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Membership in Common Property Regimes

**A Case Study of Guruve,
Binga, Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe
CAMPFIRE Programmes.**

By

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Abstract

Community based resource management programmes are deemed to work best in an environment in which the groups are small in size and have face to face interaction. The argument is that benefits from natural resource management are significant when they are confined to a small group. Further, it is argued that rules governing natural resource management work best in an environment in which membership is localized and demographically small. This research examines a community-based programme, CAMPFIRE², and shows that in certain instances local people do support increases in community membership. The research further argues that those implementing CAMPFIRE must intensify their efforts to make sure that these communities do not increase their membership, as evidence has shown that this can adversely affect the programme.

² Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources

Introduction

CAMPFIRE is a national initiative which attempts to put the management of wildlife in the hands of the communities who live, and thus pay the price for living, in proximity to the resource. The **CAMPFIRE** programme is informed by the idea that common property regimes, unlike open access, are a sustainable form of resource management. The strength of communal tenure lies in the fact that it defines the resource users and specifies the property rights of the legitimate users.

Common property can be regarded as group private property. However, unlike a private property regime where rights are held by individuals, in common property rights are held by the group. A property right is a claim to a benefit stream (from a resource) while excluding others (outsiders) from realizing this benefit. The outsiders have an enforceable duty to respect the rights of the right holder's access to the benefits of the property.³ The property right holders in this case are a group who have a corporate claim to the benefit, or income stream, from a resource. The same group excludes outsiders from using the resource held under this regime. In common property we deal with social relations between groups who are the owners of a resource, and groups or individuals excluded from the resource.

This is a discussion of membership regarding wildlife as a resource held under a common property regime in the **CAMPFIRE** districts of Guruve, Binga, Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe in Zimbabwe.

Group Size and Membership

Group size is an important variable in the management of common property resources. In a common property regime, group size is specified.⁴ In effective common property regimes the size of the group is small, the users reasonably homogeneous in important characteristics and residing in close proximity to the resource.⁵ As Murphree points out -

³ D.W. Bromley, 'The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy,' in: Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 1-17 (page 2), 1992.

⁴ D.W. Bromley and M.M. Cernea, The Management of Common Property Natural Resources. Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. (Washington: The World Bank, 1989). Discussion Paper # 57 (page 6).

⁵ *ibid* (page 24)

*. . . large scale structures tend to be ineffective, increasing the potential for inefficiency, corruption and the evasion of responsibility. . . . a communal resource management regime is enhanced if it is small enough (in membership size) for all members to be in occasional face to face contact, enforce conformity to rules through peer pressure and has long standing collective identity.*⁶

The determination of who is a member becomes important in deciding the group size.

A Methodological Note

The data for this study comes from fieldwork which was conducted in four districts - Guruve, Binga, Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe - where members of the research team have a long history of research work. Unlike other research studies within the Centre of Applied Social Sciences, which have often involved a sole researcher holding interviews with the local leadership as well as government resource managers (some of which are very useful), this project involved three research fellows working as a team on the same problem. The advantage of this team method was that local people, as well as resource managers at district level, were at once exposed to the management experiences of other districts represented by research fellows. A particular research fellow would often shed some light on how her or his district had dealt with a similar problem which our interviewees were experiencing and looking for a solution to. There was also another advantage. As a team, we helped each other to state and often reformulate questions which we asked respondents. The result was that appropriate questions were asked. We are, therefore, more certain of the validity of our data - a situation which would be different had we followed the 'traditional' method indicated earlier on. Team work proved useful not only to the research but also to the people on whom the research was being done.

⁶ M.W. Murphree, Communities as Institutions for Resource Management. (University of Zimbabwe: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1991). CASS Occasional Paper Series - NRM ; (reprinted 1992), page 7.

See also J.H. Peterson, A Proto Campfire Initiative in Mahenye Ward, Chipinge District: Development of a wildlife utilisation programme in response to community needs. (University of Zimbabwe: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1991). CASS Occasional Paper Series - NRM ; 3/92, page 39.

1. Membership Issues in Kanyurira/Masoka

Kanyurira ward lies in Guruve district, Mashonaland West province. The area is often referred to as Masoka, a name derived from the royal spirit of the area. At present the ward has 169 households, more than double the number reported by Cutshall (1989)⁷ from his 1988 survey at the early stages of CAMPFIRE. This growth can be attributed to the arrival of close to 45 VaDoma households, immigrants from Masvingo province and natural increase of the local population.

A ward is made up of six (sometimes seven) vidcos with an average of 100 households each. Kanyurira ward is unique in that it is made up of three vidcos with an average of 56 households each. The ward has an area of four hundred square kilometres with settlement taking up only four percent of this area. The rest of the area is used as a wildlife reserve. Due to the presence of tsetse flies, the ward does not have any cattle. A few households have managed to rear goats only.

In 1989 Kanyurira ward developed a land use plan whereby the 16 square kilometres of settlement was fenced with a solar powered fence donated by the World Wide Fund For Nature Multispecies project to keep wildlife away from damaging people's crops and endangering their lives too. The rest of the area was left unfenced for wildlife. At present the ward is generating a substantial amount of income from wildlife safari hunting.

Membership in CAMPFIRE

The definition of membership in Masoka is continuously changing. At the surface, the general agreement within the community is that everyone who was in the village when the programme started is considered a CAMPFIRE member, a *nhengo*. With the realisation that some local people who had long left the area were coming back and claiming natural resource management benefits, e.g. household cash dividends without the intention to settle in the area, the community decided to set up some conditions for membership. These conditions may also have been partly a result of the influence of implementing agencies raising the problems the community could experience by letting too many immigrants settle in their area as a result of an influx of immigrants coming to settle in the valley.

Immigrants are divided into two major categories. The first are those coming from within the Valley. The Vadoma are an example of this. The second group is made

⁷ C.R. Cutshall. "Masoka Kanyurira Ward: A Socio Economic Baseline Survey of Community Households." (Harare: Centre of Applied Social Sciences (CASS), University of Zimbabwe, 1989).

up of those coming from other districts in the country and from neighbouring countries. Immigrants from other districts must stay in Masoka for five years before they can be accorded full membership in CAMPFIRE. During this probation period they should be seen participating in CAMPFIRE related activities such as attending village meetings, despite not being allowed to make any contributions to the discussions. This attendance of village meetings is seen as a reflection of their interest in conservation issues in the area and an initiation into natural resource management.

Along with the above, the immigrant is supposed to change his/her national registration identity card so that one has the Gurube district code. The immigrants are also expected to follow the set conservation bye-laws. Failure to follow the set rules may result in either expulsion from the village or extension of one's probation period. After one has satisfied these requirements, one can then be accorded CAMPFIRE membership status which would enable him/her to realise "full" benefits from the programme. At the time of this study, none of the immigrants had fulfilled the five year probation period requirement but reported having attended village meetings.

Membership rules have also been set for other local residents who did not acquire membership status at the start of the programme. The majority of these are young men who are starting their families. They have to be married for a full year before they can be granted full membership status. There seems to be some confusion though on the exact period of probation, as some respondents said the probation was two years, rather than one as pointed out by most of the respondents.

CAMPFIRE members have to follow the set conservation bye-laws. Failure to abide with these bye-laws results in sanctions, which generally involve doing some work on CAMPFIRE related projects, or the case being sent to the district level, depending on the nature of the case. If one fails to do the work, their membership is suspended for a year.

While decisions regarding CAMPFIRE related activities are generally made at village meetings, the wildlife committee takes a leading role. Traditional leadership also has a significant role to play. These are mainly the chief and the spirit medium who are consulted on most of the issues.

CAMPFIRE Costs

While CAMPFIRE appears to be doing well in Masoka, there are some costs that people still experience from wildlife. Both CAMPFIRE members and non-members experience similar costs from wildlife. Although the village has a game fence, the community still experiences problems with crop destruction by smaller animals like wild pigs, baboons and monkeys that cannot be kept away by the fence. The

fence also has some management costs, for example repairs and clearing along the fence line.

About 90 percent of the households have some alluvial fields along the Angwa river which are located outside the fence. These are often destroyed by bigger game like elephant and buffalo. For these fields, people have to invest a lot of time into guarding their crops. Despite the risk of losing crops to wildlife, people have maintained these alluvial fields because they have some advantage of moisture retention over the upland fields. Even non-members have fields along the Angwa river, which means they also experience the crop destruction problems. There is no direct compensation given for crop loss to both CAMPFIRE members and non-members.

CAMPFIRE Benefits

The Masoka community is realizing a lot of benefits from CAMPFIRE through projects funded by CAMPFIRE from revenues generated from the programme. These projects consist of the school, a tractor and the clinic, an electric game fence, meat and household cash dividends. These benefits are realized differently by those people regarded as CAMPFIRE members and non-members.

Electric game fence

Both members and non-members realise similar benefits from the electric game fence in the form of crop protection and safety from wildlife injuries. The fence also provides employment opportunities to everyone in the ward. Payment is equal for everyone working on the fence.

Employment opportunities

Besides fence employment, the resident safari operator also employs local people regardless of their membership status in CAMPFIRE. Local people are employed as game trackers, skimmers, cooks and guides. Some people have also been employed as game guards at the local level and are paid from CAMPFIRE revenues. Other employment opportunities come from village projects that are funded by CAMPFIRE, for example, molding bricks and fetching water for building operations at the school or clinic. Anyone willing can be employed on these projects regardless of their CAMPFIRE membership status.

Household cash dividends

Distribution of household cash dividends appears to be a very sensitive issue in Masoka. Cash dividends are given to household heads who are defined as

CAMPFIRE members. The amount that each household gets is determined at an Annual General Ward Village Budget Meeting. Climatic conditions, for example drought, have tended to affect the amount each household receives. However, household cash dividends have been increasing since 1992, when each household received \$200. In 1993 households received \$400 each, and in 1994 dividends had increased to \$1 000 per household.

Food distribution

Meat from safari operations is distributed equally to all the ward members regardless of their CAMPFIRE membership status. In times of drought, (for instance in January 1995) the village may decide to buy some food/maize using CAMPFIRE generated funds. This food is distributed to everyone in the village but non-CAMPFIRE members have to exchange this for labour. It is considered inhuman not to give other people food particularly during a time of need.

CAMPFIRE funded village projects

The major CAMPFIRE funded projects in Masoka at the time of this study were the school, the tractor and the clinic which is under construction. Regarding the school, children of both members and non-members can utilize the school facilities although non-members have to pay a certain fee. Like household cash dividends, payment of school fees has been a controversial issue, with non-members beginning to protest against payment. Members do not pay this fee as they are said to be covered by wildlife revenues. The village also invested CAMPFIRE revenues in a tractor and a trailer. Everyone has access to the tractor for both cultivation and transportation purposes. For cultivation a higher fee is charged to non-members. However, for transportation everyone pays an equal amount. In times of illness, an individual is transported for free regardless of their membership status.

2. Membership Issues in Binga

Background

Kabuba Ward is found in Binga, a semi-arid district that lies in the Zambezi valley. The ward is made up of a collection of loose villages, each headed by a village head who reports directly to the chief. There is also an elected Councillor who represents the villages at the District Council, which is the local authority for the area.

The 1992 census put the ward's population at 3772. Of late there has been an influx of the Ndebele and Shona 'immigrants' from the neighboring districts of Lupane Nkayi and Gokwe.

The ward hosts CAMPFIRE and, for this reason, has set aside some areas earmarked for safari hunting. The ward has elephants, most of which spill over from the nearby Chizarira National Park.

The Costs Involved in CAMPFIRE

The costs from wildlife are as follows. Wildlife, particularly elephants, roam about the villages destroying farmers crops. Sometimes they destroy huts and granaries as they search for food. Occasionally, people are also injured as they try to safeguard their property from wildlife damage. There are reports that people have been killed by elephants as they tried to safeguard their property. Lions and hyena also kill farmers' livestock. Finally people are scared of walking at night, and some are forced to put off their errands or tasks when darkness falls. These are costs which are associated with living next door to wildlife.

These costs are distributed in the following manner. Those who live at the periphery of the villages are the first to suffer damage. Villages in the interior suffer less, as those at the front bear the brunt of crop damage. Since most of the people who live in the periphery of the villages are immigrants, damage is more concentrated on them than the Tonga people. Immigrants' activities and movements are limited by wildlife. Their agriculture suffers heavily from wildlife damage.

In the ward there is no clear policy on compensation for crop damage. Although there are cases where people were compensated for the destruction of their crops, the majority of victims have not been compensated at all. The argument put forward by the wildlife management committee, and supported by the local authority, is that compensation will reduce the amount of money that would otherwise be available for social services.

Membership and Benefits

The range of benefits are as follows. There is money that comes from safari hunting and tourism. Sometimes there is meat which comes from the culled animals or those animals shot for giving problems to the local people. In addition there is also the benefit which comes in the form of protection from wildlife. Normally the Safari hunter who buys hunting concessions in the ward is obliged to protect the villagers from wildlife. There are also people who are employed through CAMPFIRE funds to drive away marauding elephants. Finally, there is the land and other forest products.

The Tonga people say that the benefits are limited to them alone. The Council too say that benefits are limited to the Tonga people, ie. those born in Binga. But this is contradicted by reality. Any person, whether an outsider or not, is entitled to land which can be acquired through laid out procedures. Similarly, all people who are members of the village in the sense of being the subjects of the Sabhuku are entitled to forestry products. The rule is this: once a person gets permission to settle in the area he is entitled to land and forest products. Similarly, all people are entitled to benefit from wildlife revenue and meat. In one village, outsiders were offered dividends but refused to accept them on the grounds that they were too little. Each person was supposed to get \$11.00. In all the villages of the ward, meat from marauding elephants is shared among the people and the exact amount which each person gets depends on their strength and fitness to outdo others in cutting portions, not on ethnic identity. Also, in all areas both outsiders and legitimate members use facilities such as schools and clinics built from CAMPFIRE revenue. Immigrants are not barred from attending schools built using money from CAMPFIRE. More telling is that both outsiders and people born in the ward are heavily subsidized by CAMPFIRE. The ward buys mealie-mealie using CAMPFIRE funds and then sells it below price to all villagers.

Decision Making in CAMPFIRE

In theory immigrants are not entitled to leadership positions in CAMPFIRE. In fact, it is stated regularly by Tonga people supported by Council, that the outsiders cannot be elected to leadership positions in other development institutions too, not just CAMPFIRE. Thus all the committee members from the village to the Ward who are involved in the administration of CAMPFIRE from the village to the ward level are supposed to be Tonga people. In practice, both Tonga people and non-Tonga people are eligible to leadership position in CAMPFIRE institutions. There is no committee which does not have outsiders in its composition.

In addition, immigrants attend CAMPFIRE annual general meetings where they actively suggest the direction the programme should take. Finally, immigrants are members in farmer associations. Such associations are influential in structuring the direction CAMPFIRE takes. Thus it was the farmers association in the ward, in conjunction with other associations in the districts, which pushed for intensive problem animal control strategies in the district.

In conclusion, communal resources in Kabuba seem to be open to all people in the village regardless of their origins. Membership of the village gives one access to the resources in the area. Membership itself is open to any person who promises to abide and respect the rules of the land.

3. Membership Issues in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho Districts

Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho are adjacent to one another and at one time ran a joint safari operation. The CAMPFIRE project in both districts revolves around wildlife hunting, especially the elephant. In terms of resource endowment Tsholotsho has more elephants than Bulilimamangwe.

Who is a Member?

In discussing membership issues Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho can be grouped together. In both districts, there are some wards which are in the CAMPFIRE programme and some which are not.

Tsholotsho has eight out of 20 wards in the CAMPFIRE programme. In this district there are three wards which have a common boundary with the wildlife area or the Hwange National Park. These wards are included in the CAMPFIRE programme. There are four other wards which have been included in the programme which do not share a boundary with the wildlife area but suffer from wildlife crop damage, mainly from the elephant.

Bulilimamangwe has seven out of 24 wards in the CAMPFIRE programme. These seven wards were selected on the basis of their claims on the wildlife area for grazing purposes. Some of the distant wards use the area for grazing in dry years and do not use the area during the good years. However, these wards have made a historical claim to the area although they have least contact with wildlife. There is an awareness among the project planners that there is a difference amongst the wards within the same district regarding interaction with wildlife. The selection of these wards was done by the Rural District Council with the assistance of a N.G.O., Zimbabwe Trust.

In both Districts each household which resides in the CAMPFIRE wards is regarded as a member of the resource owning unit. There is no difference in status among households regarding the position of the household vis-a-vis the wildlife area. However, settlement patterns show a higher concentration of homes away from the wildlife area in both districts.

During the interviews respondents were asked if they were willing to accept immigrants. Officials, like councillors from the wards, felt that if there was space in the area an immigrant could come provided she or he had formalised the move with the relevant authorities. The usual procedures are informing the traditional leadership, the councillors and getting a permit to reside from the Rural District Council. Some of the local respondents expressed the desire to keep the land free of immigrants so that their children could get some land for agriculture and

settlements in the future. In no case did the respondents indicate that more immigrants were a threat to the wildlife resource and habitat.

Ward One in Tsholotsho shares a boundary with a wildlife area. The wildlife area has several species, some of which stray from the Hwange National Park. Settlement in this area is not as dense as in other interior wards. The councillor for the ward was asked whether he would like more people to come and reside in his ward. In reply he said, *'We are in the bush at our place, we need more people in our area to keep the wild animals at a distance.'* This ward receives the second highest amount of cash revenues from wildlife safari hunting. This is because of its high wildlife population and suitable habitat. However, the councillor felt that the wildlife was a menace which could be reduced by increasing human population and density in the ward.

Government provision of services in the area is also considered when people regard the issue of immigrants, ie. group size. The water and sanitation requirements are such that there is a minimum number of households required before services like boreholes are provided by the government. Therefore, larger numbers of people are regarded as a strategy to attract services into the area. Politically, constituencies are also being determined in terms of human population. These are issues which communities and their leaders also consider when they take in immigrants.

Community and Costs

The communities in the two districts are aware of the costs they suffer as a result of wildlife. There is a greater awareness of costs than benefits from wildlife within the communities. This was succinctly put by the councillor for Ward Two of Tsholotsho when he said that *'the communities do not care about the money, they are worried about problem animal control.'* The major issue is that of problem animal control which most feel is not adequately addressed.

Wildlife, especially the elephant, invade fields eating up most of the crops. This affects those people who are nearest to the wildlife area much more than those who are further away. The costs are, therefore, unevenly distributed within the CAMPFIRE wards. However, the communities do not view the problem of costs as being solved by monetary benefits from wildlife - but rather by effective problem animal control.

Community and Benefits

Benefits from the CAMPFIRE programme in the two districts come in various forms. These are money for households and projects, and meat from wildlife hunting and problem animal control.

Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe differ in the process of benefit distribution. Tsholotsho has taken steps to deliver the highest proportion of benefits to the wards which have the highest number of animals and, therefore, the habitat for wildlife. The ward in which the hunt takes place is regarded as the producer of the animal. The producing ward gets 50 percent of the revenues from that particular animal. However, wildlife is a fugitive resource which affects even those wards where hunts may not take place. As a result, 50 percent of the revenue from safari operations is also shared equally among the remaining CAMPFIRE wards. The wards closest to the wildlife area are satisfied with this arrangement because they are able to get the greater share of the revenues. Those wards which are in the interior where hunts do not take place are demanding that this condition should be changed and all wards should get equal shares of wildlife revenues. The 'frontline' wards have argued that this should not be the case until a proposed electric fence is erected. This is an acknowledgement that the elephant is the source of the money and the electric fence will keep these animals away from their fields in the future.

Within the wards the revenues are shared equally among the villages making up the ward. It is up to the villages to decide how the money is used in the ward. In terms of benefit distribution, there is an indication that all members of the ward should benefit. There is no effort to exclude other villages or households from benefitting from wildlife revenues. Household dividends depend on the number of people who claim a share of the money. In other words, the size of the population determines the amount of money each household receives. There has not been an effort to reduce or keep to a minimum the number of households which receive benefits from wildlife funds.

Bulilimamangwe has one wildlife area where hunting takes place. This is the area which is also used for seasonal grazing. Benefits from wildlife hunting are shared equally among the wards. The wards then share the revenues equally among villages. The money in Bulilimamangwe has been used for development projects in most cases. During the interviews we pointed out to the local government officials that not all the wards paid the same price for wildlife damage and livestock predation. In reply, it was pointed out that it is difficult to exclude some of the wards because they were included in the setting up of the project. Some of the councillors put a lot of effort into getting the people to agree to the project. These councillors would not agree to be excluded at this stage of the project.

Makhulela ward in Bulilimamangwe shares a boundary with the wildlife area. The households in one of the villages, Sihoho, suffer a lot of crop damage from wildlife. However, they did not feel that they were entitled to a greater share of the wildlife revenues. Their wish was that problem animal control should be intensified so that they can get enough food for their families. One woman felt that it was not proper for her village, although they were in the frontline, to receive all the revenues from

wildlife; while others, even though they did not suffer crop damage, did not receive any revenues.

The idea of embarking on community projects is regarded as a form of community development. The projects are said to be good because they benefit the whole community. The feeling is that of inclusion rather than exclusion, where all people should receive the benefits.

Ward Seven in Tsholotsho also receives the greatest share of the financial benefits from wildlife. The ward councillor argues that the ward suffers the highest cost in terms of wildlife crop damage and livestock predation. Income from wildlife safari hunting has been used to build a community hall, and a grocery store in a central village. This hall and store are for the benefit of the whole community. Some money has been used to buy maize for resale to the whole community at no profit. Those from nearby Ward Eight can also purchase the grain although they are not members of that ward. The wildlife committee has given money to schools in the ward for development and some for parents' day celebrations. Some of the schools have pupils from other wards. Even immigrants from other districts enjoy the benefits from CAMPFIRE's wildlife utilisation.

Meat as benefit

Meat was not regarded as an important issue in both districts. Some expressed the feeling that they were not used to eating elephant meat anyway. In Tsholotsho those who live closest to where a hunt has taken place are the ones who receive the meat. The wildlife chairman in Ward Three said that there were plans to dry the meat and sell it to earn more revenue.⁸ In Bulilimangwe, distance was cited as the problem which keeps the majority of people from receiving meat. This does not seem to raise any negative feelings among the people.

Members and the Decision Making Process

In this study we were interested in studying the extent to which the community, as the legitimate owner of a resource, is involved in the decision making process. This is important to show the extent to which members of a resource owning group organise themselves in the management of a resource.

Both Tsholotsho and Bulilimangwe districts have wildlife committees at district, ward and village level. Important decisions regarding wildlife revenues and projects

⁸ See also Peterson, 1991 (page 14).

are discussed at ward level in a general meeting. The general meeting is for the whole ward and each member can participate in the debates.

The inter-ward committee at district level is composed of ward councillors and wildlife committee representatives from each ward wildlife committee. The inter-Ward committee is responsible for selection of tenders for hunting, reporting to council on how they have been using the revenues allocated to their ward, and submitting proposals for projects in their wards.

The ward committee is responsible for keeping the finances allocated to the ward from wildlife revenues. In the case of Ward Three of Tsholotsho, a planning committee which is not the wildlife committee has been set up to vet and prioritise the projects which must be undertaken in the ward.

Quota Setting

Quota setting is an involved process which requires a knowledge of the number of animals in the area. This is further complicated by the fact that some of the wildlife, especially elephants, move from the National Park into the communal area in search of browse. Final determination of the quota is done by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. In this exercise there is little or no participation by the local community. The major constraint is the lack of adequate information and techniques.

Conclusions

Common property theorists do not just characterize commons. They say that small populations are important to resource use. Communal property systems which are successful are those which limit resource use to a clearly defined group. Conversely, communities which are successful actively exclude outsiders from having access to these resources.

It appears from our data that some communities actively involved in common property systems do not share this idea. They do not believe that they should have sole claims to natural resources. Thus, in Bulilimamangwe, local villagers pointed out that grazing was open to other people even those from afar. In Tsholotsho villagers saw nothing wrong in allowing children from non-producing areas to enjoy the benefits from CAMPFIRE. In Binga outsiders were allowed, just like anybody else, to buy subsidized maize meal bought using CAMPFIRE money. Finally, in Masoka outsiders were allowed to use CAMPFIRE facilities, though at a nominal price.

The case studies generally suggest that, provided needy people from other areas follow local customs and procedures regarding settlement as well as regarding resource usage, they can become part of the common property system.

It is not clear as to why the practice of inclusion is prevalent. Our speculation is that local people regard natural resources as something to be shared with those in need. We also speculate that local people allow outsiders to benefit from wildlife as a return for other non-wildlife related benefits which they receive from such outsiders. These, however, are speculations which need further research.

This general practice of inclusion poses a dilemma for CAMPFIRE. Benefits become too stretched, to the extent that their value cannot act as an incentive for wildlife conservation. With changes in demography, norms and values in general, and those governing natural resource conservation in particular, become heterogenous. They generally become difficult to enforce. Although this is not yet the situation in the areas that we studied, there is no doubt that over the years these dynamics and processes will increasingly become significant. Those working in CAMPFIRE must, then, strive to convince the communities that their inclusive practices ultimately negate the programme.



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