

**MEKELLE UNIVERSITY**  
**COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS**  
**DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT**

**DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE FROM LOCAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE  
(THE CASE OF HAWZEN WOREDA, TIGRAY REGION, ETHIOPIA)**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGMENT IN PARTIAL  
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS  
DEGREE IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND  
DEVELOPMENT)**

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**JUNE, 01/2014**

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## Declaration

The thesis entitled as “*Democratic developmental state from Local Governance Perspective: The Case of Hawzen woreda*” is my original work and has not been presented for a degree, diploma or fellowship to any other university to the best of my knowledge and that all the sources of materials used for the thesis have been dully acknowledged.

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## Certification

This is to certify that this thesis entitled “*Democratic developmental state from Local Governance Perspective: The Case of Hawzen woreda*” Submitted for partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of MA, in Development studies of the college of Business and Economics, Mekelle University, through the Department of Management, done by Mr. Weldeabrha Niguse , ID, No, CBE/PR081/05 is carried out by him under our guidance..

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## **Acknowledgements**

First and for most my special thanks go to my esteemed thesis advisor Ato Tesfay Aregawi (Assistant Professor) for his invaluable contribution, diligent assistance, important and constructive comments, suggestions and advice, in the successful completion of this study. My Heartfelt gratitude also goes to my Co-advisor Abdulkirim Ahmed (MA) for his precious and timely feedbacks and comments throughout this thesis.

My greatest gratitude also goes to my best former instructor and my close friend Ato Seife Hailu who has always been the right person to talk on my area of investigation and proposal development.

I am also grateful to my former instructor Ato Meresa Tsehay Department Head of Political Science and Strategic Studies and his Staff Members for their Continuous Moral Encouragement and Open Discussions in my two years stay in Mekelle University.

# Acronyms

<i>CBOs</i> .....	<i>Community Based Organizations</i>
<i>CIDA</i> .....	<i>Canadian International Development Agency</i>
<i>ECA</i> .....	<i>Economic Commission for Africa</i>
<i>EPRDF</i> .....	<i>Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front</i>
<i>ERA</i> .....	<i>Economic Report on Africa</i>
<i>FDRE</i> .....	<i>Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia</i>
<i>FDRFANSPS</i> .....	<i>Federal Democratic Republic of Foreign Affairs and National Security Policies and Strategies</i>
<i>GRIPS</i> .....	<i>National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies</i>
<i>GTP</i> .....	<i>Growth and Transformation Plan</i>
<i>LDCs</i> .....	<i>Least Developed Countries</i>
<i>LDI</i> .....	<i>Local Development International</i>
<i>MoFED</i> .....	<i>Ministry Of Finance and Economic Development</i>
<i>PASDEP</i> .....	<i>A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty Policy and Strategy</i>
<i>SDPRP</i> .....	<i>Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program</i>
<i>UNCTAD</i> .....	<i>United Nation Conference on Trade and Development</i>
<i>UNDP</i> .....	<i>United Nations Development Program</i>
<i>UN-OHRLLS</i> .....	<i>United Nation Office of the High Representative the Least Developed Countries, Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States</i>
<i>WB</i> .....	<i>World Bank</i>

## ABSTRACT

*In this research under taking, an attempt is made to analyze the democratic developmental state from local governance perspective taking a particular woreda/district as a case study. To come up with the required data pertinent to the research undertaking, qualitative research methodology in which purposively selected key informants from different local public institutions, nongovernmental organization, and community based development associations, ordinary local people residents from purposely selected kebel are approached for interviews and focus group discussions with significant consideration of their access to public institutions and extent of potential relevance to the topic under discussion. Moreover, documents of local public institutions, news papers, magazines and journal articles that have critical relevance to this research are also reviewed in the theoretical and practical discourse analysis. Both empirical and theoretical research findings in the democratic developmental state experiment in Ethiopia from a particular case study reveals that the local government falls short of local autonomy thereby undermining local bureaucratic autonomy, lack of democratic accountability from below, inability of attracting and retaining qualified man power due to civil servant unfriendly local political and administrative conditions. Most of these local government problems are emanated from excessive fusion of party politics and government service and the repetitive counterproductive interference of local political elites for their mere vested interest. According to this research findings, the local government under its current status resembles neither the authoritarian developmental character nor to the democratic developmental one. Therefore, local governments need to enjoy significant local autonomy so that autonomy of local bureaucracy along with neutral civil service that stands for national and local demand priority come to reality. At the top of all however, political-administrative dichotomy should get significant attention as this spoils the autonomy of all public institutions.*

**Key words:** democracy, developmental state, decentralization, local autonomy

# Content Page

Contents	page
Declaration.....	i
Certification.....	ii
Acronyms.....	iv
Content Page.....	vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Background of the Study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	5
1.3 Research Questions.....	7
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	7
1.4.1 General Objective.....	7
1.4.2. Specific Objectives.....	7
1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study.....	7
1.5.1 Scope of the Study.....	7
1.5.2 Limitation of the Study.....	8
1.5 Significance of the Study.....	9
1.7 Organization of the Paper.....	9
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	11
2.1 Conceptual Basis of Developmental State.....	11
2.2 Evolutionary Development and Nature of Developmental State.....	13
2.2.1 Brief History on Evolution of Developmental State.....	13
2.2.2 Classical Developmental State.....	15
2.2.3 The Contemporary Developmental State.....	17
2.2.4 Essential Conditions and Defining Features for a Successful Developmental state.....	22
2.3 Debate on the Feasibility of Developmental State in Africa.....	26
2.4 Democracy-Development Discourse and the Emergence of Democratic Developmental State.....	29
2.5 Decentralized Local Governance in Developmental State.....	34
2.6 Decentralization and Developmental Local government.....	38
CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE DISCOURSE UNDER DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONTEXT IN ETHIOPIA.....	41

3.1. The Theoretical Discourse on Democratic Developmentalism.....	41
3.2 The Discourse on Democratic Developmentalism in Practice: Is Ethiopia performing in a Way it can be Labeled Democratic Developmental?.....	48
3.2.1 Development-Oriented Political Leadership.....	53
3.2.2 Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy .....	56
3.2.3 Production-Oriented Private Sector .....	64
3.2.4 Performance-Oriented Governance.....	68
3.3 The State of Local Government and Governance in Ethiopia .....	71
3.3.1 General Overview of Governance in Ethiopia .....	71
3.3.2 Political and Legal Framework for Decentralized Local Governance in Ethiopia .....	75
3.3.3 Challenges of Local Democracy and Decentralization in Ethiopia .....	78
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	83
4.1 Site Selection and Description of the Study Area.....	83
4.2. Research Strategy and Design.....	84
4.3. Data Type and Source.....	85
4.4. Target population and Selection of Respondents.....	85
4.5. Methods of Data Collection .....	87
4.6 Methods of Data Analysis.....	88
4.7 Ethical Considerations .....	88
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS.....	89
5.1 Extent and Depth of Understanding the “Democratic Developmental State” Notion in the Context of Hawzen Woreda .....	89
5.1.1The Understanding at Political Leadership Level.....	89
5.1.2 The Understanding at Bureaucracy/Civil Service Level.....	92
5.1.3The Understanding at the Private Sector Level.....	94
5.2 Local Public Institutions, Capacities and Implications for Bureaucratic Autonomy .....	95
5.3 Challenges of Democratic Developmentalism at the Local Governance Context.....	102
5.3.1None Developmental and Counterproductive Political Leadership Interference.....	103
5.3.2 Lack of Performance Oriented Governance and Local Demand Priority .....	106
5.3.3 Lack of Bureaucratic Autonomy and Untrained Man Power.....	109
5.4 Prospects of Building a Democratic Developmental State in the Woreda.....	112
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION .....	117

6.1 Conclusion .....	117
6.2 Recommendations.....	120
Appendix A: Interview and Focus group discussion guide .....	122
Appendix B: List of Informants .....	128

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background of the Study

The State is undeniably the most important socio-economic and political institution in the society with its cluster of inter-related socio-economic and political institutions, charged with the performance of a multitude of roles and functions, to foster the overall wellbeing and development of society (Economic Report on Africa (ERA), 2011; ECA, 2013). However, the ability of the State and its institutions to perform its functions and fulfill its multiple roles has varied over time and space (ECA, 2013:P1).

African countries clearly need developmental States to promote economic and social transformation with five major elements: purposeful and democratic leadership accompanied by developmentalist coalition; transformative institutions; focused industrial policy; investment in research; and enhanced social policy (ERA, 2011).

Given the challenges of the Asian Authoritarian Developmental States, especially in terms of democratic participation, Democratic Developmental State would be the most ideal model for late comer countries in Africa and the rest (Maphunye, 2009).

*In light of current international conditions, democratic developmental states must be pursued and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa will be premised on the ability to 'create new ladders' of development as old ones have been kicked away (Dadzie, 2012:p21).*

The constitution of a democratic developmental state is therefore an indication to mean the pursuit of two mutually reinforcing agendas: democracy/good government and holistic development (Adekunle, 2008). Committed and capable government need to be in place to construct such a state. In conformity to this, Evans (1995) call for a “more encompassing form of embedded autonomy” is critical for building democratic developmental state with broad based legitimacy that is capable of galvanizing the mass around similar national development objectives. Definitely the mass to be galvanized is in the grassroots for which capable developmental local government is essential to do same.

Democratic developmental state is a state that is capable of institutionalizing local government committed to work with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives (Madumo, 2012). Local government is viewed as the sphere of government closest to the people. Democratic developmental state is therefore expected to be transparent, accountable and responsive to citizens, so that citizens' confidence in the government can be enhanced that in turn enables the local government to easily mobilize groups of citizens towards some development objectives that otherwise could be difficult (UNDP, 2012; Gemandze, 2006; Tissington, undated).

What is required now according to UNCTA's report for LDCs is a developmental State that is adapted to the challenges facing an interdependent world in the twenty-first century. The preferences and priorities of the people of Less Developed Countries can only be set by a strong representative state with a clear developmental vision. This State should seek to harness local, bottom-up problem-solving energies through stakeholder involvement and citizen participation that creates and renews the micro-foundations of democratic practice (UNCTAD, 2009:p8).

The policies that aim to achieve a developmental state are found to be critical component in establishing a developmental state and argued further the objectives of a developmental local government are the same as those of a developmental state (Madumo, 2012).

Local government is a key part of the reconstruction and development effort of a given country as many argued particularly to those states in strict follow up of decentralization like Ethiopia. Because the aim of democratising a society and bringing about a growing inclusive economy can only be realised through a responsive, accountable and participatory local government system which in turn enhances public trust.

However, public trust in public sector performance in delivering services consistent with citizen preferences has been considered weak in developing countries (Shah, 2005). The reason is that politicians and bureaucrats are typically observed to show greater interest in rent-seeking activities than in delivering services wanted by their citizens (Ibid).

Good local governance is not just about providing a range of local services but also preserving the life and liberty of residents, creating space for democratic participation and civic dialogue, supporting market-led and environmentally sustainable local development, and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents (Shah, 2006).

Unlike the previous regimes, Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime believes the threat for the statehood of Ethiopia is from within. The regime's threat analysis seems wisely articulated when it states poverty, lack of democratization and backwardness are dangers to our national security. As cure to this the government declared democratic developmental state as development paradigm to achieve fast economic growth rate and speed up democratization process of the state. The choice for constructing democratic developmental state for EPRDF regime is therefore in line with the objective of putting the national threats to the level that they cannot be a threat no more for the country.

The government has also shown its commitment to promote good governance through ratifying a number of international human rights instruments, reforming domestic laws to harmonize with international human rights standards, emphasizing good governance in different policies and programs such as the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), and Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and the good governance packages.

Despite important progresses made in the area, the process of building good governance and democratization processes as deemed in democratic developmental state are at their early stage, which has been facing serious and complex challenges. Major challenges in realizing democracy include lack of adequate awareness about human rights among the public, the limited democratic culture and experience in the country, limited participation of citizens in governance, lack of adequate and appropriate laws and policies in some areas, capacity limitations of law enforcement and governance organs of the government are some among others ( Rahmato et al., 2008).

As indicated in the United Nation Development Program report (2009), the fight against poverty is not simply a social, economic and technical objective but also a political and institutional goal for which democratic governance is the key instrument implying that

democratic governance and development are mutually reinforcing goals. However, Lack of good governance manifested in lack of accountability, meaningful participation and transparency in different parts of the country are observed challenging the pace of democratization process as deemed by EPRDF regime (FDRE MoFED, 2012-2013, Meskerem, 2007, Helvetas Ethiopia, 2008).

To achieve sustainable development, Least Developed Countries must build transparent, participatory, accountable and effective democratic governance systems from the higher to the local levels (UNDP, 2006). This proposition in turn requires well institutionalized and functioning local government institutions committed to put public interest ahead of private interest.

However, the issue of serving the public interest ahead of private interest is becoming a rare case as practically observed for instance in different parts of the hierarchies of government in Tigray regional state (weyen newspaper, 2013 :p 8). As indicated in the works of Rahmato et al. (2008), among 37 regionally registered advocacy and human right organizations in Ethiopia, Tigray regional state remained as an island to be accessed by these organizations. This can have its own implications in promoting democracy, good governance and human rights in the region. This governance inconveniencies and gaps can also create loss of confidence of citizens on public institutions and loose relationships between state and citizens while building a strong relationship between the state and its citizens is believed to be central to successful development and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (UNDP, 2006).

Democratic developmentalism of Ethiopia is seeking the attention of scholars and policy makers as paradigm shift for development policy alternative to ensure democracy and development as matter of national survival. However, empirical evidences show that there are complex challenges that hinder democratic governance from taking root at the local level which in turn can undermine the basic essence of democratic developmentalism. This research undertaking is therefore an attempt to examine the essence of democratic developmental state from local governance context at one particular woreda.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

One of the most serious challenges in today's ever changing political, social and economic circumstances is how to reconfigure the role of the state. Most often however, the ideal state is characterized as democratic developmental state (Saito, 2008). However, it has to be noted that successful 21<sup>st</sup> century developmental states will have to depart fundamentally from existing models of the developmental states in order to achieve success. Growth strategies focused primarily on traditional capital accumulation and narrowly focused state society ties with capitalist elite will no longer be sufficient. Broad based democratic deliberation is getting momentum to be a pre requisite for constructing adaptive developmental state (Evans, 2008:p1).

The need to construct democratic developmental state as a consequence is believed to get its basis from below especially in countries where devolution of power is constitutionally granted to local governments. Local bottom-up problem solving and development efforts are crucial for least developed countries to get out of poverty in condensed period of time (UNCTAD, 2009). As indicated in Romeo (2013), UNDP (2006), there is no development that cannot happen locally and committed, transparent, accountable and participatory local leadership that puts public interest ahead of private profiteering is must to achieve it.

According to the FDRE constitution (1995), article 50/4, State governments shall be established at state and other administrative levels that they find necessary and adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units. The constitution has therefore allowed substantial autonomy and autonomous decision-making power to the regional and local governments.

Despite this wide reaching and internationally vital statement, it has not been sufficiently proved empirically in Ethiopia (Gebreslassie, 2012, LDI, 2013, USAID, 2010). Many woredas and other lower level administrations have been facing a deficiency in attaining a viable local development and providing an efficient and effective service for their grass root people which gave birth for repeated resentments among the local residents in different parts of the country (Helvetas Ethiopia, 2008; Meskerem, 2007; Rahmato et al., 2008). Moreover, as indicated in the works of yilmaz and venugopal (2008) and Merara

(2007), at the local level, while the letter of the law in the constitution is obeyed, the spirit of putting in practice is mostly compromised in Ethiopia.

Even though the critical role of local government in the overall societal transformation in terms of economic, social and political aspects in Ethiopia is widely recognized, capacity limitations related to skilled man power and leadership role modeling remained to be a continuing hindrance for realistic change as promised in the constitution and policy documents (UNDEF, 2014; Meskerem, 2007, Helvetas Ethiopia, 2008).

Despite the recognition of the critical role and expectation of local government in development, so far academic research works in Ethiopia with regard to democratic developmental state mainly concentrates on the center giving less emphasize how its core values and principles are being practiced at the grass roots level specifically as viewed from democratization dimension. To substantiate this reality the researcher goes through a review of scholarly articles and other publications contributed by scholar like: Desta A., Amha (2012), Tamrat D. (2013), Samuel B. (2011), klawnsen (2005), Demeke A. (2013) Clmphan (2013) and others but none of the scholarly contributions touched and correlated democratic developmental state to the local context.

Moreover, most of the scholarly works at the center are also solely based on literature review leaving aside the primary sources to enrich their study and to have additional implication for the research out puts. In addition to this, while democratization and economic development are assumed to be the core values of democratic developmental state and making them go hand in hand in Ethiopia is the claim of the current government, research works attempted from above, especially from proponents position, fail to give balanced treatment to both democratic governance and economic development; inclining more to the economic dimension and making their unit of analysis the center.

Furthermore, there are varying narrations up on the feasibility of democratic developmentalism in the current state of Ethiopia even from above. Therefore, this research is aimed to examine the feasibility of democratic developmental state indicators and alignment of the local governance practice to the claims and promises of democratic

developmental state thereby to contribute to the available varying narrations from bottom up perspective.

### 1.3 Research Questions

- How the notion of democratic developmental state is being understood and practiced in the study area?
- What is the level of local public institutions autonomy in passing decisions and carrying out their responsibilities to meet public demand?
- What are the major factors that promote/hinder the practice of democratic developmental state principles in the study area?
- What windows of opportunities can be sought to remedy the challenges of practicing the principles of democratic developmental state at the local level?

### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

#### 1.4.1 General Objective

To analyze democratic developmental state from local governance perspective taking Hawzen woreda as a unit of analysis

#### 1.4.2. Specific Objectives

- ❖ To analyze the extent of understanding and practice of the notion of democratic developmental state in the study woreda
- ❖ To assess the autonomy of local public institutions in carrying out their respective responsibilities
- ❖ To assess the major challenges of practicing principles of democratic developmental state in study area
- ❖ To indicate the way out for practicing the principles of democratic developmental state in study woreda

### *1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study*

#### *1.5.1 Scope of the Study*

The study had conceptual, methodological and areal scopes so as to be manageable and focused. Even though the characteristic features and indicators of democratic developmental state are so many that include economic, social and political indicators of various development input-outcome performance analyses to have comprehensive picture, this research is confined to examine and assess the governance dimension of local public institutional arrangement, organizational feasibility and the interactions to each other thereby their implications for democracy and development at the local level. Developmental outcomes of the overall local governance performance will not be dealt comprehensively. To this end, focus had given to local autonomy, extent of local elite commitment to meet public demand and their alignment to the notion of democratic developmentalism and the way local civil servants are recruited and promoted. Methodologically, this study is a bottom up approach of examining democratic developmental state on qualitative basis of cross sectional survey type in which data was collected in a single point in time. Areal scope of the study is confined to Hawzen Woreda administration consisting of 24 rural kebeles and one urban kebele.

### 1.5.2 Limitation of the Study

Basically this research is a case study of qualitative design to examine democratic developmental paradigm from local governance perspective. So the ultimate goal of this study was primarily to make analytical generalization up on the existing governance system against the core values, principles and aspirations of democratic developmental paradigm. To this end, this research had methodological limitation to give statistical representative generalization. This is so because when in-depth interviews are conducted, generalizations about the results are usually not able to be made because small samples are chosen and random sampling methods are not used (Neale, and Boyce, 2006).

Democratic developmentalism is a comprehensive concept that incorporates the overall state guidance over political, social and economic performance. However, to assess this all against this paradigm at local context in detail is cumbersome. For this reason, the research recognized from the outset that there was not detailed analysis of the economic dimension rather more weight was given to the governance aspect of socio-political nature in line with

local autonomy, leadership commitment and capability, performance oriented governance and their implications to development at local level.

Another limitation of the study lies on the fact the available literature with regard to developmental state coincides to the miraculous development experience of the East Asians. The governance system that one can reveal from the East Asians is an authoritarian nature of top down rule that could not give relevant evidence in the experience of local governance from the democratic developmental state perspective for which this research had been dealt. In addition to this, to the best of the researcher's knowledge there is little scientific investigation made so far regarding democratic developmental state-local governance nexus.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

In order to ensure democracy and development as mutually reinforcing goals of democratic developmental state in a condensed period of time, designing effective institutional strategies that enhance broad based participatory decision making through which clear line of accountability is realized is indispensable as this arrangement in turn creates motivation of citizens to take part in public decision making processes and development activities. As this research work is conducted in area of scantily researched, it may open the way for further researchers who have the motivation to do so. Again conceptually, democratic developmental state from local context is also scantily assessed so far. To this end, the research work may have the following purposes after its completion.

It may serve as initial reference material for researchers who are interested to make their contribution in this area. It can also give an input for local governors to rate their governance performance against their expected role as local government authorities in democratic developmental state.

### **1.7 Organization of the Paper**

The paper has six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study by describing the background, statement of the problem, objectives and significance of the study. Chapter two covers literature review dealing with definition and conceptualization of the developmental state with its peculiar features and democratic developmental state. Chapter three deals with the developmental state of Ethiopia and the state of local governance. Chapter four discusses the

methodology of the study including description of the study area, research design, and sources of data, data collection and data analysis. Chapter five also involve results and discussion of the study and the last chapter consists conclusions and recommendation of the study.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Conceptual Basis of Developmental State

The developmental state theory, one of the statist approaches, attempts to explain the government driven development of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Abe, 2006:p1). There is of course a major problem in defining a developmental state simply from its economic performance: not all countries with good growth rates are developmental states (Taylor, 2005; Omoweh, 2012). Recognition of episodes and possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development and hence sustainability and consistency perspective takes paramount attention a state to be labeled as developmental one (Ibid).

It has been acknowledged that state activity in the market was one of the key factors which facilitated the rapid growth of Japan and the East Asian tigers. As such there is a counter argument to the market fundamentalists that the state and the market are not antithesis rather compatible and reinforcing entities in which one without the other is rare to bring positive development as historical records reveal. In conclusion therefore, functioning market is the product of functioning state role (Shabbir Deen, 201; chang, 2003; Economic Report on Africa, 2011). Nowadays there is an increasing recognition for the critical role of the state in development which fuel the re conceptualization of the so called “developmental state” adaptive to the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Different scholars defined the concept of developmental state in different ways; but all emphasize the Government’s commitment to developmentalism and the translation of this commitment into policies and institutions designed to achieve national economic development. Thus, as summed up in the (UNCTAD, 2009:p29) report:

Fritz and Menocal (2007: 533) perceived a developmental State to exist when the state possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed period of time; Bagchi (2000: 398) defines a developmental State as a state that puts economic development as the top priority of government policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal; and Chang (1999: 183, 192)

defines a developmental State as a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships which support sustained industrialization.

When reference is made to the “developmental state”, it is thought of East and South East Asian countries and not usually about Africa. For the past few years, however, there has been a noticeable interest in academic as well as development cooperation circles in the usefulness of the concept for political economic conditions in Africa (Meyns and Musamba, 2010:p7).

The role of the state in promoting economic growth and social progress in the developing world has been a subject of contestation among international development experts and policy analysts for the past 50 years (Menocal and V. Fritz, 2006). International thinking on the role of the state in development has therefore undergone several alternative paths over the last decades.

As indicated in the works of V. Fritz and A. Rocha Menocal (2006) there are three major stages under which debate on the role of the state in development is perceived. These were: the pro state led development; anti state led development via structural adjustment program of the Washington consensus and revisiting pro state led development as consequence of East Asian remarkable growth (ibid).

A developmental state can be defined as a state that puts economic development as the top priority of government policy, and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal (economic report on Africa 2011).

Levi-Faur defines the developmental state as a state with a dutiful and credible commitment to development. The duty refers to the expectations of citizens and other stakeholders who perceive the state as responsible for development. Credibility is an acquired attribute, which state elites have to gain in order to fulfill their duty. Credibility means that rhetorical commitments are reliable and trustworthy and that the subject of credibility has, in the eyes of a diverse set of domestic and transnational actors, the capacity to deliver. At the same time development is also a duty of state elites who are accountable to these actors and derive their legitimacy from this commitment and duty (Levi-Faur, 2012).

Developmental state can also be explained as a state that plays an active role in guiding economic development and using the resources of the country to meet the needs of the people. Developmental state tries to balance economic growth and social development by using state resources and state influence to attack poverty and expand economic opportunities (Economic report on Africa, 2011).

The term developmental state refers to a situation in which a government, motivated by the desire for socio-economic development, intervenes in the operation of the free market. Such a state is therefore determined to influence the direction and pace of socio-economic development by directly intervening in the developmental process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces in the allocation of resources Manuel (2004) cited in Edigheji (2007).

## 2.2 Evolutionary Development and Nature of Developmental State

This part of the review introduces the coinage of the notion of developmental as a popular scholarly discussions and the evolution of its nature from the classical to the contemporary reality.

### 2.2.1 Brief History on Evolution of Developmental State

In its contemporary usage, the concept of the developmental state came from Chalmers Johnson (1982) as cited in economic report on Africa (2011:p96) who used it to describe the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy and its rapid industrialization after the Second World War. He argues that central to Japan's economic miracle was a planned rational state a developmental state that was able to stimulate, as well as proactively support and promote, economic development. This interventionist state, through a planned process, established clear economic and social objectives and influenced the direction and pace of economic development in the country (Ibid).

Despite the debate and counter debate in the role of the state, historical records in development indicates that the necessity and indispensability of the role of the state in social transformation. To this effect developmental states have evolved, and they characterized the growth of the Netherlands in the 16th century, England in the 16th to the 19th century, and

Germany in the mid-19th to the early 20th century apart from the recent history of East Asia (Chang, 2003; Economic Report on Africa, 2011).

According to Chang (2003) virtually all of today's developed countries actively used interventionist trade and industrial policies aimed at promoting and protecting, infant industries during their catch-up periods. For instance growth of the Netherlands in the 16th century, England in the 16th to the 19th century, and Germany in the mid-19th to the early 20th century are characterized by interventionist state role (ibid). When Amuwo (2008) substantiates the role of state, there are simply no historical examples of development occurring under conditions of openness and liberalization promoted in the South by the international development community; instead accelerated development has required state involvement and control over the allocation of foreign exchange and subsidies and protection for infant industries (2008:p7). There is no historical account that proves development actualized without state involvement (Stiglitz, 2004).

To this end, the State is undeniably the most important socio-economic and political institution in the society across history. It consists of a cluster of inter-related socio-economic and political institutions, charged with the performance of a multitude of roles and functions, including fostering the overall wellbeing and development of society. The State has always been seen as the main supplier of basic and essential public goods and services, ranging from the maintenance of law and order, creating and maintaining the enabling environment for peace, security and stability, to the health and education services for the citizenry. However, the ability of the State and its institutions to perform its functions and fulfill multiple roles has varied over time and space (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2013).

It is therefore the state that promotes macroeconomic stability and that establishes an institutional framework for the maintenance of law and order, effective administration of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts along side with broad based investment in infrastructure and human development (Mkandawire, 2010). With this increased recognition of the role of the state ideally and from experience the so called the developmental state emerged to be used as favorable development paradigm for late comers.

The East Asian developmental state was the product of a certain time and place and it was that historical coincidence as some scholars argue that gave chance for success story. At the policy level, the postwar developmental state was characterized by its use of market-intervening policies. These policies were tolerated by the rest of the world because of the imperatives of postwar economic reconstruction and the need to contain the spread of communism during the Cold War (Wong, 2004).

### 2.2.2 Classical Developmental State

The 20<sup>th</sup> century developmental state followed the footsteps of the 19<sup>th</sup> century early developers like Germany, Russia and Japan (under the Meiji dynasty). If one looks into the history of economic thought, one can find that those early developers developed under authoritarian political leadership (Amha, 2012). In line this, Chang (2003) pointed out that even in the great forerunner of development, Great Britain, developmental brake through in the form of the industrial revolution, preceded democratization.

In analyzing the nature of authoritarian states Tuong Vu (2007:p48-49) wrote: *Authoritarianism covers a wide range of regimes; from modern military dictatorships to traditional patrimonial systems. Even fascist and communist states are sometimes referred to as authoritarian. There is a critical difference between regimes where a cohesive and purposive weberian bureaucracy exists and those where bureaucrats are only personal servants of patrimonial rulers... Both kinds of regimes maybe equally repressive, but only the former possess developmental structure.*

No wonder therefore, that the miraculous economic performance of the first generation Asian Tiger countries of Taiwan and South Korea and the second generation Asian successful developers like Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia all took place under “authoritarian auspices” (White 2006:p61). Scholars who dwelt on the issue of the East Asian developmental state define it ‘not only by its goals but most importantly by institutional attributes’ (Edigheji 2007:p5).

The first major study on the developmental state was produced by Chalmers Johnson in his 1982 book MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Johnson,1982 cited in Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005). In this book according to Mbabazi and Taylor, Johnson drew up four constituent parts

of a model of what became termed ‘the developmental state’. These four segments were: the presence of a small but professional and efficient state bureaucracy; a political environment where this bureaucracy has enough space to operate and take policy initiatives independent of overly intrusive interventions by vested interests; the crafting of methods of state intervention in the economy without disrupting the market principle -the concept of ‘market-conforming’; a pilot organization such as Chalmers found in MITI (Johnson,1982 cited in Mbabazi Taylor 2005:p4).

Tuong Vu (2007:p49) captured the secret for the authoritarian developmental state success as follows: *It was the systematic coordination of large scale violence, political control, and the concomitant mobilization of support from foreign and domestic capital. Their success in this task helped them build a cohesive bureaucratic structure, institutionalize social submission, and develop a close relationship with domestic producer class. At the same time, the structures they built were sufficiently cohesive to avoid being captured by private interests.*

White (2008:5) refers to such types of authoritarian states as ‘rational authoritarianism’. The other important element of the authoritarian developmental state is credibility. If the state fails to be seen by the public as credible, it means that it has been hijacked by rent seeking interest groups. Without credibility, the developmental state cannot arise, and credibility comes with the ability of the state to register sustained economic growth.

There is a wide range of consensus in the literature among developmental scholars that the current thinking about the developmental state has been strongly shaped by research into the experience of the East Asian tigers even though there are scholars who trace as this concept is beyond the recent history of the East Asians. Although there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the core set of policies that enabled the original Asian tigers (and now others) to achieve high levels of development and economic growth, there is a general consensus about the essential features that characterized these successful developmental states. Most of all, a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being ‘captured’ by particularistic interests is regarded as having been essential (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:p8). This is what Peter Evans (1995) has called ‘embedded autonomy’.

Two factors are assumed to have enabled such a bureaucracy embodying embedded autonomy and the developmental orientation of the state to arise in the East Asian cases: a political leadership that was committed to development and, in most case, the uprooting of traditional elites. In Asia, political leadership committed to development was often motivated by regional competition, nationalism and the desire to ‘catch up’ with the west (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007; 8)

Developmental vision and drive in the contexts most frequently discussed as developmental, namely the core East Asian states, have often taken on a nationalistic tone. Nationalism served not only as ‘rallying cry’ to mobilize action. The national developmental project provided a sense of social cohesion an awareness of “we are all in the same boat” (Routley, 2012). However, the pre-existing feeling of relative social homogeneity within these particular countries assisted in making it much easier for governments and individual businesses to adopt principles of individual, meritocratic mobility and galvanizing the wider public and letting to sacrifice for national development project (Ibid).

Given the relative homogeneity of the East Asian society and their allegedly consensual alignment to developmental state construction made these countries to escape from the desperate of poverty and by recording miraculous growth in a very condensed period of time under the authoritarian regime. This is also due to the specific time and geo-political context that these particular countries traced in which that some tend to argue even the East Asian countries themselves cannot repeat it again.

To this end, tending to repeat the classical developmental state in the contemporary reality without modification is self defeating (Onis, 1991). Therefore, the contemporary developmental state is the one that is going to take lessons as how the role of the state led to the miraculous growth of early developmental states but with careful consideration of the national and international political economy contexts for which the state can enjoy significant legitimacy from within and outside.

### 2.2.3 The Contemporary Developmental State

A considerable body of opinion suggests that the developmental state is not only possible, but also indispensable to developing countries (Leftwich, 2000). However, the contemporary

Developmental State, unlike the classical counterpart, embodies the principles (and practices) of electoral democracy and ensures citizen participation in development and governance processes (Edigheji, 2005). In line with this, Dadzie argues that in light of current international conditions, democratic developmental states must be pursued and economic development in Africa need to be premised on the ability to 'create new ladders' of development as old ones have been kicked away (Dadzie, 2012).

In explaining the need for paradigm shift from classical developmental state into its contemporary counterpart, Petter B Evans argues that: *Understandings of the role of the developmental state have changed, first of all, because development theory has changed. In addition, the historical context of development has changed. New challenges, seen through the lens of new theories, point toward a 21<sup>st</sup> century developmental state quite different from its 20<sup>th</sup> century predecessor (Evans, 2008:p2).*

In sum therefore, an effective contemporary developmental state requires not only a set of crucial institutions and mechanisms to speed up economic growth but also a democratic socio-political environment that endows it with legitimacy and authority. This environment also provides stakeholders with the voice and representation that enable them to have a sense of ownership of the country's national development programme (ERA, 2011). Consistent to ERA, Mkandawire argues that unlike the few examples of developmental states of East Asian countries which were authoritarian, the new ones will have to be democratic, and it is encouraging that the two most cited democratic developmental states are both from Africa-Botswana and Mauritius (Mkandawire, 2001).

When Peter Evans underline on the institutionalization of democratic developmental state, he explained it as: if the classical developmental state had strong and autonomous institutions, the contemporary developmental state is expected to go beyond (Evans, 2008). First, classical developmental state's prime objective was to speed up economic growth/capital accumulation with little concern for equity as their society were relatively in a state of economic egalitarianism; second, policy formulation and implementation mechanism is top down and that institutional capacity is measured and oriented towards attaining more economic growth with little confrontation from any pressure groups at their time from within and outside. The contemporary developmental state institutions are therefore there to face

these challenges of democratic decentralization, wealth redistribution and various pressure groups including international development agents which were not as such an agenda of the classical developmental state (Evans, 2008).

The construction of democratic developmental states in Africa must now be seen as one of the most urgent tasks facing the continent in the new millennium (ERA, 2011; ECA, 2011). There is of course a major problem in defining a developmental state simply from its economic performance: not all countries with good growth rates are developmental states (Dadzie, 2012). Dadzie further argues the definition of the 'developmental state' runs the risk of being tautological since evidence reveals that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is 'developing', and equates economic success to state strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies (Taylor, 2005; Omoweh, 2012).

The challenge for the political economist in contemporary developmental state construction is therefore to devise forms of industrial policy which are consistent with the norms of democratic accountability and with more limited concentration of public and private power than has been the case in the East Asian context (Onis, 1991).

Complementary to Onis proposition, Mbabazi argues that the search for alternative paths to development in Africa today is more entrenched than ever before, given the changes in the global political economy in the twenty-first century implying the fault lines of one size fits all principle (Mbabazi, 2005). He further asserts if Africa is going to ensure its developmental role, it continues to play any significant role in this new millennium, and then there is need to find a model of African democratic development to guide the continent's progress. To this effect Gemandze (2006:p75) underlined that if African states are to be labeled as developmental states the central measure is democratic rural development and hence democracy and public deliberation in decision making lies at the heart of contemporary developmental state.

The conceptualization and theorization of developmental states has evolved over the last decades (ECA, 2011). ECA underlines as it is crystal clear that where certain policy

decisions were acceptable and possible in the past, the case today may not be same reality which deserves conscious policies that can complement the contemporary reality. moreover, the political and economic conditions that were previously present during the emergence of the first developmental states do not exist today (Evans, 2008).

Hence, a developmental state adaptive to the contemporary reality calls paramount attention from scholars and policy practitioners (ERA, 2011; Dadzie, 2012 Gemandze, 2006). Public governance nowadays emphasizes decentralization, devolution and state-society partnerships, with horizontal structures of decision making and accountability in which ordinary citizens are expected to gain greater ownership over the process of development management (Gemandze, 2006).

In the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in which we live, it must be noted that no country, regardless of its development stage, could be admitted as a valid member of the international community and receive aid and cooperation unless it embraces a democratic form of government. This is an international environment sharply different from the one in which Taiwan or Korea faced during the Cold War era (Ohno, 2009; Evans, 2010). In summary, the combined adoption of developmentalism and democracy is required not only for the inherent value of democracy but also from strong pressures from within and without.

Today, if the state cannot be held accountable by its constituents, it will at least be held accountable by regional organizations such as the African Union or European Union, or internationally by economic and political institutions such as the United Nations and the Human Rights Council for example (Subira,2011). Therefore, it is acknowledged that these institutions do not necessarily possess the power to prevent war or atrocities despite their attempts but some soft power does exist as all states make an effort to adhere to certain universal ideals such as democracy and good governance.

Therefore, the recent discourse on developmental state is concerned with how certain aspects of the 20<sup>th</sup> century developmental state could apply today and what is necessary or considered important today. Evans, the famous scholar in developmental state, is more optimistic about the construction of a developmental state in the south, but emphasizes the strength of the state as determinant factor (Evans 2010:46).

One of the major issues in the scholarly and policy debates on African development is not whether democratic governance is actually under way, but if it constitutes a necessary condition for the continent to develop. Even though the majority of the governments of African countries have established political institutions like a parliament, political parties, periodic elections, and have liberalized the polity by embracing multi-party systems, democratic governance is still far from really being entrenched (Ngongang,2012:p69; Ohno, 2009). Developmentalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has therefore been refined to developmental democracy to take into account good governance and state capacity as the major determinants of developmental performance (Mhone, 2003 cited in Seedat, 2005:p35).

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on human development (2003) presented in Ngongang (2012:p69), the number of persons surviving in sub-Saharan Africa on less than US\$1 per day increased, but income per head declined in 20 countries, or stagnated in many other countries during the period under review. Nyamnjoh & Jimu, (2005:p20) further argues that Africa is today caught in a low-equilibrium development trap, just as Asia was in the 1960s. With the exception of Botswana which has emerged ‘from rags to riches’ due to its success in developmental state construction, the lot of countries and peoples in Africa remains in desperate existence. To this end, the developmental state is not only possible, but also indispensable to developing countries (Leftwich, 2000).

However, in light of current international conditions, democratic developmental states must be pursued and economic development in Africa need to be premised on the ability to ‘create new ladders’ of development as old ones have been kicked away (Dadzie, 2012). An effective contemporary developmental state requires not only a set of crucial institutions and mechanisms to speed up economic growth but also a democratic socio-political environment that endows it with legitimacy and authority. This environment also provides stakeholders with the voice and representation that enable them to have a sense of ownership of the country’s national development programme (ERA, 2011).

## 2.2.4 Essential Conditions and Defining Features for a Successful Developmental state

The developmental state has two major features, namely: a developmentalist ideology; and institutional arrangements with standards and norms that can support development processes (UNDP, 2012). It is therefore the ideology-institutional/ structural arrangement nexus that determines the realization of developmental state objectives. Different scholars and development organizations had made an attempt to characterize developmental state based on empirical and theoretical conceptualization primarily from the angle of East Asian experience.

The economic report for Africa (2011: p96-101) in the heading “African’s need for developmental state” described some defining features of developmental state as follows:

Vision setting, capable leadership and a developmentalist ideology; Relative state autonomy, especially in formulating and implementing policy; State institutional capacity, notably a strong and competent bureaucracy; Effective national development planning; Coordination of economic activities and resources; Support for a national entrepreneurial class; Commitment to expansion of human capacity and Peace, political stability, rule of law and predictability in government business.

Furthermore, Gumede, (2009:p9-12) enumerated critical conditions for successful developmental state among which, developmental vision, efficient and effective bureaucracy, integrated development plan and developmental partnership between public and private sector as defined below.

*Having a developmental vision/development oriented political leadership:* a successful developmental state requires political will, long-term vision and determination on the part of the country’s political elite to drive a development and modernization project.

*Efficient bureaucracy:* at the core of any developmental state is the state: efficient, well-coordinated and staffed with skilled employees. The state must have the administrative, technical and political capacity and competency to set national goals make use of the market

and implement these policies. It is also important that the bureaucracy is autonomous and has broad public and political legitimacy.

*An integrated long-term development plan:* very few, if any, developing countries have progressed in terms of economic development without a long-term development plan. Successful long-term development plans integrate action for the short term (present), medium term and long term. A long-term development plan is crucial for the identification of the core priorities of a nation.

*Performance oriented governance:* Developmental states are found to enjoy the support of their constituencies because they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general citizenry.

*Developmental partnership between government and civil society:* In most successful developmental states, the state and the private sector work out a constructive partnership, which involves tradeoffs both ways, but with the ultimate goal of radically transforming the economy: lifting economic growth levels, reducing unemployment and poverty and making the country competitive.

Similarly, UNDP (2012) also characterized developmental states as possessing the following specific features: (a) Strong, competent, and depoliticized bureaucracy, insulated from and unperturbed by elections or by the business pressures; (b) Strong, visionary, capable (not necessarily authoritarian), and committed leadership; (c) Effective national development planning; (d) Coordination of economic activities and resources; (e) Support for a national entrepreneurial class, which will evolve into a national bourgeoisie; (f) focused on expanding human capacity by investing in social policy to advance education, health care services, housing, and other economic and social infrastructures; and (g) Trust and confidence building institutions and norms such as the rule of law, justice, political stability, and peace.

The literature distinguishes the developmental State from non-developmental States by both its ideology and structure. The ideology of the developmental State is fundamentally developmentalist, as its major preoccupation is to ensure sustained economic growth and development on the back of high rates of accumulation, industrialization and structural change. Structurally, such a State has the capacity to implement economic policies that

effectively deliver development, which in turn gives it legitimacy. This capacity is derived from a combination of institutional, technical, administrative and political factors (UNCTAD, 2007).

In the East Asia, three main features are common to the countries involved Amuwo (2008:p14): Firstly, the developmental state is central to the economic and societal transformation they have undergone. Secondly, they have experienced, in varying proportions, substantial and sustained increases in per capita income. Thirdly, the developmental state continues to be relevant in economic development, given the different levels of development and different state capacities at the disposal of each of them.

A developmental state is one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development (Mkandawire, 2001). The ideological underpinnings of state policies are therefore crucial, as these provide the rationale for some of the policies, give legitimacy to some of the sacrifices that might otherwise not be welcome, and bind the ruling class together (ibid).

According to economic report on Africa (2011), a developmental state can be defined as one that has the capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and programmes for promoting transformation and growth, as well as for expanding human capabilities. Such a state takes as its overall socio-economic goals the long-term growth and structural transformation of the economy, with equity.

The developmental state is associated with the leading role played by the government in promoting industrialization in Japan and East Asia in the post–World War II era. However, this cannot imply that developmental state and its associated policies are unique to Japan or East Asia. A similar type of model was also adopted in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s though not successful (Caldentey, 2009).

The available literature broadly recognizes that East Asian developmental states were highly capable states in terms of economic policy making, implementation, and policy monitoring and enforcement. They were credible and the bureaucratic apparatus comprised highly

trained technocratic elites, who were among each nation's best and brightest. Rarely were bureaucrats recruited from schools other than Tokyo University in Japan, National Taiwan University, or Seoul National University in South Korea (Wong, 2004). The basic premise at the heart of the Asian developmental state in this regard, as many writers also agreed, is institutional capacity of public institutions characterized by professionalism, meritocratic selection of employees that can harness national productivity and capital accumulation.

Studies of the East Asian developmental state often reduce their analysis of the state to the examination of an autonomous and capable bureaucracy that selected and implemented policy goals that did not necessarily reflect the demands or interests of the society (Abe, 2006:P1).

The success stories in East Asian political economy lies in the institutional characteristics of the state. The East Asian states not only had developmental objectives but they also established institutional arrangements that formulated and implemented policies to meet these goals. Therefore, as argued elsewhere, a developmental state is defined not only in terms of its goals but also its institutional attributes, which enable it to act authoritatively in formulating and implementing programmes in order to achieve its goals (Edigheji, 2005). Therefore, affixing a developmental label to a state does not suffice to make it developmental. Developmental states are consciously constructed by political elites committed to national development priority.

A successful developmental state therefore requires political will, long-term vision and determination on the part of the country's political elite to drive a development and modernization project (Gumede, 2009:p9). At the core of any developmental state is the state: efficient, well-coordinated and staffed with skilled employees. The state must have the administrative, technical and political capacity and competency to set national goals make use of the market and implement these policies. It is also important that the bureaucracy is autonomous and has broad public and political legitimacy (ibid).

Developmental state is also characterized by: Cohesive leadership that shares a clear and common understanding of government policies and strategies to address the challenges through the building of a developmental state; institutions that are strategically aligned and

harmonized to complement one another to operate in a coherent and effective manner; the prevalence of institutions staffed by patriotic, professional and well-trained public servants who believe in the goals of the developmental state; representative, participative, transparent, honest and accountable governance system are some among others(Dijk, 2007; Caldentey, 2009).

### 2.3 Debate on the Feasibility of Developmental State in Africa

The success of state-led development in East Asia, and the problems of market-led deregulation in Africa and Latin America have revived interest in the concept of the developmental state. But are such states inherently autocratic, or can a new generation of democratic developmental states' achieve inclusive development in today's poor countries is a point of debate among scholars and policy makers (Green, 2011/2). This gave birth for the notion of “possibility-impossibility” dichotomy of developmental state in Africa as alternative path for development.

The “impossibility theorem” is a notion used to argue that the developmental state approach is not viable in Africa and, more specifically, to express scepticism as to whether the East Asian development experiences can serve as a model for Africa Mkandawire (2001) cited in Meyns and Musamba (2010: p30). It has been influenced by several points of view. One view posits that the unique and specific circumstances which led to the emergence of developmental states in the region of East Asia cannot easily be replicated (Meyns and Musamba, 2010: p30). Another view suggests that replication or emulation of the developmental state is not possible given the significant changes in global conditions, in particular economic globalization. Furthermore, prevailing conditions in Africa are also seen by some analysts as supporting the impossibility theorem (ibid).

Meyns and Musamba, (2010:p31-33) quoting *Low (2004)* described the impossibility theorem of developmental state in Africa as follows:

*Developmental state approach is inherently incompatible with globalization due to: the increasing dominance of neoliberalism; changing governance reforms in line with proliferation of other development actors such as civil society, supra-national governance agencies; and business networks. The high level of economic intervention favored by the East*

*Asian governments is no longer sustainable and, more importantly, has withered given the fundamental economic changes at global level (Low 2004 cited in Meyns and Musamba 2010:p p31-33).*

In sum, the problem of transferability of institutions and absence of institutional and governance capacities are the challenges that can hinder the possibility of developmental state construction in Africa and hence made the impossibility theorem robust as proponents argue.

However, UNCTAD (2009:p40) demystifies the propositions of the impossibility of constructing developmental state in late comers in Africa and elsewhere in LDCs as follows:

*An important lesson from the experience of successful East Asian developmental States is that when they embarked on their development process, the technical capacities of their governments were not particularly advanced. Policy learning was therefore an integral aspect of the process of building developmental State capability, and this occurred over time which was the case in the East Asians in the early construction the developmental state.*

Furthermore, Mkandawire asserts that neither Africa's post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 'developmental states' rule out the possibility of African 'developmental states' capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto (Mkandawire, 2001).

In general understanding, the failed attempt of developmental state construction in African countries in the early post colonial era further aggravates the proposition of the impossibility theorem in Africa. However, the immediate imposition of prescription by the international institutions like the international monetary fund and World Bank as a cure to the development failure of the African development and elsewhere proved the indispensable role of the state as historical occurrence (Mkandawire, 2010).

Mkandawire further argues that the impossibility theorem is ideological preference of the market approach to development rather than the state in development. However, scholars in the area like chang (2003); Stieglitz (2004) argues that there is no historical account that asserts state development without the role of the state. Edigheji (2010) further argues

contemporary world financial crisis first in 2008 and full blown economic crisis in 2009 is the testimony to the fact that unregulated markets are unworkable and unsustainable in the long run not only for the improvement of human wellbeing but also for the markets themselves. This further reinforced the proposition that markets are not always self regulating and most importantly it brought into the fore the criticality of state intervention (ibid: p1).

When Stieglitz criticizes the neoliberal failure to deliver development for the poor countries, he presented it as follows:

*If there is a consensus today about what strategies are most likely to promote the development of the poorest countries in the world, it is this: there is no consensus except that the Washington consensus did not provide the answer. Its recipes were neither necessary nor sufficient for successful growth, though each of its policies made sense for particular countries at particular times (Stieglitz, 2004:p1).*

The impossibility theorem of developmental state in Africa is partly linked to demoralization, moon lighting by the civil servants, corruption and most importantly the misbehaving of key policy makers in a self fulfilling manner. Hence, Makdwire argues that it is not because of the impossibility of the developmental state by its nature that made the attempt made in the early independence failed rather the nature of the governance system that African states had since the independence that made it so (2001).

Promoting the development of productive capacities will require a new balance between States and markets. However, neither the good governance institutional reforms which many LDCs are currently implementing, nor the old developmental State, including successful East Asian cases, are entirely appropriate models now (UNCTAD, 2009:p8).

What is required now according to UNCTAD'S report for LDCs is a developmental State that is adapted to the challenges facing an interdependent world in the twenty-first century. The preferences and priorities of the people of LDCs can only be set by a strong representative State with a clear developmental vision. This State should seek to harness local, bottom-up problem-solving energies through stakeholder involvement and citizen

participation that creates and renews the micro-foundations of democratic practice (UNCTAD, 2009:p8).

As many argued successful developmental States were based on a mixed economy model in which the government worked in partnership with the private sector to achieve national development goals. The commitment to public ownership in successful developmental States was pragmatic and hence evaluated from the angle of its contribution to national development rather than ideological stand point.

## 2.4 Democracy-Development Discourse and the Emergence of Democratic Developmental State

The relationship between democracy and development is one of the core issues for political scientists, with a history of antithetical conclusions. Scholars in this regard like Green contend that the institutional requirements for stable and consolidated democracy are structurally different to the institutional requirements for rapid and transformative growth and, especially, development (Green, 2012) and hence democracy and development cannot go hand in hand.

Ake (2001) cited in Omoweh (2012:p16) has on the other hand argued, the path towards simultaneous sustainable development and democracy is to collapse both processes into one by making development itself a process of democratization. This could be done through the agency of participation and empowerment; that is to say, by making politics more inclusive and confronting the severe vulnerabilities of the majority of the African population. The cure for Africa to experience real growth and development is therefore exercising democratic governance.

By extending the incompatibility thesis of democracy-development debate many argue that a developmental state is just not possible in democratic conditions. However, Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa are example of an African attempts at building a democratic developmental state with encouraging results. However, it needs to be clearly stated at the outset that there are many states which are procedurally democratic, but lack a democratic political culture or democratic substance. Most African countries fit into this category; they are democracies in name only (Omoweh, 2012).

Such limited democracies cannot of course stave off elite capture, whether it is within the context of one-party domination or so-called ‘multiparty’ politics. The failure of such nominal democratic states’ failure to build democratic developmental state cannot however justify the incompatibility conception (Gumede, 2009).

Proponents of the impossibility thought argues that democratic developmental states are not possible because the aims of a democratic developmental state are potentially contradictory and difficult to achieve: autonomy and accountability; growth and redistribution; consensus and inclusiveness’ (White, 1988:p44) cited in Gumede, (2009: p7). Against this argument however, Dani Rodrik (2004, 2006), as explained in Gumede, (2009: p7) has shown that a debate focusing on development versus democracy is simply wrong. Therefore, democracy is not only compatible with growth and poverty reduction, but may be crucial to both (ibid).

Nevertheless, there are a growing number of researchers who argue the possibility of the case for a democratic developmental state. Patrick Heller (1999) indicates that there is a strong case for the argument that developmental states can successfully manage the balance between economic growth and social development while building democratic institutions at the same time. Of course, Amartya Sen has made the case for both development and democracy that the one cannot go without the other, for some time now. Sen (1999) expressively argues that development is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy and that development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.

With this long lived debates however, there is growing consensus among scholars and international development institutions that democracy and development are reinforcing goals that can be simultaneously attained by capable state (UNCTAD, 2009; UNDP, UN-OHRLLS, LDCs report, 2006; Edigheji, 2005). This brings the idea of democratic developmental state, a state charge with responsibility of bringing rapid economic growth with democratic means.

The compatibility of democracy and development is a long lived debate. From those thinking about the nature of democratic developmental States, two key insights are noteworthy

(UNCTAD, 2009:p36). Firstly, it has been observed that electoral democracy with competitive political parties has yet to play an important role in fostering democratic developmental States. Randall (2007: 633) cited in UNCTAD (2009: p36) points out that:

*On the available evidence, parties make a very limited contribution to the emergence of new democratic developmental States, in terms of either democracy-building or policy-making, recruitment, ensuring accountability or policy implementation.* This is due to as the quoted writer argues weak institutionalization and the prevalence of clientelism.

Secondly, it is clear that democratic deliberation is critically important to build societal consensus around a national development project and also to develop effective policies and institutions in what is necessarily an open-ended and uncertain development process (UNCTAD, 2009:p37).

It is also further argued democratic developmental State is one that not only embodies the principles of electoral democracy but also ensures citizens' participation in the development and governance process because public administration reform in a context of democratization necessarily entails popular empowerment and better recognition of human rights (UN-OHRLLS/UNDP, 2006).

A national developmental vision is particularly effective when it becomes a shared national project and if there is a societal mobilization behind the goals of this project. Democratization process that supports broad based societal participation and consensus building coupled with grass roots empowerment therefore makes developmental state more effective(UNCTAD, 2009:p37).

The increasing dominance of democratic developmental state as adaptive form of the classical developmental state is the cumulative effect of the defeat of market fundamentalism that heralded the crucial role of the state in societal transformation and the end of democracy-development nexus incompatibility thesis as advocated by modernization theorists.

Most of the East Asian developmental states may have reached their developmental goals under undemocratic conditions, yet in Africa, a constitutional democracy, the delivery of the

developmental state will not only have to take place in the economic and social spheres, but must also deepen democracy (Gumede, 2009:p7).

Countries prone to conflict due to specific historical manifestation, social stratification and discrimination for causes of racial or cultural target for which the reality in many African countries is so as many argued, adopting democratic developmental state is wise option that states men need to focus. Not only the specific realities in the respective countries but also the issue of waves of democratization process across the world with regard to human and democratic rights, inclusive development and so on are also concerns that cannot tolerate authoritarian rule at least as an official declaration to be adopted. The East Asian authoritarian developmental state is therefore the product of specific time and space that as many argued they cannot repeat it now even themselves.

The new developmental State for this reason is likely to draw on a hybrid approach to ensure administrative effectiveness, based on bureaucratic capacity, market signals, and bottom-up democratic accountability (UNCTAD, 2009:p40).

The democratic developmental state is therefore one that forges broad-based alliances with society and ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation processes. Verena Fritz and Alina Menocal (2007) cited in Green, (2011/2:p41) indicates that recent history of Brazil, India, South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana are examples that prove democratization and an increase in the developmental orientation of the state can occur simultaneously.

Without doubt, the East Asian countries had promoted impressive growth, but the absence or lack of democratic credentials in its polity and economy was a major hindrance to its capacity to sustain such growth and converting it into development. The same is true of Latin America and Africa, where the autocratic nature of the state in the 1950s and 1960s frustrated the rise of a developmental state (Omoweh, 2012).

The current developmental state under construction embodies the principles and practices of electoral democracy and ensures citizen participation in the development and governance processes (Edigheji, 2005). While legitimacy of authoritarian developmental state is basically the derivation of fast economic growth records gained successively, the case in democratic

developmental state goes beyond that to incorporate democratic governance as measured by level of accountability, transparency, broad based legitimacy and so on in a given polity (ibid).

By the 1990s, societies and governments – whether poor, emergent, transitional or industrialized had realized the need for the modern state to combine democracy and markets in order to tackle rising transformational, distributional and industrial challenges facing them. The argument is put forward that the state’s capacity to provide affordable and sustainable public goods for the people depends on its democratic credentials (Omoweh, 2012). In formulating the notion of the democratic developmental state therefore the ability of the state to promote political and economic development is decisive.

Deepening democracy through institutional accumulation of the value and practices of democracy is compulsory for democratic developmental state to emerge in the south (Omoweh, 2012). Therefore, inclusive embeddedness that implies the social basis and range of accountability of the state goes beyond a narrow band of elites to embrace broader sections of the society in the twenty first century developmental state (ibid).

Mkandawire defined the developmental state as ‘one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development (2001:291).

Democratic developmental state refers to the political leadership and its institutional groups which enjoys a reasonable measure of autonomy from the society, but aligns with groups, classes and institutions that will facilitate the delivery of its set development objectives (Omoweh, 2012). The defining characteristics of the democratic developmental state include, but are not limited to, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and, democratic governance, autonomy, and a people centred development strategy that can promote delivery of the public good (Green,2011/2; Amuwo, 2008).

Unlike the Developmental State model of the East Asians, developmental state for late comers is in charge to incorporate redistributive role of the state, democratic values and practices to allow civil society and public participation in the process of building such a developmental state . The case why democratic participation becomes a crucial ingredient of

an ideal developmental state for Africa is to overcome the history long despotic rule, one-party states and other forms of authoritarian rule that have denied the continent's citizens the opportunities to play a meaningful role in their countries' governance processes (Maphunye , 2009).

In sum, democratic developmental state is characterized by: high or at least remarkable economic growth that also addresses a country's socio-economic challenges, such as poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment, State-led developmental agenda, Public or civil society participation in the governance process; Gradual or increasing democratization of the political landscape, a skilled, efficient and effective as well as ethical or less corrupt public/civil service and administration, Political leaders with a strategic interventionist economic programme able to bring a rapid and significant turnaround of the economic and development scenario (Maphunye , 2009).

## 2.5 Decentralized Local Governance in Developmental State

Decentralization has recently been embraced by a large number of developing countries, especially in Africa, since it has been presented as a powerful tool to reduce poverty and improve governance (Caldeira, et al., 2010). Local authorities and their associations are important actors for change in reducing poverty and in promoting human rights and democracy, good governance and sustainable development at local levels (Council of the European Union, 2013)

In the contemporary reality, the most desirable state arrangement to realize the ideal state reconfiguration is democratic decentralization as local governments are in close proximity to the people and so in a better position than the central government to meet public demand (Saito, 2008). In the developing world therefore, the feasibility of democratic developmentalism lies on the appropriateness of defining the local government and power transfer in a way developmental local government is realized (Saito, 2008:p4). To this end, democratic developmental state is no more feasible in top-down approach as the classical developmental states reveal.

Working through local authorities and supporting decentralization processes of power, decision making and resources improves opportunities to increase participation of citizens in

decision making, strengthens democratic ownership, drives domestic reforms and helps bring about sustainable development and pro-poor results (Council of the European Union , 2013). In doing such roles, it is not arguable that local authorities need to possess good political reputation and far reaching public legitimacy based on their recurrent performances.

However, in the developing world, politicians with good democratic reputations are typically lacking. Aspiring politicians who have no real power can make fine speeches about better government, but they cannot demonstrate any ability to allocate public funds and patronage in a way that provides public goods and services for the population (Myerson, 2013). In line with this, Romeo argued that there is a missing link between decentralization and local development in so many countries whose decentralization reforms are driven by political rather than developmental goals. He suggests that decentralization reforms in developing Countries could be better designed, sustained, and externally supported, if understood as domestic efforts to build developmental states (Romeo, 2013).

Linking Decentralization to development requires a rather specific understanding of local development and of the role of local autonomy to promote it. It also posits that successful development driven decentralization reforms require both a wider national policy for local development, and the emergence of social demand and responsible local leadership (*Seedat, 2005*).

Over the last decades, democratic decentralization has been a key component of the good governance agenda and a common presence in the long list of reforms and related guiding principles (UNDP, 2002; cited in Romeo, 2013). Therefore, decentralization in developmental state is more than a mere political power transfer from the center to the local governments rather it needs to be thought of in line with developmental implication in the socio-economic transformation of a given community (LDI, 2013).

Current decentralization measures are intended to meet and expected too, to make the state both democratic and developmental through which opportunities for citizens participation in decision making is widen. Democracy as a political system in its relation to local autonomy stands on at least two requirements; namely (1) concentration of all institutions in empowering the people and (2) the intensification of checks and balances mechanisms

among local institutions. Orienting the contemporary state toward this context at institutional level signifies the developmental state program (Saito, 2008:p36).

International development agents like the World Bank in particular views decentralization as one of the major reforms in their agenda. In response to the failure of a central state to run the countries development, decentralization is perceived as a way to ensure political stability, to improve accountability and responsiveness of local leaders, to increase the efficiency of public policy, and ultimately to reduce poverty (Caldeira, et al., 2010).

Therefore, the aim of the decentralization programme is to build a more democratic government that is responsive and accountable to the people. It focuses on promoting capacity building at the local level and to introduce local ownership of resources, power, plans and decision-making (Murembe et al., 2005). In sum, decentralization is basically aimed at creating a local government system that is democratic, participatory, and development-oriented accompanied by community empowerment to take charge of their own destiny through local institutions of self governance and resource mobilization (USAID, 2010).

Decentralization therefore is significant in development planning in the sense that it facilitates the formulation and implementation of development plans, securing people's participation so that greater attention can be given to the needs and priorities of the local population. In short, decentralization is any act through which a central government formally transfers powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political administration and territorial hierarchy. This means the local level acts on behalf of the central government; strengthening state capacity in service delivery to the people (Murembe et al., 2005).

For many writers the importance and rational of decentralization for public sector accountability and responsiveness enhancement is the "Proximity principle". Oates (1972) cited in Caldeira, et al. (2010) asserts that decentralization theorem states that decentralization improves preference matching by offering a greater diversity of public services to a heterogeneous population. Moreover, by reducing informational asymmetries between those in power and those governed, decentralization induces a higher accountability of governments and in fine a better efficiency in public spending (USAID, 2010).

Although many African states have pursued substantial decentralization reforms many of these reforms are still experiencing problems in bringing about effective local governance. Often these problems grow from the difficulty in translating general reform initiatives into specific working arrangements at the local level that are effective in several key processes and operations. In sum, a combination of the central reluctance to hand over authority to local governments in these key areas and the complexity of organizational redesign to support decentralization seem to explain these problems to prevail (Wunsch, 2001).

Local governance implies to genuine control over important services and investment and hence two important concerns need to be analyzed: willingness and commitment of the central authority to hand over certain powers to the local authority on the one hand and institutional capacity arrangement at the local level to utilize these powers properly (USAID, 2010; LDI, 2013).

Lack of commitment from central authorities is therefore found to be one of the key hindrances for meaning full autonomous local governance. In line this, Myerson, (2013) presented that the potential of autonomous sub national governments to become sources of new competition for national power is one important reason why established national leaders are generally not inclined to share power with locally elected governors. Thus, there has a reason to expect that political decentralization may often be undersupplied, relative to what would be best for the general population, as it runs against the vested interests of those who hold power at the national level (Myerson, 2013). From this it can be deductively concluded that decentralization in many cases is manipulated in a way that gives central authorities to gain significant control and influence in the expense of local interests.

As seems often to be the case in any type of reform or organization, the “devils is in the details” as political leaders may at times be serious in their commitment to decentralize and local governance to emerge, in experiencing the desired change many obstacles are found (Smith 1996 cited in Wunsch, 2001). The most powerful of these seems to grow from the persistence of actors at the centre to retain authority and resources at the local level which in fact deteriorates the objective of decentralization and local autonomy. Often loopholes are left in decentralization legislation that allows central ministries and their delegates to override or ignore local authorities (Wunsch, 2001). Therefore, Weak authority and defective

institutional and operational rules can make it difficult to reach decisions, and thereby lead to policy failure and weakened local governance (LDI, 2013).

Hence, nominally transferred powers to the local government are subject to recapture by the central authorities when they wish. Poorly trained and paid local personnel that can result in local functioning breakdown, poorly designed local institutions that made effective decision making at local level impossible hampers meaningful local political process which involves public deliberation in decision making and down ward accountability.

## 2.6 Decentralization and Developmental Local government

The notion of developmental local government would be more concisely conceptualized in terms of and together with the concepts of good governance, decentralization and community involvement (*Seedat, 2005*). In one way or another, the objective of any developmental local government is to meet at least the following community interests: (a) Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) Ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) Promote social and economic development; (d) Promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) Encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (*Ibid*).

Local government is specifically supposed to promote social and economic development, provide services and ensure participation; given the comparative advantage of proximity theorem (Local Development Internationa/LDI, 2013). Local government as an organ of the state is therefore required to progressively address socio-economic and political rights of its citizens.

The need for sub-national government (including local government), according to Lemon (2002:18), stems from three aspects of the modern state: the bureaucratic nature of the central state requires decentralization of functions that can be better administered locally, the state's legitimacy may be assisted by acceptance of local autonomy and the need to address uneven development. Mabin (2002:46) further argues that the concept of decentralization is really a way of shifting development and management responsibility from national governments to local governments – perhaps based on the charitable concern that if national government could not do the job, then local governments provided the alternative.

However, rhetoric for decentralization and *de jure* decentralization cannot guarantee the existence of autonomous developmental local government that meets public demand unless there is political commitment from above for *de facto* handing over of power and proper oversight prevails. Khan (2004:12) quoting World Bank (1997) study asserted that decentralization with central state's handing over of its responsibilities sharpened inequality between localities, undermined economic stability and that institutions have been prone to capture by local groups leading to misuse of resources. Therefore, unless proper oversight from above and effective downward accountability gets momentum, devolved powers can be manipulated to meet a sectional interest that is against the very essence of decentralization program.

Lemon (2002) however argues that there is a potentially important role for local government in development both from its use by central government as a developmental tool, and from its own enterprise and initiative. However, effectiveness of local government as many argues lies on the concept of 'embedded autonomy'; claiming that to fulfill its developmental mandate within the context of resource constraints, the national state need to grant sufficient autonomy though with closer follow up to secure misuse of public power by local elites is critically advisable. Decentralization is therefore understood as a process of 'embedded autonomy' where local government is afforded autonomy and responsibility to undertake local development (Romeo, 2013).

Across the world as scholars unanimously argue, the extent of decentralized local government can differ quite markedly. On the one extreme deconcentration that refers to the local administration of central government functions. In many countries, this is the only form of 'local government' in which councils in such case may lack power to initiate policy, but may nevertheless be given discretion to implement central policies flexibly in relation to local needs (USAID, 2010). This kind of decentralization some calls it as 'top-down autonomy'. There are arguments whether such kind of power to local government really signifies the essence of decentralization in comprehensive manner. Consistent to this idea, Lemon (2002:20) asserts that reliable decentralized sub-national government (local government) that can meet public demand with proper oversight is characterized by 'bottom-up autonomy' that ensures full-fledged self rule for given community.

However, decentralization of local government is difficult to achieve in practice; but vast of the available literature deals with the theoretical framework of decentralization not the practice (LDI, 2013). According to *Seedat* a number of conditions need to be satisfied to ensure a decentralized system of local government to function well and to meet local demand. First, local government should be constitutionally entrenched. Second, national government should not limit financial resources or should not transfer its functions without sufficient resources at the local level. Third, it should have sufficient financial resources to accomplish its tasks and adequate administrative capacity to administer those tasks. Finally, adequate human resource and capacity building mechanism need to be institutionalized (*Seedat, 2005, USAID, 2010, LDI, 2013*). Therefore, decentralized local government is important because it would enable local communities to exert influence in their local affair and provide the point of accountability for the service delivery and development of the locality.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE DISCOURSE UNDER DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE CONTEXT IN ETHIOPIA**

### **3.1. The Theoretical Discourse on Democratic Developmentalism**

Developmental states emerge out of some specific events and situational reality under which the need for developmental state becomes inevitable and conducive for institutionalizing and consolidation (Routley, 2012). This author raised three important contextual factors under which the developmental states emerged taking the Asian miracle as a case in point. These are; the geo-political context, national security threat and agricultural policies and land reform (Ibid).

When Professor James Clapham explains the context of Ethiopia's endorsement of developmental state theory, he indicates the change in emphasis of the ruling part towards development. Clapham believed that four major reasons necessitated the introduction of developmental state in Ethiopia. The first one is the Ethio-Eritrean war; second deep divisions within the party itself and the ultimate split in 2001. Third, Clapham also attributes some of reason behind the evolution of developmental state to the outcome of the 2005 election. “The election likewise shocked the ruling party by revealing that its program has failed to generate the support it had simply taken for granted (Clapham 2013).

The fourth reason is related with the personal character of late PM Meles Zenawi. As Clapham pointed out it was a way for Meles to correct the mistakes he had committed and that precipitated in the result of 2005 election and the Etho-Eritrean war. In way, it was Meles out of the box idea to redress mistakes of the past via democratic developmental state construction. From Clapham’s point of view therefore, the context under which the Ethiopian developmental state is endorsed is more of a national security threat driven.

In similar vein but a bit broader manner, the Federal Democratic Republic of Foreign Affair and National Security Policy and Strategy /FDRFANSPS (2002) document presents lack of democratization, poverty and backwardness are threats to national survival of Ethiopian statehood system. As indicted in the document: There can be no doubt that the attainment of speedy economic development, democratization and peace is fundamental to the survival of

our country which finds itself in a state of object poverty and backwardness. That is why the Government gives priority to matters that are key to the national survival and well-being. Unless the overall policy direction pursued by the government take this basic reality into account, the national existence and security will face grave danger (FDRFANSPS 2002). As one can infer from this, the need for speedy economic transformation and poverty alleviation through a democratic means made the claim and endorsement of the democratic developmental state inevitable.

However, a debate arises from the suspicion whether a developmental state is compatible with the highly decentralized federal structure like Ethiopia. Clapham states, it could be very difficult to endorse developmental state paradigm in such devolved states. For Clapham, successfully implementing developmental state ideology in a state with such a wide variety of ethnic groups and cultures like those existing in Ethiopia is difficult (Clapham, 2013). This assertion emanates from the notion that in such very diverse and conflict shattered societies for various reasons in history accompanied by poverty and backwardness, creating civic nationalism and along line one national priority is rarely feasible. Clapham's assertion and suspicion in constructing developmental state seems far reaching when Young Nam Cho quoting Schneider asserts:

*Generally speaking, nationalism has played two important functions. On the one hand, it has supported incumbent regimes by legitimatizing economic developmentalism and associate political authoritarianism while suppressing popular demands for democratization. On the other hand, it has mobilized people to participate in economic development .In fact; a developmental state and nationalism are two sides of the same coin. In this sense, the developmental states could not exist without the support of nationalism, and the Latin American countries are an illustration of this (Schneider, 2009 cited in Cho, 2009:p79).*

In all of the original Asian cases, from which the idea of developmental state arose, they had powerful cultural bases which could be called up on to mobilize a resource, a form of enthusiasm, a sense of social discipline behind the developmental project itself and with no doubt a top-down approach (Clapham, 2013; Evans, 2008; Edigheji, 2005; Onis, 1991).

In line this Emanuele Fantini (2013) presented that despite the federal and decentralized structure of the Ethiopian state , development policies, targets and programs are designed at the centre, authorizing regional and local authorities little room for exercising significant autonomy, in centralistic and top down logic. This is a sign to the nature of developmental state towards harmonization and centralization that is incompatible with the essence of decentralization and local autonomy.

From Clapham's argument therefore, to label Ethiopia as democratic developmental state and attributing the development outcomes gained for the last successive years to developmental state nature under the potentially contradictory notions of democratic developmental state and decentralization of the current Ethiopian state is too immature and too early. If to be said, Ethiopia's successive economic growth record has run taking one of these conflicting goals but displayed rhetorically as both are compatibly achieved. Taking indicators of democratic developmental state in to account, Laura Routley aptly captures that Ethiopia is aspirational developmental state with few politically interested groups claiming to have it but no clear institutionalizations and bureaucratic apparatus installed and hence far from labeling it developmental state yet (Routley, 2012).

Clapham further contends that the new development agenda contrasted so sharply with the project under which the current EPRDF led government established itself in the first place. Seen in a broad perspective, a federal system, for starts, seeks to push government decision-making downward and to build up structures of government from the bottom level. A developmental state on the other hand sought to centralize critical areas of decision-making especially those related to economic management (Clapham, 2013).

Other contradictory proposition apart from the contextual factor of Ethiopia's state structure and development paradigm is, whether democracy and economic development can go in parallel though with increasing consensual alignment to positive convergence in the contemporary reality from practical evidences.

The impact of democracy on economic growth is less straightforward and has been a matter of much more controversy among scholars. Mixed findings have been observed. To illustrate

this connection, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) put forward three major perspectives. These are namely the “*conflict*,” “*compatibility*,” and “*skeptical*” ones.

First, the conflict perspective views democracy as a big hurdle to economic growth. To experience economic expansion, policies inhibiting excessive increase in real wages and promotion of both national and foreign capital accumulation are required. Unless these policies are adopted, rapid growth of industrialization has a tendency to be delayed. This in turn slows down the process of economic growth. Democratic governments are looked upon to be vote maximizers and they are more concerned about implementing myopic policies such as state benefits and welfare policies at the expense of accumulation. Democracy has thus a negative impact on economic growth (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Heo et al., 2008).

In essence, the conflict hypothesis will be supported if in the long-run, a change in democracy causes economic growth and a rise in democracy has a negative effect on economic growth.

On the contrary, the *compatibility perspective* is incompatible with an authoritarian model where economic development is exclusively directed by a centralized body or dictator. As a consequence, democracy is considered to sustain equitable allocation of resources and power, reduce distributional conflicts, and support fundamental civil liberties and political rights. These are appropriate to create the necessary socio-politico-economic conditions favorable to economic growth. The impact of democracy on economic growth is expected to be positive (Kurzman et al. 2002; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2009). Fundamentally, the compatibility hypothesis will be supported if in the long-run, a change in democracy causes economic growth and an increase in democracy has a positive effect on economic growth.

Finally, from the *skeptical perspective*, there is no systematic relationship between democracy and economic growth (Rodrik, 1997). From the skeptics’ point of view, factors such as the effectiveness of government policies, institutional maturity, and the coordination of government entities, etc. play a more significant role in economic performance than the presence or absence of democracy. This skeptical perspective explains the coincidence of the East Asian developmental states exceptional miraculous growth under an authoritarian regime though many scholars argue it is special coincidence under special geo-political and

time space that even the East Asian themselves cannot repeat and hence it is the exception not the rule.

Repeatedly quoted scholar on developmental state Edigheji interestingly presented the link between democracy and economic development as: “If there is a positive correlation between undemocratic regimes and development, then African countries would have been among the most developed countries in the world” (Edigheji 2005: 10, 18). This author further asserts that, the Developmental State embodies the principles (and practices) of electoral democracy and ensures citizens participation in development and governance processes and ultimately encourages inclusive bottom-up development and hence there is no contradiction between the two. In line with this, Mkandawire and Dadzie maintained that “unlike the few examples of developmental states of East Asian countries which were authoritarian, the new ones will have to be democratic and developmental, and it is encouraging that the two most cited democratic developmental states are both from Africa-Botswana and Mauritius” (Dadzie, 2012, Mkandawire, 2001).

Contrary to this, Andra Leftwich another most quoted scholar in the area maintains that there is a paradox that impedes democracy and economic development to go in parallel harmoniously and hence the need for sequencing. He explains this paradox with that the two concepts, development and democracy, have contrasting objectives; while development is essentially a society changing process with regards to distribution of resources and the socio-economic structures of society, when it is successful, democracy in contrast is in its nature a conservative regime type especially in its consolidated and stabilized form (Leftwich, 2000).

In favor of the compatibility thesis, Economic Report on Africa in its 2011 report explained that an effective contemporary developmental state requires not only a set of crucial institutions and mechanisms to speed up economic growth but also a democratic socio-political environment that endows it with legitimacy and authority. This environment also provides stakeholders with the voice and representation that enable them to have a sense of ownership of the country’s national development programme (ERA, 2011).

From this it seems a timed out argument to apply the “sequencing fallacy” of democracy and economic development separately in the 21<sup>st</sup> century which is sharply different context from the time when this notion had been dominant outreach and acceptance. Therefore, one can argue that the link between a truly committed democratic states and economic development is common and sustainable while the link of otherwise is exception and also vulnerable.

Therefore, the theoretical discourse on the democratic developmental state in light of Ethiopia revolves around three major themes:

- Democracy economic development nexus: can both be compatibly achieved in a country where its masses are in desperate poverty and with little experience of democratic culture?
- Ethnic politics versus civic nationalism/ideological underpinning and bureaucratic neutrality/depoliticizing
- Constitutionally decentralized along ethnically structured federalism Versus developmental state

Under the umbrella of this contesting discourses, if Ethiopia surpasses to meet its development paradigm, which actually is under experiment at least de jure, to label of success full democratic developmental state, this will be making a history on the world development experience under which a state with this all controversies realize such development paradigm is unique to the preexisting development experience.

The success of this proposition will also end up the existing mutual inter ethnic suspicions of history long experience in the country which deserves far reaching socio-economic and political transformation on the one hand, and the institutionalization and consolidation of the fragile or non existing democratic institutions at peripheries of the country in the true sense which the Ethiopia people had never experienced in their history on the other.

Taking in to account the compatibility thesis for granted as empirical and theoretical findings also reveal, this part will focus on analyzing to what extent the current Ethiopian regime complies with the characteristic features and principles put forth by developmental state scholars in their definitions and explanations of democratic developmental state paradigm as viewed from bottom up governance perspective. According to the current

government's development strategy papers, development and democracy are the stated goals of its political initiatives. They announce that their aim is:

*To become a country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice reigns, upon the involvement and free will of its peoples; and once extricating itself from poverty and becomes a middle-income economy (MoFED, 2010:p7).*

By adopting democratic developmentalism and Agricultural Development Led Industrialization, Ethiopia intends to radically transform the state management paradigm, politically and economically, from the system in which rent seeking is the dominant behavioral pattern to the system in which value creation is central (GRIPS, 2009). According to the GRIPS, this reflects Ethiopian leaders' deep disappointment with the previous ruling paradigms: the paradigm of a predatory state, which was the root cause of rent seeking in Africa, as well as the neo-liberal paradigm that was introduced from outside in the 1980s and 1990s with the purpose of eradicating such rent seeking but, according to Ethiopian leaders, failed miserably (2009:p112-113).

The question then remains, how far the efforts of the current government go to meet these aims and to which extent the regime itself is strong enough to bring them about by consolidating the empirical evidences and discourses theoretically with the practices in the local governance long line the broader notion of democratic decentralization. This requires that the state follows the characteristics that developmental state scholars use to describe developmental state. The bureaucratic or administrative strength of the state, the level of adherence to democratic values, the level of developmental commitment of the elite, are main points of investigation in this analysis, along with the state's ability to deliver development achievements giving due emphasis on bottom up governance context and alignment to the values and principles of democratic developmentalism that the current government claim to adhere to this category.

### **3.2 The Discourse on Democratic Developmentalism in Practice: Is Ethiopia performing in a Way it can be Labeled Democratic Developmental?**

There is an emerging body of consensus that developmental state is indispensable to escape Africans from the desperate poverty to some stage of socio-political transformation in a condensed time frame. There is however, a major problem in defining a developmental state simply from its economic performance: not all countries with good growth rates are developmental states; instead a developmental state is one whose ‘ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development’ (Mkandawire, 1998:p2; Mbabazi and Taylor2000:150).

From this, Evans impliedly and Zia Onis explicitly asserts that to learn lessons from the East Asian early developmental states is inevitably important but attempting to transfer the whole story without appropriate institutions and making to adapt to the 21<sup>st</sup> international and national context can led to self defeating situation that late comer developers need to consider seriously (Evans, 2008, Onis, 1991).

When compared with the previous political environments, it is possible to regard Ethiopia as an emerging democratic state (Desta, 2012). Viewing it from the surface, the current government constantly argues that it applies fair and equitable laws to its entire people as a prerequisite to the country's developmental process. Elections are regularly conducted every five years. Since the government has established various developmental plans as a means of achieving legitimacy, it assumes that it has the support of its own people. The various opposition groups on the other hand feel that the outcome of all elections held thus far in the name of democracy in the country have been used for window dressing purposes (Amha, 2012; Desta, 2012; Klausen, 2005).

In many of the arguments in democratic developmentalism in Ethiopia point out on the gaps that prevail in practice and lack of political leadership commitment and institutionalization of the public sector in a way that helps to execute such policies as it is already promised in the documents including the constitution. Inline this, many scholars argued that the formulation

of interesting policies and showing interest to have democratic developmental state cannot make the government to have it. Instead the consistency of policy frame work, institutionalization of executing organs of the state and the practical implementation and complying with the values and principles of democratic developmental state remains the litmus test (Evans, 2008; Edigheji, 2005; Onis, 1991).

Furthermore, the prevalence of regular and period election at face value can not signify the prevalence of democracy. In re-thinking democracy and decentralization in building developmental local government, Roger B. Myerson (2013) asserts that even with free elections, a corrupt political faction could maintain a grip on power if the voters believed that other candidates would not be any better and if they have no significant level of understanding on the alternative policies forwarded by contesting political elites. Successful democracy therefore requires more than just elections; it requires alternative candidates who have good democratic reputations for using power responsibly to benefit the public at large, and not merely to reward a small circle of supporters (Myerson, 2013).

In similar vein, Edigheji further asserts that democratic developmental state is one that not only embodies the principles of electoral democracy, but also ensures citizens' participation in the development and governance processes in an informed manner (Edigheji, 2005). Viewed from democratic politics as expressively presented by Local Development International (LDI) Ethiopia political space is far to be competitive and highly single party dominated and hence difficult and infeasible to be labeled as democratic in real sense (LDI, 2013)

The key point here is that the rights of citizens to form and join political parties of their choice should not be curtailed by the state. Of importance is therefore a climate that allows other political parties to thrive, and regularity of elections so that citizens can voice their concerns about the social, economic and political direction of the country. Where the outcome of an election is already predetermined due to the dominance of one party, it is likely to lead to voter apathy and ultimately authoritarian rule, although there is no empirical evidence in this regard as many scholars argue.

In conformity to this proposition, Sisay Asefa argues that: without effective loyal political opposition, and strong civil society groups, any government is likely to degenerate into dictatorship overtime. Experience shows that such governments in Africa begin to do serious damage to economies once they stay in power over 20 years (Sisay, 2004:p15).

Therefore, a political system that encourages real contest among competing parties might be more desirable; especially as it forces the ruling party to be more accountable to citizens. However, this does not signify the number of political parties involved necessarily promotes accountability. To this end an electoral system that promotes accountability becomes more important than the number of political parties involved in the election process.

In line this, Sisay Asefa appreciated the role of strong political parties in building viable democratic developmental state taking Botswana a case in point. He aptly captures that:

*For example, one can point to a rare case in point of a successful African state, that of Botswana, which is regarded as the most democratic and development-oriented state in Africa. One reason for Botswana's political and economic success and stability is the presence of a strong opposition party...This has contributed to Botswana's being among the most successfully governed and best-managed economies in the developing world, whose rate of economic growth was the highest in the world, even surpassing the Asian Tigers, in the 1980s, a period that some have called the lost decade for Africa (Sisay, 2004:p16).*

Democratic developmental state has to have a political system that promotes horizontal and programmatic relationships between political parties and their members, between elected officials and citizens and between the state and society (Edigheji, 2005). In similar vein, Myerson argues that strong competitive democracy depends on a multi-party national assembly, and elected local councils with autonomous local responsibilities (Myerson, 2013).

In the case of Ethiopia, there are deep contradictions in the narratives of development and Developmentalism. First, for the government in power and its supporters, the economic successes that the country witnessed in the last several years should be credited to the democratic developmental strategies and practices of the ruling party. Second, almost all of the opposition political parties accuse the regime of using development as an instrument of consolidating its grip on power by undermining electoral democracy.

Proponents argue that the current state of Ethiopia is developmental because according to them, the country has achieved a double digit economic growth rate for the last successive years. In line this, Tamrat (2013) overtly argues that: Ethiopia is the only democratic developmental state in Africa that by and large satisfy the prerequisites for democratic developmental state; i.e.; land ownership system, corruption incidence, income equality, extreme poverty reduction and most importantly the presence of development-oriented leadership and the adoption of long term development plan (Tamrat, 2013:p1).

This extremely extended conclusion tends to over look even the long established ideal democratic developmental states like Botswana as repeatedly cited by the famous developmental state theorists like Evans, 2008; Edigheji, 2005; Meyns and Musamba, 2010; Mkandawire, 2001; Maphunye, 2009; and the international continental organizations that affirm Botswana as establish democratic developmental state. Therefore, Tamrat's argument seems too immature in explaining scholarly analysis of the wide reaching scholars on the notion of developmental state.

Unlike Tamrats assertion however, WB (2013, 2012), Alemayehu (2013), Demeke, (2013), Samuel (2011) argued the pervasiveness of corruption and extended rent seeking are threatening and spoiling the state bureaucratic apparatus. Particularly as indicated in the World Bank (2013) study the debate is not whether corruption is pervasive or not in current Ethiopia and that whether corruption perception and practice in Ethiopia is in the rise or not; but rather the debate is if corruption is systemic or not.

Alex De Waal Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School impressively argued that:

*“...He further stated that rent seeking and patronage within the ruling party posed the key dangers to the objectives of constructing and consolidating democratic developmentalism...The next decade was to be his chance both to hone and implement his theory of ‘democratic developmentalism’. One may disagree with Meles’ thesis or argue that he failed to implement it properly. But without question it represents a serious attempt to develop, and apply, an authentically African philosophy of goals and strategies of development. Meles was doubly constrained: internally the EPRDF was regressing,*

*rehearsing its rhetoric but practicing what Meles came to dub pervasive socially wasteful rent seeking” (Waal, 2012:p4-5).*

It is convincing therefore, to legitimize the scholarly analysis of Laura Routley who asserts that and labeled Ethiopia as an “*aspirational developmental State*” in which key political actors along line the party structure have publically advanced the case for pursuing a developmental state strategy with whether and how this project will progress is unknown but a few interested political actors are stating an intention to create a developmental state (Routley, 2012:p12).

It is also argued that for building democratic developmental state, there should be programmatic relations, rather than patron-client relations between citizens and government and between citizens and political parties. As such relations create participatory political institutions, emphasis need to be given in building a weberian ethos in the public service which involves establishing an administrative system that ensures long-term rewarding career path for civil servants (Edighiji 2010: 15).

With no significant difference to the above Andria Leftwich has arrived at some defining characteristics of a typical developmental state, which have got broader acceptance by many authors. According to him, six major components define the developmental state model: determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and legitimacy and performance (Leftwich 1995: p405).

Among the indicators mentioned by leftwich, *weak and subordinated civil society* indicator is criticized by scholars of democratic developmental state who seek the role of civil society as such partners are critical for the consolidation of democracy and social transformation unlike to that of authoritarian counterpart. As development actors, civil societies become the main service providers in countries where the government is unable to fulfill its role due to capacity and other limitations. They increasingly involved in capacity development and skills and tools for strengthening society and hence giving appropriate space to contribute for the overall development endeavor is a timely policy emphasis (UNESCO, 2009).

These dispersed indicators that different authors have explained them in different wording but similar central themes of developmental state can be summarized in to four major sub topics as presented by Meyns and Musamba (2010) that are to be dealt here under in which the current state of Ethiopia and its alignment to the values and principles of democratic developmental state is analyzed along line that. These themes are: Development-Oriented Political Leadership, Performance-Oriented Governance, Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy Production-Oriented Private Sector.

### **3.2.1 Development-Oriented Political Leadership**

Numerous analysts highlight the essentiality of development-orientated political leadership bound together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development. Ziya Onis (1991) for instance asserts that in the case of the East Asian developmental states, it has been observed that the political elites in these countries were able to devise functional state institutions that facilitated both political stability and economic development (Onis, 1991). A development-oriented leadership evolves from a clear consensus within the governing elites, both administrative and political, over the scope and direction of development (Weiss, 2000).

*The problem of state effectiveness is more clearly a political problem, and state-society relations are at the heart of the politics involved. The ability of the state to pursue collective goals coherently, rather than responding to the subjectively defined immediate demands of individual members of the elite, or particular elite organizations, is even more essential than earlier work on the developmental state suggested (Evans 2011:p10).*

Political leadership is crucial because of the way it affect the quality and autonomy of the bureaucracy in developmental states. Importantly, political leadership in Africa has not been uniformly poor since independence. However, even development-oriented post-independence leaders failed to build a sustained ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007).

As a result of their high levels of expertise and sufficient economic credibility, the classical developmental state political elites were able to win the hearts and minds of the broader public and the trust and cooperation of the bureaucrats as well as the private sector (Huff et

al., 2001). Wade (1990) described in Meyns and Musamba (2010) further asserts that interests of political survival and the need for extended legitimacy forced political elites towards a developmental orientation (2010:p24). It is also claimed that these leaders were either relatively uncorrupted, non-predatory or had limited personal gains, and thus did not impede investments but rather facilitated the expansion of national productivity (Fritz and Menocal 2006: p8-9).

The philosophy of the East Asian developmental states underlines the mutually cooperative and clear delineation of responsibilities between the political and bureaucratic elite which they connote it as “the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule” (Onis, 1991). To this end discussions about sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction could not be complete without due consideration and analysis of the underlying political economic forces that shape the pace, pattern, and sustainability of economic growth and its capacity to address distributional and poverty reduction objectives (Abu Girma, undated:p11).

However, the public service in Ethiopia is criticized as it is prone to pervasive corruption and systemic rent seeking. Amha (2012:p203) asserts that the current situation of Ethiopia can never signify the democratic developmental state. He further maintains that:

*The regime in power is openly engaged in embezzlement and corruption with huge costs to economic development. Instead of using public institutions for the purpose of development, in Ethiopia, public institutions, be they political or economic in their dispensations are used for the purpose of prosecuting political and business opponents. The current political leadership in Ethiopia is not a disciplined one. Instead it is rapacious and predatory. The state led by EPRDF is not properly addressing the developmental challenges facing the country – poverty, rising levels unemployment and inequality. In general, its economic policies are not socially inclusive (2012:p203).*

In similar vein, the World Bank (WB) in its review in 2012 comments the pervasiveness of corruption and maladministration in the public sector of Ethiopia and its risk to the overall development. The Bank further asserts that: The drivers of corruption in Ethiopia are complex and interrelated but can be grouped into overlapping categories related to deficiencies in accountability, capacity, and trust. A lack of capacity makes corruption

possible, a lack of accountability makes corruption happen, and a lack of trust allows corruption to take root (WB, 2012:p278).

For the ECA, it is good political governance that will influence all other facets of governance in any society why because good political governance as a societal state symbolized by, among others, predictable, open, and enlightened policy-making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; a strong civil society participating in public affairs; adherence to the rule of law, respect for basic human rights and freedoms, and judicial independence; consistent traditions and predictable institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a given nation-state (ECA, 2002:p8).

The absence of predictable political governance coupled with lack of adherence to rule of law and distorted professional ethos play its own role in the exacerbation of corruption and related issues of maladministration. As the WB persuasively asserts: *people tend to engage in corruption when the risks are low, the penalties mild, and the rewards great* (WB, 2012).

Regardless of their ideological alignments (as rightist, leftist and centrist), there is wide reaching consensus that today's developed states have realized institutional capability and recorded success in corruption prevention and maladministration in their development effort in a way that cannot be an impediment to development. Consistent to this Abis (undated) argues that: 'No matter what kind of ideological stand they have, these developed countries can build their institutions that dreams for the next generation. But when we come to the case of Ethiopia, we are twin hearted that is neither right centered nor left centered that made us , as a nation, failed to build strong political and economic institutions . Such failure may not end on this generation but may have an impact on the coming generation since it transfers ill suited institutions that could not reconcile the conflicts between: autonomy and accountability; growth and distribution; consensus and inclusiveness' (Abis, undated:p2).

Cohesive political elite who detach itself from corruption and rent seeking and committed to the national development goal and capable to fashion its developmental agenda is as important as the insulation of the technocrat elite and hence it is even better when both political and bureaucratic elites share a common developmental goal (Edigheji, 2007). The

secrete behind success story of Botswana that brought in its endeavor in constructing democratic developmental state construction lies on the support of non corrupt state structure and cohesive political and bureaucratic state apparatus (Sebudubudu, 2005). In line this, Sebudubudu quoting Wallis (1989) asserts that two main points were of critical importance in ensuring that Botswana's planning process of constructing democratic developmental state was effective: first, political commitment and support for planning makes a substantial difference; second, planning and budgeting have been closely linked and this was also backed by a committed political state structure, that is missing in most other African countries (Sebudubudu, 2005:p81).

On the basis of the East Asian developmental state experience, Weiss and Thurbon mentioned in Meyns and Musamba (2010), concluded that state-directed development under the developmental state approach is not just about policy but, more importantly, it is about sustained political will to govern the market in accordance with development aspirations.

In explaining the need for development oriented political leadership, Roger B. Myerson asserts that great differences in the wealth of nations have a basis in their political systems and hence theory of economic development is incomplete without quality governments headed by competent political elites. Myerson further elaborates that a fundamental basis of modern economic growth is that it requires decentralized economic investment by many individuals who must feel secure in the protection of their right to profit from their investments (Myerson, 2013).

Thus, modern economic growth requires a wide distribution of political voice and power throughout the nation both at local and national level. To this end, it is not enough to focus only on national leaders; local leadership is also essential as investments depend on local security and other public services from local agents of government (Romeo, 2013).

### **3.2.2 Autonomous and Effective Bureaucracy**

The developmental state is an investor itself, employer and regulates other private investors too. Non autonomous bureaucracy in developmental state is highly dangerous than otherwise as it can be reduced into state capture by manipulating the wealth of the state (Onis, 1991).

This part of the analysis investigates to what extent the Ethiopian state is endowed with relative autonomy for the state apparatus, a competent and insulated economic bureaucracy, able to keep economic and particularistic interests at bay. Therefore, the specific area of investigation in this section will be the capacity of the bureaucracy, both close to the power centre and in the far flung areas of the state- the local government.

To start with, developmental states are characterized by tightly organized, relatively small-scale bureaucratic structures with the Weberian characteristics of highly selective, meritocratic recruitment patterns and long-term career rewards, which enhance the solidarity and the corporate identity of the bureaucratic elite (Onis, 1991). The bureaucratic capability and public-private cooperation are not cultural givens but can be built up over time through a process of institutional reform (Evans, 1995; 2008). Hence bureaucratic reform as well as attempts to institute organized forms of bargaining and cooperation between the public and private spheres assume critical importance as a basis for improving the effectiveness of state intervention in a market-oriented setting.

When Evans (2008) appreciates the public bureaucratic capacity of East Asian developmental states, he impressively presented as: To focus on the East Asian developmental states is to focus on the importance of the capacity of public bureaucracies. Nearly everyone agrees that when East Asian public bureaucracies are compared with those of developing countries in other regions they are more closely approximate the ideal typical Weberian bureaucracy. Meritocratic recruitment to public service and public service careers offering long-term rewards commensurate with those obtainable in the private sector were institutional cornerstones of the East Asian economic miracle (Evans, 2008:p6).

In the case of current Ethiopia, the principles and proclamations that deal with the civil service administration are quite proper if one go through the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 515/2007. It reads as:

*The purpose of Human Resource Planning shall be to enable a government institution to take measure to meet the objective specified in the strategic plan, to forecast its human resource demand, to acquire human resource in the right number and type, to develop and properly utilize it, monitor and evaluate its result and make corrective measures from*

*time to time... Vacancies may be filled through recruitment, promotion, transfer or deployment on the basis of the human resource plan. However, in filling of vacancies there shall be no discrimination among job seekers or civil servants in filling vacancies because of their ethnic origin, sex, religion, political outlook, disability, HIV/AIDS or any other ground. A vacant position shall rather be filled only by a person who meets the qualification required for the position and scores higher than other candidates (See Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 515/2007).*

Given the proclamation as one can read from the above, it is possible to raise a question whether the quota representation along ethnic and other affiliations in the higher level civil service offices and bureaucracies and other affirmative action oriented representations as Desta (2012), Samuel (2011), Amha (2012), WB (2013) others repeatedly reflected in their studies' findings are compatible with the word by word principles of the proclamation and the practical observations in the state bureaucracies.

It is legitimately claimed that ethnic representation and affirmative action based on personnel allocation are overtly present as part of reconciliation and trust building strategies in the current state system of Ethiopia. Moreover, proponents of the current government affirm that Ethiopia is a country that maintained competitive civil service and autonomous bureaucracy on the one hand and nationalities quota representation on the other. However, there is little historical account that reveals states can emerge as developmental states under ethnically diverse states which involve a clear representational and quota sharing of bureaucratic office as mechanism of reconciliation.

The author of this research is not to argue that whether this civil service *de jure* and *de facto* consideration of recruitment and staffing in the state bureaucracy is good or bad at its face value; but simply to reflect how this could comply with values and principles of rigorous and meritocratic competitive bureaucracy from the higher to the lower level of government which the developmental states tend to realize and as the experience also reveals too. There is no chance that merit and affirmative action based quota representations and ethnic quota sharing of federal bureaucracy can happen without compromising one against the other and the case in Ethiopia is no exception. But what comes very interesting is the unbelievable attempt of the current government to employ the said to be very contradictory notions of developmental

state on the one hand and ethnic quota representation along highly decentralized system of federal arrangement on the other, yet to be tested its success, which a lot of scholarly writers tend debate and refrain to accept the hope of its feasibility.

As many development scholars such as Wong (2004), Onis (1991), Evans (2010; 2008;1995) argue the secret behind the developmental state success East Asians is the autonomy, capability and effectiveness of the bureaucracy and institutional strength coupled with political elite commitment. This is traced back to the presence of bureaucracy in the Weberian tradition which prioritizes meritocratic recruitment, provides promotion incentives, shows rationality and guarantees high levels of prestige and legitimacy to bureaucratic officials (Evans, 2008; Onis,1991).

Onis further supports this observation: Rigorous standards of entry not only ensured a high degree of bureaucratic capability, but also generated a sense of unity and common identity on the part of the bureaucratic elite. Hence the bureaucrats were imbued with a sense of mission and identified themselves with national goals which derived from a position of leadership in society (Onis, 1991: p114).

Long-term career rewards created commitment and a sense of corporate coherence that gave the bureaucratic apparatuses a certain kind of autonomy (Evans, 1995). Moreover, the bureaucracy was able to exhibit such uncommon levels of autonomy and effectiveness when they were effectively insulated by the political elites from unproductive interference (Evans 1995; 2008; Onis, 1991).

Omano Edigheji persuasively asserts that a developmental state, which Africa states aspire to, need highly competent bureaucratic elites. However, they must not displace the political elite; instead they need to create clear delineation of roles between the political and bureaucratic elites in each country's efforts to build a developmental state (Edigheji, 2007).

The UNDP further characterizes the developmental state as the state with strong, competent, and depoliticized bureaucracy, insulated from and untroubled by elections or by the business pressures along line with strong, visionary, capable (not necessarily authoritarian), and committed leadership (UNDP, 2012).

Edigheji further underlines on the need for autonomy as one of the crucial variables that define a state as developmental one. It is an attribute that enables a developmental state to act in a coherent fashion and the key indicators of state autonomy include its Weberianness - namely meritocratic recruitment and career paths for civil servants (Edigheji, 2007).

In explaining the bureaucratic autonomy, Wade (1990:26) quoted in Meyns and Musamba (2010:p22) and Onis (1991) explains: While the bureaucrats 'rule', politicians 'reign'. Their function is not to make policy but to create space for the bureaucracy to man oeuvre in while also acting as a 'safety valve' by forcing the bureaucracies to respond to the needs of the groups upon which the stability of the system rests: that is, to maintain the relative autonomy of the state while preserving political stability.

The capacity of public institutions especially the bureaucracy is crucial to economic performance in a developmental state. The bureaucracy constitutes "the soft underbelly of the state" which advises the political executive and formulates and implements public policies professionalism. Discipline and technical skills are core issues in administrative, competence and capability (UNECA, 2005:138). Similarly, Mkandawire argued that one of the key features of developmental state is the capacity of the bureaucracy to implement the policy.

Such capacity is determined by institutional, technical, administrative and political coherence (Mkandawire, 2001). Evans also explained that the state must create a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freely combine their close contacts with the private sector with their independent understanding of the global market to help steer economic planning in directions good for the national economy as a whole (Evans, 1995).

Furthermore, Abdi Samatar, in his work 'An African Miracle' (1999:p6), argued that Botswana's status as a developmental state is located in a professional Weberian-style bureaucracy that has conducted and implemented policy efficiently. In this respect, Botswana has maintained a strong and relatively autonomous and effective bureaucracy by insulating the bureaucrats (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005). Botswana then echoes the developmental state where what Zian Onis termed a notion "politician reign" and the state "bureaucrats rule" and

to that end Botswana bureaucracy has contributed to its success story to be an ideal democratic developmental state in the world (Mkandwire, 2001, Ois, 199).

The state bureaucracy and public administration in Ethiopia is in many ways unlike that of many other African countries, has a very different and atypically long history, which dates back to Menelik II in 1907. The general civil service in Ethiopia was developed by Menelik II from 1907 till his death in 1913 and further developed by Haile Selassie from 1930 to 1975 and also bears a legacy from the recent socialist military rule (1975–1991) (Mengesha and Common, 2007 cited in Klausen, 2005).

Brian Klausen referring the contributions of Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011) describes that the long tradition in public administration has both advantages and disadvantages. Contrary to the rest of Africa which suffers from too little government, Ethiopia in some aspects suffers from too much government since the state is well entrenched in every administrative layer down to the decentralized kebele level. Further they argue that the current government has struggled to improve the condition of inertia and inefficiency which characterized the administration it inherited from the Derg in 1991 by virtue of the establishment of multi-level governance, civil service reform and capacity building (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011 cited in Klausen, 2005:p67).

A recent study by the World Bank on the public sector reform program in Ethiopia reveals that there is a general improvement across the various levels of government bureaucratic institutions with some capacity limitations (WB, 2013). However, according to a the recent assessment of the WB, the perception of the public obtained from citizens report card on these causes of corruption is reflected in different ways and showed that: at a local level, households who reported making extra payments outside the legal requirement for any government services in the last year decreased from 4.3 percent in 2008 to 4.1 percent in 2010 and then increased to 6.5 percent in 2011 (WB, 2013:p44).

This shows there is a significant increment on the level of negative public perception to the public institutions in giving services and the prevalence of corrupt practices. An assesses on the Ethiopian bureaucracy in relation to developmental state theory, by Desta Asayeghn, on the other hand reveals that the Ethiopian bureaucracy is managed by civil servants

with clearly divided functions which generally are recruited on meritocracy and are expected to serve competently and while on the job their skills are improved via various experiential learning seminars. The story is however somewhat different when it comes to the institutions in which the functionaries operate. These are not autonomous but strongly influenced by the ruling elite and high positions in many governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based quota system (Desta, 2012).

Despite the state bureaucracy by and large is recruited on meritocracy, due to perception in the public; the bureaucrats are expected to operate in accordance to their ethnic group instead of pursuing the goals of their organization. This practice is according to Desta what leads the practice of these institutions to a lack of transparency and makes corruption even more prevalent. The government's approach to controlling corruption is closer to the top-down (Singapore) model than a bottom-up reliance on civil society monitoring (Zook 2009 quoted in WB, 2012:P200). This tends to undermine the grassroots power of influence on public office holders and down ward accountability which is repeatedly criticizing by the ordinary people in various event and scholars who made their contribution in the area.

Had not been be the weak public institutions and officials running it resulted, according to Desta, some of the government-initiated development plans which were in fact rational in design could have been successfully achieved their intended goals. Therefore, this author asserts that:

*“... if Ethiopia desires to use the state as a very important vehicle to tackle its deep rooted developmental problems, it needs to improve the competence of its public administration sector and keep public employees politically neutral (Desta, 2012:p7).*

Supporting the notion civil service neutrality and assuming that this neutrality is a desirable attribute for an effective public bureaucracy, it is wise to note that there need to exist some preconditions for the existence of neutrality. Nation-states in transition that are determined to transform the civil service system they inherited from the regimes they have replaced do not yet have a foundation from which to create a viable neutral bureaucratic institution that will fully serve society (Sisay, 2004). Therefore, Sisay doubted whether the current Ethiopian state can realize and institutionalize autonomous and effective bureaucracy for the general

improvement of the Ethiopian people and thereby able to consolidate a developmental public sector.

Inconformity to this, Demeke argued that the increased role of the government in Ethiopia is similar to the East Asian countries but still the Ethiopian developmental state lacks the building of strong bureaucracy. The author further argued, despite many efforts in constructing the developmental state in current Ethiopia, there is a great gap between the political leadership and civil servants and there are many weak links between the civil servant and the public in general and for sure developmental state in Ethiopia is not effective in the creation of strong bureaucracy so far (Demeke, 2013:p175).

Supportive to the preceding argument, Samuel Khan quoting Mesay presented that in the current Ethiopia, cumbersome weight of political intervention does not allow the autonomy of the bureaucratic sphere. He further stressed that, far from allowing autonomy, the bureaucracy is using an extended organ of the political machinery, thereby undermining impartiality and professionalism, and distributing favorable treatment on the basis of political patronage and, ethnic affiliation (Mesay, 2010, cited in Samuel, 2011:p52). When World Bank presents corruption incidence and nature, it presented as:

Corruption, where it occurs, takes one of two forms: (a) political interference with the independent actions of courts or other sector agencies, or (b) payment or solicitation of bribes or other considerations to alter a decision or action (WB, 2012:p183). Where they are themselves corrupt, their activities in this area are severely compromised, both literally (they cannot perform their functions) and symbolically (their rulings will bear no legitimacy) (WB, 2012: p187).

In similar vein to Mesay, Sisay further argues that establishing a foundation of civil service reform that ensures neutrality and autonomy in a one party state is challenging. If to be, which is less probable, such a foundation is an evolutionary process that must be developed and nurtured over time by an enlightened leadership that have a firm stands and commitment that such a foundation is essential for sustainable development. It is this foundation that Ethiopia needs to develop to become a viable democratic polity and society that can lead to

development continuity, under a responsible and effective system of governance (Sisay, 2004).

According to Evans, one of the most important characteristics of developmental state is ‘embedded autonomy’. In other words, the elite must create concrete social ties that connect the state and society in a mutually binding way and establishing good communication and ties with the private sector (Evans, 1995). This is undoubtedly created by a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freely combine their close contact with the private sector with their independent understanding of the global market to help economic planning in directions good for the national economy (Evans, 2005; Onis, 1991).

These bureaucracies were: first, able to construct markets as well as promote actors to operate in these markets and second they set the performance criteria and disciplined the private sector firms that did not measure up to the set standards of performance (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). In summary, using “carrots” and “sticks”, the bureaucracy in the developmental state was able to influence the industries’ decision-making more importantly, the state itself was disciplined in a manner that prevented predatory, disruptive rent-seeking behavior or the abuse of power.

However, embedded autonomy is far to be reality in the current Ethiopia because the relationship between government and society is not based on equality, mutual recognition of sovereignty and freedom (Tegegn, 2007:14 quoted in Samuel, 2011:p54). Deductively, Samuel concludes that the public elites in Ethiopia fail to develop a vision that connect the state and society and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of policies.

### **3.2.3 Production-Oriented Private Sector**

Available literature reveals that production-oriented private sector has been at the centre of the rapid progress of industrialization and modernization that occurred in the East Asian developmental states. As Evans rightly implied in his recent contribution on developmental state for the 21<sup>th</sup> century developers suggests that economic structures are just as important as state structures in facilitating the sort of policies that are so essential in newly industrializing countries (Evans, 2008). It is therefore, up to the effectiveness and autonomy

of bureaucracy to guide coordinate that productivity of the private sector is ensured as repeatedly argued.

In line this Onis further recognized that the market is guided by a conception of long-term national rationality of investment formulated by government officials. It is the "synergy" between the state and the market which provides the basis for outstanding development experience in the East Asian developmental state experience (Onis, 1991).

This assertion best explains what a developmental state public institutions need look like given their wide reaching responsibilities in the economic, social and political affairs to transform a society of given state in condensed period of time. As the responsibility of developmental state is not socialism that suppresses the private investment and overtakes all mandate to hand of state is commanding role of the state, and also not under the neoliberal tenet of free market capitalism with regulatory principle; but a stat amidst of them which tends to nurture the market to grow in its own right in a productive manner and tends to curtail the limitless operation of the market to meet social equity.

Here, therefore, it is argued unless the state maintains strong control and checks and balance system in the public sector performance determine allocation of incentives and imposing restrictions, the probability of state fall in to the pray of vested interested groups who can abuse the state resource to those who have excessive access to state bureaucracy either through political patronage or some else way outs of rent accumulation. It is here, that Evans firmly asserted the need "embedded autonomy" to rescue the state from capture of any interested groups. In doing so however, it is argued creating capable state with strong bureaucratic apparatus organized along rigorous meritocratic staffing procedures.

Coming to the Ethiopian reality, the prevalence of non autonomous bureaucracy and excessive political interference in the areas of economic and other sector in the one hand and the short lived experience establish in the country made the creation of production oriented private sector. The prevalence of ethnic politics and vested interest of few political elites that resulted also conducive environment for corruption and rent seeking in the state machinery made the opportunity of private competitors so as not gate a equal playing field. Amha inline

this argued that bureaucratic corruption as the extension of political patronage reinforced the absence of productive private sector (Amha, 2012).

The most repeatedly mentioned success of early developmental state as many argue is the commitment of the political elites and the capacity of bureaucrats to realize bureaucratic autonomy and public- private cooperation. Therefore, it is convincingly argued that the coexistence of these two conditions allows the state and the bureaucratic elites to develop independent national goals and, in the subsequent state, to translate these broad national goals into effective policy action and the coexistence of these two conditions is critical for attempt to consolidate viable developmental state.

Because of the absence of insulated and independent bureaucracy along with excessive political interference in the civil service administration that Ethiopia has (see also Desta, 2012; Demeke, 2013; WB, 2012, 2013; Sisay, 2004), it is improbable to construct production oriented private sector. It is rightly argued by Evans and Onis that in the absence of such capability enhancement strategies and political elites dedicated for national interest priority and to put their bureaucracy in its proper autonomy, emulating the developmental state notion is self defeating (Evans, 2008,2011; Onis, 1991)

State intervention in the East Asian developmental states marked a different type of capitalism, in which the primary purpose of state intervention was to promote the interests of the business sector, create conditions for capital accumulation and productivity improvement. In pursuit of this goal, the state these countries utilized a wide range of institutional instruments to poke and prod domestic firms to meet domestic and international business standards, productivity levels, and organizational and technical capacities. These instruments as Wong argue included selective and strategic use of protectionism, provision of industrial subsidies and programmes tied to performance standards and targets, and the creation of business coalitions amongst industrial capital and financial capital and the state (Wong, 2004).

Based on long-term institutionalized alliances among political power, financial and industrial capital, these state-private sector partnerships were crafted on the principle

of reciprocity, such as connecting subsidies to performance, and acted as an incentive for productivity.

Through this tactics, as Evan, Onis, and Wong argued, The state was not only able to secure the survival and the ability of the private sector to compete at any level but, more crucially, was able to “create” and “reward” in addition to “picking” good performers as well as “punishing” bad ones (Evans, 1995; Onis, 1991, Wong, 2004).

There is a by implication that an autonomous state institutions are prerequisite for effective business management sector. As Onis asserted the logic of the developmental state rests precisely on the combination of bureaucratic autonomy with an unusual degree of public-private cooperation and this was the secret for East Asian success (Onis, 1991).

In explaining the prevalence of production oriented private sector in Africa, Meyns and Musamba presented that instead of nurturing private investment as key economic actor, state dominance of the economy led to the neglect and crowding-out of the private sector from the economic arena. The authors further asserted that to be successful, businesspeople depended heavily on political connections rather than performance. Such state-business relations encouraged corrupt practices to secure contracts and negatively affected business efficiency and productivity (Meyns and Musamba, 2010: p30)The most serious hindrance for productive private sectors is the prevalence corruption and favoritism in public institutions and capacity limitations same. Viewed from the angle of both corruption and capacity limitation of public institutions in Ethiopia as vast of the literature reveal and the current government itself also affirm in different documents (see for instance MoFED, 2006; WB, 2012, 2013) the feasibility for productive private sector to prevail is rarely realistic. In summary the bureaucracy in Ethiopia as evidences from literature indicates is far to be autonomous and competently align to the pillar principles of developmental state. As Onis firmly argued, the absence of bureaucratic autonomy public-private cooperation easily degenerates into situations in which state goals are directly reducible to private interests which is most serious threat that could prevail in developmental state claimers (Onis, 1991).

### 3.2.4 Performance-Oriented Governance

Developmental states are found to enjoy the support of their constituencies because they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general citizenry (Weiss, 2000). This approach to development has commonly been referred to as “growth with equity”. As observed by Chang:

*“...the achievements of the region’s economies did not stop at income growth. Their records in terms of improvements in infant mortality, life expectancy, educational achievements and indicators of ‘human development’ have also been very impressive, even considering their income growth” (Chang 2006: p1).*

There are two major issues worth noting with regard to the governance-orientation of the developmental state. First, the ruling elites in these countries demonstrated high levels of commitment to poverty reduction. They began to address equity concerns from the early stages of the transformation process on. Second, successful economic performance was the primary source of political legitimacy. Political elites largely depended on delivering growth with equity as a means of strengthening their legitimacy and support base (Meyns and Musamba, 2010). Therefore, source of legitimacy in developmental state as many argue is revolutionary authority: the authority of a people committed to the transformation of their social, political, or economic order rather than the way they came to power.

Therefore, the central feature of governance in developmental state is effectiveness in meeting the societal demand as promised in condensed period of time. Referring Ethiopia public sector governance performance Desta (2012) argued that the most noble policies and strategies the current government of Ethiopia have designed since coming to power in 1991 up to now are either subjected to total failure to the worst case scenario or they met their target after too much delay which their spill over on the society is insignificant.

It is broadly believed that most post-colonial African states opted for one-party systems of rule shortly after independence. As a result, regimes that were autocratic and intolerant to dissent came to characterize the continent. Proclaimed as appropriate for the dual tasks of nation-building and socio-economic development, they served more often than not as many argued to boost the ruling elites’ power and to facilitate their self-enrichment, in short: to establish predatory rule instead of performance oriented governance.

Not too much different but in different words, in explaining the predatory and rent seeking nature of African states in which Ethiopia is not the exception, Amha quoting Kofi Annan's interview with Newsweek, presented that:

*After independence, we got into a situation where men who hungered for power went into politics, and we created a situation of winner takes all. In many countries, people who want to make money go into business. In Africa, people who want to make money go into politics. It is very unhealthy. [Yet] it is very profitable (Amha, 2012:p68)*

Although varied in degree, regimes under predatory rule were based on intense personalization of authority and were not conducive to performance-oriented governance. Ruling elites in such regimes depended on the distribution of spoils to stay in power and diverted huge amounts of public resources for patronage purposes, detracting from genuine development efforts in the process.

The adaptability of the developmental state to the African context as demonstrated by Fritz and Menocal, is constrained by the continent's "omnipresent" failure of governance, as evidenced by abject poverty, widespread corruption in the public realm, violation of human rights and political instability. Furthermore, because Africa lacks adequate political superstructure and leadership required to pursue developmental policies coupled with governance limitations, there is insufficient commitment by the state elite to development imperatives (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).

The case of Ethiopia in this regard is no exception to the African context if not worse compared to significant number of the African states. In their assessment Yilmaz and Venugopal they affirm that the sharp contradiction in *de jure* and *de facto* claims of democracy and good governance specially viewed in bottom up dimension. These authors affirmed that:

*The political competition and accountability in Ethiopia is a typical of countries in transition. There is a gulf between the constitutional provisions of decentralization and the de facto exercise of these provisions. ...At the local level as well, while the letter of law is generally obeyed, the spirit of the law is mostly compromised. The separation of executive*

*and legislative is blurred and all local government employees are beholden to the party administration (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008:p7).*

In conformity to this, Adem Abebe argued that democracy and rule of law in Ethiopia is getting from bad to worse as different international democratic and development institutions reveal. He described it as:

*For the first time, Ethiopia was classified as “not free” by the Freedom House in its 2011 Freedom in the World Index. Similarly, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation ranked Ethiopia 34<sup>th</sup> in Africa in its 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance(38<sup>th</sup> in the sub-categories of “safety and rule of law”, and “participation and human rights”).The Economist classified Ethiopia as an “authoritarian” regime in its 2010 Democracy Index (Adem, 2012:p3).*

Starting from the positive side of the current Ethiopia government in attaining speedy economic growth, Befekadu and Demeke in their respective contribution argued that: Though Ethiopian developmental state has played an important role in bringing remarkable economic growth in the country, yet it has failed to contain the rampage of rent seeking behavior and practice which is overrunning the structure of governmental apparatus at alarming pace (Befekadu, undated:p3, Demeke, 2013).

When Maphunye underlined the history of developmental state attempt failure in the early days of independence Africa, it points out on the pervasiveness of corruption and overall governance deterioration. To this end, Corruption, Incompetence, Inefficiency & ineffectiveness, Politicization of the bureaucracy & patronage, Unskilled/untrained personnel Domestic instability/conflict are grave dangers of democratic developmental state construction in developing countries ( Maphunye,2009:p42). The analysis of democratic developmental state label in Ethiopia and the rest therefore lies in the very essence that these particular countries under consideration supersedes such challenges and met public demand and recognition thereof.

Professor Alemayehu G/Mariam a distinguished professor of political science in California university in his article titled as “*Deconstructing Construction Corruption in Ethiopia*”, and World Bank in its recent book in the title “*Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia*” impressively

asserts that: In the construction sector, Ethiopia exhibits most of the classic warning signs of corruption risk, including instances of poor-quality construction, inflated unit output costs, and delays in implementation. In turn, these factors appear in some cases to be driven by unequal or unclear contractual relationships, poor enforcement of professional standards, high multipliers between public sector and private sector salaries, wide-ranging discretionary powers exercised by government, a lack of transparency, and a widespread perception of hidden barriers to market entry (Alemayehu, 2013, WB, 2012).

In sum, the overall governance performance and especially in controlling corruption and related abuse of power are pervasive in Ethiopia which sharply contradicts the value and principles under which democratic developmental states are consolidated. Moreover, as the World Bank (2013) indicates, the dominant public perception in Ethiopia towards the public institutions and office holders is highly pessimist and inclines to negative. This in turn shows that the very essence of that developmental states which is characterized by low level of corruption and in decreasing rate and consolidating legitimacy from state's achievement remains far to be reality in the current Ethiopian state.

Consistent to this and with great suspicion to current government, WB identified that the post-1991 public administration has reinforced the rule of law, but its interest in it conflicts with its desire to maintain control (and thus with the law's application to its own activities and various requirements of accountability). This poses some constraints, real or imagined, to optimizing the independent operations of the judiciary and other sector organizations, further complicating their situation as institutions unused to independence WB, 2012: p).

### **3.3 The State of Local Government and Governance in Ethiopia**

#### **3.3.1 General Overview of Governance in Ethiopia**

Local government refers to specific institutions or entities created by national constitutions, by state constitutions, by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government, by provincial or state legislation, or by executive order to deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small geographically delineated area. Local governance is a broader concept and

is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level (Shah, 2006:p1).

Local governance is governing at the local level viewed broadly to include not only the machinery of government, but also the community at-large and its interaction with local authorities (Levine and Bland, 2000). In line with this, Romeo asserts that when local governance is democratizing, local governments are increasingly responsive to and interactive with the community and hence the developmental role of local government also gets momentum (Romeo, 2013). To this end, local governments under democratic decentralization are assumed to be more participatory, transparent, and accountable to local residents and hence services are increasingly provided in response to citizens' demand and priorities.

Up through the Haile Selassie era, top-down centralized government coexisted in Ethiopia with strong regional elites. The various decentralization efforts during the Haile Selassie period though not genuine, however, need to be noted. These include the administrative decentralization enacted in 1942, which created three sub-central levels of government—known as *taklay gizat*, *awraja*, and *woreda*—mainly to facilitate central administration in performing the functions of local government at lower levels (Meheret, 2007, p. 73 quoted in USAID, 2010:p2). The focus of development was on *Awarajas* (zones) while *Woredas* and municipalities were considered more like deconcentrated units of government administration (UN-HADBITAT, 2002)

The Derg continued the trend of top-down governance, albeit with a radically different structure: Haile Selassie's version of indirect rule was replaced with a militarized Marxist - Leninist party. The Derg developed a far more penetrating state than Haile Selassie through militarization up to *kebeles* in the urban and rural areas (USAID, 2010).

The present government has declared Ethiopia a Federal state with apparently five tiers or levels of government, (federal, regional, zonal *woreda* and *kebele* levels), comprising nine regional states and two autonomous administrative areas. Since the early 1990's, a policy of decentralization that divides power and responsibilities between the central and regional governments has been put in place (UN-HADBITAT, 2002).

The current Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution states that rule of law will be respected and that development at each level of government (federal, regional, zonal and woreda/district) will be guaranteed. While trying to achieve development, it is indicated that the rights of citizens would be respected. Functions of government at all levels shall be transparent and officials shall be accountable to the people. If these are not fulfilled by elected representatives or officials they shall be questioned and proper action will be taken. It is also reflected that adequate power/devolution shall be granted to the woredas as center of development so that the communities participate in the development of their vicinity (FDRE, 1995).

Furthermore, the current FDRE constitution grants the mandate to each regional state government to formally devolve adequate decision-making authority and control over resources to zonal, woreda and kebele administrations in order to promote democratic decentralization and get government closer to the people. In many literatures the significance of local government is getting strong base for enhancing democracy and development in respective countries.

Decentralization processes and effective local governance contribute significantly to deepening democracy and citizen's empowerment and hence local authorities and their associations are important actors for change in reducing poverty and in promoting human rights and democracy, good governance and sustainable development at local levels in a given country (UN-HABITAT, 2002; USAID, 2010). Alongside central governments and in partnership with civil society organizations, local authorities at different levels play an important role in the provision of basic services, supporting inclusive growth, and increased social cohesion (EU, 2013).

No withstanding the available literature, it is explicitly pointed out that both the federal and the regional constitutions in Ethiopia recognizes woredas and kebeles as legitimate units of local government administration with legally defined authority and functions, including popularly elected councils and executive administration for democratic governance and local economic development (UN-HABITAT, 2002).

The current government in official report has submitted the reality that while there is clear vision and policies at hand, there are also serious limitations at the level of implementation and ensuring democratic good governance especially at the woreda and kebele levels (Ministry of capacity building, 2006). The issue of consensus building and making things done as per of public interest is lacking in the country and people in many part of the country are found to be forced to involve in public activities without their consent (Ministry of Capacity Building, 2006: p7; Serdar and Varsha, 2008).

The main rationale for opting for decentralized system of governance as many argue is the need to create democratic system at local level and broadly agreed that democratic local government exists when it is participatory, accountable and responsive for local interests. In order to create such a democratic local government, therefore, local government should be constituted by elected official rather than by centrally appointed officials so as to ensure proper downward accountability (Zemelak, 2008: p15).

Local government serves as sphere of government that aims to promote the relationship between the governors and the governed and this in turn can arguably be achieved, by taking the following steps Hanekom, 1988) cited in Madumo (2012: p44): ensure a proper linkage between the government and the people over which it governs; promote greater community participation; and ensure a flourishing democratic political system.

Holding periodical election of local authorities is an example of democratic local governance but not sufficient to label a given political system as democratic one (Myerson, 2013). A democratic system of local governance should also be participatory, accountable and responsive as per the promises and enshrined in the available legal and political documents practical and there need to be political will from above and a demanding capable local leadership from below (LDI, 2013; Zemelak, 2008). Thus a system in which, the local people can take part in the decision making process of local governance system should be devised.

Madumo, (2012:p46) notes that: It is evident that the goals the state ought to achieve in terms of development are the same as those of the local governments. Thus a congruent approach towards overcoming the developmental challenges is suggested. The local level is therefore, the level of government hierarchy where communication between the government and the

governed is taken place and policy effectiveness is also tested (Caldeira, et al., 2010). It is inline this that scholars in favor of decentralization and increased local autonomy argue that “there is no development that cannot occur locally” and unarguably local leadership and institutional basement remains the core ingredients to realize it in its intended time frame.

Moreover, local governance and government is an area where government legitimacy and trust is built up and public mobilization for democratization and development is enhanced. Consistent to this proposition, Pan African Conference of Ministers of Local Government (2006) underlines that the more people participate in the activities of government, especially at local level, the more government becomes transparent, accountable and trusted. Therefore, one of the ways of building trust in government is to increase the participation of citizens in government decision-making, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation through the channels of local government.

### **3.3.2 Political and Legal Framework for Decentralized Local Governance in Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is one of several African countries that are currently engaged in implementing one form or another of an integrated decentralization system. This system consists of several interrelated and sometimes overlapping tiers of government and/or administration. After the federal government, the regional level involves the nine "national regional states" as well as two "city administrations" (that is, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa).

The constitution of the FDRE (Art.51 and 52) defines the divisions of the powers and functions of the Federal and Regional governments. It reveals the separation of state power, check and balance, transparency, and accountability among different government organs. The Federal constitution is also an umbrella that gives the broader framework for policy formulation.

Ethiopia has made advances in institutionalizing and enhancing legal authority for regional level decentralization. The expenditure and revenue assignments of regional governments have been clarified. Powers and responsibilities were provided to the sub-national governments by the Federal constitution, regional constitutions, and the subsequent proclamations. Article 52, which is focused on the powers and the functions of States, places

regional states at the highest level. It does this so that all powers are not given expressly to the Federal government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States, and are reserved for the States. Similar but challenging efforts were also made for devolving power to local governments (WB, 2013).

The Federal constitution of 1994 has provision for further decentralization to the lowest units. In article 50 of the FDRE constitution, it is enacted that adequate powers shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units. However, the theoretical and fundamental idea on decentralization/devolution from regional government to local level was not fully captured until the National Capacity Building Program (district level decentralization) brought it to the forefront in 2002.

Based on the FDRE constitution, each of the regional states promulgated its constitution by taking into account the objective reality of the region; by achieving rapid economic development, enhanced democracy, lasting peace, and security; by refining and strengthening the powers of government organs; by revealing accountability and effective government structure; and by ensuring popular participation at regional district and sub-district levels (World Bank, 2013).

Therefore, by constitution there are regions and the two administrative cities. zones which are explicitly mentioned in the constitution as structures to be used for "administrative convenience" and hence in all regions, zonal administrations have been installed which are mostly appointed, except in the most diverse region Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples where they are elected. Each zone is sub-divided into 'Woredas' which are considered to be the key local units of elected government since they play key roles in prioritizing the provision of public services. And the last legally defined local level structure in the current governance modality of Ethiopia is the kebel (LDI, 2013; UN-HABITAT, 2002).

According to the USAID study of (2010), the legal framework for decentralization is relatively clearly established in the Constitution of 1995 (and indeed was established in the transition prior to the passage of the Constitution). USAID further asserts that from political

and legal point of view, Ethiopia is more decentralized than most African countries engaged in same business, though this is not a guarantee the practical implementation at hand (2010).

As explained in the literature, a prominent decentralization expert Falleti (2005) quoted in Mulugata (2012) explains how the sequences of decentralization matters for effective local autonomy and democratization as follows:

*If the process starts with administrative decentralization it is simply a deconcentration of tasks. It is simply pushing away routines from the center. Decentralization of this type is not different from establishing field offices by local staff". When political decentralization takes place and is followed by administrative, it is again only passing over of responsibilities, not authorities to lower bodies. This type of sequence only pushes complaints to lower bodies. If political tasks are devolved and administration is deconcentrated without finance (resources), it does not serve the real purpose of decentralization (Falleti, 2005 quoted in Mulugata, 2012:p100).*

The decentralization program in Ethiopia followed: Political-Administrative-Fiscal sequence while the economic/market dimension has not been mentioned because it requires further assessment as it is almost nonexistent or perhaps it is still at a very early stage (Mulugata, 2012). As it is obvious, Ethiopian decentralization goes two major waves; first (1991) and the second also called district/woreda level decentralization (2002/3) waves respectively. During the first wave of decentralization, that only went as far as "Political- Administrative" form. But in the second wave of decentralization, when the district level decentralization was commenced fiscal decentralization took place (Tewfik, 2010).

Nevertheless, the mere devolution of power transfer in their right sequence cannot guarantee the success of the decentralization program (USAID, 2010; Wunsch, 2001; Myerson, 2013). There are many other complicated factors such as the weight of the leading party, the accountability issue (if the legislative is de facto accountable to the executive), the weight of states (their capacity to influence the center and their resilience to courageously utilize their legitimate powers) given the need for the consent of the leading party for each and every step of the way and also for many other reasons.

### **3.3.3 Challenges of Local Democracy and Decentralization in Ethiopia**

The Federal System of Ethiopia has been enshrined in a new and modern Constitution (adopted on 8 December 1994), which also guarantees important fundamental rights and freedoms of the population with clear separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers along line with parliamentary democracy and underlined the importance of cultural identity through the fundamental equality of languages. The new Ethiopian Constitution is often hailed as one of the most enlightened ones in the world but yet, the practical implementation of the constitution remains a challenge to the authorities (FDRE, 2004).

Ethiopia's current system of state structure can be characterized as ethnic federalism because ethnicity and language are used as major criteria in creating sub-national governments. One of the criticisms leveled at the present ethnic-based regionalization policy is that there has not been effective devolution of power and responsibility from regional governments to lower levels of administration (Meskerem, 2007). The point is made that regional governments are still dominant and exercise significant control in the affairs of sub-national levels of government, including zonal, wereda and kebele administrations. Mehret termed it as "An Experiment in Authoritarian Ethnic Federalism" implying the term "authoritarian" is used to explain the tight control exercised by central authorities over the lower orders of governance which undermines the essence of devolved powers from taking roots (Mehret, 2002).

On the other hand, proponents of the policy argue that it has laid a strong foundation for a federal system of participatory governance whereby public officials will be held accountable and responsive to the needs of the citizenry. The adoption of federal system of Government in Ethiopia resulted in open, transparent, and democratic governance that respects the right of all citizens. This is further strengthened by the adoption of the decentralization process, which gave power to regional governments to implement development policies and strategies and provided the opportunity for local residents to participate in development programmes (MoFED, 2006).

The process of rebuilding and reorganizing state power in Ethiopia on the basis of ethnic federalism is predicated on, and intertwined with the need to establish a lasting peace, build democracy and advance the socio-economic development of Ethiopia's nations, nationalities

and peoples. The aim of the federal arrangement in Ethiopia is not only to enable ethnic communities to maintain and promote their distinctive collective identities and their particular styles of life, it is also directed at building one political and economic community for the promotion of the common interests of Ethiopians in a mutually supportive manner. Hence, Ethiopia's federalism should be seen in the light of its current process of consolidating democracy and pursuing socio-economic development (MoFED, 2006).

Contrary to this however, Chanie (2007), asserts that decentralization in Ethiopia is far to meet its promises due to clientelism and Intra-party control which restricts sub-national autonomy. Whatever the merits of the controversies surrounding devolution of power along ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, it is obvious that the evolving system manifests certain problems; problems of bottom-up and top-down accountability balance and local autonomy (Meheret, 2002; 2007).

Indifferent to this, while the current federal and regional constitutions clearly recognize the critical role of local government in the overall societal transformation in terms of economic, social and political aspects, capacity limitations related to skilled man power and leadership role modeling remained to be a continuing hindrance for realistic change as promised in the constitutions and policy documents (UNDEF, 2014; Meskerem, 2007, Helvetas Ethiopia, 2008).

Meheret and Meskerem in their respective contribution further assert that the local level institutional capacity and lack of qualified local personnel is also exacerbating and impeding the success of decentralization (Meskerem, 2007; Meheret, 2007). Moreover, implementation problems and lack of capacity of the regional states to prepare economic development policies, weak public accountability (down ward accountability) for local officials, and lack of incentives for local officials to exercise their constitutional power are the major ones (USAID, 2010).

Indifferent to the above, Mehari Tadele argues that local officials are less responsible for failure or lack of development policies of their own as there is no strong mechanism of public accountability and incentive for them to do so. Local officials are more responsive to the ruling party—EPRDF as their career is highly dependent on EPRDF's leadership rather than their constituent voters (Mehari, 2007). According to the FDRE constitution, citizens are

legally empowered to recall their elected representatives if their actions and behaviors are contrary to their responsibilities and mandates. However, due to low level of practical downward accountability, decisions in such cases are usually determined in favor of upward accountability, particularly the ruling party EPRDF (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008).

Ojienda and Mbondeniyi (2013) referring the Freedom House report on freedom in the world, Ethiopia regressed from 'partly free' in 2010 to 'not free' in 2011. According to Freedom House, 'Free' represents an average score of 1 - 3 and signifies broad scope for open political competition a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. 'Partly free' represents an average score of 3 - 5.5 and signifies limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism. 'Not free' represents an average score of 5.5 – 7 and signifies a situation where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied (Freedom House report 2010, 2011 cited in Ojienda and Mbondeniyi, 2013).

Furthermore, in terms of government effectiveness and control of corruption, which are two of six governance dimensions analyzed by Kaufmann et al. (2007), cited in David et al (2008) Ethiopia ranks globally in the 31<sup>st</sup> and 37<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively (where the country in the highest, i.e., 100<sup>th</sup> percentile, performs best). In contrast, Ethiopia's relative status in terms of voice/accountability, and in terms of political stability, is relatively weak (17<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> percentiles, respectively) which is very low even compared to countries with similar incomes.

Ethiopia's system of decentralization process has been credible in devolving power, improving governance and service delivery, as well as narrowing the per capita differences among Regional governments and districts. However, the second phase (district level decentralization) of decentralization was brought some gaps on addressing administrative and fiscal decentralization issues associated with a) detailed clarity of expenditure and revenue assignments, b) shortage of skilled manpower and lack of incentive in remote areas and inadequate budget for recruitment, c) building local government

specific purpose fiscal transfer, d) local government mandate on Public Sector Reform/capacity building (WB, 2013).

Another recent governance index named as “Ibrahim Index of African Governance” a report in 2013, Ethiopia ranked 33<sup>rd</sup> out of 52 African countries for its 2012 performance with an average score of 47.6%. This governance index takes in to account the following variable against which a given country’s performance is evaluated: Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, Human Development. In each variable/dimension mentioned above, Ethiopia is rated as 47.6% \_\_, 47.3% (34<sup>th</sup>), 36.5% (38<sup>th</sup>), 53.0% (15<sup>th</sup>), 53.7% (32<sup>nd</sup>) respectively (Ibrahim Index of African Governance report, 2013).

Decentralization as currently practiced in Ethiopia began with the establishment of an ethno–linguistic federal state first created in the early 1990s and codified in the Constitution of 1995 (USAID, 2010). Ethiopia has limited experience with decentralization policies in comparison to many African countries in which a relatively developed system of local government prevailed from the colonial heritage (UN-HABITAT, 2002). However, Woredas have existed as the lower tier of government or basic unit of administration for nearly half a century, and they were entrusted with a range of responsibilities over matters such as education, health, law and security within urban areas and their surrounding rural settlements since the imperial regime though with varying degree of autonomy and structure (Ibid).

Nevertheless, there has not been meaningful integration and co-ordination between these units of government functioning at the grassroots partly because the very concept of local government and its structure is not well conceived and developed in Ethiopia (Meheret, 2002; LDI, 2013).

The 1995 FDRE constitution underlines that each regional state government must formally devolve adequate decision-making authority and control over resources to zonal, woreda and kebele administrations in order to promote democratic decentralization and get government closer to the people (MoFED, 2006). However, the stark reality in Ethiopia’s decentralization process is that woredas and kebeles have been given too much responsibility and functions without the necessary financial and resource capacity to undertake development at the local

level (WB, 2013; LDI, 2013). However, despite several imperfections decentralization in Ethiopia since 1991 has been dramatic in which the country serves as a crucial case study that pushes the envelope of decentralization in Africa (USAID, 2010).

Moreover, the World Bank explains about the local level performance like this; while administrative authority has been devolved to sub-national levels (de jure and de facto), serious constraints on capacity hinder the achievement of full-fledged decentralization. Administrative decentralization constraints mentioned by the Bank are associated with lack of refined expenditure and revenue assignment at local governments, shortage of skilled manpower and pressing budget for recruitment of the same by local governments, and lack of incentive for critical professional staff especially in remote areas (WB, 2013).

In sum, the decentralization and local governance processes in Ethiopia is constrained by lack of adequate man power, institutional capacity, lack of autonomy to carry out decisions based on local demand, imbalance of top down and bottom up accountability among others.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The aim of this chapter is to present the research method used in order to give answers to research questions as well as describe the process of data collection and analysis.

### **4.1 Site Selection and Description of the Study Area**

Tigray region is one of the nine regional states (see Art. 47 of FDRE constitution) located in the northern tip of Ethiopia. As per of the constitutional privilege, it enjoys the constitutionally granted autonomous powers and self rule claims via decentralization program along ethnic federalism since the endorsement of the constitution. The decentralization drive in Ethiopia has proceeded in two phases. The first wave of decentralization (1991-2001) was centered on creating and empowering National/Regional Governments and hence was termed as mid-level decentralization.

Unlike the first wave of decentralization that created regional self rule by constitutional means, the second wave of decentralization involved the District Level Decentralization Program which granted various powers and responsibilities of local governments including woredas and kebeles. Unlike the first wave of decentralization which has a simultaneous country-wide coverage, the second wave was initially limited to the four Regional States, namely, Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.

The regional state of Tigray is therefore, among the nine regions that consist of 35 rural woredas among which Hawzen is one. The woreda for which this research had been undertaken is located in eastern zone of Tigray region, in the Northern Ethiopia. Based on the Woreda updated census report of 2012/13, the woreda has a total population size of 128,871 among which 62,129 are male and 66,742 are female. With an area of 1,892.69 square kilometers, Hawzen has a population density of 62.32, which is greater than the Zone average of 56.93 persons per square kilometer.

Concerning the selection criteria, Hawzen is a woreda where recurrent public protests are occurred as consequence to the maladministration that the local people affirm. As an input to a preliminary assessment, the researcher has took part in some of the public discussions as delegate of community based organization (Hawzen Woreda Development Association) and

other formal and informal discussions of the overall ongoing governance in the woreda. In the preliminary assessment the researcher came across some cases of corruption incidence, criminalizing individual civil servants and local residents by the local officials for reasons of fake cause and other case under investigation were observed. Moreover, the local people complain to the zonal and regional authorities via their selected representatives are also another witness. Inconformity to this, the social media reports on the local governance is also additional support to the prevailing governance problem (see for instance Adis Zemen magazine, 2013; vol. 73; No. 118).

This preliminary access to the governance inconvenience symptoms and the overt public reaction against the local government performance triggered the researcher to select Hawzen woreda as a case study. Moreover, the researcher's relative familiarity to the study Woreda and potentiality of ease of access to local bureaucracy for data collection is also additional motive for the site selection.

## **4.2. Research Strategy and Design**

In research undertaking, the strategy employed depends on how the problem looks like, what questions the problem leads to and what end result is desirable. Qualitative research is typically used to answer questions about the complex nature of a phenomenon, often with a purpose of describing and understanding the phenomenon from the participant's point of view. It seeks a better understanding of complex situations and often exploratory and descriptive in nature Oksana (2008 cited in Gebreslassie, 2012). If a concept or phenomenon needs to be understood because little research has been done on it, and then qualitative approach is necessarily important.

This research had dealt with a particular case study of Hawzen Wereda as the unit of analysis from which data was collected. This study is a bottom up approach of examining democratic developmental state in qualitative basis of cross sectional survey type in which data had been collected in a single point in time from purposively selected key informants. Therefore, individuals from different administrative offices were approached for interview and focus group discussion to express their views on the ongoing democratization and development governance in the woreda in qualitative approach.

### **4.3. Data Type and Source**

The data type for this research is qualitative type which is to be gathered by interviews, focus group discussion and document analysis of relevant data sources. Both primary and secondary data sources were accessed in the case study. The Primary data sources were used to gather first-hand information through interview and focus group discussion to achieve the objectives of the research.

Secondary sources were employed for gathering certain secondary information especially those relating to the woreda annual plans, human resource profiles, and performance reports, local level guideline documents and administrative manuals. Related journal articles, national and regional policy documents and other relevant materials were also part of the source for the research undertaking.

### **4.4. Target population and Selection of Respondents**

There are no hard and fast rules about the exact number (sample size) determination in qualitative research (Tuckett, and Stewart 2004). Whilst there are no closely defined rules for sample size (Baum, 2000), sampling in qualitative research usually relies on small numbers with the aim of studying in depth and detail. Seeking a richness of data about a particular phenomenon, the sample is derived purposefully rather than randomly (Ezzy, 2002). To this reason, the researcher used non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Therefore, the study used purposive sampling to select the study woreda, sample key informants from members of local government office workers, administrators of various hierarchy in the woreda and below and service providers to examine their opinions in the overall local governance.

There are many factors that can influence sample size determination in qualitative research. Heterogeneity of population understudy and scope of the study are important among others. Peil (1982:p40 cited in Khan 2006:p88) asserts that, if a group of population understudy is homogenous in the issue to be studied, drawing large sample size is unnecessary. Due to difference in understanding and access to public institutions, all local residents may not similar level of understanding on the ongoing governance situation of the woreda. This can be

particularly apparent when individual respondents are supposed to address about public institutions performance, local leaders' capacity, commitment and other relevant policy wise discussions and bureaucrats' autonomy. So meeting those individuals with required understanding and access were deliberately selected. The most critical consideration of the researcher was therefore, not size of the sample but the degree to which the researcher can approach the key respondents and ensuring their confidence up on the researcher as how confidential their privacy of information is. To this end, exerting significant effort on whom to meet as key respondents to address the research questions in depth instead of how many participants to include is paramount importance.

Some scholars attempted to give guidelines for actual sample sizes in qualitative research. However, there are still variations regarding the actual sample size determination. For instance, as summarized in the works of Mason (2010); Morse (1994) indicated that for Grounded theory, Ethnography and Ethno science thirty to fifty (30-50) sample is acceptable, starting from six (6) is also acceptable for phenomenology; while Creswell (1998), Bernard (2000), argue that starting from five to twenty five (5-25) is sound to undertake qualitative research for analyzing a given phenomena. Bertaux (1981 cited in Mason 2010) in similar vein asserts that for all qualitative research undertakings, fifteen (15) key respondents is the smallest acceptable sample for conducting qualitative research.

The target institutions from which key respondents to be drawn for this study were the Woreda political institutions (woreda council, administration office and justice office), civil service office, agriculture and rural development office were purposely selected. From each office, two interviewees and hence a total of ten interviewees were selected purposively. The compositions of the key informants from each office were one appointed official and the other professional employee/expert to help cross check each other.

Alongside these key informants, purposely selected key informants one from nongovernmental organization (millennium village project), three from community based development association (Hawzen woreda development association) and two from members of local trade associations (Hawzen woreda traders association) were also included. This is needed because such organizations and associations are critical stakeholders in the overall

democratization and development activities of the local governance and have significant access of information at the local level. In addition to these key informants mentioned above, from three purposely selected kebeles (Hawzen, Selam and Dgum), kebele managers (one from each kebele) and three secondary school teachers (Megab, Edagaselus secondary schools and Masho preparatory school one from each) were also included. These secondary school teachers are selected from those who lived no less than two years in the woreda and based on their expected potential access and understanding of the local governance environment. Moreover, 6 key informant local residents 2 from Dgum and 4 from Selam were purposely selected. In summary, three FGDs and twenty eight key informants were involved.

#### **4.5. Methods of Data Collection**

As indicated above, both primary and secondary sources of data will be employed. To help both data sources were properly gathered, interviews, focus group discussions and document analysis were employed.

**Interviews:** Interviews are a systematic way of talking and listening to people through conversations. Therefore, semi-structured in-depth interview was employed to gather information from the key informants. To this end, 28 key informants were interviewed.

**Focus group discussion:** there were three focus group discussions having participants from different sections of the community in the woreda. Two of the focus group discussions had included participants from the woreda office experts and teachers. One focus group discussion was held with participants from community based organization that is hawzen woreda development association and members of local trade association in the woreda.

**Document analysis:** Woreda annual plans, human resource profiles, performance reports of the selected institutions, local level guideline documents and administrative manuals were reviewed. Particularly, the local government documents are relevant to assess the available man power to run autonomous and capable bureaucracy and to drive legitimacy along with the required leadership so that to drive the challenges that can impede developmental state

feasibility at the local level. Relevant and pertinent literatures that deal with democratic developmental state, challenges, prospects and potentialities and its basic value and principle foundations were also reviewed to substantiate and address the theoretical based research questions of the study.

#### **4.6 Methods of Data Analysis**

The data analysis for this research was conducted based on data and information triangulated from interview, Focus Group Discussion and document analysis and pertinent literature to this research. Based on the nature of the information it utilizes, the research was largely exploratory-explanatory-analytical in its approach /methodology design. This was so because the main purpose of the study was not to drive statistical but only analytical generalizations. Consequently, the study was dominantly qualitative nature.

#### **4.7 Ethical Considerations**

Ethics as scholars argue is cornerstone for conducting effective and meaningful research. As such, three important ethical considerations were given due attention by the researcher. The first consideration was ‘voluntary participation’ that there should be no coercion or the feeling of such act by the interviewee from the researcher. The second one was ‘informed consent’ which is to say that the participant or the interviewees fully understand what they are being asked to do and that they are informed if there is any potential negative consequence for such participation. Thus withdrawal at any stage is also given guarantee. Third the researcher took into consideration ‘confidentiality’ of information generated and ‘anonymity’ of respondents to ensure safety.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

### **5.1 Extent and Depth of Understanding the “Democratic Developmental State” Notion in the Context of Hawzen Woreda**

As it is clearly indicated above (in the literature review part), the issue of understanding the conceptualization dynamics of the notion of “democratic developmental state”, of its historically evolving essence and nature, and of its essential pre-conditions to be a viable alternative path in itself has become a critical factor for the successful realization of its vision and core values on the ground. In other words, the extent and depth of its understanding by the key actors in the implementation process has become at least as equally influential factor as other factors are. This is so because clarity of thought is always crucial for clarity of actions and outcomes. And, this has been the general sense grasped from the discussions the researcher had with the key respondents both in the in-depth-interview and focus group discussion sessions.

For simplicity purpose, therefore, the extent and depth of understanding of the democratic developmental state notion is classified here under by actor category and is presented in a summary form as follows. To this end, based on an inference driven from the theoretical and empirical literatures reviewed in the preceding chapters , the following three major actors working in synergy are identified as the key actors in the process of proper realization of all what is entailed by the notion of democratic developmental state- namely; a committed and development and democracy-oriented political leadership, an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy and a productive and development and democracy-oriented private sector.

#### **5.1.1 The Understanding at Political Leadership Level**

Given the researcher’s expectation of the Woreda political leadership’s level of exposure and awareness about the concept (that it would be relatively higher), questions that are descriptive, evaluative and comparative in nature are carefully designed and addressed to them. Accordingly, from the feelings, perceptions and opinions of majority of the local government officials (from the executive body, Woreda council, and Woreda judiciary/justice and security office) it is learned that the extent of their understanding of the

democratic developmental state notion appears to be largely narrow and shallow in scope and depth and also at times confusing and miss-leading. Specifically, asked about “How they understand the democratic developmental state concept” for instance, they expressed that they are not familiar with the comprehensive meaning and nature that the concept has in contemporary academic literatures and even in the various policy documents of the Ethiopian government. In fact, they added “Our source of information and knowledge about the democratic developmental state concept is cadre meetings and seminars and from these all what we know about it (the concept) is that it means a model against “neo-liberalism”, against “rent-seeking and corruption” and instead a “pro- development and transformation” one.

Asked further about “How they would distinguish a democratic developmental state from that of a neo-liberal state”, a sizable portion of them responded by saying “our understanding is that while a democratic developmental state is a state that stands and works day and night for development a neo-liberal state on the other hand is an anti-development one” (Informant 20, 17/04/2014). Here thus comes the problem of either “not-understanding” or “miss-understanding” of the true nature of the concept democratic developmental state and of its essential difference from the neo-liberal state. In fact, one can also see that there is a deeply entrenching tendency on the part of the political leaders in the Woreda to understand the democratic developmental state not from the perspective of “what it is” but from “what it is not”- which is detrimental to a leadership that is supposed to correctly figure out the true definition and unique defining features (if any) of the democratic developmental state and accordingly lead and galvanize mass understanding along the same pattern and mood.

Moreover, as noticed in the above reviewed literatures and in invariably all policy documents of the Ethiopian government including the recent GTP document, the key differentiating line between the democratic developmental state and the neo-liberal state lies not in the idea that the democratic developmental state is pro-development and the neo-liberal one anti-development. Because such an assertion does not make sense as there can be no state which is by definition anti-development. So, in principle both models of state have development as their agenda. The difference comes rather on how to go about it. The neo-liberal state wants to bring it about by minimizing its role in the economy and leaving the room for the private

sector whereas the democratic developmental state wants to achieve it by advocating a big and active role for itself in the economy. In essence, both states are thus interventionists yet the point is the degree of their intervention- in the neo-liberalism case the degree is small while in the democratic developmental state model it is large. Then, despite the fact that contemporary literatures, world empirical experiences and Ethiopian government policy documents understand the two models in this way, the situation in the case of the local political leaders in Hawzein Woreda, however, is sadly found to be very far away from this. The problem of conceptual in-clarity at the political leadership level is evidently becoming in abundant supply is thus a big worry in itself in this regard. Why? Because how would one expect a leadership with an understanding of this nature, extent and depth be able to create clarity of direction during the process of mass mobilization towards clear actions and outcomes in the spirit of the true values and principles of the democratic developmental state.

On the other angle, in an in-depth- interview, the officials at the political leadership level in the Woreda were asked about “whether or not they feel the value and institutional foundations necessary for the success of a democratic developmental state do exist in their administration and if they exist to what extent they are functional in terms of realizing the spirit of democratic developmental state?”. On this point, few respondents feel that the necessary value foundations for a successful democratic developmental state (as they understood it above) are already on the ground in the Woreda.

For instance, they argued; “we as a Woreda, have a political leadership committed to development and democratization, an efficient and autonomous civil service and as well as a productive and development oriented private sector”. (Informant 16, 15/04/2014). On the contrary, a significant number of the respondents believe that the political leadership in the Woreda can be fairly judged as development-oriented (though still development is understood only in its narrowest sense-infrastructure establishment and expansion) but not as democracy- oriented one as it is observed to have made no tangible investment in this sector. Similarly, they argued, inefficiencies and lack of autonomy and un-productiveness largely characterize the civil service and private sectors in the Woreda respectively.

Asked about why such problems, most of the respondents feel that the lack of civil service autonomy is may be due to absence of clear boundary between state and party affairs. This is

to say that all civil servants in the Woreda are by default expected to be ruling party members and consequently they are almost wholly practically so now. This would thus deny them professional independence and loyalty to state/government duties. Instead, they are first and foremost accountable to party responsibilities. To this end, notions such as “party discipline” and “democratic centralism” play key roles in monitoring, evaluating and controlling civil servants’ behaviors and actions. This then is cultivating not a civil servant with culture and identity of professionalism, efficiency and autonomy but one with a dependent, patrimonialist and rent seeking culture and identity. As they argued, the private sector has also become un-productive and non-development and non-democratic -oriented for similar reasons.

### **5.1.2 The Understanding at Bureaucracy/Civil Service Level**

Scholarly researches and practical experiences of countries show that an efficient and autonomous civil service/bureaucracy with high degree of professionalism plays a critical role for the success of developmental states. With a well-institutionalized democratic culture added to this quality, the bureaucracy becomes an even irreplaceable actor in the process of building a democratic developmental state. Given this, therefore, it has become extremely important to assess the extent and depth of these actors understanding of the meaning, defining characteristic features and the necessary conditions for the success of the notion of democratic developmental state.

Asked about what they understand by the concept democratic developmental state, many of the discussants in the focus group discussion revealed that they know very little about what it actually means. They said “what we only roughly know about it is that it is a kind of state that has pro-poor policies and programs such as the safety- net, package programs that are meant to ensure food security for peasants and urban poor and this understanding we get it (like all other sections of our society) from government media news and expressions as well as some party or other political fora seminars and discourses” (FGDs, 11, 13, 19; /04/2014).

Otherwise, they further noted “we can’t claim we have a deeper scientific understanding of the concept as we could not access to appropriate sources of information or knowledge on the subject-for instance, to such sources as education and training centers, higher level academic

and research institutions. As a result, the respondents said, “we are doomed to be left with only an ideologically and politically induced understanding of the democratic developmental state notion” (FGDs, 11, 13, 19; /04/2014). It can thus be inferred from this that, despite their relatively better professional exposure, even the experts in various fields in the Woreda are observed to have no broader and deeper understanding of the democratic developmental state concept than the other key actors.

Moreover, in an in-depth- interview, respondents from secondary school teachers, experts and bureau heads in the agriculture and rural development offices were asked “whether or not they feel a committed and development and democracy-oriented political leadership, an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy and a productive and development and democracy-oriented private sector as the basic value and institutional foundations necessary for the success of a democratic developmental state - do exist in their Woreda?

Many of them expressed that they have a mixed feeling on this issue. On the one hand, they feel that some necessary institutions are already being put in place. This is true, they argue, particularly on the development (economic sector) wing. They supported this view by refereeing to investments being undertaken in the Woreda in physical and social infrastructure expansion. As they stated, their only concern in this regard is that the quality service delivery capacity of these institutions is not as remarkable as society would demand of them. On the other hand, they noted that they don’t feel that similar weight of investment is being made in the establishment and strengthening process of democratic institutions which, for a full-fledged democratic state, are as equally important as the development institutions are. In this respect, they said “As we are witnessing roads, schools, clinics and the like increasing in our Woreda which is very commendable, except for the formal government institutions, we are not witnessing ” (Informant, 1 & 8; 9,12/04/2014). The same pattern of investment move in the realm of democratic institutions – e.g. civic associations, pressure groups, interest groups, political parties, Media and similar others which are critical avenue for civic awareness creation and thereby in building and consolidation of democratic values and principles.

According to the respondents, the value-foundation part of the issue is an even more worrying one. i.e they don’t generally feel that currently their Woreda has a committed and

democratic development-oriented political leadership, an efficient and autonomous bureaucracy, a productive and democratic development-oriented private sector and most importantly an informed and active participant general public. Put differently, they said “.....Instead rent seeking and corruption on the part of our political leadership, inefficiency and lack of autonomy on the part of our bureaucracy and un-productiveness on the part of our minuscule small scale private sector are the predominant values currently dictating our development and democratization endeavors” (Informant 1, 17/04/2014 ).

### **5.1.3 The Understanding at the Private Sector Level**

Theoretically, it is argued that the existence of a vibrant productive and both development and democracy-oriented private sector a pre-condition to build a full-fledged democratic development state. However, in the context of Hawzein Woreda, a private sector with such nature and quality is largely absent to begin with and those that exist are only small scale ones with by and large an investment orientation towards non-productive sectors.

Asked about their understanding of the democratic developmental state notion and their role in its realization, interview respondents from the business sector are found to have understood the concept in almost the same manner as the respondents in the political leadership and the civil service/bureaucracy as mentioned above. Accordingly, they stated the key ideas that make up their understanding of the concept as this: “We (the respondents) understand the democratic developmental state concept as a state which is characteristically anti-thesis to “neo-liberalism” and hence a pro-development state model and more specifically it is a state model with pro-poor policies and programs for its society” (Informant from FGD participants, 13/04/2014).

On the issue of how they understand their role in realizing the spirit of democratic developmental state, a significant majority of members the business sector discussants revealed in a focus group discussion that they largely perceive their role in building a viable democratic developmental state is insignificant. In this regard, they stated “we in the business sector perceive that a key role in the process of building a democratic developmental state is to be expected from the federal and regional governments and most importantly from the strong leadership the ruling political party because, after all, given our capacity we couldn’t

believe we qualify as the ideally needed type of private sector expected in a full-fledged democratic developmental state-hence our role is an expectedly limited one”( *Ibid* ).

To conclude, therefore, most of the key actors in the democratic developmental state building process (in the political leadership, in the bureaucracy and in the private sector), are found to have possessed a narrow scoped and shallow depth understanding of the democratic developmental state notion. Yet, a significant number of them are also found to have a very confused and often misleading understanding of it. One can thus imagine that if this is so at the administrative levels very closer to higher level governance system and also modern information network, how serious the problem of understanding would be as we move down to the general public in the very small administrative units ( Kebele and kushet levels) with a largely detached geography from modern information flow.

In other words, the democratic developmental state understanding would naturally be narrower in its scope and shallower in depth. Even where an understanding of some degree exists it would still be expected an even more confusing and miss- leading one. The net implication of such kind of understanding is thus the notion of democratic developmental state in the Woreda is being carried out in the absence of clarity of thought and direction from leadership down to the general public. Its actions and outcomes would also naturally be constrained accordingly.

## **5.2 Local Public Institutions, Capacities and Implications for Bureaucratic Autonomy**

Capacity is most commonly defined as the process by which individuals, groups, institutions and organizations improve their ability to perform functions, identify and solve problems efficiently and to understand and deal with their development need in a broader context and in a sustainable manner (UNDP, 2005).

As a contemporary quote in local government goes the need for strengthening local government reads: "We cannot have successful globalization without successful localization." (Peter Cardinal Turkson quoted in Myerson 2013:p2) The estimation of how strong and capable the Ethiopian state bureaucracy must rely not only by assessing the central bureaucracy alone but also on how it performs out to the very periphery of its society

in both in governance and economic achievement. Therefore, an analysis of economic development is incomplete without considering local political leadership and autonomy.

According, to UNDP (2005) one indicator of institutional capacity is the availability of adequate number of staffs and low level of employee turnover. According to the WB (2013), the average employee turnover of Ethiopia reached 1.2% percent which by sub-Saharan standard is considered as moderate as it ranges from 2.0% to 2.2%. However, when the turnover rate is disaggregated by level of government, the 4.1% percent rate at the federal level turnover rate is quite high and should be of a concern to policy makers. The WB further asserts that it is quite difficult to develop capacity and sustain performance gains in any organization with such a high staff turnover.

When the employee turnover of the case study woreda is calculated it reached as high as 4.2% in 2013/14 while vacant positions of the local government are found to be 185. Therefore, the local public institutional capacity is overtly under serious crisis due to failure to retain the available staffs and to attract new entrants. Under such very serious employee turnover rate, the possibility for institutional capacity and bureaucratic autonomy is less trusted. Informants were asked what reasons that they can indicate. Even though it is commonly recognized that the current Ethiopian state structure recognizes woreda as the basic units of planning and political administration, the practice fail short of capacity problems.

In line this; findings of this research suggest that the woreda level government does not exercise sufficient decision-making power and self-rule to act as an autonomous local government entity. Formally, the woreda level of administration is a legally recognized independent local government authority and has been given powers and functions guaranteed by the regional constitution. In practice, however, it does not exercise sufficient local autonomy on budgetary, economic and social affairs and is tightly controlled by deconcentrated zonal administrations in each region. This is a clear implication of the absence of institutional capacity and autonomy under which the local public institutions are operating.

Local capacity limitations are pervasive in the current state of decentralization in Ethiopia. Empirical findings in different regions of Ethiopia therefore reveal the prevalence of serious capacity limitations in the local governments even they cannot exercise the exclusive powers given without restriction. Apaza (2013) for instance argued that many woredas face a critical lack of competent and trained personnel. Referring for instance, in Kelet Awlalo woreda (Tigray region) there are no clear planning guidelines that the local government can carry its responsibilities and most sector heads are not trained as planners but positioned to an office that they could not deserve (Apaza, 2013).

It is repeatedly argued that an extremely meritocratic form of recruitment constitutes the starting point in understanding the extraordinary degree of bureaucratic autonomy associated with the developmental states. However, as clearly indicated from the available evidences from local level informants, it is for a mere formality that vacancies are posted and announced but who to get the vacant position is predetermined based on some sort of favoritism mostly political affiliation. It is unthinkable at the local level to find an individual employed without the certification of party membership. It is also true according to the respondent that those civil servants except few secondary school teachers are party members. It is reported that from the total 1546 public employees in the woreda, 1265 are party members. In such kind of local government to think neutrality of the civil servant and competency of the bureaucracy is rarely feasible. This contradicts the democratic developmentalism principles. Therefore, under a bureaucracy where neutrality is overtaken by party affiliates, developmental feasibility is far from reality unless it is to be told in rhetoric.

In explaining the excessive party interference in local public matters the authors *Ojienda and Mbondenayi* (2013) further argued:

*Membership of the ruling party has become a duty failure to be a member entailing systematic exclusion and discrimination in access to public resources, including government employment. Given that the government is the principal employer, almost all new graduates and civil servants have joined the EPRDF. As a result, the membership of the party has more than quadrupled since the 2005 elections, a clear case of neo-patrimonialism, politics based on favors and grants. The 'carrot and stick' policy of benefiting members and excluding and*

*even harassing opposition party members and neutrals has apparently paid off. (Ojienda and Mbondenyi, 2013:p63-64).*

Therefore, capacitating public sector performance and the civil servants running it requires a conducive environment basically autonomous existence from counterproductive horizontal and vertical interferences and need to be subsidized with appropriate resource allocations; both material and human requirements. This in turn is supposed to enhance balanced horizontal and vertical checks and balance that further contributes in curtailing abuse of power in the public institutions.

As repeatedly argued it is generally acknowledged that recruiting and retaining professionally knowledgeable, skilled, committed and motivated personnel in the public service of the local government is a daunting challenge in the study woreda. The worrying concern is that existing levels of talent in the public service in the local government is rarely supportive to the development aspirations of the local government as expected due to various restrictions and manipulation. Moreover, the local government failed to find a mechanism that involves keeping those trained in critical areas in the local government; curtailing loss through turnover; keeping them constantly exposed to new knowledge, tools and techniques in their various fields and providing conducive work environment as well as the tools to work.

When the institution's legal framework, policies, rules, and procedures provide a consistent referent for operations, it is said to be good institutional capacity indicator (UNDP, 2005). Discussions and reflections in the case study woreda including local office holders affirmed that there is no culture of being abided by the laws and procedures that are available. It is emotions, common practices and unsystematic handling and decision making procedures that take precedent in many cases of local government. However, the deviation from procedures and systems of clear guideline may emanate consciously when local officials tend to manipulate the decisions in favor of their vested interest or unconsciously because of the capacity they have grasp what has to be done in a specific case of decision making procedures.

The local government institutions are under recognizable capacity limitations to act as creative agents of developmental state delegates at the local level. It is also revealed that decision making processes are unsystematic and the way local public institutions account each other and to the people are most of the time based particular vested interests. Particularly accountability between officials and elected representatives are inadequate, and there is a shortage of officials with the necessary technical, managerial and financial skills. This is also worsened by the fact that most of the local councilors are unsalaried individuals whom most of them are farmers with little educational background; the checking role of the local councilors is less feasible to be effective.

Due to less institutionalization and capacity limitations of public institutions at the local level as deduced from the key informants, violations of law in the study worda is common by the local office holders themselves that needs serious attention if democracy and justice is to be delivered to the mass equitably and in fair manner. Consistent to the findings from the informants, Yilmaz and Venugopal had presented their findings as:

*“...At the local level, while the letter of law is generally obeyed, the spirit of the law is mostly compromised. The separation of executive and legislative is blurred and all local government employees are beholden to the party administration” (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008:p7).*

According to informants, woreda officials pass decisions rarely up on their own confidence without the consent of zonal and regional superiors even though the matter that is to be decided is exclusively under the local jurisdiction. There is little recognition for local public demand for which the local government was established for.

Being incapable of discussing and negotiating with those who raise complain, local leaders use an approach of fear creation and intimidation so as to make the rest of complaints silent. At the local level, it is not only absence and denying of delivering good governance and good service that the local people are suffering from but they are also denied to voice their suffer and to say “there is lack of good governance”. Group of teachers in the secondary schools and, according to the FGD participants reflection, individuals who complained and submitted their copy of copy to the woreda, zonal and regional offices in writing are subjected to a political connotation that the local officials termed it as “Group Fourteen” “terrorists” “anti

people”, “Arena” “Hidden agenda holders” and so forth nomenclatures and harassment by different local cadres and their allies for the individual civil servants who complain on existing maladministration. Local office holders use the positions they have for harassing others and rewarding their loyal favors in an unjustifiable manner which is a sign of institutional failure and strength to control not only ordinary people but its creator too.

Informants from the justice office of the study woreda also underlined the problems of independence of the judiciary and the justice office itself. They wondered that the head of the justice administration of the woreda is a political appointee and with no doubt accountable to the party. So, in such case the informants asserted that:

One can imagine how justice office can serve neutrally and autonomously for all citizens regardless of their political outlook while its key coordinator is a politically appointed official? What really facing as prosecutors is totally different from what the law says and what is formally spoken on the stage in front of the public and the media. The head of the justice office tends to give political connotations for which they are pure legal matters and many times we come across conflicting interests while we are all together assumed to stand for justice and justice only. Therefore, what the law says and what practically is being done is in diametrical opposite which needs serious consideration from concerned bodies in the way politics and justice are independently treated (Informant24, 18/04/2014).

The whole story with regard to politicization of justice system in the case study woreda exactly fits to what Djilas wrote in his very impressive book *The New Class System*: political criminalization strategy is the way that communist political systems used to eliminate their potential and actual competitors and to make them stay under tight cadre control for what they speak, act and wants to pursue in every part of their life. He further argued:

*“....For these reasons political trials in communist regimes are mostly prearranged. The courts have the task of demonstrating what the power wielders need to have demonstrated; or have the task of giving a legal cloak to the political judgment on the "hostile activity" of the accused. In trials conducted by this method, the confession of the accused is most important. He himself must acknowledge that he is an enemy..... How are political trials handled? First, up on the suggestion of party functionaries, the party police establish that*

*someone is an "enemy" of existing conditions; that, if nothing else, his views and discussions; with close friends represent trouble, at least for the local authorities. The next step is the preparation of the legal removal of the enemy. This is done either through a provocateur, who provokes the 'Victim to make "embarrassing statements," to take part in illegal Organizing, or to commit similar acts; or it is done through a "stool pigeon" ;who simply bears witness against the victim according to the wishes of the police"(Djilas, 1957:p90-91).*

The WB also reduced such form of a political cause criminalization as it can occur in the form of: detection of alleged crime, political authorities or higher-level officials direct police to ignore a complaint, undertake an investigation, or arrest a "suspect" without probable cause and politicians can cause pressure on judges(WB, 2012).

Informants from kebele administration also responded that there is excessive fusion of public/government and party responsibility in the local governance activities. Surprising of all what the researcher come across from the respondents of kebele managers is the fact that "nationality identification card/Resident ID card" is distributed and verified by party structure of the kebeles ("Yekebele Mseretawi Aderejajet" or the core) if local residents are in need of it. It is very irritating and unbelievable to get nationality privilege reduced to the mercy of party control and administration. However, this is nothing but the sign of the degree of deep and excessive political interference on the non party matters which makes everything under tight party control.

The basic pillar of the current state of Ethiopian along line its federal and regional constitutions is institutionalizing and consolidating democratic governance which is characterized by people centered and people driven government via the making of government close to people with the tenet that local democracy must be adequately funded and resourced. The developmental local government, characterized by the principle of working with citizens and communities, is therefore at the heart of the constitutional framework and development policies of various levels of the government in the current Ethiopia.

However, de facto things turn apart and the essence of the constitutional principles rarely practiced at the local level. As Pausewang (2009: p72) presented it well as: “The sharp contradiction between constitutional principles and the central government claims and local practice is the indication of the greatest deficiency in Ethiopia’s democratic governance.”

In summary, if we are to follow evidences from the theoretical and empirical findings in line with the local level evidences from key informants at the local level, democratic developmental feature is under serious constraining factors. The local government capacity and the autonomy of the bureaucracy from political and economic vested interests is not prevalent in local government administration in the case study woreda. More importantly, institutional strategic orientation: an approach premised on people-centered and people-driven change; capacity to lead: alignment to the definition of common national agenda and in mobilizing all of society to take part in its implementation with full consent and consciousness; Organizational capacity: ensuring that its structures and systems facilitate realization of a set agenda; technical capacity: the ability to translate broad objectives into programmes and projects and to ensure their implementation are far from the reality of the local governance.

Because the requirements of a developmental state which inevitably needs a strong and capable bureaucracy that enjoy significant level of autonomy is far from prevailing due tight to top down accountability along party structure, weak local public institutions staffed by incapable leadership merely positioned for their political loyalty and submissiveness to serve their bosses are dominating the local administration .

### **5.3 Challenges of Democratic Developmentalism at the Local Governance**

#### **Context**

Local governance as discussed in the preceding analysis has challenged in practicing the notion of democratic developmental state due to multiple factors. Lack of development oriented political leadership, absence of performance oriented governance and local demand priority, lack of bureaucratic autonomy and untrained man power are discussed as critical challenges for this purpose.

### **5.3.1 None Developmental and Counterproductive Political Leadership Interference**

Available literature in Ethiopia local governance widely acknowledges that there is serious capacity and commitment limitations under local leadership and most of the time experts and political appointees used local office as a transition for other better positions. Worse of all however, as persuasively presented by *Pausewang (2009:p72)* “*Local leaders give priority to fulfilling the wishes of their superiors. Only positive reports and successes that strengthen their positions are passed upwards. This is one reason why the central leaders of the ruling party EPRDF remain ignorant to respond to the voice of the local people.*”

The relationship between local and national politics is vital for economic and political development and hence the consolidation of cohesive and capable political leadership at the local level is undeniably important. Leadership in developmental state is key actor of the societal transformation. Not only local leadership is expected to have cohesive knowledge of what is to mean democratic developmental state but also it has to make all other local people also need to be galvanized at the notion of democratic developmental ideology. However, practical reality from the key local officials shows that they have scant knowledge of theoretical conception of democratic developmental state. None of the key respondents from local offices explain the theoretical conceptualization and how it needs to be practiced.

It is widely acknowledged that without good governance the best talent cannot be identified, recruited and developed. It is under good governance Leaders hold onto power by providing collective benefits that earn support of large segments of society; Decision-making standards are explicit and procedures are transparent; Administrators are recruited and promoted in competitive processes that judge their merit and expertise; Administrators can only be dismissed with cause; Rules are applied with neutrality and all citizens receive equal treatment. Despite this conventional wisdom however, the findings from the case study woreda indicates that: Leaders hold onto power by providing personal favors that secure the loyalty of key followers; Decision-making standards are tacit and procedures are not legible;

Administrators can be dismissed for no reason; Rules are applied with partiality, and people with close ties to political attachment get preferential treatment.

Due to local level leadership capacity limitations to comprehend what is to mean by democratic developmental state accompanied by top down appointment and accountability ties, there is pervasive compromise and contradictions in the practice of considering the premises of democratic developmentalism.

Local leadership and its strategic orientation which is one important ingredient of democratic developmentalism that indicates committed leadership to people-centered and people-driven change is far to be feasible at the local level. The central concern that the local political and bureaucratic leadership focuses is routine political activities that is counterproductive to bring reliable societal transformation and public demand. At the local level it is not the people's interest that gets serious attention among the local office holders but the top down tight party accountability and instructions of upper offices with vested interest at the local affairs. Attempts of local office holders towards responding public demand and people centered orientation are found to be costly as it results up to dismissal of those who made that particular attempt.

Moreover, the local leadership is suffering short of the capacity in the definition of common national agenda and in mobilizing all of the local community to take part in its implementation while leadership in developmental state should have effective systems of interaction with all social partners, and exercise leadership informed by its popular mandate.

Moreover, leadership in developmental state is measured against its technical capacity which is the ability to translate broad objectives into programmes and projects and to ensure their implementation. This quality of leadership in turn depends on among others on the proper training, orientation and leadership of the public service, and on acquiring and retaining skilled personnel. Viewed from this perspective, evidences from the study area shows that it is more in rhetoric than implementation oriented performance that dominate the local

leadership and there is no clear measures that has been taken for the missed promises of local officials as a consequence of weak down ward accountability.

The capacity and credibility of legislative, administrative, law enforcement, judiciary and other government agencies are important determinant factors in realizing good governance, human rights and democracy. Even where appropriate and pro-poor policies and laws have been put in place, lack of capacity and political will among office holders can become a critical hindrance to their implementation. Accompanied by less check and balance mechanisms and down ward accountability channel, these problems are more acute at the lower levels of governance and administration of justice (Rahmato et al., 2009).

It is rightly argued when Yilmaz and Venugopal (2008) and Merara (2007), presents that at the local level in Ethiopia, while the letter of the law in the constitution is obeyed, the spirit of putting in practice are mostly compromised. To this end while it is persuasively asserted by many scholars and international organizations that democratic credibility, public involvement and consensus building are the core values and characterizations of contemporary developmental state, this seems missing promise as one goes down to local government. This in turn results citizens' distrust on public institutions and restrain them to give their consent to be governed mobilized persuasively which the case woreda under this research undertaking as evidences show is a typical of this kind.

According to informants of FGDs, there is an incidence of corruption that manifests itself in the form of embezzlement, discrimination, favoritism and the like. And most of this incidence affirmed due to the absence of strong checks and balance systems among the local level public institutions. Informants further asserted that lack of strong system of administration lack knowledge, competence and skill. Policies and strategies that flow from above are good but change can never exist in the absence of knowledgeable and skilled individuals. Moreover, since they are unpaid workers they can try to get some benefit through corruption. While it is widely recognized that leadership in developmental state is indispensable for success of social mobilization and empowerment, findings from

respondents indicated that the local leaders are only recipients what is said from above regard less of the appropriateness and the jurisdictional claim of the decision.

Informants from the local residents affirmed that the political leadership assigned to the top offices and running the local government affairs are those with law educational back ground that cannot write and read English properly and operate computer micro soft office word and open e-mail accounts. They are those local political elites that determine the fate of local bureaucratic autonomy under the guise of their bosses' instruction. Most of the time local meetings are about party activities and all government matters are decided in the party. Because of the fact that there is no functioning civil service apart for simple formality, most civil servants join the party either implicit or explicit imposition from local political cadres whose mere existence is dependent on serving the party.

Informants further indicated that unless local office holders are judged by the political elites of the local and some others above them, they are not most of the time accused due to public complain of abuse of power up on the particular official. This is a clear indication of non developmental and undermining of people centered political leadership described under the notion of democratic developmentalism in rhetoric in Ethiopia. Informants further argued that as they are bored of the government's political rhetoric on supremacy of people, consensus building, accountability and serving the public ahead of private interest and the like. What they missed really is not those who can make blessing speeches in different Medias and different formal stages rather the one who truly acts as per the promises of the laws enshrined in the constitution and different derivative development and governance documents.

### **5.3.2 Lack of Performance Oriented Governance and Local Demand Priority**

Developmental states are found to enjoy the support of their constituencies because they are associated with promoting rapid economic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general citizenry. Legitimacy of governor is derived from their high performance and commitment to curtail corruption and rent seeking activities. The local

governance in the study woreda is subjected to repetitive complains and loss of trust up on the local administrators that most of the time negotiated by third party intermediaries.

It is undeniable that to discharge their duties local level public institutions need to have exclusive functional competences, political willingness, administrative capacity and comprehensive understanding on the policies and strategies in certain areas of governance, which are clearly defined by national or regional constitution or other similar legislations. Such clarity of assignment and institutional obligations in line with the capacity to implement are believed to contribute for the realization of local democratic development that in turn harnesses public legitimacy. However, the local administrators have double constraints; first they have their own capacity limitation and second lack of proper autonomy to decide on local matters based on local demand and priority.

Sizable portion of the informants reflect that there is deteriorating legitimacy at the local level for public offices for their poor performance to meet local demands and priorities. The most important way of governing the people in study area as repeatedly reflected by informants is fear creation and intimidation while it has to be negotiation and renegotiation process. The local officials employ harsh reactions for simple developmental public demand particularly when they fail to give appropriate answers.

Therefore, while the central feature of governance in developmental state is effectiveness in meeting the societal demand as promised in condensed period of time, the governance performance at the local level goes far beyond this logic. This is most of the time attributed to the capacity limitations and lack of proper people centred development and governance commitment. This situation is also exacerbated by the strict top down performance accountability rather than bottom up performance orientation. Here, local office holders tend to meet the wills and instructions that come from regional or zone administrators which most of the time are pumped via the party channels. Consequently, there is little room for local officials to give strict follow up of local demands which in turn undermines recognizable legitimacy of the local residents to office holders for whom they are formally assigned to meet the local demand and priorities.

In conformity to this, some kebele manager key informants asserted that, there is a serious fusion of politics and administration in the local government. We the kebele managers are de jure civil servants employed by the local government and our responsibility is to serve public equally. However, we are forced to join to the party membership with no question and we are now serving not only as members but rather serving as top leadership in the party structure of the kebele. If we ask why this is so in the meetings of woreda government, they gave us a very irritating answer that says “The party is same as the government and it is because of the presence of the party that you are here as a salaried employee” and hence every public servant at local office by default is supposed to be member of the party.

This seems exactly what Vaughan and Tronvoll have argued. They argued: Nearly all the officials in the state administration, from the kebele to the federal government are EPRDF members, having joined the party before or soon after election to their post. Government business is discussed and decisions are made in party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:p35). In view of the party-state merger, it is understandable that Ethiopians have difficulty distinguishing between them. (Markakis 2001 quoted in Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:p35).

Consistent to Tronvoll assertion, according to human resource personnel management of the TPLF office of hawzen woreda, out of 1546 (total public employees), 1265 which is 81.8% are members of the party. Almost anonymously, informants of the different offices and local community members in the woreda reflected membership to the party is mandatory in most cases explicitly and implicitly specially for the civil servants of the local government offices. Willingly or unwillingly therefore, due to the pervasive fear and intimidation imposed on the local public servants by their bosses in different offices, many civil servants in the woreda used the party membership as a hiding strategy and a means of maximizing material benefit. The remaining non affiliated public servants whom many of them are teachers incur the cost of different privileges including their professional career development opportunities for being not a member to the party.

Despite the logical reality of the way that local governors have expected to do, they served more often than not as many informants argued to boost the ruling elites’ power and to facilitate their self-enrichment, in short: to establish predatory rule instead of performance

oriented governance. Informants further argued the local office holders are based on intense personalization of authority and are not conducive to performance-oriented governance. They most often depends on the distribution of spoils to stay in power and diverted huge amounts of public resources for patronage purposes, detracting from genuine development efforts in the process. They used public offices to reward their loyal friends and affiliates regard less of their relevance to positions that they are going take over.

Contrary to this, however, it is common observation at the local level as informants affirmed and also assessed some related files of cases in the local government offices that those who are critical and capable actor in their area of respective position and stand for principle are subjected to different interruptions and sometimes that extend to expulsion from office for unjustifiable causes of accusation. In this case, it is not the performance orientation that gets precedent instead the priorities and interests of local political elites and their allies are most important.

In summary, performance oriented governance requires committed leadership that aspires and politically wilful elites to bring social transformation a head of private interest. Their commitment to serve the public is supposed to be their willingness to allocate skilled personnel for vacant positions for rational reasons of performance enhancement and societal benefits regardless of political and other favours. However, as information as revealed from the informant and the actual institutional compositions of the local public offices infer that there is clear line of party favour and unproductive interruptions in the affairs that are even purely non party matters. This is contributing for local patron client relationship which is repeatedly cited as critical hindrance for performance oriented governance. Therefore, the overall governance performance and especially in abuse of power manifested in the form of political manipulation and favor are very pervasive in the study area which sharply contradicts the value and principles under which democratic developmental states are consolidated.

### **5.3.3 Lack of Bureaucratic Autonomy and Untrained Man Power**

As repeatedly indicated in the above discussions, the civil service in the study woreda is filled by individual office holders who have any significant educational background. FGD

participant and individual informants asserted that, for assigning to a position in the local offices you need to be in the first place party member for any kind of office and in the second step you need to get some favors from the officials already in position. It is in this way that local offices are filled and staffed that one cannot wonder if policies and strategies of the government got failed due to incompetent and unskilled office holders. In the study woreda for instance, the chief administrator is only grade ten complete, head of peace and security office head of the woreda is also grade seven who is rarely capable of reading and writing in Tigrigna and Amharic but nothing more particularly English. Therefore, one can imagine that these individuals and their allies are administrating approximately 130,000 people with no foundational public legitimacy and recognition from the official themselves in particular and the local residents in general.

According to the informants, people have complained many times for their disappointment of local administrators' incapability to give appropriate leadership that they perceive as lack of adequate educational back ground. Individual informants further wondered saying that how individual office holders for whom they have no mass support for their performance but with such educational back ground that cannot communicate in English lead 130, 000 people for many years and continuing to lead. These positions in black white are reserved for them while many masters and relevant degree holders are expelled to an office that is much lower than the offices hold by those with no educational back ground except for writing and reading local language.

When Maphunye (2009) explained such way of recruitment and promotion of officials to some preferential offices; in weaker political economies, particularly of the African nature, the bureaucratic arena itself is highly politicized and interconnected with sectional interests; it is where power employment and patronage are concentrated. So vested interests dominated bureaucracy lacking autonomous existence and in which patronage is the value. This tends to undermine the notion of democratic developmentalism which in turn seriously hampers public service motivation, public morale and participation in development programmes.

Consistent to this proposition and explanation, there is a serious politicization any routine activities and impeding the functioning of the local bureaucracy. This impedes the need for consolidating and institutionalizing competent civil service through which developmental state gets its roots. There is no prior experience that reveals developmental state prevailed under politicized civil service or bureaucracy rather they do exist states which ensured insulation of the bureaucracy. Referring findings from the study area, there is excessive fusion of political and administrative matters to the extent that one cannot separate party and government matters. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that there is little room for autonomous and neutral bureaucracy staffed in the basis of rigorous meritocratic standard. Instead civil servants are recruited based on patronage and party loyalty certifications.

Political leadership and civil service in less developed countries are regarded as mostly about creating jobs and controlling access to state favors (Moss, 2007:95). Under such situation, it is too hard to find a leadership that can align to the principles of democratic developmental state notion of serving public interest a head of private profiting. It is clearly apparent at the local level as drawn from key informants to this research that the local offices are filled and staffed according to highly discriminatory way of recruitment to pick the favors of the established local employees who controlled key local offices.

This office holders have little concern for the effectiveness and performance orientation of the local public institutions and most of the time they defend their private interest like staying in power regardless of local people complain and rejection of their leadership. They tend to preserve the consent of their bosses who gave them the positions that they are making their live to continue with recognizable entitlements. In the study woreda, where the public/civil service is often regarded as a means of rewarding friends, relatives and political colleagues with positions in the bureaucracy, in exchange for loyalty and other favors, the issue of appointing officials on merit is very problematic for the democratic developmental state principles to get appropriate precedent. Sizable portion of the informants have low level of trust and respect to the local public institutions particularly for being self centered officials that have little concern for public matters and demands.

## **5.4 Prospects of Building a Democratic Developmental State in the Woreda**

As discussed above in some detail, a considerable number of scholarly works asserted that in countries that are not characterized, among others, by ample homogeneity and concomitantly strong nationalism in their socio-cultural and civic foundations, authoritarianism in their political systems (as in the experience of the Asian Tigers), there is no or (if any) only little prospect for building and entrenching states modeled on the notion of “developmentalism”. So, consequently, in states that are socio-culturally characterized by marked diversity/heterogeneity and above all by strong ethnic/cultural nationalism and loose civic nationalism (as is the case in most African countries, Ethiopia included), it is meant that it either needs extremely unique efforts or else is unlikely to practice the notion of democratic developmental state in its full sense.

In this sense, the issue of building a democratic developmental state is thus even a more demanding agenda in those societies. Because to build a state that is simultaneously both democratic and developmentalist is an ambitious and hence a very expensive project as it requires big investments in the area of the value and institutional foundations upon which such a state is erected. Looking at such atmosphere of pessimism, some scholars and policy practitioners even went on as far as advocating “the impossibility theorem” thesis to indicate that the idea of building a full-fledged democratic developmental state in those settings is not anything more than a mere rhetoric.

However, this is only one side of the story. There are also, on the other hand, many scholarly works and country experiences that have shown a room of optimism on the possibility of building a democratic development state even in those states and societies where the impossibility theory is advocated. Then, since recently cases from African states have begun to be supplied as examples to attest such line of argument that building a democratic developmental state is possible and desirable in African societies. In some states/ societies like Ethiopia doing so is even considered as a matter of survival and not a mere option. It is thus against such conflicting views that an assessment of the prospect for realizing the spirit of democratic developmentalism in the context of Hawzein Woreda is discussed below. Accordingly, from the opinions and perceptions of the various participants (political officials, civil servants, business community ...etc) in the focus group discussion and interview

secessions, three major areas of prospect are identified as crucial to laid down the basement for democratic developmentalism values and principles at the local governance level.

The first prospect lies in the existing legal and policy frame works both at national and regional levels. In this case, the spirit of the FDRE and Tigray National Regional State (TNRS) constitutions is of a prior importance. If one argues (as shown in review of literatures and experiences of countries above) that what a successful democratic developmental state needs as its foundations are such core values and institutions as commitment (from a political leadership), efficiency and autonomy (from bureaucracy), productivity (from the private sector) and most crucially an institutionalized partnership between them then it can easily be found out that both the FDRE and the Tigray National Regional State constitutions in their fundamental principles and detailed provisions have solid grounds that go well in line with democratic developmental state's value and institutional foundations. A case in point here might be the fact that both constitutions have in principle recognized among others such key principles as vertical and horizontal power sharing/separation and check and balance system, decentralization and local government autonomy (self-rule) and empowerment, free and competitive market economy, multi-party politics, state-party separation and judicial and civil service independence and respecting, protection and promotion of citizens' fundamental human and democratic rights.

Similarly, all the major policy documents of the Ethiopian government that came out after the country officially declared that it is building itself through the democratic developmentalism path also produced values, principles, programs and guidelines that are very well in tune with the very values, sprits, and intentions of democratic developmentalism. Among others, the recent GTP document can be taken as a proving case in point here. In the GTP it is clearly stated that notions of development and democracy broadly understood are not mutually exclusive- hence they can be developed in parallel. One should not proceed to or preside over the other. The document further states that a successful effort at making the Ethiopian state developed (to be measured by its ability of acceding to the status of middle income country by 20-25) is possible only when there is a strong and mutually reinforcing partnership between the public and private sectors.

The essence of the partnership as put in the document is thus for each actor to contribute its part one hand and for both actors to correct and complement each other's failures on the other hand. What this entails is therefore, existing policy documents are clear in terms of the value and institutional setups they want to establish for a democratic developmental state. It is also to serve this end that the GTP and other documents/ manuals openly promote such values as competitiveness and productivity on the part of the private sector and also condemn and criminalize such values as corruption and rent-seeking on the part of all actors in the process of development and democratization in general and on the part of political leadership and civil service/bureaucracy in particular. Because, doing this would bring about a rapidly growing and equitable economy.

It can thus be concluded that the values and institutions incorporated in the constitutional and legal frame works and policy documents of the Ethiopian government don't have contradictory but only supplementary and complementary ones to the value and institutional foundations mentioned in contemporary literatures and experiences of countries as pre-conditions for a successful democratic developmental state. Hence, they can be taken as very good prospects or opportunities yet to be exploited by the Woreda under study. What might be seriously needed here, however, is the idea of constitutionalism (i.e. genuine practice of the spirits of the constitutions and policy documents to the letter by all actors at all levels). And, to this end, their internalization at individual level and institutionalization at system level becomes a mandatory one.

The second prospect lies in the area of the physical and human resource potential that are being accumulated at national, regional and local levels. Infrastructure expansion and emerging professionalism deserve mentioning in this regard. On the physical infrastructure side, there is now a gradually increasing trend of investment on roads, energy supply, and Information Communication Technology system in the Woreda which could be taken as good opportunity for attracting a productive private sector to invest on productive sectors that would in turn boost up the economy and there by positively contribute to one of the key goals of a democratic developmental state creating a rapidly growing economy. Similarly, the investments being made on the social infrastructure sector such as those in the education and training institutions, health sector and trade and service giving institutions both at the Woreda

and at national/regional levels could, if properly exploited, also be key assets in the process of professionalizing the governance system (development as well as democracy governance) in general and the civil service/bureaucracy in particular. Because, ten and hundred thousands of professionals in different fields are being produced almost on a yearly basis from those institutions. So, if placed in right places, they could critically fill the knowledge and skill gaps currently observed in relation to the notion of democratic developmentalism in the Woreda.

In a net shell, therefore, by developing the human capital potential in to a social capital potential the productivity and efficiency-related problems of the private sector, the professionalism, efficiency and autonomy-related problems of the civil service and the commitment and clarity of thought- related problems of the political leadership that reflect themselves in an emerging Democratic Developmental State in general and, as also discussed above, in the Woreda under discussion in particular can be mitigated before they pose an appreciable harm of any sort. Given this, therefore, the area of existing resource potential exploitation and mobilization deserves to be taken as one critical prospect for the notion of democratic developmental stat to take root in the Woreda and also elsewhere via a scaling up process.

Finally, the third prospect is to be found in the realm of world experience. Here, base line experiences for knowledge gap filling and performance improvements are of utmost significance. Since adoption/ adaptation is technically much easier task than innovation/invention for any actor, taking lessons from world experiences (especially those driven from governance/administrative structures that have similar or equivalent status ) would be of paramount importance for the Woreda under survey. And, in this case there are sufficient experiences that the world can offer. From the failure stories, the lesson not to repeat the same mistakes and from success stories, the lesson to carefully adopt, strengthen and scale them up could be learned. Accordingly, about issues like how to understand the democratic developmental state notion and how best to establish the foundations for a viable and reliable democratic developmental state both bad and good lessons are available both from states/societies with similar settings and those with different settings. In this case, for instance, lessons could be taken from the histories and actual situations of local governances

in Asian states with a long established experience of the developmental state model such as the Asian tiger countries and also from the local governances of African states with an emerging experience of the democratic developmental state model like countries such as Republic of South Africa and Botswana. To conclude, therefore, since lessons drawn from world experiences on the Alphas and Omegas of the democratic developmental state notion especially in the context of local governance is extremely important for the better internalization and institutionalization of the essence of the concept and then for its proper implementation on the ground, it has to be taken as one prospect area or opportunity to be yet exploited.

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

### 6.1 Conclusion

One of the most serious challenges in today's ever changing political, social and economic circumstances is how to reconfigure the role of the state and most often however, the ideal state as the emerging consensus reveal is characterized as democratic developmental state.

In the preceding chapters of this research, it has provided a framework to understand the concept of a democratic developmental state. Though not exhaustive, the researcher has defined the democratic developmental state based on its institutional attributes and objectives. It is also indicated that democratic developmental state not only has the institutional attributes of the classical developmental state that is, being autonomous, performance oriented governance, development oriented political leadership and coherent, but also takes on board the attributes of procedural democracy. In addition, the democratic developmental state is one that forges broad-based alliances with society and ensures popular participation in the governance and transformation processes. Regardless of the system of government, democratic developmental state is guided by the goals of coherence and authoritative governance, accountability, inclusiveness, stability, ability to generate consensus and popular participation.

In the contemporary reality, the most desirable state arrangement to realize the ideal state reconfiguration of democratic developmental state is democratic decentralization with believe that local governments are in close proximity to the people and so in a better position than the central government to meet public demand. In the developing world therefore, the feasibility of democratic developmentalism lies on the appropriateness of defining the local government and power transfer in a way developmental local government is realized. To this end, contemporary developmental state is no more feasible in top-down approach as the classical developmental states reveal if it strives to get democratic credibility at national and international contexts.

Paradoxically however, in most developing countries for which Ethiopia is one, the *de jure* power transfer for the creation of democratic and developmental local government fall short of real institutionalization and capacity limitation. This is also attributed to the lack of

commitment from above to refrain from imposing their vested interest in the affairs of local government. This manifestation as revealed from empirical and practical evidences is facilitated via tight top down accountability channels of the sole political party.

Current decentralization measures are intended to meet to make the state both democratic and developmental through which opportunities for citizens participation in decision making is widen. In doing so however, local autonomy is a key in the local government organization and reconstruction to meet the aspiration of democratic developmentalism. Democracy as a political system in its relation to local autonomy therefore stands on at least two requirements; namely (1) concentration of all institutions in empowering the people and (2) the intensification of checks and balances mechanisms among local institutions. Orienting the state towards this context at institutional level signifies the developmental state program.

Because there is limitless political party interference at the local level under which this study is conducted, the autonomy of local government is seriously threatened which eventually undermined the separation of powers among horizontal and vertical actors of the public institutions at the local level. The local public office holders are found responding to those who actually made them to enjoy the offices they are assigned for. Undeniably, there is a trend for strengthening local governments to discharge their responsibilities autonomously in their area of jurisdiction rhetorically. However, the powers transferred to the local government are not supported by required resources – human and material resources nor created conducive environment for attracting and retaining skilled man power. Most importantly, the local public offices suffer from serious staff turnover rates that supersede more than three times the national employee turnover rate. As a consequence of this reality, the local government and its branch offices are suffering from lack of proper legitimacy and virtually deliver unsatisfactory services to their immediate electorates at the local level.

Institutional attributes are important yardsticks to judge whether or not a state is a developmental state. Viewed from the institutional attributes of developmental state, the local government under investigation is neither it possess the core values and principles under which the democratic developmental state is explained as claimed in the current Ethiopia nor its excessive top down decision making and its *de facto* more focus on economic issues

move it to the authoritarian developmental state character. There is wide reaching rhetoric of democratic developmentalism and mere imitated words of this alternative development path at the local level. However, none of the findings reveal developmental state attribute in strict sense.

## 6.2 Recommendations

As the available theoretical and empirical literature reveals, the most serious challenge that resulted in impeding democratic developmental state building are tensions in the political-administrative interface, instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability and authority, poor organizational design and low staff morale. To build local government of democratic developmental character the following measures need to get considerable attention.

*Strengthen local government institutional capacity and autonomy:* develop an enabling framework for local government with active support and oversight from national, regional and zonal government authorities. In this case an emphasis need to be given for long-term approach to developing skills together with a professional ethos and commitment to public service along with mainstreaming citizen participation thereby bottom up accountability.

*Strengthen delegation, devolution, accountability and oversight:* democratic developmental state making in countries like Ethiopia under massive decentralization at least in principle, is inseparable from democratic decentralization and local governance. Promoting and supporting greater and more consistent delegation supported by systems of support and oversight is therefore critical if democratic developmental local government is to emerge so that to form democratic developmental state at large. Making it easier for citizens to hold public servants and politicians accountable, particularly for the quality of service delivery creates local officials responsibility to the demands local people in the one hand and balance of top down - bottom up accountability on the other.

*Make the public service and local government administration careers of choice:* building a skilled and professional public service from both the top and the bottom level is with no doubt a choice of no alternative if capable and insulated bureaucracies are to take the required precedent. Recruitment and management should be based on a clear standard of experience, expertise and the skills that will be necessary for future public service path ways. The public service should attract highly skilled people and cultivate a sense of professional common purpose and a commitment to developmental goals. To achieve this,

Ethiopia needs a two-sided approach to building a more professional public service from the top and the bottom.

It needs to increase the pool of skilled people by ensuring that the public service and local government become careers of choice for graduates who wish to contribute to the development of the country by availing themselves at the local level. Building a skilled and professional public service requires a vision of how public servants' experience and expertise will develop during their careers and can be improved through: a formal graduate recruitment scheme for the public service and career path for local government. Therefore, by making the local government comfortable area of bearing office responsibilities, it is possible for making the local government center of attraction for professionals. Like any other public institutions in Ethiopian public sector as empirical evidences show, skill shortage is most evident in the local government and hence developing technical professional skill need to take precedent.

*Stabilize the political-administrative interface:* Building a professional public service that serves government, but is sufficiently autonomous to be insulated from political patronage. This requires a clearer separation between the roles of the political principal and the administrative head. As finding from the study area shows that there is excessive fusion of party and government undermining the entire institutional set up of the local political environment. Making clear demarcation between party and government need to get considerable attention thereby enhancing local autonomy and capable bureaucracy under which viable democratic developmental local government is explained.

Therefore, as there is little historical account that reveals developmental state is consolidated under less autonomous civil service and incompetent professionals, the local government in the study area needs to expose itself to the world experience so that to reduce the practical and potential challenges that hinder the democratic developmental state priority.

## Appendix A: Interview and Focus group discussion guide

Mekelle University

College of Business and Economics

Department of Management

Postgraduate Development studies

I am Weldeabrha Niguse from Mekelle University working on an MA thesis titled as “Democratic Developmental State from Local Governance Perspective the Case of Hawzen Woreda”. The purpose of this interview (both focus group and individual based interviews) in line with the mentioned title is therefore to solicit the perceived and actual governance practices that the local community is experiencing and it’s compliance to the values, principles and practices of the democratic developmental state. This interview is part of the research towards MA degree in development studies at Mekelle University. The results of the study will be drawn from the suggestions of respondents in this interview accompanied by significant theoretically supportive explanations. Therefore you are kindly requested to provide with a genuine response and I want you to assure that the information you provide will only be applied to academic purpose and never bypass to any other third body and it will kept confidentially.

## *I. General Interview questions to be applied for all interviewees*

Since a decade ago, the current EPRDF led government officially declared democratic developmental state as alternative development path to neoliberalism. Here under, there are some related questions used to examine the essence and practice of democratic developmental state in general and in context to the local governance that are to be discussed with you.

- How do you explain the notion of democratic developmental state?
- Do you think democratic developmental state is appropriate development path for Ethiopia? How?
- What are the major rational for the current government to introduce democratic developmental state paradigm?
- Could you mention any value and principle foundations of ideal democratic developmental state?
- How feasible is the local government to be democratic and developmental in its current status in terms of;
  - ✓ Institutional capacity
  - ✓ Institutional legitimacy
  - ✓ Reliable human resource
  - ✓ Elite commitment
  - ✓ Corruption prevention and related issues?
- What do you think are the major challenges of local democratic development?
- How democratic and development oriented are the local elites in putting public interest ahead of sectional interest?
- How committed and free from self centeredness, discrimination and corruption are the local elites? What challenges are facing the local government in this respect?
- How competent and autonomous, from any sectional interest (higher and horizontal authorities, local business elites etc...), is the local bureaucracy in passing decisions? Could you elaborate your answer please?
- Whose interests do you think are mostly prioritized/sectional interest or the public? Explain.
- What are the channels through which local people can influence decision making in favor of their interest?

- How do you evaluate the general institutional capacity and performance of the local government against the standards what ought to be in democratic developmental state taking into consideration the prevalence of:
  - ✓ Professional civil servant
  - ✓ Autonomous bureaucracy
  - ✓ Capable and legitimate leadership
  - ✓ Mutually cooperative and cohesive leadership?
- As one layer of government, what major impediment do you think are retarding from being democratic developmental local government?
- Do you think the local authorities are giving cohesive leadership?
- In its current status, how do you explain the institutional legitimacy of local government? Do the public trust the local government?
- Do you think the local government is capable of galvanizing local people towards specified development goals persuasively?
- How effective is the local government in the management of private businesses interests in terms of level of success in preventing corruption and discrimination?
- One basic feature of developmental state is depoliticized bureaucracy to extent possible and maintaining bureaucratic autonomy. How do you explain the local bureaucracy from this perspective?
- In developmental state, the prevalence of trust and confidence building institutions and norms such as rule of law, justice and peace are regarded as corner stone for the enhancement of institutional legitimacy and democracy. How this trust and confidence building institutions and norms are practiced in this local governance?
- Are the trust building institutions such as human rights commission, ombudsman, anticorruption and others accessible to the local people to present their complain if they have any?
- What can the local people learn from the local officials practice in terms of commitment to serve public interest, honesty and transparency etc.?
- Could you suggest any possible way out to enhance good opportunities and overcome the prevailing impediments in the overall local governance?

- ✓ How do you explain the political civil service interface in the local government?
- ✓ Could you explain how employees of local office (civil servants) for vacant positions are recruited, appointed and promoted? What are the major criterions? Do you believe these ensures meritocracy?
- ✓ To what extent do local government officials enter to civil service via formal examination? What about via appointment based on political affiliation?
- ✓ Do you believe the local government is adequately staffed both in terms of quantity and professional qualification?
- ✓ What channels and incentive mechanisms do the local government has to attract, promote and retain qualified professionals?
- ✓ How do you explain the general employee turnover (as result of promotion to higher government and to other alternative employment opportunities)?

## II. *Questions for local (woreda) council members only*

- What are the objectives of this council?
- How do you work/operate in this area to realize these objectives?
- How is this council managed?
- To what extent is this council representative of the local people in this area?
- Do you think the people feel represented by this council? Please elaborate your answer
- What mechanism does this council use to account to the people?
- If this council has to realize its objectives, human resource is important. How do you explain the council in this respect?
- What are the contributions of this council to the overall democratization and development of the local community?
- How autonomous and competent is this council in terms of decision making from horizontal and vertical actors?
- In your opinion, what do you think is/are the reason(s) for the successes/failures of the council?

## III. Questions for the civil service officials of the local government only

- ✚ What is the mission and vision of the civil service?
- ✚ What are the objectives of the civil service office of the local government?

- ✚ What does the civil service law say in recruitment, appointment and promotion of public employees?
- ✚ To what extent do the practice complement with the civil service law?
- ✚ Do you believe meritocracy, professionalism and competition are the guiding principles for selection of individuals for vacant positions in the local government? Could you explain your answer with some practical exemplifications?
- ✚ Is the civil service office itself equipped with qualified personnel to discharge its responsibility to extent possible?
- ✚ What are the major challenges that hinder the civil service law based recruitment, appointment and promotion? What about the good experiences you have so far?
- ✚ If you have any suggestion you want to add in this regard?

#### *IV. Focus group discussion questions*

- ❖ Have you ever been familiarized with the notion of democratic developmental state?
- ❖ How do you explain and understand democratic developmental state?
- ❖ How democratic and development oriented are the local public institutions?
- ❖ Good political governance entails an effective separation of powers between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive and this is the prerequisite for constructing viable democratic developmental state. How do you evaluate the practice of local public institutions in this regard?
- ❖ What are the recurrent observations that you have experienced in this local governance in respect to democratic good governance?
- ❖ Are the institutions of democracy and development getting similar pace of attention in the local governance environment? To which do you think is the inclination?
- ❖ How do you evaluate the separation of power in the local government and their implication for democratic good governance?
- ❖ What do you think is the dominant opinion held by the local people with regard to justice, rule of law, respect for public demand and responsiveness?
- ❖ How do you explain the political and civil service interaction and its implication for autonomous and meritocracy oriented civil servants at the local level?

- ❖ What are the general methodologies used for recruitment, appointment and promotion of local public employees? How do you explain its relevance for retaining qualified experts at the local level?
- ❖ How comfortable the local political and administrative environment is for the local civil servants?
- ❖ What do you think are the major impediments for democratic good governance in this area and the possible way out that you can suggest?
- ❖ Do you have any additional suggestion you need to forward?

Thank you for your cooperation!

## Appendix B: List of Informants

Informants/FGDs	Office of Informants	Date of interview	Place of interview	Remarks
Informant 1	Civil Service office	April 9, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 2	*****	April 9, 2014	Selam kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 3	*****	April 9, 2014	Selam kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 4	Millennium village project	April 11, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 5	Masho 2 <sup>ty</sup> School	April 11, 2014	Hawzen Town	Teacher
Informant 6	*****	April 11, 2014	Selam kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 7	*****	April 12, 2014	Selam kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 8	Civil Service office	April 12, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 9	Agriculture & rural dev't	April 12, 2014	>>	
Informant 10	Agriculture & rural dev't	April 12, 2014	>>	
Informant 11	Worda council	April 14, 2014	>>	
Informant 12	Edaga selus 2 <sup>ty</sup> School	April 14, 2014	Edaga Selus	Teacher
Informant 13	HWDA office	April 14, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 14	Hawzen kebele office	April 15, 2014	>>	
Informant 15	Woreda council	April 15, 2014	>>	
Informant 16	Administration office	April 15, 2014	>>	
Informant 17	Megab 2 <sup>ty</sup> School	April 15, 2014	Megab	Teacher
Informant 18	Woreda Council	April 17, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 19	Justice Office	April 17, 2014	>>	
Informant 20	Justice Office	April 17, 2014	>>	
Informant 21	*****	April 17, 2014	Dgum kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 22	*****	April 17, 2014	Dgum kebele	Not an office holder
Informant 23	HWDA office	April 18, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 24	Selam kebele office	April 18, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 25	*****	April 18, 2014	Hawzen Town	Not an office holder
Informant 26	Dgum kebele office	April 18, 2014	Dgum kebele	
Informant 27	HWDA office	April 19, 2014	Hawzen Town	
Informant 28	Administration office	April 19, 2014	>>	
FGD 1		April 11, 2014	>>	From different offices
FGD 2		April 13, 2014	>>	>>
FGD 3		April 19, 2014	>>	>>

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