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
**The Impact and Implications of External Aid
on the Communal Areas Management
Programme For Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE)**

By

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INTRODUCTION:

The CAMPFIRE Programme

The CAMPFIRE programme is designed to decentralize the management of natural resources in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. Through the institution, *inter alia*, of a new system of group rights, i.e. a common property regime, a participatory common property resource management system is being established for these areas. The guiding principle is that those individuals and 'communities' who bear the costs of resource management become the resource managers for their own direct benefit. The extent to which CAMPFIRE will be able to achieve these objectives depends on a variety of factors. CAMPFIRE is developing a programme of "adaptive management" of natural resources, premised on the philosophy that monetary benefits produced from wildlife management and utilization will act as an incentive for local communities to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms to manage the wildlife resources in their own areas. In addition, CAMPFIRE operates on the basis of multifaceted involvement in the programme. At various levels, different actors are to be found ranging from the Government regulatory agencies, NGOs and research organizations to the "local" communities themselves.

In this paper, I examine some of the more salient effects and impacts of the participation of NGOs and aid agencies in the implementation of CAMPFIRE on the programme's ability to institute a new system of rights in natural resources; and on the participation of local 'communities' in the management of these resources. In particular, I focus on the implications of monetary and other aid to the CAMPFIRE programme for the developing focus on economic benefits to the exclusion of other "benefits" of wildlife management.

This paper is largely based on my own field work in the Omay Communal Lands (CLs) of the Nyaminyami District as well as documented case studies of other CAMPFIRE initiatives in communal Zimbabwe. Use is also made of field work material collected by other CASS researchers in various other field sites in which the CAMPFIRE programme is being implemented. I have also worked with, talked to and extensively interviewed various staff from the aid organizations participating in the programme, the Rural District Councils (RDCs) and other interested parties.

CAMPFIRE was envisaged in the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), [Zimbabwe] as a programme designed to enhance the participation of local communities in the management of their own natural resources. Although the programme originated as a holistic resource management programme for the CLs, its implementation has inevitably tended to focus exclusively on wildlife. Wildlife is seen as a resource that has the capacity for eliciting participation in management because it generates revenue for the communities through various forms of exploitation. Thus not only is wildlife stressed, but its commercial value is given prominence in the programme. This is hardly surprising, given that it was conceptualised by National

Parks and Wildlife. Thus all CLs¹ participating in CAMPFIRE to date are not only those that have wildlife, but those that have commercially exploitable species and quantities.

It was originally envisaged that CAMPFIRE would be implemented by an "Implementing Agency", centrally located in the DNPWLM. However, Treasury never funded this agency and consequently implementation was undertaken by a local Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), the Zimbabwe Trust. A local NGO, the Zimbabwe Trust receives its funding from the British Overseas Development Association (ODA) and from the blocked funds of former Zimbabweans now living in the United Kingdom.

NGOs have come to play a significant role in funding CAMPFIRE programmes as well as in providing environmental and socio-economic implementation and monitoring/evaluation information. It is thus important to begin to understand the role of NGOs thus far and the impact that external aid is having on the programme and its implications for local participation in resource management. The DNPWLM recognises the need to evaluate the role of external aid in CAMPFIRE. The department does not, however, attribute any significant impact on the project to the participation of NGOs in its implementation.

"It is of interest to note that very little, if any, of the present progress is due to donor aid - it is mainly a result of local effort. ... In general, most viable projects do not require aid, and most non-viable projects should not receive aid. There are, however, certain limited areas in which aid could be of use e.g. restocking of game in depleted areas, electric game fencing to protect crops, vehicles and operational costs for project staff". (DNPWLM, 1990: 5)

This paper will outline the roles played by four different NGOs in funding or otherwise aiding the implementation of CAMPFIRE, namely :

- Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- CAMPFIRE Association (CA); and
- World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

I attempt to evaluate the effects of such aid on the programme. Because of the diversity of contexts in which CAMPFIRE is being implemented, focus will be on two districts in the Zambezi valley: Nyaminyami and Guruve, and four districts in Matebeleland North and South: Binga, Tsholotsho, Bulilima-Mangwe and Hwange. Comparison with two communities that are evolving CAMPFIRE programmes with limited or no external aid - Mahenye Village in the Chipinge District and Chikwarakwara village in the Beitbridge District will be undertaken.

¹ Zimbabwe consists of four land use and tenure categories: the large scale commercial farming sector; small scale commercial farming sector; communal lands and state land. The communal lands support about 60% of the total population of Zimbabwe and are currently in a state of ecological decline characterised by their structural inability to support existing livestock and human populations. For discussion of the reasons for this ecological degradation, see: Ranger, 1985.

Other external agencies participating in CAMPFIRE implementation are not considered in this paper, although it should be borne in mind that their impacts on the programme are similarly fundamental and need to be considered for a more complete picture. The four agencies discussed here have been chosen either because they have had some financial input into this programme or because they have tended to have a role in defining the CAMPFIRE agenda for local communities and local authorities.

I will demonstrate that external aid tends to be concentrated in the high potential projects such as the Nyaminyami and Guruve DC projects, each with the potential of generating in excess of Z\$1 million annually (about US\$200,000), and to ignore the low potential areas. Moreover, external aid tends to be distributed across whole districts or larger parts of the district, whereas the programmes of low potential areas tend to extend over very small geographic areas, typically villages.

I conclude that external aid has resulted in the development of sophisticated management structures, and has in turn provided these with the requisite operating capital in the high and medium potential areas. The effect of the development of such institutions, which typically become top-heavy bureaucracies, is to negate local participation in the management of the resource, a basic tenet of the programme. Such bureaucratic structures are unlikely to be sustainable after the funding ceases.

However, while such local institutions negate the potential for local people's participation in resource management and institutional development, they result in increased capacity for the local authorities to manage the resource. Thus typically DCs' capacity to manage wildlife, carry out Problem Animal Control (PAC) and other crop protection measures, and to enter into joint venture arrangements with private enterprise is enhanced as a result of their employing skilled labour and acquiring the necessary capital. This technical management capacity actually increases wildlife revenues earned by DCs. However, because of the high costs of maintaining these structures, revenue distributed as dividends to the so-called 'producer communities' is therefore reduced. Moreover, while technical capacity increases, ward inputs into the management programme remain marginal, 'indicating that the desired degree of sub-district devolution of proprietorship has not yet taken place' (Murphree, 1992: 3), or might never take place in the current context.

On the other hand, the low potential, and to some extent medium potential programmes, tend to be dominated by the local authorities (DCs) because of historical factors as well as the absence of any countervailing influences on the DCs' paternalistic tendencies. DC dominance results from the historical configuration of local government in Zimbabwe which discounted participatory mechanisms and institutions in favour of less democratic, paternalistic structures. The colonial philosophy of local government has generally continued unchanged into post colonial era (*vide e.g.* Drinkwater, 1991), and the implementation of CAMPFIRE is but one manifestation of this continuity (Murombedzi, 1992).

Secondly, I conclude that external aid agencies typically get into conflict with the local authorities of the areas in which they fund projects over issues of accountability and control of the decision-making processes and machinery. Another field of contest is between aid agencies and local people. Aid agencies view local people's demands on them as constituting 'shopping lists' which are not viable; while local people see

the role of these agencies as that of responding their demands without questioning them. Again this arises because the agencies are not accountable to local people or their representatives.

Finally, I conclude that participation tends to be defined by dynamics external to local communities in both situations where there is external aid and those in which there is none. This is because external aid tends to inhibit participation by developing capital intensive, top-heavy bureaucracies; while the absence of external aid implies the absence of checks on the DCs, and hence results in DCs becoming more paternalistic in their relationships with local communities. In such situations, DCs tend to define for local communities the types of benefit they can get from wildlife management as well as determine the investment decisions of these communities. Thus, in both scenarios (aid and no external aid), the need to define and institute local management of the resources remains urgent. The need for greater local control and the evolution of truly co-management arrangements in which local decision-making is given prominence is indicated.

ZIMBABWE TRUST:

The Role of the Implementing Agency in CAMPFIRE

The CAMPFIRE programme was first implemented in November, 1988, when the first two district councils, Nyaminyami and Guruve, were granted Appropriate Authority status by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. Appropriate Authority (AA), granted under a 1982 amendment to the National Parks and Wildlife Act (1975), entails that district councils manage the wildlife resources of their constituent areas for the direct benefit of their populations. DCs also have certain obligations. From these obligations (as loosely defined in AA) CAMPFIRE has developed several principles which inform its approach. These are summarised below:

- Effective management of wildlife is best achieved by giving it focused value for those who live with it.
- Differential inputs must result in differential benefits.
- There must be a positive correlation between quality of management and magnitude of benefit.
- The unit of proprietorship should be the unit of production, management and benefit.
- The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable within ecological and socio-political constraints. (Murphree, 1992: 17-19).

ZimTrust as the principal implementing agency sees its role as strengthening the management capacity of 'producer communities' and their institutions to manage their own resources, as well as DCs capacity to manage the resources of their constituent areas. This is achieved through the provision of grants to district councils for infrastructural and capital development. ZimTrust also funds district councils in their local institutional development programmes through the provision of training grants as well as recruitment and funding of district level "Institutions Officers".

The Nyaminyami and Guruve DCs' CAMPFIRE programmes are funded by the Zimbabwe Trust. In Nyaminyami, Zimbabwe Trust acts as a donor agency to the Nyaminyami Wildlife Management Trust (NWMT), a sub-committee of the district council formed as the management arm for wildlife resources. NWMT was itself the culmination of two years of preparatory work by a "Steering Committee to Establish the NWMT ..."² The steering committee's membership was drawn from the NDC; the District Administrator's office; NGOs operating in the district (Save the Children Fund (UK) Zimbabwe, and Omay Development Trust); Bumi Commercial Fishing Association; Safari Operators, Nyaminyami; the Bumi Hills Safari Lodge and two anthropologists carrying out research in the Omay CL.

Thus the steering committee was made up of representatives of central government, NGOs, commercial operators with interests in the district's resources, and representatives of the local communities, i.e. the Nyaminyami District Council (NDC). The extent to which local interests would have prevailed given this array of interest groups is obviously debatable. It is, however, instructive to note that the two

² *The Wildlife of Nyaminyami*, Nyaminyami District Council, 1987.

anthropologists both resigned from the steering committee on the grounds that it did not give sufficient scope for the participation of local people in the development of a wildlife management programme for the district.³ It is also instructive to note that the Field Operations manager of Save the Children Fund (UK) Zimbabwe, who served as a member of the steering committee, was to join ZimTrust and become the first general manager of the NWMT.

As a donor to NWMT, ZimTrust has provided technical and financial assistance. The technical assistance consists of planning and management advice (ZimTrust Project Manager); procurement and administrative services (ZimTrust Finance Manager) and staff management training at ward and village level (ZimTrust Institutional Development Unit). (Zimbabwe Trust, 1991: 5).

In 1989 the extent of the ZimTrust grant to Nyaminyami District Council (NDC) was Z\$171,000 as well as the services of the interim general manager. This reflected a subsidy by ZimTrust to NWMT which freed revenues to pay the producer communities dividends during this first year of operation. Without this subsidy NWMT would have experienced a net deficit and been unable to distribute any dividends to the wards. This would certainly have constituted a serious problem for further implementation of the programme, particularly in Omay communal lands

ZimTrust has also funded the Capital and Manpower Development Programme of the NWMT. This funding has resulted in the creation of a top-heavy administration that has proved difficult to sustain and resulted in an increased recurrent expenditure and reduced ward dividends (Zimbabwe Trust, 1990; Murombedzi, 1992; Murphree, 1992). While this top-heavy, capital intensive management structure has certainly improved the DC's technical ability to manage the resource, it has actually detracted from the satisfaction of all of the CAMPFIRE principles.

The participation of local people in the NWMT wildlife management programme has been limited from the outset by the need to establish a technical cadre of highly skilled people to manage the resource. This need was perceived by the implementing agency who funded and seconded one of their senior management staff as interim general manager of NWMT to 'identify the management options'⁴ open to NWMT and develop a management programme and a structure to implement that programme. The resultant management structure is probably a reflection of the implementing agency's need to create a local body through which it could implement the programme as perceived by the agency rather than by the local authority or communities.

The assumption was that the NWMT would be controlled by its board of management, essentially composed of representatives of the people (Ward Councillors), and that participation in management decision-making would, therefore, be guaranteed. However, membership of the board of management also includes NGOs, including Zimbabwe Trust, and typically the decisions of the board are influenced by the funding agency. The board has actually become dependent on ZimTrust funding for its functioning and councillors typically expect ZimTrust to 'fund' them out of all their problems. I have observed councillors at different board

³ C. Cousins and P. Reynolds, *personal communication*.

⁴ Simon Metcalfe (NWMT interim General Manager), *personal communication*.

meetings in Nyaminyami actually having to be cautioned by the district executive not to become dependent on ZimTrust for their resource management problems but to attempt to make the resource pay for itself.

ZimTrust assistance has also resulted in conflict between the agency and the district council executive. The executive is a paternalistic cadre of experts in local government administration whose training and experience are such as to discount the ability of local people to plan and administer their own affairs, let alone manage their resources in a sustainable manner. Besides, the District Councils Act (1980) and the Communal Lands Act (1982), whose administration they are tasked with, are bureaucratic pieces of legislation that do not specify the need for much local participation in decision making beyond the confines of the elected district councils. Moreover, the executive is accountable to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), rather than to local communities for their decisions.

Further, the Legal and Administrative context in which Appropriate Authority is granted is not clear (Murphree, 1992). AA is granted to the DC on the assumption that it will further devolve the management responsibility to sub-district levels. However, below the DC the only other 'formal' organizations that exist are the Ward Development Committees (WADCs) and the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs). Created in 1984 by a Prime Minister's directive and not by an act of Parliament, these bodies do not have any legal status. As such, DCs are not legally bound to devolve authority over resources to non-legal entities. Moreover, AA is granted in terms of the Parks and Wild Life Act (1975) rather than either the Communal Lands Act (1982) or the District Councils Act (1981) which govern the functions of the DCs. Hence, DC executive staff are forced to interpret appropriate authority in terms of all the Acts that impinge on their functions, and there has been no attempt to rationalise this legislative context. In such a situation, the NDC has tended to fall back on the provisions of the District Councils Act rather than attempt some innovation which might fail and for which they would be accountable to head office.

ZimTrust implementation of the programme tended to circumvent the MLGRUD by negotiating directly with the local authorities. While this had the immense advantage of avoiding bureaucratic inertia, it has meant that MLGRUD has not come out clearly in support of CAMPFIRE and has not produced any clear cut guidelines for local authorities on the programme, thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainty at the local authority level.

ZimTrust, on the other hand, has insisted that NDC devolve control over resources to the sub-district levels, i.e. the wards and villages, because these constitute the 'producer communities'. ZimTrust has been able to put this condition on the utilization of their funds and because NWMT need the funds to stay in business, they are forced to accept the condition.

However, NDC see such demands as compromising their authority over the district and its resources. Their resentment of ZimTrust is most clearly exemplified by their asking ZimTrust to withdraw the services of their interim general manager after only a year, and their subsequent recruitment of a wildlife manager who is more

accountable to NDC.⁵ The total ZimTrust grant to NDC between 1989 and 1991 was Z\$883,621-97. (Current exchange rate (August 1996): US\$1 = Z\$5).

On the other hand, in Guruve, ZimTrust has funded the implementation of a Council run safari operation for three years (1989-1991) by providing basic safari equipment worth Z\$26,279-02 and paying half the Professional Hunter's salary (the other half being paid from wildlife revenues) as well as financing the operation costs of an 'Institutions and Training Development Officer'. ZimTrust also purchased four pick-up trucks and a lorry to facilitate the safari operation as well as the PAC programme. Not nearly as much capital has been invested in Guruve as in Nyaminyami and the impact of the external aid on the programme has been decidedly different.

Because of the nature of ZimTrust funding in Guruve, technical wildlife management capacity in the DC is poorly developed. Unlike Nyaminyami, where local people's participation is limited by the highly skilled nature of the management structure, local participation in Guruve is limited, probably, by the DCs paternalism. As a result of this perceived paternalism, there is significant conflict between ZimTrust and the district council. As in Nyaminyami, the executive feels that ZimTrust aid is essentially undermining council authority in the district. In Guruve, the District Administrator has alleged that local communities are being influenced by 'external agencies', namely ZimTrust (Thomas, 1992), to make undesirable decisions that are contrary to executive decisions. Thomas observes that "Enabling local communities to be the decision-makers in Guruve district seems to be directly contrary to the council's executive's wishes which suggest a continuing paternalism".

In both Nyaminyami and Guruve, the ZimTrust Institutional Development Unit (IDU) has been responsible for the establishment of an institutional development programme that is designed to develop appropriate local level institutions to facilitate local participation in the management of the resource and to develop an appropriate system of rights in wildlife. The IDU model has been one of creating Ward Wildlife Committees (WWCs) with expectations that these will eventually lead to the creation of Village Wildlife Committees.

The WWCs are typically elected by universal suffrage, with all adult members of the ward present at the election meeting participating. They are 'typical' western committees composed of a Chair, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and Committee members. The WWC is expected to hold regular 'properly constituted' meetings, i.e. with an agenda, minutes and a quorum. This is obviously an imported cultural model whose appropriateness for wildlife management scenario has never been questioned. Given the experimental nature of the programme and the need for flexibility, it is possible that a model of participatory democracy in which the mandate to whatever authority structure is created is flexible is more desirable than the imposed model of electoral democracy. That possibility does not seem to have been considered by the implementing agency.

Zimbabwe Trust, besides providing this extension service through its IDU, also assists DCs to recruit and train Institutions Officers. These officers' budgets for

⁵ Zimbabwe Trust funded an interim general manager (seconded from ZimTrust) between 1988 and October 1990, when his services were withdrawn by NDC following fundamental disagreements over the utilization of grant aid and over the need to devolve control to the sub-district levels.

institutional development work within their respective districts are typically funded by ZimTrust, which also provides vehicles and sometimes pays their salaries. Thus in this context, it is quite likely that the implementing agency is here creating a constituency through which it can function at the local level. Thus rather than being instruments for local participation, the WWCs seem to be instruments for the implementation of ZimTrust wildlife management ideas at the local level.

The extent to which WWCs will be the basis for the development of a system of group rights in wildlife is also questionable. The IDU, besides creating these organizations, has also been involved in producing the model by-laws to guide their operations. These by-laws are not the result of any significant participatory process and do not reflect local intentions and aspirations regarding wildlife management. Rather, they reflect the implementing agency's concerns with the problem. This is most clearly exemplified by the fact that the by-laws actually create favourable conditions for the operation of safaris, but nowhere do they attempt to define any wildlife use rights for the local communities. Thus local utilization of wildlife is not part of the new system of rights in the resource as envisaged by the IDU.

THE ROLE OF A BILATERAL AID AGENCY IN CAMPFIRE:

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Although Zimbabwe Trust is also the implementing agency for CAMPFIRE programmes in Matebeleland, the *funds* for programme implementation in these provinces is from USAID. Thus the mechanics are somewhat different and ZimTrust has less autonomy in implementing the programme. Again this has different implications for the evolution of the programme in this region.⁶

The USAID is a bilateral government agency which funds development projects/programmes through local (indigenous) NGOs. A condition of the funding is that there must be some relationship with the government of the recipient country, and hence the indigenous NGO must be licensed in the country of operation. Working through NGOs is designed to promote and facilitate the decentralized administration of projects and programmes, which would not be possible with governments. The USAID CAMPFIRE funding is essentially a grant to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism's (MET) Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. ZimTrust is the primary implementer of the programme. The USAID grant to MET, ZimTrust and CASS amounts to US\$8,141,000 for a five year period. The grant to ZimTrust is US\$1,541,000 for programme implementation. ZimTrust is also responsible for receipt and control of US\$1,400,000 for district level infrastructural and capital requirements (Zimbabwe Trust, 1990: 10).

The USAID objective in participating in CAMPFIRE is two fold: first to develop communities and their capacities to manage their own natural resources; and secondly to develop local organizations such as ZimTrust as a way of promoting decentralization and community participation in development administration and planning. Thus, in the programme, USAID works with local authorities through ZimTrust to whom USAID grants are made. ZimTrust in turn makes sub-grants to District Councils who are the Appropriate Authorities for their areas.

The grant to DNPWLM is intended for wildlife conservation on *Parks* estate rather than on *Communal* land. The grant to local authorities is designed to stimulate the economic development of the participating communities. It is not aimed at producing handouts which the communities have not participated in producing. Hence, USAID evaluates the programme on the basis of achievements in community participation and the possibility of the programme continuing after the grant period. In this connection, USAID recognizes that there is a danger of CAMPFIRE becoming a welfare programme that only produces wildlife dividends for communities without instituting any viable mechanisms of community participation in decision making and resource management. As such, USAID sees the need for some local utilization of the resource, such as traditional hunting, and is actively seeking ways of encouraging the development of such local utilization. However, because utilization of wildlife resources has tended to be based on safari hunting, with local authorities' role limited to protecting the safari interest (Murombedzi, 1992), USAID does not see itself as promoting the safari interest. Rather, they see their role as that of promoting the business interest. This is justified on the basis that the nature of the resource is such

⁶ This section is largely based on an interview with Dr. C.R. Cutshall, Project Co-ordinator, USAID Natural Resources Management Project, 18th February, 1992.

that it can only be profitably managed by professional safari operators; that is, safari hunting is a highly specialized and personalized business and the need for personal contacts etc. cannot be met by local authorities.

USAID concedes, however, that the AID rules and conditions on grant funding are unnecessarily rigid and may not be appropriate for programmes of an experimental nature such as CAMPFIRE which demand flexibility, especially in the ability of field staff to quickly respond to varying local circumstances. Moreover, the very success of CAMPFIRE programmes is predicated on their ability to mutate to suit a dynamic local environment; otherwise, as a learning process, rigidity is a sure recipe for disaster.

The AID grant has also created conflicts between local communities and local authorities, as well as between USAID and the implementing agency. These conflicts are clearly illustrated in what has come to be referred to as the Hawkes/Madzudzo Report (1991) by researchers from the monitoring agency in the programme - CASS. The report points out contradictions between the project emphasis on large mammals (elephants) and community needs for different provisions (water projects) and the need for holistic resource management. The report further deals with the contradiction between the need for community participation and the forced relocation of some households from Korodziba and Soroboni communities in Tsholotsho. Hawkes and Madzudzo point to the problems of developing viable local institutions because of the differences in perceptions of the resource management problem between local authorities and the funding and implementing agencies on the one hand, and the local communities on the other.

Publication of the report caused a furore in the funding agency USAID. This culminated in a seminar attended by representatives of all local authorities participating in the USAID Natural Resources Management (NRM) programme, USAID, the implementing agency - ZimTrust, CASS, and the DNPWLM. It is significant to note that there were no representatives of local communities at this seminar. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss and respond to the charges made against the programme by the Hawkes/Madzudzo report.

The question of modifying programme implementation to take account of the shortcomings identified was never considered by the participants. Instead, the seminar generally questioned the methodology of the CASS researchers and concluded that their findings were anecdotal rather than 'scientific'. The report was based on observations made in the field by the research team as well as their discussion with various members of the affected communities over a period of about six weeks. The research team had also during this time been administering a baseline socio-economic questionnaire to a sample of the households in these communities. However, the data generated in this survey was yet to be analyzed at the time the report in question was produced; and it was this absence of statistical data that was deemed to constitute an 'unscientific' report by the Aid community! As such, it was felt that the report's criticism of the project implementation was unjustified and that no action would, therefore, be taken to correct the problem of the project as apparently perceived by the supposed beneficiaries.

PRODUCING THE 'ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT':

The Role Of The World Wide Fund For Nature In CAMPFIRE

The WWF Multispecies Unit is involved in the monitoring of the wildlife resources in the Communal areas and in setting up annual off-take quotas for safari hunting and PAC. WWF also makes recommendations on the sustainability of various other resource utilization strategies, particularly non-consumptive safaris and cropping quotas. The resource monitoring and quota setting activities produce an 'environmental audit' that reflects the nature of the resource at a particular time and could also be used to measure the effectiveness of a management programme. However, WWF operates without any participation from the local populations and produces the quotas and reports for district councils to aid them in their planning and administration of safari hunting agreements.

Moreover, the setting of quotas for safari off-take reflects the importance of the nature of resource exploitation which is aimed at producing a dividend. It is thus a sensitive indicator of the commercial worth of the resource as produced by the high cost/high benefit safari operations. They do not, however, provide any signals of the values placed by people on the resource (Myers, 1990). There exists an asymmetry of evaluation between local communities and the 'official evaluators', WWF. Hence, there is a need to analyze and estimate the non-commercial outputs of wildlife and the values placed on these by local communities.

Quotas reflect district wide potential for a specific user group, the safari operators, and are not tied to the needs or activities of any specific proprietorial group or 'community' that constitutes the putative CAMPFIRE management unit. Hence the quota is not tied to any group of managers. There is neither participation by the local communities in the monitoring of the state of 'their wildlife resources' nor in the production of such crucial information. This points to the absence of any local resource management system and the fact that the CAMPFIRE programme has resulted in the 'recentralization' of management at the local authority level rather than decentralization to the community level. Moreover, emphasis on the production of benefits by 'external' interest groups has meant that the CAMPFIRE programme has tended to restrict local people's rights in wildlife to rights to the 'benefits' of wildlife utilization rather than rights in the resource itself.

Furthermore, because the 'environmental audit' produced by WWF is aimed at identifying a 'sustainable rate of off-take' for the safari industry and other forms of utilization which exclude local communities, CAMPFIRE has evolved into a programme that strengthens the private users of the resource while restricting the subversive capacity of local communities to resist this alienation by placing upon them the burden of monitoring each other's behaviour in return for a dividend. Continued, and sometimes increasing, 'poaching' in some communities with CAMPFIRE programmes could certainly be an indication of this fundamental contradiction. Thus CAMPFIRE does not necessarily imply the evolution of a new system of rights for local communities in their wildlife resources since it makes no provision for local control over wildlife utilization decisions. Rather, it evolves into a programme that limits local participation for the benefit of external interest.

IMPLEMENTING CAMPFIRE WITHOUT THE AID OF AID AGENCIES:

The Case of Mahenye And Chikwarakwara Villages

In Mahenye and Chikwarakwara villages, CAMPFIRE has tended to evolve as a result of local effort, with the participation of a Safari Operator with a concession to operate in the area, and with the DNPWLM's CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator acting as the 'implementing agency'. The only difference in this model is that no external funding was injected to get the project off the ground. As a result, communities are able to distribute the bulk of their wildlife revenues either as individual or household dividends, less management levies paid to the DC. However, in this model the District Council still manages the resource to the extent that it is the legal entity to which appropriate authority is granted. The DC thus manages the concessions, collects the concession and trophy fees, and ultimately disburses the revenues thus generated to the villages concerned.

Typically, communities are asked by the DC to identify projects or programmes in which they would want to invest their wildlife revenues before the revenues are released to them. This implies some residual DC control over community decision making. Although this is denied in Child and Peterson (1991), my own observations in Chikwarakwara in 1992 indicate that community participation has not occurred in decision making regarding the distribution and utilization of wildlife revenues. In this case, the village Development Committee refused (on behalf of their constituents, most of whom were present at the meeting) to accept their wildlife dividend for 1991 because they felt that district council wanted to impose their own decisions on them.

According to Child and Peterson (1991), the distribution of household dividends and the allocation of some of the wildlife revenue to a community project in 1991 represented the apex of participatory decision-making. The decision also represented movement towards the establishment of a common property regime (and therefore a system of rights) in wildlife by this village. A year later, when I visited the community to attend a ceremony to distribute wildlife revenues, it became evident during the meeting that there was conflict between the community and the local authority over control of the revenue and rights in wildlife.

The village had decided to invest their dividend of Z\$19,000 in a grocery store (the main motivation being to sell seed and other agricultural inputs at the store) and to request council for a loan to purchase a truck to ferry stock to the store. The 1992 wildlife dividend was offered as collateral for the loan. However, council executive refused to grant the loan on the basis that council was not a funding agency (another reflection of the legal problems of appropriate authority), and the Senior Executive Officer intimated that, in the council executive's view, the project was not viable. This intimation was resented by the village who saw it as an attempt to impose a project on them. They refused to consider other projects and indicated that the executive could as well keep the dividend as the wildlife did not belong to the village anyway.

At a wildlife revenue distribution ceremony in Mahenye village, Chipinge district, all the distribution decisions appear to have been made by the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator who then held meetings with members of the wildlife committee to explain how the funds were to be distributed. The co-ordinator then produced visual aids for these

community members to use to explain to the community how the revenue was being distributed. No explanation was given as to why these distribution decisions were being made and by whom. Throughout the explanation process, the co-ordinator stood by the wildlife committee members ready to offer assistance.

Thus there is evidence from both Mahenye and Chikwarakwara that this model does not necessarily account for enhanced local participation in management and decision making. The villages are appropriate distribution communities for wildlife revenues but there is no evidence to suggest participation in either the management or distribution decisions. These are controlled by the DC in conjunction with the CAMPFIRE Co-ordinator of the DNPWLM who, in effect, constitute the implementing agency.

It would appear that the legal framework which devolves authority to the district level but not to the sub-district levels remains the major obstacle in this latter context and that solutions should be sought urgently. District Councils also seem to constitute an obstacle to local participation to the extent that they remain paternalistic. As such management of the resource should be based on some clearer co-management arrangement in which local communities have greater decision-making authority.

OBFUSCATING ACCOUNTABILITY?

The Creation Of The CAMPFIRE Association

The CAMPFIRE Association (CA) came into being as the lobby group of district councils with appropriate authority. However, motivation for the formation of the CA came from ZimTrust rather than from the district councils themselves. Moreover, the initial funding for the CAMPFIRE Association was from ZimTrust. The CAMPFIRE Association charges district councils a levy of 1.5% of their gross wildlife revenues as an annual fee for the services they provide throughout the year. However, the Association is still developing its own agenda and as such it is still not clear what member councils will benefit from such membership.

However, the CA requires member councils to submit annual reports and income expense accounts to them. It is thus introducing a system whereby district councils will be accountable to the Association, rather than to its own constituency, for the wildlife management programme. The problems of this are obvious, and coupled with the problems of accountability to central government already being experienced by local authorities, the implications for local participation are grave.

The CA is an association of district councils, not local communities or 'producer communities'. This is because district councils are the appropriate authorities for wildlife, and perhaps also because it is easier for aid agencies to deal with clearly defined organizations than with a proliferation of diverse and stratified 'communities'. However, district councils become accountable to the CA which is itself still accountable to ZimTrust because of the seed money. When the CA becomes self sufficient (with levies paid by the district councils), it is not clear that any mechanisms exist to make it accountable to the district councils, much less to local communities. Thus the extent to which the CA is an instrument for local participation in decision-making is questionable. As a lobby group, it would appear that the Association thus far is acting to reinforce the interests of the safari industry, rather than local communities, in the wildlife resources of the communal lands.

CONCLUSIONS:

External Aid And Its Implications For The Development Of A Common Property Regime In Wildlife

External aid seems to have negative implications for the ability of CAMPFIRE to facilitate local participation in decision-making. Albeit the absence of aid is not necessarily a solution, as evidenced by the experiences of the villages where there has been no external aid, there is an urgent need to closely examine external aid and attempt to mitigate its negative impacts on local participation.

Aid agencies tend to come into conflict with both local authorities and local communities. This is because aid, especially funding, tends to be tied to the need to maintain CAMPFIRE principles, particularly the need to devolve control over decision-making to local communities. The aid agencies consider themselves, and come to be seen as, the watchdogs over these principles. However, aid agencies are themselves not accountable to either local authorities or communities for their actions. Because they are not involved in the decision-making process within the aid agencies, both local authorities and local communities tend to then demand funding or other aid without any strings attached. This has not been forthcoming. Typically, aid agencies determine what is to be funded or done, and how; with very little, if any, local input.

Local authorities, on the other hand, see aid agencies as undermining their authority over constituencies and their control over resource utilization, particularly revenue allocation decisions. Moreover, they see aid agencies' insistence on the observance of sometimes ambiguous CAMPFIRE principles as a demand that they become accountable to these agencies. The local authorities, on their part, demand that aid agencies become more accountable to them for their activities since it is their responsibility to plan and administer 'development' in their constituent areas. Again this conflict has the impact of limiting the possibilities of the local people participating in the programme.

Aid agencies tend to complicate the already complex issue of accountability for resource management. Because of the need to keep track of their money, they tend to require that local authorities become accountable to them, if only in the limited context of the CAMPFIRE programme, for the implementation of a local management regime. This already defeats the objective of constituting a new property regime in which local people participate in the decision-making process.

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