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Discussion Paper No. 52

THE KENYA LITTLE GENERAL ELECTION: A STUDY IN
PROBLEMS OF URBAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION

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June 1967

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The Kenya Little General Election: A Study in

Problems of Urban Political Integration

John W. Harbeson

This paper deals with some problems of achieving political integration in two Kenya cities as reflected in the background, issues, and conduct of the Little General Election, 1966*. The election was "little" because it affected only twenty-nine members of Parliament out of 169, forced by a new constitutional amendment to seek re-election after they left the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). Their departure to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU) posed a challenge to KANU's efforts at achieving political integration. Since Independence, KANU has made a notable effort to unite people of all races, tribes, political backgrounds, and economic fortunes in the common task of nation building. This paper will focus on the unsuccessful attempts of a dissident MP in Nairobi and one in Nakuru to retain their seats against new KANU candidates, from the standpoint of urban problems of political integration.

The election contests in the urban constituencies of Nakuru and Nairobi East demonstrated the essential ambiguity of the Little General Election as a whole, for the opposition Kenya People's Union campaigned in protest against alleged broken promises by the KANU Government but could not campaign as an alternative to its rule. Although KANU did not put great stress on this fact, it is a reasonable hypothesis even in the absence of a voter survey that a majority of the voters understood that even a victorious KPU would not have enough seats in Parliament to form the Government. At least the two urban elections, it is very possible that KANU victories reflected popular

* In this paper the author has used the following definition of political integration: that political integration refers to the degree of consensus among politically oriented groups and their leaders on fundamentals of policy and to the degree of shared willingness to accept and participate in a common structure of rights, duties, powers, benefits, and constraints.

appreciation that the solutions to social and economic problems could come only from the Government whether or not people thought the Government had made any progress so far. Similarly voting for KPU may well have been governed as much by existing personal and ethnic loyalties as disapproval of the government's record since Independence. What is not clear, therefore, is the political response of the urban electorate to the Government's nation building record since independence and whether the urban electorate was to any extent voting on the basis of its social and economic condition rather than ethnic and personal allegiances.

In the absence of a voter survey to clarify these built-in ambiguities, the problems of political integration in the urban constituencies as brought to light by the Little General Election can only be illuminated by examination of the local political structures within which the contests took place and through analysis of the issues as presented by the candidates. The local leadership battles reflected the problems for political integration caused by shifting ethnic proportions, major policy questions, and the social and economic conditions of the cities' inhabitants. The structure of local political leadership is relevant to the declared intention of the national KANU leadership to organize the party as an effective instrument of communication between the people and the central government.¹ The policy issues discussed in the campaign lay bare some of the major dilemmas of achieving economic and social progress in a less developed country, and the implications of this progress for political integration.

A. Social and Economic Background

The development of both Nakuru and Nairobi East has been heavily influenced by the circumstances of the surrounding rural areas. Before Independence Nakuru was dependent upon the prosperity of the surrounding European farmers and was the acknowledged if unofficial capital of the European agricultural community. The headquarters of the Kenya Farmers Association and the Kenya National Farmers' Union, in the past the principal European farming organizations, have been in Nakuru. Many of the leading European politicians of recent times have been large scale farmers in the Nakuru area. Among them have been the present Minister for Agriculture, Bruce McKenzie; Sir Michael Blundell, formerly Minister for Agriculture

and leading spokesmen of the more liberal section of the European community before Independence; J. F. Pcellard, a recent president of the KNFU, and Lord Delamere, son of the celebrated pioneer European settler and also a recent president of the KNFU.

The approach of Independence produced great uncertainty and insecurity among the European farmers both for their property rights and for their farming future in the country. These fears were exacerbated by protracted negotiations with the British Government for finance to carry out a transfer of European farms to African smallholders, causing the incumbent farmers to fear the loss of a market for their land. Development in these farms diminished and, with it, employment. Moreover since the transfer started, new African farmers have been hindered by bad growing seasons and an apparent shortage of credit which has not helped the unemployment figures. Nakuru town, being dependent on the rural economy, has been severely tried by these developments. In particular, the town has had to deal with the increase in unemployment resulting from difficulties in both the urban and rural sectors. Although there appears to be evidence that Nakuru is on the way to recovery, the recent political developments in the town must be seen against the background of a sagging economy and the consequent social distress.

Most job holders resident in Nairobi East are employed in the city proper, although a minority work on nearby rural estates. Hence, the city is fundamentally more urban in its outlook than Nakuru. The constituency forms part of the area to which Africans were relegated in pre-Independence days when residential areas of the city were segregated by law. The poverty of Nairobi East and the other largely African suburbs contrasts with the thriving modern sector of the city supported in large measure by affluent residents of western Nairobi and the tourist business. Much of the commercial and industrial economy of the city is in Asian and European hands, witnessing the economic pre-eminence these groups maintained in colonial Kenya. This pre-eminence is now a major target of the campaign for Africanization, On the other hand,

this constituency has been invaded by very large numbers of work seekers from Central Province partly as a result of land consolidation which appears to have displaced numbers of rural tenant farmers, and partly as a result of the lifting of Emergency regulations in 1960 when large numbers of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru began to drift into the city. These immigrants have increased the already serious problems of poverty, residential overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and insufficient educational and medical facilities. There is a continuing conflict between the Council and these new residents, for the council insists on condemning and destroying for health reasons the temporary huts these people set up on arrival for residential and trading purposes.

The large influx of poor and unemployed people has been a factor of major political as well as economic significance for both Nakuru and Nairobi East. A very large percentage of the new arrivals appear to have been Kikuyu, producing a substantial shift in the ethnic balances of both cities. When the last census was taken in 1962, the Kikuyu numbered about 40% of both constituencies, while the Luo and Luhya made up another 35% in both. 10% of the population of Nakuru was Kalenjin while a similar percentage of Kamba were to be found in Nairobi. In Nakuru, unlike Nairobi East, there were and still are, a significant number of Asian and a smaller number of European residents.² Resulting from the population influx the Kikuyu have probably significantly enlarged their plurality in both towns. However, the last voter registration was also taken in 1962, and it was these lists that were used in the Little General Election. A great many of these new residents, rather than going home to vote, appear to have remained disenfranchised urban voters. The effect of this group on the campaigns is another imponderable of the election. They may or may not have contributed to the appearance of apathy during the campaign, and their social and economic straits may or may not have generated sympathy for KPU among the urban poor who could vote. What is fairly clear, however, is the impact of this group on the leadership struggles which have developed in Nairobi and Nakuru. Mwangi Mbogo Karungaru, the new KANU MP for Nairobi East, probably benefitted in his campaign from long association with the Kirinyaga Welfare Association organized to assist the newly arrived

Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru. In Nakuru, public charges and counter-charges have made "tribalism" a major issue. Mark Mwithaga could not but benefit from the influx of Kikuyu in his drive for political leadership.

B. Development in the KANU Branches

The leadership struggle at the national level which precipitated the formation of KPU and the holding of the Little General Election has been interwoven with leadership contests in local Nakuru and Nairobi politics. These contests reflected the threat to political integration posed by the tensions among the leading national politicians, the shifting ethnic balance of the cities, major policy questions, as well as the social and economic condition of the cities' inhabitants.

Nairobi has been a KANU stronghold since the party's formation in 1960, but its political unity has been forestalled by the continuing rivalry of factions which have become identified with Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga. ^{2A} Mboya built his political strength in the late 1950's on the trade union movement and the Nairobi-based People's Convention Party. His main rival, in the days of district level-only political parties was not Odinga but C. M. G. Argwings Kodhek, who led the African District Congress. The position of all these leaders was made vulnerable by the exile in detention of Kikuyu political leaders and the exclusion of all Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru from political activity except those registered as Loyalists. The re-entry of the Kikuyu into politics after 1960 inevitably made the existing nationalist leadership suspect on tribal grounds. Their return, as Mboya put it, "necessarily raised the question whether recognition of the old leaders meant discarding all the others who had also made a contribution to the nationalist effort, and brought the country so far."³ But Nairobi, while ethnically diverse, had been a center for Kikuyu political activity. Hence Mboya's position was vulnerable not only as part of the new nationalist leadership but also in Nairobi which was his political base.

It is one of the ironies of recent Kenya political history that while many leaders, both exiled and non-exiled, took steps to reconcile those of their number who had and had not been detained or restricted,

the return of these exiled leaders itself produced a lasting division within the existing non exiled nationalist leadership of the day. Both Odinga and Mboya tried to unify these two streams of African nationalism and in the process became the leaders of competing political camps.^{3A}

Confusion over whether the exiled leadership was to replace the non-exiled leadership, or vice versa, or whether the two could be fused, created ambiguities on crucial ideological and policy issues, such as land, that lasted until positions were crystallized in the Little General Election.^{3B}

The emerging rivalry of leaders at the national level was felt almost immediately at the local level in Nairobi where Odinga became identified with a faction seeking to displace or limit the leadership of Tom Mboya. Odinga accused Mboya of using his old PCP to divide the new Kenya African National Union.⁴ In September 1960 a contested election for Nairobi branch officials reflected the incipient factional struggle, enlarged by confusion over election procedures. Odinga chaired a public meeting at which Munyua Waiyaki, a Kikuyu employed in the medical department since his return in 1957 from a five year study tour abroad, defeated Argwings-Kodhek on a show of hands to become branch chairman. Argwings-Kodhek successfully nominated leading trade unionist Clement Lubembe for the vice chairmanship but nevertheless complained that the elections had been pre-planned by unnamed officials. With the pivotal position of secretary undecided, Mboya interrupted the meeting to say that before the election for this post could take place, the KANU executive council would have to decide whether public meetings were the appropriate venue for electing branch officials.⁵ Sammy Maina, who had been previously elected secretary, resigned in response to accusation of tribalism in the elections.^{5A} Eventually, the KANU executive confirmed all officers elected at the public meeting after a meeting of sub-branch delegates.^{5B} Waiyaki went on to use his position, with the support of Odinga, to challenge Mboya in the 1961 'Kenyatta' election, though Mboya managed to win easily.^{5C} This meeting and the subsequent general election indicated the emergence of a local anti-Mboya faction in which Waiyaki and later KPU candidate J.D. Kali were leading figures,^{5D} a faction which was backed by Odinga.

In the background was the issue of land policy. A KANU 'Ginger Group' advocating the expropriation of land and the banning of foreign investment was strong enough in Nairobi to draw denunciation from both Mboya and Sammy Maina.^{5E}

In the interval between the 1961 and 1963 general elections, the migration of the Kikuyu from Central Province into the city shifted the ethnic balance substantially. Welfare associations which were formed to deal with the social and economic plight of these predominantly poor immigrants began to become political or, at least, were seen as a political threat by the Luo and other groups. In July 1962, even the KANU branch chairman of the day Christopher Kiprotich, openly denounced the alleged political activities of the Kikuyu welfare associations for their supposed divisive effect on Nairobi politics.⁶ One month later, members of the old PCP and the old ADC participated in the formation of the Luo Political Union. Neither Mboya nor Argwings-Kodhek were among its leaders.^{6A} Meanwhile Peter Okondo, Nairobi KADU Chairman, called upon the Luo to withdraw from KANU because of the latter's alleged association with the Land Freedom Army whose policy was reflected in its name.⁷ Thus the policies pursued by Odinga and Mboya nationally were both to some extent undermined by the tendency of local politicians to respond in tribal terms to the re-entry of the Kikuyu into politics in Nairobi. In the background lay the difficult economic and social conditions of the city's African sector. A public appeal was made to the Mayor by a KANU sub-branch chairman to do something about the rise in rents and the inadequate health and sanitary conditions.^{7A}

This pattern of politics in Nairobi continued through the 1963 general election to the present Little General Election. In 1963 the parliamentary candidates from Nairobi on the KANU ticket had become fairly easily identifiable with either Odinga or Mboya. Among the Odinga supported candidates were Dr. Waiyaki, who ran successfully in Nairobi North East and became Odinga's assistant minister in the Vice-President's Office, and J. D. Kali who was to resign from KANU three years later to join Odinga in KPU and attempt to retain his Nairobi East seat. The others who ran successfully in Nairobi in 1963 have all maintained their loyalty to the party and retained whatever posts they held.⁸

Just before the 1963 election Waiyaki and Kali, identified as a faction by Mboya publicly, tried unsuccessfully to regain control of the Nairobi branch.^{8A} The attempt took place in an atmosphere charged by accusations of tribalism. While Mboya and Odinga were prime movers in groups within KANU which were neither of one tribe nor uniformly either former freedom fighters or undetained leaders, Sammy Maina was threatening to use the KANU youth wing to break up Kikuyu and Luo caucuses in the branch elections.^{8B} The problem of tribal feeling was underlined by John Keen's warning that dissident Kikuyu politicians might undermine even the President's leadership.

An important difference between Nairobi and Nakuru is the absence in the latter of any national leader with a base of support comparable to Mboya's, Waiyaki's or Odinga's. The efforts of national leaders to prevent changes in the ethnic balance, or other similar divisions, from dominating the campaign or the results, were perhaps more successful in Nairobi than in Nakuru. The background of the two constituencies differs in other ways. Nakuru has been a two party city, while KADU never remotely challenged KANU in Nairobi. The ethnic base has shifted toward a larger Kikuyu plurality in Nakuru as in Nairobi, but the impact has been sharper because the departure of European farmers in the area has removed the buffer that safeguarded the Kalenjin peoples of the Rift Valley from the expansion of the Kikuyu from their heavily populated areas. The buffer zone included Nakuru and its removal in the surrounding area has undoubtedly had an impact on Nakuru politics where a small but significant Kalenjin minority exists beside the Kikuyu plurality. The land issue has been sharpened by significant representation in Nakuru and the surrounding area of Land Freedom Army and forest fighters elements to a greater extent than in Nairobi. The presence of such groups in Nakuru has drawn public warnings from local and national political leaders against disruptive activities on their part, but no such a warning have been heard with reference to Nairobi. Finally, Nakuru, unlike Nairobi, is engaged in industrial competition with other emerging municipalities, notably Thika, and this has given special meaning to the campaign of local political figures for more economic development and social services.

As in Nairobi, KANU in Nakuru has been divided by factional struggles from the start. Mr. Mboya hoped to prevent Luo and Kikuyu from capturing all the urban seats in the 1961 general election, and sought nomination of a candidate from a different ethnic group in Nakuru.¹⁰ Initially, there appeared to be agreement on the president of the old Nakuru African District Congress, Richard Kuboka. Whatever agreement had been obtained quickly dissolved. Kuboka dropped out of the picture completely and no less than three factions in Nakuru KANU ran candidates under the party banner. There were allegations that the three candidates each had a champion in the National party in the form of James Gichuru, Mboya, or Odinga. In the circumstances Wafula Wabuge of KADU won with only 30% of the vote. In 1963 KANU achieved what subsequently proved to be temporary unity behind Achieng-Oneko. It is hard to say how this collaboration was achieved, but it might have been assisted by Oneko's close association with both Odinga and Mr. Kenyatta, and by his apparent limited involvement in previous party factional strife. Despite KANU's unity, KADU proved stronger in 1963 than in 1961 as incumbent Wabuge gathered a higher percentage of an enlarged total vote while losing to Oneko.

The disunity within KANU Nakuru in 1961 general election was but a prologue to renewed struggles after independence. These were heightened and complicated by ethnicity, land and economic difficulties, and the changing relationship at the national level among leaders of KANU, KADU and what was to become KPU. The branch elections in 1964 indicated the impact of Kikuyu and of Land Freedom Army on the Nakuru political scene. The assistant Minister for Labour and member for Nakuru East, Fred Kubai, who was himself detained long years with Kenyatta, felt called upon to condemn political activities led by people he identified as former members of the LFA, Kamau Maithori, Kiama Kia Muingi, and other similar protest groups. Their activities were described as "subversive and tantamount to treason" and they were alleged to be attempting to seize control of the branch as well as to overthrow the existing KANU leadership.¹¹ Similar criticism came from Stephen Ogondi, Deputy Mayor of Nakuru and an influential figure in Nakuru politics for several years. He expressed anxiety over the possible domination of local politics by one tribe,

presumably the numerically predominant Kikuyu, and the presence in this group of LFA members who in his judgement were particularly anxious to control politics in Nakuru.¹²

The changes in the ethnic balance of Nakuru may have been one factor in a remarkable display of local independence in the branch elections of 1964. In this election, not only Kubai but two of the three other MP's from the area were defeated for election to branch offices. Among the vanquished in addition to Kubai were H. J. Onamu, an assistant minister and member for Nakuru West, and Wasonga Sijeyo, the then Senator for Nakuru. Only Achieng-Oneko, of the MP's, was able to secure election. Whether or not the political tension created by ethnic changes was a factor in the defeat of Kubai and the other MP's, the election demonstrated again the point that the national politicians were weak in local politics. ~~12A~~ Furthermore, since Onamu was defeated for the chairmanship by Gathogo Mwitumi who later joined Oneko and Sijeyo in opposition, the election demonstrated either that the future KANU-KPU factions had not yet fully crystallized or that neither was yet in position to monopolize local positions.

The crucial events of 1964 were the reorganization of KANU in the Rift Valley including Nakuru and the resulting emergence, in local opposition, of Sijeyo and Oneko who were to help form KPU a year later. With the support of the national KANU leadership, the former national chairman of KADU and future Kenya Vice President, D. T. Moi, was elected to lead the reorganization of KANU in the Rift Valley. Mark Mwithaga, who had long been active in Nakuru politics and who was later to defeat Oneko in the Little General Election, was chosen to be Moi's principal aide in this task.

Moi's election strengthened the hand of KANU leaders, national and local, such as Kubai and Ogondi who wished to prevent the insurgence of former freedom fighters and Land Freedom Army leaders from disrupting the political structure of the area. He had on several occasions publicly warned against excesses by these groups.¹³ His election also was instrumental in the process of integrating into KANU the Rift Valley peoples who had formerly supported KADU. Similarly, Mwithaga's

selection to assist in the task of integrating within KANU the diverse strands of Kenya nationalism, represented in the Rift Valley and Nakuru in particular, seemed to give national backing to his subsequent drive to gain control of the local branch and eventually to become the MP for Nakuru town.

The existing leadership of the Nakuru branch, led by Mwitumi, immediately and unsuccessfully challenged both the reorganization procedures and the subsequent attempt of Mwithaga to capture the branch chairmanship. The rural Elburgon sub-branch passed a resolution of confidence in Bildad Kaggia, future Deputy President of KPU, who had already lost his assistant Ministership and fallen out of favor with KANU and the Government nationally.^{13A} Oneko reacted to the reorganization plan by holding a meeting of the Nakuru town sub-branch to confirm its existing officers in power for two years, thus to prevent reorganization from entailing recomposition of the local leadership in his own constituency.^{13B} Mwitumi, for his part, accused Mr. Mboya of personally selecting the Rift Valley KANU leadership and of trying to engineer a change in the local leadership from above.¹⁴ Mr. Moi responded by publicly criticising his fellow minister, Oneko, for his action and accusing him of showing disloyalty to the President.¹⁵ Mwitumi suggested that Mr. Moi and Mr. Mboya should speak for themselves rather than implicating the President.¹⁶

The reorganization effort involved a new attempt by the national leadership to regulate the political gyrations of the local party branch. The attempt to do so brought Oneko into open opposition to central party headquarters, supported by Mwitumi and Sijeyo. A great deal of political tension was generated by this conflict, which came to focus in the branch elections in July and subsequent municipal council elections. In May, the acting Mayor found it necessary to call a meeting of all local political and municipal leaders, together with representatives of the KANU Youth Wing, and Mr. Oneko to iron out what he called "tensions in the town".¹⁶ By this he was referring to the growing crisis of leadership within the local KANU branch. The personal and factional revalries were supported by ideological conflict over whether free land should be made available to the needy and whether anything was being done to relieve the general

poverty and lack of progress in the town. Police armed with tear-gas grenades witnessed the Nakuru town sub-branch elections where chairman Mwitumi and the other officers were defeated by Kimunya Kamana, chief rent collector (!), David Sakali and Richard Kipler, both of whom had been officials of the old KADU branch in Nakuru. Mwithaga and Mwitumu engaged in a heated debate over whether the elections had been democratic, an argument which the subsequent branch meeting resolved in Mwithaga's favor who thought that they had been fair elections. The branch also elected Mwithaga to replace Mwitumi as branch chairman; Fred Kubai and H. J. Onamu rejoined the branch leadership as vice chairman and assistant treasurer. Oneko lost his post as treasurer though, to his credit, he promised continued support for the branch. The consensus was that the one faction, which had been defeated a year earlier, had now completely triumphed, and the results appeared to re-establish the position of the national party figures based in Nakuru. Onamu held a big feast on his farm to celebrate the results.

The reorganized KANU branch did not completely remove factional difficulties, however. In December 1965, KANU Nakuru refused to nominate one of its own sub-branch leaders, Richard Kipler, for the municipal council. He and five other candidates for the nomination protested that tribalism had motivated the branch in its selections, and they all stood as independents.¹⁷ Two of the six, not including Kipler, managed to win election to the Council. In addition two other independents won in the Asian dominated central ward. Mwithaga accused the independents of disloyalty to KANU¹⁸ and they in turn demanded the ouster of the present KANU branch leadership.¹⁹ Stephen Ogondi, the Deputy Mayor who has been dubbed 'leader of the opposition' for his alleged support of independents said he maintained his support for the President and his Government while also continuing to oppose what he saw as the attempted monopolization of leadership posts by one tribe.²⁰ Thus, on the eve of the emergence of KPU nationally, problems of ethnicity as well as economic and ideological difficulties continued to trouble the quest for political integration in Nakuru.

C. Candidates and their Selection

In both constituencies, the KPU candidates had formerly held positions of responsibility in the KANU government. Achieng-Oneko (Nakuru town) had been Minister for Information and Broadcasting and J. D. Kali (Nairobi East) had been until mid-1965 the Party's Chief Whip in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, both had long records of activity in the struggle for independence. Both had been very active in the pre-Emergency Kenya African Union led by Kenyatta; Oneko had served as Chairman and as Secretary General in the years before its dissolution. Both had been detained during most of the 1950's. After the Emergency, Oneko served as President Kenyatta's personal secretary until 1963 when he won the Nakuru seat. Consequently Oneko had strong associations with Kenyatta as well as with Odinga whom he had served as manager of his Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation. Kali, on the other hand, had travelled widely especially in South East Asia while in the Army and this experience plus his later visit to China seem to have led him to share Odinga's ideological proclivity for the non-capitalist approach to development. Both men had been articulate as well as active participants in the nationalist cause. Oneko edited his own paper "Ramogi" while Kali was a teacher and sometime editor of "Sauti mwa Afrika."

The men who defeated Kali and Oneko in the Little General Election were distinguished by their records in local government and party organization. Mark Mwithaga (Nakuru town) is chairman of the Nakuru branch and had been, as noted above, very active in local politics for nearly 10 years. Mwangi Mbogo Karungaru (Nairobi East) is an officer of both the Nairobi Branch and the Nairobi East sub-branch and has been active in the local party since his release from detention. Mwithaga has been a member of the Nakuru Municipal Council since 1965 while Karungaru has been a clerk to the Nairobi City Council. Karungaru's local position is almost certainly enhanced by his leadership of the Kirinyaga Welfare Association which has tried to serve the needs of the great influx of people who have come to Nairobi from Central Province since 1960.

The new KANU representatives appear to have had stronger bases of local support than the men they defeated. In contrast to Mwithaga's long activity in Nakuru politics, Oneko has not been a long time resident of the municipality. This plus the demands of his ministry during the time when he held a position in the local branch combined to prevent him from establishing a strong local base. His strength locally appears to have been based on the respect he commanded as a person and as a minister rather than on any real organizational strength. Mwithaga, in addition, probably profited from membership in the largest ethnic group. Kali and Karungaru had much the same liabilities and the same advantages in background and their political careers might have been expected to follow a similar rather than a divergent course. Both are Kamba and share some disadvantage in being representatives of a minority ethnic group in Nairobi. Both were detained, however, and could have identified themselves with the Kikuyu in Nairobi who had been excluded from political activity during the 1950's. The two men have been rivals, however, and Kali as an incumbent has been defeated not once but three times by Karungaru in the last four years. In addition to the Little General Election, Karungaru twice defeated him for positions in the local branch.

The explanation for Karungaru's apparently greater strength in local Nairobi politics would appear to derive from his choice of political tactics. Kali, along with Muniya Waiyaki, quickly became identified with a local faction that appeared to have Odinga's support. This local faction appears to have tried to use the Kikuyu's return to politics to dislodge the position that Mr. Mboya had built during the Emergency. Since only these two MP's, of the Nairobi representatives, appear to be in this group, it appears Kali in part failed simply because he chose the weaker group. On the other hand the Kirinyaga Welfare Association is apparently as open to both the new and the old poor from Central Province and those who were detained as well as those who weren't. Karungaru's organization appears to have been more in keeping with the efforts of Mr. Mboya to build bridges between those who had and those who had not been detained in the 1950's. On ethnic grounds such a group might have become or have been

perceived as a challenge to the existing leadership as hinted by the 1962 KANU Nairobi Chairman (above). Its aims, however, apparently have not been primarily political and perhaps for that reason has not threatened Mr. Mboya's position. Karungaru's selection as the candidate might in itself suggest that the KWA's aims were compatible with support rather than overthrow of the non exiled Nairobi KANU leadership. On the other hand when the KWA's leader becomes a candidate for political office, it is natural that such a group would be at least a passive base of support for him. Thus, while Kali became openly identified with a group whose tactics made it a relatively unsuccessful rival to Mr. Mboya's position, Karungaru in more quiet fashion became identified with a group whose purposes and tactics appeared to support the effort of the non-exiled KANU leadership in Nairobi to create political unity within the party.

The process of candidate selection illustrated the concern of the national party leaders with the selection procedures, while the choices made from among would-be candidates demonstrated that candidates of local reputation with active records in KANU branches were chosen from a group that included several people with some claim to national prominence. The candidates were selected at meetings which included representatives of each ward in the case of Nairobi and each sub-branch in the case of Nakuru. At both meetings the KANU Vice President for the area presided without voting at the meetings. There was a report, however, that Mr. Moi persuaded several candidates to stand down in Nakuru in the interests of party unity.²² In Nairobi, the announcement that branch officials would attend the meeting caused a misunderstanding between the Nairobi East sub-branch and Mr. Sammy Maina, the branch secretary. The former feared that they would be under-represented in the selection process and that a candidate might be imposed on the meeting.²³ Maina made it clear that Mr. Kibaki and the branch officials would supervise but would not vote.²⁴

In each case the field of would-be candidates included people with some influence or prominence nationally. In Nakuru, Mr. Kenyatta's personal secretary -- the job Oneko held before his election in 1963 -- tried unsuccessfully to get the nomination. In Nairobi, three notables were initially in the field of 27 candidates and all withdrew.

These included Margaret Kenyatta, daughter of the President, who was formerly in the Kenya U.N. delegation, the Mayor of Nairobi, Alderman Charles Rubia; and the KANU National Executive Officer, Mr. John O'Washika. The reasons for these withdrawals remain in the realm of surmise and rumour. Mr. O'Washika may well have been persuaded that he would be more valuable to the party in his present position. On the other hand, there was an unsubstantiated report that the Mayor might contest one of the Nairobi seats in the 1968 general elections, since delayed until 1970. Both branches made it clear that a "local man" was preferable to an outsider, and in Nairobi this seems to have figured in the preference shown Karungaru over the man believed to have been his nearest rival, Wilson Mukuna. Mukuna, prominent as treasurer of the Confederation of Trade Unions and General Secretary of the Printing and Kindred Trades Workers' Union, is a resident of Nairobi but not of the Nairobi East constituency.

D. The Issues and the Campaign.

Without a survey of voter attitudes it is necessary to deal with the issues of the campaign from the standpoint of the candidates and the party leaders and to consider how the issues as presented related to problems of political integration. It must be repeated that the impact of the issues on voting behavior in this election is problematical since, as KANU pointed out, even a 100% KPU victory would not give them the parliamentary strength to determine government policy. KPU could only counter this by asking the voters to think in terms of the next general election, then scheduled for 1968, when KPU could compete as an alternative government. In this campaign, therefore, there were issues not only of policy but also of strategy: whether it made sense to vote for an opposition which could protest but could not immediately change the KANU government's policies.

The urban campaigns gave a public airing to the leadership struggles which had simmered within KANU since well before independence. Both Mr. Odinga and Mr. Kaggia were at pains to explain the political as well as the policy reasons, as it were, why they decided to form an opposition party. For Mr. Odinga, the reason was his increasing estrangement from the President beginning with his failure to get a ministry in the

pre-independence government because of his views on land policy. This estrangement was widened by the representations of western governments which he alleged had brought the President under neo-colonial influence and away from the political and economic ideology he and Mr. Kenyatta were originally supposed to have shared.²⁵ Mr. Kaggia complained that former KADU leaders had now taken over places in the KANU hierarchy.²⁶ Both these explanations confirm the reality of the national leadership struggle which, as we have seen, was closely connected with similar contests at the local level that became explicit somewhat earlier. KPU was careful in these campaigns to make clear that they were not opposed to President Kenyatta personally, however, but to those around him by whom he had allegedly been misled. Indeed Mr. Onsko in his resignation statement was particularly anxious to affirm his continuing regard for the President. In this respect the urban campaigns seem to have been somewhat different from those in Central Nyanza.

Among the policy issues of the campaign, four dominated meetings in both urban constituencies: land, nationalization, social services, and non-alignment. On land, KPU took the line that land reforms to date had benefitted only relatively few Africans, although all Africans had fought for redress of injustices of land distribution during the struggle for Independence. Non-citizens, it was said, were still able to acquire land despite the apparent intentions of KANU on this subject. Odinga emphasized that it was over the land issue that he began to be isolated from the KANU government.²⁷ KANU replied by drawing attention to the threat of confiscation and nationalization, not only of rural land but of private property generally, which it found implicit in the KPU program. KANU spokesmen thought the nationalization of private property implicit in the KPU program would turn the "whole of Kenya into one vast labour camp."²⁸ The party also asked the country to remember that nearly 35,000 families were being settled under a nearly completed 1,500,000 acre land transfer program.

The significance of the land issue in the urban contests lay in its relationship to the problem of urban unemployment. The Government has said many times that it wants urban unemployed to "go back to the land."

Though not much was said about this during the campaign itself, the policy has been voiced both before and since the election. The Development Plan 1966-70 states that the one of five men who reach working age during the next five years but do not find salaried jobs or self-employment are to be absorbed in the subsistence sector.²⁹ There is some question as to whether the rural areas can really absorb the urban unemployed. Both the new urban MP's and a number of the others are on record as thinking that settlement schemes have not done enough to relieve the urban unemployed, as distinct from the rural unemployed and under-employed for whom rural settlement schemes have obviously done a great deal. Karungaru has called for more consideration of Nairobi unemployed in the settlement schemes; Mwithaga earlier produced a plan for improving underdeveloped land with urban unemployed who would acquire individual plots on such land as they developed after initial improvements had been made by them as a collective labor force. The problem is to prevent unemployment from being a political football to be kicked back and forth between urban and rural interests both of whom may be either unwilling or unable to make an effective contribution to its solution.

The questions of nationalization and provision of social services can be treated together. The thrust of KPU's argument was that social services to urban residents have been inadequate: medical and educational facilities are inadequate and too expensive in their view, and they thought the Kenya Bus Service and the East African Power and Lighting Company had been inefficient. The latter they felt was over-staffed with expatriates. KPU thus tried to link insufficient social services with their fundamental argument that the government served only the interests of the affluent and that the root of the problem is the continued presence of foreign interests in crucial places to the detriment of the society. To this KANU replied that KPU's solution of free things and nationalization provided no answers. The root of the problem, they said, was production and economic growth which nationalization per se would not achieve: specifically, nationalization of E.A.P. & E. would not yield very much profit for allocation to social services since KANU did not believe in expropriation and would have to pay off the owners.

The dissatisfaction with the distribution of advantages which motivated KPU's protest clearly suggests that political integration might be endangered by the emergence of sharp and antagonistic economic classes arising out of economic development. The African Socialism policy of the KANU Government recognizes this danger and pledges the Government to the task of minimizing the political ill-effects of the emergence of economic classes and where possible it would limit the development of such classes. The issue of the Little General Election in the urban areas was whether the problems of the urban poor had reached proportions of enough significance to fracture the political consensus which KANU had attempted to create and maintain since taking power.

It would be worthwhile to gauge the effect of the non-alignment debate on the degree of political integration in the urban areas. Each party claimed to adhere to a policy of true non-alignment and decried the alleged hypocrisy of the other for not practicing its principles. Each accused the other of serving and being supported by "foreign masters." In addition, KANU took the position that one revolution, great though it was, is enough. It suggested that those who really knew about the revolutionary societies of the East would not be so enthusiastic over their promise as KPU was alleged to be. There was not, however, and could not have been any implication from either side that the candidates had not participated fully in the nationalist struggle in Kenya, since all obviously had records of dedicated political activism.

The danger of such a debate lies in the possibility that alleged differences between parties in their international alignments could reinforce any ethnic or economic cleavage which separated the two parties. One possible criterion for a politically stable country might well be the existence of a political consensus on certain fundamentals and non-alignment might well be part of such a consensus. There might be an advantage to both parties and the country if both parties were, and could be seen to be, non-aligned to such a degree that the non-alignment of each party could be mutually taken for granted.

In assessing the impact of the personalities and issues of the campaign on the outcome, considerable attention would have to be given to the style of the campaigns themselves. Nairobi had a predominantly peaceful campaign in which both sides had a fair number of election meetings, while Nakuru was the scene of considerable unrest in which several KPU meetings were stopped by police when parts of the crowd became unruly. Of the three large meetings scheduled by KPU one was broken up by police when a riot appeared in the offing and another had to be cancelled when it was learned that the President would address a rally in Nakuru the same day. Mr. Odinga was able to hold one large rally in the town two days before the election. In Nairobi, however, no meetings were broken up, though there was some unrest after the initial KANU rally where several ministers had spoken. At this meeting Mr. Mboya attacked the supporters of Odinga, alleged to be mainly Luo, whom he said spent their time behaving badly, sitting in bars "drinking beers and indulging in fruitless politics," and generally trying to create a tribal party.³⁰ One reason for the difference in the campaigns might lie in the degree to which leading national politicians maintain a strong basis of support in the constituencies. While Mboya has had a strong local base in Nairobi, no national figure has had any comparable position in Nakuru. Where national leaders are able to maintain strong positions, it is possible that their followers may be more easily kept from becoming unruly.

E. Conclusions.

KANU retained both the Nairobi East and Nakuru seats, but both contests were relatively closely fought in an election dominated by one-sided results. Such close elections might suggest threats to political integration that bear with particular force on urban areas. This study has, therefore, focused on certain problems posed for political integration which were brought to light by the election in these two cities: ethnic diversities, pre-Independence loyalties, economic class discrepancies, and unemployment, distribution of land and social services, and suspicions of international alignments. Since voters' perceptions of the campaign issues could not be assessed in the absence of any voter survey, these problems necessarily have been identified from the standpoint of the candidates and of the parties' leadership.

The departure of Mr. Odinga and other MP's from KANU in order to form KPU came as the climax of a leadership struggle, fed by personality and policy clashes, that has simmered within KANU since its formation. The influence of the national leaders involved has been a factor in local leadership contests that have gone on simultaneously with that at the national level. This local leadership competition resulted in the isolation locally of both the future KPU candidates from the urban constituencies nearly a year before they went into opposition nationally.

The local leadership struggles in Nakuru and Nairobi have been influenced by the influx of Kikuyu into both areas and their re-entry into politics following the end of the Emergency in 1960. The tension produced by this influx on the pre-existing political structure has promoted warnings of tribalism which have had overtones relating to land policy and the social and economic problems of the two cities. On the other hand the basis of the struggle at the national level appears to have been based, not on tension between the pre-1960 political elite and that which returned to action after 1960, but on divisions within the pre-1960 leadership, which nonetheless resulted from the re-entry of the Kikuyu into political life. The new urban KANU MP's, in addition to being men of substantial local reputation by comparison to their predecessors and many of the would-be nominees, seem to have played some part in implementing the attempt of KANU to weave into a single fabric the different strands of Kenya nationalism represented by former loyalists and freedom fighters, KANU and KADU, urban and rural dwellers, and different ethnic groups. This effort at political integration has been founded on a common endeavor for economic and social progress. The analysis of the campaign issues, however, indicates that this common task is itself beset by certain problems, such as the apparent emergence of economic classes and how to absorb the urban unemployed, that may adversely affect progress toward political integration.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mr. Mboya, speaking at Nakuru on 21st April 1966, said "In the years which led to Independence, the role of the party was quite straight forward. It was to oppose the colonialist government and drive it from Kenya as quickly as possible. The task which now faces the party is much more subtle. The party has to be the instrument through which the government's policies are brought to the people and through which the people are brought up to the government." East African Standard April 22, 1966.
2. Figures are derived from the Kenya Population Census 1962. Volume I was published by the Economics and Statistics Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 1964. Vol. II was published in 1965 by the same division as part of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.
- 2A. The paper will indicate that the KPU candidate, Mr. Kali, and Dr. Waiyaki have been an identifiable splinter group associated with Mr. Odinga almost since 1960. See also East African Standard of January 26, 1961 and January 5, 1963.
3. Mboya, Tom Freedom and After, London: Andre Deutsch, 1963. page 82.
- 3A. The evidence for this is to be found in the fact that both KPU and KANU have among their leaders people representing those who were detainees and those who weren't as well as different ethnic groups, and political histories.
- 3B. The East African Standard reported as early as November 11, 1960 that KANU's vagueness on land was a result of differences between Gichuru, Mboya, and Odinga, that became apparent the previous day at a public press conference.
4. East African Standard April 6, 1960.
5. East African Standard September 26, 1960 and October 14, 1960.
- 5A. East African Standard October 14 1960.
- 5B. East African Standard November 17 1960.
- 5C. Results of this election, quoted in C. Rosberg and G. Bennett, the Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London, Oxford University Press, 1963) page 210 show that Mboya captured nearly 88% of the 35787 votes cast.

- 5D. East African Standard January 5 1963.
- 5E. East African Standard November 8 1960: and November 3 1960.
6. East African Standard July 23, 1962.
- 6A. East African Standard August 20 1962.
7. East African Standard October 17, 1962.
- 7A. East African Standard December 14 1962.
8. Dr. Waiyaki resigned his position as an Assistant Minister to Mr. Odinga in the Office of the Vice President at nearly the same time as Odinga and the other MP's resigned from KANU to form KPU. Dr. Waiyaki did not, however, resign from KANU.
- 8A. East African Standard January 5 1963.
- 8B. East African Standard February 5 1965.
9. East African Standard December 31, 1962.
10. Bennett, George and Rosberg, Carl. G., The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Page 174.
- 10A. East African Standard January 25 1961.
- 10B. Rosberg and Bennett, op. cit., page 174
- 10C. Ibid., Wabuge is quoted by Rosberg and Bennet as having gathered 2,124 votes out of 7182 cast.
- 10D. East African Standard June 1 1963.
11. East African Standard, July 14, 1964. In the Little General Election of 1966, it should be noted that Freedom Fighters publicly expressed their continued support for the KANU government. See, for instance, the East African Standard for May 9, 1966.
12. East African Standard September 1, 1964 and December 31, 1965.
- 12A. East African Standard November 2 1964.
13. See, for instance, the East African Standards for October 13, 1962 and May 23, 1966.
- 13A. East African Standard May 22 1965.
- 13B. Ibid.
14. East African Standard April 30, 1965.
15. East African Standard April 27, 1965.

16. East African Standard May 6, 1965.
- 16A. East African Standard July 19, 1965.
- 16B. East African Standard August 2, 1965.
17. East African Standard December 5, 1965.
18. East African Standard December 22, 1965.
19. East African Standard December 22, 1965.
20. East African Standard December 31, 1965.
21. East African Standard December 31, 1965.
22. East African Standard May 21, 1966.
23. East African Standard May 16, 1966.
24. East African Standard May 17, 1966.
25. East African Standard June 10, 1966.
26. East African Standard June 10, 1966.
- 26A. East African Standard April 26, 1966.
27. East African Standard June 10, 1966.
28. East African Standard May 21, 1966.
29. Kenya Government, Development Plan 1966-1970 Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966.
30. East African Standard May 23, 1966.