 | 50 | 16 | 67 | 17.0 | 68 | 84 | 12.2 | 569 | |
| Zambia | 225 | 252 | 477 | 37.1 | 421 | 439 | 860 | 71.2 | 395 | 232 | 627 | 51.9 | 456 | 646 | 1,102 | 1,813 | |
| Subtotal | 745 | 677 | 1,422 | 22.6 | 1,790 | 2,165 | 3,955 | 66.7 | 1,572 | 796 | 2,368 | 39.9 | 1,961 | 2,538 | 4,499 | 57.1 | 10,599 |
| Other IDA-eligible countries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Burkina Faso | 10 | 10 | 20 | 9.7 | 17 | 29 | 46 | 20.7 | 17 | 29 | 46 | 20.7 | 22 | 32 | 54 | 19.8 | 332 |
| Burundi | 4 | 4 | 8 | 6.3 | 17 | 25 | 41 | 20.3 | 14 | 10 | 24 | 11.7 | 25 | 30 | 54 | 23.1 | 283 |
| Central African Rep. | 4 | 5 | 10 | 5.4 | 14 | 22 | 36 | 15.1 | 11 | 9 | 20 | 8.4 | 15 | 24 | 38 | 12.0 | 303 |
| Ethiopia | 28 | 26 | 54 | 9.7 | 44 | 110 | 154 | 18.5 | 44 | 110 | 154 | 18.5 | 51 | 160 | 211 | 20.6 | 883 |
| Ghana | 59 | 54 | 112 | 12.2 | 87 | 178 | 265 | 25.2 | 87 | 178 | 265 | 25.2 | 108 | 189 | 265 | 12.2 | 995 |
| Kenya | 241 | 247 | 488 | 27.2 | 266 | 365 | 631 | 29.9 | 266 | 365 | 631 | 29.9 | 293 | 363 | 656 | 24.2 | 2,142 |
| Lesotho | 5 | 4 | 8 | 2.1 | 4 | 7 | 11 | 1.8 | 4 | 7 | 11 | 1.8 | 5 | 7 | 13 | 1.6 | 714 |
| Malawi | 54 | 40 | 94 | 30.2 | 47 | 67 | 115 | 20.4 | 47 | 67 | 115 | 20.4 | 43 | 63 | 96 | 11.1 | 448 |
| Rwanda | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3.2 | 8 | 11 | 19 | 8.9 | 8 | 11 | 19 | 8.9 | 10 | 12 | 22 | 9.0 | 366 |
| Senegal | 81 | 73 | 154 | 19.1 | 167 | 218 | 385 | 34.4 | 139 | 80 | 219 | 19.6 | 193 | 221 | 415 | 26.9 | 1,279 |
| Sierra Leone | 18 | 40 | 58 | 27.6 | 29 | 43 | 72 | 30.5 | 26 | 26 | 52 | 31.9 | 50 | 50 | 82 | 25.0 | 420 |
| Uganda | 18 | 53 | 71 | 21.9 | 44 | 126 | 170 | 26.0 | 44 | 126 | 170 | 26.0 | 37 | 63 | 100 | 13.1 | 432 |
| Zaire | 217 | 179 | 396 | 22.2 | 434 | 542 | 977 | 39.6 | 334 | 169 | 503 | 20.4 | 452 | 565 | 1,016 | 31.4 | 2,072 |
| Subtotal | 741 | 737 | 1,478 | 19.0 | 1,177 | 1,744 | 2,921 | 27.8 | 1,042 | 1,187 | 2,229 | 21.2 | 1,267 | 1,678 | 2,945 | 21.2 | 11,089 |
| Total: IDA-eligible countries | 1,486 | 1,413 | 2,900 | 20.6 | 2,967 | 3,910 | 6,877 | 41.8 | 2,614 | 1,983 | 4,597 | 28.0 | 3,228 | 4,216 | 7,444 | 34.2 | 21,688 |
| Other countries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cameroon | 168 | 155 | 323 | 15.0 | 195 | 239 | 434 | 14.1 | 195 | 239 | 434 | 14.1 | 262 | 160 | 423 | 10.9 | 2,340 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 635 | 516 | 1,151 | 37.8 | 1,145 | 1,145 | 2,220 | 55.3 | 1,025 | 588 | 1,613 | 40.2 | 1,351 | 1,048 | 2,398 | 48.0 | 4,270 |
| Nigeria | 1,155 | 586 | 1,741 | 8.7 | 2,173 | 3,088 | 5,461 | 48.6 | 2,173 | 875 | 3,248 | 28.9 | 2,941 | 2,586 | 5,537 | 38.9 | 22,211 |
| Zimbabwe | 88 | 47 | 135 | 8.1 | 184 | 279 | 463 | 22.7 | 184 | 279 | 463 | 22.7 | 205 | 205 | 448 | 15.3 | 2,102 |
| Subtotal | 2,045 | 1,344 | 3,389 | 12.5 | 3,827 | 4,751 | 8,578 | 42.1 | 3,778 | 1,981 | 5,759 | 28.3 | 4,760 | 4,047 | 8,806 | 33.8 | 30,923 |
| Botswana | 10 | 4 | 14 | 2.0 | 32 | 32 | 64 | 4.9 | 32 | 32 | 64 | 4.9 | 46 | 47 | 94 | 5.5 | 1,093 |
| Congo | 84 | 80 | 164 | 14.4 | 221 | 257 | 477 | 40.1 | 204 | 73 | 277 | 33.3 | 293 | 315 | 607 | 41.2 | 1,441 |
| Gabon | 131 | 235 | 366 | 15.0 | 98 | 138 | 236 | 11.1 | 138 | 138 | 276 | 11.1 | 121 | 141 | 263 | 10.6 | 2,020 |
| Mauritius | 45 | 28 | 73 | 11.7 | 51 | 90 | 141 | 14.6 | 51 | 90 | 141 | 14.6 | 52 | 105 | 157 | 9.7 | 638 |
| Subtotal | 269 | 348 | 617 | 12.9 | 402 | 517 | 918 | 16.4 | 385 | 333 | 718 | 12.9 | 512 | 609 | 1,121 | 15.4 | 5,192 |
| Total: Other countries | 2,314 | 1,692 | 4,006 | 12.6 | 4,229 | 5,268 | 9,496 | 36.6 | 4,167 | 2,314 | 6,477 | 25.0 | 5,272 | 4,655 | 9,927 | 29.8 | 36,115 |
| TOTAL | 3,801 | 3,105 | 6,906 | 15.0 | 7,196 | 9,177 | 16,373 | 38.6 | 6,776 | 4,298 | 11,074 | 26.1 | 8,499 | 8,872 | 17,371 | 31.5 | 57,803 |

Note: Debt service includes interest on short-term debt and payments of private nonguaranteed debt and arrears. Rows may not add to totals because of rounding. Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Swaziland are excluded because data are not available.

Source: The World Bank, Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90

TABLE 17
Multilateral Debt Renegotiations, 1975-85
(U.S. \$ Millions)

| Country | Number of Renegotiations, 1975-85 | 1975-81 | | 1982 | | 1983 | | 1984 | | 1985 | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | | Paris Club | Commercial Bank | Paris Club | Commercial Bank | Paris Club | Commercial Bank | Paris Club | Commercial Bank | Paris Club | Commercial Bank | |
| 1. Argentina | 3 | | 970 | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Bolivia | 2 | | 444 | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Brazil | 3 | | | (3,478) | (4,532) | | | (5,350) | | | (536) | |
| 4. Central African Republic | 3 | 55 | | (13) | (3,400) | | | | (14) | | | |
| 5. Chile | 4 | 216 | | 97 | 1,240 | | | | (176) ^f | (6,000) | | |
| 6. Costa Rica | 4 | | | (200) | (1,835) | | | | (166) | (299) | | |
| 7. Dominican Republic | 3 | | | | | | | (590) | (296) | (4,475) | | |
| 8. Ecuador | 5 | | | | | | | | (400) | (29) | | |
| 9. Equatorial Guinea | 1 | 105 ^a | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. Gabon | 3 | | 29 | | 14 | | | | | | | |
| 11. Guyana | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12. Honduras | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13. India | 3 | 436 ^b | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14. Ivory Coast | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15. Jamaica | 6 | 55 | | 18 | | | | (218) | (229) | (558) | | |
| 16. Liberia | 6 | 142 | | 103 | 27 | | | (106) | (164) | (70) | (71) | |
| 17. Madagascar | 6 | | | 24 | | | | (117) | (195) | (135) | (78) | |
| 18. Malawi | 3 | | | | | | | (146) | (77) | | | |
| 19. Mauritania | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20. Mexico | 3 | | | 1,550 ^c | (23,625) | | | | | | | |
| 21. Morocco | 4 | | | 1,225 | 475 | | | (200) | (1,000) | (530) | | |
| 22. Mozambique | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23. Nicaragua | 4 | | 770 | | 102 | | | (145) | (32) | | | |
| 24. Niger | 4 | | | 33 | | | | (924) ^f | (15) | (603) | | |
| 25. Nigeria | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26. Panama | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27. Pakistan | 1 | 263 ^b | | | | | | | | | | |
| 28. Peru | 6 | 478 | | | | | | (1,000) | | | | |
| 29. Philippines | 2 | | | | | | | (936) | | | | |
| 30. Romania | 4 | | | (234) | (1,598) | | | | | | | |
| 31. Senegal | 6 | 77 | | 84 | 64 | | | | | | | |
| 32. Sierra Leone | 4 | 68 | | | | | | 88 | (97) | (105) | (22) | |
| 33. Somalia | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 34. Sudan | 6 | 373 | 638 | 174 | 502 | | | (179) | (142) | (230) | | |
| 35. Togo | 7 | 262 | 68 | 114 | 74 | | | (51) | (22) | | | |
| 36. Turkey | 5 | 4,696 ^d | 5,740 | | | | | | | | | |
| 37. Uganda | 2 | (56) | | (22) | | | | | | | | |
| 38. Uruguay | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 39. Venezuela | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40. Yugoslavia | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 41. Zaire | 7 | 2,168 | 402 | | | | | | | | | |
| 42. Zambia | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 144 | 9,450 | 10,111 | 641 | 1,741 | 10,559 | 41,091 | 3,894 | 8,813 | 5,916 | 86,877 | 26,439 |

Note: Data cover arrangements formally completed in 1975-85 plus commercial bank reschedulings agreed in principle but not completed in 1985. Figures indicate renegotiated amounts as reported by the countries or, if in parenthesis, as estimated by staff members. Cuba and Poland, which also renegotiated debt-service payments with official creditors and commercial banks, are not members of the World Bank and therefore are excluded from this table.

a. Denotes an agreement of a special task force.

b. Denotes an aid consortium agreement.

c. Technically this was an agreement of a creditor group meeting, not a Paris Club.

d. Includes debt of \$24,625 million previously rescheduled in 1983.

e. Denotes an agreement with suppliers on uninsured short-term trade arrears. Amount includes only promissory notes issued through 1985.

f. Denotes agreements deferred until negotiations with the IMF are finalized. Amount includes principal due from April 1983 through July 1985.

Source: The World Bank, Development and Debt Service: Dilemma of the 1980s, 1985-86 edition

TABLE 18

A. IMF NET FLOWS BY COUNTRY, 1980-85
(\$ million, 1983 prices and exchange rates)

| | <u>1980</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>1982</u> | <u>1983</u> | <u>1984</u> | <u>1985</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Low-Income | 460 | 1,113 | 658 | 1,089 | 450 | 191 |
| of which: | | | | | | |
| Ghana | -12 | -11 | 4 | 278 | 215 | 122 |
| Zaire | 16 | 104 | 120 | 128 | 107 | 66 |
| Zambia | 7 | 358 | -49 | 80 | 78 | -19 |
| Madagascar | 46 | 36 | 57 | 12 | 18 | -4 |
| Malawi | 29 | 27 | 2 | 26 | 18 | 7 |
| Senegal | 45 | 59 | 44 | 28 | 17 | 15 |
| Liberia | 20 | 52 | 71 | 55 | 16 | -7 |
| Niger | - | - | - | 33 | 15 | 16 |
| Sudan | 132 | 168 | 46 | 162 | 14 | -5 |
| Togo | 20 | 8 | - | 23 | 13 | 7 |
| Sierra Leone | 0 | 28 | - | 23 | 11 | -4 |
| Somalia | 7 | 30 | 35 | 51 | -3 | 26 |
| Mauritania | 16 | 4 | 17 | -2 | -9 | -3 |
| Kenya | 65 | 26 | 147 | 96 | -12 | 54 |
| Uganda | 34 | 129 | 92 | 108 | -17 | -65 |
| Ethiopia | - | 76 | 23 | -19 | -21 | -31 |
| Tanzania | 18 | -12 | -10 | -20 | -25 | -5 |
| Middle Income | 75 | 468 | 492 | 472 | 99 | -72 |
| of which: | | | | | | |
| Zimbabwe | 40 | 43 | - | 164 | 83 | -21 |
| Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire) | 15 | 377 | 127 | 179 | 14 | -38 |
| Cameroon | -16 | -10 | -3 | 13 | 7 | - |
| Congo | -6 | -8 | - | 4 | 3 | - |
| Nigeria | - | - | 339 | 83 | - | - |

Source: OECD

B. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: NET USE OF IMF CREDIT
(SDR million)

| | <u>1982</u> | <u>1983</u> | <u>1984</u> | <u>1985</u> | <u>1986</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total purchases* | 1,285 | 1,805 | 1,046 | 740 | 573 |
| Repurchases | 241 | 352 | 505 | 623 | 851 |
| Total purchases less repurchases | 1,045 | 1,453 | 541 | 117 | -278 |
| Net use of fund credit** | 678 | 1,237 | 505 | 105 | -227 |
| Trust Fund repayments | 1 | 13 | 60 | 103 | 153 |
| Net flow of Finance | 677 | 1,224 | 445 | 2 | -380 |

* includes reserve tranche purchases

** excludes reserve tranche

Source: IMF

TABLE 19

FINANCIAL FLOWS TO IDA ELIGIBLE SSA¹
(Annual Averages in \$ billions)

| | <u>1980-82</u> | <u>1983-84</u> | <u>Projected 1986-90</u> |
|--|----------------|----------------|------------------------------|
| Grants | 4.1 | 4.2 | 5.2 ² |
| Concessional Loans | 2.4 | 2.2 | 3.3 |
| Other Loans | 2.6 | 1.5 | 1.0 |
| Total Inflow | <u>9.1</u> | <u>7.9</u> | <u>9.5</u> |
| Interest ⁴ | 1.7 | 2.0 | 3.0 ³ |
| Amortisation ⁴ | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3.8 |
| Total Outflow | <u>4.0</u> | <u>4.9</u> | <u>6.8</u> |
| Net Inflow Before Rescheduling and Other ⁵ | <u>5.1</u> | <u>3.0</u> | <u>2.7</u> |
| Rescheduling and Other | 1.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 |
| Net Financial Resource Inflow | <u>0.7</u> | <u>0.6</u> | <u>1.0</u> |
| | <u>6.9</u> | <u>5.4</u> | <u>6.0</u> |

Notes:

1. Excludes Mozambique.
2. Assumes 1% a year real growth.
3. On existing and projected future borrowing.
4. Includes payments to IMF.
5. Largely net short term capital and IMF purchases, also includes direct investment plus errors and omissions.

Source: Adapted from World Bank, Financing Adjustment with Growth: Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-90, 1986.

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