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CONFLICT SUPPLEMENT EDITORIAL

Since the launch of Indicator SA's first Conflict Supplement the mood in the country has undergone a radical change. The overwhelming sense of relief (which few people would like disturbed) is largely the result of a peaceful election and an easing of tensions which political conflict and violence forced to a crescendo before the election.

People were preparing for weeks, maybe months of food, candles and possible attack or intimidation, while analysts monitored the Inkatha Freedom Party's election boycott and the right-wing's bombings with trepidation.

The administrative crises of the Independent Electoral Commission were made bearable by the knowledge that for a few days at least, the carnage which preceded the election had stopped. That more people did not react violently to these crises reiterated the countrywide desire for peace and for a new beginning.

The Conflict Supplement does not intend to darken this mood, which although hard to pin down, has brought hope to many disillusioned South Africans. We must nevertheless face the realities of the situation.

Levels of violence in May were considerably lower than they 've been over the past year, and commentators anticipate that these reduced levels will continue. The devastation caused by the past eight years of violence must not be forgotten now that statistics reflect a decline in deaths.

The implications of violence extend far beyond the loss of life. The vast numbers of injured people must rebuild their lives in communities where health care is a luxury. Families are split up and children orphaned, others are left homeless and relieved of their jobs as they salvage the pieces of their lives. Thousands of refugees remain exiled from their homes. The police, who will be called upon increasingly in the future, still face constant attack and death.

The damage which violence has inflicted on people, along with its structural causes, cannot be managed in the short term. It is optimistic to expect violence to abate altogether, instead we must start assessing the costs with a view to finding solutions, while remaining aware of potentially volatile situations which may further burden this task.

Antoinette Louw
Conflict Supplement Editor

GUNS

By Anthony Minnaar
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The proliferation of firearms in South Africa has fuelled violence and caused an escalation in the number of people killed. The new Government urgently needs to implement measures to curb arms smuggling and possession if peace is to be given a chance. This is easier said than done.

Since 1990 firearms - and specifically illegal arms - have wreaked violent havoc, injury and death in South Africa. Among the illegal firearms which proliferate in high conflict areas, the AK-47 occupies a macabre pride of place. It is the foremost weapon of destruction and killing.

A symbol of the 'struggle', the AK-47 has become a badge of status and power in black townships, where youths and comrades from self defence units (SDUs) flaunt it as a mark of authority, power and control. It has also come to have sinister connotations as the preferred weapon of criminal gangs, vigilantes and shadowy 'hit squad' assassins, and increasingly it is used in bank robberies, car hijacks and massacres.
Gunshot wounds

In the past four years deaths by gunshot wounds in KwaZulu-Natal have increased by nearly 1 000%. Post-mortem statistics gathered in the region by Dr Reggie Perumal of the Department of Forensic Medicine at the University of Natal, Durban, showed that in 1989 doctors performed autopsies on 521 people who died of stab wounds and 354 who died from gunshot wounds.

In 1992 the stab wound rate dropped to 366 while fatal shootings accounted for 1 109 deaths. Ninety per cent of the gunshot victims were black men and more came from the 20 to 29 year age range than from any other group, with a second peak for the 30 to 39 year olds.

Very few victims were women, children or elderly. Hence most came from the 'lost generation': children who dropped out of school after the 1976 unrest and became unemployed through lack of schooling.

It was also found that the victims were being killed more violently. While in the past bodies would have one or two bullet wounds, it has become commonplace for people to be shot 10 or more times.

The type of gunshot wound also indicated an increase in the use of military-type weapons, with the distinctive wound left by the AK-47 predominating. The AK-47 has a 'tumbling bullet' effect, unlike the R1 or other semi-automatic rifles and shotguns.

Arms smuggling

The proliferation of illegal weapons is one of the most worrying aspects of the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and the PWV. According to the South African police, arrests have revealed that members of various political groupings and crime syndicates, as well as ordinary criminals, are involved in smuggling firearms.

The most common types of weapons imported illegally into South Africa are AK-47 assault rifles, Makarov and Tokarev pistols and Stechkin machine pistols, besides quantities of hand and rifle grenades, limpet mines and RPG7 missiles.

The main source of weaponry has been neighbouring countries. There have been allegations that many of the AK-47s captured by the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the Angolan civil war found their way into the conflict in Natal. During the 1980s the SADF was believed to be supplying Renamo in Mozambique with military supplies, much of it equipment captured from the MPLA in Angola.

There is no concrete indication of the quantity of weapons privately or officially owned in Mozambique, but in 1991 military sources estimated that there were 1,5 million AK-47 assault rifles unaccounted for in that country. Some of these weapons were subsequently smuggled south to KwaZulu-Natal along two main routes: through the Maputoland corridor or Swaziland.

Much of the smuggling was undertaken by criminal syndicates cashing in on the lucrative practice of exchanging a bag or two of maize meal (a 50 kg bag can be bought for around R50) for AK-47s from Renamo fighters facing starvation.

Market forces

In 1990 an AK-47 could be bought in KwaZulu-Natal townships for between
Many small traders and otherwise law-abiding citizens bought illegal weapons for self protection. Some members of the security forces hire out their R1s with no questions asked.

R5 000 and R6 000, but with increased supply this price dropped to about R1 600 in 1991 and R300 in some areas by the end of 1992.

Availability and levels of violence, however, play a significant role in selling price and by the end of last year the price had risen to between R700 and R1 200, but with increased supply this price dropped to about R1 600 in 1991 and R300 in some areas by the end of 1992.

These prices still represent a considerable profit margin. Criminals smuggling arms have not been partisan about who they sell to, supplying anyone wishing to buy. Many small traders and citizens bought illegal weapons for self protection.

In a township like Mpumalanga people talked about the 'gunshot symphony'. In the early 1990s, at the height of the violence, every night those who owned any sort of firearm would stand outside their houses and fire a few rounds from their weapons. This was to let people know that they were armed and that nobody should dare try and attack since they were capable of defending themselves. The night would be punctuated by the differing sounds of gunfire - the staccato beat of an AK-47 or R1, the whipcrack of a .22, the deeper boom of an old Lee Enfield .303 or the blast of a shotgun.

There were other sources for illegal weapons, one being from arms smuggled into South Africa over the years by Umkhonto we Sizwe caches and cached for later use. More recently there have been accusations of arms being smuggled along the southern route from the Transkei, allegedly from the arms stores of the Transkei Defence Force.

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<th>Table 1: Specified Firearms Seized by SAP: 1991-1993</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Firearm type</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>AK-47 assault rifles</td>
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<td>Scorpion machine pistols</td>
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<td>Tokarev pistols</td>
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<td>Makarov pistols</td>
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<td>Home-made revolvers</td>
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Third force

In the late 1980s certain members of police riot units (which became the Internal Stability Units (ISUs) based in KwaZulu-Natal) were accused of supplying both sides in certain areas in order to sustain violence as part of a destabilisation campaign, and to justify imposition of measures such as the state of emergency.

Credence was recently given to these accusations by a Goldstone Commission report which alleged the sale of AK-47s and other weapons by senior police officers from the Vlakplaas Unit on the East Rand to factions in the political violence on the East Rand and in KwaZulu-Natal.

In recent years there have been reports of some members of the security forces hiring out their R1s with no questions asked to members of SDUs as well as criminal gangs for as little as R100 a night.

And at the end of 1993 there were accusations of members of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) in Zululand and northern Natal selling off pistols from KZP armouries.

Although there are now thousands of illegal weapons in KwaZulu-Natal and PWV townships, the security forces until recently had little success in halting the smuggling of arms into the country.

Towards the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 some successes were achieved by the special police Firearms Unit, set up to cooperate with Mozambique and Swaziland to stop the smuggling of firearms across those countries' borders into South Africa.

Although constant searches for arms are undertaken by the police, specifically in high conflict townships, they managed to seize only 1 000 AK-47s in 1991, 891 in 1992 and 386 in 1993. These figures exclude the number handed in to the police by people claiming the reward of R6 000 offered.

G3s and the KZP

A complication to the KwaZulu-Natal conflict was the appearance in early 1990 of the lethal G3, a German designed high-powered semi-automatic rifle. In response to pressure and attacks by the comrades on
peace keepers, fine collectors etc. Previously the sale was an extremely sensitive matter, and attack them. The procurement of firearms has become crucial to controlling and holding onto territory.

Both sides justify arming themselves for self protection, since they are communities under attack. Similarly, hostel residents blame ANC supporters for the conflict, saying that the township inhabitants resent their presence and attack them. The procurement of firepower has become crucial to controlling and holding onto territory.

The need for firearms is met in a variety of ways. One is through the manufacture of homemade arms often in crude but effective backyard ‘factories’. Here the ubiquitous qwasha - homemade guns which derive their name from the noise they make when fired - is a length of steel pipe into which a shotgun shell is fitted with a rudimentary firing mechanism. This mechanism usually comprises a sharpened nail tied to strips of rubber car.

considering South Africa’s situation in the lead up to April elections and the fact that, at the time, the IFP had not decided to participate in the elections. Just a week earlier the Goldstone Commission had released its report about the involvement of senior police officers in the illegal delivery of firearms to KwaZulu.

The Goldstone Commission was asked to investigate the Eskom sale and found several worrying aspects, including the speed with which an ‘export’ permit was issued by the police to the KZP but by the office of the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Government. Being legally licensed, they were allowed to be carried openly in public. From 1990, G3s were increasingly in evidence at Inkatha rallies and marches. Besides their intimidating aspect they served as provocation to comrades and SDU members who were unable to display their weapons in a similar manner. Members of the security forces, particularly of ISUs, complained bitterly about not being able to disarm the tribal policemen.

When self protection units/home guard training camps were set up by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) at Umfolozi and elsewhere in December 1993, some recruits received training with G3s.

When one of the camps, Mlaba, was raided by the police on the first day of voting in the April elections, the police found an arsenal of illegal weapons - G3 rifles, shotguns, hand and rifle grenades and quantities of ammunition - ostensibly supplied by the KwaZulu government and police officials for training purposes.

They also found a homemade shotgun similar to those allegedly manufactured by operatives of the C10 Unit (Vlakplas) and used by ‘third force’ hit squads like those uncovered in Zululand by the Goldstone Commission in December 1993.

The procurement of arms by the KZP was also in the news in March 1994, when Eskom uncovered an unauthorised arms sale by its personnel. Eskom was approached at the beginning of March 1994 by agents of an arms company, Gintans Security, which had itself been approached by KwaZulu Government representative and former security policeman, Phillip Powell, who was running the Inkatha training camps.

Eskom security officials, without obtaining clearance, offered surplus arms - 1 000 LM4 semi-automatic rifles - to Gintans for resale to the KZP. The sale was aborted when the shipment was discovered being loaded at Eskom headquarters onto KZP lorries.

The sale was an extremely sensitive matter, considering South Africa’s situation in the lead up to April elections and the fact that, at the time, the IFP had not decided to participate in the elections. Just a week earlier the Goldstone Commission had released its report about the involvement of senior police officers in the illegal delivery of firearms to KwaZulu.

The conflict on the East Rand, particularly in the Katlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus and Phola Park areas, is a case in point. Conflict in those townships has been likened to undeclared and unofficial war. Nevertheless it is a war in which two armed opposing sides protect and hold territory in a ‘war zone’.

People die regularly, and the lives of ordinary residents are disrupted. In the unofficial war there are ‘battle lines’ and ‘no-man’s land buffer areas’, night time patrols and guard duties. There is a mass of armaments ranging from spears and pangas to homemade guns, shotguns and automatic assault rifles like AK-47s and RIs. There are even LMGs, and grenades, mortars and rocket launchers have occasionally been used in attacks.

Both sides justify arming themselves for self protection, since they are communities under attack. Similarly, hostel residents blame ANC supporters for the conflict, saying that the township inhabitants resent their presence and attack them. The procurement of firepower has become crucial to controlling and holding onto territory.

The need for firearms is met in a variety of ways. One is through the manufacture of homemade arms often in crude but effective backyard ‘factories’. Here the ubiquitous qwasha - homemade guns which derive their name from the noise they make when fired - is a length of steel pipe into which a shotgun shell is fitted with a rudimentary firing mechanism.

This mechanism usually comprises a sharpened nail tied to strips of rubber car.
Transport is a crucial issue in the violence between hostel residents and township inhabitants. The KwaZulu-Natal government needs to address the vexing issue of carrying 'traditional weapons'. Many SDUs will resist measures to disarm them.

A policy of 'one family, one licensed gun' has been proposed. The vexing issue of carrying 'traditional weapons' has been a problem. There is considerable controversy surrounding what constitutes a traditional weapon, and the situation has been complicated by the electoral victory of the IFP, which is sympathetic to the right of Zulu's to bear traditional weapons.

Taxi wars

Illegal arms smuggling has also been one of the underlying causes of some of the conflict between minibus taxi organisations on the Reef. Transport is a crucial issue in the violence between hostel residents and township inhabitants.

There are two minibus taxi associations in most Reef townships - a local and a long distance one. Some of the latter are Natal based and financed. Usually the long distance Natal based associations ply the lucrative 'home run' route, transporting migrant workers home for visits and back. Because they were standing idle during the week, the long distance taxis began transporting hostel dwellers to work, making inroads on the local association's routes and taking passengers away from them. Local associations resent this economic competition.

Since the long distance taxis mainly transport Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers, they became associated politically with Inkatha, and vice versa the local associations with the township civils and by extension with the African National Congress. Economic competition became politicised.

With the escalation of the hostel-township violence from mid 1990s, local associations began suspecting some long distance operators of smuggling firearms for hostel residents. Drivers of the Natal based associations became targets of attack by township comrades, and began arming themselves, often illegally, for protection.

Runouts of an impending attack on long distance operators would often lead them to launch pre-emptive attacks on local operators. And so a cycle of minibus violence, termed the 'taxi wars', began.

Control

Obviously the proliferation of firearms in South Africa and the role they play in violence urgently needs to be addressed. President Nelson Mandela has repeatedly said that a new government will tighten up existing gun control measures.

'The new Safety and Security minister for the PWV Region, Jessie Duarte, has proposed a policy of 'one family, one licensed gun' in a bid to reduce the numbers of firearms in the region. This stance was supported by the ANC's Obed Bapela in a speech to the provincial parliament when he highlighted the need for illegal firearms to be confiscated. He emphasised that the 'one person, one firearm' policy was a temporary measure and that, once the police could offer sufficient security, all privately owned guns would have to be handed in. This, he said, was part of the ANC's plan for a gun free society.

In KwaZulu-Natal the situation is slightly different. At issue will be whether the new provincial government will be able to address the vexing issue of carrying 'traditional weapons'. There is considerable controversy surrounding what constitutes a traditional weapon, and the situation has been complicated by the electoral victory of the IFP, which is sympathetic to the right of Zulu's to bear traditional weapons.

The disarming of SDUs - especially in violence torn areas on the East Rand, where many of them act independently, are undisciplined and unaccountable to any political or community structure - is also a contentious issue. Many SDUs will resist measures to disarm them until decisions have been made on their future role and legitimate community policing structures are in place.

Until the new Government manages to gain some control over the proliferation of firearms in South Africa, they will continue to play a critical role in violence.

REFERENCES


The new police, who began to make some inroads on the proliferation of firearms, found themselves under attack from the very people they were trying to help. The police were often caught in the crossfire, and casualties were high. The situation became even more dangerous as the police tried to gain control over the proliferation of firearms.

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Sinister reports of Western Cape gangs working for political parties, of politically motivated taxi violence and gun-running, prompted Independent Electoral Commission workers to fear disruption of April elections. That did not happen, but political conflict remains a threat in the one major metropolitan area in South Africa that had begun to believe it was immune.

Political violence does not actually have to take place for it to be an important phenomenon. Sometimes, merely the threat of violence can shape political processes and planning in significant ways.

This article looks at the political impact of the potential for violence in the Western Cape, through the eyes of the information analysis department of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), for whom I worked during the April election.

The function of information analysis, attached to the IEC’s monitoring directorate, was primarily to assemble and digest information with a view to identifying trends which might threaten the freeness and fairness of the election.

Election threat

Beside our normal duties monitoring campaign rallies and gatherings, newspaper accounts in the weeks preceding the election sparked our interest in the possible electoral effects of three, what appeared at the time discrete, issues: increases in gang activity, resurgences in taxi violence, and gun-running.

Our explorations into these matters eventually unearthed enough links among all three issues to devote a great deal of attention to what appeared to us to be a very real threat to peaceful elections in the Western Cape, a threat which seemed to emanate from "external" sources in the political community.

In any event, these threats turned out to be few. Ironically, the major threat to the election was organizational and logistical, and was "internal" to the IEC. Mounting concerns about political violence meant that the IEC failed to focus on and monitor what turned out to be a completely different but very real threat to the elections.

This is the picture of events that emerged quickly in the weeks preceding the election.

Gang politics

IEC monitors had been reporting that gangs were causing problems at large, open-air campaign rallies throughout the Cape Flats. Reports from election field researchers for the Institute of Multi Party Democracy (MPD) also indicated that gang leaders were publicly advertising their services to political parties, as well as claiming they were receiving feelers from parties.

Initial enquiries with the police as well as IEC monitors led us to believe that gang presence at campaign rallies was purely a function of criminal activities - large crowds were tempting targets - and that claims of partisan links were only so much bravado.

But deeper probes uncovered a widespread and consistent body of information, allegation and rumor that there was indeed an effort by political parties to use gangs to intimidate and harass political opponents.

Cape Flats gangs had a definite interest in politics: offering their services was a way to earn income, as well as a way to test their status against political parties who posed challenges in terms of community control and status.

One gang reportedly claimed that they had been preparing for elections since November 1993, spending approximately R100,000 acquiring guns in anticipation of demand from the parties.
Gangs had loosely aligned themselves with the NP and the ANC, and were used to harass political opponents.

It was also reported to researchers that the two largest gang confederations had loosely aligned themselves with the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC), though configurations seemed to change in specific circumstances.

MPD interviews with local party organizers revealed that gangs were indeed being used to harass political opponents. Canvassers from both parties reported actual or feared harassment. In many areas the ANC was forced to resort to large billboards in order to establish a presence since their posters were habitually destroyed.

And in sworn affidavits one NP Member of Parliament was even accused of being directly involved in recruiting and paying gang members in Bontshevoed for various political services, such as attacking ANC members' houses, distributing the NP's infamous 'comic book' and destroying ANC posters.

Mounting information from a member of different sources, including a BBC documentary, also suggested possible gang links with the police ranging from resistance and resistance to gang crack downs, all the way to supplying weapons.

It is interesting to note that while township youths and self defence units almost always use AK-47s, Cape Flats gangs use police and defence force issue weapons such as R1s, R4s, R5s and pump-action shotguns. It also emerged that arms flows to gangs had increased significantly over the previous six months. All of this raised the possibility that parties were using gangs to create 'no go' areas for rival political parties.

**Taxi wars**

Gangs were also important because of their close association with the taxi industry. In the Cape Flats, gangs both collect rent from taxis to run in their areas and provide muscle to keep competing or non-aligned operators off these routes. This close association meant that any general pattern of gang-party alignments would be replicated in the taxi industry.

We observed all of this against a backdrop of a resurgence in taxi violence, stemming at least partially from conflict between the ANC aligned taxi association Codeta and non-aligned operators, as well as from renewed tension 'within' Codeta. Both were related to longstanding disputes between factions.

According to local unrest monitors, suppressed recent taxi 'hits' appeared to be evenly divided between township gangs aligned with traditional leaders and armed units working for the leadership of ANC aligned taxi associations.

**Gun running**

All of this sat uncomfortably with surfacing information about partisan alignments associated with our third concern, gun running operations from the Ciskei into black townships in the Western Cape.

Goldstone investigations had reportedly confirmed the involvement of elements from or associated with the intelligence community. More importantly, available information seemed to point to a possible NP link to these operations.

We had a very good indication that, as recently as two months before the election, about 150 youths were being trained in weapons use in Khayelitsha squatter areas by people with admitted connections to the intelligence community.

These people were part of a small group of traditional squatting camp leaders with connections to the Ciskei, the security and intelligence community, and another organization called the Western Cape Civics Association (WCCA).

This group of leaders had long-standing conflict with township and squatting camp gangs and self defence units generally aligned to the South African Civic Organization (Sanco) and the ANC.

**Party links**

The arms training camp appears to have been intended to provide self defence capabilities to WCCA and traditionalist groupings. WCCA had been started as an alternative civic front to Sanco and, according to Press reports, was funded by white businessmen closely linked to the NP.

Over the previous six months, Khayelitsha had been wracked by violent territorial conflict between people aligned with Sanco and WCCA, including a running battle in November 1993 between supporters of the ANC Youth League and a breakaway unit being waged by some traditional leaders, that left two people dead and 65 shacks burnt to the ground.

These same broad alignments, interestingly, reappeared once we reviewed the history of taxi violence in the area. Of greater concern...
for the IEC was that the alignments seemed to replicate themselves once we examined the composition of various party's candidate lists for the provincial parliament.

Perhaps the most serious signal was publicly leaked police documents which revealed that some people publicly implicated in ongoing gun-running and arms training activities had held talks with Western Cape NP officials in party offices as recently as November 1993. They allegedly talked about forming a broad anti-ANC political front. Moreover, Press reports and other informed sources indicated that people involved in recent smuggling and training had long histories of involvement with traditional leaders who appeared on the NP provincial candidate list.

Concerned sources monitoring regional developments pointed to a possible nightmare scenario in which gun-running operations may have been intended, among other things, to put arms into the hands of a loose anti-ANC front for the purpose of fanning taxi violence during the election, with the presumed intention of keeping black voters away from the polls.

This potential resembled what Judge Goldstone called the 'horrible network of criminal activity' in which arms were stored, smuggled and then given to people with the motives to use them.

Third force

These possibilities sounded ominously similar to the type of 'third force' activities recently publicized by Goldstone elsewhere in the country, but which had always seemed to avoid the Western Cape.

We asked ourselves whether the Western Cape was as immune to these activities as previously imagined. We were not comforted by our awareness of two ongoing Goldstone investigations, one looking into taxi violence and another four month old investigation into gun-running aimed at destabilizing Western Cape communities.

We were also interested in ANC charges that an NP controlled provincial government and NP appointed police commissioner could provide a safe haven for security officials implicated in third force activities.

This could have provided a powerful incentive for those concerned to do everything in their power to ensure that the NP emerged not only as the largest party in a government of provincial unity but with a clear majority.

All of this led to increased IEC fears about drive-by shootings at key taxi ranks, especially those located near voting booths. These fears mounted further once we matched our information to IEC lists of polling locations.

Astonishingly, we found that at least two voting sites were within hundreds of meters of reported weapons caches and arms training sites, as well as areas with recent histories of armed conflict.

Still other polling sites had been placed very close to taxi ranks with a history of being 'hot spots' in the taxi wars of 1990 and 1991. Understandably, IEC officials had done so to facilitate voter access to polling booths.

The final straw seemed to come when, just prior to the election, we received increasing reports of contacts between local party officials and taxi operators reaching individual agreements to transport supporters, as well as even more far reaching negotiations between regional bus and taxi associations and political parties to book large numbers of vehicles to drive party faithfuls to the polls on election day.

The ANC reportedly reserved hundreds of busses and thousands of taxis. This brought fears of large scale movements of voters in vehicles clearly identifiable as 'ANC' or 'NP' taxis or busses. If violence was in the offing, these vehicles would be tempting targets.

This nightmare seemed about to become reality when, early in the morning of the special voting day on 26 April, the IEC received confirmation of deaths during an attack by party supporters on a taxi perceived to be carrying only supporters of a rival party, near a voting station earlier identified as a hot spot.

Fortunately, this proved to be the first and last such incident during the election. Later joint operations centre reports indicated that no one had actually died in the shooting, but the incident did trigger a series of emergency meetings between the IEC, the Regional Peace Committee, political parties and taxi associations, which resulted in taxi associations publicly pledging to carry supporters from any party to the polls.

While the issues of gang and taxi violence and gun-running never combined into the particular scenario we feared the most, they were all real concerns. More importantly, they have not gone away and are now emerging as important post-election issues which demand immediate attention by the new national and provincial governments.
ENDING VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU-NATAL

By Antoinette Louw
Editor, Indicator SA Conflict Supplement

As the newly elected premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Frank Mdlalose and his Inkatha Freedom Party-led government have the unenviable task of eradicating violence in the region. He is well placed to lead the way, having helped facilitate peace and reconstruction in Mpumalanga. Indicator SA interviewed Dr Mdlalose to ascertain his views on conflict and what lies ahead for the region.

I don't think the state of emergency really helped to tone down the violence. I would like it to be lifted.

The whole country needs a new police policy. There is not a single police department which has been absolutely pure.

After two of the most violent months in the history of this region, violence almost ceased while the April elections were underway. Why do you think that happened?

The most important thing about it is that I'm thankful violence did not feature much during the elections. I thank God for that, because it might have been the most violent time of our lives. If there had not been a satisfactory resolution of certain problems prior to elections we might have had a very violent period.

On April 19 there was some finding of one another between the then state president, Mr FW de Klerk, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Dr Nelson Mandela. I think that sent a message of hope throughout the country and made people see there was progress. That was a factor in bringing about stability. People could vote together and accept one another.

There were of course unfortunate situations within that milieu which could quite well have caused a lot of violence. The fact that the Independent Electoral Commission was not really prepared and the fact that there was an upsurge of voters and polling stations within a matter of a week, from the April 19 - 26, must have been a problem even to them.

The state of emergency was implemented on March 31 and has yet to be lifted. Do you think it has been effective?

I don't think the state of emergency really helped to tone down the violence. When it was declared and for some time afterwards there was a lot of violence. Before April 19, when the state of emergency was there, violence was high. I would like it to be lifted. I never wanted it in the first place, and right now there are more reasons why it ought to be lifted.

Effective policing is crucial to ending violence. What ideas do you have for restructuring and reintegrating the police, particularly because some communities have had problems with the KwaZulu Police (KZP) in this region?

Policing generally in South Africa is receiving a new look and I think policing throughout should be overhauled. Isolating the KZP is a political issue, and anybody who does this is politicising the issue.

When one KwaZulu policeman does something wrong, and some of them do, the whole force suffers. When a white policeman from the South African government does something wrong, just that individual is blamed. Apartheid is still very much with us. In the Goniwe situation, where white policemen were involved, nobody said 'away with the SAP, destroy them'.

The whole country needs a new police policy. There is not a single police department which has been absolutely pure. When people came back from exile and certain political organisations were unbanned in 1990, there were calls to eradicate the KZP and the KwaZulu government. This idea has become implanted in the minds of many academics.
There was deep disagreement between the IFP and the African National Congress over the KwaZulu-Natal police portfolio, with the ANC wanting it shared. Do you think this might affect restructuring of the police in the region?

Again, this has been taken out of context. The focus by some people on policemen goes back to highlighting the KZP all the time, and it’s absolute nonsense. We have spoken about deputies for a number of ministries, not only police. When I talk about this in terms of health nobody bothers, but when I mention police, that’s all that is concentrated on.

What do you understand community policing to be about?

I’m not minister of police and I don’t think I can answer that adequately. With policing in our present situation you ought to have the involvement of the community. One of the most offensive things I have witnessed, in front of my surgery in Macadens some 20 years ago, was somebody being chased by a knife-wielding man who stabbed and killed the victim while there were people all around.

When the police got there nobody knew who had done it. Everybody was absolutely ignorant because the community was so rotten that you never told on your neighbour. The community is not geared towards its own self-protection. The community should have arrested that man and held him until the police came. A community awareness of crime can bring about community involvement in policing.

The PWV government announced measures for disarming and disbanding self-defence units (SDUs). These structures were still in operation in KwaZulu-Natal at the time of elections. Do you have similar ideas for this region?

We haven’t applied our minds to that. Our cabinet was only completed the day before yesterday (May 30). There is no place for the SDUs now and they must go. They have been very harmful and have destroyed many lives.

Disarming society is also an important issue?

Yes, but someone on TV made the good point that you will succeed in disarming responsible people with licenses for guns while leaving the irresponsible ones who have no licenses. They won’t submit their guns because they know what they’re keeping them for. Responsible people will then be prey to those irresponsible elements.

Do you think violence levels will be affected by the arrangement whereby King Goodwill Zwelethini acts as custodian over what was KwaZulu land?

I don’t see the connection.

Soon after the new Government took power questions were raised about this issue, and a cabinet commission investigated it. As I understand it this arrangement means traditional structures and land allocation practices will remain intact in the areas concerned, which may conflict with some people’s ideas about how land should be allocated.

It is a pity that we have such a clear past history with past conflicts which academics ought to know about. When the white man got to South Africa there were two different concepts about land, its ownership and its use.

The white man coming from Europe was of the idea that if land was his, he must put a fence around it and have a title deed. That was a Western concept. The concept of the African was that the land belongs to the King. The King is not the owner in the Western sense, and he is not in a position to sell.

The King, through the chiefs, owns the land according to unwritten customary law. The chiefs allocate land through indunas (headmen), having been given authority to do...
My approach to the youth is that they need to be sympathised with so by the King. As things are changing we feel that we must protect communal ownership and therefore we have this trust. Saying that land has been stolen and given to the King is the hype of the politicised academic’s mind.

There may be some opposition from the ANC, and from those who wanted to see this system of land allocation changed.

I wouldn’t necessarily say the ANC as such. Certain people like to cause problems no matter what you do.

The election results for this region were not accepted by everyone. Harry Gwala, for example, expressed dissatisfaction on occasions. Do you think these sentiments are likely to fuel conflict in the region?

I think this is calculated to bring about conflict and more violence. Some people are not happy to have peace. You have quoted Harry Gwala and I don’t align him with the group that seeks peace. He is one of those who will raise problems with whatever you do.

Youth throughout the region have been involved in violence. What ideas do you have for stemming this?

We preach to the youth and try to involve them in a number of ways, to get their hands away from violence. We have always advocated schooling. Some of us never said liberation first and education later.

When it became a catch phrase to say the youth are a ‘lost generation’, others said they were rather a misled generation. ‘Lost’ creates a picture of gone forever, forgotten, and unable to be remedied. I think we must do something to lead them along correct paths. Other people have glorified them, saying they’re not the lost generation but the heroes who brought about liberation.

My approach to the youth is that they need to be sympathised with. They need to be seen to be misled, and often not by themselves but by their peers. Once they are misled by their peers it becomes self-perpetuating. We ought to have sympathy with that.

The Joint Enrichment Programme has a very good approach which focuses on youth and lets them interact and find a way of curing themselves of this misled philosophy. They must go to school and interact outside the political field. There must be sport, talks, church attendance, travel, and the youth must be organised. Then they can see themselves being productive. When somebody does something that people appreciate, his prestige is enhanced and he doesn’t want to lose that.

Nearly 100 people died in violence in KwaZulu-Natal during May. Many of these conflicts were between ANC and IFP supporters. What will you do about conflict which is endemic, based on territorially, political control and intolerance?

Where there has been an established mode of behaviour it is often difficult to break it down. We wish it would go away overnight. The Minister preaches every Sunday and that has been going on for years. He still preaches but not everybody, even among the converted, can keep the Ten Commandments.

These commandments have to be preached all the time. Where there has been a culture of intolerance, hatred and politicisation of activities, you don’t get rid of it overnight. Of course there are differences between the IFP and ANC. They have been there for quite some time. I don’t think it would be realistic to expect them to end overnight.

Do you foresee potential problems with ensuring that development in conflict areas is carried out efficiently and fairly?

Yes, I have been involved in a number of situations like that, and there are problems when you set about reconstruction. Through the Peace, Reconstruction and Development Trust in Mpumalanga, of which I am one of the trustees and Jacob Zuma is another, we saw this on the ground.

You cannot reconstruct before you can have peace, and when you start to reconstruct this tends to enhance the prospects of peace being sustained. Reconstruction and peace must keep going together because if one stops the other will fall flat.

There were instances in Mpumalanga where we saw the ups and downs of the joint venture between the ANC and IFP. After heavy casualties, the society was torn apart. There were those who remained in Mpumalanga and were at logger heads with one another when many others had left the area.

When that happened there was the realisation from the local leadership that this is self-inflicted destruction. We’ve got to catch hold of that feeling and consolidate it and let the people find themselves. We succeeded in keeping to the background and letting the local people come up. The local leaders and people found each other and worked together.
When we were reconstructing we employed local people without jobs, uneducated young people who had been taught liberation first, education later. We applied for money from the Independent Development Trust and industrialists. We needed constant refresher action to maintain the peace and reconstruction. But on the whole I think it worked.

So this example needs to be replicated all over the region. Should the Peace Accord structures play a role in this?

Peace Accord structures have to be encouraged. In this region we have the Regional Peace Committee with which we work and interact. These structures are spreading all over the province. Of course they have been undermined. Everyone who fights for peace gets undermined by a number of things. Sometimes by articles in the Press or by some academics, but we have to work despite these destructive elements to get peace established.

Rural areas are often neglected when it comes to implementing new policies and development. How will you ensure violence in these areas is given equal attention to urban areas?

The urban population often gets early help because they are within easy reach. There are roads and telephones, and many people together in one group which makes it seem easier to deal with. Rural areas which are sparsely populated tend to be neglected, but I have no intention of neglecting the rural people. I am from a rural background, and luckily so was Jacob Zuma, so we don’t see ourselves neglecting rural areas.

There have been suggestions that the decline in violence since the elections is a ‘honeymoon period’ and that levels could get worse once again. What are your feelings about future conflict?

I’m aware there are some people who have thrived on the violence. There will be those who wish it will flare up again. As much as they have an influence on violence levels, the peace-loving ones also have an influence on eliminating violence, and it may become a seesaw.

I think I am a pragmatic optimist. I wish peace would come to our country forever. But I am also realistic enough to know that things don’t always go according to one’s wishes. There will be disruptions.

What does your government have to offer to end violence where other attempts have failed?

Our government’s first priority has to be the elimination of violence. Priority number two has to be economic enhancement and development. I intend working with Jacob Zuma to look into the problem of violence.

We’ve got to bring in other people to help us, and both Jacob Zuma and I want to include people from the industrial field, the National Peace Accord structures, the academic world, and church leaders to participate in a forum to find ways of going forward. We may need a facilitator. The Mamelalanga experience is the sort of approach we should take.

I have just received an invitation from the Peace and Reconstruction Trust Committee for a meeting in Durban. I contacted Jacob Zuma who has a similar invitation and said: ‘My friend, let’s go for this’. I want to make that the start, because now we are a cabinet we can begin work on the provincial scale. These are the things we have in mind, and I think we are on the right course.
After weeks of horrifying pre election violence, levels of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal have subsided. But most of the reasons for violence - economic, social and psychological - remain. This is a cause for concern and a signal that violence will continue to simmer.

Violence levels have dropped and regional leaders have reinforced this positive trend with moves toward reconciliation.

The resolution of violence in KwaZulu-Natal will depend largely on how the regional government improves policing and facilitates local peace initiatives.

Tensions rise

Violence in KwaZulu-Natal reached massive proportions in the months before the elections. The only other upsurge of this scale occurred in March and April 1990, when the country was launched into political transition (Figure 1). In April 1994 the elections heralded the realisation of that transition, with an equally violent reception.

In both instances violence peaked throughout the country, although in KwaZulu-Natal the trend was more pronounced. The increase this year must be seen in the context of heightened tensions and expectations before the first democratic election in a country where democracy, tolerance and confronting political opposition through the ballot has not been the norm.

Particular events in both 1990 and 1994 ignited these violent outbursts. In 1990 the unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in February of that year preceded the massive outbreaks of violence.

This year the IFP's decision to boycott the election until a week before the event fuelled
existing rivalries. Conflict developed not only over which party to vote for, but also between those for and against participation.

The riots and subsequent coup in Bophutatswana in March 1994 caused widespread fear that a similar fate would befall other homeland governments. In KwaZulu in particular, where the ruling IFP's boycott of elections threatened to scuttle elections in the region, tensions intensified.

The fact that the government takeover in Bophutatswana was authorised by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), of which the IFP was not a member, further alienated the IFP.

Since the election, violence has thankfully dropped to early 1993 levels. In May, according to the Human Rights Committee (HRC), 111 people died in KwaZulu-Natal compared with 338 in April. Such extreme violence could not be sustained for long, particularly after the IFP had joined the election and the results were accepted with minimal opposition.

The election process illustrated that opposing political parties can participate in a fair contest and, most importantly, that supporters can partake in this contest peacefully. A closer examination of violence trends reveals these dynamics.

A weekly focus

Considering the region's history of political antagonism, intimidation and lack of free political activity, an increase in violence before the election was not surprising. To this backdrop can be added the non participation of the IFP and events in Bophutatswana.

A weekly analysis shows that events did not increase gradually as the election drew nearer, but that violence surged suddenly in mid-March. The rate of conflict more than doubled between the second and third weeks of March (Figure 2).

An increase over this period was evident in all the sub regions of KwaZulu-Natal. The Durban sub region experienced the most violence before the election, and events here...
ANC. Tensions were high before the election and continued during the voting, with many allegations of voter interference coming from this area.

**Tensions erupt**

The second week of March marked the height of the rioting in Bophuthatswana and, more importantly, the occupation by IFP hostel residents of the stadium in Umlazi, which had been reserved for an ANC rally (Figure 2).

The IFP's boycott of the election took on a grim reality which was to be repeated, unrestrained, a week later in KwaMashu. This sharpened hostilities between the IFP and ANC and the deaths of three people that day in Umlazi launched a spiral of violence which gripped the whole region.

The devastating loss of life which followed these events and other actions by the IFP led the HRC in Natal to conclude that the upsurge was the result of 'a planned, coordinated strategy by anti-election elements within the IFP'.

This interpretation was bolstered by similar findings of independent international observers, church bodies and monitoring groups in KwaZulu-Natal. The HRC draw attention to various events. Attacks on people involved with voter education are documented, most notably the massacre of 15 ANC youths in February near Creighton in the Midlands. The youths were preparing for a voter education workshop. The brutal murder of eight people distributing TEC pamphlets on voting in Ndwedwe on April 12 is well known, and the attack on ANC canvassers - two of whom died - in Umkomaas on April 23, are also discussed. The disruption of ANC rallies by IFP supporters at Umlazi, KwaMashu and Mondlo near Vryheid, contribute to the argument.

Finally, allegations of large scale movement of IFP supporters around the province by bus and the continued training and deployment of members of Inkatha Self Protection Units, until discovered by a police raid on April 26, conclude the evidence.

These findings were dismissed as propaganda by the IFP's information centre, and sources there associated the violent outburst in March with the imminent election and the opposition of the IFP to participation. This opposition was expressed spontaneously and gained momentum in the Durban area

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Figure 2: Frequency of violent events by week in KwaZulu-Natal: Jan - May 1994

Figure 3: Frequency of events by week in the Durban and Zululand sub regions: Jan - April 1994

The IFP's boycott of the election sharpened hostilities between the IFP and ANC.

The Durban area, with its metropolitan environment, vast informal settlements and massive population, has always been the focus of conflict in the region. Election related violence occurred mostly in this area, in Umlazi, KwaMashu, KwaMakhutha and Ndwedwe.

The Zululand sub region also endured high violence levels, with the proportion of events here increasing in April, compared with a decrease in most other regions (Figure 4).

The majority of areas in this sub-region are IFP supporting under the control of traditional authorities fiercely opposed to the ANC. Tensions were high before the election and continued during the voting, with many allegations of voter interference coming from this area.
with the occupation of the stadiums, organised by the largely IFP supporting, South African Hostel Dwellers Association.

The IFP acknowledged that ANC supporters bore the brunt of attacks in the run up to the election, but also drew attention to increased conflict within ANC structures and between ANC and South African Communist Party supporters.

Since the election commentators have chosen not to unravel the chain of events which led to the IFP’s last minute decision to end its boycott. In March tensions throughout the country were high, and provocative actions should have been avoided at all costs.

Violence subsides

In the third week of March violence levels began a decline as sudden as the upsurge had been (Figure 2). The state of emergency was declared on March 31 but only took effect around April 13 when all the manpower was in place.

The effectiveness of the emergency is hard to assess, particularly because the IFP re-entered the election race a week later on April 19. The change of attitude which the IFP’s position fostered eased tension and accelerated the decline, although in some areas, like Ulundi, free political activity was still obstructed.

Violence levels began to abate before the IFP joined the process, and the high presence of security forces in the troubled areas of the region probably inhibited violence. This does not necessarily justify the enactment of the emergency, as security force numbers were to be increased for the election in any event, and personnel had already been called up when the emergency was declared.

It is fortunate that the emergency did not cause additional violence, given the IFP’s intense opposition to the regulation.

Future trends

The election has brought new leaders to the region who seem determined to end violence. In Nkandla and the Pietermaritzburg area local leaders have already made moves towards resolving rivalries. The peaceful election also indicated the priority of the region’s citizens, and since the election fewer people have died in political conflict than before.

The election could not, however, solve important structural realities in KwaZulu-Natal which have generated much of the violence. More than half the population was urbanised by 1989, and it is estimated that 37% of these people live in overcrowded informal settlements, most of which lack basic services and infrastructure.
Almost a half of the urban population in the Durban-Pietermaritzburg metropolitan complex, the largest in the region, live in shack settlements. The region is also saddled with the second highest unemployment rate in the country and national social indicators reveal below average levels of social development, especially in the rural areas.

Development programmes aimed at dealing with these problems will have little effect in the short term, and violence around these issues is likely to continue. Violence in rural KwaZulu often took the form of clashes between traditional authorities and groups contesting their position, often comprising youths. The arrangement whereby King Goodwill Zwelithini acts as custodian over former KwaZulu means that these traditional structures will remain in place and the potential for conflict thus continues. The implications of this arrangement for the allocation of resources offered by development and reconstruction remain to be seen.

Under these conditions, low scale violence will undoubtedly continue for some time. Local leaders must try to stop this violence becoming politicised and developing into cycles of revenge attacks which have divided so many communities.

Under the region’s new democratic government there is no reason why political struggles should be resolved through force, let alone the barrel of a gun. Political organisations must act decisively if supporters continue these rivalries.

Should political parties succeed in depoliticising localised violence, the possibility exists that conflict may increasingly be expressed along ethnic, racial and class lines. Divisions such as these are not new to the region, but were mostly subsumed by the prevailing political rivalry between the ANC and IFP.

A legitimate, effective police force will be vital in this regard. The mistrust of the police is harmful both to their work and to the communities which they serve, particularly where the Internal Stability Unit and KwaZulu Police are concerned.

KwaZulu-Natal needs a police force with an entirely new image and the reintegration of the security forces should be a priority for the new government.

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The changing nature of violence during the election period and its subsequent decline is significant. It indicates how central the political impasse, police illegitimacy and the political power play were to sustaining conflict. Violence is bound to continue in some areas, but essentially political conflict may have been a transitional phenomenon.

High levels of violence in the months preceding the election led many to fear that South Africa's first exercise in democracy would be marred by large scale blood letting.

In March the Human Rights Committee (HRC) reported that at least 311 people had been killed in KwaZulu-Natal alone in what The Star described as a 'toll attributed largely to the conflict between those supporting the election and those against it.'

The killing of two African National Congress (ANC) canvassers early in April and seven Transitional Executive Council pamphlet distributors in the Ndwedwe area of Natal on April 12 seemed to indicate that more overt forms of election related violence were to follow.

But the separation of violence directly related to the election and the ongoing conflict was difficult. In reality, the two are closely interlinked. In the Ndwedwe massacre, for example, the possibility remains that the pamphleteers were simply mistaken for intruders and that the attack was not directly linked to the elections. A survivor of the massacre said that their attackers accused them of being members of the ANC.

Killings fields

In the second half of March in Natal, according to the Human Sciences Research Council, an average of 14 people a day were slain with a three fold increase in deaths. The first half of April saw little respite, with the daily average climbing to 15. In the first two weeks of the election month 219 people were killed. The PWV, while comparatively quieter than Natal, recorded 55 deaths in the first two and a half weeks.

The form that violence took during March and early April seemed to differ little from the violence that has claimed over 16,000 lives since February 1990. But there was one notable disparity.

Studies in the past have shown that massacres - defined as the killing of more than 5 unsuspecting victims by one group of attackers - generally intensified over weekends, peaking on Sundays. In early 1994, figures for Natal and to a lesser degree the PWV, showed no specific time of occurrence.

In line with this trend, a preliminary assessment indicates a general decline in the number of massacres: only three such incidents occurred in the first half of April.

The general decline in the number of massacres may indicate a decline in revenge attacks.

The Goldstone Commission's investigations may have halted massacres planned and executed from within the state structure.
The late entry of Inkatha into the election was a significant factor in reducing internecine conflict. This new development may indicate a decline in the number of revenge and retaliatory attacks in the two months preceding the election.

Some have suggested that the Goldstone Commission's investigation into third force activities in the South African Police also put a halt to massacres which could have been planned and executed from within state structures. Arguably, it also demonstrates a more disturbing and alternative explanation:

If the number of massacres declined while the death toll continued to rise, violence was widespread and intense, with a larger number of incidents on a wider scale. Such an explanation places even greater importance on the decline in violence over the immediate election period.

Peaceful poll

What has been significant, and the subject of much debate, was the drop in violence during polling days and in the period immediately afterwards. Of the 45 people killed in the PWV during the elections, 21 died in rightwing terror bomb blasts. Thus, the election was not characterised by the internecine conflict of recent years. Why is this so?

Most important, the late entry of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) into the process was a significant factor. The exclusion of the IFP raised the possibility of large scale violence during the election period. Non-participation added a central complication: the secret ballot would have been undermined, meaning that anyone going to the polls would have been seen to be voting against Inkatha.

Two independent pre-election polls showed that despite the IFP boycott, over half of the party's supporters planned to go to the polls anyway. This raised rather than reduced the probability of violence in the election period. IFP supporters who broke the official party line to cast their ballots may well have suffered the consequences.

The physical act of travelling to and lining up at a polling station would have indicated support for the electoral process. Prior to the IFP entry into the elections, for example, an Inkatha supporting chief on the South Coast publicly stated that no minibus taxis would be allowed to run on the days of the polling.

The election period was characterised by high levels of security force deployment. More importantly, the visibility of security forces in most areas as well as large numbers of international and local monitors in the field had some impact. Indeed, security measures may have been effective not only in curbing political violence but also in markedly reducing crime levels.

Large scale security deployments in the past have not ended the violence and in some cases have encouraged an escalation in conflict levels. This time the security apparatus acted with greater broad legitimacy for their task and with the consent of all major political leaders. The ANC called for greater levels of security force deployment in Natal in the run up to the election.

International

Evidence from other countries suggests that, provided all parties participate in and are committed to the process, elections are unlikely to be characterised by large scale violence.

In both Kenya and Bangladesh, societies which had the potential for and had experienced conflict, were free of violence during the election period. This trend has also been demonstrated more generally across Africa where, it has been reported, in a number of cases there has been a remarkable mass commitment to 'free and fair' elections when it seemed neither likely nor possible.

All of the South African parties were committed to seeing the election through. That meant it was in nobody's interest that the poll be disrupted. For parties contesting the election, the logic of the democratic process suggested that instigating acts of violence would be counter-productive or would, at least, place a ceiling on the number of votes achievable.

This was of further importance in South Africa since all parties blamed the others for instigating violence. Indeed, shifting the
blame onto other parties for causing violence was a central feature of the campaign. An overt display of violence in the run up to the elections would have damaged the legitimacy of any party’s call for peace.

For this reason, the Goldblatt Commission’s allegations about third force activities in the SAP were damaging to the National Party and were acted on immediately by President FW de Klerk.

Violence, as Rollo May has suggested, “comes from powerlessness, ... it is the explosion of impotence. As we make people powerless, we promote their violence rather than its control”. This links closely with the idea of ‘anomie’, knowing the rules of the game but being unable to participate.

These are useful concepts in that they serve to demonstrate the changing shape of violence brought on by the election. While voting in the past in South Africa had disempowered the majority and empowered the minority, the opposite applied in the April 1994 elections.

The far right’s reversion to violence before the election was a reflection of power but of powerlessness. They could not hope to win a substantial degree of national support in the election and thus sought other means of winning influence.

The Freedom Front’s decision to take part in the election within the confines of the rules of the game rested on the assumption that the party was not taking the route to powerlessness and could win enough support within the democratic contest to ensure survival. Arguably, a central premise on which the NP Government agreed to the elections and the process of reform was that it could gain enough electoral support to remain a significant player.

**Shifting patterns**

Attackers or perpetrators of violence, where they could be identified, changed dramatically during the days preceding the elections. As early as April 3 ‘white men’ were identified as being involved in a random shooting spree which resulted in the death of one person in Weskoppies.

After this incident the number of attacks where whites were indicated as being the perpetrators increased substantially. Indeed, between January and April, 45% of all attacks where whites were implicated occurred during April.

A more easily definable indicator also showed a significant change in the pattern of violence: there was a marked shift away from urban townships. This trend became evident from April 17 until the day before the election, during which 38% of all attacks occurred in white residential and rural farming areas.

Weapons used in violence also showed a marked shift from about the middle of the month until election day. The types of violence come from powerlessness. The far right’s reversion to violence was a reflection of power but of powerlessness.

The reality is that the rightwing violence may be easier to contain than the internecine conflict of the past five years.
years of intense grievances and reinforced by conflict. From April 11, virtually the only type of weapon used was commercial plastic explosives, with a total absence of AK-47s and homemade guns in violence reports.

While this could have been a result of under reporting given the intensity of other election issues, a closer look at reports from high conflict urban areas demonstrates that this trend is consistent. Umlazi, Mpsambilianga, Bhambayi, Phola Park, Kutlehong and Thokoza did not report the use of such weapons.

By April 21, after the inclusion of the IFP in the process, there appeared to be a distinct change in the types of targets that violence was directed against. Conflict appeared to shift from attacks on homes, hostels and IFP or ANC supporters to election offices, polling stations, campaigners, pipelines, powerlines and taxi ranks.

Central to this shift was a greater concentration of attacks against physical structures related either to the state or the election machinery. From April 21 to 25, 91% of all attacks targeted physical structures.

**Political solution**

The changing nature of the violence during the election is significant. It indicates on one level how central the political impasse was to continuing the violence. Uncertainty, the illegitimacy of policing agencies and the political power play must be seen as crucial in sustaining pre-election violence.

On the other hand, the changing nature of the violence around the election period also indicates where future threats may lie. The reality, though, is that rightwing violence may be easier to contain than the intermezzine conflict of the past five years.

Fewer instigators are involved in rightwing attacks and they are much more tightly organised. The result is that rightwing violence is less spontaneous. Ironically, this may allow the security establishment to crack down on rightwing cells, destroying the organised networks and undermining the potential for violence. Greater organisation means that the networks can be 'rolled up' more easily.

The speed with which rightwing bombers were arrested during and after the election period signifies at least that the security forces retain the capacity, and more importantly the will, to carry out such operations.

The election has resulted in violence being changed in form, or at least in classification. Incidents which previously may have taken on political labels may now be reclassified as crime. The weakness of new institutions, though, may ensure that violence, whether criminal or political, will continue to spurt and splutter.

The experiences of the National Peace-Keeping Force, and to a lesser extent the Independent Electoral Commission, are apt examples. It may take some time for the new South African Police Service to build the institutional capacity and legitimacy to follow up and prosecute offenders.

Few incidents of violence were recorded in the days between the election and the presidential inauguration. The HRC said the week to May 10 had the lowest national toll since last July, with 39 deaths nationwide.

This is not to say that violence will not continue after the election. In many areas, particularly KwaZulu-Natal, violence retains its own dynamic, fed by local grievances and reinforced by years of intense conflict. Essentially, however, political conflict may have been a transitional phenomenon, beginning on a wide scale with the breakdown of the apartheid state and petering out as new institutions are forged.  

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Sorrow in Sundumbili

By Mary de Haas
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The troubled township of Sundumbili on the KwaZulu-Natal North Coast has endured eight years of political conflict which has claimed scores of lives. The conflict follows the familiar pattern of clashes between Inkatha and African National Congress-affiliated supporters. It has been exacerbated by the bias of the KwaZulu Police and shows no sign of ending.

Sundumbili, which in Zulu means two 'isundu' palms, is situated about 100 kilometres north of Durban, on a hill overlooking the turbid Tugela River, the 19th century border between the colony of Natal and the Zulu kingdom.

The kingdom has long since been vanquished, and the township owes its existence to the borders drawn by grand apartheid, which outlined the KwaZulu homeland. Sundumbili was built to accommodate workers in nearby Isithebe, where 'border industries' had been created.

Like so many other townships its brief history has increasingly become written in blood. Since the beginning of 1993 at least 120 people have lost their lives in Sundumbili and its surrounding shack areas alone, according to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and Natal Monitor.

The violence should be seen in the context of the wider geographical area of which the township is a part, including the nearby industrial area of Isithebe and the surrounding rural areas which are under the control of chiefs. It must also be located within broader political events in the country as a whole. The dynamics, like the cast of role players, are similar to those elsewhere in the region.

Political economy
Built in the early 1970s a few kilometres away from Mandini, Sundumbili resembles countless other black townships in its layout and the design of its houses. In spite of the addition of the newer, 'Dark City' section, the supply of formal housing falls far short of demand. There is an ever increasing shack settlement population, especially in the Machibini area between Sundumbili and Isithebe.

Established as a result of the 'border industry' policy of the late 1960s and 1970s, Isithebe was described by the Sunday Times in 1989, as being 'one of the largest and fastest growing decentralisation areas'.

However, abuse of subsidies and the payment of appalling wages, have been widely reported and hundreds of workers earn between R18 and R25 per week. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that South African labour legislation did not apply in the bantustan.

The growing trade union movement was, consequently able to find fertile recruiting ground in areas such as Isithebe, and through the threat it posed to the status quo was the catalyst in the spread of violence to the Isithebe-Sundumbili area from the mid-1980s.
The earliest reports of violence involved the targeting of trade unionists.

Pre-1990 violence

The situation which developed in the Isithebe-Sundumbili area should be seen in the context of what was happening in the region as a whole. Organised resistance to apartheid was crystallising in the form of residents' associations, youth organisations, and trade unions.

Some of the resistance was peaceful, some violent, but all was dealt with through methods such as bannings, detentions and attacks by hit squads and vigilantes. In Sundumbili it was the trade unionists who were initially to bear the brunt of these repressive activities.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) was launched on December 1, 1985, and had a high political profile with its support for disinvestment and moves to identify with the United Democratic Front.

The anti-homelands tone of its president's inaugural speech, singled out KwaZulu chief minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi in particular, and alienated Inkatha, which formed its own union, the United Workers Union of South Africa (Uwusa), in May 1986.

From the very start Uwusa was linked to Inkatha and KwaZulu, and after the 1991 " Inkathagate" scandal it emerged that the union was a project under the joint control of the security police and KwaZulu's Minister of the Interior, and financed by the South African taxpayer to a tune of R1,5 million.

It was not surprising, therefore, that earliest reports of violence in Sundumbili-Isithebe area involved the targeting of trade unionists. This trend, which has continued from 1986 to the present, has been part of a much wider pattern in the region, in the Mandini area, people associated with Cosatu were accused of "selling out" to Xhosas and Indians, and an anti-Cosatu campaign was launched in December.

Bus loads of people said to be from the Lindelani squatter camp near Durban, assisted by local residents, allegedly assaulted known supporters of Cosatu or its affiliates. Uwusa and Cosatu declared a truce after peace talks, but soon afterwards two residents, allegedly mistaken for Cosatu supporters were shot dead.

Reports of harassment and violence against trade unionists continued during the ensuing years, and Cosatu accused Isithebe factory management of turning a blind eye to the harassment and physical intimidation suffered by members of their affiliates.

In 1989 the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of South Africa was obliged to obtain an interdict against Uwusa and four of its officials, following the disruption of a union in Isithebe by the heavily armed occupants of about 16 taxis.

Struggles surrounding taxi operations also became a feature of the conflict. In November 1987, for example, Cosatu noted that during the previous week at least three people had been killed and many injured in violence between workers and taxi operators.

The union claimed that KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member for Esikhawini, Prince Gideon Zulu, and other Inkatha officials had disrupted a meeting between the black Taxi Association, Sabta, Cosatu and local Inkatha officials.

1990 to June 1993

Established patterns of violence continued in the region after the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements, but certain new developments emerged.

Violence spread to several rural areas hitherto largely unaffected - a process which is still continuing - and the role of the KwaZulu Police (KZP) increased. Both these trends were to impact upon Sundumbili.

In the Enembe rural area north of Sundumbili, in April 1991, clashes began as faction fighting between residents of Enembe and nearby Impendhle. The fighting assumed an overtly political character when the KwaZulu police labelled Enembe people as ANC supporters.

In the ensuing weeks 17 people died in attacks, many were injured, and many...
properties were destroyed in clashes while, tensions reported, the KZP and other security forces did nothing to stem the conflict. The situation in the area, some taking refuge in Sundumbili.

In the Sundumbili-Isothebe area itself hostilities between Inkatha and Uwusa, on the one hand, and Cosatu and the ANC on the other, continued. New Nation reported that Cosatu trade unionists in Mandini were told to start preparing for their own funerals. In the nearby rural area of Machibini, where shack settlements had mushroomed, there were reports of forced recruitment drives and the vigilantism of high school students by vigilantes.

Regular clashes and unprovoked attacks, especially on youth and trade unionists, continued from 1990 to 1993, but at a fairly low level. Senior Cosatu activist, Alton Ndwandwe, survived two such attacks.

On April 24, 1991, his home at Ezuvi/mamayama, near Isithebe, was attacked and petrol bombed by men wearing balaclavas and armed with R1 rifles. Ndwandwe was not at home, but a man was killed and several other people injured. On May 4, the vehicle in which Ndwandwe was travelling was ambushed, killing the driver. The vehicle used in the attack was recognised as one which had been frequently parked at a KZP station in Sundumbili.

One of the suspects in the attacks on Ndwandwe, and others in the area, was Jerry Madanda. In January 1992 Madanda was arrested on charges of murder, robbery, escaping from custody and pointing a firearm - and apparently given conditional bail. Madanda has never been brought to justice and there is currently a warrant out for his arrest.

The KwaZulu police did little to remedy the situation in the area, either through preventive action or arresting and charging culprits. Here, as elsewhere, the violence continued because of the failure of the criminal justice system.

The KZP were frequently alleged by the HRC and Natal Monitor to be involved in attacks and murders, either on their own or in collusion with Inkatha. Allegations of KZP cover-ups by senior officers also surfaced and soon they became widely feared, particularly after their involvement in the killing of at least eight people in the Mandini area in March and April 1990.

The conflict intensified during the latter part of 1993, with an increase in incidents and deaths of both IFP and ANC supporters.

June 1993 to elections

A sudden escalation in the violence during July 1993 is linked, by local residents, to an IFP rally addressed by KwaZulu and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) leaders from Eshowe and at least one of the chiefs from nearby rural areas.

In a report submitted to the Transitional Executive Council in December, the district commissioner of police said the unrest situation, especially in Sundumbili township and local squatter areas, had escalated drastically after an IFP meeting in July.

A struggle developed around the freedom to organise politically and access to local venues, along with ongoing collusion between Inkatha and the KZP, as evidenced from the following events.

Through a successful application against the township manager brought before the Durban Supreme Court early in July 1993, Cosatu won the right to use the local stadium for a rally on 18 July.

Cosatu had, since August 1992, made three applications to the township administration for permission to use the stadium, but they were denied on the grounds that the meetings would be political. The Cosatu rally went ahead and while no incidents of violence were reported at the stadium, buses returning Cosatu supporters to Isithebe after the meeting were stored.

Events at a South African Communist Party rally on September 26 illustrated the type of behaviour on the part of the KZP, which township residents had become accustomed. According to the Unrest Monitoring and Action Group, people at the rally reported the following events.

The KZP under the direction of the Sundumbili station commander were witnessed sjambokking and assaulting people on their way to the rally. The Commander himself was seen kicking and beating a young man wearing a Cosatu T-shirt, and was joined by other members of the KZP.

Shortly after the rally began three buses carrying Inkatha supporters were seen travelling towards Sundumbili from the nearby KwaMakhosi and KwaMathatha areas. Gathering near the entrance to the stadium the occupants opened fire on the crowd of about 1 000 gathered there. They also attacked vehicles outside the stadium, including that of a National Peace Accord monitor.

The KZP arrived and took no action to stop
The intervention of the ISU in Sundumbili was welcome, but short-lived. Within weeks they were to gradually withdraw. As the election date drew nearer, resistance on the part of Inkatha and its allies became more vocal and allusions to the possibility of war more frequent. What was happening. Marshalls from the rally went to the police station, and were told there were no vehicles available. An hour later six members of the South African police Internal Stability Unit (ISU) arrived and fired above the heads of the mob, but the attacks continued.

The ISU, reluctant to fire live ammunition, requested a supply of tear gas and rubber bullets from members of the KZP, who replied that their tear gas and rubber bullets were all at the police station. The ISU also requested an armoured vehicle from the KZP, who refused to assist.

A large group of KZP who had arrived at the stadium did nothing to stop the attack, and stood laughing at the ISU as they attempted to bring the situation under control. The attack lasted for about an hour, and the attackers were eventually driven back by the ISU, with no assistance from the KZP.

Attacks also occurred in the nearby rural areas and on March 27 a car was stopped by people attending an Inkatha meeting in Mangete, the coastal area near Mandini, and three occupants were killed. Others managed to escape.

The ISU left, ostensibly to attend to trouble elsewhere. People who had attended the rally launched attacks on the township and shack areas. The ANC claimed that KZP opened fire on people trying to defend themselves and allowed attackers to go free.

Changing politics

The escalation of violence during the latter part of 1993, in Sundumbili as elsewhere, should be seen within the broader political context in the country. Agreement about an interim constitution and an election date had been reached by the main negotiating partners, but was rejected by Inkatha and its political allies. As the election date drew nearer, resistance on the part of Inkatha and its allies became more vocal and allusions to the possibility of war more frequent.

Violence levels in KwaZulu-Natal soared between February and mid April 1994 when, at the 11th hour, Inkatha decided to participate in the elections. Twenty people died in Sundumbili alone during these three months, according to the HRC.

The attackers were escorted from the stadium by the KZP who, together with the IFP mob, fanned out into KwaBhidla and other sections of the township and shot at and assaulted people who had managed to flee the stadium. But for the presence of the ISU a massacre would have occurred.

In spite of these events it was almost two months before the ISU was deployed in the township. During this period there were upheavals in the rural areas around Mandini, allegedly instigated by local chiefs. Non-Inkatha residents fled their homes, and strangers from elsewhere moved into the area, causing problems such as squatting on privately owned land in the nearby Mangete area.

The intervention of the ISU in Sundumbili was welcome, but short-lived. Within weeks they were to gradually withdraw. On December 5 Uwusa held a rally, and as it came to an end the KZP asked the ISU to leave, saying it was ‘their’ area.

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On April 1 four people died and seven were injured in an attack on Masomonoca, in the Sundumbili area, in which members of the KZP were allegedly implicated. A group of 15 women and children, displaced from their homes and fearful of further attacks, took refuge at the Mandini South African police station, spending their nights in one of the cells.
The situation improved somewhat with the imposition of a State of Emergency on April 1, with SADF patrols responding timeously to calls for assistance, particularly in Sundumbili.

The election

Gross electoral irregularities were recorded by observers and party officials in Sundumbili and nearby areas were typical of those reported from the North Coast region in general.

These included the presence of armed men at polling stations who threatened voters and chased away party officials and candidates gaining access to blank ballot papers, the failure to check or mark hands with invisible fluid, and intimidation of voters and interference with ballot boxes by members of the KwaZulu police.

Such irregularities also occurred at 'informal' polling stations, not officially gazetted but which came into existence as a result of an informal agreement between IEC officials and representatives of the KwaZulu government.

These stations mushroomed in the Eshowe voting area which includes Sundumbili. Events around voting in this area raise serious questions about the declaration of the elections as 'substantially free and fair'.

Post-election

In common with many other parts of KwaZulu-Natal, no real change has occurred in Sundumbili and its surrounds since the election, KwaZulu police harassment has continued.

On Sunday May 1, for example, the KZP arrested 10 residents of the Dark City section of the township in connection with the murder of an Inkatha supporter, and assaulted them so badly that their families feared for their safety.

After intervention by the police reporting officer in Durban the following day all were released without being charged. On Sunday May 6, members of the KZP joined Inkatha supporters in an attack on Dark City residents, which resulted in two people being hospitalised with injuries.

Attacks also continued in the nearby rural areas. On the morning of Sunday May 15, Mshack Mshali, the father of Mandla Mshali who had been murdered on March 27, was shot dead, together with a companion, in the Mangete area, and a third person was seriously injured.

Mshali senior had known that his life was in danger, and had not been sleeping at his home. Community members believe that his death was related to the fact that he had given information to the police about the identity of local killers.

A number of houses were razed in the area during the next 24 hours and, as dozens of residents fled their homes, defence force reinforcements moved in. Over the same weekend ANC supporters in Machebini, near Sundumbili, had to be escorted out of the area by defence force members because of threats from the local chief and his associates.

Like so many other parts of the region, the post-election situation in Sundumbili is far from normal. Were it not for the presence of the army it would almost certainly be far worse.

The crux of the problem in Sundumbili, as elsewhere, lies in the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with the perpetrators of violence, regardless of political affiliation. The impunity with which the custodians of law and order, the KwaZulu Police, have actively fanned the flames of violence would in a normal society defy all understanding.

In South Africa such behaviour has become commonplace. Only when the KwaZulu Police has ceased to exist as a separate force, and has been replaced by a credible policing system which includes a proficient investigatory arm, will peace return to the place of two 'isundu' palms.
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