

Ethno-religious citizenship in Nigeria

Ethno-religious fault lines and the truncation of collective resilience of digital citizens: The cases of #ENDSARS and #PantamiMustGo in Nigeria

Ayobami Ojebode, Babatunde Ojebuyi, Oyewole Oladapo and
Marjoke Oosterom

Introduction

Nigeria has the largest number of internet users (about 136 million) in Africa and the sixth largest in the world (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2020). Though not all internet users are ‘digital citizens’ – a term we will unpack later in the chapter – all digital citizens are internet users. Therefore, the large number of internet users gives a hint as to the large number of digital citizens in Nigeria. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with a history of acrimonious politics and events running along its ethno-religious cleavages (Otite 1990). How this ethno-religious multiplicity impacts citizenship and citizen claim-making has been the subject of many studies (Ekeh 1978; Osaghae 1990; Ukiwo 2003; Egwu 2004; Osaghae and Suberu 2005; Çancı and Odukoya 2016). However, the question of whether digital citizenship is also affected by the pressure of these cleavages remains largely unanswered. Sharply divided along the regional lines of North and South and the major ethnic lines of Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, Nigeria presents a good opportunity for exploring the nature of digital citizenship that is produced in an ethno-religiously diverse context.

Digital citizenship has been understood in at least three different ways: being involved in acceptable and ethical conduct in the digital space

(Hollandsworth, Dowdy and Donovan 2011); being able to use and actually using the opportunities for development and growth in the digital space (Choi and Kim 2018); and being active citizens making civic demands and contributions and holding governments accountable using digital technologies (Hintz, Dencik and Wahl-Jorgensen 2017). Digital citizenship studies have proceeded along these lines, examining the presence of ethics and etiquette in online activities, if (and how) educational institutions were fostering digital citizenship and the practice of or obstacles to active digital citizenship from a socio-political perspective.

However, one important aspect of citizenship that has been neglected in the study of digital citizenship in Africa is the place of ethno-religious loyalties and affinities (Ekeh 1975; Ndegwa 1998) in people's enactment of their digital citizenship. Whereas most Africans see themselves as citizens of their countries, their ethnic and religious loyalties often play a strong role in their sense of belonging and experiences of citizenship (Oosterom 2016) – and, consequently, in their expressions of citizenship through social and political action.

Furthermore, ethno-religious fault lines in Africa have been the source of mobilization and different forms of collective action, some of which have been harmful, such as electoral violence and inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence. This debate has not sufficiently been addressed for the digital realm – an important space for expression and for enacting citizenship. The internet and social media are important spaces where people can mobilize for digital action. Digital campaigns and movements constitute one example of mass digital action. While some of these movements promote inclusive citizenship, other forms of action can undermine citizens' unity of purpose in times of digital campaigns or even promote violence.

Such actions run along ethnic or religious divisions or, what we choose to describe as fault lines, do have the tendency to undermine collective citizen action. A fault line is a divisive issue capable of causing negative consequences – a line along which, metaphorically speaking, an eruption could occur. With reference to social and political collective action, fault lines might weaken the ability of citizens to present a united front, thus limiting the efficacy of such actions.

In this chapter, we reflect on the following question: Do ethno-religious fault lines undermine digital citizens' collective resilience by which is meant

their ability to collectively mount pressure for change? We are particularly interested in citizens' ability to muster collective resilience that crosses religious and ethnic fault lines in polarized contexts such as Nigeria. While some studies of digital activism and digital citizenship show that citizens do unite around a cause, mount pressure for change and record some measure of success (Olorunnisola and Martin 2013; Aina et al. 2019); others show that citizens are often so sharply divided that protests are matched with counter-protests (Lee 2018; Beattie, Zhang and Thomas 2020; Colpean 2020). In what situations do digital citizens tend to unite around a common goal and in what situations do they break into opposing factions? To what extent do ethnic-religious unity or divisions determine the effectiveness of collective digital citizenship in Nigeria?

This chapter analyses two protests that involved large-scale digital action: the #ENDSARS movement and #PantamiMustGo protest, analysing Twitter data in both instances. The analysis focused on the extent to which tweets promoted ethno-religious divisions and incited violent action and thus undermined digital citizens' unity or promoted unity of purpose by calling for non-violence and making claims on the state to protect citizen security. We also address the different outcomes of digital action: while the government conceded to #ENDSARS, it made no concessions in the case of #PantamiMustGo.

The case studies: #ENDSARS and #PantamiMustGo

In October 2020, a group of young people began an online protest against the excesses and cruelties of a special unit of the Nigerian police force known as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) (Punch 2020). The movement began online but soon spread offline and became arguably the best organized and focused street protest in Nigeria's (recent) history. The movement's original request was for the government to disband SARS and compensate victims of its brutality. Within a week, the online and offline pressure mounted by protesters forced the government to abolish SARS and to promise wider reforms within the police force (Ayitogo 2020). However, the protest was hijacked by violent hoodlums resulting in deaths and widespread looting and destruction (Daka 2020). The government later deployed armed security personnel to quell the protest at the Lekki Toll Plaza in Lagos, resulting in what the protesters branded

#LekkiMassacre (Samuel 2020). Despite this, #ENDSARS, which trended on Twitter in Nigeria and other countries (*The Guardian* 2020), was an important example of activism that obtained an immediate positive response from the government.

In the second example, in April 2021, an online news outlet published a report accusing Mr Isa Pantami, Nigeria's Minister of Communications and Digital Economy, of support for and affiliation with terrorist Islamist groups. This was picked up by many other outlets and went viral. Videos and audios of Mr Pantami's sermons and speeches in support of the terrorist groups emerged just as did #PantamiMustGo, with citizens calling for his resignation. However, a counter-hashtag and offline group emerged, stating that the campaign against Pantami was anti-North and anti-Islam, and asking all Muslims to rise in support of the minister. #PantamiMustStay thus trended alongside #PantamiMustGo, with each garnering over 100,000 tweets within a few days (Premium Times 2021). Unlike #ENDSARS, #PantamiMustGo did not yield the desired result, as the federal government stood behind the minister and dismissed the protesters as unserious and idle.

Both #ENDSARS and #PantamiMustGo-#PantamiMustStay present an opportunity to explore the nature of digital citizenship in a highly polarized nation and to tease out the obstacles to the collective resilience of digital citizens.

Connecting digital citizenship to collective resilience and security

In this section, we connect the scholarship on digital citizenship to the concept of resilience in critical security studies, which analyses the range of self-protection strategies and social institutions developed by communities to respond to ongoing insecurity and violence and/or its aftermath. Sousa et al. (2013: 247) define community resilience as 'positive collective functioning after experiencing a mass stressor, such as a natural or human-made disaster'. Scholars researching community resilience emphasize social relations, interactions and processes through which resilience develops, highlighting that these are shaped by power dynamics, and that individual and community resilience are entwined (Blewitt and Tilbury 2014; Brown 2016; Vertigans and Gibson 2020).

Vertigans and Gibson's (2020) study with youth in Kenya's largest informal settlement, Kibera (Nairobi), shows how people emphasize their social and reciprocal relationship to neighbours and the wider community, which offers a sense of belonging, pride and hope – important resources for their individual coping. Similarly, a qualitative study in a disadvantaged township in South Africa showed how youth demonstrated a propensity towards altruism and felt a 'strong sense of both individual and community responsibility to transform social conditions' (2020: 252). Specifically, in relation to responding to political violence, scholars have emphasized factors that operate within the relationship between individuals and their communities, like involvement in school, work and also political struggles (Sousa et al. 2013: 244), and connectedness to and acceptance by the community (Cortes and Buchanan 2007).

Some have emphasized the need to explore people's own understanding of risk and what *they* consider as resources for resilience at the community level (Mosavel et al. 2015). In her book on community resilience in contexts of cyclical, inter-communal violence in Nigeria's Plateau state and in Indonesia, Krause (2018) connects individual to community-level resilience. She argues that the analysis needs to focus on how people perceive a conflict situation to understand their responses (Krause 2018: 69), and how social learning and previous experiences influence perceptions. She highlights the role of *human agency* in communities – notably formal and customary (religious) leaders who have legitimate authority to persuade community members and (youth) groups not to respond violently to threats (for instance, when riots could spread from neighbouring areas, or when gangs or violent groups from other areas provoke a fight). These leaders establish rules and informal institutions for violence prevention, help resolve disputes inclusively and can effectively repress deviant individuals (Krause 2018: 75). She notes that institution-building *among* community leaders is important to maintain social control, which facilitates communication and information exchange, and also signals credibility of violence prevention efforts (Krause 2018: 75.).

In addition to the role of leaders and institutions, Krause (2018) highlights the importance of two other social processes that build resilience: depolarization of social difference and creating a cross-cleavage identity; and engagement with armed actors to negotiate neutrality, refuse collaboration and gather intelligence as part of conflict-prevention efforts (Krause 2018). Krause's book thus highlights the interactions between various social groups and actors but

particularly leaders. The issue of online action presents a new dynamic that is not addressed in Krause's book, because it may involve interactions between people that do not live in the same geographical areas, outside of established relationships between community leaders and citizens. Yet the processes of depolarization and creating divisions might be strongly influenced through digital action and social media.

The role of digital action and social media is relatively new in the field of critical security studies. It has been explored for its role in spreading hate speech and inciting violence, as well as promoting peaceful action and protest (Roberts and Marchais 2017). Digital action has also been linked to coping and resilience-promoting tactics – for instance, among vulnerable refugee communities (Udwan, Leurs and Alencar 2020). Connecting social media action to expressions of active citizenship and peace-building, Oosterom, Pan Maran and Wilson (2019) demonstrate how youth in a conflict-affected region of Myanmar, where ethnic militia clash with the state military, were actively screening disinformation that was spread online and posting counter-messages. They strongly believed this could help stop rumours and de-escalate tensions to maintain the peace. These examples illustrate that digital action can both promote or undermine resilience by inciting violence and becoming part of conflict dynamics. Digital action can reinforce the identities of members of a political community, deepening social divisions (Udwan et al. 2020). It is, therefore, the nature of digital action and expressions that need to be explored. The cases selected for this chapter represent these two possibilities. As we will show, #ENDSARS took on the state to promote citizen security and inclusion, while dynamics in #PantamiMustGo were such that it undermined resilience. Since online expressions are also forms of claim-making and hence part of active citizenship, we now turn to the conceptualization of citizenship and digital citizenship.

Citizenship and ethno-religious mobilization

From both historical and political perspectives, citizenship has remained a contested notion (Carens 2000; Dagnino 2005; Hunter 2016; Lonsdale 2016; Kligler-Vilenchik 2017). Therefore, given its controversial nature, it is extremely difficult to ascribe a one-size-fits-all definition to the concept.

For instance, Hunter (2016) has argued that there has been serious tension between how historians and social scientists have conceptualized citizenship. While social scientists have axiomatically submitted that colonial states were characterized by a dichotomous status of subjecthood and citizenship – suggesting clear discrimination between the majority of the population and a privileged minority given full legal rights – historians have held a converse view. However, for the sake of clarity and contextualization, it is expedient to attempt some descriptions of citizenship and explicate their implications for collective social actions, civic norms and practices (Kligler-Vilenchik 2017) such as ethno-religious mobilization in contemporary society.

Citizenship has commonly been defined according to three dimensions. First, it refers to the ‘membership of a political community’, whereas the second and third dimensions of ‘legal status’ and ‘political agency’ refer to the rights, entitlements and obligations that come with this membership (e.g. Cohen 1999; Carens 2000; Kymlicka 2000; Lister 2003; Kabeer 2005). The legal status is defined by the citizens’ political, civil and social rights where citizens are seen as the legal persons free to act according to the law and seek protection by the law. The second dimension sees citizenship as a political action where citizens actively participate in the political institutions of their society, while the third dimension considers citizenship as belonging to a political community that provides some unique identity. Similarly, Lokot (2020) explains that based on its traditional definition, citizenship is seen as a special personal status based on one’s legal belonging to a sovereign nation state. Citing Waters (1989), Lokot further explains that apart from the fact that citizenship confers certain rights and obligations as derived from the laws or normative frameworks, the traditional idea of citizenship closely connects to ideas of territory, belonging and identity.

As evident in the foregoing definitions, the concepts of legal status, political agency and identity as the characteristics of citizenship have implications for social cohesion and the enactment of civic norms and practices. Citizenship is also about inclusion and exclusion: formal institutions such as laws but also informal institutions like social and gender norms create hierarchies in citizenship or the extent to which substantive citizenship is genuinely enjoyed (Lister 2003; Nyamnjoh 2007). In particular, ethnic and religious minorities may formally have equal rights, while discriminatory norms and practices restrict their substantive citizenship. As argued by Nyamnjoh (2006), even in

many African countries, including Nigeria, with liberal democracy and global consumer capitalism, the problems of identity politics and ethnic citizenship still manifest. In such circumstances, while most nationals can claim their legal citizenship, some groups, because of their ethnic identities or stereotypes, consider themselves or are regarded to be less authentic claimants of legal citizenship and its privileges. In other words, citizenship in many African states is characterized by cultural discrimination and social dichotomy. This trend could be exploited by the political elite to weaken the strengths of digital citizenship and prevent citizens from uniting to promote a nation-building agenda.

In a country where the formal and informal institutions that underpin a notion of citizenship cause the exclusion of certain social, ethnic or religious groups, as the case in China, such groups might take collective action that would resist their exclusion or marginalization by the state and society (McCarthy 2000). McCarthy further argues that such activism, apart from being 'a means of asserting minorities' rightful place in the contemporary Chinese body politic', could also 'cement cross-national ethnic and religious identities, thereby consolidating the material and ideological resources that make anti-state behaviour more feasible' (McCarthy 2000: 107). In situations where members of different ethnic, social, political or religious groups are permitted to enjoy the privileges and rights of substantive citizenship, they would be encouraged to participate in mobilization for nation-building, while the converse holds for a situation where there is discrimination or preferential treatment of the members of a social group.

Nigeria is a good example of how the conception of citizenship along ethno-religious identity and sentiments has generated anti-state mobilizations and divisions among citizens themselves (Udeagha and Nwamah 2020). As Alao (2020:21) asserts, the ethno-religious segmentation of Nigeria has ignited inter-group contentions whereby the various ethnic and religious groups, especially Christians and Muslims, are perennially 'mobilized and militarized' along these ethno-religious alignments. And, unfortunately, these rivalries have constrained the national integration efforts of different administrations over the years. It has been established that ethnic sentiments provide frames that the political elite could use to appeal to a group of citizens and unite them against other groups. This is confirmed by a Nigerian study by Ojebuyi and Lasisi (2019), which reveals that the majority of online readers in their

responses to news stories about Nigeria's unity were found to be attracted to readers from their own ethnic group but highly hostile towards other readers who belonged to different ethnic groups. In Kenya, as in Nigeria, ethnicity is 'a powerful conditioning factor of political subjectivity, rights, membership, and opportunities for political participation as well as for the inter-relationship between these components' (Balaton-Chrimes 2016:16). This trend of ethnic citizenship could also manifest in digital citizenship and activism where an ethnic appeal could divide the citizens and prevent them from achieving a collective agency against social oppressions. Egbunike (2018) confirms this, arguing that politics and ethnicity are sensitive and connected topics in Nigeria, and when taken to social media, where citizens have space to unleash hate speech, these topics could further divide a country already battling with bruised unity.

Digital citizenship, ethno-religious cleavages, violence and tension

Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal (2008) define digital citizenship as the qualities that a person is expected to have as a responsible member of the digital community. One of those qualities is the regular and effective use of digital technologies either for negative purposes such as self-destruction or for positive objectives such as self-actualization, political participation, education or civil mobilization (Musgrave 2015). Mossberger (2009) further popularized the concept of digital citizenship by conceptualizing it as how citizens explore and use the large volume of political information and an array of opportunities available online. Therefore, digital citizens are those individuals who use the internet frequently because they have access and motivation and possess certain practical and digital skills and the educational proficiencies to perform online activities such as searching, using the information on the web, and interacting with other members of the cyber community (Mossberger 2009; Breindl 2010; Hicks 2017). Although digital citizenship is a universal concept, there still exist some inherent contextual characteristics that distinguish the definition of African digital citizenship from the global or Western definitions. As explained by Hunter (2016), one of the major features of the colonial states was stratification into subjecthood and citizenship which suggests some

degree of social inequality and dichotomy. Interestingly, the post-colonial African states have continued to preserve these indices of dichotomy such as identity politics and ethnic citizenship as indicators of colonial legacy (Mamdani 1996, 2001) that have characterized digital citizenship in the sub-Saharan African states. Digital citizens use the internet for different purposes such as economic gain, political participation and general information to fulfil some civic duties, norms and practices (Mossberger et al. 2008; Kligler-Vilenchik 2017). Even though the internet holds the potential to provide social equity and empowerment of minority and marginalized or disadvantaged citizens (Hernandez and Roberts 2018, Mehra, Merkel and Bishop 2004), the digital factors – access, competence and motivation – identified by Breindl (2010) constitute a major challenge to digital citizens as these digital factors encourage active minorities, who are already privileged, to be over-represented in cyberspace compared to the disadvantaged group, who have lesser access, agency and competence to enjoy the digital benefits (Hernandez and Roberts 2018). Therefore, as it is incontestable that the emergence of digital citizenship has significantly enhanced the process of citizens' engagement in democracy, it is glaring that the rise of e-society has also created some levels of dichotomy and inequalities, especially with the emphasis on access to the internet, competence and motivation as the basic requirements for fair and inclusive involvement in civic duties through cyberspace.

Socio-demographic factors such as gender, religion, ethnicity and education influence how citizens use the internet to participate in politics (Baker-Bracy 2004; Campbell 2006; Pontes, Henn and Griffiths 2019) and enjoy other digital dividends such as 'remote access to health and education information, financial inclusion and digital pathways to economic and political empowerment' (Hernandez and Roberts 2018: 1). This is because the digital citizenry is also a subset of the traditional citizenry and the two groups are bound to share some normative characteristics such as exhibition of ethno-religious loyalties and sentiments (Udeagha and Nwamah 2020). Consequently, as citizens use digital technologies for political participation and other civic duties, the social and ethno-religious cleavages, tensions and violence that play out in real life also manifest in digital life. Musgrave's (2015) position gives credence to this reality as the author asserts that real life is digital life, arguing that we are now in a generation when boundaries between real life and digital life are becoming increasingly indistinct.

Literature underscores the importance of framing in mobilizing citizens (Benford and Snow 2000). Frames that resonate with people motivate them to join and stay on in a movement, just as frames that run contrary to deeply held beliefs and biases can evoke opposition. Injustice, human rights, security and safety, and democracy frames are generally likely to attract more people than those appealing to narrower and small-group interests (Benford and Snow 2000; Oriola 2021).

Methodology

We set up a query on Tags at <https://tags.hawksey.info/get-tags/> to collect #ENDSARS tweets over thirty-nine days, from Monday 19 October, the day before the deadly shootings of #ENDSARS protesters at the Lekki Toll Plaza in Lagos, to Thursday 26 November 2020. Tags is an open-access Google Sheets-based site for archiving tweets from Twitter.

The query retrieved 85,465 tweets. We set up another query to collect tweets related to the Pantami saga. That query ran from Friday, 16 April to Thursday, 2 May 2021, to retrieve 121,432 tweets over sixteen days. Our datasets are only a fragment of the tweets generated in relation to the two protests, especially #ENDSARS, which trended in many countries across the world. Nevertheless, the randomness with which Tags retrieves tweets assures some degree of representativeness, as two queries set up on Tags at the same time, using the keyword, retrieved different sets of tweets. The two datasets were analysed separately using a combination of Notepad++ 7.9.5 and Ant Conc 3.5.9 (Windows). We complemented the analysis of tweets with a review of news stories from mainstream media and news blogs to track government responses to the two cases.

An initial exploration of the retrieved tweets revealed use of multiple hashtags in both datasets. We focused the first stage of our analysis on the hashtags contained in the entire 206,897 tweets retrieved. We ascertained the extent to which the hashtags were related to the focus of the two cases of citizen actions and how often each hashtag was used. We then focused the analysis on the twenty most popular hashtags used in each case. With 65,047 hashtags, the first 20 hashtags in the Pantami corpus constituted 79.5 per cent

of the total 81,852 hashtags. In the #ENDSARS corpus, they constituted 77.1 per cent, with 127,423 out of the total 165,277 hashtags.

In the Pantami corpus, all the hashtags that were used to promote the call for the resignation of the minister were coded as 'pro-resignation'; those that were used to mobilize against the call for resignation were coded as 'anti-resignation'; while those that were used by protesters on both sides were coded as 'anti- and pro-resignation'. Hashtags that called attention to issues other than the Pantami saga were coded as 'other civic issues'. Those that campaigned for the breakaway of a section of the country were coded as 'secessionist'. In the secessionist category were tweets that called for the re-creation of Biafra, a defunct state whose breakaway from Nigeria resulted in the country's thirty-month civil war between 1967 and 1970. Hashtags with a focus different from the aforementioned were coded as 'unrelated' while the remaining hashtags were grouped under the label 'others'. Classification of the hashtags used in the #ENDSARS corpus followed the same process. The hashtags that aligned with the goal of the protesters were coded as 'pro-#ENDSARS'; those against it were coded as 'anti-#ENDSARS'; while those that were used to both ends were coded as 'pro- and anti-#ENDSARS'. Hashtags with a focus different from the aforementioned were coded as 'unrelated', while the remaining hashtags were grouped under the label 'others'.

Next, we examined the nature of actions and opinions contained in the tweets for the following issues:

We were interested in actions such as inciting or facilitating confrontational action, inciting violent action, promoting or facilitating peaceful action (such as calling for peace and dialogue), reporting and denouncing violence or justifying violence. We were interested in these because they are the antithesis of collective citizenship action. We mapped the tweets for opinions expressed on issues such as good governance, rights to security, right to protest and freedom of speech. To uncover ethno-religious fault lines in the citizen actions, we examined the tweets for the presence of words that define national politics of ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria. Those words are North and South, the country's two regions; Hausa and Fulani, the two major ethnic groups in the North; Igbo and Yoruba, the two major ethnic groups in the South; and Christian and Muslim, the two major religions in the country. First, we used the keywords function of AntConc 3.5.9 to isolate the tweets that contained the keywords. For confirmation, we used

the search function of Notepad++ 7.9.5 to explore the keywords and got the same outcomes. Next, we read the tweets containing the keywords to understand the goal to which they were used to pursue in tweets. During the qualitative reading of the tweets, sample tweets were purposively selected for illustration purposes. In this case, as it is in the hashtag analysis, the keywords were not mutually exclusive; multiple hashtags and keywords were used in a single tweet. The units of analysis used were thus hashtags and keywords.

Based on this analysis, we examined the outcomes of the two cases of citizen action to make inferences about the resilience of digital citizenship in Nigeria.

Using social media data raises some ethical issues, especially in contexts where the civic spaces have been found to be shrinking (Roberts 2021). Many governments have demonstrated a high degree of intolerance of free speech and public criticism, especially those expressed on social media platforms. This is the situation in Nigeria too, with legislative efforts being made to control the use of social media (Oladapo and Ojebode 2021). Specifically, after the #ENDSARS protests of 2020, there were reports of police arrest and brutality against young people who had on their mobile phones trails of having participated in the protests. There were also reports of confiscation of national passports and refusal of the right to travel out of the country simply because of having participated in #ENDSARS protests (Akinwotu 2020). Given these realities, we decided to back-check a portion of the tweets in our datasets. We found that some users had deleted the tweets from their timelines. While we could not be sure of the reasons for this, we could not rule out safety and security concerns. As a result, we decided to anonymize the tweets we quoted in this chapter. As an additional measure of protection, we presented only paraphrases of tweets that contain views that were critical of government positions on the two issues analysed. Lastly, to avoid inadvertent disclosure of the identity of the users, we engaged in minimal quotations, citing only portions of tweets that were found relevant to our discussions. It is also noteworthy that there were positive developments after the initial clampdown on the protesters. The government set up a panel of inquiry in the affected states, which led to cessation of #ENDSARS-related arrests.

Issue consistency in #ENDSARS and Pantami tweets

The hashtags used in the #ENDSARS tweets were mostly focused on the objective of the activism, which was for government to end police brutality. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the focus of the hashtags.

As Table 2.1 shows, three hashtags pursued the protesters' primary demand to end SARS (#ENDSARS 48,389; #ENDSARSImmediately 4,748; #ENDSARSNow 1,493). Four hashtags sought an end to police brutality and demanded reform of the Nigerian police (#EndPoliceBrutalityinNigeraNOW 4,031; #EndPoliceBrutalityinNigera 2,600; #ReformTheNigeriaPolice 2,564; #EndPoliceBrutality 1,398). Three hashtags demanded good governance (#EndBadGovernmentinNIGERIA 6,655; #EndBadGovernanceinNIGERIA 6,035; #EndBadGoveranceInNigeria 1,434). Another three hashtags sought the release of an arrested protester (#FreeEromzy 2,185; #FreeEromz 2,177; #FreeEromosele 2,169). Two hashtags protested the alleged shootings

Table 2.1 Focus of Hashtags Used in #ENDSARS Protest

Hashtag	Focus	Frequency	Total
#ENDSARS	Pro-ENDSARS	48,389	122,746
#SoroSokeGeneration	Pro-ENDSARS	24,454	
#EndBadGovernmentinNIGERIA	Pro-ENDSARS	6,655	
#EndBadGovernanceinNIGERIA	Pro-ENDSARS	6,035	
#LekkiMassacre	Pro-ENDSARS	5,324	
#ENDSARSImmediately	Pro-ENDSARS	4,748	
#SideWithNigeria	Pro-ENDSARS	4,034	
#EndPoliceBrutalityinNigeraNOW	Pro-ENDSARS	4,031	
#EndPoliceBrutalityinNigera	Pro-ENDSARS	2,600	
#ReformTheNigeriaPolice	Pro-ENDSARS	2,564	
#FreeEromzy	Pro-ENDSARS	2,185	
#FreeEromz	Pro-ENDSARS	2,177	
#FreeEromosele	Pro-ENDSARS	2,169	
#SoroSoke	Pro-ENDSARS	1,970	
#ENDSARSNow	Pro-ENDSARS	1,493	
#EndBadGoveranceInNigeria	Pro-ENDSARS	1,434	
#EndPoliceBrutality	Pro-ENDSARS	1,398	
#LekkiMassacre	Pro-ENDSARS	1,086	
#sanwoolu	Pro- and anti- ENDSARS	2,134	
#tuesdayvibe	Unrelated	2,543	
Others	Sundry issues	37,854	
Total		165,277	

of unarmed protesters (#LekkiMassacre 5,324; #LekkiMassacre 1,086). The protesters used one hashtag to project their ideological orientation (#SoroSokeGeneration 24,454); one hashtag to invite others to speak up against police brutality and other issues (#SoroSoke 1,970); one hashtag to express patriotism to Nigeria (#SideWithNigeria 4,034); and one hashtag to evaluate the role of a major political actor in the shooting of unarmed protesters (#sanwoolu 2,134). Only 1 unrelated hashtag featured among the first 20 (#tuesdayvibe 2,543, a generic hashtag with which Nigerian Twitter users share experiences which make their Tuesdays pleasurable). In summary, the hashtags that demanded an end to SARS constituted 42.9 per cent; those that projected the protesters' ideological orientation 19.2 per cent; those that demanded an end to bad governance 11.1 per cent; those that demanded an end to police brutality and called for police reform 8.3 per cent; those that called for the release of an arrested protester 5.1 per cent; those that appraised the shooting of protesters 5.0 per cent; those that expressed patriotism to Nigeria 3.2 per cent; those that appraised the role of a major political actor in the shooting of protesters 1.7 per cent; those that invited other actors to speak up in support of the cause of the protesters 1.5 per cent; and those that were unrelated, 2.0 per cent.

Contrarily, we found that the first twenty most-used hashtags in the Pantami tweets focused on diverse issues, many of which are not directly related to the central focus of the activism. Table 2.2 summarizes the focus of those hashtags.

As Table 2.2 shows, 5 hashtags ($n = 29,316$) focused on demanding the resignation of Isa Pantami from the office of the Minister of Communications and Digital Economy. Opposing that call were 4 hashtags ($n = 20,732$). Besides the two groups of hashtags, we found 1 hashtag that was used by users on both sides of the divide ($n = 598$).

Besides those that focused on the Pantami issue, we found five hashtags that extended the activism to other civic causes (#BuhariMustGo 3,521, calling for the resignation or removal of President Muhammadu Buhari; #RevolutionNow 2,392, promoting a protest convened by Omoyele Sowore, a presidential candidate of Action Alliance Congress in the 2019 presidential election; #ENDSARS 2,171, appealing to the popularity of an October 2020 protest against police brutality; #impeachbuhari 739, calling for the impeachment of President Muhammadu Buhari; and #ArrestGumiNow 566, calling for the arrest of a Northern Muslim religious leader who mediated between

Table 2.2 Focus of Hashtags Used in #PantamiMustGo Protest

Hashtag	Focus	Frequency	Total	
#PantamiMustGo	Pro-resignation	17,230	29,316	
#PantamiResignNow	Pro-resignation	9,081		
#PantamiResign	Pro-resignation	1,268	20,732	
#PantamiMustResign	Pro-resignation	1,156		
#PantamiIsATerrorist	Pro-resignation	581		
#PantamiMustStay	Anti-resignation	11,304		
#IstandWithPantami	Anti-resignation	5,409		
#PantamiWillStay	Anti-resignation	3,604		
#PantamiWillNotResign	Anti-resignation	415		
#Pantami	Anti- and pro-resignation	598		
#BuhariMustGo	Other civic issue	3,521		9,389
#RevolutionNow	Other civic issue	2,392		
#ENDSARS	Other civic issue	2,171	4,296	
#impeachbuhari	Other civic issue	739		
#ArrestGumiNow	Other civic issue	566		
#BiafraExit	Secessionist	1,463		
#SayNoToNigeria	Secessionist	1,345		
#BiafraNationNow	Secessionist	1,091		
#EndNigeriaNow	Secessionist	397		
#win	Unrelated	716		
Others	Sundry issues	16,805		
Total		81,852		

the Nigerian government and bandits who abducted students from several schools in northern Nigeria). Four other hashtags pursued secessionist causes (#BiafraExit 1,463, mobilizing for the breakaway of South-Eastern Nigeria to re-create the defunct Biafra state; #SayNoToNigeria 1,345, expressing the rejection of the continued existence of the Nigerian state; #BiafraNationNow 1,091, calling for the immediate breakaway of the South-East from Nigeria to re-create Biafra; and #EndNigeriaNow 397, calling for an immediate dissolution of Nigeria). In summary, pro-resignation hashtags constituted 45.1 per cent; anti-resignation 31.9 per cent; a hashtag which focused on both sides of the issue 0.9 per cent; those that pursued other civic causes 14.4 per cent; those that pursued secessionist causes 6.6 per cent; and those that were unrelated to the issue or any other civic cause, 1.1 per cent.

Issue consistency is a product of the unity among the diverse segments of the digital 'nation'. This in turn seems to wax or wane depending on the framing of the issue (see Benford and Snow 2000). The #ENDSARS case was framed as a problem of justice and human rights, and a national threat. For as long

as it remained so, actors focused on the objective of the protest. This is not to suggest that #ENDSARS had no opposition: a pro-SARS protest also erupted in some northern cities. Although violent offline, the pro-SARS protest was barely visible on Twitter.

Manifestations of ethno-religious sentiments in tweets

We are interested in finding out whether ethno-religious fault lines impeded the expression of digital citizenship in the two cases. To ascertain this, we analysed keywords that are associated with ethno-religious divides in Nigeria and how they figured in tweets. Along the ethno-regional affinities, Nigeria is divided along the regional lines of North and South, and along the major ethnic lines of Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba.

We found that these identities featured in few #ENDSARS tweets: regional identities (North 24 hits; South 27 hits) and ethnic identities (Fulani 4 hits; Hausa 20 hits; Igbo 17 hits; Yoruba 25 hits). However, in the Pantami tweets, the identities feature prominently: regional identities (North 2,143 hits; South 491 hits) and ethnic identities (Fulani 288 hits; Hausa 6 hits; Igbo 445 hits; Yoruba 467 hits). A similar finding is made in relation to the expression of religious identities in the two cases. While the keywords relating to religion feature only marginally in #ENDSARS tweets (religion 24 hits; Christian 5 hits; Muslim 7 hits), they feature prominently in Pantami tweets (religion 1,873 hits; Christian 94 hits; Islam 1,040; Muslim 198 hits).

Beyond the frequency of deployment of these polarizing identities in tweets, we also found that they were deployed in the two cases to achieve different ends. The following tweet exemplifies the use of these identities in #ENDSARS tweets:

I have said it before and I will say it again #SoroSokeGeneration do not let anyone divide you guys with religion and ethnicity. We are strong when we believe in the spirit of diversity.

Anonymous 1 (2020) Twitter post on 01/11/2020, accessed 01/11/ 2020

The tweet is a call to *avoid* pursuing ethnic or religious agendas within the #ENDSARS struggle and to block every attempt to introduce such agendas. It was believed that the government and its agents wanted to create divisions

among the protesters. Conversely, in the Pantami tweets, the identities were deployed to a divisive end, as illustrated by the following tweet:

This fight is just because Pantami is a Muslim and a religious type. Had it been Pantami cares not about his religion no one will accuse him. In conclusion, any Northerner against Pantami is ANNAMIMI [a mischief maker]

Anonymous 2 Twitter post 23/04/2021, accessed 23/04/2021

The tweet clearly constructed the call to Pantami to resign as anti-Muslim and anti-North. Users from the South construe the anti-resignation stance as enabled by a misconception of Islam as pro-terrorism:

If he's not a terrorist, and he represents Islam, what actually is Islam? Don't make nonsense of Islam because of one pronounced terrorist.

Anonymous 3 (2021) Twitter post on 02/05/2021, accessed 02/05/2021

As we have shown already, Northerners who were against Pantami's resignation mobilized support for him on the grounds of religion and ethnicity and alleged that the Southerners who were calling for his resignation were anti-Islam and anti-North. The users who maintained this position diverted attention from the subject of the protest and pitched the two regions of the country against each other based on religion. The sensitivity of the Nigerian digital civic space to ethno-religious sentiments is well established in literature. The moment an event is successfully framed as 'we' versus 'them', it takes on a divisive nature that polarizes citizens and truncates their ability to collectively hold leaders accountable (Oladapo 2016; Oladapo 2017; Aina et al. 2019; Oriola 2021).

Actions in #ENDSARS and Pantami tweets

Existing literature documents diverse acts of citizenship expression. They include expressing rights such as security, freedom and good governance; denouncing and reporting all forms of violence, including police violence; and promoting and facilitating peaceful actions (Gaventa 2002; Yu and Oh 2018; Gaventa 2020). Citizenship expressions could also take the form of facilitating confrontational action/protest and inciting violent action. We examined Pantami and #ENDSARS tweets for the presence of tweets that fall into either category. The findings of that inquiry are presented next.

We found in the Pantami tweets views that promote divisive ethno-religious politics, as illustrated by this tweet:

The trends of #BuhariMustGo and #PantamiMustGo make me develop a mindset of voting only a Northerner/Muslim as a PRESIDENT no matter [who] he is or his political affiliation, such trends are borne [out] of hatred and dislike for Northerners and Islam.

Anonymous 4 (2021) Twitter post on 23/04/2021, accessed 23/04/2021

That user, like many others, thought that keeping a Northern Muslim in power was the only solution to what they perceived as an attack on the Northern Muslims. There are also tweets that called on Christians who held political office to resign in protest at the perceived support the current government gives to Islamists and Muslim fundamentalists:

Without being unreasonable, and very sincere, I think every Southern Christian that has a seat at the Federal Executive Council should resign. @ ProfOsinbajo should start the process. You can't be sitting down in a meeting with a Jihadist.

Anonymous 5 (2021) Twitter post on 23/04/2021, accessed 23/04/2021

The tweets in this category conceive of the issue as Muslims versus Christians, thus entrenching division along the religious line by calling on the vice-president to resign as an exemplar of Christians' dissociation from Jihadism. Another category of tweets calls into question cross-ethnic political alliance on the grounds of religion: 'If the Moslems amongst the Yoruba Nation still choose to align with the North, as Tinubu and co have shown, what then can be done?' Such tweets consider ethnic ties to be superior to political alliances, irrespective of religious affiliation. Some of the tweets promote loyalty to ethnic interest as superior to loyalty to national interest:

If you are an Igbo man who hates and speaks against Nnamdi Kanu, you are a bastard; If you are a Yoruba who hates and speaks against Sunday Igboho or Tinubu, it will not be better for you. Just imagine Hausa people defending Isa Pantami, a known and proven terrorist.

Anonymous 6 (2021) Twitter post on 23/04/2021, accessed 23/04/2021

To users who tweeted in this category, other ethnic groups have a lot to learn from how the Hausa defend one of them, despite the gravity of the allegations levelled against him. These tweets present ethnicity as the weakest point of

the resilience of digital citizenship among Nigeria's Twitter users. Going by the sentiment they expressed, ethnic consideration is strong enough among them to truncate digital citizenship that is national in outlook, even when there are other unifying forces such as religion.

In the #EndSARS tweets, we found those that celebrate the spread of the protests across the Southern part of the country:

The Wild West has woken, the tough tough East has come on. . . . It's appearing that the volatile South-South is about to . . .

Anonymous 7 (2020) Twitter post on 19/11/2020, accessed 19/11/2020

'Wild Wild West' used in the tweet is a historical allusion to the riots that rocked South-West Nigeria between 1962 and 1966 and resulted in a widespread breakdown of law and order, which only ended after the country's first military coup. The tweet, like many others, prognosticates the descent of #ENDSARS protests into large-scale violence. Popular among #ENDSARS tweets are those that pursue rights:

Whenever I think about #LekkiMassacre I see mass freedom beyond #EndSARS protests. I don't know what this is to you but as for my personal self, I'll fight for my right until I'm gone!

Anonymous 8 (2020) Twitter post on 25/10/2020, accessed 25/10/2020

The tweets in this category consider freedoms and rights as hallmarks of citizenship too fundamental to be sacrificed for anything, including personal safety. There were also numerous tweets reporting government persecution of #ENDSARS protesters and promising the return of protests to the streets:

This demonic Buhari government is so desperate. They seized Moe's passport. Imagine if the #EndSARS movement had leaders, they would have just arrested the so-called leaders and throw them in jail. There would be another wave of protest and it will be massive.

Anonymous 9 (2020) Twitter post on 03/11/2020, accessed 03/11/2020

Tweets such as the above maintain that oppressive treatment of protesters such as seizure of passport, a symbol of citizenship, will only invite more protests. A number of #ENDSARS tweets project a scathing assessment of the government, as illustrated by this tweet:

The value of government is measured through how well it values its citizens. USA deployed military to rescue one citizen while Nigeria deployed military to kill her citizens. You can decode.

Anonymous 10 (2020) Twitter posted on 31/10/2020, accessed 31/10/2020.

The tweets question the value the Nigerian government places on Nigerians. They allege that the government treats Nigerians as subjects rather than as citizens who deserve the full complement of constitutionally guaranteed rights, importantly security and protection. Tweets that celebrate moves to sanction politicians implicated in the attacks against #ENDSARS protesters are also visible:

We did it again guys!!! The UK GOVERNMENT voted to sanction Individuals in this useless government. Next we are going to the @IntlCrimCourt and @ UN. They will never have peace, whether they are dead or alive.

Anonymous 11 (2020) Twitter post on 24/11/2020, accessed 24/11/2020

Despite the dissimilarities found in the #ENDSARS and Pantami tweets, users in both cases appeared to have abstained from inciting people to violence. The closest we found in the #ENDSARS tweets is a wish for a natural force to strike and kill those responsible for the plight of the protesters:

I wish thunder could strike and kill everyone involved in victimizing the innocent Nigerian youths fighting for a better governance and a better Nigeria.

Anonymous 12 (2020) Twitter post on 06/11/2020, accessed 06/11/2020

Another #ENDSARS tweet invites protesters to return to the streets, despite news of police shooting at protesters:

I'm fuming right now and if you're not we both suffer in the end! Let's move back to this street, they CANNOT kill us all!

Anonymous 13 (2020) Twitter post on 18/11/2020, accessed 18/11/2020

The tweet invites protesters into an unavoidable confrontation with the police. Despite these few cases, we did not observe instances of tweets that promote, celebrate or invite others to violent actions. Mostly, what we found could be described as evaluative opinions, rather than calls to violence. The kind of violence we observed in the tweets was as expressed in this tweet:

Buharists and pro-regime people are pledging to counter our peaceful account closing protests by opening multiple new accounts with the bank. Let us show them we are the #SoroSokeGeneration. Tomorrow we move to #BoycottAccessBank.

Anonymous 14 (2020) Twitter post on 15/11/2020, accessed 15/11/2020

The tweet alleges an attempt by those considered anti-#ENDSARS to neutralize their boycott of Access Bank, a bank reported to have placed a ban on accounts of #ENDSARS protesters.

Outcomes of #ENDSARS and anti-Pantami protests

While #ENDSARS and anti-Pantami protests were both forms of mass action by digital citizens, the two resulted in different outcomes. It is noteworthy that a kind of government–citizen synergy emerged from #ENDSARS, despite the initial confrontations and attacks. The government agreed to meet the demand of #ENDSARS protesters to disband SARS when it could no longer ignore the protests. It agreed to meet the five other demands issued by the protesters: immediate release of all arrested protesters; justice for all deceased victims of police brutality and appropriate compensation for their families; inauguration of an independent body to oversee the investigation and prosecution of all reports of police misconduct (with a ten-day timeline); in line with the new Police Act, psychological evaluation and retraining (to be confirmed by an independent body) of all disbanded SARS officers before they can be redeployed; and increase in police salary so that they are adequately compensated for protecting lives and property of citizens (The Cable 2020; Vanguard 2020).

In addition, the government promised to reform the police and created Special Weapon Tactical Team (SWAT) in place of SARS, ensuring that the personnel attached to the new unit would be well trained. The government also stipulated that affected states should convene a judicial panel of inquiry. Lagos inaugurated its panel on 19 October 2021 (Lagos State Government 2020), and some other affected states did so afterwards, all ensuring that youth representatives were included in the panel membership. Thus, #ENDSARS climaxed into a government–youth collective action towards ensuring that victims of police brutality would get justice.

However, the Pantami issue ended differently. The protest reached an anticlimax when the federal government issued a statement of support for the embattled minister. The statement circulated on social media platforms and blogs, thereby giving impetus to the #iStandWithPantami hashtag, which then co-trended with #PantamiMustResign. Although the government accepted that the minister's speeches and action were in support of terrorism, it dismissed them as having been informed by youthful exuberances some ten years earlier (Shehu 2021). With government support, the minister continued in office, the hashtags calling for his resignation stopped trending and the protest faded out.

Conclusion

How do Nigerians enact digital citizenship? Our analysis, on the surface, suggests the amorphousness of digital citizenship. In one instance, digital citizens are observed united and fully pressing for reforms against injustice and oppression; in another, they are at daggers drawn against each other. Three distinct forms of citizenship were found enacted in the Nigerian digital space: ethnic, religious and national citizenships. Expression of these digital citizenships in the Nigerian Twitter space is fluid, often responding to the nature of the issues and the attributes of the actors involved in them as exemplified by the two cases analysed. At one time it appeals to constitutionally guaranteed universal human rights, thereby attracting the solidarity of international community. At another time it is enacted much like the conventional citizenship, fractured by divisive considerations such as ethnicity and religion. In the latter case, many citizens, it seems, take a dispassionate look at issues and weigh them on a scale of importance that ranks ethnic, religious, national affiliation in a descending order. For these citizens, national interest is important only to the extent that it does not conflict, even remotely, with ethnic and religious loyalties. When issues do not have obvious ethnic and religious overtones, the resilience of digital citizens, borne out of their unity, is likely assured and the government may be wary of ignoring citizens' demands.

This raises the question of who should be left to frame issues. Digital activists should be firm and choosy in their framing of issues. One of the greatest limitations of the #PantamiMustGo protest was the framing of the minister as a sheikh or Islamic religious leader, rather than just a terrorist sympathizer. The religious label attached to him must have aroused a sympathetic response from

Muslim users, who quickly concluded that Islam, rather than terrorism, was under attack and felt it was their bounden duty to defend Islam by defending the sheikh. Framing is complicated; Mr Pantami is indeed a Muslim sheikh of the fundamentalist strain, and it would have been impossible to frame him as a terrorist sympathizer without that religious label. However, frames that ignored the line between Islam and Islamist terrorism were many among anti-Pantami users, and these were exploited by pro-Pantami users to discredit the protest.

The digital space is often thought of as a space free from the fault lines that bedevil and characterize the conventional space. Our analysis echoes the position of Musgrave (2015) on the similarities between the digital and the conventional. The same ethno-religious fault lines that have influenced Nigerians' interpretations of and responses to many national events continue to play similar roles among digital citizens. As apparent in the analysis, digital citizens are able to unite around a common goal when it does not offend their ethnic and religious sensibilities. When it does, they break into opposing factions, enacting in the digital space a form of citizenship that is fragmented along ethnic and religious lines.

Our analysis also shows that closing the civic space does not always have to involve the use of surveillance technologies, bots and site-blocking. Citizens taking sides with the government sometimes overwhelm and silence other citizens, as the case was in the #PantamiMustGo protest. Activists and researchers seeking to understand the nature of civic space have often focused on the technological efforts to close it or resist its closure (Hintz et al. 2017; Howard 2020). In the process, they have not paid significant attention to the active participation of some citizens in efforts to close the civic space. Citizens who promote ethnic and religious disinformation online, bots deployed to promote the same and external actors who exploit it could all be as actively involved in the closure of the digital civic space as an oppressive government that deploys restrictive laws, surveillance technology and other means to achieve the same goal.

Bibliography

Aina, T.A., M. Atela, A. Ojebode, P. Dayil, and F. Aremu (2019) *Beyond Tweets and Screams: Action for Empowerment and Accountability in Nigeria – The Case of the #*

- BBOG Movement*, IDS Working Paper 529, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Akinwotu, E. (2020) 'Nigeria Cracks Down on "End Sars" Protesters, Alleging Terrorism', *The Guardian*, 13 November, accessed 19 May 2021.
- Aiao, O. E. (2020) 'Ethno-Religious Mobilization, Militarization and the Rhetoric of Unity in Nigeria's Hundred Years of Nationhood (1914–2014)', *AIPGG Journal of Humanities and Peace Studies*, 1 (1): 21–47.
- Ayitogo, N. (2020) '#EndSARS: Nigeria Dissolves Dreaded Police Unit, Announces Police Reforms', *Premium Times*, 11 October, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Baker-Bracy, L. J. (2004) 'Political Participation in America: The Role of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender', MA dissertation, University of Arkansas, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Balaton-Chrimes, S. (2016) *Ethnicity, Democracy and Citizenship in Africa: Political Marginalisation of Kenya's Nubians*, New York: Routledge.
- Beattie, T., A. Zhang, and E. Thomas (2020) 'The Power Dynamics of Thailand's Digital Activism', *The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog*, 14 December, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Benford, R. and D. A. Snow (2000) 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611–39.
- Blewitt, J. and D. Tilbury (2014) *Searching for Resilience in Sustainable Development: Learning Journeys in Conservation*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Breindl, Y. (2010) 'Critique of the Democratic Potentialities of the Internet: A Review of Current Theory and Practice', *Triple C*, 8 (1): 43–59.
- Brown, K. (2016) *Resilience, Development and Global Change*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Campbell, D. E. (2006) 'What Is Education's Impact on Civic and Social Engagement?' Paper presented at the Symposium on Social Outcomes of Learning, Danish University of Education (Copenhagen), 23–24 March.
- Çancı, H. and O. A. Odukoya (2016) 'Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis upon Identities (1999–2013)', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 16 (1): 87–100.
- Carens, J. H. (2000) *Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Even Handedness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Choi, H. H. and M. J. Kim (2018) 'Using the Digital Context to Overcome Design Fixation: A Strategy to Expand Students' Design Thinking', *Arch Net-IJAR: International Journal of Architectural Research*, 12 (1): 228–40.
- Cohen, J. (1999) 'Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos', *International Sociology*, 14 (3): 245–68.
- Colpean, M. (2020) 'Muslim Women Against FEMEN: Asserting Agency in Online Spaces', *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, 13 (3): 274–90, accessed 18 October 2021.

- Cortes, L. and M. J. Buchanan (2007) 'The Experience of Columbian Child Soldiers from a Resilience Perspective', *International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling*, 29 (1): 43–55.
- Dagnino, E. (2005) *Meanings of Citizenship in Latin America*, IDS Working Paper 258, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Daka, T. (2020) '#EndSARS Protests Was Hijacked, Buhari Tells Former Leaders', *The Guardian*, 23 October, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Egbunike, N. (2018) *Hashtags: Social Media, Politics and Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Lagos: Narrative Landscape Press.
- Egwu, S. G. (2004) 'Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Jos Case, 1960–2000', PhD thesis, University of Jos, Nigeria.
- Ekeh, P. P. (1975) 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17 (1): 91–112.
- Ekeh, P. P. (1978) 'Colonialism and the Development of Citizenship in Africa: A Study of Ideologies of Legitimation', in Onigu Otite, *Themes in African Social and Political Thought*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension.
- Gaventa, J. (2002) 'Introduction: Exploring Citizenship, Participation and Accountability', *IDS Bulletin*, 33 (2): 1–7, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Gaventa, J. (2020) 'Seeing Like a Citizen': Re-claiming Citizenship in a Neoliberal World', in A. Fowler and C. Malunga (eds), *NGO Management: The Earthscan Companion*, 115–28, London: Routledge.
- Hernandez, K. and T. Roberts (2018) *Leaving No One Behind in a Digital World. K4D Emerging Issues Report*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c178371ed915d0b8a31a404/Emerging_Issues_LNOBDW_final.pdf.
- Hicks, E. R. (2017) 'Digital Citizenship and Health Promotion Programs: The Power of Knowing', *Health Promotion Practice*, 18 (1): 8–10, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Hintz, A., L. Dencik, and W. Wahl-Jorgensen (2017) 'Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society', *International Journal of Communication*, 11: 731–9.
- Hollandsworth, R., L. Dowdy, and J. Donovan (2011) 'Digital Citizenship in K-12: It Takes a Village', *Tech Trends*, 55 (4): 37–47.
- Howard, P. N. (2020) *Lie Machines: How to Save Democracy from Troll Armies, Deceitful Robots, Junk News Operations, and Political Operatives*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hunter, E. (2016) *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues Between Past and Present*, Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Kabeer, N. (2005) 'Introduction: The Search for Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions in an Interconnected World', in N. Kabeer (ed.), *Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions*, 5, London: Zed.

- Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2017) 'Alternative Citizenship Models: Contextualizing New Media and the New "Good Citizen"', *New Media & Society*, 19 (11): 1887–903, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Krause, J. (2018) *Resilient Communities: Non-Violence and Civilian Agency in Communal War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2000) 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts', in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, 1–41, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lagos State Government (2020) '#EndSARS: Sanwo-Olu Inaugurates Judicial Panel on Brutality, Human Rights Violations', *Lagos State Government Official Web Portal*, 19 October, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Lee, T. (2018) 'The Thin Blue Line Between Protesters and Their Counter-Protesters', *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation*, 21 (2): 10, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Lister, R. (2003) 'Investing in the Citizen-workers of the Future: Transformations in Citizenship and the State Under New Labour', *Social Policy & Administration*, 37 (5): 427–43.
- Lokot, T. (2020) 'Articulating Networked Citizenship on the Russian Internet: A Case for Competing Affordances', *Social Media + Society*, 6 (4): 1–14.
- Lonsdale, J. (2016) 'Rethinking Citizenship and Subjecthood in Southern Africa', in E. Hunter (ed.), *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues Between Past and Present*, 18–43, Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mamdani, M. (2001) 'Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 43 (4): 651–64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696665>.
- McCarthy, S. (2000) 'Ethno-Religious Mobilisation and Citizenship Discourse in the People's Republic of China', *Asian Ethnicity*, 1 (2): 107–16.
- Mehra, B., C. Merkel, and A. P. Bishop (2004) 'The Internet for Empowerment of Minority and Marginalized Users', *New Media & Society*, 6 (6): 781–802.
- Mosavel, M., R. Ahmed, K. A. Ports, and C. Simon (2015) 'South African, Urban Youth Narratives: Resilience Within Community', *International Journal of Adolescence and Youth*, 20 (2), accessed 18 October 2021.
- Mossberger, K. (2009) 'Toward Digital Citizenship: Addressing Inequality in the Information Age', in A. Chadwick and P. Howard (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, 173–86, London: Routledge.
- Mossberger, K., C. Tolbert, and R. S. McNeal (2008) *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Musgrave, M. L. (2015) *Digital Citizenship in Twenty-First-Century Young Adult Literature: Imaginary Activism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2020) 'Telecoms Data: Active Voice and Internet per State, Porting and Tariff Information', accessed 18 October 2021.
- Ndegwa, S. N. (1998) 'Citizenship amid Economic and Political Change in Kenya', *Africa Today*, 45 (3/4): 351–67.
- Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006) *Insiders & Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa*, London and Dakar: Zed Books and CODESRIA Books.
- Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2007) 'From Bounded to Flexible Citizenship: Lessons from Africa', *Citizenship Studies*, 11 (1): 73–82, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Ojebuyi, B. R. and M. L. Lasisi (2019) 'Speaking Up or Staying Silent? Citizens' Engagement of Pro-Biafra Protests and Farmers-Herders Crises in the User-generated Content of Selected Nigerian Online Newspapers', *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities*, 15 (2): 25–51, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Oladapo, O. A. (2016) 'Pro-Biafra Construction of Nigerianness in Twitter Protest Against Frivolous Petitions Bill 2015', *Journal of Communication and Language Arts*, 7 (1): 63–83. https://www.academia.edu/40864739/Pro_Biafra_Counterpublic_Identity_Construction_in_Twitter_Protest_against_the_Frivolous_Petitions_Bill.
- Oladapo, O. A. (2017) 'Construction of the Political Other in Citizens' Comments on Politicians' Facebook Pages', *International Journal of E-Politics*, 8 (2): 17–29. <https://www.igi-global.com/article/construction-of-the-political-other-in-citizens-comments-on-politicians-facebook-pages/180335>.
- Oladapo, O. and A. Ojebode (2021) 'Nigeria Digital Rights Landscape Report', in T. Roberts (ed.), *Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries*, 145–66, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Olorunnisola, A. A. and B. L. Martin (2013) 'Influences of Media on Social Movements: Problematizing Hyperbolic Inferences About Impacts', *Telematics and Informatics*, 30 (3): 275–88.
- Oosterom, M. A. (2016) 'Internal Displacement, the Camp and the Construction of Citizenship: Perspectives from Northern Uganda', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 29 (3): 363–87.
- Oosterom, M. A., J. Pan Maran, and S. Wilson (2019) "'Building Kachin": Youth and Everyday Action in One of Myanmar's Ethnic States', *Development and Change*, 50 (6): 1717–41, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Oriola, T. B. (2021) 'Framing and Movement Outcomes: The #BringBackOurGirls Movement', *Third World Quarterly*, 42 (4): 641–60, accessed 18 October 2021.

- Osaghae, E. E. (1990) 'The Problems of Citizenship in Nigeria', *Africa*, 45 (4): 593–611.
- Osaghae, E. E. and R. T. Suberu (2005) *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*, CRISE Working Paper No. 6, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Otite, O. (1990) *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Shaneson C.I. Ltd.
- Pontes, A. I., M. Henn, and M. D. Griffiths (2019) 'Youth Political (Dis)Engagement and the Need for Citizenship Education: Encouraging Young People's Civic and Political Participation Through the Curriculum', *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 14 (1): 3–21.
- Premium Times (2021) 'Editorial: Why Pantami Must Step Aside from Government', 4 May 2021, accessed 6 June 2021.
- Punch (2020) 'Editorial: Looking Beyond #EndSARS: Youths and People Power', 19 October, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Roberts, T. (ed.) (2021) *Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, doi:10.19088/IDS.2021.003.
- Roberts, T. and G. Marchais (2017) *Assessing the Role of Social Media and Digital Technology in Violence Reporting*, IDS Working Paper 492, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Samuel, O. (2020) *Livestreaming Lekki: Digital Evidence of #EndSARS Shooting in Nigeria Makes Impunity Much Harder*, accessed 11 August, <https://theconversation.com/livestreaming-lekki-digital-evidence-of-endsars-shooting-in-nigeria-makes-impunity-much-harder-148696>.
- Shehu, O. (2021) 'Presidency Stands by Pantami Despite Pro-Terrorism Statements', *International Centre for Investigative Reporting*, 22 April, accessed 18 October 2021.
- Sousa, C. A., M. M. Haj-Yahia, G. Feldman, and J. Lee (2013) 'Individual and Collective Dimensions of Resilience Within Political Violence', *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse*, 14 (3): 235–54.
- The Cable (2020) 'FG Accepts 5-point Demand of #EndSARS Protesters', 13 October, accessed 19 May 2021.
- The Guardian (2020) '#EndSARS Protests Gaining Global Attention', accessed 11 August 2022, <https://guardian.ng/news/nigerians-endsars-protests-gaining-worldwide-attention/>.
- Turner, B. S. (2009) 'TH Marshall, Social Rights and English National Identity', *Citizenship Studies*, 13 (1): 65–73.
- Udeagha, N. and G. Nwamah (2020) 'Ethno-Religious Sentiments and the Need for Restructuring in Nigeria', *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 7 (8): 17–34, accessed 18 October 2021.

- Udwan, G., K. Leurs, and A. Alencar (2020) 'Digital Resilience Tactics of Syrian Refugees in the Netherlands: Social Media for Social Support, Health, and Identity', *Social Media and Society*, 6 (2), accessed 18 October 2021. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2056305120915587>.
- Ukiwo, U. (2003) 'Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41 (1): 115–38.
- Vanguard (2020) 'Five Demands From #EndSARS Protesters', 12 October, accessed 19 May 2021.
- Vertigans, S. and N. Gibson (2020) 'Resilience and Social Cohesion Through the Lens of Residents in a Kenyan Informal Settlement', *Community Development Journal*, 55 (4): 624–44.
- Waters, M. (1989) 'Citizenship and the Constitution of Structured Social Inequality', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 30: 159–80.
- Yu, R. P. and Y. W. Oh (2018) 'Social Media and Expressive Citizenship: Understanding the Relationships Between Social and Entertainment Expression on Facebook and Political Participation', *Telematics and Informatics*, 35 (8): 2299–311.