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Richard Wilson

Waiting for Utopia: Quality of life in the 1990s
Valerie Moller

What ‘Swing’?
Local Elections in the Western Cape
Jeremy Seekings

Local Elections 1995
Griególt

Cultural Faultlines: South Africa’s New Provincial Boundaries
Richard A Griggs

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Citizenship and Local Government: A New Political Subject?
Ivor Chipkin

Continued non-payment of rents and services could indicate that South Africans have a different perception of what constitutes their citizenship. Local governments will have to deliver in a way that improves the visibility of the democratic state.

Manufacturing Legitimacy: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Richard Wilson

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is poised to provide a full record of our authoritarian past. But the idea of a formal role for civil society in development has become a sacred cow. The STC will elevate often self-defeating criteria to the status of standing orders.

Putting the Local into Government, Two Finger Exercises in Analysis
John Seiler

Understanding the local government election results requires insight into community dynamics and politics, which differ substantially from one area to another. The analysis here focuses on the politics of two towns, in the Western Cape and North West.

What ‘Swing’?
Local Elections in the Western Cape
Jeremy Seekings

The local government election results have been widely misinterpreted in terms of a ‘swing’ to the ANC, especially in the Western Cape. A closer look at the results points instead to a low turnout and a complete collapse in the National Party vote.

ECONOMIC MONITOR
RDP Focus

A Lifelong Task:
Chris Heymans

The RDP could be successful if it genuinely became the flagship of government, was openly debated, and the tensions likely to emerge between them, established institutions and powerful informal local players.

AIDS and the Highways:
Sex Workers and Truck Drivers in KZN
Tessa Marcus, Karen Oellermann

Commercial sex workers and long-distance truck drivers have been identified as core groups in the spread of HIV and AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal. There is an urgent need for a prevention and education intervention.

Universities:
Responding to the ‘Global Challenge’
Raphael de Kort

How South Africa relates to global systems will be crucial to its prospects in many spheres. Universities must think about how best to respond to this reality. There are important gaps in what our universities do.

DEVELOPMENT MONITOR
Planning for AIDS: HIV/AIDS and Town and Regional Planning
Alan Whiteside

AIDS will have a devastating impact on KwaZulu-Natal. The Ministry of Health, the World Bank and other donors are being asked to provide a full record of our authoritarian past. But the idea of a formal role for civil society in development has become a sacred cow. But elevating often self-defeating criteria to the status of standing orders.

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Volume 13, Number 1
Summer 1995
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**UNIT LABOUR COST IN MANUFACTURING IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES**

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* Computed in nominal national currency values.

Source: Central Statistical Service

**EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (‘000)**

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<td>1 278</td>
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Includes permanent and temporary workers
Excludes household services
"We are committed to democratic principles, individual freedom and a socially responsible free enterprise economy."

An extract from AECI "TOWARDS 2002"
Cultural Faultlines
South Africa's New Provincial Boundaries

By Richard A Griggs
Department of Environmental and Geographical Science
University of Cape Town

Political boundaries rarely coincide with areas of cultural and regional identity, creating cultural faultlines: volatile areas where segments of populations oppose being attached to the wrong political or administrative unit. Contestation along South Africa's new provincial boundaries - there are 14 disputed areas - is being exacerbated by the lack of a mechanism for local communities to participate in the decision making process, and could result in instability along these cultural faultlines.

Geopolitics is concerned with analysing the distribution of political power in situations where territory is being contested. Power is seldom distributed evenly, meaning that certain geopolitical actors - groups organised to either promote or resist proposed changes to existing political divisions of territory - have more control over spatial decision making than others.

South Africa's ongoing construction of nine new provinces according to constitutionally established policies and processes for boundary delimitations, including a defined list of 14 disputed boundaries - Schedule 1, Part 2 of the Interim Constitution - provides an unmatched opportunity for investigating the geopolitics of territorial restructuring in a multicultural state. Under Centre for Science Development funding, the author is presently analysing data and monitoring the decision making process.

Neither the boundaries nor the research have been finalised, but the ongoing analysis is pointing to problems with the constitutional mechanisms for resolving boundary disputes.

Political boundaries rarely coincide with areas of cultural and regional identity. This can create cultural faultlines: volatile areas where segments of a population organise around the theme that they are attached to the wrong political or administrative unit. At the extreme, cultural faultlines have led to the breakup of states - for example, Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia, the Soviet breakup, the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The potential threat of such geopolitical conflicts can be mitigated through transparent and inclusive policies and processes, for example referenda. Therefore it was hypothesised that the risk potential of provincial boundary disputes would be mitigated or intensified according to the following set of contingencies:

• Where cultural areas are included within a single province, geopolitical pressures for boundary changes will be minimal.
• Where cultural areas are crossed by provincial boundary lines to produce cultural faultlines, geopolitical pressures for boundary modifications will intensify.
• Where the boundary delimitation process involves a high level of participation by all geopolitical actors, violence is likely to be averted.
• Where participation is limited or geopolitical actors are ignored, violent conflicts will arise.

There are 14 different disputed boundaries along South Africa's new provincial boundaries.

Cultural faultlines have led to the breakup of states.

The threat of geopolitical conflicts can be mitigated through transparent and inclusive policies and processes.
## Method

Interviews, map surveys and submissions (written and oral) form the basis of the study. Map surveys are conducted in the field by having key geopolitical actors use a base map of magisterial districts to draw in their preferred boundaries. The motivations for these particular maps then form the essential part of the interview process. Key policymakers such as commissioners and government departments were interviewed to determine the extent of public participation and understand the mechanisms for decision making.

Ultimately the interviews and surveys reveal both the criteria and actors that influence - or do not influence - the final production of the boundaries. The geopolitical force of each set of actors cannot be precisely measured, but broader processes can be observed such as the general level of community input and the manner in which localities articulate with provincial and central government actors.

### The study areas

Figure 1 indicates that of the 14 original areas of dispute, there remain eight areas of active contention. Some of the affected areas are interrelated, and therefore active boundary disputes can be simplified into five problem areas. These are:

- The related Northern Province-Mpumalanga disputes over Bushbuckridge, Groblersdal and Marble Hall.
- The Eastern Cape-KwaZulu-Natal boundary affecting East Griqualand, Pondoland and Umzimkulu.
- The Gauteng-Mpumalanga border region including the main affected area of the former KwaNdebele homeland.
- The Gauteng-North West border region affecting the areas outlined in Figure 1.
- The Northern Cape-North West dispute over the main affected area of Kuruman.
Altogether the boundaries of seven provinces are contested. The Western Cape and Free State are the only two provinces not affected. The author has conducted surveys in the disputed Eastern Cape-KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng-Mpumalanga and Northern Cape-North West areas, including observations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Finalisation of the Provincial Boundaries between KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, more commonly called the Justice Trengrove Commission.

Early results

Early results indicate that the operating hypothesis was in need of some refinement but essentially correct. The active boundary disputes can be traced geographically to cultural and economic faultlines. In this sense it may be better to speak of socio-economic faultlines.

However, it appears that the *de facto* situation of cultural and economic geographies explains the disputes less adequately than the lack of proper mechanisms for grassroots input into the decision making process. Furthermore, the results are complicated by an inherent bias toward socio-economic discourse when actors motivate for boundary changes. Political motivations are seldom cited.

Socio-economic bias

Most of the discourse around the disputes concern the two interrelated issues of economic functionality and cultural coherence. Most of the data gathered from map surveys and interviews confirms that throughout the active dispute areas there are groups who feel they were left outside the economic centres that either serve or derive economic benefit from them.

The people of Mothibistad on the North West side of the provincial boundary complain that they have been cut off from their main service and shopping centre, Kuruman, which lies in the Northern Cape. Eastern Cape populations adjacent to East Griqualand say that their buying power supports the urban nodes that lie on the KwaZulu-Natal side of the boundary.

The Ndebele complain that they spend more of their lives working in Gauteng than sleeping in Mpumalanga yet have no say in the affairs of Gauteng. Residents around Moretele, Odi and Ga-Rankuwa argue that their main hospital and university facilities...
Boundaries have enormous political ramifications: they help to determine the outcome of elections. Dispute problems

The structures or mechanisms for resolving provincial boundary disputes are clearly addressed in the Interim Constitution. They include a time limited referendum and various forms of negotiation. The referendum process was highly constrained and untested for the following reasons:

- The six month time frame for the entire process of referenda elapsed on October 27, 1994.

Within the framework of interviews and both written and oral submissions to various commissions, cultural criteria were cited with the same frequency as economic ones: sometimes in a purely cultural context but often mixed with economic reasons.

In cultural terms, many Xhosa speakers addressing the Justice Tresego Commission expressed an interest in remaining affiliated with the Eastern Cape by declaring that "we do not want to be ruled by boys". This was in reference to Zulus, who do not hold circumcision ceremonies.

Many groups representing Bhaca people in Umzimkulu expressed an interest in belonging to KwaZulu-Natal for reasons of historic and cultural affiliation, and resented the enforced teaching of Xhosa during the years of affiliation with the Transkei.

Consider the Eastern Cape-KwaZulu-Natal boundary debate. The potential movement of nearly 2.5 million African National Congress (ANC) voters into Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) held KwaZulu-Natal by an adjusted boundary was surely not missed by ANC strategists. If the affected areas were moved into KwaZulu-Natal it would erode the power base of the IFP.

The structure for resolving such disputes (Section 62 of the Interim Constitution) constrains such an outcome: both provincial governments must approve boundary changes by a two thirds majority. It is doubtful that the IFP provincial government would welcome more than Umzimkulu and the retention of East Griqualand.

This complex situation is one of many geopolitical realities that are not openly discussed when surveying motivations for boundary modifications. This produces data biased toward socio-economic explanations that must be balanced with geopolitical observation, inference and analysis.

The structures or mechanisms for resolving provincial boundary disputes are clearly addressed in the Interim Constitution. They include a time limited referendum and various forms of negotiation. The referendum process was highly constrained and untested for the following reasons:

- The six month time frame for the entire process of referenda elapsed on October 27, 1994.
Government and party officials actively encouraged communities to undertake other means of addressing disputes.

The Constitution restricts referenda to highly specific questions about the 14 areas shown in Figure 2.

Given the time constraints, geopolitical manoeuvrings by political party leadership, and the strict terms of reference included in Section 124, referenda had to be rapid, well funded and well directed.

Action: Referendum Eastern Cape, supported by business, was the only geopolitical actor to attempt a petition before the expiry date – but failed to obtain even half of the 158,154 signatures needed to split the province along the Kei River. However, calls for referenda increased after the date for filing elapsed, indicating that this mechanism expired sooner than most groups could experience the boundaries, assess the problems and organise a response.

With the referendum as a time limited and highly constrained option, negotiations became the only mechanism for resolving boundary disputes. None of these seem to be very workable, decisive or as democratic as referenda. A recent paper produced by the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, the dispute process was described:

"Notwithstanding several 'agreements' between provinces, it has (sic) to be noted that provinces were to date not able to affect the application of Section 62(2) of the Constitution. This resulted in disputes being referred to central government for resolution. The latest tendency is that some premiers refer all boundary disputes to the Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development without even attempting to resolve the matter."

The inability to resolve boundary disputes in a well structured manner is indeed a 'crisis' since there is costly confusion over competencies such as the payment of civil servants, delays in Reconstruction and Development Programmes, and ongoing violence and threats of violence.

One death in Kuruman is linked to the boundary disputes and tales of intimidation, death threats, house burnings and other acts of violence have been reported in the press and before Commissions of Inquiry. Additional urgency stems from the May 10, 1996 deadline for adopting a new Constitution that could better address the structure for resolving disputed boundaries.

Some of the current mechanisms include: negotiations between provincial officials; commissions of inquiry; mediation by the Ministry of Provincial Affairs; and political party agreements. A brief introduction to each may highlight some of the reasons why referenda should be brought back into the process.

- **Negotiations between provincial officials**

From the point of view of the central Government, negotiations on boundaries should be undertaken by the provinces subject to Section 62 of the Interim Constitution that requires 'adoption at a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate by a majority of at least two thirds of the total number of members of both houses'. This in turn must be approved by the affected provincial governments.

In practice this means that when Premiers Mathews Phosa of Mpumalanga and Ngoako Ramathlodi of Northern Province negotiated an agreement to transfer Bushbuckridge to Mpumalanga, it still had to undergo a complex constitutional process. When the Northern Province linked the exchange of Groblersdal and Marble Hall to the cession of Bushbuckridge – political 'horse trading' – this deadlocked an already rigorous process and returned the problem to central government level.

- **Commissions of inquiry**

Technical commissions can be organised at either the provincial or central government level to take submissions, analyse them, and provide a recommendation. However, consultants and advisers are not the decision makers. While useful for supplementing the available information, such commissions are fraught with problems and are expensive.

The Justice Trengove Commission probably represents the most thorough attempt to ascertain public opinion that has ever been undertaken in a South African boundary dispute. Four wheel drive vehicles have been used to take commissioners into the most remote of areas to hear testimony.

**The referendum process was highly constrained and untested**Political organisation had to be rapid, well funded and well directed

**The inability to resolve boundary disputes is indeed a 'crisis'**
Nonetheless the very presence of the commission created tensions as various political forces focussed on swaying the decision making process by packing halls and sometimes using intimidation to create the impression of unanimity. Sometimes individual speakers claimed to represent communities and organisations that did not acknowledge them as leaders.

Several translators were asked to step down for not faithfully translating the words of political arguments. Numerous individuals spoke openly about threats to their well being, even though Justice Trengove made it repeatedly clear that intimidation was not part of the democratic process.

In other provincial boundary disputes, entire busloads of people have been moved across provincial boundaries to skew the testimony of 'local' citizens - for example, the Groblersdal Hearings of May 26, 1995.

**Mediation by the central government**

Given the constraints imposed by the existing constitutional procedure, mediation by the central Government cannot do more than bring the existing geopolitical actors together, serve as a consultant and appoint commissions to further investigate a dispute. In the case of the Justice Trengove Commission, the results will be reported directly to President Nelson Mandela, but even a presidential decree is not a mechanism for resolving boundary disputes. The Cabinet can recommend that the Parliament vote to change the boundaries but the provinces must ultimately concur with that decision.

**Political party negotiation**

Political party negotiation is one mechanism that has worked to resolve some boundary disputes, but at the expense of transparency and grassroots democracy. On the one hand, the majority of boundary disputes that have been settled were worked out in just such a manner at Kempton Park. On the other hand, most existing boundary disputes are also the result of the Kempton Park negotiations that frequently omitted local actors from the decision making process.

As discussed earlier, the political analyst can only infer the extent and kind of political maneuverings to effect the outcome of elections and increase the power base of various individuals and political parties.

REFERENCES


**Tentative conclusions**

The research continues, but initial data indicates that South Africa's multicultural geography is less of a problem than the lack of a mechanism for local communities to fully participate in the decision making process.

Mass action and protest are primary ways for peripheralised local actors to demand the attention of more powerful roleplayers. In turn, these higher level authorities embark on processes of negotiation that often lack transparency. This reproduces limited levels of local participation in the decision making process and escalates violence and mass action as alternative responses to political powerlessness.

In the absence of referenda and given the formidable procedures for modifying provincial boundaries, all the mechanisms of negotiation refer power back to higher levels of authority and party politics.

Submissions to a commission of inquiry have no binding power on the decision making process and may even heighten the tension. In any case, the economic and cultural discourse at the grassroots level often disguises complex geopolitical maneuverings to effect the outcome of elections and increase the power base of various individuals and political parties.

As a policy consideration for multicultural states, it seems that mechanisms for community participation in constructing boundaries is requisite to avoiding the potential instability of cultural faultlines (supporting the hypothesis).
The Skweyiya Commission
Lessons for a Democratic South Africa

By John Seiler, Political Analyst
and Brendan Seery, Sunday Tribune, Johannesburg

The Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry into former Bophuthatswana, which presented its summary report to the North West provincial government in October, uncovered an extraordinary web of corruption and misuse of public money by Lucas Mangope and top government officials. The Commission was well conducted, and poses challenges not just for government in South Africa, but for all of us who remain committed to democratisation.

Commissions of inquiry were commonplace in the apartheid era. On the surface, they appeared legitimate and productive but, more often than not, they legitimised government behaviour by utilising chairmen who did not know enough to judge the political context into which they were thrust, were often given inadequate staff, and as a result produced belated and superficial reports which disappeared into the maw of government with very little media or public attention.

Take two distinct examples. The Browne Commission of Inquiry into the administration of international financial policy, headed by long time former Secretary of Finance, Gerald Browne, worked for more than a year from a Union Buildings cubby-hole without a secretary.

The Margo Commission investigating Samora Machel’s death in a plane crash in October 1983 took evidence presented by the South African Government at face value and exonerated Pretoria of any responsibility in what remains a murky, unresolved incident.

Of course, the politicisation of commissions of inquiry is not novel to South Africa. Any governing party in an established democracy is tempted to do the same thing, but usually the opposition party and a portion of the media put enough pressure on the government of the day to make it difficult for it to put up a Potemkin Village inquiry with innocuous or non-public recommendations without some political cost.

There are exceptions, especially when a government can appeal on grounds of patriotism: the Warren Commission comes to mind. While it would be naive to expect the origins of commissions to be devoid of partisan political motivations, in a democracy there should be no mystery about either the final recommendations or the process that led to the recommendations.

Openness about commission processes depends on the endurance and accumulating insight of regular observers, particularly journalists. The commission’s work depends on adequate funding, competent investigative staff, and sufficient legal powers to pursue leads wherever they take it.

Most important, a commission’s work should be as free as possible of political intervention – especially by the party in power – and if any attempts at interference occur, the commissioners must be independent minded enough and of such integrity that their public revelations of such attempts severely embarrass the politicians involved and add to the public impression of the commission’s objectivity and virtue.
The Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry comes close to meeting the standards for an inquiry in a democracy.

The Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry — charged to inquire into corrupt practices and irregular use of public funds in government departments and parastatal bodies by various individuals or at their instance — which presented its summary report on corruption in Bophuthatswana to the North West provincial government in mid-October, comes close to meeting the standards for an inquiry in a democracy.

In its strengths, its few shortcomings, and the enormous amount of unfinished business it has evoked, it poses challenges not just for the new West provincial government, for other provincial governments and for the Government of National Unity, but for all of us in South Africa who have a commitment to continued democratisation.

Origins and evolution

The Commission had its embryonic origins in a two-person investigation into personal corruption in the former Bophuthatswana, President Lucas Mangope's government, launched by Joint Administrators Job Molopo and Tjaart van der Walt during the interregnum between Mangope's enforced removal from office in mid-March 1994 and the inauguration of Popo Molefe's North West provincial government on May 10 that year.

By August, the new provincial government had issued the proclamation setting up the Commission and it started work in September, chaired by Advocate Louis Skweyiya. The Commission's original brief was focused prosaically on alleged acts of personal corruption by Mangope. It expected to complete its work by the end of 1994.

In practice, its range of investigation expanded unexpectedly and began to move beyond acts of individual corruption and fraud in the Bophuthatswana government into abuse of governmental powers and funds for illegal purposes directed at strengthening the Mangope regime and weakening the mounting opposition to it from the African National Congress (ANC), unions, the South African Council of Churches, and other anti-apartheid groups.

What started as a short-term assignment for the commissioners (all drawn from outside the province), the three staff advocates, and the two investigators became at first a prolonged effort to uncover supporting evidence for the charges against Mangope. That was essentially completed by March this year. Few witnesses came forward voluntarily.

In the same period, the first of only two breakthroughs came on broader issues. Jerry Reid, who had been Bophuthatswana's Information Secretary and then director general of its parastatal reincarnation, the Information Service of Bophuthatswana, was caught by investigators in a palpable act of perjury and in bribe-taking.

The investigators squeezed Reid as much as they could, offering him freedom from indictment in return for his cooperation. Some hard facts emerged: these, in turn, raised broader questions.

The facts were simple. Reid had ostensively signed a contract on February 10, 1994, with a South African based company, Q Projects, to do political education work aimed at encouraging support within the homeland for Mangope's preferred position of keeping Bophuthatswana independent from South Africa.

That contract, for R6 million, was presented to Tjaart Van der Walt, who on the recommendation of his legal advisor, decided the commitment was legal and needed to be honoured. Citing political instability, Q Projects asked for and received full payment within days.

Staff investigation revealed that Reid had been paid a total of R138 000: R40 000 in cash and the rest in two checks drawn on a company registered in Ciskei. When confronted with the checks, Reid admitted that the contract with Q Projects had been signed on March 16 (when he no longer had any authority) and back dated to February.

The Ciskei threads were intriguing but were not brought together before the Commission's work ended.

The role of Q Projects did yield more fruit. It had done similar "voter education" work for Mangope in 1992 and 1993. In 1993, its work was slanted toward building support for Mangope's Bophuthatswana Christian Democratic Party (BCDP). That thread led the Commission staff to search for other indications of illicit support for the BCDP utilising government funds.

A second reluctant witness emerged — JJA Esterhuizen, former Secretary of the...
Bophuthatswana State Security Council (SSC), Esterhuizen testified only because he risked indictment for theft and/or fraud of R700,000 of Bophuthatswana funds which Mangope had asked him to deposit overseas but for which he could not (or perhaps would not) account.

Esterhuizen’s submissions of SSC records and his depiction of SSC meetings added a range of alleged offences. The most specific was the decision to pay the RCDP R10.5 million from the SSC budget via one of two private front companies. Advocate Skweyiya was unequivocal in his condemnation of this decision and the attitude underlying it:

“(Keikelame and Cronje)...defended the decision to fund the CDP from government money. In essence, they contended that the activities of the ANC jeopardised the independence of Bophuthatswana. Because the CDP was an important weapon in the struggle against the ANC, the use of government money to fund the CDP was justified, they said.

“Such thinking is totally foreign to the idea of multi-party democracy...The entire covert nature of the operation makes it quite clear that they were always aware that these activities were illegitimate and illegal and would not find favour even among the people of what was then Bophuthatswana.” (Summary report)

Esterhuizen’s testimony also made clear Mangope’s central role in the kitchen cabinet that constituted the SSC cabinet committee and made these decisions. Only two other Cabinet members were privy: Rowan Cronje (whose previous activities in former Rhodesia and Ciskei left a pervasive distrust of him by other Ministers and officials), and Ephraim Keikelame, then Minister of Economic Affairs.

Take one major instance; the decision to construct a total of R177 million to the construction of a major coal operated power station which was never used. Mangope did not reveal the details of the project even to the kitchen cabinet, the remaining cabinet members did not even know of its existence until it was constructed, and – as in most other reported instances of misuse of government funds – the Auditor General, who had legal responsibility to ensure that government funds were expended in line with established budgets, was deliberately kept uninformed.

Report, actions and reactions

The Commission’s summary report was submitted to the North West government on October 13. (The recommendations are summarised in the separate chart.)

The Executive Council gave its stamp of approval quickly. The Attorney General was asked to bring the recommended indictments against Mangope, Keikelame and the others cited. A prominent advocate was asked to prepare the civil suit against Mangope for return of some R18 million. And the Office for Serious Economic Offences was asked to conduct a full investigation into the alleged fraud involving the non-utilised power station.

There was a brief, belated flurry of attention from the media, which had given almost no coverage at all to the Commission during the previous year – with the spasmodic
Mangope related the report and insisted that it was a malicious effort to weaken his party's local election prospects.

The civil claim against Mangope was presented to his Johannesburg attorneys on October 30.

Advocate Skweyiya noted in his summary report that the evidence presented was no more than the tip of the iceberg.

Mangope denied any truth in the report and insisted in the final weeks of the new United Christian Democratic Party's campaign for the November 1 local government elections that the report's release was a malicious effort to weaken the UCDP's electoral prospects.

This appeal gained no discernible support. The UCDP lost Mangope's two home wards in Lehurutshe to the ANC, and fell far behind the ANC, the Freedom Front and the other large communities in the province.

Its only substantial success came in Mmabatho, reflecting disgruntlement among many civil servants in this 'government town' about their longer term career prospects when the Interim Constitution's protection of all civil service jobs falls away in 1999.

Implementation constraints

The civil claim against Mangope was presented to his Johannesburg attorneys on October 30, 1995, by the Johannesburg firm of Ismail Ayob. It called for the payment of R18 479 819.78: the total recommended by the Skweyiya Commission, excepting only the Marico Chrome Mining royalties allegedly diverted from the Bahurutshe tribal trust. Apparently that final amount must be claimed by the trust itself.

The Ayob letter of claim had a deadline of November 15. Non-payment by that date meant that a time consuming and expensive legal process was just starting without any clear end date or termination.

The recommended indictments have gone to the Attorney General for the former homeland, based in Mmabatho. In this case, the fact that the pre-existent domains for South African Attorneys General have yet to change to correspond to new provincial boundaries poses no administrative problem—although it would if indictments were called for outside the jurisdiction of the Attorney General.

Like all other South African Attorneys General, the Mmabatho office is overworked and understaffed. Some hard decisions will need to be made about priorities among the recommended indictments. Those involving Mangope's personal corruption have the most substantial supportive evidence and would require the least staff time in preparing criminal cases.

At the other extreme, those involving Rowan Cronje and JIV Vermaak, former Bophuthatswana Secretary for Finance, are most circumstantial. While the Attorney General's judgement about pursuing them should be shorn of any political considerations, it is possible that an awareness of the surrounding political environment may come into play.

Cronje's reputation is particularly negative around Mmabatho, so that, despite the flimsy nature of the evidence to hand, there may be incentives to pursue an investigation that would more firmly establish his role in official malfeasance and misuse of funds than now exists.

The resort to the Office for Serious Economic Offences poses not only the question of overstretched staff resources but an ironic footnote to apartheid. As the present statutes stand, the Office has no jurisdiction over alleged offences arising from the former independent states—although its jurisdiction extends to the former self governing territories.

It would require an act of Parliament or a Presidential proclamation to provide authority to the Office for Serious Economic Offences to investigate the Bophuthatswana power station boondoggle.

Beyond the tip

Advocate Skweyiya noted in his summary report that the evidence presented was no more than the tip of the iceberg. This is patently true in at least three distinct dimensions.

First, personal corruption extended throughout the homeland government. Most
Skweyiya Commission Recommendations

Recommendations: Mangope

1. The offences cited involve a total of nearly R22 million. Civil proceedings are recommended to get government funds and/or fraud by the Premier halted, except where marked.

2. Improvements: R4 400 000 (calls for immediate publicity).
   - See new R1 700 000
   - Generators/alternators R90 000 (return or pay criminal charge).

3. Employment: R105 000 (no criminal charge).

4.Generator, alternator: R90 000 (return or pay criminal charge).

5. Generator, alternator: R90 000 (return or pay criminal charge).


Mining royalties

7. Mining royalties went to Mangope instead of the tribe he heads.

8. Mining royalties: R2 626 000.

Other Recommendations

1. The power station, Office for Serious Economic Offences carry forward an investigation to determine if fraud was committed (R177 million spent, on a 'secret' project, without Bop Cabinet being informed, no power ever generated). Both managing directors, David Nurms, (and unnamed others) be assessed to determine their culpability for the losses suffered.

2. Q Projects (its Bophuthatswana name - it was registered in South Africa as Q Group). David Immelman be indicted for fraud and civil proceedings be brought against QP for R9.5 million paid for 1994 backdated contract.

3. Jerry Reid be warned that his honest testimony in Immelman trial will be his only protection against prosecution for above offence, and that, in any case, he will be held liable for any funds not recoverable from QP. QP be forced by civil proceedings to refund R6 million of its 1993 contract which strengthened the BCDP with government funds.

4. Regardings: R950 000 to former Finance Secretary JJJ Vermaak as 'golden gag' (both Vermaak and Mangope).

5. Rowan Cronje, as Director General of the Information Service of Bophuthatswana: for various instances (misuse of credit cards, official vehicles etc) totalling roughly R300 000. He has promised to repay, but should be indicted for fraud if he fails to do so.

6. Regarding payments of R920 000 to former Finance Secretary JJJ Vermaak as 'golden gag' (both Vermaak and Mangope).

7. JJA Esterhuizen, Secretary of the State Security Council, responsible for R8 100 000 of Mangope's R1.3 million for overseas account, which Esterhuizen did not send on, and which she did not account for. To be charged with fraud and/or theft if he fails to testify honestly in all criminal cases involving misuse of SFC funds (BCDP, Vermaak, Mangope etc.).
Cabinet members, most senior officials and a fair number of middle level officials – particularly those with posts outside Mmabatho that put them into direct contact with business people – followed the pattern of noblesse oblige set by Mangope himself.

Second, and linked with personal corruption, was corruption around major projects: whether tangible ventures, like the 'Independence' Stadium in Mmabatho, the Convention Centre (named after Mangope and from which, allegedly, he took the rental fees for his personal use), and almost every construction project throughout the homeland, or 'development' projects – Bop Air, Agrichicks and a wide range of agricultural and industrial ventures.

Finally, and least explored to date, is the work of the Bophuthatswana State Security Council in sustaining Pretoria's political interests in the homeland.

Here it seems likely that Rowan Cronje's role becomes pivotal, and given the protectiveness of South Africa's Military Intelligence directorate about its activities in the dying days of apartheid, this focus will be the most difficult to unravel.

How to explore these dimensions of past corruption? How much in the way of continuing revelation should we expect? The provincial government's funding of the Skweyiya Commission's investigations continued through November.

At the current point, some of the work in progress could logically be given over for prospective completion by the commission promised by President Nelson Mandela after he read the Skweyiya Commission's report – especially those elements involving the former South African government in the Ciskei and other homelands, and the range of activities beyond this country involving illegal transfers of money for propaganda and various covert activities to sustain Bophuthatswana and weaken the ANC, for the dubious purchase of property for 'official' use, and in transfers to hidden personal accounts, like Mangope's in the Channel Islands.

It would not be easy to pursue other cases of personal corruption in the former Bophuthatswana regime.

Aside from former Cabinet members and department secretaries, most officials have remained at work and are protected in employment until 1999 – unless dismissed for cause following departmental procedures or sentenced in court.

Few would admit to past offences, given the probable loss of jobs and perhaps pensions and civil suits for repayment to the provincial government. Few who know of others' malfeasances would seem likely to tell, for fear of their own offences being publicised.

The same dilemma applies to the range of companies that engaged in patently illegal activities in the pursuit of contracts with the homeland government.

The best mechanism may be nothing more complicated than making repetition of corruption difficult and un rewarding. The provincial government has put considerable effort into making tendering processes more straightforward and transparent. Auditing functions have been strengthened.

Most intriguing is the still early work, started in April this year, of a Skweyiya-like commission, the Motmele Commission, which has outside commissioners, a substantial and energetic investigative staff, is well funded and has the inclusive brief of examining malfeasance in local authorities, in both the former homeland and the Transvaal portions of the province. It is not limited to pre-May 1994 activities.

The Premier has been forthright about corruption, not only in his public rhetoric but in his approach to the single modest case involving Riani de Wet, former Member of the Executive Committee for Media, who misused some R10 000 for personal travel to Sun City for a Joe Cocker concert.

Ironically, when she resigned in late October, the immediate and publicly emphasised reason was her naive handling of the negotiations with Bop Broadcasting over retrenchment packages, which the Premier and ExCo disowned. Her minor malfeasance was never mentioned.

The only other apparent error of judgement involved utilising Q Projects for two projects in the new provincial government. Both were launched before it became public knowledge that the company had bribed Jerry Reid, and to the government's credit, it then cancelled a large voter registration and education contract as quickly as possible.
During the apartheid era, Sun City, all spoke of prosperity. When compared to the excesses of the homeland administrations, governments and the national government in terms of political impact to have initiative and control come from provincial governments. Then they can pledge with greater legitimacy to avoid the mistakes of the recent past – and hopefully do so.

There are also lessons for the rest of us. The media need to watch provincial and local government contracts. Business needs to move from the ‘shrug of the shoulders’ mentality that sustained bongomelane, while profiting themselves.

The rest of us need to support provincial governments and the national government in the hard business of producing more effective civil services, a process that will not only being improved and less expensive service delivery but also will reduce the likelihood of corruption within government.

That the Skweyiya Commission, in the words of chairman Louis Skweyiya, only scratched the surface of possible corruption, theft and mismanagement in the former Bophuthatswana is no reflection of the work put in by investigators. It is more an indication that only those matters which could be dealt with reasonably quickly and simply were presented before the Commission.

Investigators attached to Skweyiya did turn over a number of other rocks or were aware of other rocks that needed to be turned over.

Lucas Mangope’s empire was often touted as the ‘homeland that worked’ – its glittery shopping centres, government buildings and, of course, Sun City, all spoke of prosperity. Mangope himself frequently pointed to the supposed fiscal discipline of the homeland when compared to the excesses of the Transkei, Venda and Ciskei.

Skweyiya is shown that vision of Bophuthatswana to be a facade. The spending of R177 million of taxpayers money by the former Mnabatho administration on the ‘white elephant’ power station north of Pretoria, and the cavalier way in which correct tender and other procedures were side-stepped, has echoes elsewhere.

Investigators with Skweyiya identified a number of different government contracts which were awarded without going through the normal State Tender Board channels. Their belief is that all such deals – and they claim there could have been hundreds during the life of the Mangope regime – should be investigated.

All major capital projects would also therefore fall under suspicion, and should be closely examined to determine whether the correct procedures were followed and whether money paid out by the homeland government was related to what it got.

Skweyiya investigators have on their files a copy of a 1979 Pretoria News press report in which an official of the former Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation was quoted as saying that there had been no need to put out to tender the Mmabatho shopping complex, because Stocks and Stocks Bophuthatswana had already completed large projects in Mmabatho where it submitted the lowest tender.

Stocks and Stocks current deputy chairman Bart Dorrestein, who ran the company in the 1970s and 1980s, was approached by Skweyiya Commission investigators and asked to explain the details of a palatial house the company built for Mangope in the late 1970s. It is not known what the outcome of the inquiry was.

Another area involving big South African capital in Bophuthatswana is casinos and gambling. A thorough investigation along the lines of Skweyiya would determine whether the business involvement of Sun International especially was above board.

Other aspects which investigators probed only superficially were the foreign property acquisitions of the Bophuthatswana government. Houses in London, Paris and a rented property in Riga, the capital of Latvia, were identified and reclaimed on
There should be further investigations into murky security connections, alleged hit squad activities and arms trafficking.

Tens of millions were poured into the parastatal Agrichicks, and nearly R100 million into the International School.

The Mangope government squandered R120 million on Bop Air, now trading as Sun Air.

What was around one third of the value in asset terms.

Close to R100 million was spent on the exclusive International School in Mmabatho, which was an educational base for the children of Mangope’s close associates, together with those of wealthy whites from the homeland and wealthy families from neighbouring Botswana.

The school was later turned over to a Board of Governors and continued to draw government funding for some time. It is now operated as a private school, but questions remain about who the rightful owners of its assets are. The new North West government has already had a commission of inquiry into the school, but its findings have not yet been released.

Many reports over the past 10 years about questionable deals in Bophuthatswana have included reference to the ‘Israeli connection’. A number of Israeli businessmen were deeply involved with Mangope and made millions. Mangope also made frequent, unexplained trips to Israel.

Apart from the financial probes which could logically follow the work of Skweyiya, there is the more murky question of the connections in Bophuthatswana of the South African security services. The Q Group of companies, for example, was involved in a disinformation project funded by Pretoria slush money in the early 1990s in Botswana, as well as in ventures Skweyiya identified.

Then there must also be a thorough investigation into allegations made in the mid-1990s about alleged hit squads operating on behalf of the Mangope government.

And the unresolved mystery of how Mmabatho airport was used as a covert import and export channel for arms and other goods. One shipment of weapons from Armcor, flown out from the airport in 1992, ended up in the hands of the then Yugoslav government when it was destined for Croat rebels.

Many of those questions are probably within the realm of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The North West administration could do well to identify, by preliminary investigations, those areas which could be examined by the truth body in relation to Bophuthatswana.
**Official SA Trade Unions Directory**

**Labour Statistics**

**ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION**

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Figures for all years are based on 1985 boundaries, i.e. excluding the TBVC states.

Source: Central Statistical Services

**ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION ACCORDING TO AGE GROUP, 1991 ('000)**

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Population census adjusted to undercount.

Source: Central Statistical Services
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Local Elections 1995

By Graeme Götz
Centre for Policy Studies

Interpretation of the results of the local government elections held on November 1, 1995, has glossed over many problems that bode ill for the operation of local democracy in South Africa. Among them are the low voter turnout, what produced the results in different local authorities, what the real balance of power will be in each area – regardless of what the vote counts reflect – and what new councils will be able to achieve in the areas they control.

There is something both annoying and disturbing about the stock analysis that has tended to accompany the release of the November 1, 1995 local election results. Not because this standard analysis has misinterpreted the figures, but because its point of departure and basic emphasis has seemed so profoundly out of joint with the essence of local elections – the mapping of new local political forms onto existing social and economic circumstances in a multitude of different localities.

Turnout and authority

Consider, to start with, the tendency to explain away the surprisingly low turnout in the local elections with reference to comparable levels of participation in local polls in other modern democracies.

Overall turnout hovered somewhere in the region of 51% of registered voters in the 690 local authorities that voted on November 1, dropping to about 33% of total potential voters if it is considered that only some 75% of citizens who could have cast a ballot chose to appear on the voters rolls.

The argument has been made that these rates, although 'disappointing', are generally considered normal in comparable polls elsewhere, and hence are 'satisfactory'.

The comparison is annoying, epistemologically, because it appeals to an explanation which is no explanation at all. The fact that South African voters did not make it to the polls in local elections is somehow understandable by virtue of the fact that local government never attracts much electoral support.

This reasoning begs the question as to why citizens give such little import to the installation of democratically accountable systems of local rule.

Surely we are entitled to demand more than a cursory non-explanation when asking why Krugersdorp, for example, though applauded throughout the earlier stages of the electoral process for having mobilised virtually every one of its residents onto the voters roll – its final recorded registration was 106% – saw only 38% of them vote on November 1, thus achieving one of the lowest turnout rates in Gauteng.

The comparison is also disturbing politically because it buys into the same constellation of assumptions and attitudes which arguably produced the low turnout in the first place. A mere 30% turnout is somehow 'forgivable' because local elections never garner much higher levels of interest anyway.

The equation carries within it an excuse, which rests on the uncritical normative perception that whatever happens in local government can be measured against a set of standards universally acknowledged to be.

Analyses of the local election results are annoying and disturbing

Only about 33% of total eligible people voted

The low turnout was excused by comparisons with polls elsewhere
Local government has come to be regarded as a mere adjunct to its more potent provincial and national counterparts. Voters put all their faith in national and provincial governments installed last year. And for many of those who did vote, it was simply to bolster a ballot, the value and significance of which had already been determined in April 1994.

Local factors

It must be acknowledged that a great number of locally specific factors conspired to produce abstention from the polls in various parts of the country. Many voters who were fully committed to casting their ballot were deterred by administrative bungling or boycott calls, and would have felt far greater personal responsibility to contribute their vote, whatever the apparent balance of power in their community, had local governments carried more symbolic weight as significant political forms in their own right.

Looming problems

What this observation alerts us to - and this is the problem obscured by the non-explanation provided by a banal comparison is that if local governments cannot call out significant numbers of voters on election day, they will probably be unable to call upon these same voters to become personally involved in onerous community wide endeavours in the future, or to sacrifice their own interests in favour of those of other sections of a local population.

It must be recognised that it will be local authorities, not provincial and national governments, that will lead the difficult processes of resurrecting and transforming communities in the years to come.

These processes - inducing residents to pay for services delivered is only the first - will involve the juggling of hard, conflicting priorities and the awkward assertion of official political prerogative in areas which have effectively governed themselves for
The aic processes which will entrenched material and local power bases.

If local governments cannot rely on the weight of their own authority, because the citizenry who are the objects of their endeavor are looking past them to the power of higher institutions as the source of development and change, the transformation of our towns, cities and rural areas is likely to be slow and conflictual process.

The problem of prevailing attitudes to local government is starkly illustrated in an HSRC survey conducted a month before the elections.

Forty eight percent of survey respondents felt that local government should not have the power to adopt policies in conflict with those of provincial and national governments, as opposed to 34% who felt they should and 27% who did not know.

Forty seven percent – as opposed to 37% – felt that the money spent holding the local elections would be better spent funding the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). And 60% could not correctly identify the local authority in which they would be voting.

An ANC victory?

An ANC victory, for related but slightly different reasons, has been the tendency to treat the election results as if they were the outcome of a single national election, rather than a series of local polls.

Particularly annoying has been the first inclination of many analysts to read the proportion of votes polled by the major parties, and in particular the ANC, backwards against their performance in last year's election, and forwards as an indication of their prospects for 1999. The following lead in for a story in The Star was typical:

"With most results from the local government elections now out, the ANC edged a little closer to the two thirds majority which eluded it in last year’s election by improving its showing by nearly 2%. Results released showed that the ANC fell a fraction short of the 66% it needed to have total control of the national Parliament and the constitution writing process.”

Though such writing occurs in heady moments as results flow in, pursuing such a point as virtually the only strand of analysis through which to understand the election (as has been done) is to make a number of analytical slips.

Firstly, one cannot draw valid comparisons until the results for the whole country have been compiled. If the areas in which no voting has yet occurred (principally KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape Town metro) are factored out of the percentages derived from last year’s results, it would appear that the ANC has actually declined in support from 72% to just over 67%. The ANC did make gains in certain areas, such as urban authorities in the Western Cape, but it only makes sense to conceive of these victories on a case by case basis.
The ANC has actually declined in support from 72% to just over 67%.

Secondly, although nobody would dispute that the democratic outcome must rest solely on those who chose to participate, the reality is that the ANC’s overall 67% was achieved on a far slimmer margin of support than its 62% last year, the party actually lost more than five million votes.

It has already been suggested that large numbers of voters simply did not bother to make their way to the polls because they felt they had already vested their expectations in bigger forms of government elected last year, but acknowledging this does not discount the possibility that many other voters simply stayed away in protest.

Field researchers for a University of the Witwatersrand and HSRC project on local election dynamics predicted as early as August that voters frustrated with the performance of the Northern Province regional government might stay away from the polls. There was no possibility of shifting support to any other of the contending parties: the option was to vote ANC or not at all, and the likelihood seemed to be that it would be not at all.

Should the ANC really feel confident in its 92% win in the Northern Province’s rural areas, when this was carried by a mere 37% of potential voters? Once again, the meaning of the results can only really be determined if local dynamics are taken into account.

Lastly, and most cogently, totalling the votes cast in a range of local authorities as if the final tally, expressed as a percentage, can give an impression of the spread of power across an entire area or the whole country, is simply not a valid exercise.

In local elections, especially ones complicated by bizarre neo-apartheid provisions which guaranteed ward seats for underrepresented population groups, the votes cast within the boundary of a local authority must be taken as valid for that local authority only.

The ANC gained 67% of the proportional representation vote in the Free State, and 74% in the North West, but managed to occupy only 57% and 64% of the total seats in each province respectively.

The party captured only 53% of the vote in the Gauteng, but achieved a clear majority of seats in 27 of the 37 councils which voted on November 1.

What is disturbing about this analytical thrust and the slips it entails, is that it stems in the way of a real analysis of what lay behind voting patterns in each local authority, to the extent that we have not gained a single insight into the civic culture and political feelings on the ground which really produced the results. Analysts have summarily rewritten the will of individual political sentiments and interests to see its performance in the local authorities in terms of the performance of the Government of National Unity and the RDP.

To treat the final percentages as an accurate society wide measure of sympathy for the contending parties, without looking at the local dynamics which converged to produce the outcome in different authorities, is to obscure the fact that what we really need to know is not what the ANC or other parties are likely to poll in the next general election, but what they are going to be able to achieve in the local authorities they control in the years to come.

It matters not to Morgenberg in Mpsmalanga that party dominates 80% of the councils in the rest of the province, when the ANC in the town has control of only five of the 10 seats, the others being in the hands of the Freedom Front and ratepayers group.

The direction of the town will depend not on the fact that the ANC in the region polled 77% of the total votes, but on whether the party can balance a range of different local political sentiments and interests to see its vision carry the day.

The local social, political, economic and demographic realities which produced the results will continue to frame the operation of new powerholders, dictating what is possible for them to achieve in each local authority functioning quite separately from the others.

Local dynamics

The question of crude figures representing overall voting patterns being a very poor reflection of the real balance of power at a local level, can be seen from a different angle. There is a singularly important point which analysts – some of whom bemoan the fact that the ANC now appears to have too much power, others of whom speak imperissibly of the fact that the ANC has proved it has the right to govern at all levels – have disturbingly not picked up in their review of the results.
The week following the November election, Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale held a gathering of newly elected ANC members that the days were past when officials ran the daily structures of local government and elected representatives had limited influence.

"This is how things went wrong in the past. (The ANC) is committed to ensuring that political responsibility lies where it belongs — with the people."

This is an important and noble sentiment, but it misses the fact that democracy's institutional principle of power resting ultimately with the electorate, is consistently mocked by the reality that power resides in, and works through, systems of entrenched policies, processes and practices.

In realpolitik, the content of decisions is governed as much by the rigidities of the institutional complex through which they will be implemented as by the values, goals and political will of the decision makers themselves.

What many analysts have missed is the crucial question of capacity. Do new political incumbents really have the capacity to run their governments in a quite different way to which they have always been managed, when the material stock of power, the systems they have to work with, are geared towards fundamentally different political priorities?

The issue is most visible in stories told by Project Vote fieldworkers who have taken on the task of training new councillors. A month and a half after the elections, many new local councils in rural areas still have not even met because "they are waiting for someone to convene a meeting for them."

Of course, these councillors have some responsibility themselves in the matter, but giving them the benefit of the doubt for the moment, the 'someone' under obligation to see that such meetings are called are officials in the new District Councils. The problem is that District Councils are simply retroceded Regional Services Councils, whose ethos, mode of operation and resources run against the new programmatic ideals of stimulating local level democracy in rural areas.

New representatives in even the most established and efficient local governments face the same problem. They will soon realise that whatever the election results say they can do, their space for manoeuvre is limited by precisely that which makes the council 'established' and 'efficient', restrictive council standing orders; overcommitted operating budgets which leave little money for capital expenditure on new projects; curtailed of information, responsibility and command which run through the offices of old officials; planning departments which operate within the parameters of old schools of thinking and so forth.

The power of newly elected officials might be limited in another sense. The fact that the existing institutional complex of local governments which will house the new councils has been geared in the past only towards certain goals, in the interests of only certain sections of the population — in the amalgamation of local council areas very little could be taken in the way of working...

What really matters is what the ANC and other parties are going to be able to achieve in the local authorities they control.
The systems which new councilors have to work with are geared towards priorities very different to theirs — will mean that their recreation will run up against informal regulatory systems which have arisen to fill the vacuum of power in townships.

Administratively, whether it be in the realms of land allocation, housing provision, development, safety and security, even justice, a great deal happens in areas of our country which escapes formal power structures and arrangements.

The most obvious example of this is traditional authorities, whose control over local government functions in many rural areas will sit uneasily with the power supposed to be exercised by elected representatives.

Even more interesting — and worrying — will be the clash between official authority and the de facto local powers currently enjoyed by urban shacklords and civic leaders, many of whom contested wards in the local elections as independents, but failed to claim a seat.

Consider as an example of this, the case of Midrand-Ivory Park in Gauteng. The election results, expressed as crude percentages, show that the ANC walked away with the Midrand-Ivory Park-Rabie Ridge election.

What they do not show, unless one is looking closely, is that one of the contestants denied a ward seat was Mandla Samuel Songo, a man variously described as a warlord, or the founding father and benevolent long time leader of the massive Ivory Park informal settlement.

Songo once operated under the banner of the ANC — although some suggest this simply cloaked real PAC tendencies — but for this election ran as a member of the Community Action Party, a loose, cross-community alliance of individuals of various political persuasions.

In its voting, the community clearly perceived party affiliation as a more important variable than personality, and an ANC candidate claimed the ward in which Songo was standing. But what does his loss actually mean? Shut out from the formal political arena, might he not constitute a serious rival to the de jure authority of the new council with his informal networks of community control?

There are countless instances identical to this across the country, and no indication of how they will be played out is provided by the election results.

No analyst commented on what seemed an obvious ANC win in the Phola Park ward in Thokoza, but a loose, cross-community alliance of individuals of various political persuasions seemed to be the clash between official authority and the de facto local powers currently enjoyed by urban shacklords and civic leaders, many of whom contested wards in the local elections as independents, but failed to claim a seat.

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WHAT 'SWING'? LOCAL ELECTIONS IN THE WESTERN CAPE

By Jeremy Seekings
Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town

The 1995 local government election results have been widely misinterpreted in the media in terms of a 'swing' to the African National Congress, especially in the Western Cape. A close look at the results points instead to a low overall turnout and a complete collapse in the National Party vote. It is unlikely that many former NP supporters actually voted for the ANC.

The media has tended to view the local government election results as an indicator of the South African electorate's verdict on the performance of the respective parties since April 1994.

Most interpretations of the results have been framed in terms of 'swings', as voters are deemed to have rewarded or punished the parties. Crude comparisons of the local government election results with the results of last year's general election have given rise to glib conclusions that there has been an overall 'swing' to the African National Congress.

In 1994, the ANC won over 62% of the vote countryside-wide. As the 1995 results trickled in, it appeared that the ANC was doing rather better. At one point it was reported that the ANC was winning 73% of the vote, although the final share proved to be around 64%. Nonetheless, the press concurred that the ANC had increased its support.

The problem with this comparison is that like is not being compared with like. There were no local elections in either KwaZulu-Natal (19% of 1994 voters) or in metropolitan Cape Town (about 7%).

Excluding these areas, the ANC won an estimated 73% of the vote in 1994. The ANC's share of the vote has in fact therefore fallen.

It is also necessary to examine absolute numbers as well as shares of the vote. In 1994, just over 14,5 million votes were cast in the seven provinces and non-meto Western Cape. The 1995 poll is said to have been 5,3 million votes. This amounts to just 37% of the 1994 poll, and perhaps as few as 32% of potentially eligible voters.

Such a turnout in local government elections is not low in international terms. But the fact that turnout was so low has important implications for the analysis of the results, as we will see below.

The Western Cape

More than 330 000 people voted in elections to 95 councils in the non-metropolitan towns of the Western Cape. The elections were a resounding success for the ANC, which won outright control of at least 21 councils including major towns such as Paarl, Worcester and Mossel Bay.

The ANC won a total of 306 seats, the National Party 292, the Democratic Party six, the Pan Africanist Congress just four, and the Freedom Front a meagre three. Independent candidates and civic groupings won 271 seats.

Overall, the NP led the ANC in terms of votes in the proportional representation (PR).

Turnout at the polls was perhaps as low as 32% of potentially eligible voters.
Table 1: Comparing the 1994 and 1995 election results: Non-metropolitan Western Cape (excluding ineligible voters on farms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1994 (estimated)</th>
<th>1995 (actual)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'000 votes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other parties</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local civic groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
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The ANC won 306 seats in the non-metro Western Cape, and the NP 292 seats

Independent candidates and civic groupings won 271 seats

The NP led the ANC in the proportional representation vote: 45% against 37%

The ANC won about 45% to the ANC's 37%. The relative number of seats won by the parties did not reflect their shares of the vote, primarily because of the 50-50 ward division between white-coloured and African areas.

The 50-50 ward division was demanded by the NP during the multi-party talks at Kempton Park, primarily because it wanted to bolster the representation of non-ANC voters in platteland towns – by reserving half the wards for former white, coloured and Indian local authority areas.

In the Western Cape, however, it had the perverse effect of bolstering the representation of African voters, who were given half the wards while constituting less than half of the electorate.

This ward allocation meant, for example, that six of Paarl's 12 wards were in its African township. Nine thousand voters voted in these wards, whereas 25 000 voters voted in the other wards, in Paarl's white and coloured areas. A more equitable division of wards would have resulted in the NP, not the ANC, winning control of Paarl.

Nonetheless, the ANC's overall 37% share of the vote did seem to be an improvement on its performance in the 1994 elections. Last year the ANC won just 33% of the provincial vote, against the NP's 53%. The apparent increase in the ANC's share fuelled the media's assessment that there had been a 'swing' from the NP to the ANC, as coloured voters switched their votes.

These provincial level comparisons suffer the same methodological problem as at the national level. Firstly, like is not being compared with like. The figures for the parties' share of the 1994 vote include the votes cast by about 1.6 million people in metropolitan Cape Town, and a further 160 000 voters living outside of the boundaries of the Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) – mostly on farms – who were also ineligible to vote in 1995.

Table 1 shows the parties' estimated shares of the 1994 vote in non-metro Western Cape towns where elections were held in 1995, as well as their actual shares of the 1995 vote in those towns.

At the provincial level, unlike the national level, there is a very marked change in one party's share of the vote between 1994 and 1995: the NP's share of the vote drops from about 61% to 45%. The ANC's share rises by the relatively small amount of 5%.

Insofar as there has been a 'swing' in terms of the parties' shares of the vote, it has not been so much from the NP to the ANC as from the NP to civic and other locally based organisations. They did not compete in 1994, but accounted for 10% of the 1995 vote.

It is important to clarify that the civic organisations referred to here are those which won votes on the PR ballot. Many individual wards were won by candidates running under the auspices of a civic or ratepayers organisation – often with the blessing of one or other of the major parties, which would not put up rival candidates. But a vote for a civic or ratepayers group in the PR ballot meant rejecting the major parties in favour of the civic or ratepayers group.

The concept of a 'swing' measured in terms of shares of the vote is very misleading, however, when the size or composition of the electorate changes. Just over 330 000 votes were cast in the non-metropolitan Western Cape on November 1, 1995, compared with an estimated 644 000 votes in the same areas in 1994. Turnout this year was thus under half of last year's turnout.

Last year the ANC won about 208 000 votes in these towns. This year it won just 125 000: that is, about 95% of its 1994 vote. The NP won about 370 000 votes in 1994, but only 150 000 or 40% as many this year.

The story of the local government elections is therefore, above all, the story of the NP's failure to mobilise its former supporters in this year's local elections.
It is possible that the ANC recruited some former NP supporters. An analysis of the election results cannot tell us whether or not this was the case — for that we would require detailed opinion poll data. It is more likely that the ANC simply performed better in terms of mobilising its supporters than did the NP. Some former NP voters probably defected to civic and ratepayers' associations, most just stayed at home.

The 'coloured vote'

Elections in the Western Cape turn on the 'coloured vote', since coloured voters comprise more than half of the electorate. The loyalties of coloured voters are thus of considerable importance.

ANC Member of Parliament, Willie Hofmeyr, has calculated that the ANC won more votes than the NP in predominantly coloured wards. In wards where over 90% of the voters were coloured, the ANC won about 69 000 (or 44%) of the nearly 156 000 votes, while the NP won just over 38 000 (or 24%) (Cape Times November 6, 1995).

Last year, the ANC won an estimated 25% of the coloured vote in the province as a whole. But pre-election data indicated stronger support for the ANC among coloured voters in the non-metropolitan towns than either Cape Town or farming districts. It is likely that the ANC's share of the coloured vote has edged up by a few percentage points, but not more.

More importantly, turnout was low in 1995 in coloured as in other wards. The ANC certainly won far fewer votes from coloured people in 1995 than in 1994; its share rose because of the spectacular collapse of the NP vote.

Why the ANC did better

Why, amidst a generally low turnout, did the number of ANC votes fall far less than that of the NP? Three factors stand out: the ANC's perceived performance over the past 18 months, the local rather than national character of the election, and the character of ANC support in small Cape towns.

The ANC benefited from its leading role in many Transitional Local Councils in 1994 and 1995. This has probably reduced many coloured voters' fears that the ANC would take away their homes, jobs or pensions. NP 'swart gevaar' campaigning no longer resonated with coloured voters' experiences and evaluations.

Secondly, local elections favour the ANC among coloured voters. Crucially, the 1995 elections were focused on local candidates. The NP thereby lost much of the advantage of having FW de Klerk as leader — an advantage which had weighed heavily in 1994.

The selection of coloured candidates in coloured wards ensured that the ANC lost its big 1994 disadvantage: having been seen as an African party which had no place for coloured people. In key towns the ANC candidates include high profile coloured residents, for example the mayors of the TLCs in Paarl and Worcester.

The importance of high profile local candidates was made clear in towns such as Stellenbosch and Outshoorn, where non-party candidates performed very well in coloured wards. In Stellenbosch, prominent former ANC leaders stood for election in coloured wards in competition with the ANC and NP, under the auspices of a newly formed Stellenbosch Civic Alliance. One was elected in his ward, another on the PR ballot. A third civic candidate was elected on a civic ticket on the PR ballot.

All three seem to have been well known among coloured voters — better known, perhaps, than the official ANC (and NP) candidates standing against them. Similarly, ANC inclined leaders of the Bridgton Civic Organisation performed well in competition with the ANC and NP in Outshoorn.

The ANC's election campaigns seem to have succeeded in ensuring that the elections were defined in terms of its strengths (especially its local candidates, local issues, and its new found respectability as a party of government) rather than its weaknesses (its predominantly African character) or the NP's strengths (De Klerk). This was in stark contrast to 1994, when the election in coloured areas was defined by the NP.

Moreover, there remains a deep racial divide between white and coloured areas in many of these small towns. Apartheid still continues in ways which have all but disappeared in greater Cape Town. Overall, therefore, fears about the ANC have abated whilst cynicism about the NP persists. The ANC's campaigns persuaded many former NP voters that they did not need to turn out to vote against the ANC.
Local elections favour the ANC among coloured voters

The ANC benefited from its leading role in many TLCs

A third factor in the ANC’s higher share of the vote is the character of its support. In 1994, in the province as a whole, the NP won far more votes from coloured voters than the ANC. But pre-election opinion polls found that there was little difference in the number of coloured voters who identified with either of the major parties.

In other words, NP support comprised a core of NP identifiers and a huge number of people who voted for the NP but did not identify with it, while ANC support comprised a similarly sized core of ANC identifiers but a relatively small number of non-identifying voters.

An opinion poll by Research Initiatives found that there were actually more ANC identifiers than NP identifiers among coloured voters in the small towns outside Cape Town. This data needs to be regarded with some circumspection, since the numbers involved are small and the poll was done eight months before the 1994 election.

But if this pattern of party identification remained true through to 1995, then we would expect that a low turnout would result in the ANC doing disproportionately well in coloured wards in these small towns. This is because party identifiers may make more of an effort to vote than other voters.

Differential rates of party identification combined with a low turnout could account for the changing shares of the vote of the major parties – the supposed ‘swing’ – in coloured areas, without any voters actually changing their vote.

Independents and civics

Candidates standing for election as independents, for civic groups, or for other non-party organisations won 226 wards in the province, as well as 45 proportional representation seats. These councillors hold the balance of power in a majority of the newly elected councils. Their prominence has been rightly highlighted in media reports, but they are a heterogeneous bunch.

In some wards, parties did not run official candidates against friendly independents or civic candidates: often the latter were thinly disguised party candidates. This seems to have been the case in white Stellenbosch wards (where winning ‘independents’ were nominated by the NP aligned Ratepayers Association, and were supported by the NP), and in coloured wards in Mossel Bay (won by the D’Almeida Civic Organisation, almost on behalf of the ANC, in the face of opposition from NP candidates).

Neither the Stellenbosch Ratepayers Association nor the D’Almeida Civic Organisation competed on the PR ballot, which would have entailed direct competition with the political parties, Elsewhere, independent candidates or candidates from civic groups ran in direct competition with official candidates from both the major parties. This was the case in coloured wards in both Stellenbosch and Oudtshoorn, where several civic groupings competed against the ANC and NP on both ward and PR ballots.

Some of these civic groups were seen as broadly pro-ANC, but nonetheless ran against the ANC and its official candidates. A vote for the civic was thus certainly not a vote for the NP, but nor was it a vote for the ANC; it was a vote against both of them. Such civic groups won a total of 34 000 votes – or about 10% – on the PR ballot.

And Cape Town?

What are the implications for prospective elections in metropolitan Cape Town? The ANC seems to have received an enormous fillip from its successes on November 1. But it should not be complacent. It won just over a third of the votes, fewer than the NP. Its control of many councils depends on the 50-50 ward allocation.

A low turnout in Cape Town would not benefit the ANC as much as it did in the smaller Cape towns. Furthermore, the NP will surely learn from its mistakes – just as the ANC learnt from its disappointing performance in 1994 – and run a more effective campaign in Cape Town.

The ANC was favoured by the politics of many small towns, where there is a sharp division between white and coloured residents. In Cape Town, divisions are perhaps sharper between coloured and black residents. The ANC will need to work hard if it is to challenge the NP in the Mother City next year, and its jubilation at the results should therefore not be unqualified.
Putting the Local into Government

Two Finger Exercises in Analysis

By John Seiler
Political analyst

South Africans missed the point about the November 1 local government elections: they were local and they were about politics. To understand the results requires an understanding of community dynamics and politics, which often differ substantially from one adjacent area to the next. This article contains two 'finger exercises' analysing local politics in two towns, one in the Western Cape and the other in North West.

The November 1 local government elections were the first such democratic ones in South Africa. Both black and white communities were administered without much regard for local participation under the past regime. The culture of management was at the heart of public administration training in South Africa until very recently.

For these reasons it is not surprising that almost everyone involved - political parties, Government of National Unity ministers and deputy ministers, national and provincial task team chairs and secretariats, local council and Regional Services Councils stuff used to run voter registration and the elections, the media and academics - missed the point of the elections.

The whole point about the local government elections was simple: they were local and they were about politics - clashing views about priorities and how to fund them, about the best ways to administer local government, and even about the nature of the 'community'.

All of this rests on the foundation of the pre-existent social and economic dynamics of the 'community', which were challenged with increasing energy starting with Nelson Mandela's release from prison and the legalisation of the African National Congress (ANC) and its Alliance partners, and capped by the run-up to the April 1994 national elections.

These dynamics were challenged more directly by the recent election. To understand the election results requires a prior understanding of community dynamics, which often differ in substantial ways even from one adjacent community to the next.

To make policy relevant to local governance, whether corporate policy about how best to fit into a given community, or provincial or national government policy about how best to build stable and development oriented communities, means knowing as much as possible - on a continuing basis - about the evolution of local politics, community by community.

What follows are two 'finger exercises' in the analysis of local politics. Aside from the superficial novelty of looking at two small villages, there was no special intention in their selection. These are simply two places I know well enough to tease out some tentative conclusions about the voting data.
Local government grants from Pretoria will drop by R80 million from April 1, 1996.

Voter turnout in Franschhoek was 66.8%.

and to suggest some questions for further examination.

The questions are deliberately tentative, to avoid any temptation to plunge into the brambles of punditry which befouled our media in the first weeks of November. Of course, for people with special interests in one or the other village, there should be some direct provocation in these preliminary analyses.

For journalists, academics and those who depend on the forgery’s analyses, the lessons are straightforward. Getting this information requires going back repeatedly to the communities involved.

To start with, it turns out that the national local government task team did not ask for data correlating ward by ward voting on ballots one and two – the key bit of evidence required to do the exploratory discussion of ‘tension’ on the part of voters between embryonic notions of self interest (ballot one) and equally tentative notions of party allegiance (ballot two).

Local officials seem delighted to talk about their local election and even, circumspectly, to address how their administrative concerns are already being affected by the new local dispensation. Local politicians are equally accessible.

Our attention should be concentrated by recent grim news about funding for local government. On November 24, Parliament’s committee dealing with local government legislation was told that grants from Pretoria to local governments will drop in the 1996 budget year, starting on April 1, by R80 million to a total of R800 million – and that total will need to be shared not only by all local councils but also with the around 300 rural representative councils just established to meet the gap of participation by rural black people in this country.

If provincial governments are even less able to provide financial support, then local councils will be forced to come to grips very soon with hard choices about the extension of basic services, and the generation locally of revenues to pay for these services.

At best, what seems widespread residual distrust and racism might be erased under a shared sense of responsibility. At worst, local tensions might deteriorate and dissipate into overt social conflict.
the ANC got the largest number of coloured votes: 337 compared with the Ratepayers Association’s 293, and another 117 divided among two independents, one in each ward.

First steps
The Council’s first meeting suggested at least tacit racism which seems likely to characterise local politics for the foreseeable future. With a clear majority of five, counting the NP member, the Ratepayers Association and NP group did not wait for the two ANC members who were late for the meeting. They elected the Ward 2 winner as chair and the Ward 1 winner as vice-chair.

For the time being, they decided the entire Council would serve as executive committee. But a crucial land affairs committee was established — finding the funds to provide housing for both coloureds and Xhosa speaking shack dwellers had been the bone of contention among all three ethnic groups for the past three to four years — comprising the chair, the Ratepayers Association’s proportional member and the NP proportional member: all white male professionals.

The Ratepayers Association-NP majority excluded its only coloured member, the woman representing Ward 3, and both ANC members, from any of the positions.

Flaw in the Act
The 1994 Transitional Local Government Act (TLGA) required equity for the minority ethnic group in the allocation of wards, regardless of the disproportional number of voters per ward that might result. Although intended to protect the interests of white voters in provinces where black voters would otherwise dominate local elections, in many of Western Cape TLCs, the ‘minority’ is neither white nor coloured, but Xhosa speaking.

This was the case in Franschhoek, which has 1,000 Xhosa speakers, 1,100 whites and 3,000 coloureds. The dilemma was logistic: the TLGA referred to black people previously represented by black local authorities.

Unlike Stellenbosch where the Xhosa speakers’ township had such prior legal footing, Franschhoek’s Xhosa speakers did not, and were therefore not entitled to the equity in wards afforded by the Act.

Although resident for some years within the geographic boundaries of the Franschhoek Local Council area, in law these shack dwellers had the same anomalous status of most rural blacks throughout the country.

Zeerust
Voter turnout
Voter turnout was 63.7%, 3,962 people voted, of 6,215 registered.

Ward results
All eight wards were contested. The ANC won three — including the two Lehurutshe wards and one of the two Ikageleng township wards — was narrowly defeated in the other Ikageleng ward and in the village’s Ward 4 (Zeerust’s only multi-ethnic ward), and got only token votes in the ‘white’ Wards 1 to 3.

The remaining five wards were won by ‘independents’: one Setswana speaker (Ikageleng Ward 6), one Indian (Ward 4) and three whites (Wards 1 to 3), one of whom belongs to the Zeerust Ratepayers Association while the other two have no public party or organisation links. Lucas Mangope’s United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) put forward three candidates, all of whom were defeated, including two in Lehurutshe — the former homeland village closest to Mangope’s Motswedi home.

There were differences in the coloured vote between wards. Although resident for some years within the geographic boundaries of the Franschhoek Local Council area, in law these shack dwellers had the same anomalous status of most rural blacks throughout the country.
Ethnic voting predominated in Zeerust

The Council's 12 members include: five ANC, one UCDP, four non-party whites, and an Indian and Setswana independent

PR results
With 2 177 total votes, the ANC's 55.1% gave it two of the four proportional representation seats, the UCDP's 678 votes gave it one seat, and the Zeerust Ratepayers Association got one.

Composition
The Zeerust Council will have 12 members, including only two women, who are both from Lehurutshe, one ANC and one UCDP. Five members will be ANC – including one white man on the proportional slate – the UCDP woman, two from the white Zeerust Ratepayers Association, two other white independents, the Indian independent and the Setswana speaking independent reputed to be an ANC supporter.

Ethnic voting
Ethnic voting predominated; only Ward 4 was significantly multi-ethnic. The Conservative Party (CP), formerly the dominant party in the old white village, put forth its only candidate, who came third. The UCDP's only candidate outside Lehurutshe came fourth. The Indian independent defeated the coloured ANC candidate by 10 votes. In Lehurutshe and in Ikageleng township, the Zeerust Ratepayers and the CP combined got only 62 votes on the proportional ballot; in the three white wards the ANC got only 64 votes.

White attitudes
White attitudes were fluid: in Wards 1 to 3 the ward ballot was distributed over a total of eight independent candidates, but the proportional ballot was divided in three distinct ways – Zeerust Ratepayers 500, CP 354 and UCDP 211.

Black independents
Black independents were significant: aside from the wins in Wards 4 and 6, another black independent lost by only 14 votes in Ward 5 to the ANC candidate who had been the TLC chair. In the Ikageleng Wards 5 and 6, six independents shared more than half the vote, but in Lehurutshe’s Wards 7 and 8, the three independents fared badly, with the ANC and the UCDP gaining the vast majority of votes between them.

Services
Regarding the provision of equitable services and ensuring payment for them, the Zeerust TLC had not proposed including Lehurutshe in its area of responsibility but was instructed by the MEC for Local Government to do so. The MEC also called for a total of eight wards, adding the two from Lehurutshe plus four proportional council seats (instead of the five in order under the 1994 Transitional Local Government Act).

At present, Lehurutshe services are provided by a private contractor whose costs are met by the provincial government, honouring a contract initiated under the homeland regime and continuing to March 1, 1996. The Council will supervise the contract for its final six months, but need not extend it.

The province will continue for a negotiable term the present subsidy to Lehurutshe residents, who pay R2.00 a month (plus electricity and water) and might be expected to pay R45.55 without a subsidy. The Zeerust Council will need to educate Lehurutshe residents to pay the much higher sum, while at the same time maintaining good relations with its customers in Ikageleng and Zeerust village, some of whom have been pressing for a Lehurutshe type subsidy.
Citizenry and Local Government
A New Political Subject?

By Ivor Chipkin
Centre for Policy Studies

Continued non-payment of rents and services, despite the Masakhane campaign, could indicate that South Africans have a differentiated notion of what national and local citizenship means. The challenge for citizenship will be the capacity of local governments to deliver in a way that improves the visibility of the state as a democratic state, argued Chipkin at a conference hosted by the Centre for Policy Studies and the Interfaith Community Development Association in October.

This article looks at notions of citizenship implied by local government, and in particular whether there is a peculiar type or experience of citizenship vis-a-vis the urban form - and hence urban local government - as opposed to the nation state.

What does it mean to be a citizen of a democratic state?

Conventional usages of the term refer to certain rights and obligations between so-called citizens and the state: some form of unconscious social contract in the Lockean sense of the term, where citizens agree to recognize the authority of the state and conduct themselves according to normative standards 'negotiated' within the collective in return for certain positively or negatively defined rights, be they the positive material rights of the welfare state, or the negative rights of the American constitution, where citizenship implies rights exercised against the state.

However these rights are defined and wherever their context, citizenship always implies an identity referenced with regard to the state. In other words, one might only be prepared to accept the obligations implied by citizenship if one believes oneself to be a subject of its authority. This is what was contested under apartheid: not the rights and obligations that followed from citizenship, but rather the very existence of citizenship itself.

These remarks may seem banal, but they imply an interesting tension if this concept is applied to local government. If we regard the local state as merely an agent of the national state then it follows that citizenship of the latter translates automatically into citizenship of the former.

In other words, if I believe myself to be a subject of the national state - with all the rights and obligations that implies - and the local state is merely an agent or sub-unit of the national state, then it follows that I automatically believe myself to have rights and obligations to the local state as well.

Masakhane
This is certainly implied by the Masakhane campaign. The message is the following: we now have a democratic and legitimate state to which you have certain rights but also obligations. In this regard you must pay your rent and services as part of your duty to the democratic state.

Rents and services are, of course, payable to the local authority. So the assumption here is that the local state and the national state are indistinguishable and your duties to the former translate automatically into duties to the latter. And yet service and rent payment in many areas remains very low. What can this mean?

If the national and local state are indistinguishable, as Masakhane sometimes...
What could these be? Firstly, rights exercised in the nation are necessarily general and universal in that they apply formally to all citizens. Local government citizenship implies a differential relationship in which the rights and obligations exercised in the city are defined and apply locally.

Partial citizenship

In South Africa it would seem that we have only partial or incomplete citizenship, provided we mean by this that not everywhere is there an identity of a local state form to which one is a subject (over and above one’s citizenship to the national state).

In Ivory Park, for example, interviewees nearly always referenced questions about citizenship to the Government of National Unity and/or President Nelson Mandela. What this implies is a notion of citizenship that is defined only towards the national state.

This process, however, is uneven. It depends largely on the specific history of political mobilisation within the locality in question, and it might also depend on the nature of urbanisation.

Let us dwell on this briefly. In many formal townships, struggles around rent and service issues during the 1980s and 1990s produced in certain areas a consciousness of the city.

This process also manifested in the slogan ‘one day, everyone, tax base’, with political organisations beginning to realise that the crisis in the urban environment was partly due to the structure of the city itself— the segregation of the urban form denied townships access to the tax base of the industrial and manufacturing sectors included in white areas.

This massively undermined the financial resources of black authorities, making them dependent on rent and service charges for...
Shanty dwellers ordered to pull down their shacks in Clermont, Durban, 1977. Under apartheid, the very existence of citizenship was contested.

Their income — and hence displacing the full costs of the urban environment onto African residents themselves.

The focus on the urban form and its political expression in the local state was further supported by local government negotiations that mostly began in 1990.

What this means today is that in places where this consciousness took root, formal township residents often reference some of their rights (and perhaps also obligations) towards the urban state.

In other words a notion of local or urban citizenship may have partly emerged. And yet the growth of an urban citizenry is irregular even where this urban identity did develop. Indeed, it seems to be mainly a "middle class" phenomenon — with 'middle class' here referring to those people with rights to a formal housing unit.

For many backyard shack dwellers, the quality of their urban environment spoke not of the structure of the city but of the contractual arrangement entered into with their "landlord".

High rents and poor services often referred to the burdensome and exploitative obligations demanded by house permit holders, who often boycotted rents and levies and yet required payment from their tenants. As a result political consciousness usually coalesced around organisations or entities that could secure personal autonomy through access to an independent piece of land.

So whereas residents of formal houses struggled for improved services and the upgrading of the urban environment — which mostly focused their efforts on the local state as the agent of these services — backyard renters, in most cases, addressed their grievances to the issue of land.

In this regard an identity of the city was highly uneven, and usually depended on the state agency against which informal
A new political subject may be formed: the urban citizen

If the local state is unable to meet its obligations, conflict may arise aimed at the local authority.

Dwellers struggled for tenure. In Ivory Park, ground was secured through battles with the then Transvaal Provincial Administration, and not with the Midrand Town Council. This is perhaps different in Tamboville in Benoni, where land struggles were conducted against the white local authority.

It seems then that the history of political contestation – and the degree to which struggles took place against an institution with a specifically urban or local identity – has played a significant role in the determination of urban citizenship. This has potentially interesting consequences for the future.

The future

Many local political organisations around the country have experienced a fundamental crisis in both their identity and function. Civic or residents associations in informal settlements, for example, have historically referenced their identity around the issue of space for settlement.

While these struggles have mostly been successful and informal areas are now being integrated into the administrative and spatial boundaries of the city, organisations are finding it difficult to address the diversity of political identities that are beginning to emerge, and which were previously united around the issue of land.

In Ivory Park, this is evidenced by the decline in attendance at mass meetings and participation in street committees. So, for example, as these areas become formalised, the issue of land and tenure has receded and new issues around service delivery have come to the fore.

It is possible that as demands around the quality of the urban environment increase, so too will the visibility of the local state in the eyes of many residents. Hence, local government may become more and more the object against which residents exercise their rights – and perhaps obligations. This points to the formation of a new political subject: the urban citizen.

But there are dangers inherent in this process. If a differential notion of citizenship emerges which is attached to the local state, and the local state is unable to meet its perceived obligations – which is a distinct prospect – then the very process of formalisation or consolidation holds the possibility that conflict may arise aimed at the local authority itself, precisely because consolidation focuses attention on the urban state.

Alternatively, and this is perhaps more worrying, the failure of the local authority might displace citizenship away from the democratic state and establish – or perhaps re-establish – the mediative function of local organisations that might be based on patron-clientism. The possibility of the latter depends, of course, on the particular political culture that exists or emerges within the informal settlement in question.

If, for example, local organisations are premised on a mutually exclusive ethnicity, such as in parts of the Vaal Triangle, and/or a hostile party political history, then the prospects for conflict are once again exacerbated. In Zonkezizwe on the East Rand, violence recently flared up between Inkatha and ANC aligned residents over access to residential sites.

If, on the other hand, informal dwellers can successfully exercise their rights through the local democratic state, with the attendant emergence of urban citizenship, then it might be possible for conflict to be mediated through democratic institutional forms, rather than through bloody battles on the ground.

The challenge for citizenship is the capacity of local governments to deliver in a way that improves the visibility of the state as a democratic state.
Manufacturing Legitimacy

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Rule of Law

By Richard Wilson
School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, operating in a context of high level human rights prosecutions and with extensive powers of search, seizure and subpoena, is poised to provide a fuller record of the authoritarian past than any previous truth commission. But ultimately the creation of a 'rights culture' will depend more on the realization of rights enshrined in the Constitution by making the present legal system accessible, swift and fair.

"There is a deep crisis of legitimacy of our political institutions. The moral fabric of society has been torn. Expediency and principle have been blurred. Society is now held together by obstinacy, goodwill and good luck, instead of an inclusive moral base." Johnny De Lange, African National Congress MP, Member of the Select Committee on Justice of the National Assembly, Cedar Park Conference, September 21, 1995

Truth commissions have become one of the main mechanisms by which transitional regimes seek to create legitimacy for state institutions still tainted by the legacy of authoritarian rule.

Despite elections and the apparently radical reform of laws and the structure of government in the new South Africa, there is a degree of continuity of state institutions in terms of structure and organisation, even of personnel. A lingering "institutional memory" continues to impede the development of citizens' trust and allegiance in a new political dispensation.

This is one reason why President Patricio Aylwin made a televised apology for state crimes on the publication of Chile's truth commission report (Berryman 1993), even though he had been in exile from Augusto Pinochet's regime.

Since negotiated settlements usually ensure an ongoing role for the previous political elite, truth commissions become one of the main arenas for stating that the new government is different and is committed to protecting and respecting the rights of citizens. How specifically do truth commissions manufacture legitimacy, and in what ways can the political constraints on them actually encourage a culture of impunity?

Reinstating the rule of law

"The criminal justice system is in crisis. It lacks legitimacy and is seen as ineffective." Jeremy Sarkin

Truth commissions aspire to create legitimacy for the state generally, but they are especially associated with wider attempts to overhaul the criminal justice system.

The importance of legitimate legal institutions and an independent judiciary holds an even greater significance in South Africa than in Chile or Argentina, since South Africa has invested so much political capital in constitutional sovereignty, as opposed to a Latin American strategy which sought to establish strong executives.

If Hannah Arendt was justified in writing that the first act of totalitarianism is to kill the legal impulse in citizens, then part of the role of transitional bodies such as truth commissions is to revive that juridical impulse.
One of the strongest arguments for a truth commission was lack of faith in the courts.

The criminal justice system could not cope with all human rights violations committed over 34 years.

The prosecutions against Malan et al will no doubt convince many wavering officials that testifying is in their own best interests.

One impediment to the resuscitation of the judicial process in South Africa was lack of faith in the courts—the perception that apartheid crimes could not be given back to the same criminal justice system.

Recent attempts to investigate apartheid 'dirty tricks' campaigns through the Harm's and Goldstone Commissions resulted in one significant prosecution, that of former Vlakplaas commander Colonel Eugene de Kok. More than anything, the two commissions demonstrated the limitations of using existing structures to unearth past violations.

Rapid and effective prosecutions of police officers in the new political dispensation have also been hampered by repeated accusations that some Attorneys General have failed to bring prosecutions for political reasons.

Much more centred around Tim McNally, the Attorney General of KwaZulu-Natal, who in September 1995 was dragged across the coals by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Justice.

Only a month later, McNally confounded his critics by issuing arrest warrants against former Defence Minister General Magnus Malan and 10 other high ranking former defence and intelligence officials in connection with the massacre of 13 people at KwaMakutha in KwaZulu-Natal in 1987.

These are the most extensive and far reaching prosecutions since the demise of apartheid, and may constitute a threat to the stability of the Government of National Unity.

So far, President Nelson Mandela has refrained from intervening in the interests of 'reconciliation', and General Malan has eschewed making an application to the amnesty committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

If the allegations against the 11 former members of the defence hierarchy are true, then it is not at all clear that the Commission would constitute a possible escape route from prosecution anyway. If the Norgard Principles are principles at all, then amnesty would not be granted for involvement in a massacre, on the grounds that it constituted a 'heinous crime'.

Despite these unexpected high level prosecutions of the more implicated senior officials of the 'ancien regime', criminal prosecutions will not replace or outweigh the functions of the Commission, since the criminal justice system simply could not cope with all the human rights violations committed over a 34 year period.

Such a strategy would be too lengthy, costly and destabilising, especially in a context where there is little public confidence in the legal system to handle the backlog of past abuses it once ignored, and therefore cannot be wholly responsible for its own rehabilitation.

We have to perceive the legal system and Commission as complementary and working in tandem, with the latter compensating for the limitations and deficiencies of the former. At the same time, the prosecutions against Malan et al feed directly into the truth commission process since they will no doubt convince many wavering lower ranking security force officials that testifying in the hope of gaining amnesty is now in their own best interests.

Creating legitimacy

"Ultimately, the transformation of our conceptions of what is a just system is part of the process of nation building, and cannot be divorced from the other processes intended to reinvent South African society." Azhar Cachalia, Secretary of the Ministry of Public Safety and Security.

There are three main characteristics of mechanisms through which truth commissions generate legitimacy and trust in state institutions, and legal institutions in particular:

Liminality

In anthropological parlance, liminality is associated with mediation. In the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission it refers to how the Commission will mediate between different branches of government. The Commission exhibits a number of characteristics which could be described as "liminal", which make it neither fish nor fowl.
It is a transitory and fleeting body which will function for no more than two years. It is not the sole body of any one government branch, and is formally independent, but lies between them. The Commission is formally beholden to the executive - the commissioners are selected and can be removed solely by the President. It will make recommendations to the President regarding reparations and 'the national, administrative and legislative measures which should be introduced in order to prevent the commission of violations of human rights'.

The Commission has an ambivalent relationship to the legal order: it is not a legal institution, in that it is not constituted as a court of law. It cannot carry out prosecutions nor can it sentence. In fact it can bypass the legal process by naming perpetrators before they have been convicted and by granting amnesty before a perpetrator has been through the trial process and been convicted.

Conversely, many of the Commission’s functions are overseen and administered by the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, including negotiating the pay, terms and conditions of the employment of commissioners, liaison over the witness protection programme, gathering information from foreign countries and dealing with applications for amnesty from people in custody.

The positioning of the Commission between the justice system and the executive and Parliament creates a set of distinctions between those branches of government. This defining of boundaries is part of the creation of a system of checks and balances which is one of the hallmarks of a liberal democratic order. Under authoritarian rule, it was precisely the lack of institutional boundaries which meant that the judiciary functioned largely as the oppressive legal arm of the executive.

Q Individualising responsibility

Truth commissions facilitate the legitimating of state institutions by both individualising responsibility and indemnifying the state itself from claims for damages. Francisco Pianizza (1995) records how in Latin America:

"...it was argued that under the rule of law there was a need to individualise responsibility. Otherwise a whole institution - the armed forces - would remain tainted with the crimes of a number of individuals."

Thus truth commissions divert responsibility for human rights abuses away from institutions and onto individuals. In the same instance as abusive acts are personalised, state institutions are symbolically decontaminated and absolved of blame.

Closely linked to the individualising of responsibility is a programme of lustration, or purging of the security forces. The Report of the Truth Commission (1993) in El Salvador called for the purging of all military or civilian officials named in the report, and their banning from further office. This extended to include members of the opposition.

It is difficult to speculate on the extent to which the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission will pursue a strategy of lustration. There is likely to be a
The South African security forces remain riddled with perpetrators of abuses under the previous regime. To achieve amnesty, the perpetrator does not need to express remorse; only to convince the amnesty committee the acts were associated with a 'political objective' and that a full disclosure has been made.

The state then may consider what reparations it wishes to make to survivors through the reparations committee, but these will not amount to more than a fraction of possible civil damages. In this way, the slate will not amount to more than a fraction of reparations it wishes to make to survivors.

The Commission will remove citizens’ rights to damages if a former government agent is granted amnesty by the amnesty committee, then the state will be automatically indemnified for damages. The state becomes a silent partner, shadowing each perpetrator who comes forward and whose amnesty request is successful. If a perpetrator is on trial at the time, civil proceedings can be suspended until the appeal for amnesty is heard.

The state then may consider what reparations it wishes to make to survivors through the reparations committee, but these will not amount to more than a fraction of possible civil damages. In this way, the slate is wiped clean and state ministries no longer bear responsibility for the actions of the past.

Constructing a benevolent state

Two of the three main functions of the Commission (Newham 1995) – hearing testimony of human rights violations and making reparations – are geared towards constructing an aura of benevolence around state institutions. As Alex Boraine stated:

"This will be the first experience of many survivors of a compassionate state, which goes out to people. Survivors will be received, respected and given a cup of coffee. Before, if they went to the police, magistrates or the military they would receive a hostile treatment." (Boraine, personal communication, September 1995)

The Chilean Commission called for a ‘National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation’ which would administer housing, educational benefits and a pension for the survivors of people disappeared and executed, putting them on a par with the families of war veterans and giving them a recognised collective role.

It recommended special medical care for those who had suffered physical and medical trauma, and called for mandatory psychological treatment for those involved in torturing others (Ensalaco 1994). Through such measures, truth commissions seek to restore a sense of reciprocity and mutuality in social relations.

Reciprocity in South Africa lies in the balancing of reparation and amnesty in the functions of the Commission. Survivors tell their story in public, have it officially recorded, and they may receive reparation. Perpetrators also construct their narrative and may receive amnesty from civilian and state prosecution.

In the balanced exchange of receiving compensation and renouncing vengeance, this reciprocity parallels and reinforces the exchange inherent in a revitalised social contract, where the individual gives up his or her right to retribution for the past in return for protection and stability in the future.

Political constraints

Amnesty Provisions

Although truth commissions have legitimisation as an objective, it is not clear at

The Commission will remove citizens' rights to civil claims for damages. Perpetrators only have to convince the amnesty committee that acts committed were associated with a 'political objective' public clamour for the removal from office of named perpetrators even if indiction is not formalised.

Purging within the South African security forces has been ongoing since May 1994, but they remain riddled with perpetrators of abuses under the previous regime, as well as a smaller number of African National Congress (ANC) intelligence personnel named in the Goldstone Commission report for atrocities in ANC detention camps.

Recent revelations alleging involvement in possible curitdamaged Third Force activities by Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) MP Thembisile Kitoza and KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Committee for Safety and Security, Celine Mhethwa, have reinforced suspicions of lingering rogue elements within state structures.

It is hoped that the Commission will deal with such elements in a unified procedure which will not be as thorough or extensive as a series of court prosecutions, but will provide actionable information on serving state officials in a quicker and less piecemeal manner.

Inextricably linked to this legitimating process of individualising responsibility and purging state officials is the less publicised programme of indemnifying the state itself. The Commission will remove citizens' rights to civil claims for damages: if a former government agent is granted amnesty by the amnesty committee, then the state will be automatically indemnified for damages.

The state becomes a silent partner, shadowing each perpetrator who comes forward and whose amnesty request is successful. If a perpetrator is on trial at the time, civil proceedings can be suspended until the appeal for amnesty is heard.

To achieve amnesty, the perpetrator does not even need to express remorse; only to convince the amnesty committee the acts were associated with a 'political objective' and that a full disclosure has been made.

The state then may consider what reparations it wishes to make to survivors through the reparations committee, but these will not amount to more than a fraction of possible civil damages. In this way, the slate is wiped clean and state ministries no longer bear responsibility for the actions of the past.
This all depends on the contributions of commissions made to ongoing processes of legal reform and whether they enhance the capacity of the criminal justice system to carry out past and ongoing human rights prosecutions.

For instance, the Report of the Truth Commission (1993) in El Salvador recommended an extensive programme of radical reform, which was inadvertently ignored, and the amnesty law passed shortly afterwards undermined its potential as an instrument for radical reform of the security forces. Because of this and similar experiences, Francisco Panizza writes:

"It would be tempting to sum up the legacy for human rights of the processes of transition to democracy in Latin America in a single word: impunity...Politically impunity eroded the legitimacy of the new government by blatantly violating the principle of equality before the law which every democratic government is bound to uphold." (Panizza 1995)

In South Africa, the question of legitimation depends largely on how the amnesty question is handled. The fact that the Commission can supersede ongoing criminal trials and grant amnesties in the middle of a prosecution may contribute to an atmosphere of impunity. If trials are suspended as the accused apply for amnesty, the Commission could derail prosecutions of crimes in connection with Third Force activities.

However, South Africa is unique in that there is no blanket amnesty law in effect as occurred in many Latin American countries. Instead, the process of granting amnesty is dealt with in the scope of the truth commission process: individualised and more stringent conditions – for example around 'political objectives' and 'full disclosure' – are placed on the applicant.

?q Terms of Reference
Section 16(x) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act restricts the mandate of the Commission to investigating 'gross violation of human rights', or more specifically the violation of human rights through:

"(a) the killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill-treatment of any person, or
(b) any attempt, conspiracy, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a)."

This brief is significantly wider than previous truth commissions, and has the potential to be far-reaching, insofar as a liberal interpretation of the terms 'instigation' and 'command' could include intellectual authors of acts: that is, high ranking politicians of the apartheid era who are still in government.

Yet the narrow restriction of the Commission's scope of enquiry is unsatisfactory, in that it will only deal with those who went beyond the already wide latitude of abuse permitted by apartheid laws. Judging the past in terms of itself misses many core issues around the routinisation of violence. For instance, cases involving arbitrary detention without trial are excluded, since they were a routine and legal part of the apartheid order.

The exclusion of that which was legal under apartheid creates a false distinction between the normative aspects of a racialised authoritarian order – which is acceptable for the purposes of the Commission – and illegal forms of violent coercion, when instead one implied the other. Thus the Commission can only capture the extreme events, not the normality, the everydayness and mundane technicality of apartheid.

The Commission's brief suppresses the type of violations and abuses which relied on acts of surveillance, covert information gathering (such as telephone tapping), harassment, censorship and self-censorship, where no 'gross violation' was committed, but where a system of abuse still operated.

Whereas the Commission will operate with an instrumental conception of violence, social scientists such as Taussig (1988) and Bourdieu (1991) have drawn our attention to how regimes of terror thrive on uncertainty, mystery and disguised violence in order to cultivate a 'culture of terror.'

An overemphasis on visible, physical violence misses out levels of symbolic

Truth commissions are geared towards constructing an aura of benevolence around state institutions

It is not clear at all whether or not they actually can or do legitimate state institutions
The pervasive social nature of violence is perhaps one of the greatest limitations on the Commission's ability to articulate a clear break with the past.

Conclusions

As Gareth Newham (1995) recently argued, the expectations on the Commission are enormous, and the potential for disappointment equally high. Whether the Commission can be part of a process of restoring legitimacy to governmental and legal institutions depends much upon whether it is perceived as accessible and just in its decisions.

Yet it is important not to overestimate the significance of the Commission. If it is seen to have failed on a number of counts, this will not necessarily jeopardise the overall project of creating a 'rights culture', since there are many other institutions dedicated to this end, such as the Gender Equality Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector and programmes instigated by the Ministry of Justice.

The Latin American experience of truth commissions has been a highly mixed one, to the extent that they can actually enhance a climate of impunity.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, operating as it will in a context of high level human rights prosecutions and with extensive powers of search, seizure and subpoena, is poised to provide a fuller record of the authoritarian past than any previous truth commission. This will no doubt contribute to the perception that these institutions have embarked on a programme of reform, and may deter future abuses.

However, the mere expression of human rights discourses at the level of formal state institutions is in itself not enough, as the Latin American experience tells us. Ultimately, the creation of a 'rights culture' will depend more on the actual realisation of rights enshrined in the forthcoming Constitution by making the present legal system accessible, swift and fair.

REFERENCES

Waiting for Utopia
Quality of life in the 1990s

By Valerie Moller
Centre for Social and Development Studies
University of Natal

Immediately after the April 1994 elections – for the first time – black and white South Africans registered similar levels of happiness and satisfaction. Eighteen months later, the post-election euphoria bubble has burst, with one in two people registering life satisfaction compared with 82% post-election. The good news is that the gap between the perceived quality of life of black and white people has narrowed in some areas. The bad news is that the narrowing gap reflects the growing discontent of the formerly privileged, but no gains in satisfaction among the underprivileged.

All stable democracies aim to create a nation of contented citizens to ensure peace and prosperity. The populations of most Western and democratic societies register happiness and satisfaction with life. South Africa in the 1980s had the dubious distinction of a black population indicating unhappiness and dissatisfaction with almost all aspects of their lives.

Rich and poor
The legacy of apartheid is a racial hierarchy of unequal social and economic life chances and unequal perceived quality of life. Socio-economic inequalities show up clearly in the key indicators of poverty collected for the Living Standards and Development Project in 1993 (Saldru 1994).

African households, on average, earn approximately 2.3 times less than coloured, 4.5 times less than Indian and 6.2 times less than white households (Table 1). Africans have nearly twice the unemployment rate of coloureds, more than three times the unemployment rate of Indians and nearly 10 times the unemployment rate of whites.

Currently nearly 95% of South Africa’s poor are African. The poor – that is 40% of households, equivalent to 53% of the population – account for less than 10% of total consumption, while 10% of households – with only 5.8% of the population – account for over 40% of consumption (Office of the President 1995).

The poverty study confirmed the link between living standards and perceived quality of life. While almost three quarters of the poorest 20% of South African households were dissatisfied with living conditions, almost 70% of the richest 20% of households were satisfied.

The link between living standards and perceived quality of life has been confirmed

In the 1980s, black people indicated unhappiness with almost all aspects of their lives

Indicator SA Vol 13 No 1 Summer 1995
The 1994 and 1995 weighted samples are representative of the total South African population and the former homelands. All South Africans were included.

Sample sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
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<td>1299</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
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<td>234</td>
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<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>77</td>
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</table>

Sometimes identical items were used in all three surveys:

Items in the Markdata September 1995 survey commissioned by the Quality of Life Project (see box). To test feelings of personal well being and social inequality in the new South Africa, the Quality of Life Unit and RDP Monitoring Unit at the University of Natal commissioned Markdata to apply a set of social indicators in their September 1995 omnibus survey. The same indicators had been measured previously in 1983 and 1988. This is the third full survey carried out for the Quality of Life Project (see box). Table 2 shows that the post-election euphoria has burst.

Eighteen months after the April 1994 elections only one in two South Africans, on average, registered life satisfaction and happiness compared with 82% in the post-election period. Post-election levels of happiness among Africans have dropped dramatically.

Table 1: Racial inequalities 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Poverty rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Income (Rands)</th>
<th>Satisfied (%)</th>
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<td>3373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>4595</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

- a Percentage of race groups who are among the poorest 40% of households
- b Percentage unemployed
- c Average household total monthly earnings
- d Percentage of households "very satisfied" and "satisfied" with current living situation

Source:


The election miracle

Immediately after South Africa's first democratic elections black voters closed the gap in happiness. This result is remarkable in the history of quality of life studies.

Satisfaction and happiness indicators are known to produce consistent results on aggregate over time. Levels of happiness and satisfaction tend to be fairly stable over another.

Table 2: Quality of life trends: Happiness and life satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All South Africans

Notes:

Identical items were used in all three surveys:

- "Taking all things together. How would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, fairly unhappy, or very unhappy?" (unhappy)
- "Taking all things together in your life, how would you say things are these days. Generally speaking would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?" (satisfied)

Sources:

- Mailer and Schiemmer (1983) based on HSRC survey
- Mailer (1989) based on SASCOS survey
- Harris Interactive, May 1994 survey commissioned by Mailer
- Harris Interactive, September 1994 survey commissioned by the Quality of Life and RDP Monitoring Unit...
The most significant increase in satisfaction over the past decade has been among all groups the most dramatic decline in satisfaction levels between black South Africans and other groups (see Table 3).

Domain satisfactions

The Government of National Unity has declared a better life for all South Africans. The Reconstruction and Development (RDP) programme is an ambitious programme which aims to create the material base to erase racial inequalities and sustain a fledging democracy.

How satisfied are South Africans with various aspects of their lives in the new South Africa? Table 4 groups the 31 social indicators developed by the Quality of Life Project under 10 broad headings for the years 1988, 1988 and 1995. Five general trends are evident:

- The proportions of South Africans satisfied with various aspects of their lives have generally decreased over the past decade. Personal aspects of life are by and large exempt. It is uncertain at this preliminary stage of analysis whether technical factors, such as sample design, exaggerate the overall decline in satisfactions (see box on interpreting social indicators).
- The gap in satisfaction levels between black South Africans and other groups remains. Satisfaction with housing is a case in point.
- Where the satisfaction gradient has levelled it is due to decreases in white satisfaction levels rather than increases in African satisfaction levels. Examples are the sharp increases in dissatisfaction with personal security, against crime and the standard of public services among whites.
- Among all groups the most dramatic drop in satisfaction concerned work and income. South Africans appear to be increasingly alarmed by declining job opportunities. Respondents in jobs complained about their lack of independence and poor treatment at work. Less than a third of people felt confident of their current or future ability to provide for their families after retirement or if they were disabled.
- The most significant increase in satisfaction over the past decade has been among the destitute, the black South Africans who live on under 10 broad headings for the years 1988, 1988 and 1995. Five general trends are evident:

Table 3: Quality of life indicators 1995: Happiness and life satisfaction

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global happiness</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life satisfaction</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 200 social indicators were thoroughly tested before making a final selection of 35 indicators covering general and specific quality of life satisfactions, which were then reapplied in the 1988 and 1995 surveys. The multi-item instrument is considered ideally suited for systematic monitoring of subjective quality of life across all communities in South Africa and for the description of changing patterns of social cleavages.

A feature of the South African quality of life Instrument is that all items are immediate and personal concerns. This is reflected in the wording of items. For example, respondents are asked how satisfied they are with: your family's health, the way you are treated at work, your family's income if you should become ill or die, your freedom of movement, public services in your community, the housing available for people like you, the way you get on with other race groups, the respect you get in your community, your right to vote, and yourself as a person.

The indicators of overall quality of life and satisfaction with life as a whole and general happiness were also tested in a Markdata survey conducted during April 1994.
The post-election bubble has now burst

The proportion of South Africans satisfied with their lives has decreased over the past decade

occurred in the socio-political sphere. Three quarters of Africans and over 90% of all other South Africans stated they were satisfied with their right to vote in 1995. Higher proportions of South Africans felt race relations had improved and life chances were more similar for all South Africans. More coloureds and Indians felt they were respected by their fellow South Africans than formerly.

Domain satisfactions among Africans highlight the above quality of life trends in the period 1983 and 1995. Table 5 shows that satisfaction with personal concerns, mainly family and private life, was consistently ranked highest. Satisfaction with socio-political issues increased from eighth to fifth rank over the three time periods, while satisfaction with work issues dropped from fifth to ninth rank.

The switch over between levels of satisfaction with socio-political and economic aspects of life suggests that the new South Africa has brought reduction in political discontent but has had little impact on the material base needed to sustain a fragile democracy.

The gender challenge

The Government of National Unity is committed to reducing gender inequalities and empowering women. Preliminary results suggest that South African women are less content than their menfolk with job opportunities and the manner in which they feed, house and can provide for their families in case of adversity and in old age.

Women in jobs were more likely to complain about low wages and lack of independence in the workplace. Women also appeared to be less satisfied after hours than men.

### Table 4: Quality of life trends: Domain satisfactions

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<tr>
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<td>Family happiness</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Socio-political issues</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income &amp; social security</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Survey respondents evaluated 31 domains of living on a five-point scale ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied".

Domains are grouped under the headings: Family happiness; personal life; self, respect and intimate relations; income and social security; community facilities; education; housing; socio-political issues; health; food; personal life; and family happiness.

Sample sizes, see Table 2.
Significantly more women than men reported dissatisfaction with intimate relationships, the fun they have in life and their circle of friends. Women reported less satisfaction with self than men, suggesting less self-agreement. South African women are less self-confident.

Findings which run counter to overall trends may reflect new job opportunities opening up to women of colour as a result of affirmative action measures to redress past disadvantage. Although numbers are small, Indian women, on average, tended to be more content than their menfolk with job opportunities and their ability to provide financially for their families.

The generation gap

The satisfaction ratings of people under 30 years of age were compared with those of the older age categories (30 to 45 and 46 years). Young people were more optimistic about their life chances now and in future than the older generations. Young South Africans were more likely to think that their situation had improved since the elections and that their life chances in five years time would also be better.

These attitudes were particularly pronounced among African and Indian youth, who also were more likely than others to see life as "rewarding". More older than younger South Africans thought they and their children could improve their situation and that their life chances in five years time would also be better.

African, coloured and Indian but not white youth gave themselves a poorer health rating than their younger counterparts. This finding may reflect differentials in life styles and living standards as well as age.

Only coloured youth expressed significantly greater dissatisfaction than their elders with their housing circumstances. Black youth were less discontent than their elders with food and fun in life but less satisfied with prospects of job opportunities and social security.

Relative to their elders, white youth were less satisfied with basic needs, such as food and housing, and more intensive needs including independence at work, fun and leisure, respect received from other South Africans and race relations. However, satisfaction levels were still higher than in the total sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Average satisfaction levels: Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
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<td>Overall well-being</td>
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<td>Happiness</td>
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<td>Life satisfaction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Quality of life projections 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past satisfaction (five years ago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current satisfaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived change since April 1994 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life in five years time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life is currently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustrating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 6 for wording of items
South Africans generally projected cautious optimism

It is difficult to tell whether the relative dissatisfaction of white youth is merely transitory - related to life stage - or a sign of scepticism and deeper seated alienation. The fact that twice as many white youth than elders perceived life as 'getting better' suggests that the life stage interpretation holds.

It is possible that lower satisfaction ratings on respect and race relations are born of feelings of solidarity and egalitarianism: white youth may be less smug about their personal relations with fellow South Africans than their elders.

Cautious optimism

To overcome the large gaps between surveys, respondents in the Markdata 1995 survey were asked to project feelings of happiness into the past and the future. Table 6 shows that South Africans generally projected cautious optimism.

- The proportion of survey respondents indicating satisfaction with life in 1995 was slightly higher than the one projecting satisfaction with life the year Nelson Mandela was released from prison. However, more South Africans indicated that they were dissatisfied at present (38%) than five years ago (31%).

- A third perceived that their lives had changed for the better since the April 1994 elections compared with just under a quarter who perceived changes for the worse.

- Over a third anticipated that in five years time life for people like themselves would be better. Less than a quarter thought things would be worse.

- A higher proportion (31%) indicated that the life they were leading now was getting better rather than worse (27%).

- Overall, only a quarter of South Africans perceived their current life to be rewarding while over a third saw life as frustrating.

The survey response also struck a cautious note. In 1995 many South Africans appeared to be reserving their judgement and feeling neither one way nor the other. Feelings of ambiguity about the quality of one's life may be symptomatic of the transition period which may be as frustrating and exhausting as it is exhilarating.

Future quality of life

There were major differences in how groups of South Africans saw the future relative to their present circumstances.

In September 1995, Africans achieved the lowest level of life satisfaction and happiness among South Africans. However, they were also most likely to indicate that progress had been achieved since the elections and to express optimism for the future. The current level of frustration reported by black South Africans was also higher than any other group.

Coloured South Africans consistently expressed the highest sense of achievements and optimism for the future.

Indians were far less optimistic about the future than their African and coloured counterparts but, on average, less pessimistic than white South Africans.

White South Africans projected greater life satisfaction in the past than present, which compares with trend results. One in two stated that their lives had changed for the worse since the elections and 56% expected life chances to deteriorate in five years time.

Respondents were asked to qualify their future projections of greater or lesser life chances.

- Optimists

Every second person who believed in a better future hoped the new Government's election promises would be realised. As a few people put it, the new Government should be given a chance to prove itself. A small proportion of respondents referred to specific RDP projects. In particular, optimistic people expected more job opportunities and a stronger economy.

Gains in civil rights and international recognition were gratifying for a few, while hopes of material gains and a higher standard of living pointed to a brighter
future for others. A few respondents stated that improved race relations or religious convictions made them optimistic for the future.

Ambiguous

Respondents who expected life to be about the same in five years time were mainly hesitant to project the future or predicted no or slow change.

Pessimists

Many pessimists also forecast no or slow change. Pessimists were mainly concerned that the economy would remain weak and the job situation would deteriorate. A large group of pessimists were anxious about South Africa’s high crime rate and the breakdown of law and order in the country. Reference was made by a few respondents to continued strike action which threatened to retard economic growth.

Others predicted that weak, incompetent or corrupt leaders would be the country’s downfall. A minority feared a loss of their cultural values and discrimination in future. A few people predicted that personal circumstances, such as advanced age or a meagre retirement income, would depress their future quality of life.

Expressions of pessimism varied. Pessimists among Africans were mainly concerned that promised changes would not materialise. Fears for the future among other pessimists were associated with predictions of an exclusively ‘black’ government and a one-party state. Indian respondents were very anxious that the high crime rates should not jeopardise future life chances.

Although numbers were small, Indian and coloured South Africans tended to be more concerned about job discrimination in the future, and whites about incompetent people taking leadership positions. More white and coloured than other South Africans gave religious reasons for expecting a better future.

Happiness for all

The quality of life trends reviewed above suggest that there is ample room for improvement in the lives of ordinary South Africans. In 1995 the overall level of well-being of South Africans has not converged – as hoped – between the very high white

Interpreting social indicators

The interpretations of trend indicators is a hazardous task. Shifts in levels of satisfaction result from a number of factors including changes in external social conditions which impinge on personal well being, the demographic composition of the population, levels of expectations of the population, and technical artefacts.

Shifting quality of life trends may reflect real changes in objective life circumstances of South Africans during the review period. All other things being equal, positive interventions aimed at improving living standards are expected to register in higher satisfaction rates in affected areas.

Satisfaction results from people’s subjective appraisal of their objective life circumstances. Individuals measure the appropriateness of their life circumstances against various standards. Personal quality of life may be seen to improve or deteriorate because reference standards shift.

Rising expectations and rapid adaptation to new living standards may result in a more critical assessment of life conditions. Thus popular discontent may emerge especially during periods of social transformation.

Although social indicators are measured under identical circumstances in each repeat survey, this is rarely the case in practice. The research instrument employed for the Quality of Life Project was refined and shortened after the first wave of research which resulted in minor changes in the wording of some items in the 1985 survey. Therefore identical items were used.

The initial aim of the Quality of Life Project was to explore the nature of social cleavages and racial inequality in South African society. The samples used in the 1980s canvassed representative cross-sections of the then four official population groups. Due to financial constraints samples were drawn among urban populations in metropolitan areas, and larger and smaller towns. Data collected from an exemplary rural sub-sample drawn in the former homelands in 1983 are not reviewed in this article.

In the 1990s a new South African sample design was devised by Markdata which was inclusive of the former homelands and allowed for breakdowns by the new provinces. The new South African sample was a breakthrough for quality of life research: it yielded the first estimates of average South African perceived well being.

Strictly speaking, the preliminary analysis presented here is flawed in that it compares time series data generated by samples which do not match perfectly – the samples were drawn under conditions of the old and new boundaries. Nonetheless the results do give insight into the dynamics of inequalities under apartheid and since the birth of democracy.

An alternative approach would be to use the 1995 quality of life survey as a baseline study. In this case the September 1995 levels of happiness and satisfaction would serve as the benchmark against which improvements in perceived quality of life could be measured relative to delivery on RDP programmes.
The narrowing gap between black and white satisfaction merely reflects the growing anxiety of whites. Level of the pre-election period and the abnormally low black level. Levels of happiness have dropped generally and inequalities in perceived quality of life remain. This analysis has focused on race and gender inequalities and used age differentials to point to future trends. Rural, urban and regional differences and income dimensions of inequality need to explored in further analysis.

Encouraging is that preliminary results suggest that the gap between the perceived quality of life of black and white South Africans has narrowed in some areas of life, notably civil rights and political freedom. In 1995, the universal franchise is no longer a quality of life concern. On aggregate, satisfaction in this domain is saturated. Statistically, satisfaction with voting rights no longer contributes to enhanced well being.

Worrying, on the other hand, is that the narrowing of the gap between black and white satisfaction rates merely reflects the growing discontent and anxiety of the formerly privileged and indicates no gains in satisfaction among the underprivileged.

Now that the political dimension of unequal life quality has been resolved, the focal concern of all South Africans appears to be the future of the economy. The main difference of opinion between optimists and pessimists among survey respondents was whether the economy would meet their aspirations.

The study of poverty referred to at the outset found that job creation was at the top of the wish list of South Africans from all social backgrounds. In the 1995 quality of life study, job opportunities evidenced the lowest satisfaction rates among African, coloured and white South Africans, and the second lowest satisfaction rate among Indians.

Past projections of satisfaction appear to have no bearing on current well being, but feelings of optimism for the future do. This finding augurs well for the future well being of South Africans. The following scenario emerges if results are combined for three measures of life quality: current satisfaction with life as a whole, feelings that life is getting better now, and projections of quality of life for people like you in five years' time.

Coloured South Africans are fairly optimistic in the longer and shorter term. Indians, and whites, in particular, appear to be satisfied in the short term but less confident of their continued well being in the future. Comparatively fewer Africans appear to be satisfied with life in the shorter term, but their longer term prospects are very good. The longer term positive prognosis holds for 61% of Africans but only 35% of whites.

The results on short and long term projections of life satisfaction suggest that Africans, few of whom enjoy the good life now, are willing to wait for their due. Other South Africans are still relatively content at present. The challenge will be to preserve the patience of poorer South Africans while instilling greater confidence among the better off in their prospects for happiness in the distant future.

The focal concern of all South Africans appears to be the future of the economy.

The challenge will be to preserve the patience of poorer South Africans while instilling greater confidence among the better off.

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Moller V (1990) 'Quality of Life and Basic Needs: the 1995 quality of life survey, and Markdata for making the data available the quality of life and basic needs', Social Indicators Research, No 1:27-50


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Quality of Life and RDP Monitoring Unit is funded by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The author thanks the HSRC for financial support to conduct the research, and Markdata for making the data available. The 1989 quality of life dataset and carrying out the 1995 survey. Viewed as the author and should not be attributed to the HSRC.
Official SA Trade Unions Directory
Labour Statistics

REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS AND THEIR MEMBERSHIP, 1979 TO 1994

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* As on 31 October
Source: Department of Labour


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</table>

* Figures for 1979 not available
** As on 31 October 1994
Source: Department of Labour
THE 1996 IPM HUMAN RESOURCES DIRECTORY AND HANDBOOK

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The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is an ambitious initiative. Amid dire backlogs and institutional paralysis, it commits the relatively new Government to accelerated service delivery and a fundamental turnabout in the way government operates. Willing this agenda, complete success would be spectacular.

Analysing the period from April 1994 to November 1995, this article reflects on the nature, achievements, shortcomings and future of the RDP. It contends that the RDP should not be judged by delivery only, but as a strategy to transform government through policy and institutional change.

**Delivery matters**

Government is under much pressure to deliver tangible RDP outputs. Poor access to basic services, opportunities and facilities deny millions a decent living. To rigidly insist that policy and institutional changes must pre-empt delivery, will therefore be insensitive in the extreme.

In October 1995, RDP Minister Jay Naidoo noted some RDP achievements (Saturday Star October 21, 1995, *Taking the RDP Forward*), including:

- 28 000 jobs through 489 projects
- Final preparations for new water supplies to four million people
- Funding already programmed for 614 municipal upgrading projects, affecting some three million people
- Free health care for pregnant women and small children
- Free meals for 3.5 million school children
- Electrification of 2.7 million new houses
- Land reform affecting 4 100 families
- Several community policing and school upgrading projects.

While the Minister concedes limited success, more delivery would not have constituted greater success. Delivery matters, but being able to respond to needs in the long term is even more crucial.

The RDP should not be judged by delivery only, but as a strategy to transform government.
The RDP’s main goals are: democratisation, meeting basic needs, economic and human resource development, and managing and monitoring reconstruction and development. While working with others towards these goals, the Government of National Unity first has to transform itself so that, as the RDP Office’s Dr Bernie Fanaroff puts it:

"...everything government does is RDP." (The Star, August 31, 1995)

This implies that the RDP is not an add-on: departments should reorientate their expenditures towards RDP objectives; the RDP Office cannot take sole responsibility for the programme; and a framework for consistent application of the RDP is essential.

This is the Government’s official approach, but it is not applied consistently. New policy documents — of varying quality and specificity — and coordinating committees illustrate some reorientation across departments.

However, reluctance among some civil servants about the RDP, the fluid policy environment and the tendency to level criticism about RDP delivery at the RDP Office only, suggest otherwise. In reality and perception, everything government does is not yet RDP.

A policy framework

Elected with a mandate for change, the African National Congress (ANC) majority in the Government of National Unity moved rapidly to set the RDP process in motion.

Once in power, they created a ministry to oversee the RDP, established some capacity to manage it and sought to align other parties and interest groups behind the programme.

Within five months, the Government of National Unity produced a White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (Government Printer, November 1994). The White Paper was criticised for not being specific and for not making critical choices and resource allocations. Critics rightly pointed out that it presented a list of ideas rather than — as one might expect of a government document — attainable commitments.

Two points place these shortcomings in perspective.

First, such a new government was unlikely to produce anything more. The White Paper itself called for further policy analysis to clarify the basis for and nature of choices and the institutional and fiscal mechanisms to pursue those choices. Prioritise goals included urban, rural and human resource development and capacity building, and how to link expenditure to objectives.

Second, its shortcomings should not obscure what the White Paper achieved. It placed reconstruction and development at the core of the Government’s agenda and made the RDP state policy, underwritten by all parties in government.

What policy change?

At least six significant RDP related policy themes have come to the fore.

1 Growth and redistribution are mutually supportive goals, not alternatives

As a growth strategy, the RDP seeks to make the economy internally vibrant and globally competitive. Yet, anticipating that growth will not automatically trickle down, it also pursues redistribution.

By grappling with these issues, government has illustrated an increasingly nuanced approach to economic policy. However, it has yet to prove its willingness to make the complex and politically controversial choices which its stance on growth and distribution implies.

While most departmental white papers and policy statements emphasise equity, few show how departments will support economic growth. It is unclear what choices ministries will make when they have to balance growth considerations against equity trade-offs. This lack of clarity affects policy from education and health through to investment in infrastructure and spatial economic development.

2 Integrated urban and rural development

In November 1995, a new Green Paper set out the Government of National Unity’s perspective and intended strategies regarding rural and urban areas. Although general, the visions for integrated rural and urban development provide a basis for wide-ranging transformation. Furthermore, while spatial matters receive attention, especially...
The recent Urban and Rural Development Green Paper commits government to a culture of local governance and an enabling environment for local government. It recognises the value of local government, calling for the its transformation and greater public awareness of its role in a democracy (Government Printer, November 1995).

The notion of local economic development has gained ground, and while there is an irony about local economic development strategy led by central and provincial government, several departments are
investigating how local roleplayers can make the RDP happen.

But policy statements in this regard are ambiguous. In emphasising the implementing role of local government, central and provincial spokespeople often downplay the potential policy role of local structures. Centralised policy making might, of course, aim to ensure that institutions at all levels are viable and their programmes and projects sustainable. However, there is a fine line between such a strategy and a patronising, top-down approach which disempowers local government to become a functional subsidiary of the centre.

6 Performance management

The RDP aims to enhance efficient, accountable and user friendly government. It proposes departmental business planning which sets goals and delivery targets, plans processes and resource allocations for programmes and projects, and shows how results will be measured.

Key performance indicators are also being developed. All Presidential Lead Projects already report quarterly on the key performance indicators, specifying, for example, the employment, training and gender impact of projects.

The intention is to spread this approach to everything government does. Because the procedures are still rough and practical knowledge is limited, the RDP Office has designated specific capacity to the definition of a key performance indicators system and the development of skills to oversee it.

To conclude, the RDP has to undo many problems inherited from the past, mobilise and manage scarce resources, motivate staff towards a vision of something better, redline government’s core values and improve its mode of operation.

So far, some shifts have occurred across departments and levels of government, but countless problems remain. To succeed the RDP has to overcome these problems through policy change which makes delivery sustainable.

**The public sector**

The transformation of the public sector in support of the RDP revolves around eight aspects.

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**The notion of local economic development has gained ground**

**All Presidential Lead Projects already report quarterly on key performance indicators**

**Many provincial governments experience such problems becoming operational that they cannot effectively plan**

**1 Relating policy to the planning and programming of resources, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation**

The RDP White Paper and other policy statements articulated government’s support for a systematic decision making system. An interdepartmental Macro-Economic Working Group therefore developed a Medium Term Expenditure Framework to guide central and provincial budgetary allocations.

The proposed Framework’s expenditure projection model links RDP policy to each budgetary function. The model is already being tested and – if politically acceptable – could herald a new era of goal orientated decision making and budgeting.

The RDP Office envisages a development planning system to link multi-year planning to budgeting across departments and provinces within the parameters of the Framework. To build consensus around this – and around reform of the spatial planning system – the Forum for Effective Planning and Development was formed. Chaired jointly by the RDP Office and the Department of Land Affairs, it involves provincial ministers in development planning supervision with the central government.

Some provinces are progressing well with their plans, but others are unable to develop functional perspectives and plans. The RDP Office has assisted them, but many provincial governments are becoming operational that they cannot engage effectively in visionary planning.

The RDP Office believes that a National Growth and Development Vision could soon be formulated jointly by the national government and provinces in consultation with business, labour and other development interests. However, even if a vision is now produced, capacity constraints make a sustainable development planning system a matter for the longer term.

To build consensus between government and other roleplayers around strategies, programmes and projects, the RDP Office has called for the formation of consultative forums as part of a development planning system at all levels of government.

However, several local and provincial delegates at meetings about development planning and other RDP policy initiatives
have expressed fears that these structures will complicate the institutional environment, entrench unrepresentative interests and undermine elected bodies.

While all departments have to pursue the RDP, it needs a dedicated champion.

Attempts were made—with mixed success—to establish such dedicated agencies at all levels of government. At national level, a Ministry without Portfolio—the 'RDP Office'—has to promote the RDP in government and mobilise support from other roleplayers. It regards line departments as responsible for implementation, but has established a capacity to 'unblock' obstacles.

It also initiated interdepartmental strategic task teams dealing with Urban and Rural Development, Capacity building and Development Planning.

With other departments, work was also done on institutional questions like the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the mobilisation of experts in support of decision-making processes. Responsible for the Central Statistical Services, it spearheaded attempts to make official information more accurate, development-oriented and user-friendly.

An RDP Fund, accounted for by the Department of Finance, was formed to assist the RDP Office in four ways:

- Fast-tracking delivery through high profile projects: Presidential Lead Projects.
- Kick starting budget reprioritisation.
- Introducing a performance culture into government.
- Capturing lessons of experience from the Presidential Lead Projects to benefit future development projects.

The RDP Office reviews its first year.

Critics argue, however, that the Fund introduces a dual budgetary process and that 'progressive' departments will in any event align expenditures to RDP goals, while more conservative ones are unlikely to change theirs in response to the relatively limited 'topping up' capacity of the RDP Fund. Some critics also question the sustainability of some projects. More recently, provincial misadministration of the primary school nutrition programme was alleged.

The RDP Office has faced five major institutional problems:

- Staffing. It depended initially on secondments from other departments, parastatals, private companies and NGOs, while developing a skeleton permanent staff. It has now appointed more permanent people, but still finds it difficult to recruit the range of skills it needs.
- The RDP lacks champions at the provincial and local levels. After the 1994 elections, virtually all the provinces and some local authorities either established RDP units or designated RDP coordination to specific departments. Many of these

Critics question the sustainability of some RDP projects.

The RDP Office still finds it difficult to recruit the range of skills it needs.
arrangements have not yet come to fruition and some have been terminated altogether. RDP units either never built sufficient capacity or could not overcome political, administrative and other constraints.

- Territorial resistance from some line departments. Coordinating departments either work because their hierarchical power base is uncontested, or by performing their cross cutting role with finesse.

The RDP Office enjoys special status by being in the Office of the President, but also relies on process management to align departments to the RDP. Yet, it is somehow not sufficiently associated with the President, and parts of the civil service regard it as inexperienced and idealistic. Some officials resent the RDP Office for its "meddling" in their departmental management.

- A delicate relationship with Parliament. Tasked to be creative, the RDP Office might in theory have to seek its mandate early from Parliament, but in the heat of the moment simply not do so. Its wide focus also complicates its relationship with Parliament.

The RDP Ministry might, for example, meticulously work at its relationship with the RDP Standing Committee, while other committees feel that they need a more direct say in RDP issues. Recently, some parliamentarians (for example, the Standing Committee on Finance) expressed frustration with the RDP Office for its very reason.

- The temptation to justify itself periodically on the grounds of delivery. The problem is that the RDP Office’s own budgetary allocation is aimed at gearing resources towards RDP objectives, rather than full scale implementation. It therefore has to emphasise policy and institutional change while enabling line departments, provinces and local authorities to deliver.

4 Reforming the development finance system

The Department of Finance spearheads the transformation of existing institutions like the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), and the formation of new ones in several RDP related sectors.

Five public sector wholesale loan finance systems will be set up for: infrastructure (DBSA), industrial development (IDC), housing (an envisaged National Housing Finance Corporation), small business development (Khula Enterprises), and rural and agricultural development. Meanwhile, provinces are either transforming old development corporations or establishing new ones to provide multi-sectoral retail finance and development support.

The RDP Office is driving attempts to establish a national grant funding institution to support NGO capacity building and perhaps NGO driven projects and capacity building for weak local authorities. An interim trust for grant funding was recently established, but this process remains fraught with difficulties around focus, participation and its relationship with the DPS.

The decision to establish various national institutions, rather than one channel of funding, also poses a coordination challenge. And defining roles, transforming individual institutions and forming new ones have been complex and time consuming, and have impeded RDP delivery.
Government structures are often either misdirected or lack financial and appropriate human resources.

There is not sufficient clarity about what incentives would lure the private sector into participation at the required scale.

Controversy surrounds the extent to which the Government should guide development funding for NGOs.

5 **A fiscal and financial system to underpin the RDP**

The Government wants the private sector to help fund the RDP and has therefore - with other roleplayers - explored ways in which they can achieve this. However, while larger local authorities (with strong rates and service charge bases), parastatals and DFIs will be able to access private sector funding, many public sector institutions cannot do so.

Most local authorities, facing vast demands for services and infrastructure in poor areas, require direct support from the central and provincial governments. Reshaped fiscal relations between the different levels of government - and especially the long term financing of local authorities - are therefore critical in order to address priorities like housing, infrastructure, transportation and regional and local economic development.

6 **The transformation and strengthening of local government**

Most rural areas have no proper local authorities, and transformation of urban local authorities has only started. The Government launched the Masakhane Campaign to strengthen local government and to get residents to pay for the services rendered by local authorities. However, payments have not been forthcoming and the campaign has not yet convinced as an overall transformation strategy.

7 **The overall transformation of the civil service is part and parcel of the RDP**

The introduction of a performance culture and greater synergy between departments enjoys high priority. Line departments should take up this challenge because, like the RDP, public sector transformation will fail if it becomes the responsibility of the Public Service and RDP Ministries only.

8 **Very basic capacities must be developed within and outside the public sector**

Government structures are often either misdirected or lack financial and appropriate human resources. Communities supposed to benefit from the RDP often lack information, know how and resources to take charge of their own development.

The proposed national grant funding agency will presumably focus on some of these problems, while the RDP Office has a "troubleshooting" unit to undo obstacles - often institutional - in project context.

At the provincial level, the RDP Office has - with the support of donors, parastatals, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and educational institutions - initiated a provincial support programme. It entails Project Preparation Facilities to support in the preparation of project proposals, 'skills audits' of provincial governments and technical support for development planning. Capacity building needs are, however, so vast that these efforts can at most be seen as part of the solution, and they have progressed with varying success.

**Other roleplayers**

Government alone cannot implement the RDP. It has therefore:

1 **Interacted regularly with organised interests**

Apart from ad hoc meetings, structured discussions took place at an RDP Investment Conference in mid-1995, and preparations are underway for another investment conference in April 1996. Furthermore, the National Economic Development and Labour Council facilitates structured interaction between the Government, the private sector, labour and development sector interests.

2 **Promoted the notion of multi-stakeholder partnerships**

While discussing this with the private sector, labour and others, the Government expects the Development Bank of Southern Africa to actively pursue 'co-funding' with the private sector for infrastructure development.

However, there is not yet sufficient clarity about what incentives would lure the private sector into participation at the required scale. Housing indemnity schemes, for example, have often disappointed and the Government has largely ruled out guarantees for loans by lower tiers.

It is also not clear whether the Government and the private sector understand 'partnership' similarly. The Government's support for partnerships and its pragmatic attitude towards private sector participation in financing and implementing the RDP could nonetheless herald a new era in public-private cooperation.
It is time that stubborn civil servants be made to realise that the RDP has voter support.

3 Explored, through the RDP Office, ways to mobilise 'community interests' in the development planning process.

It promotes the notion of development forums at all levels. Critics fear that the structuring of stakeholder participation could undermine normal democratic institutions, create a group of (not necessarily representative) 'insiders' and threaten the independence of civil society.

4 Depicted NGOs as additional channels for financing, capacity-building and delivery and as innovative change agents, willing to test new ideas.

However, controversy surrounds the extent to which the Government should guide development funding, especially for NGOs. It seemed that the RDP Office might become a clearing house for donor funds - purportedly to ensure synergy in support of RDP objectives. Jay Naidoo has now made it clear that this is not his intention, but many NGOs remain concerned about the autonomy of their relationships with donors. Donors have been ambivalent.

5 Made the role of donors an issue.

Donor agencies often relieve pressure on government by supporting delivery priorities and institutional and policy development. The RDP Office and Department of Finance have attempted to systematise their relationships with donors. However, controversy surrounds the extent to which the Government should guide development funding, especially for NGOs. Donors have been ambivalent.

6 The way forward.

The RDP can be a success if:

- It genuinely becomes the flagship of government as a whole. The perception that the RDP Office is responsible for the RDP is still too strong. Despite some progress, departments and lower tiers of government are neither sufficiently aligned nor have they all accepted full ownership of the RDP. In addressing this, the RDP Office should remain graduate, but it is also time that stubborn civil servants be made to realise that the RDP has voter support and they simply have to implement it.

- The RDP is openly debated and challenged, instead of becoming an unchallengeable gospel. In this way, topics and issues will receive due attention and the nation will feel more secure that the need for the policy is being tested and remains under scrutiny. Precious and necessary as the RDP might be, it is a policy framework. In contrast, democracy is a value system. The former is negotiable, the latter not.

- The political and implementing role of different levels of government are properly delineated and recognised. Lower tiers will not easily accept political ownership of a programme they did not politically conceive. They should therefore not only be the 'arms and legs' of the RDP, but should also be part of the brain power. Systematic and clear intergovernmental relations are fiscally and institutionally vital.

- Sectoral arrangements are clarified to enable roleplayers to define their roles and commit their resources to the RDP in complementary ways and in terms of clear investment criteria.

- Partnerships assume real meaning with different roleplayers committing resources - whether they be financial, technical or political - to the RDP.

- The right things are done at the right time and for the right reasons. There should always be a short term plan and a long term one, probably proceeding at the same time. Delivery should start because needs are so vast, yet policy and institutional changes are preconditions for sustainable delivery.

- Principle and practice are clearly distinguished. The toolkit to make the RDP happen should be assessed continually. The reformed budgetary process, the RDP Fund, strategies and all other means supposed to ensure implementation and planning of the RDP should be seen as instruments, open to change if alternatives arise.

Together, these approaches should ensure that the RDP is well planned and effectively implemented.
A host of problems are holding up housing delivery in South Africa. They include bureaucratic logjams resulting from government restructuring, long winded plan approval procedures and land availability agreements, local government transition, land tenure problems, unavailability of finance, lack of institutions and problems with local builders. But the key problem is a housing policy underpinned by conflicting principles included to fudge differences between the key stakeholders.

South Africa's new Housing Subsidy Scheme - now into its second year - has entered a critical phase in demonstrating its ability to succeed. The first year, while it may have seemed a failure with respect to on the ground delivery, produced a significant number of milestones in moving the policy beyond simply being a vision and a strategy.

- Government housing institutions were restructured in line with the Interim Constitution.
- The Provincial Housing Boards (PHBs) awarded more than 150,000 subsidies.
- A housing accord was signed by key stakeholders.
- A White Paper on housing was written.
- The logjam over a mortgage indemnity scheme, designed to bring banks back into the low income housing market, was finally broken by an interim agreement with the building industry.
- The National Housing Forum (NHF) and National Housing Board (NHB) restructured themselves in line with new realities.

While the resolution of outstanding elements of the policy have dragged on into the second year, the lack of significant housing delivery this year - fewer than 12,000 housing units have materialised - indicates a need to scrutinise both the new policy and its implementation carefully.

The first section of this article will briefly describe the first year's progress, focusing on behind the scenes activity that took place in the housing sector to develop the necessary programmes to ensure implementation of the scheme.

The second section will take a closer look at the views of the implementors and deliverers of the policy with respect to whether the policy is 'imploding' - as is currently being reported in the press - or if it is simply a matter of 'teething problems' slowing down delivery.
Finally, the article offers an analysis of what the key problem may in fact be with respect to the lack of housing delivery.

**Year one**

On the face of it, the housing programme made little progress during its first year in operation. But a closer look reveals that it was in fact a year of significant behind the scenes housing activity. For example, housing institutions were restructured in line with the Interim Constitution.

The Housing Arrangements Act passed in September 1993, which replaced racial housing departments with a single National Housing Board (NHB) and four Regional Housing Boards (RHBs), was amended in July 1994 to replace the four RHBs with nine Provincial Housing Boards (PHBs) and provide for the extension of the Housing Subsidy Scheme into the former homelands.

This rationalisation and restructuring of the housing sector was necessary to achieve a more efficient allocation of state resources. Other significant accomplishments were the adoption of a National Housing Accord at Botshabelo and a White Paper on housing towards the end of 1994. In August, 1994, then Minister of Housing, Joe Slovo, outlined the Government's thinking on white papers.

He noted that in the past white papers came down from 'on high'. This time, the Government intended engaging with the housing constituencies before its release. A process was therefore put in place to negotiate the details of a white paper.

While the details of the white paper were incomplete when the Housing Summit in Botshabelo was held, Slovo had by then mobilised stakeholders to support a 'sustainable housing process'. Shortly after the summit, he completed his task and presented a housing White Paper to the cabinet.

Even with the publication of the White Paper, much work remained to be done on the details of the housing programme that would give content to the agreed strategy. For example, even though much of the groundwork with the banks - necessary to rekindle the availability of end user finance - had been completed, there were outstanding issues surrounding builders' defect warranties which needed to be ironed out.

From the outset, banks had made it clear that they would not re-enter the low cost market without the warranty, since they claimed they were often singled out by irate home buyers when defects surfaced in their houses. Unable to locate unscrupulous builders, new owners would shift their anger to banks by withholding bond repayments.

Just prior to the summit, Minister Slovo cracked a deal - although the final agreement was months away - with the Association of Mortgage Lenders in which the Government committed itself to persuading residents to abandon boycotts, and mortgage lenders agreed to return to the low income market provided the building industry agreed to a product defect warranty.

The last significant accomplishment during the first year was the restructuring of the National Housing Forum and the National Housing Board. The housing summit and the completion of the White Paper brought to an end an effective era in housing policy making. For more than two years, the NHF had been taking the lead in the policy process.

Shortly after the summit it was announced that the NHB would be restructured into a statutory body to advise the Department of Housing on national policy. The new NHB would be made up of 18 representatives of civil society and government, who together would formulate housing policy, then being handled by the NHF and the Department of Housing through joint technical committees.

This move reflected the fact that with the political transition complete, it was no longer necessary to have an 'interim' body in place to formulate housing policy.

One year down the road, the money was there, the vision and strategy were in place and many, but not all, structures and programmes were falling into position.

**Year two**

Notwithstanding the achievements in the first year, by the end of 1995 it was clear that the new Housing Subsidy Scheme was running into severe problems on the ground.

Articles continually appeared in the press describing problems around, for example,
lack of political commitment to the incremental housing policy, rejection of the policy by the beneficiaries, bureaucratic logjams and so on.

Research conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies midway through the year tried to determine what the logjams really are.

Contrary to what was expected, in interviews carried out with the implementors of the policy, the Members of the Executive Committees for Local Government and Housing, and the Provincial Housing Board Chairmen, around their commitment to the 'incremental housing policy', six of the nine MECs expressed general acceptance of the need for breadth over depth.

The 'broader versus deeper debate' has been between those who say housing must reach as many people as possible, which inevitably means everyone gets less, and those who say policy should provide for a four room house, even if it means fewer benefits. It was surprising to find that the broader view has the upper hand.

Some of the comments included:

"The policy is basically good...its formulation mobilised many sectors and that is a major achievement."

"It is better if more people get something if it enables them to live."

But while there appears to be a degree of acceptance of the new policy, it is clearly the case that provinces are regularly ignoring the national policy, modifying it by adding further resources, such as serviced land, to increase the subsidy amount.

The dissenting views argued that the subsidy amount is insufficient, for example:

"Government made promises about housing. It now needs to deliver on them. The subsidy will therefore have to be increased."

The interviews suggest that the 'consensus' on policy is not as deep as it seems. They also revealed a further message. The policy

By the end of 1995 the new Housing Subsidy Scheme was running into severe problems
The policy is riddled with 'teething problems' that are the real reasons for bottlenecks.

Further research carried out with developers has reinforced this perspective. For example, social compacts—agreements between the 'community', the developer and other stakeholders to ensure participation in the housing process—often fall apart at the 11th hour, causing delays and cost overruns.

Bureaucratic logjams, resulting from the restructuring of former provinces and homelands into nine new provinces, have still not been fully resolved. Approval of layout plans, the opening of township registers, land availability agreements and so on—long winded processes at the best of times—are taking longer because of bureaucratic delays resulting from local government transition.

Unresolved rural land tenure issues, the unavailability of end user finance, the need for bridging finance for developers, a lack of institutions and sources of funding to carry out bulk infrastructure provision, increasing prices of building materials, problems with organising local builders—the list is endless.

But what do all these problems mean?

**Conclusion**

In examining the evidence surrounding the failure to deliver houses, there seems to be something more than 'endless problems' impeding delivery.

The key problem is that the housing policy is underpinned by conflicting principles. Immediate and visible delivery, community participation, developer driven housing, economic empowerment of communities and so on seem to clash when put into practice.

For example, immediate and visible delivery does not meld well with economically empowering communities, as the latter relies on unskilled and inexperienced small builders. Developer driven delivery does not sit well with the need for full community participation, as time consuming consultation tends to erode profits.

Incrementalism, by its nature, implies that low income households will be looking to find more resources to improve their housing situation. But bailing subsidies from other (than national) government sources (double subsidies) eliminates a potential avenue of assistance.

How did we get into this situation? The new policy, we need to recall, is the result of lengthy negotiation between the National Housing Forum, a multi-party negotiating body, and government.

The Forum not only saw itself as a vehicle for negotiating a housing policy and strategy, but as a mechanism for eliciting consensus among key groups. This was essential, given that housing comprises organised interests whose support for policy is essential if it is to be implementable.

Consensus can be achieved either by hard bargaining during which parties settle for 'second best', or by fudging vital differences between them. The housing agreement, it seems, was achieved at least partly by the second route: by including conflicting principles and priorities in order to ensure that each key interest endorsed the agreed policy.

Nearly two years after the policy's launch, it may be necessary to stop and examine whether hard won consensus is the real reason behind the lack of housing delivery.

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### HIGH-LEVEL AND MIDDLE-LEVEL MANPOWER ACCORDING TO OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS

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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>296,444</td>
<td>220,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>643,228</td>
<td>466,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>880,051</td>
<td>566,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>829,669</td>
<td>569,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NUMBER OF PUPILS AND STUDENTS BY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Colleges of Education</th>
<th>Technical Colleges</th>
<th>Technikons</th>
<th>Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,291 221</td>
<td>22,943</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>82,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,497 780</td>
<td>34,506</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>152,346</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>6,250 866</td>
<td>40,286</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>211,736</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,564 486</td>
<td>60,034</td>
<td>72,174</td>
<td>83,424</td>
<td>259,910</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8,374 584</td>
<td>57,076</td>
<td>89,933</td>
<td>113,970</td>
<td>319,044</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9,007 199</td>
<td>65,877</td>
<td>91,974</td>
<td>147,391</td>
<td>337,573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who will fill the gap?

Sanlam have for years been quietly funding tertiary education in our country.

Providing improvements to buildings, purchasing new and more advanced equipment... and, most recently, helping struggling libraries.

It's all part of our philosophy—that assisting higher education is one of the best ways of assuring all our tomorrows.

Sanlam
Assuring your tomorrow
For some!
The idea of a formal role for civil society in development has become a sacred cow, with any challenge to it seen as authoritarian or anti-democratic. But elevating often self-appointed organs of civil society to positions in which they have de facto veto rights is to give them the authority of elected bodies without the concomitant accountability, and to allow them to hamstring development while taking no responsibility for delivery.

South Africa has a well documented history of imposing development on impoverished and marginalised communities with greater regard for political ideology than for their real needs and aspirations.

I think, therefore, that the perspective that beneficiaries of a development initiative should be enabled to participate effectively in its planning, together with the view that development has something to do with the development of people as well as roads and sewers, has been hard won by disadvantaged communities.

These underpinnings of what has come to be known as a developmental approach – which is that beneficiaries should participate effectively in decision making and that development has a human as well as a physical dimension – now seem to act as a bulwark against the potential for inappropriate or actively damaging interventions.

It is in this light that the notion of a role for civil society has emerged, with processes of community empowerment and capacity building seen as key requirements for successful development.

I think the rather unnerving realisation – certainly for me – that community leaders, government officials and professionals alike were all beginning to champion this approach, has led to some questioning of its basic premise.

The challenge is appropriate, certainly at the local level, if for no other reason that the notion of a role for civil society has become something of a sacred cow, with any challenge to it seen as necessarily authoritarian or anti-democratic.

This article argues that elevating the organs of civil society, which it must be remembered certainly at the local level are often largely self appointed, to positions where they have de facto veto rights, is to permit such structures to borrow authority from elected bodies without being required to carry any of the concomitant accountability for progress in development initiatives.

The argument does not seek to relegate the importance of civil society participation, but rather is an attempt to move towards a clearer definition of the roles of local government and civil society in development, and a less woolly view of community empowerment and capacity building.

Competing interests
The basis of the argument for a central role for civil society and local development
The notion of a conflict free beneficiary community is now thankfully treated with some scepticism. Structures have a veto right without any sense of joint responsibility in the solutions.

It is interesting to note that the organs of civil society that frequently present this argument are the same organs that are most likely to hold themselves up as the sole and legitimate civil society representatives of the community. The notion of a harmonious, conflict free beneficiary community with a uniform set of needs and interests represented by a single organisation, which has so often asserted itself in the past, is now thankfully treated with some scepticism. It is increasingly recognised that communities more often reflect division in competing interests than they do harmony and common purpose.

However, if we agree in principle that citizens, whether unified or divided, should participate in local development planning, the obvious question becomes: how do we facilitate that participation? Unfortunately, the dominant mechanisms developed in an attempt to enable development planners to get to grips with the views of civil society at the local level will reflect a perception of civil society interests as somewhat monolithic. This perception is reflected in the tendency to bring groups together into single forum type structures, although this has been explained as an attempt to coordinate and streamline a process that could become extremely unwieldy.

In essence, what is attempted is an application of corporatist arrangements in the local context among partners who have no power to bind their constituencies and have demonstrated that they do not have the power to bind their conscriptees, which is exactly why they become such immobilising forces at the local level.

Not so democratic

Often, rather than facilitating coordination among diverse interests, community structures have demonstrated a tendency to become quite authoritarian gatekeepers.

These structures accord with definitions of organs of civil society in the sense that they wish to engage with the state without taking it over. But in many instances local development forums nonetheless become alternative power bases to elected structures of local government, representing particular interests in a given community. They have the power to hamstring all development initiatives with no real accountability for delivery and, most importantly, no effective mechanism to unseat them should the community wish to do so.

The most important thing, from my own experience, is that the civil society structures have a veto right without any sense of joint responsibility in the determination of local solutions. Very often developers, planners or local government are told to go away and ‘do it again’, because people do not like what has been done: there is no real sense of co-responsibility.

Even if community structures are models of democratic restraint, the type of structure invariably results in a situation in which particular groups land up playing a role in decisions around which they may have little expertise or even little real interest. A key part of the way in which such structures, social compacts, community development forums, local development forums and the like are set up, is that they reflect the view that participation is an all or nothing affair.

Even if one was to accept that such structures are an effective and desirable way of facilitating civil society participation and development initiatives, the fact that the right to participate is claimed in such a crude and ill defined way is part of the reason for the immobilising role that forums so often play in development processes.

Social compacts

A hypothesis worth testing is that the defining feature of social compacts that work – and I am led to believe that there are some that work – as opposed to those that flounder in perpetual stalemate, is the degree to which the contract between stakeholders reflects something more than a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ statement about the worthiness and importance of participation by the community.

It should be remembered that in the past, broad based organisations of civil society emerged organically from a process of...
people centred rules and there are no formulas in this development has resulted in the amplification of differences and particular interests. This is an entirely healthy and desirable situation.

But it seems strange, then, that the platform offered to civil society in the local development process uniformly requires that such organisations join together to speak with one voice. By making consensus a prerequisite to being heard, we are compelling the heterogeneous force called civil society into a position in which there are three likely outcomes:

The first is that powerful interests will hijack the process and impose a consensus that does not factually exist. The second is that civil society interests are forced to return to an adversarial and oppositional relationship, with local government as the common enemy necessary to create unity. And the third is that such structures will be coopted by the state as a delivery agent in service of predetermined goals and objectives.

Key among the difficulties with the mechanisms through which organisations of civil society are now invited to participate in the development process, is that they lead to an artificial recreation of the types of structures that emerged organically through the apartheid era.

The broad movement to reject and immobilise the system of black local authorities, for example, was not facilitated by anybody. It emerged from the somewhat intangible relationship between government, however illegitimate at the time, and the governed: a relationship with its own momentum that produced appropriate responses to fit the times.

The crux of my argument is that there are no rules and there are no formulas in this process. In essence, people centred development is about the way in which we structure government at whatever level and not about our attempts to structure civil society.

At the local level we have an obligation to ensure that local government understands that a crucial part of its role is to create accessible communication pathways between it and any structure of civil society that chooses to use those pathways. It is not local government’s role to attempt to herd organisations into a forum for bureaucratic convenience.

**Local government**

The move towards local government as the engine for development offers a spectrum of opportunities. A particular benefit emerges from the reality that the relationship between local government and its consumers is very clear and direct.

Ideally, the relationship is one in which a spectrum of services are provided to a community of consumers. On this basis it becomes nothing more than intelligent practice for local government – or any development agency – to provide a high quality service that meets the needs of its consumers.

Any structures or mechanisms set up should be nothing more than a vehicle through which local authorities identify needs, develop and communicate programmes in service of those needs, and monitor performance in meeting them.

In terms of this model, the existence of organisations of civil society, no matter how they choose to structure themselves, does not mean that the local authority can or should abdicate any of its roles and responsibilities.

This should be emphasised because I believe that one of the unintended outcomes of the emphasis on institutionalising the role between civil society and local government has been that it has given local government the right to abdicate its responsibilities. To simply say, “we are waiting for the local development forum to decide”, is a situation in which many people in the bureaucracy have very little interest in serving the needs of the vast majority of their constituents, this gives them an enormous out, and this should be avoided.

The structures that need to be created, then, are those which enable consumers (citizens) to air their needs, complaints and problems so that the people delivering services are able to improve the services they provide.
It is recognised, however, that communities are mistrustful of the democratic process and have a long history of being without adequate services. There are also unequal power relationships, because of capacity problems in civil society, between government and civil society.

**Building civil society**

But what should be recognised is that building capacity in civil society does not necessarily presuppose that relationships between civil society and representative government first have to be institutionalised. On the contrary, as Maxine Reitzes has pointed out, delivery is one highly effective way of building a robust civil society.

It is also important that structures which are established do not operate on the assumption that democracy at the local level will inevitably fail. Progress will not be served by confusing or blurring the roles of civil society and government structures. In the end, the clarification of roles is to a large degree what the current debate is about.

In particular, local authorities and developers need to perceive that the citizen – not the funding authority or the province or the national Reconstruction and Development Programme – is the client. This is a crucial role definition that is about transforming the way in which local government perceives itself.

The mechanism with which communication between communities and service providers takes place may be highly sophisticated, but each party to the communication has both the right and the responsibility to decide how they are going to engage, and the mechanisms need to emerge organically.

Attempts to impose a protocol or recipe to facilitate interaction may be tempting and give a warm feeling to all concerned, while simultaneously satisfying the bureaucratic need for order, uniformity and predictability. But it will not achieve the desired result.

Empowerment and capacity building in this context are largely activities that enable each stakeholder to clarify their role and acquire the skills necessary to execute that role. In this sense, empowerment is not broad and embracing but rather a relatively narrow process that is clearly defined and relatively easily measured.

It is my strong view that if stakeholders understand their role as a given time within a given interaction, and have the skills to execute that role and appropriate expectations of the role of other stakeholders, they will find an effective way of engaging with one another, and without the expertise that consultants provide to the process.

**Experience**

Reflecting on practical experience, two recent incidents have reinforced my view of the impossibility and undesirability of attempting to apply formulae to the role of civil society in development.

In one project in which I am involved, it was reported that a large and seemingly amorphous group of women had marched on a local police station to complain of perceived police inactivity in addressing crime.

The response of the project team, which included the security establishment, was essentially one of irritation that the group had failed to use the elaborate mechanisms that had been established by various organs of government to institutionalise their relationship with civil society.

Among the resolutions was one which duly recorded that the use of appropriate channels would be encouraged in future. It occurred to me that the least likely reason for the group of women not using the channels was that they did not know about them.

The second example draws on my own experience as a member of ‘civil society’, and has to do with plans to desecrate Zoo Lake by constructing a shopping centre. The grounds swell of outrage by ordinary citizens that greeted the proposal took everyone by surprise.

It cuts across traditional boundaries of race, gender, class, geographical location and political allegiance – in fact, every category that might have defined how government could structure relationships with civil society. It emerged organically, and developed a structure and strategy all of its own. It is entirely autonomous, and once the issue is resolved it will dissipate.

And so it should, because that is the nature of civil society.
Planning for AIDS
HIV/AIDS and Town and Regional Planning

By Alan Whiteside
Economic Research Unit
University of Natal

More than a million people in KwaZulu-Natal could have AIDS by the year 2011, according to projections by the Economic Research Unit. Clearly AIDS will have a devastating impact on the province's social and economic well being. The epidemic will alter the demand and supply of services and the ability of people to pay for them, and planners need to build these factors into their plans.

The election of the new government in South Africa in 1994 brought many changes to the country. For the majority of people it brought hope and, indeed, one of the planks of the African National Congress (ANC) platform is to improve the lot of the poor. This means providing services, particularly education, housing and health.

The challenge is two-fold: firstly, services have to be provided to people and this means building homes, providing clinics, and developing new schools. Secondly, services have to be paid for — the State simply cannot afford to provide them free. As a result, there is not only emphasis on providing services, but also on people taking responsibility and paying what they can afford for them.

The spread of HIV and AIDS has the potential to derail some of the development taking place. It is ironic that the disease should be spreading most rapidly at the time when there is much reason for optimism.

Furthermore, HIV/AIDS is an issue that has been noted as a problem, but outside of the health providers, nobody seems to take it terribly seriously. Part of the reason is that people find it difficult to respond to a problem unless they have some idea of what solutions there are.

With HIV and AIDS the experts in the field have, in the past, been guilty of failing to provide the solutions. This is not good enough — the HIV epidemic is a reality in South Africa, the AIDS epidemic soon will be.

Planners need to take cognisance of the epidemic and build it into their plans. The epidemic will alter the demand and supply of services and the ability of people to pay.

Planning Commission
The first attempt to address the issue of HIV and AIDS by planners took place in November 1994, when the Town and Regional Planning Commission of KwaZulu-Natal signed a contract with the Economic Research Unit (ERU) at the University of Natal for a study of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the province. The aims and objectives of the project were to:

- Assess Commission activities and structures to determine where HIV and AIDS would be of importance.

The spread of HIV and AIDS has the potential to derail development.

Outside of the health providers, nobody seems to take HIV/AIDS seriously.
AIDS will change the speed of population growth and its structure.

- Assess the current status of the epidemic in the province.
- Provide projections of the increase in HIV and AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal.
- Assess the demographic, social and economic impact and their implications for the planning process.

### Table 1: HIV in South Africa 1990-1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>9.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIS (not Kwazulu)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei (North-East)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA (ex. Transkei)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Specimens were recorded and reported according to the provincial demarcations of pre-election South Africa.

Source: Swanevelder R (1994) page 71

### HIV/AIDS in context

The situation with regard to HIV and AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal is extremely worrying. This province is the worst affected in South Africa.

The key features of the disease are:
- The majority of people affected are young adults; the disease is sexually transmitted and, as a result, it infects people in their twenties and thirties; and HIV is predominantly transmitted through body fluids through sexual intercourse and blood and blood products.

### Planning and HIV

The first task was to establish how HIV/AIDS would affect planners. Town and regional planning aims to manage elements within the social, economic, institutional and physical environments; achieve a sustainable and optimal living environment; and create maximum opportunity for realisation of human needs.

The study identified three main ways in which the epidemic will impact on the planning process. They are:

- Demographics. AIDS will change the speed of population growth and its structure.
- The demand and supply of services. The epidemic will affect the demand for certain services due to the changing demographic profile and increases in morbidity and mortality.
- The impact on the economic environment. AIDS will have an effect on the economy, initially at the microeconomic level (household income will be adversely affected), and later at the national economic level. Here, a worst case scenario will see a reduction in the growth of the national or geographic product.

### HIV/AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal

The current HIV data was used to project the increase in numbers of people who are sick or dying as well as the total population. The projected HIV prevalence in KwaZulu-Natal and projected number of people infected are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The effect on the total annual death rate is shown in Figure 3, while the effect on population is illustrated in Figure 4. The summary indicators are illustrated in Table 3.

### Table 2: AIDS data in South Africa

Reported AIDS case totals by province and year, as at February 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>82-86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>1 609</td>
<td>3 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopani</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1 854</td>
<td>2 923</td>
<td>6 610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Epidemiological Commentary 23(2) February 1996.
The implications

The population of the province will continue to grow as is illustrated in Table 4. This is important to note, as it puts paid to ill-informed views that 'AIDS will solve the population problem' or that fewer facilities are required.

The structure of the population will also change, with a rise in mortality in the under five year age group and the 25 to 40 year age group. This will affect the size of the labour force, the availability of skills, the dependency ratio, household size and structure, and incomes.

There will be a marked and significant rise in the demand for health and social services, notably health care and care of orphans.

Impact on services

AIDS will reduce the projected population, but this effect will only be felt towards the year 2000.

The present provision of services such as health, housing, education and infrastructure is constrained by supply rather than demand and there is a huge backlog. This means that the HIV epidemic should not reduce the speed with which services are provided or new housing is planned.

The epidemic does have implications for the type of household requiring services and their ability to pay for such services. The bulk of cases will be in the poorer socio-economic groups which currently have the fewest services and the least ability to purchase them.

Planners operate with socio-economic data, and the AIDS epidemic will alter underlying assumptions concerning the structure, size and wealth of households. For example, primary schools are normally provided with one primary school for every 450 to 550 housing units.

Table 4: Population projections for KwaZulu-Natal ('000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Without AIDS</th>
<th>With AIDS (Projection 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3 779 4 176</td>
<td>7 955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4 385 4 719</td>
<td>9 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5 024 5 312</td>
<td>10 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5 679 5 920</td>
<td>11 599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6 386 6 991</td>
<td>13 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7 155 7 725</td>
<td>14 880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One cost-effective and compassionate source of care for patients who are terminally ill is the hospice movement. The "low technology" used means that ordinary houses can be adapted for hospice care and local authorities could be urged to be sympathetic to changes in use from housing to hospices.

A rather more macabre impact will be on the provision of cemeteries. Cemetery space will not have to increase in size as the demand will not increase in absolute numbers - each consumer will consume one space once - but they will have to be provided sooner than would have been the case due to the increase in mortality among people who would not normally have been occupying plots for several decades.

**Conclusion**

In order to assess the implications and the actions that town and regional planners can take, a table was developed setting out the effects of the epidemic, the indicators that planners should look for and the actions that they could take.

The issue is extremely complex and there are some overriding guidelines:

- Assumptions underlying the planning process about population size, structure and growth must change to take account of the epidemic.
- Assumptions about household income and expenditure, and the ability to pay for housing and services, must be re-examined in the light of the epidemic.
- The demand for health and social services will change, and planners should liaise with the relevant departments to assess how these changes will be met.
- The fundamental importance of prevention should be constantly emphasised.
- Planning for the epidemic is better than reacting to it.
- Planning should be innovative and geared to helping people cope with the consequences of the epidemic.

It is clear that AIDS will have an adverse effect on KwaZulu-Natal, on its social and
### Table 5: The implications of HIV and AIDS for planning in KwaZulu-Natal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Action for Planners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Demographic</td>
<td>Slowing of population growth</td>
<td>Fewer births, higher mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changing structure</td>
<td>Higher mortality in 15-39 year group and higher infant mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Demand for services</td>
<td>Decline in school entrants</td>
<td>Enrolment rates decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in health care needs</td>
<td>More patients at clinics, hospitals and hospices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased mortality</td>
<td>More deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased dependency ratio (elderly, orphans)</td>
<td>Adult deaths, increase in orphans and destitute elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing needs</td>
<td>Declining rate of population growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to pay</td>
<td>Changes in household income and expenditure patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- Provincial/national environment</td>
<td>Variable sub-regional vulnerability</td>
<td>Increased HIV seroprevalence, high number of AIDS cases, mobility, poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in economic growth rates</td>
<td>Decline in savings and investment, increased mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demand for services coasts with decreased ability to pay</td>
<td>Increased demand on state donor funds, with an increase in donor dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development projects</td>
<td>AIDS spread speeded by project, project made less viable by AIDS</td>
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<td>Provincial socio-political environment</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal seen as 'plague' province</td>
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**Economic well being.** Responding to it requires a new way of thinking.

However, what is certain is that the epidemic does need to be addressed and no planner should ever submit a document which mentions AIDS as 'a wild card' again.

**Acknowledgements**

The study was carried out by Alan Whiteside and Nick Wilkins, both of the Economic Research Unit, and Barbara Mason and Mr Greg Wood, both of Mason and Wood. The report titled 'The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Planning Issues in KwaZulu-Natal' was published by the Town and Regional Planning Commission in October 1995, and is available from the Commission for R18.00. Address: Private Bag X9038, Pietermaritzburg 3200, KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. The projections were carried out by Greg Wood of Mason & Wood using three public domain software programmes, namely Epimodel, Demproj III, and the AIDS Impact model.

**Planning for the epidemic is better than reacting to it.**
Aids and the Highways
Sex Workers and Truck Drivers in KwaZulu-Natal

By Tessa Marcus, Karen Oellermann and Nonceba Levin
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Commercial sex workers and long distance truck drivers have been identified as core groups in the spread of HIV and AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal. There is an urgent need for a multi-faced prevention and education intervention aimed at containing the spread of the disease in the long term and at supporting its victims.

Globally, there are an estimated 19.5 to 26 million people who are HIV positive.

The need for an AIDS prevention and education intervention with long distance truckers, commercial sex workers and other vulnerable groups has been recognised by the Government. Minister of Health, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, describes the National AIDS Plan as having three objectives:

"The first is to prevent the spread of the epidemic. This will be done by promoting safer sexual behaviour, ensuring the adequate provision of condoms and controlling sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Education programmes will be directed at schools, vulnerable groups – including truck drivers – and the community at large."

(Fleetwatch 1994)

The other two objectives are related to the reduction of the personal and social impact of HIV/AIDS and the mobilisation and unification of resources to prevent and reduce the impact of the disease.

The study on which this article is based was commissioned by ATICC (Natal Midlands)/AMREF to help develop a sustainable intervention with commercial sex workers and long distance truck drivers living or passing through the midlands of KwaZulu-Natal. Information was gathered through a literature review, observation, mapping, questionnaires, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and participant observation.

The AIDS epidemic
Globally, there are an estimated 19.5 to 26 million people who are HIV positive, of whom 11 to 17 million live in sub-Saharan Africa. The number of full blown AIDS cases is recorded by the World Health Organisation as being over one million in 1995, although given under reporting this figure is likely to be closer to 4.5 million.

In South Africa, there are an estimated 1.2 million people who are HIV positive, with around 700 new infections occurring every day and 7 000 cases of AIDS reported.

HIV and AIDS were first manifest among white homosexual and bisexual males in 1982. Within four years, heterosexual contact had become the dominant route of HIV transmission. The male to female ratio is 0.73:1 and the doubling time is 15.4 months. Most HIV infected people are 15 to 35 years, with infection in women tending to occur at a younger age than in men.

In Africa, the epidemic has been compounded by economic and social conditions such as unemployment, malnutrition, illiteracy, widespread poverty, the low status of women and poor access to adequate health services – conditions typical for South Africa’s black population.

In South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal has the highest prevalence of HIV infection. A survey of antenatal clinics in November...
1994, for example, showed the prevalence of HIV infection was 14.35%, compared to 7.57% for the country as a whole (Table 1). At King Edward VIII Hospital, the sero-prevalence rate among antenatal clients had risen to 21% by February 1995, and the figures from STD clinics show infection rates approaching 45%.

There are a number of features which might contribute to the province’s high incidence of infection. They include population movement and dislocation across international boundaries due to war, protracted endemic violence, large numbers of migrant workers, the long distance trucking routes, an international port, a low rate of male circumcision and other factors associated with poverty.

It is clear that globally, nationally and within the province there are cogent reasons for social action to prevent the further spread of HIV and AIDS and to support those people who are already directly or indirectly affected by it.

Core Groups

Commercial sex workers and long distance truck drivers have been identified as core groups in the spread of the disease. This is a convenient and functional concept for public health policy as it legitimizes the ‘targeting of limited resources to groups that are most critical for transmission’ (Mann et al. 1992).

However, the concept of core groups does not account for how social relations actually work, and can impact negatively on the success of an intervention. This is evident in interventions which have promoted increased condom usage with clients but have failed to address the issues of non-paying partners.

Sex and poverty

The general conditions which stimulate commercial sex work arise from the structural inequality between women and men, and are most often driven by conditions of poverty as well as a demand for the service.

In Pietermaritzburg, commercial sex workers interviewed all indicated that sex work was a survival strategy. Most of them were mothers, either never married or divorced. They did not like sleeping with different men. Many sporadically looked for work to take them off the streets, and only returned to commercial sex when in need of money. Others engaged in informal sector activities, and sold sex if it was asked for.

Poverty is the overriding pressure pushing people into commercial sex work. Poverty in South Africa is endemic and is not likely to be overcome quickly or universally, which suggests that sex work is likely to remain a source of livelihood for many for a long time to come.

Mobility

Physical mobility is a general characteristic of commercial sex work. In developing regions sex workers are frequently mobile, they often come from rural areas to work in unfamiliar urban settings (Celentano et al. 1994) and there is generally a high turnover rate (Sawanpanyalert et al. 1994).

In addition to transnational and inter-regional migration, sex workers are also mobile between and in towns for work purposes, as well as between their work settings and homes. Mobility is also affected by client preferences. Servicing truckers often means travelling with them and beyond the region or even the country.

As an important feature of sex work, mobility has significant implications for the spread of the disease as well as the planning of interventions.

The law

Whether commercialised sex is legal, illegal or unregulated by the law directly affects the social standing and working conditions of people operating in the sector. There is much debate around whether sex work should be legalised or decriminalised.

Experience of legal sex work has been mixed, but among the advantages for sex workers is that they have a measure of protection as part of an institution such as a brothel, a place to work and live, health precautions and facilities to keep clean.
This compares sharply with conditions of street work. Interaction is hurried, covert and exposed. Among the women in Pietermaritzburg, where abuse – the act of giving a guy access to your body in exchange for money – occurs is determined largely by the client and is usually in his vehicle, on open land or in a room. They have no possibility of inspecting and cleaning clients’ genitalia and no immediate access to water to clean themselves.

Where selling sex is illegal, women and men are persecuted by the law. The women in Pietermaritzburg had been arrested, charged, brought to trail and paid fines – between R200 and R500 – or spent time in jail. They also reported entrapment by police.

Illegality further exposes women selling sex to abuse by clients, passing strangers and the police. In Pietermaritzburg, the women reported that clients had beaten them, abandoned them in isolated places, left them naked, thrown them from vehicles or forced them to jump from moving vehicles in order to escape. They also reported being robbed and raped by passing men.

They have no recourse to the law, no support and limited access to services. Their relationship to the health system is problematic, as it is often tied to their contact with the legal system. There is a strong case for the decriminalisation of sex work to establish the basic human rights of sex workers and help in interventions.

The persistence, inevitability and long term nature of the profession needs to be a core assumption of intervention development. It critically affects the degree to which success can be achieved (Pickering et al).

Intervention also has to be developed in a way which empowers them to improve their legal, health and rights status.

**Truck drivers**

In Africa, the spread of AIDS has been linked to the main transport routes through Africa. South Africa is intimately connected to the transnational and international road network and services, with the result that similar routes of social and geographical spread of HIV in the country seem to be developing.

The social transmission route associated with the haulage industry is of particular interest as it links vertically and horizontally through a relatively elite segment of the working class which is skilled, educated and trained. The links go backwards into the families of truckers and sex workers and they move forward through physical mobility onto each new population that truckers pass through.

The consequences of the AIDS epidemic are not only felt by the individuals, but have a direct bearing on a major link in the industrial and service production chain that is integral to economies. Hence, the pertinence of the observation that the disease could be a direct negative bearing on truckers' social mobility and risk taking behaviour evident among long distance truckers.

**Working conditions**

Preliminary findings from a recent parallel study of truck drivers passing through the KwaZulu-Natal midlands (Marcus et al) reveal that truck workers live and work under very hard and pressured conditions. Their work shapes all aspects of their world.

The study found that truck drivers worked an average of 16 hours a day. Their lives were mostly spent on the road, alone. Although most were married, they saw their wives and families infrequently, with many only touching their home base once a month. Some did not even have a home base (Madime cited in Fleetwatch).

Good road conditions mean they cut across South Africa more quickly and frequently than their counterparts in many African countries. Pay and conditions vary, and are a source of considerable grievance.

They lead lives that are hard and lonely. Their work is intensively fatiguing and stressful. The scope to unwind is very limited and centres on women they meet along the way. In short, the working conditions in the road haulage industry have a direct negative bearing on truckers' social lives and are integral to social sexual mobility and risk taking behaviour evident among long distance truckers.

**Knowledge**

This section draws from the survey of truck drivers and the case study of commercial sex workers conducted in the midlands of KwaZulu-Natal to assess and compare their knowledge, attitudes and practices with regard to HIV and AIDS.
Ninety seven percent of long distance truck drivers interviewed indicated that they knew about, or had heard of AIDS. The most important source of information for the drivers was the radio, followed at a distance by the medical profession (a doctor). Only a minority (12%) reported learning about the disease from their sexual partners.

Eighty three percent of truck drivers knew that AIDS is incurable, with only a minority (11%) believing that people could recover from it. Most perceived it as a serious threat to their own health (76%) and to the well being of their families (70%).

This knowledge has practical application for the drivers interviewed indicated that they knew that they would use a condom every time they had sex if they knew that it would protect them from AIDS. At the same time, the fact that 22% did not view AIDS as a threat to their health is cause for concern.

Interviews with sex workers show that the majority of them knew about AIDS but levels of understanding ranged. Most believed that they were vulnerable to AIDS. Significantly, this vulnerability is associated for some with their regular partners, rather than with their clients, reflecting a common practice of not using condoms.

In both studies, there is a knowledge gap, suggesting that education about AIDS probably has to be built in as a continuous component of AIDS education policy.

Testing and practice

A high percentage (46%) of long distance truck drivers interviewed had been tested for HIV, with just over half (50.5%) tested by a private doctor and 35% by their companies.

In sharp contrast, 8.8% of the sample knew of anyone with HIV and nearly half who did described that person as a stranger. A higher percentage indicated that they knew of someone who had died of AIDS (13%). The majority of the sex workers did not know anyone who had died from AIDS.

Clearly, only a minority of the two groups have had direct contact with HIV and AIDS infected people which possibly influences the credibility of the danger of the disease and therefore, actual practices.

When asked about how often they had had sex in the past week, 52% of truckers reported having had sex once and 28% twice in the past week. And when asked how many different people they had had sex with in the past week, at least a quarter had had sex with two different people and 18% with three or more different partners in the last week.

Eighty one percent of long distance truckers stated that they always had penetrative sex, 90% indicated that they do not always use a condom and 67% indicated that they had never used a condom.

Conservatively, this means that 43% of the truckers interviewed are having sexual intercourse with more than one sexual partner, the intercourse is most likely (81%) to be penetrative and it is highly unlikely that they will be using condoms.

For sex workers, knowledge of AIDS does not appear to impact significantly on their practices. Penetrative sex was the commonest sexual activity. The issue of trust and condom use was commonly expressed, and relates to an assumption that it is possible to see an HIV infected person, that somehow they look 'dirty'.

Familiarity with the person - client or sex partner - also influenced women not to use condoms. This highlights the limited effectiveness of interventions around 'core groups', given that their networks and associations extend in a myriad of ways.

There appears to be a general awareness about STDs: 93% of the truck driver sample agreed that there was a connection between having many sex partners and getting STDs. 91% said STDs are bad for health, 28% reported having had an STD and a further 14% indicated that they had had them often.

Institutions and companies

Institutional involvement and capacity was explored through two case studies. The first focused on nine strategically selected health care and social service providers in the Pietermaritzburg and Msunduzi area. The second focused on 11 long haul transport companies.

The major health care providers for most people are state hospitals and clinics. Of the nine selected health-care centres, three hospitals diagnose, treat and care for STDs, AIDS and related diseases. The clinics do the same, but most do not test for HIV.

83% of truck drivers knew that AIDS is incurable. Most perceived it as a serious threat to their health and to the well being of their families.

There is a need for a social compact on AIDS, which mobilises all strata in society.

Working conditions in the road haulage industry are integral to social sexual mobility and risk taking among truckers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The study was conducted by a field team under the guidance of Dr. Tessa Blank and in close collaboration with the Project Smart Manager, ATCC Publishers, Delhi. Special thanks to William Oled of AIDS, St. Martin's Press for help with the computer, and to the staff of the National AIDS Control Organisation, India, for their support.

REFERENCES


A preliminary assessment suggests that the STD, HIV and AIDS units within these policy areas should be under resourced, with a lack of physical space. Staff are few and they are grossly oversubscribed. Most of the sites lacked computers, which impacts negatively on record-keeping, referrals, follow-up and general statistical information.

The general training programme for nurses tends to be specialised and does not include AIDS education and counselling. This is clear in that the main public health care service providers have little capacity to engage in a meaningful way in an intervention with commercial sex workers and long distance truck drivers.

The responses of human resource managers of 11 large cargo hauliers, were instructive. Only three of the companies had a work-based AIDS education programme. The one transport company that did have an AIDS education programme did not have any of the key principles considered necessary for some measure of success in intervention.

Only two of the companies have a formal document on AIDS but neither were exclusively in transport. The rest were too busy and anyway, were not exclusively in transport. The rest were driven by inertia, saying they were waiting for the government to set out guidelines or were 'waiting for things to happen'.

All the human resource managers interviewed indicated some willingness to either support an intervention, or be involved in one. However, some of the organisations contacted indicated that they were too busy and anyway, were not particularly interested in the problems of HIV and their workforce.

Generally, there was an awareness of the AIDS related problems affecting the industry and a tentative indication of commitment to some kind of action. Most of the reservations about intervention centred on the level of commitment that it would demand of the companies. The bottom line was always the immediate cost factor, both in terms of time and actual money.

Service site managers indicated willingness to participate in an intervention 'depending on financial implications' and provided that it was 'practical'. They felt that a condom vending machine would be acceptable and this was the present extent of their commitment to any intervention process.

One of the major problems with both trucking companies and site managers is that they have no vision of the scale that they might play in any intervention. But is evident that they need to be involved.

Conclusion

The nature and the scale of the HIV and AIDS epidemic makes no allowance for any one level of social organisation – be it state, business or civil - to exclude itself or be excluded from efforts to contain its spread and respond to its effects. There is a need for a social compact on AIDS, which mobilises all strata in society to address a common national and international crisis.

For an intervention initiative, such as that envisaged around commercial sex workers and long distance truck drivers in the KwaZulu-Natal midlands, the starting assumption must be that all the relevant parties participate in its development, management and implementation, from the beginning to the end.

Such an approach is likely to ensure that the immediate goals of the intervention are more likely to be achievable. It will ensure that the social and institutional capacity of people to combat the epidemic and engage in their own development.

The intervention needs to be multifaceted and sustained, with a clear understanding of the specific interests in each group can be brought in and actively involved. This requires careful thought around how the specific interests in each group can be brought in and actively involved.

Information and education about AIDS is central to the policy and practice of intervention. The Government is developing a mass communication intervention specifically around condoms. In group interventions an approach which takes into account the beliefs and views of the target people needs to be adopted. The teaching of practical skills is also essential for a successful intervention.

Any intervention has to encourage and support institutional cooperation and development. It also has to engage proactively with the forward and backward linkages of both 'core' groups.

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Responding to the ‘Global Challenge’

By Raphael de Kadt
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How South Africans, individually and collectively, relate to global systems will be crucial to their prospects in many spheres. This raises the question of how centres of teaching and scholarship—especially universities—ought best to respond to this reality. There are important gaps in what our universities do, particularly in the areas of comparative studies, the implications of new technologies and systematic theorisation.

The ‘rehabilitation’ of South Africa as a respected member of the world system of nation states has brought with it new challenges. It has, especially, emphasised the extent to which political and economic isolation made South Africans inward looking.

The turn inwards was, understandably, reinforced by the need to focus intellectual energies on the daunting task of reshaping the domestic polity. Thus, during the apartheid years, the awareness of South Africans of both their country’s global and more immediately regional contexts was diminished.

What has since become clear is that South Africa is indeed an integral part of both a global economy and a global society. This, in turn, has sharpened the sensitivity of South Africans to both the benefits and burdens, the opportunities and responsibilities, that attach to such membership.

How South Africans, individually and collectively, relate to global systems will be crucial to their prospects in many spheres. This raises the question of how South African centres of teaching and scholarship—especially its universities—ought best to respond to this reality.

Nature of universities
At this point I ought to say a little about how I see the distinctive role of universities. Conventionally, universities are referred to as ‘centres of higher learning’ which, on closer analysis means ‘centres of teaching and research’ with the dual task of training ‘elites’ through the transmission of appropriate skills and knowledge, and generating new knowledge and information either for its own sake or to serve some social purpose.

I should like to suggest that universities in the contemporary world should be seen under a further and related aspect. They are, under this aspect, the principal ‘institutions of reflexivity’ in societies.

They arguably constitute the most important intellectual spaces within which the actions and interactions of a multiplicity of different agents are analysed and evaluated. They thus constitute a kind of ‘cerebral space’ of the societal organism, an organ crucial to the steering functions of the society.

However seemingly chaotic, internally fragmented and diverse they may seem, however ‘pandemonic’ their discourses might appear, they probably contain richer networks of dialogic and deliberative...
rationality than any other modern institutions. They are crucial centres of discourse. In this they contribute vitally to the task of mapping the lived environment and defining the perceived reality within which social actors pursue and defend their various ends.

Thus, universities are among the ‘axial’ institutions of modern societies. What they do and how they do it, has substantial implications for the way in which the ambient society functions. The capacity of the society effectively to address its many challenges will turn, in no small measure, on the quality and appropriateness of its universities. Today especially, this ‘reflective’ role of universities includes engagement with the global contexts in which they are situated.

For all that societies have many local concerns and intellectual preoccupations, and for all that these are often best pursued through the marshalling of local resources and the mobilisation of specifically local knowledge, scholarship and intellectual life today are increasingly international.

The ‘informed conversation of humankind’ to which, historically, universities have been host is now a truly global conversation – as anyone who has attended international conferences or published in international journals knows. Thus universities have also become increasingly important in ‘intermediating’ between global and local contexts.

In the light of this, I have decided to identify what appear to me to be some important gaps in what South African universities do. This article is meant merely to be suggestive, to provide a kind of ‘activities list’ of things that might be done or are at least worth thinking about doing. In particular I have focused on issues which are of global significance and which have, or are likely to have, profound local or national implications.

Frameworks of action

It is important to explore the ‘frameworks of action’ within which people in the contemporary world make their choices, negotiate meanings and engage in relationships both cooperative and conflictive. It seems to me that there are three areas in particular that need to be addressed. They overlap somewhat, but for analytical purposes might usefully be separated.

The three areas identified are: comparative civilisation studies, the study of the implications of new technologies for contemporary societies, and the demand for international and systematic engagement with the tasks of theorisation, which I have termed ‘theoretical reconstruction and renewal’.

Each of these is significant in two very specific ways. First, it makes a vital contribution to the creation of informed contexts for decision making. In this it contributes crucially to the fostering of public reason and debate so pivotal to responsible policy formation in democracies. Second, it forces South Africans – and citizens everywhere – to recognise the limits of excessive localism.

Comparative civilisation

The first area is the question of contexts, understood as ‘cultural’ or ‘civilisational’ phenomena. This addresses the issues of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation. There is a sense in which we all now live, as McLuhan famously put it, in a ‘global village’. We are not, however, all equally citizens – or even members – of this village. In a moment of Orwellian disenchantment it could be said that membership for some is more equal than it is for others.

This village, furthermore, defines only part of our field of reference, only one among many contexts or spaces within which people articulate their identities and coordinate their actions. However, it is impossible properly to apprehend our times in a manner that ignores, or is innocent of, this global context. As the late Norbert Elias said in 1987, all sociology has now, of necessity, to be world sociology.

Anthony Giddens recently stressed that among the central concerns of contemporary sociological studies are those of the coordination of action across great distances in space and time. It could be argued that the rhythms and routines of everyday life are increasingly being defined by institutional complexes at the ‘centre’, as opposed to the ‘periphery’, of the global village.

To appreciate precisely how global and regional or local rhythms intersect, and with what implications, requires a comparative perspective.
It is, I think, common cause that comparative studies are very poorly developed in South Africa. It is interesting to note, for instance, that very little attention has been given to Asia. Yet, as Peter Vale pointed out in a recent Weekly Mail and Guardian article, it could be argued that in terms of the global economy the 21st Century might well "belong" to Asia.

Certainly, projections suggest that China and India – as well, of course, as Japan – will become major forces in world affairs in the next century. Europe too is a theatre whose global economic prospects and significance should not be underestimated. Yet even Europe, which is so much better understood in South Africa than Asia, stands in danger of being inadequately studied. And what applies to Asia also applies to the Middle East and Latin America.

The almost total absence of scholarly enterprises in South Africa concerned with exploring these issues is troubling: the absence, for instance, of Sinology or even Indology of a properly established kind leaves South Africans without an appropriate resource system to draw on when confronted with the challenge of reflecting informedly and intelligently on Asia.

How many South African scholars have even a passing acquaintance with, much less a deep and substantial knowledge of, Confucianism? How many have a working knowledge of Mandarin – likely, along with English and perhaps Hindi-Urdu and Spanish to be among the most widely spoken and important languages of the next century? Further dimensions of this will be explored in the next section.

New technologies

It might be argued that the extraordinary technological developments of the post World War era have redefined, on a global scale, the frameworks of human action. Especially important in this regard are developments in biotechnology and information technology. Crucial to the welfare of all contemporary societies is the question of how their individual members and institutions address these new technologies.

The challenges posed by technologies have implications for ethics, culture, politics and economics. They have implications, too, for the very way in which we define and understand contemporary societies. Are the models and metaphors with which we apprehend societies, which mostly had their origins in the ages of scientific and industrial revolutions, still adequate?

Many issues and questions arise in this context. First, it seems clear that new technologies have profoundly altered the relationship between the 'technological disciplines' and the humanities. The juridical questions alone posed by the information and biological technologies make this clear. To take just one example: to whom, if anyone, does one's genetic information belong?

Such questions raise large issues, such as what it means to take seriously the dignity and integrity of the individual human being, and whether the relationship between the public and private spheres is being fundamentally reconfigured.

Clearly, dialogue across Snow's celebrated 'two cultures' is more imperative than ever before: indeed, some developments in the 'natural sciences', technology and the contemporary philosophy of science cast doubt on the very validity of a distinction between these intellectual 'cultures'.

Thus the emergence of an acute environmental awareness reflects the need to inform the development and deployment of new technologies with a consideration of the full range of their implications for human flourishing and the 'lived environment'. The dialogue across such established disciplinary boundaries is insufficiently developed in South African universities.

There are further, and fascinating, questions that flow from a reflection of the relationship between science, technology and culture. These questions have, I shall argue, a crucial bearing on how we interpret and relate to other cultural or civilisational contexts.

Central is the question of how 'homogenising' the technological and organisational dynamics of Western industrial and post-industrial type societies are. Is modernisation a single 'neutral' process, or is it invariably 'culturally inflected', as Charles Taylor recently and provocatively asked? How do different cultures, civilisations and religious world views relate to the phenomena of modernisation, globalisation and the implications of the new technologies?
We need to grasp the extent and depth of the normative crisis of modern societies.

Global inequality is greater than it has ever been, and is growing.

We are witnessing the emergence of an increasingly unified world civilization for which the values, structures and dynamics of Western modernity are more or less paradigmatic. Or, as Taylor suggests, are we witnessing the emergence of multiple and complexly differentiated "modernities"?

If it is the case that "multiple modernities" are emerging, what kinds of civilizations will they constitute? Will they be internally monolithic, or will they display the kind of "value pluralism" supposedly defining Western modernity? How will "Western modernity" relate to them? Are we beginning to witness a clash of competing modern civilizations? The jury may still be out, but there is little doubt that the very questions themselves point to developments of world historical moment.

With respect to new technology, not only do we need to ask how it inflects - and is inflected by - diverse figures of thought: we also need to ask whether these are common issues that, globally, technology has forced people to address, perhaps with a lexicon and theoretical registers that are both new and unavoidably universal.

Specifically, we need to question whether or not the consequences of the revolutions in biotechnology and information sciences have profound implications for the ways in which identities come, globally, to be negotiated and defined. And whether new contexts of action, power and interest are being defined in ways that transcend more established contexts.

Theoretical renewal

It is not accidental that sociological thought has arguably gone through its most creative period since the days of the great "founding fathers". This renewal has been occasioned, in part, by the limitations and inadequacy of earlier perspectives. There is clearly a need for a new "social cartography", for a mapping of the social world that accurately reflects, and provides the basis for plausible interpretations of, the transformed frameworks of action already alluded to.

These developments in sociology have been accompanied by related developments in philosophy and political economy. Old schemes of classification, explanation and justification have been called into question. One obvious instance has been the articulation of various broadly "postmodern" perspectives. But there have been and doubtless will be many others.

Also of fundamental importance is the need fully to grasp the extent of the normative crisis of modern societies. As we approach the end of the millennium, it is clear that much of the promise of the enlightenment - so triumphantly embraced - is still growing. This moral crisis is of global reach. Global inequality is great - it has and, in many respects, is growing.

Irresponsibility in the pursuit of power and profit is rampant and the miracles that new technologies can deliver are miracles only for the relatively rich and privileged.

A situation like this is clearly a recipe for catastrophe. Everywhere there is evidence of disturbing intimations of what Hans Magnus Enzensberger has called "molecular civil wars": wars that turn out to be disastrous for the innocents caught up in them as well, so often, for the politicians who promote them.

Examples can be drawn from many continents, from Los Angeles to Bosnia, from Sri Lanka to Somalia. These are wars that turn on dispossession and injustice, on the mobilisation of resentments that flow from exclusion. They are the squabbles among those who do not occupy Royal Circle seats in the black political theatre of the "late modern age".

The point, however, is that they are an integral part of the seamier yet seamless world system to which I have referred. They can only be understood through an appropriate theoretical enterprise - and it is only through the renewal of moral philosophy and of social, political and economic theory that we can begin properly to respond to and rectify, them.

It is an illusion to believe that South Africa is guaranteed immunity to their influence, however this may express itself. Thus again, to fulfill their reflective tasks, South African universities need to rekindle a much neglected tradition of engaged theoretical and philosophical enquiry. Years of isolation had deleterious consequences for the social sciences seen as moral and theoretical enterprises - not obstructing the many very admirable accomplishments of practitioners in these fields.

Universities need to rekindle a neglected tradition of engaged theoretical and philosophical enquiry.

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