

Cash-Plus Programming in Protracted Crises: A Review of Programmes in Contexts of Overlapping Conflict, Forced Displacement and Climate-Related Shocks

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Summary

This paper explores the nature and effectiveness of cash-plus programmes in protracted crisis settings characterised by conflict, displacement and recurrent climate shocks. Despite limited evidence on their suitability or sufficiency in such contexts, where high-quality supply-side services are lacking, cash-plus programmes aim to improve the wellbeing and livelihoods of chronically poor and food-insecure populations by providing cash transfers alongside services and assets to enhance opportunities in local economies.

The paper reviews 97 cash-plus programmes in 16 countries, considering their design features and outcomes. It finds that cash-plus programmes in protracted crises, with some technical adjustments, resemble those in stable settings. For instance, objectives rarely explicitly address wider transformative agendas and drivers of vulnerability (such as economic structures rooted in conflict), often focusing on the micro-level – on households and individuals. Evaluation data on programme outcomes and impacts is limited, thus restricting the availability of evidence on better approaches.

The paper concludes that cash-plus programmes need to address the specific dynamics and drivers of vulnerability in different protracted crisis contexts, going beyond interventions focused on individuals to tackle structural causes of weakened livelihoods. Furthermore, it highlights the need for more evidence on the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of cash-plus programmes in these challenging contexts.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

BCC	behaviour change communication
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
IDP	internally displaced person
IPV	intimate partner violence
INGO	international non-governmental organisation
ND-GAIN Index	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
NGO	non-governmental organisation
RCT	randomised controlled trial
TVET	technical and vocational education and training
UCT	unconditional cash transfer
UN	United Nations

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1. Introduction

In recent years, multiple efforts have been made to introduce cash-plus programmes into protracted crisis settings, but little learning has been generated about the conditions under which these programmes might be beneficial, or how they might be adapted for settings characterised by conflict, displacement and/or vulnerability to climate shocks and stressors.¹ Cash-plus programmes² aim to improve the wellbeing and livelihoods³ of people who are chronically poor and often food-insecure by enabling them to engage with a range of opportunities provided in local (usually rural) economies where productive livelihoods are possible.

These opportunities are presumed to depend on public service provision (health and education), local labour markets, financial institutions and business opportunities through functioning markets. Evidence on the design and impacts of these programmes derives almost exclusively from stable contexts with high levels of chronic poverty (Andrews *et al.* 2021; Lind, Sabates-Wheeler and Szyp 2022; Roelen *et al.* 2017).⁴ Yet, whether findings from these studies apply to protracted crisis settings is open to question.

'Protracted crisis/crises' refers to a variety of settings and contexts whose dimensions, as well as drivers of insecurity, levels of conflict and violence, and scope and options for whom to assist, vary enormously. These are contexts where multiple dimensions of crisis and fragility overlap, and where covariate and idiosyncratic shocks compound existing vulnerabilities associated in part with conditions of fragility. The nature and extent of protracted crises – including conditions of distorted markets, contested public authority, destroyed infrastructure, violence, lack of legal rights for certain populations, and constraints on movement and access due to insecurity – greatly affect possibilities for pursuing different livelihood opportunities, as well as processes of recovery and rebuilding.

While the duration of conflict can be long (such as in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia), this can conceal periods of heightened risk that generate large-scale displacement, resulting in a layering of acute needs over a situation of chronic precarity and vulnerability. Other protracted crisis settings experience – or have experienced – little current or recent conflict, but host large populations who are living in situations of protracted displacement (for five years or longer); examples include Lebanon, Turkey and Uganda. Recurring climate shocks, and the vulnerability of systems, communities, households and individuals to the impacts of these, compound conflict- and displacement-related pressures on people's livelihoods. Indeed, these characteristics raise questions about the effectiveness of cash-plus programmes as an approach to strengthening livelihoods in protracted crises.

In the context of this review, cash-plus discourses often involve reframing poverty and weakened livelihoods as products of inadequate inclusion in markets and/or depressed agricultural productivity, rather than outcomes of wider structural drivers of disadvantage and vulnerability. Policies consequently focus on individual shortcomings instead of, for instance, mechanisms of exclusion and (in protracted crises) predation and violence. An emphasis on promoting productivity and the acquisition of skills to access work and business opportunities for *individuals* risks overlooking not only conflict-related processes that drive vulnerability and weaken livelihoods, but also the sustainability of benefits without transformation in *structural* (security, governance and legal) settings.

¹ Economic inclusion programmes emerged relatively recently as a different model of comprehensive programming for strengthening livelihood resilience and opportunities. We chose not to use this term in this paper as it encompasses financial inclusion and livelihood programmes that do not necessarily include a cash transfer component. Furthermore, 'economic' inclusion is just one type of inclusion, and we are specifically interested in framing discussions of livelihoods in protracted crisis settings so that political, social, cultural and religious constraints are made visible.

² Cash-plus programmes can have a broad range of objectives, of which livelihoods is one. Other objectives include building human capital, addressing discriminatory social norms, reducing violence, etc.

³ Although the main focus of this paper is livelihoods, which is what guides our inclusion criteria, outcomes that go beyond the economic, such as psychosocial and political (if these are mentioned in respective evaluations) are also showcased (e.g. see impact indicators on protection, social inclusion, cohesion, etc.). For research on cash-plus programmes with a specific gender equality and empowerment perspective, see Holmes, Marsden and Quarterman (2021).

⁴ Andrews *et al.* (2021) includes analysis of economic inclusion programmes in contexts of conflict, fragility and violence.

In this way, cash-plus programmes share much in common with aid approaches that encourage resilience.⁵ Challenging the ‘fantasy’ of resilience, Jaspars (2021: 196) explains that ‘resilience approaches can be seen as promoting the creation of autonomous and responsible subjects who can adapt and survive in situations of repeated crisis or uncertainty.’ Jaspars draws on experience in Darfur and South Sudan, where aid agencies turned to resilience approaches, despite the effects of conflict and violence on the agencies’ ability to provide assistance, as well as persistent insecurity and the acute prevalence of malnutrition above emergency thresholds. Jaspars explains that embracing resilience entailed shifting ‘responsibility from the state or international community to the individual’ (Jaspars 2021).

For cash-plus approaches, small improvements in the livelihoods of beneficiary individuals and households are likely to be temporary and prone to reversals in protracted crisis settings where conflict risks are elevated, displaced populations confront discrimination and lack certain rights, and recurring climate shocks easily overwhelm small-scale livelihood activities. Further, in protracted crises there often are repeated waves of displacement (e.g. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)), meaning that any gains from cash-plus support risk being eroded in a new wave of displacement.

Nevertheless, the spread of cash-plus programming in protracted crises indicates the ambition of governments, development partners and humanitarian organisations – beyond providing lifesaving relief – to enable improvements in livelihoods for people grappling with the impacts of compounding risks and uncertainties. At issue is whether cash-plus programmes are fit for purpose as a model of intervention to sustainably improve the livelihoods of people living in these settings. Yet, the gap in researching and assessing how programmes are adjusted in these settings, as well as their outcomes and impacts, presents challenges in understanding the suitability of cash-plus models and what the most appropriate package of support might be. Thus, this paper asks: *What is the nature of cash-plus programmes in protracted crises? Further, to what extent are these programmes adapted to the dynamics of conflict and displacement that characterise these settings?*

This paper builds on our earlier paper that assessed cash-plus programming in protracted crisis settings determined by the intensity of conflict (Lind *et al.* 2022). We reviewed 42 cash-plus programmes in 17 countries experiencing conflict and found that most programmes combine design features seen in more peaceful contexts – skills being the most common component, followed by agricultural and livestock extension services and access to finance. This was reflected in the aims of programmes, with ‘promotion’ being the most frequently mentioned objective. However, evidence of the impacts and outcomes of programmes was patchy. This paper develops this further by developing a multidimensional indicator of protracted crisis incorporating not only conflict but displacement and climate change vulnerability, as well. Further, here we build on a more extensive search of cash-plus programming, with particular attention to evidence of impacts and outcomes.

In the next section we introduce the model of cash-plus programming and summarise how it has been rolled out in protracted crisis settings. We then develop a framing that maps identified cash-plus programmes according to the country's nature of protracted crisis and the strength of state social protection. In the framing and methods section, we propose an innovative approach to constructing an empirical indicator of overlapping and compounding shocks, and map this against the relative strength of social protection systems. We then present the findings and analysis of a comprehensive review of 97 cash-plus programmes⁶ across 16 countries, identifying differences and commonalities across programme characteristics, design features and outcomes according to the relative intensity of protracted crises, as well as the strength of the social protection system. The evidence from this review provides insights into whether and how cash-plus programming is conceived and implemented to suit protracted crisis settings and the challenges therein of supporting livelihoods in places characterised by overlapping conflict, displacement, and climate-related shocks and pressures.

⁵ Béné (2013: 22) defines resilience as the ‘ability to persist, adapt or transform in the face of a shock or changing environment’.

⁶ This review is based on a narrow definition of cash-plus programmes focused on livelihood modalities that include at least one of these cash-plus components: skills training, asset transfers, agricultural extension, microcredit, access to finance and animal health services. Other cash-plus components that are part of these programmes, and which could be necessary to enable certain groups to participate in livelihood activities, were also coded and analysed, though were not part of the inclusion criteria.

2. Cash-plus in protracted crisis settings

2.1 Defining 'cash-plus'

In the early days of social protection, interventions and instruments were limited primarily to regular food and cash transfers (sometimes also asset transfers) with the purpose of protecting lives through consumption and food security support, and contributory insurance mechanisms such as pensions and unemployment benefit, with the aim of preventing damaging downturns in economic wellbeing over the life cycle. Popularised through the work of Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), the terms used to describe these functions of social protection include 'protective' (providing relief from poverty and deprivation through the provision of welfare and social services; for instance, through cash and food transfers) and 'preventive' (seeking to prevent deprivation through formal and non-formal insurance strategies). In fact, smoothing consumption and extending income support remain the core contribution of all social protection support. Yet, claims have always been made about the potential of well-designed and delivered social protection programmes to achieve 'promotive' outcomes – outcomes that go well beyond supporting lives to promoting and enabling resilient and strengthened livelihoods (Sabates-Wheeler 2021).

In this vein, over the past decade, attention has shifted towards the additional support required to augment cash or food transfers that would allow households not just to survive but to thrive (see Sabates-Wheeler *et al.* 2021 for a review). Emerging from this came an assortment of programmes that aim to encourage 'graduation'. Similar in composition to any integrated livelihood programme, what distinguishes these is the centrality to the package of support of regular provision of social assistance (usually in the form of cash, but also food or assets).

Fundamentally, then, the theory is that cash augmented with other forms of support and services as a way of strengthening livelihoods will, over time, contribute to creating productive (promotive) livelihoods, which can be sustained even when programme assistance is withdrawn. 'Cash-plus' interventions combine cash transfers with one or more types of complementary support. This can be done by linking cash transfer programme recipients (e.g. in nationally led social programmes) to externally provided services⁷ or by providing multiple interventions within a cash transfer programme (or combinations of both) (McLean *et al.* 2020). Evidence suggests that cash-plus programmes in stable contexts can achieve sustainable long-term impacts (Sulaiman 2018; Sulaiman *et al.* 2016).

For this paper, we use the terminology of graduation and cash-plus, with a preference for cash-plus – recognising that many programmes provide a bundle of services that might not hit all the marks of a 'graduation' programme. The difference in language reflects an evolution in the preference of policy and programming terminology. Graduation programmes tend to be more comprehensive in terms of providing a time-limited package of support to a population group for a specific purpose, with a more specific timeline or progression of the package, such as cash-plus extension services, financial literacy, public works, and credit within one programme for the purpose of addressing poverty and encouraging better farming or business practices.

Cash-plus can be anything from cash and training on nutrition, or cash augmented with multiple other interventions. Cash-plus programmes frequently link people to a broad range of social services (including social workers or psychosocial support), with the purpose of improving a range of human development outcomes, including poverty (Bastagli *et al.* 2016; Roelen *et al.* 2017; Watson and Palermo 2016). Technically speaking, a graduation programme is a type of cash-plus programme, with comprehensive package of complementary components sequenced along a specified timeline, and often focused on economic outcomes. Cash-plus includes components as well as linkages, both in relation to economic and social outcomes.

⁷ Linking cash transfer recipients to externally provided services or interventions can be achieved by simply giving cash transfer beneficiaries information on relevant available services in their locality (e.g. financial services) or through more formalised coordination mechanisms (e.g. automatic enrolment in community sensitisation).

The broader remit of objectives for cash-plus programmes means they can align more obviously with the fourth (less addressed) function of social protection – that being the ‘transformative’ function, whereby social protection interventions seek to address exclusion and equity in access and provision (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). The transformative agenda of ‘social protection draws attention to:

1. Practical issues of programme design, such that design features do not entrench existing vulnerabilities and exclusion – for instance, ensuring that a vulnerable group, such as children living with disabilities, is not further stigmatised by inappropriate targeting and labelling.
2. Progressive and innovative programming for initiatives that empower vulnerable groups through enabling access, building social cohesion and trust, and giving a voice to underrepresented people (such as refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) or other stigmatised minorities in protracted crisis settings) (MacAuslan and Sabates-Wheeler 2011; cited in Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman 2011).

The relevance of the transformative agenda for cash-plus programming in protracted crisis settings is obvious, particularly when social relations are fraught with tension and latent conflict from years of war and displacement, and when trust in governing parties and institutions has been shattered. Beyond the vital functions of cash provision for relief of basic needs, deprivation and basic livelihood support, ‘plus’ components related to building trust, social cohesion and establishing peaceful relationships within and across communities in crisis contexts would appear to be critical. Yet, there is almost no evidence of these ‘plus’ components in existing programmes within protracted conflict settings (Lind *et al.* 2022).

2.2 Defining ‘protracted crisis’

While protracted crisis settings are diverse, generally they encompass places where authority is contested, war is ongoing and many people are residing in situations of long-term displacement, either as IDPs or as refugees. Many groups of people living in these settings (some of them often a target population of cash-plus programming), face increasing challenges, such as women and girls’ heightened risk of sexual exploitation (Holmes, Marsden and Quarterman 2021), or children and young people’s family disruption, among others. Designing and implementing programmes that address these structural challenges – heightened and sometimes different from those in stable contexts – is needed to be able to transform their lives and livelihoods.

In addition, protracted crises can occur because of, or be intensified by, recurrent climate shocks and stresses. It is sometimes implied that ‘climate’ and ‘conflict’ are parallel sources of vulnerability within protracted crises (e.g. ICRC 2020; Vivekananda *et al.* 2019), but this is misleading; there is no equivalence between the two. Climatic factors can, without doubt, exacerbate vulnerabilities within protracted crises, acting as ‘risk multipliers’ (Butler and Kefford 2018). But there are no reasonable grounds for understanding fragility and conflict essentially as products of climatic hazards, or thinking of these hazards as more than secondary, if compounding, sources of vulnerability and instability (Naess, Selby and Daoust 2022).

Each setting has its own specific history and dynamics of conflict, fragility and displacement. Some current crisis situations happen in places that were not fragile or conflict-affected ten years ago. Equally, some contexts that are currently categorised as ‘stable’ include at least elements, or particular geographical zones, of conflict and fragility (*ibid.*). While we use ‘protracted crisis’ as our main analytical category and suggest a framework for analysing cash-plus programming within it, we recognise the difficulties and dangers inherent in generalising across this category.

Conditions of conflict and fragility have two types of implication for cash-plus programming in protracted crises. On the one hand, they have implications for its design, targeting and delivery: weak administrative capacities, highly politicised decision-making, armed conflict, the association of social assistance itself with one party in a conflict, and more can pose huge challenges for programming. For example, certain areas and populations may be inaccessible due to insecurity or because of administrative barriers. State politico-administrative structures at subnational level may be degraded, lack capacities or be altogether missing. Alternative governance by rebel groups or other armed non-state actors may make it difficult, if not impossible, for international relief agencies and organisations to operate. Further, some of the most vulnerable people, including those who have been displaced, may lack legal rights and recognition by state institutions and authorities, complicating the delivery of much-needed support. All these characteristics complicate longer-term planning, thus tending to accentuate short-term responses without due attention to longer-term impacts (including of climate) that might render certain livelihoods unviable.

On the other hand, conflict and fragility can also have significant impacts on the nature and causes of vulnerabilities that cash-plus programmes seek to address. People in protracted crises often face direct and structural violence daily, while also lacking the quality and substance of citizenship. Conflict, displacement and climate change reshape access to resources and markets as the basis of resilient lives. The impacts on agricultural and pastoral livelihoods are particularly severe, through depleted assets; resettlement to camps or urban areas; diminished or no access to land and resources; loss of agro-ecological knowledge among younger generations; feelings of mistrust between different groups; militarisation; and armed self-defence. In these contexts, promoting livelihoods that are 'resilient' can be a shifting and misleading terrain for cash-plus programmes if the intention is circumscribed to supporting individuals and households to withstand compound risks and shocks linked with conflict-related processes and situations of displacement.

Protection outcomes are at the core of efforts to provide social assistance in relation to shorter-term relief; yet longer-term processes of recovery and rehabilitation, as well as peacebuilding objectives, can be particularly relevant in contexts with high levels of protracted crisis. Promoting access to a means of livelihood (often a portfolio of multiple livelihood activities) to affected groups in situations where pre-crisis livelihoods are no longer possible is also a priority in these settings. This also pertains to longer-term impacts of climate change and the need for responses that build adaptive capacities, not simply strengthening capacities to respond to short-term shocks (*ibid.*).

In other words, the nature and intensity of crisis should affect the design and delivery of the 'plus' components of a cash-plus programme. We would expect that where conflict and the threat of violence is protracted and high, programme objectives beyond food security would realistically focus on provision of basic needs (e.g. shelter, health), some recovery of assets and peacebuilding initiatives, very likely delivered through emergency response and on-the-ground implementers. Even delivery of cash in these contexts, along with the absence of food markets, will mean that delivery mechanisms and modalities will need to be adapted (for instance, through e-transfers or perhaps converted to food).

In other situations, for instance where climate and environmental factors have eroded livelihoods, natural assets and livestock over prolonged periods, the 'plus' components of a cash-plus programme would be different. In addition to the cash component, 'plus' components might include livestock restocking, access to seeds and farming equipment, rebuilding irrigation systems, provision of finance and training. And, again, in contexts of mass displacement, we would expect to see 'plus' components constitute measures for helping refugees access provision, social integration and cohesion measures, in addition to other components that focus on livelihoods more generally.

2.3 Recent work on cash-plus in crisis settings

A review of recent research on cash-plus programming in protracted crisis settings uncovers several key themes: the reliability of evidence, objectives and modalities, scale and targeting. These are reviewed in turn below.

Reliability of evidence

Existing evidence concerning the effectiveness of cash-plus programmes is minimal, and much of it derived from a small number of settings. Further, the lack of a common set of indicators, and differences in how these are measured, makes it challenging to compare evidence across different evaluations. Programme performance reviews typically report immediate outputs, but less is usually said about outcomes, while (enduring) impacts are rarely examined (Andrews *et al.* 2021; Wiggins *et al.* 2021). Reported evidence is prone to positive bias in publication, which leads to an overly rosy picture of results. Further, unpacking and generalising evidence to other contexts and groups entails great challenges, as few studies provide enough information about the context in which programmes are implemented or about the channels of impact.

Nevertheless, evidence is reported to be growing, and a recent review shows that a bundle of coordinated multidimensional interventions demonstrates greater impact on income, assets and savings relative to stand-alone interventions (Andrews *et al.* 2021). Moreover, some tools are emerging that may enable more inclusive programming, such as by helping build an evidence base of effective approaches, and guidance on how to incorporate specific vulnerable groups into programmes (Lippi and Taylor-Grosman 2017; Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative 2019; UNEP 2014).

Objectives and modalities

Wiggins *et al.* (2021) find that a key objective of cash-plus in conflict-affected settings is to help individuals and households to restore previous livelihoods or encourage new livelihood activities with capital support, training and technical assistance. Capital is more effective when there is a demand for what is produced. Vocational and technical training is relatively costly, small scale and very specific, and its effectiveness depends on local demand for skills taught. Generic business and financial skills often lead to better outcomes. Business support is often combined with psychosocial support to promote its success for groups, such as displaced populations and women. Elements of soft technical assistance are frequently provided to farmers and herders in a participatory way (e.g. farmer field school and community animal health workers), but with some sustainability-related challenges.

Further, the timing of the provision of any specific modality is key: an early response to conflict can enable the provision to go beyond simply providing relief for livelihoods support where assets have been eroded, social networks broken up and livelihoods undermined (Wiggins *et al.* 2021). It is also important that in addition to support provided at individual and household levels, it can be provided at community or national levels, by using components such as roadworks, market information and public services, which may allow structural challenges exacerbated by the conflict to be addressed (Wiggins *et al.* 2021).

In settings affected by *forced displacement*, one of the key objectives of cash-plus programmes is to build social cohesion and reduce tensions. This is a stated objective for both humanitarian and development organisations, which are increasingly expanding targeting criteria from citizens to both poor refugees and host community members (Heisey, Sánchez and Bernagros 2022).⁸ Some programmes emphasise the need for a 'normalisation' period for new arrivals, where meeting basic needs may need to be prioritised (rather than long-term solutions) (Trickle-Up 2019).

However, because most refugees often reside in protracted crisis situations with multiple constraints, emergency relief is often less suitable than longer-term solutions, such as changes to legal frameworks that would provide refugees with access to services and work opportunities. Research shows that while the consumption support element of cash-plus enables extremely poor people to minimise their use of negative coping strategies (e.g. selling asset transfers), continuous training and mentoring contribute to their capacity to build self-reliance (PAC 2020).

A small amount of work exists on mainstreaming *climate change* into cash-plus operations to avoid adding to environmental degradation, and to build peoples' resilience to climate shocks through actions designed to sustain and restore their natural environment. The literature often points to coordination of social protection policies with actions or strategies to adapt to climate change and mitigate disaster risk. For instance, programmes often target smallholders, aiming to diversify their livelihood portfolios and facilitate access to climate-smart agriculture, investment in human capital and asset protection, strengthening social networks to reduce reliance on negative coping strategies in the event of climate shocks, and supporting business models that make optimal use of (scarce) natural resources and reduce environmental risks (BRAC 2020; Concern Worldwide 2022).

However, these initiatives tend to emphasise support to help particular populations cope in the aftermath of climate-related shocks, with less attention given to how responses might support longer-term adaptation or whether they could be misaligned with other national priorities. Most cash-plus programmes in settings of climate vulnerability aim to strengthen coping and adaptive capacities within structural contexts, without addressing the underlying conditions that make people vulnerable, such as by considering barriers smallholders face to adopting specific initiatives.

⁸ 'Host community members' are people who live in places where displaced persons seek refuge. They may be local residents, residents of neighbouring communities, or individuals who have been living in the area for an extended period of time. They can belong to different nationalities or ethnic groups. They often play a significant role in providing support and assistance to the displaced population. 'Nationals' are those people who hold citizenship or legal status in a particular country and generally have access to the rights, benefits and services the government provides. Nationals can include both host community members and individuals who have not been affected by displacement.

Scale

Overall, the level of assistance provided in protracted crisis settings is low relative to actual need. This is exacerbated by constraints on accessing and receiving assistance, particularly for the poorest and most marginalised people (Wiggins *et al.* 2021). The current scale (and coverage) of cash-plus interventions is modest (i.e. many are pilots); scaling-up involves more than expanding programme beneficiary numbers or level of support. It includes improving quality of impact and sustainability of coverage, as well as the quality of processes of change and adaptation, such as by building on pre-existing government social safety nets (Andrews *et al.* 2021).

Clearly, scale is influenced by the contexts in which these programmes are being implemented (e.g. some may raise challenges in relation to scaling-up or even continuing during conflict), and delivery costs and availability of funds; thus, understanding cost structures is key to assessing the scope for scaling up programmes.⁹ Furthermore, adopting and scaling up cash-plus programmes depends on their political acceptability and involves trade-offs in programme design and implementation, specifically around objectives, financing and institutional arrangements for delivery. These considerations, as well as perspectives on historical processes, structural forces and institutions, are critical in crisis contexts and underpin the question of scaling up (*ibid.*).

Targeting

Andrews *et al.* (2021) suggest that the most common targeting criteria focus on the most vulnerable groups (including children, people with disabilities and displaced people), and that the most frequently cited objectives are self-employment, income diversification and resilience. Further, most programmes incorporate a focus on gender (e.g. in their design to promote empowerment and mitigate unintended risks), as there can be gender-specific threats in protracted crises, including increased care responsibilities. Young people are also an important category that cash-plus programmes target, where the emphasis is on supporting their self-employment and economic inclusion by linking them to value chains and markets (*ibid.*). Indeed, targeting of programmes is often categorical, but usually without considering categories that might relate explicitly to conflict-related dynamics, such as displaced people or former combatants. In contexts with high numbers of forcibly displaced people, evidence argues for tailoring programme design and implementation features to the higher levels of mobility and insecure legal status of displaced people (Victor 2017).

While still nascent, most of the existing literature on cash-plus programmes in crises is in response to specific, acute shocks – primarily climate shocks and displacement. What, then, of protracted crises, where conflict risks and/or legacies combine with displacement and recurring climate shocks in ways that heighten vulnerability, but also constrain the range of possible interventions? Our purpose in this review, therefore, is to determine whether there are clear differences in the method of provision and type of complementary support provided across different contexts, and to reflect on whether these cash-plus programmes are fit for protracted multi-crisis settings. Can these programmes adequately cater for the different drivers of vulnerability within their design and implementation across contexts characterised by multiple, intersecting drivers of vulnerability and different social protection systems or provision?

3. Methodology

Our earlier paper (Lind *et al.* 2022) detailed a methodology for categorising protracted crises along two axes, one in relation to strength of social protection system and the other in relation to conflict-related fatalities. In this paper we extend this method by acknowledging that protracted crises are complex, involving different kinds of conditions and shocks that are overlapping and compounding. As detailed above, we focus on three dimensions of protracted crisis: (1) protracted forced displacement; (2) climate change vulnerability; and (3) conflict-related fatalities. Building on established indicators for each, we combine these to create an index to: (a) inform the selection of countries that will be used as a basis for searches of cash-plus programmes; (b) map the countries along a scale of ‘crisis protractedness’; and (c) assess and compare the design

⁹ See newly developed PEI Quick Costing Tool in Andrews *et al.* (2021).

characteristics and impacts of cash-plus programmes in these countries, considering both the intensity of protracted crisis conditions and the strength of the social protection system, to which we now turn.

3.1 Measuring strength of social protection system

Work by the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board, as well as Winder Rossi *et al.* (2017), usefully distinguishes different social protection scenarios in relation to state (national government) involvement in social protection provision and country context (see Table 3.1). The scenarios range from complete absence of social protection provision due to conflict or war, to a situation in which the social protection system is flexible (or fully shock responsive) and able to respond in an appropriate and efficient manner after a shock. Category 1 (no system) and category 5 (highly shock responsive system) should be considered as 'reference scenarios'. Intermediate categories range from a situation in which a coherent social protection system has not yet been developed to one in which a national social protection system exists but is only partially able to adapt and respond to shocks. Of course, in reality the scale would be continuous, reflecting the nuances between system strength and responsiveness across countries and regions; but for ease of comprehension and conceptual presentation categories are useful.

Table 3.1: Maturity of social protection system and function of humanitarian response

Category	Type of social protection context or scenario	Description	Remit for humanitarian or emergency response
1.	No system or severely weakened system	Context where there is no formal provision of social assistance and/or existing structures (formal and non-formal) have been shattered or severely weakened by crises or conflict.	Humanitarian assistance largely substitutes for state-led social protection, with limited scope for linking to national systems.
2.	Nascent social protection system	Initial components of a social protection system are being put in place, providing short- to medium-term support, mostly in relation to acute risks, threats or crises. Yet, a coherent system has not been developed.	Humanitarian assistance is likely to retain a significant role, but efforts to link with national systems are possible if feasible and appropriate.
3	State social protection system unable to respond to repeated crises	A social protection programme or system exists and is institutionalised within the state structure, yet it is rigid and inflexible or too overloaded; it is unable to adapt to increasing burden of need in the event of a covariant shock or crisis.	International humanitarian assistance may still be needed, but it is possible to link more closely with national systems if appropriate.
4.	Limited shock responsive national social protection system	A social protection programme or system exists that includes committed state involvement (even if it is donor funded). The system is partially able to respond to predictable shocks and increase coverage of households that have been affected by the shock and are eligible to receive social protection.	Efforts are likely to focus on increasing the shock responsiveness of national systems and making financing more sustainable and domestically led. Any humanitarian role is more limited, with the important exception of refugee situations, in which case the international community helps to shoulder the financing burden.
5.	Highly shock responsive national social protection system	An ideal scenario where a social protection system is institutionalised within state structures, and is prepared to respond nimbly and flexibly to predictable and unpredictable shocks and stresses.	States can lead both routine social protection and response to shocks through responsive social protection and domestic emergency management.


Source: Authors' own. Adapted from Winder-Rossi *et al.* (2017).

These scenarios help to illustrate the different providers, types of interventions and delivery approaches that are most appropriate in different contexts. For instance, where a system is shattered or severely weakened, the most appropriate provider of cash assistance is most likely the international humanitarian system. Where the state system exists but is weak, the international system can provide support to strengthen state-led social protection and deliver humanitarian resources through the system. Ideally, in a stable context, social assistance is provided through the state social protection system.

Referring to Table 3.1, most scaled-up cash-plus programmes are implemented in contexts that correspond to categories 4 and 5. In other words, these are the contexts in which the promotive function (e.g. supporting livelihood resilience, jobs, education) of social protection is most likely to bear results. In contexts such as categories 1 and 2, the protective (e.g. food, cash and asset transfers) and preventive (e.g. insurance) functions would be expected to take precedence as relief against destitution and deprivation, including food security, nutrition, consumption and health. Other functions specific to contexts of high levels of protracted crisis with conflict, displacement and climate vulnerability, such as recovery of infrastructure and assets, and social cohesion and inclusion (more of a 'transformative' element), should also come into play in scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Supporting productive capacity will also be possible in category 3, if supported by non-state actors and combined with infrastructure and asset recovery, and social cohesion initiatives.

Building on this scale, we plot countries experiencing protracted crises according to the strength of their social protection system (Figure 3.1 shows how the countries map onto this index (vertical axis)). This is not an empirically defined scale, but one based on expert advice and knowledge of the country contexts. We validated countries' placement along this scale with social protection experts who have country-level knowledge of where countries are situated relative to one another. A challenge with this method of validation is around its potential subjectivity in cases where the experts' profile – their positioning in the aid and research architecture, and how they 'see' particular places – may affect their judgement on where countries are placed. We aimed to address this by triangulating with multiple experts. The Asian Development Bank¹⁰ and World Bank¹¹ have attempted to create empirical indicators of social protection, although they are specific to defined geographical contexts, measuring performance of programming rather than the strength of the system.

Figure 3.1: Country mapping and categories, based on level of protracted crisis and strength of social protection system



¹⁰ See: <https://socialprotection.org/discover/databases/adbs-social-protection-index-spi>

¹¹ See: www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire/documentation

The scale Winder Rossi *et al.* (2017) provide is useful to identify countries with weak systems and those which are somewhat stronger but still unable to respond to repeated crises. Countries are clustered with those with social protection systems of similar strength to see how these different crisis contexts may provide diverse challenges and opportunities for cash-plus programming, based on their institutional architecture. According to our criteria for country selection, as outlined above, no 'stable' countries are included in the sample. The countries in our sample correlate highly with weaker or no state social protection system and therefore our 'social protection' axis is truncated at level 3. **Weaker social protection systems (up to 2) include Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Mali, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen; and stronger systems (above 2) include Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria and Uganda.**

3.2 Measuring complex protracted crises

Building on earlier work that focused on protracted crises defined only by conflict-related violence (see Lind *et al.* 2022), this paper recognises the more typical reality that protracted crises are complex and involve multiple compounding shocks and stressors. Thus, in this paper we focus on places where multiple dimensions of crisis and fragility overlap, and where covariate shocks compound existing vulnerabilities. Our conceptualisation and measurement of crisis focus on conflict, displacement and climate as the three main shocks and stresses. The data sources used to measure these three types of conditions and shocks are listed below:

1. For **conflict** we use data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)¹² (19/02/2019–18/02/2022) for conflict-related fatalities, based on number of deaths from riots; violence against civilians; battles; and explosions or remote violence.
2. For **protracted displacement** we use data from UNHCR (2020) for forcibly displaced people, based on country of asylum and counting refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs of concern, Venezuelans displaced abroad, stateless people and others of concern.
3. For **climate shocks** we use the 2019 Notre Dame Global Adaptation (ND-GAIN) Index for climate vulnerability, based on countries' climate vulnerability and readiness.

Drawing on these datasets, we included countries that met at least two of the following criteria:

- At least 1,000 fatalities recorded per year, on average, according to ACLED data.
- At least 1 million forcibly displaced people in the country, according to UNHCR data.
- Up to a score of 36 on the ND-GAIN Index (indicating higher levels of climate change vulnerability).

In total, we include 16 countries: **Afghanistan; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; DRC; Ethiopia; Iraq; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan; Syria; Uganda; and Yemen.** Using the three indicators above, we created a composite index as a measurement of intensity of protracted crisis. We did this by normalising (to 0, 1) values of each of the three indicators, then averaging the result to generate a composite indicator. We used the following formula:

Protracted crisis index =

$$\frac{(X_{ACLED} - Min_{ACLED})}{(Max_{ACLED} - Min_{ACLED})} * \frac{1}{3} + \frac{(X_{UNHCR} - Min_{UNHCR})}{(Max_{UNHCR} - Min_{UNHCR})} * \frac{1}{3} + \frac{(X_{NDGAIN} - Min_{NDGAIN})}{(Max_{NDGAIN} - Min_{NDGAIN})} * \frac{1}{3}$$

Thus, countries are scored relative to their level of conflict-based fatalities, numbers of forcibly displaced people and degree of climate vulnerability. These are weighted equally. Figure 3.1 shows how the countries map onto this index (horizontal axis). Countries experiencing low-intensity protracted crises include Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Mali and Pakistan; medium-intensity protracted crises include Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria,

¹² ACLED (2020) challenges using conflict-related fatalities as a proxy for the intensity of a conflict, which can be biased (e.g. gendered) and inaccurate; for example, women may be more likely to experience different forms of conflict-related violence, as opposed to men (civilians and otherwise) – this proxy measure for conflict is renowned worldwide and considered reliable. Future research could look into selecting and categorising countries' conflict level by other indicators, such as reports of sexual abuse. However, this proxy has its own challenges as episodes of gender-based violence can also go under-reported in many contexts.

Somalia, South Sudan,¹³ Sudan and Uganda; and high-intensity protracted crises include Afghanistan, DRC, Syria and Yemen. In summary, the placement of countries in the figure was determined by a combination of empirical data, our expert knowledge, country documents and consultation with other experts.

3.3 Method for identifying cash-plus programmes

The process of identifying cash-plus programmes within these contexts was based on a comprehensive review of grey and academic literature (see Annexe 1 for a detailed description of our review strategy and Box 3.1 on conceptual framing of cash-plus programmes). The literature reviewed constituted documents¹⁴ published over the past ten years (since 2012), for programmes active at some point during that period, and sources included funding and implementing agencies, academic and grey literature, and programme evaluations. Specifically, this review covers programmes that include a social assistance component (including conditional or unconditional cash transfers, public works programmes and grants) and complementary 'plus' components to strengthen livelihoods (e.g. through providing skills training, asset transfers, agricultural extension, microcredit, access to finance and animal health services).¹⁵

Box 3.1: Research inclusion criteria for cash-plus programmes

Document type: academic journal articles, grey literature, books and book chapters, and PhD dissertations.

Modalities: conditional or unconditional cash transfer or grant, which can be accompanied by 'plus' components including at least one of the following: skills training, asset transfers, agricultural extension, microcredit, access to finance and animal health services; and sometimes accompanied by: coaching, mentoring and sensitisation; market links and information; access to social services; apprenticeships placements and education; food assistance and education supplements; or job matching. Programmes included those where: (1) there is one programme with multiple components within it; as well as (2) a cash transfer programme, which may link beneficiaries to programmes or services ('plus' components as above) provided by other organisations and agencies.

Year of publication: studies published over the past ten years (since 2012), for programmes active at some point during that period.

Languages of publication: English and French.

Countries covered: Afghanistan; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; DRC; Ethiopia; Iraq; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan; Syria; Uganda; Yemen.

Process:

Activity 1 – keyword search of databases and other web-based search engines, using a structured approach that allows for systematic review and replication.

Activity 2 – initial review of keywords on titles, table of contents, abstracts and summaries, introduction, and full papers to define programmes to include in the list.

Activity 3 – identification of impact evaluations and assessments for selected programmes.

Activity 4 – recording and coding of programmes and impacts according to key criteria.

¹³ South Sudan is excluded from the ND-GAIN Index; thus, based on contextual similarities with other settings included in ND-GAIN, including Somalia and Sudan, we identified a value for South Sudan to include it in our index.

¹⁴ Note on programme documentation vs programme implementation: the analysis in this paper is based on project and impact documentation. What happens on the ground, in terms of any process adaptations field staff make during implementation that are not reflected in project-level documents, will not be part of the analysis and is an area for further research.

¹⁵ For further explanation of programming elements that are promotive, see Slater and Sabates-Wheeler (2021). See Annexe 1 for additional details on the methodology and inclusion criteria used to identify programmes. Refer to Annexe 2 for a list of the programmes that we identified and used as the basis for empirical analysis.

In total, 97 programmes met the criteria for our review (see Table 3.2, which shows the number of programmes by country; and intensity of protracted crisis, as depicted in Figure 3.1). As the core objective of this paper is to understand differences in the characteristics of cash-plus programmes across different protracted crisis contexts, we focused on programme design and implementation aspects: objectives, ‘plus’ components, targeting criteria, implementer types, evaluation methods, and impacts and outcomes.

Table 3.2: Number of cash-plus programmes reviewed, by country and intensity of crisis

Countries	Low intensity (<0.3)	Medium intensity (0.3–0.5)	High intensity (>0.5)	Total
Burkina Faso	13			13
Niger		10		10
South Sudan		8		8
Nigeria		8		8
Yemen			7	7
Afghanistan			7	7
Ethiopia		6		6
DRC			6	6
Somalia		6		6
Uganda		6		6
Mali	6			6
Iraq	4			4
Cameroon	3			3
Pakistan	3			3
Syria			2	2
Sudan		2		2
Total	29	46	22	97

Source: Authors' own.

Most programmes included in this review have limited coverage: almost half are small scale (targeting fewer than 50,000 people or 10,000 households) and include pilots or experimental programmes (see Table 3.3). Just 16 per cent cover more than 250,000 people or 50,000 households. The median duration of these programmes is four years (although the duration of assistance provided to beneficiaries was only a portion of that time, sometimes not indicated, and others depended on the different components that were provided).¹⁶ Beyond government at national and subnational levels, programmes were implemented by a combination of non-state actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international NGOs (INGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies and the private sector.

¹⁶ Challenges in providing greater detail on the duration of programmes and their components include poor record keeping on many of the specific details of programmes and the variable duration of their components.

Table 3.3: Number of cash-plus programmes reviewed, by country and scale of coverage

Countries	Small	Medium	Large	Unknown	Total
Afghanistan	5	1	1		7
Burkina Faso	10	2	1		13
Cameroon		2	1		3
DRC	2	2	2		6
Ethiopia	2	1	3		6
Iraq	3			1	4
Mali	4	1	1		6
Niger	5	2	2	1	10
Nigeria	1	5		2	8
Pakistan		1	1	1	3
Somalia	3	1		2	6
South Sudan	4	2	1	1	8
Sudan		1		1	2
Syria	2				2
Uganda	3	1	1	1	6
Yemen	3	1	1	2	7
Total	47	23	15	12	97

Source: Authors' own.

4. Findings and analysis

This section presents the findings from our review of 97 cash-plus programmes in 16 countries experiencing protracted crises. We first present findings for the overall sample, before assessing programmes in relation to intensity of protracted crisis and strength of social protection system.

4.1 Overall findings

Objectives


As described above, both funders' and implementers' priorities, as well as country context, including dimensions (e.g. conflict, displacement, climate vulnerability) and intensity of crisis, could be expected to have a bearing on stated programme objectives (Figure 4.1).

Most programmes (84 per cent) have multiple stated objectives. Improving food security, health and nutrition is the most common objective, indicated by nearly half (45 per cent) of all programmes. For instance, programme 25 (Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project, DRC) states that its aim is 'to improve access to adequate quantity and quality of foods'. Beyond this core protective objective, many of the other objectives reflect efforts to promote livelihoods, such as through building and improving productive capacity (44 per

cent); enhancing rates of self-employment or graduation (35 per cent); strengthening resilience (31 per cent); or increasing access to work opportunities (24 per cent). Programme 47 in Niger illustrates an example of a resilience objective 'to support vulnerable households in Tahoua to achieve greater resilience to food shocks'.

Objectives that could be more explicitly associated with the dynamics of protracted crises include promoting social cohesion (30 per cent) and building or recovering infrastructure and assets (21 per cent). For instance, programme 37 (Funding Facility for Stabilization, Iraq) states that its objective is 'to facilitate the return of displaced Iraqis, to lay the groundwork for reconstruction and recovery and to safeguard communities against the resurgence of violence and extremism'. Yet, overall, objectives of cash-plus programmes in protracted crises are not dissimilar from those in other settings that are peaceful and/or stable.

Figure 4.1: Objectives of cash-plus programmes in protracted crises




Note: SP = social protection
Source: Authors' own.

'Plus' components

Cash-plus programmes incorporate a suite of components beyond social transfers, reflecting an underlying theory of change that an integrated range of services and support alongside transfers is needed to improve livelihoods. Most programmes reviewed (86 per cent) have multiple 'plus' components. The most common component, present in 92 per cent of programmes, is the provision of skills training and capacity building of beneficiaries and communities (Figure 4.2). This covers both the training (e.g. vocational, technical, life skills, business focused, etc.) and building of skills and capacity of people in communities and service providers (if different). For instance, programme 37 (Funding Facility for Stabilization, Iraq) offers vocational training and government capacity building to deliver essential services to communities.

Related efforts are also apparent in components that provide coaching, mentoring and sensitisation (51 per cent), as well as strengthening access to finance and microcredit (47 per cent). Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation were not part of the inclusion criteria, yet as highlighted, many programmes offer these. For instance, programme 14 (Social Safety Net Project, Burkina Faso) provided social and behaviour change communication dissemination via radio on health, hygiene and nutrition. Many components reflect a focus on strengthening crop and livestock production (agricultural extension: 36 per cent; animal health services: 10 per cent) or encouraging entrepreneurship and self-employment, including through access to financial services and training.

Figure 4.2: ‘Plus’ components of cash-plus programmes in protracted crises



Source: Authors' own.

Payments and conditionalities

The frequency and predictability of transfers are important to ensure the aims of many programmes that support food security, nutrition and investment in livelihoods. Programmes make payments as frequent and regular transfers or one-off lump sum payments; sometimes, both can be made in the same programme. Just over half (52 per cent) of the programmes reviewed provide frequent transfers.¹⁷ While this figure seems low, it indicates that even in protracted crises it is possible to make regular transfers. Furthermore, lump-sum payments are also often an important part of cash-plus programmes to support a significant investment in agricultural productivity or to start other income-generating activities. However, less than one third of programmes (29 per cent) provide a lump-sum payment; with this type of payment there may also be risks relating to conflict and insecurity, and transfers of large sums of money. Some 18 per cent of programmes incorporate both frequent and lump-sum payments.

Programmes make variable use of conditionalities as a feature of implementation. Some programmes provide a range of services alongside an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) (29 per cent). More common, however, is the use of conditionalities (e.g. work, savings, health visits, attending education or training sessions, preparing business plans) in connection with specific programme objectives. Some 47 per cent of programmes have conditions attached to transfers, whereas just under a quarter (24 per cent) incorporate conditions for some programme components, but have no conditions for others. When looking specifically at condition types, work-based conditionalities are the most common (62 per cent of programmes that include components with conditions), followed by business-related conditionalities (43 per cent), soft conditionalities (including health, education or training, in 22 per cent of programmes) and savings-based conditionalities (3 per cent).

Targeting criteria


In contexts of overlapping shocks and crises, categorical targeting is very common, often addressing multiple demographic groups (Figure 4.3). As in settings that are otherwise peaceful and stable, cash-plus programmes in protracted crisis settings target specific groups that are, though not associated directly with the dynamics of the crisis, perceived to be more vulnerable and in need of focused efforts to improve their livelihoods, such as women, poor people and young people.

¹⁷ In this paper, 'frequent' transfers refers to the provision of multiple payments of cash, on a weekly/monthly/bi-monthly/seasonal/quarterly basis, and excludes one-off grants or transfers; for example, those provided in cash-for-work programmes.

Overall, 'women' is the most common category used in targeting (57 per cent, including programmes targeting pregnant women or widows),¹⁸ closely followed by those assessed as poor (48 per cent). Programme 54 (PPFS-CT, Niger) illustrates a case of targeting poor women. The programme uses a proxy means test to select 30 per cent of eligible households and requires that women are the transfer recipients.

Yet, in the protracted crisis settings reviewed for this paper, programmes also specifically target groups defined by crisis-related vulnerability markers such as exposure to conflict (e.g. host communities, former combatants) and displacement (IDPs, refugees and returnees, in that order), as well as those who are particularly at risk of suffering from conflict-related processes, such as minorities and those who are otherwise marginalised. Those un-/under-employed, farmers and pastoralists, children and orphans, entrepreneurs, people with disabilities, people with low educational attainment and older people were targeted as well, but to a lesser extent. Less than a fifth of programmes explicitly targeted these groups.

Figure 4.3: Targeting criteria used in cash-plus programmes in protracted crises



Source: Authors' own.

Implementers

The model of cash-plus programmes that provide an integrated range of services and support that spans sectors is an indication of the wide number of agencies and offices that are often involved in implementation. For this reason, there are often practical barriers to implementing cash-plus programmes in protracted crises, given that public services are often spread thin or severely degraded. Further, the assumption is that state public authorities and administrations will be weaker in settings affected by protracted crises and, therefore, that a wider range of stakeholders will be involved in implementing programmes.

Our results indicate that government (mainly at national level, with less emphasis on regional and local levels)¹⁹ is involved in implementation in nearly half all programmes (47 per cent). This includes cases where cash-plus programmes link to (or are part of) nationally led social protection systems, such as programme 32

¹⁸ In terms of whether women beneficiaries must be the head of the household, that information is not necessarily explicit in programme documents.

¹⁹ When project documents and websites indicated the government as an implementing partner, they referred to: national or federal government departments and ministries; local district or regional administrations; national agencies; social funds; national programmes or offices; national technical services; national commissions; provincial authorities; and central banks.

(IN-SCT Pilot/Livelihood Component – PSNP, Ethiopia) or programme 65 (Ehsaas National Poverty Graduation Initiative/Programme, Pakistan, under the flagship poverty alleviation programme).

However, only a quarter of these specify a role for government offices in the subnational delivery chain, such as local-level development agents, community health workers or agricultural extension officers. Unsurprisingly, INGOs and UN agencies, often substituting for states in providing services and assistance in protracted crisis settings, are involved in implementation in many programmes (INGOs: 44 per cent; UN agencies: 32 per cent). Other implementing authorities include national or local NGOs (25 per cent) and private sector actors (15 per cent).

Evaluation, impacts and outcomes

This section details the methods and indicators used to evaluate cash-plus programmes as well as evidence of their impacts and outcomes in protracted crises.²⁰ Evaluations were retrieved either through web-based searches and/or by contacting agencies involved in implementation, and include assessments at midterm, endline and several years after projects had finished. Overall, evaluations were identified for around half (49 per cent) of all programmes. Almost half the identified assessments built on quantitative methods only, and impact evaluation methods ranged from recipients vs non-recipients, to multiple treatment arms, and 'before and after' interventions. With regard to indicators used to evaluate programme impacts and outcomes,

Box 4.1: Cash-only vs cash-plus – findings from impact evaluations

Of the 97 programmes reviewed for this paper, just seven programmes from five countries (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger and Uganda) have impact evaluations that compared cash-only to cash-plus treatments. Analysis of these evaluations shows that:

- Cash-plus interventions from more than half these evaluations report **significant and positive impacts from the cash-plus components combined** compared to cash only. The number of indicators resulting in significant positive impacts are highest when three key components are combined with **frequent UCTs** (programme 50, Niger Safety Net Project): 'skills training and capacity building', 'coaching, mentoring and sensitisation', and 'access to finance'. This results in 11 significantly improved social, economic and political outcome indicators, such as consumption, social cohesion, collective action and women's empowerment. Interestingly, if the same 'plus' components are combined with a **lump-sum UCT** (as opposed to frequent UCTs, as above), no positive or significant outcomes are seen in the outcome indicators (programme 89, Village Enterprise Program, Uganda). Alternatively, if the same 'plus' components are combined with **frequent conditional cash transfers** (conditional on training), six socioeconomic outcomes show significant and positive changes, including food security and gender equitable attitude indicators (programme 7, Women for Women International, Afghanistan).
- The impacts of cash-plus programmes appear to be nuanced depending on the *context*, the *bundle* of components, and the types of *indicators* measured (see Table A4.1 in Annexe 4 for detailed information; and programme 50 as an example). There is a high degree of **heterogeneity** and mixed results in the available evidence.
- For programmes implemented in contexts of **high- and medium-intensity** protracted crises, cash-plus programmes provided relatively better transformational outcomes compared to cash only (e.g. programme 2, Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training, Afghanistan; and programme 34, Strengthen PSNP4 Institutions and Resilience, Ethiopia, highlight better cohesion and financial inclusion impacts, respectively). Evaluation findings indicate that cash-plus programmes had more sustainable impacts than cash only (e.g. programme 2), and interestingly, better protective outcomes as well (e.g. programmes 7 and 89, for food security and consumption, respectively). However, an impact evaluation of a cash-plus programme implemented in a **low-intensity** protracted crisis setting showed cash-only had significant positive impacts on aspirations for children's education. The addition of the 'plus' components did not result in significant change.

²⁰ See Annexe 3 for detailed tables showing the impact of programmes (positive, negative or neutral) across a range of indicators.


incomes and economic inclusion (e.g. market access, financial services, savings)²¹ were the most frequently reported (77 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively).

Other indicators measured include social cohesion and peacebuilding (reflecting the protracted crisis setting),²² social inclusion,²³ food security and assets.²⁴ In general, when reported, impacts and outcomes indicators show increases and improvements. A neutral (or no) impact is twice as likely to be reported as a negative impact. Overall, evaluation evidence points to the most frequent positive impacts being on income and economic inclusion indicators,²⁵ followed by food security and assets. For instance, an assessment of programme 59 (Gender Graduation Program, Nigeria) reports an average net monthly increase (from US\$10 to US\$67) and an average total savings increase (from US\$11 to US\$116). Less frequently reported, yet still with positive impacts, are psychosocial indicators including social cohesion and social inclusion.

4.2 Comparing cash-plus programmes by intensity of protracted crises

In this section we review design and implementation features of cash-plus programmes, as well as methods of evaluation and evidence of their impacts according to the intensity (severity) of protracted crises. As explained in the preceding section, we use an index incorporating measurements of conflict, displacement and climate change vulnerability to locate countries on a scale of protracted crisis intensity (from 0 to 1; see Figure 4.4). After locating the countries on this scale, we identified three clusters of protracted crisis settings: low intensity, indicating a context with recurring shocks but no enduring severe conditions; medium intensity, often experiencing some level of conflict and hosting large, displaced populations; and high intensity, where there are high levels of conflict-related fatalities, large displaced populations and a high degree of climate change vulnerability.

Figure 4.4: Placement of countries according to intensity of protracted crisis



Source: Authors' own.

Objectives

While cash-plus programmes generally feature livelihood promotion as a fundamental objective, we would expect that the objectives of cash-plus programmes would reflect variation and nuance according to the intensity of protracted crises. Important differences emerge when looking across categories defined by low, medium and high levels of intensity of protracted crises (Table 4.1). Notably, despite higher levels of conflict, displacement and climate change vulnerability, enhancing self-employment and graduation stands out as the most common programme objective in high-intensity protracted crises (55 per cent).

One example is programme 95 (Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project), the aims of which include 'restoring or establishing [beneficiaries'] livelihoods and starting their own businesses... promoting

²¹ Because impact evaluations measure very many different indicators, we have clustered them based on overall themes and logic in our analysis.

²² This category includes indicators such as support for the government, political violence, participation, sharing or reciprocity, criminality, dialogue, etc.

²³ This category includes indicators such as gender equity, social capital, empowerment, access to basic services, etc.

²⁴ These may refer to productive assets (e.g. livestock, land), or long-term or durable assets (e.g. motorcycles).

²⁵ This category includes indicators such as market access, financial services, savings, etc.

women’s entrepreneurship to generate higher income’. By comparison, self-employment and graduation ranks third in medium-intensity crisis settings, and seventh in lower-intensity settings. Instead, in settings with less intense crisis conditions, resilience ranks as the most common objective (along with building and improving productive capacity), as in the case of programme 21 (Adaptive Safety Nets and Economic Inclusion Project, Cameroon), which intended to ‘increase [households’] resilience to conflict- and climate-related shocks’. A protective focus on improving food security, nutrition and health is the most common objective of programmes in medium-intensity protracted crises.

Despite these differences, objectives associated with livelihood promotion are by far the most common across all settings. This includes ‘building and improving productive capacity’, which is in the top two objectives in all three categories. Encouraging social cohesion, an objective with greater urgency and specific dimensions in protracted crises, also features among the top five programme objectives across all three protracted crisis categories.

This indicates that the aim of cash-plus programmes, beyond improving the condition of individuals, is to advance broader societal aspirations of inclusion and strengthening the social contract. An example of this, programme 68 (Enhancing Durable Solutions for and Reintegration of Displacement Affected Communities in Mogadishu and Baidoa, Somalia), seeks ‘to create a conducive environment to reach durable solutions for displacement-affected communities in South-West State, Somalia’. Relatedly, and of significance in relation to the discussion below in section 4.3, some programmes aspire to put in place the building blocks of a national social protection programme, particularly in medium-intensity protracted crises (15 per cent of all programmes).

Table 4.1: Objectives of cash-plus programmes, by protracted crisis setting

Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity
Resilience (1)	Food security, nutrition and health	Self-employment and graduation
Building and improving productive capacities (1)	Building and improving productive capacities	Building and improving productive capacities
Food security, nutrition and health	Self-employment and graduation	Food security, nutrition and health (3)
Social cohesion	Work opportunities	Social cohesion (3)
Building and recovering infrastructure and assets (5)	Social cohesion	Building and recovering infrastructure and assets
Improved environmental management (5)		Resilience

*Note: Numbers in brackets represent the ranking (based on frequency) of the objective; objectives with the same number in brackets are those that have the same frequency of appearance in the data.
Source: Authors’ own.*

‘Plus’ components

Across protracted crisis settings, we would expect that contexts with lower-intensity crisis conditions would exhibit a greater range of programme components. This is because, without acute conflict risks, there would be a greater range of public services and technical support. Indeed, in contexts with high-intensity protracted crises, the average number of ‘plus’ components is lowest (2.64). However, comparing programme types in low-, medium- and high-intensity protracted crisis settings, ‘plus’ components are broadly similar (Table 4.2).

In all settings, skills training and capacity building is by far the most common component. In medium- and high-intensity crisis settings, access to finance and microcredit is the second most-indicated ‘plus’ component. Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation is the second most common objective in low-intensity crisis settings and ranks third in medium- and high-intensity crisis settings. Agricultural extension and asset transfers are common objectives across the three settings, reflecting the emphasis on improving agricultural productivity, entrepreneurship and self-employment. For instance, programme 48 (Transferts Productifs

(CASH+), Niger) offers seeds, fertiliser and goats to beneficiaries. Job matching, apprenticeships and placements, which often feature in cash-plus programmes in more peaceful and stable settings, are not significant in the protracted crisis settings we reviewed.

Table 4.2: ‘Plus’ components of cash-plus programmes, by protracted crisis setting

Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity
Skills training and capacity building	Skills training and capacity building	Skills training and capacity building
Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation	Access to finance	Access to finance
Agricultural extension	Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation	Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation
Access to finance	Agricultural extension	Agricultural extension
Asset transfer	Asset transfer	Asset transfer

Source: Authors’ own.

Payments and conditionalities

As shown in Table 4.3, the percentage of programmes with conditionalities increases with the level of protracted crisis, from 62 per cent of programmes in low intensity crisis settings to 77 per cent in high-intensity settings. This seems counterintuitive, as one would expect that more severely disrupted conditions would imply higher challenges in monitoring conditions, as well as a lower likelihood that beneficiaries can meet the conditions.

Work (such as through public works and cash-for-work programmes) and business plan requirements were more often established conditions to participate in these programmes, with business plans being more prominent in higher-intensity crisis settings, and work being more common in lower-intensity settings. Enforcing work related conditions decreases in contexts with higher-intensity protracted crises. This is an interesting finding as these are the contexts where infrastructure is more likely to be destroyed and in need of rebuilding, although some security and capacity challenges may arise in these settings. Soft conditionalities, based on health, education and training requirements, are most common in low-intensity crisis settings, where there may be better infrastructure and systems in place compared with higher-intensity crises. Very few programmes have reported requirements (conditionalities) to have formal savings. This could reflect the difficulties of providing financial services and financial inclusion activities in protracted crisis settings.

Table 4.3: Types of conditions in programmes with conditionalities attached, by protracted crisis setting

	Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity	Total
Total no. of programmes	29	46	22	97
Total no. of programmes with conditionalities (%)	18 (62%)	34 (74%)	17 (77%)	69 (71%)
Work	12	21	10	43
Saving		2		2
Health/education/training	6	6	3	15
Business	6	17	7	30

Source: Authors’ own.

Targeting criteria

In protracted crises, we would expect targeting criteria in part to reflect an emphasis on populations and groups whose vulnerability is directly associated with processes and conditions relating to conflict, displacement and a high level of exposure to climate shocks. Thus, particularly in high-intensity protracted crises, we would expect programmes to aim to cover people who are affected by conflict, IDPs, refugees, and/or returnees. Yet, as explained in section 4.1, targeting criteria for all the programmes reviewed show a concentrated focus on targeting women (including pregnant women and widows), young people and those variously defined as being ‘poor’. In lower-intensity crisis settings, crisis-related identifiers (e.g. affected by conflict, refugee, IDP) do not rank in the top five targeting criteria (Table 4.4). In medium- and high-intensity crisis settings, ‘people affected by conflict’ is a top ranked category (tied second in high-intensity crisis settings and fifth in medium-intensity settings).

Further, minorities and marginalised groups, while not explicitly associated with protracted crisis settings, nonetheless assume a particular salience in these places, given social and political divisions, exclusions and discriminatory regimes. This might suggest that programme designers are trying to craft targeting in ways that address vulnerabilities that crisis conditions generate. As expected, forcibly displaced people are among the top five targeting criteria in high-intensity crisis settings. For instance, programme 92 (Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen Programme) targeted ‘the Mohamasheen (a socio-economically marginalized group found in the peripheries of urban centers), internally displaced persons (IDPs, often lost their IDs) and stressed host communities’.

Table 4.4: Targeting criteria of cash-plus programmes, by protracted crisis setting

Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity
Poor people	Women, pregnant women, widows	Women, pregnant women, widows
Women, pregnant women, widows	Poor people	Poor people (2)
Young people	Young people	People affected by conflict (2)
Farmers and pastoralists	Minorities and marginalised groups	Minorities and marginalised groups
Un-/under-employed	People affected by conflict	Forcibly displaced people
		Un-/under-employed

Source: Authors' own.

Implementers

In protracted crises, where public authority can be contested, various non-state actors may substitute for the state. Where there are high numbers of non-citizens who have been forcibly displaced from their country of origin, we would expect that organisations and agencies involved in implementing cash-plus programmes would be more diverse, with less emphasis on government entities.

In section 4.1, we explained that while the government is the most common type of implementing authority, on closer inspection this seems limited to strategic and policy direction. At the subnational and local levels, nearer to the point of delivery, government is less involved. Comparing categories based on protracted crisis intensity, we would expect that the government would be less involved in implementation in high-intensity crisis settings; and that, instead, INGOs and UN agencies who substitute for state-led social provision would be more common.

Across all three categories (low-, medium- and high-intensity), government is the most commonly indicated implementing authority (Table 4.5). Yet, in high-intensity protracted crises, INGOs and UN agencies are as likely to be indicated as is government. Furthermore, when the government is indicated as an implementing authority in low- and medium-intensity crisis settings, it is more common for the government to implement activities alone, whereas in high-intensity settings it is as common for the government to be indicated as an

implementing partner alongside UN agencies (e.g. programme 1, Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, implemented by the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Afghanistan). Across all crisis settings, the private sector is less involved in implementation compared to governments, INGOs and the UN.

Table 4.5: Implementers' type of cash-plus programmes, by protracted crisis setting

Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity
INGOs (1)	Government	Government (1)
Government (1)	INGOs	INGOs (1)
UN agencies	NGOs	UN agencies (1)
NGOs		NGOs
		Private sector

Source: Authors' own.

Evaluation, impacts and outcomes

Across the programmes we reviewed, as indicated previously, evaluations were identified for only half the programmes overall. The evaluation methods used varied depending on the intensity of the crisis. In lower-intensity crisis settings, quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods were used in equal measure. Evaluations that used exclusively quantitative methods were most common in medium-intensity settings, whereas mixed-methods evaluations were more common in high-intensity crises. Experimental or quasi-experimental methods (e.g. randomised controlled trials (RCTs)) were more likely to be used in high- and medium-intensity crisis settings, such as in programme 7 (Women for Women International, Afghanistan), which used an RCT with two treatment arms and an endline qualitative evaluation.

Table 4.6: Impact evaluation methods, by protracted crisis setting

	Low intensity	Medium intensity	High intensity	Total
Programmes with no impact evaluation available	17	20	12	49
Programmes with impact evaluations available	12	26	10	48
Quantitative only	4	15	4	23
Qualitative only	4		1	5
Mixed methods	4	10	5	19
No information on methods		1		1
% of total of evaluations				
(Quasi-)experimental/RCT (%)	2	11	5	18
Cash-only/cash-plus arms (%)	1	4	2	7

Source: Authors' own.

In lower-intensity crisis settings, the most common indicators are income, food security, living standards,²⁶ and agricultural or livestock production, and improvements are indicated in all of these. Cohesion and asset indicators are reported in around 40 per cent of programmes, and also indicate improvement. More mixed outcomes are reported against wellbeing,²⁷ consumption and (self-)employment indicators. In medium-intensity settings, incomes and economic inclusion are the most common indicators that are measured,

Box 4.2: Impact evaluation of the Women for Women International programme, Afghanistan

Women for Women International (WfWI) is an INGO that works with marginalised women in conflict-affected countries to support their self-sufficiency and empowerment (Noble *et al.* 2019). The Economic and Social Empowerment programme in Afghanistan, which started in 2002, aimed to build women's self-reliance in every aspect of their lives: economic stability, health and wellbeing, family and community participation and decision-making, and social networking (Noble *et al.* 2019).

The programme covered almost 10,000 direct beneficiaries with a rights-based approach (PEI 2019). It targeted the most marginalised women in conflict-affected communities: those with low levels of literacy and numeracy, little or no formal education and high levels of poverty. Eligibility criteria were implemented in the initial community selection process, and then at individual level through consultation with community and religious leaders to identify potentially interested women.

The programme featured 90–180 minutes of programming per week over a 12-month period, delivered to groups of 25 women in community-based training centres. Its main activities included classroom training on numeracy, business skills and social empowerment topics, and hands-on training in a chosen vocational skill. In addition, participants received an introduction to formal and informal mechanisms to save money (e.g. self-help groups, microfinance institutions), referrals to health, legal and financial services, and connections to other women. Participants also received a monthly cash stipend of US\$10, conditional on attending the trainings, to be used however they chose, though they were encouraged to invest in businesses, and some chose to form informal savings groups with each other (Noble *et al.* 2019).

A recent impact evaluation was conducted for this programme, which aimed to determine whether such interventions in conflict/post-conflict settings influenced experiences of intimate partner violence (IPV), mental health, gender attitudes and practices, livelihoods and life satisfaction of beneficiaries. The endline assessment entailed a large-scale mixed-methods RCT with two arms, which compared a cash-only arm to a cash-plus arm (Gibbs *et al.* 2020b). In terms of implementation, although the programme took place in conflict-affected settings with high risks of security incidents, the intervention timeline was kept. There was some flexibility around the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and public holidays, but compensatory classes were held (Gibbs *et al.* 2020a).

Findings from the evaluation state that long-term economic and social empowerment interventions may lead to significant improvements in livelihoods for women and more gender-equitable attitudes, greater decision-making in the household and greater mobility, even in challenging contexts for women, as in the case of Afghanistan. However, and potentially due to the nature of the conflict, this does not automatically translate into overall reductions in IPV or depressive symptoms, although in this case, there were suggestions of reduced IPV for a subgroup of women with moderate food insecurity at baseline (Gibbs *et al.* 2020b).

Source: Authors' own.

followed by assets, food security and consumption. Outcomes are modest, however, with 'no change' reported for over half the indicators in at least one of the programmes. In the high-intensity category, incomes and social inclusion are the most-reported indicators (see Box 4.2 on a relevant programme example). Deterioration in outcomes was reported against only two indicators, but positive outcomes were more likely to be reported overall. Notably, these two indicators were social inclusion and cohesion.

²⁶ This category refers to changes in quality of life (e.g. having a respected place in society, access to water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure, access to decent work, etc.).

²⁷ This category includes indicators such as satisfaction, aspirations, expectations, etc.

4.3 Comparing cash-plus programmes by strength of social protection system

In this section we review design and implementation features of cash-plus programmes, as well as methods of evaluation and evidence of their impacts according to the strength of social protection systems in protracted crises. Building on the scale developed by Winder Rossi *et al.* (2017), which distinguishes different social protection scenarios in relation to state (national government) involvement in social protection provision, we plot countries experiencing protracted crises according to the strength of their social protection systems. Countries with weaker systems (up to a score of 2 – indicating either severely weakened or nascent systems) include Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Mali, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. Countries with elements of a system in place (above 2 – indicating countries that struggle to respond to repeated crises and have limited scope for shock responsiveness) include Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria and Uganda.

Objectives

In countries with weaker social protection systems, where complementary public service provision is more likely to be lacking, and access to financial services could be constrained, we would expect cash-plus programme objectives to have a stronger focus on protection, given the difficulties (and cost) of substituting for weak or absent state services. In settings with stronger systems, the architecture to support wider public services is more likely to be present; thus, there are more opportunities to focus on the range of promotive objectives across entrepreneurship, job training and increasing agricultural productivity.

However, across the 16 countries we reviewed, we identify broadly similar patterns in objectives (Table 4.7). Building and improving productive capacity and strengthening food security, nutrition and health are the most common objectives in both weaker and stronger systems. This is the case of programme 17 (Strengthening the resilience of populations vulnerable to nutritional insecurity in the Eastern region of Burkina Faso in a sustainable and integrated manner), whose objective is ‘sustainable improvement of productive capacities of vulnerable groups and [households] and of their access to diversified diet’ and programme 33 (Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion, Ethiopia), which, among other things, has the aim of ‘improving livestock production and competitiveness... improving the nutritional status of children and mothers’.

Greater differences are observed when comparing objectives beyond these two. While resilience is a key objective in weaker systems (ranking third), it ranks tenth (tied with income diversification) in stronger systems. Instead, programmes are more likely to focus on enhancing self-employment and graduation in countries with stronger systems, such as programme 90 (Women’s Income Generating Support (WINGS)) in Uganda ‘to help them start very small but sustainable retail and trading enterprises’.

Table 4.7: Programme objectives by strength of social protection system

Weaker	Stronger
Improving food security, nutrition and health	Building and improving productive capacity
Building and improving productive capacity	Improving food security, nutrition and health
Resilience	Enhancing self-employment and graduation
Enhancing self-employment and graduation	Social cohesion
Social cohesion	Enhance access to services

Source: Authors’ own.

Fostering social cohesion features in the top five objectives in stronger and weaker social protection systems alike. An assumption would be that places with stronger systems are more capable of promoting changes at system level (as opposed to individual level) in terms of increasing labour market demand and building community assets. Yet, in the stronger systems we reviewed, these objectives are equal or less common, with a relatively greater emphasis on improving access to markets, and financial and basic services.

Enhancing access to these services is comparatively less important in weaker systems. This could indicate the existence of complementary services to connect with in stronger systems and the lack of these in weaker ones. Notably, building the blocks of a state social protection programme or system is less significant, indicated in around 10 per cent of programmes in stronger and weaker systems alike. One example of this is programme 2 (Cameroon Social Safety Nets), which aimed ‘to support the establishment of a basic national safety net system including piloting targeted cash transfers and public works programs for the poorest and most vulnerable people in participating areas within the Recipient’s territory’.

‘Plus’ components

As discussed above, due to weakly developed or altogether missing complementary public services in weaker systems, we would expect programme components to reflect a need to substitute for these services. In the countries in our sample, skills training and capacity building is a component of most programmes across stronger and weaker social protection systems alike (Table 4.8). Further, coaching, mentoring and sensitisation, as well as providing access to finance and microcredit round out the top three programme components in both settings. Thus, system strength does not appear to shape very different patterns of ‘plus’ components.

It is noteworthy that coaching, sensitisation and mentoring is more often pursued in stronger systems. This often involves one-to-one meetings and follow-up, which is costly and thus necessarily implies a more limited coverage. This included programme 83 (GOAL Syria), which ‘complemented [a one-off payment to vendors] with technical assistance provided through one-to-one coaching sessions’. In weaker systems, where there are possibly higher levels of need, but where state-led services and support are thin or missing, the imperative to extend coverage may persuade implementing authorities to focus on other components that are less cost intensive.

In terms of other programme components, agricultural extension and asset transfers rank fourth and fifth, respectively, in stronger and weaker systems alike. Thus, in general, the strength of the social protection system does not seem to weigh significantly on the programme components that are pursued in protracted crises.

Table 4.8: ‘Plus’ components by strength of social protection system

Weaker	Stronger
Skills training and capacity building	Skills training and capacity building
Access to finance and microcredit	Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation
Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation	Access to finance and microcredit
Agricultural extension	Agricultural extension
Asset transfer	Asset transfer

Source: Authors’ own.

Payments and conditionalities

Regarding conditionalities, one would expect conditions to be more prevalent where social protection systems are stronger, such that conditions of, for example, education and health uptake, are more easily fulfilled and more successfully monitored. We see this trend in our review results, with business conditionalities attached to 59 per cent of programming in settings with stronger systems, compared with 31 per cent of programmes in weaker systems with these conditions. Similarly, health, education and training conditions exist in 24 per cent of programmes in stronger systems, compared with 15 per cent in weaker systems. Stronger systems are better able to exist in places that can support these kinds of requirements in terms of provision of a basic level of access to and quality of these institutions.

Work-based conditions (that is, providing labour) are more common in weaker systems (47 per cent compared with 38 per cent in stronger ones), which is understandable as these are primarily safety net provisions attached to public works. It also likely reflects a focus on infrastructure rehabilitation in weaker systems, as opposed to priorities around promoting entrepreneurship in stronger ones (which could be enabled by relatively fewer challenges to start up or grow a business). Savings-based conditionalities appear in very few programmes and not at all in weak systems, which could mean that in a stronger social protection system beneficiaries might be expected to generate formal savings.

Targeting criteria

Across the protracted crisis settings we reviewed, in stronger and weaker social protection systems alike, targeting reflects a focus on categorical groups that are priorities for implementing authorities, including women (ranked first in both stronger and weaker settings), as well as young people and poor people (ranking in the top three in both settings – see Table 4.9). These rankings conceal a greater emphasis on targeting poor people (over young people) in weaker systems, whereas young people are more likely to be targeted than poor people in stronger systems.

In both settings, minorities and marginalised groups, and people affected by conflict round out the top five categories of those who are targeted. In stronger systems, there is a greater focus on targeting minorities and marginalised groups (who are targeted in 38 per cent of programmes) than in weaker systems (24 per cent). Programme 35 (Mekelle Prison Project, Ethiopia), is an example which targets ‘women and youth inmates at the Mekelle correctional centre’. Other crisis-related signifiers – forcibly displaced people, including IDPs, refugees and returnees – are all more likely to feature in programme targeting in weaker systems than they are in stronger systems.

Table 4.9: Programme targeting criteria by strength of social protection system

Weaker	Stronger
Women	Women
Poor people	Young people
Young people	Poor people
Minorities and marginalised groups	Minorities and marginalised groups
People affected by conflict	People affected by conflict

Source: Authors' own.

Implementers

We would expect to observe starker differences in implementing authorities based on system strength. This is because non-government actors – INGOs, UN agencies and sometimes the private sector – need to substitute for weakened or very limited state provision of social support and services in weaker systems.

However, across the protracted crises we reviewed, in stronger and weaker social protection systems alike, government and INGOs are the most common implementing authorities (Table 4.10). As discussed above, government involvement is often at strategic or policymaking level, which does not imply that the government is involved in delivering services or other support to cash-plus programme beneficiaries at local delivery level.

Differences between stronger and weaker systems emerge when looking at the involvement of other implementing authorities: UN agencies are involved in implementation in 41 per cent of programmes in weaker systems, compared with only 10 per cent in stronger settings; whereas NGOs (national and local) are indicated in 29 per cent of programmes in weaker systems, but only 14 percent in stronger ones.

The comparatively higher involvement of national and local NGOs, as well as UN agencies, in weaker systems can be interpreted as the need to substitute for the state (e.g. project 95, Yemen Food Security

Response and Resilience Project, implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Programme and United Nations Development Programme in partnership with local institutions).

Table 4.10: Programme implementers by strength of social protection system

Weaker	Stronger
Government	Government
INGO	INGO
UN agencies	NGO (national or local)

Source: Authors' own.

Evaluation, impacts and outcomes

In both stronger and weaker social protection systems, quantitative methods predominate in impact evaluations of cash-plus programmes. Mixed methods and qualitative methods were more likely to be used in evaluations of programmes in weaker systems. Evaluations using RCTs and different treatment arms were slightly more common in weaker systems, and quasi-experimental methods were more often used in stronger systems.

With respect to indicators that evaluations measure, income is the most commonly reported across both categories. In weaker social protection systems, cohesion is twice as likely to be reported than in stronger systems, which dovetails with our assumption that social division and conflict are often apparent in weaker systems and, hence, could be prioritised in programming in these places.

When it comes to programmes' performance, while in stronger systems the most commonly reported positive impacts are on indicators such as income, and economic inclusion (with mixed outcomes as some evaluations reported neutral impacts), in weaker systems these are income (although with somewhat mixed outcomes) and food security. Indeed, outcomes such as food security, consumption and nutrition are more often reported to have improved in weaker systems than stronger ones (e.g. programme 73, Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement, South Sudan, reported a decrease in the proportion of beneficiaries with poor food consumption scores and increased dietary diversity of households).

Table 4.11: Impact evaluation methods by strength of social protection system

	Weaker	Stronger	Total
No. of programmes with no impact evaluation available	37	12	49
No of programmes with impact evaluations available	31	17	48
Quantitative only	14	9	23
Qualitative only	4	1	5
Mixed methods	13	6	19
No information on methods		1	1
% of total of evaluations			
(Quasi-)experimental/RCT (%)	10	8	18
Cash-only/cash-plus arms/RCT (%)	5	2	7

Source: Authors' own.

Outcomes such as wellbeing, economic and social inclusion are more frequently reported to have increased in stronger systems than weaker ones (where the social protection system is already stronger and other programmes are potentially aiming to influence primary-level outcomes, or people may have these needs already covered). Interestingly, cohesion has a higher percentage of positive outcomes in weaker systems, but in both categories the evidence is mixed, with some of the programmes reporting negative and neutral effects. For instance, programme 1 (Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme) reported that the programme itself was dysfunctional to the peace process.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The possibility that a combination of cash transfers alongside services and/or assets to strengthen livelihoods could be more effective than cash transfers alone has driven a surge in efforts to introduce and scale up cash-plus programmes. While much early experience and evidence with cash-plus programmes comes from settings that are more peaceful and stable, the existence of multiple, overlapping crises has not impeded a significant level of experimentation with cash-plus programming in more complex environments.

This review identifies and examines 97 programmes across 16 protracted crisis settings. While all these contexts are characterised by some degree of conflict-related fatalities, prolonged displacement and/or climate change vulnerability, they are diverse. Yet it is notable that cash-plus programmes are implemented in even the most difficult settings characterised by high levels of conflict-related fatalities and large-scale displacement, including Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen. The strength of social protection systems also varies significantly across the countries we reviewed, from settings where state-directed systems function to a degree (such as Iraq, Pakistan and Uganda), to places where they have been shattered due to the consequences of protracted crises or were very limited to begin with (such as Mali, South Sudan and Yemen).

Nonetheless, cash-plus programmes are pursued even in places with severely weakened or very limited systems where many fundamental services may be missing or have been destroyed. The scale of programming in terms of coverage leans towards the smaller scale: of the 32 programmes reporting household-level eligibility, half cover fewer than 10,000 households; of the 50 programmes reporting individual-level eligibility, more than half cover fewer than 50,000 individuals. Still, the sheer extent of cash-plus programmes across protracted crisis settings demonstrates the need for greater insight and evidence into how these are implemented, as well as their outcomes and impacts.

5.1 How are cash-plus models adapted for protracted crises?

A key objective of this paper was to consider design elements of cash-plus programmes – their objectives, components, targeting criteria and implementing authorities – to assess their appropriateness to protracted crisis settings. We find that programmes have many and often multiple objectives, ranging from providing relief (e.g. food security) to promoting livelihoods (e.g. improving productive capacity), strengthening resilience, supporting recovery (e.g. rehabilitating infrastructure) and, sometimes, contributing to peacebuilding (e.g. social cohesion). Improvements in food security, health and nutrition are the most common objectives, followed by improving productive capacity and enhancing self-employment.

Social cohesion and infrastructure recovery are less frequently stated objectives, more commonly associated with programming in higher-intensity crisis settings. Objectives related to social cohesion and peacebuilding, and infrastructure rehabilitation, are identified in less than a third and a fifth of programmes reviewed, respectively. While this is to be expected, because of the focus of cash-plus programming on household and individual levels (rather than community or social levels), it is nonetheless striking that so few programmes demonstrate explicit links with wider peacebuilding agendas, given that violence and other conflict-related processes are often key drivers of vulnerability and weakened livelihoods. Other objectives linked to structural vulnerability, such as expanding market access, putting in place the building blocks of social protection systems, enhancing access to services, and improving access to natural and common resources, are less usual – appearing in around 15 per cent of the programmes reviewed.

The most common 'plus' component, present in almost all programmes, is the provision of skills training and capacity building of beneficiaries and communities. This is associated with the core emphasis of many cash-plus programmes on improving productive capacity through equipping beneficiaries with skills and capacities to find work or become self-employed. Over half the programmes provide an element of coaching, mentoring and sensitisation, while nearly half incorporate access to finance and microcredit.

Further, over a third of the programmes incorporate an element of agricultural extension goods and services. All of these are components also commonly observed in peaceful and stable settings. Relatedly, more than three quarters of programmes, overall, include one or more conditionalities, such as work, development of small businesses, savings, or softer conditionalities such as participating in health and nutrition-oriented trainings, which in some contexts may not be functional or adequate. Thus, at the level of programme components, cash-plus programmes in protracted crises resemble those implemented in more stable contexts.

Underscoring the limits of cash-plus programming, whereas most cash-plus projects aim to increase resilience at the individual or household levels, wider conditions and dynamics driving vulnerability may be unaddressed. Thus, cash-plus programmes may have an ameliorative influence on individuals and households, providing more support and services than a cash transfer alone, yet they are unable to overcome problems of violence and predation, economic structures embedded in the war economy, and discriminatory regimes that are at the root of severe vulnerabilities and weakened livelihoods for some. Take, for instance, the fact that most post-conflict and protracted crisis settings are characterised by limited employment prospects and weak labour markets: how will 'plus' components related to training and skills development be useful? Ensuring employment opportunities exist and access to jobs is provided for those required to undertake labour market-related training is surely a key supply-side requirement of such cash-plus programmes.

As in settings that are otherwise peaceful and stable, categorical targeting is very common in cash-plus programmes in protracted crisis settings, often addressing multiple demographic groups such as women, young people and poor people. Overall, women are the most common category in targeting, closely followed by poor people. Yet, in the protracted crisis settings this paper reviewed, programmes also specifically target groups defined by crisis-related vulnerability markers such as exposure to conflict and displacement (IDPs, refugees and returnees, in that order), as well as those who are particularly at risk from conflict-related processes, such as minorities and those who are otherwise marginalised – all the more in areas characterised by higher-intensity crises.

With respect to implementing authorities, our findings confirm the starting assumption that, because state public authority and administration can be weaker in settings affected by high-intensity conflict and large-scale displacement, a wider range of stakeholders are involved in implementing programmes. Assorted configurations of partners take part in implementation, including governments, international and national NGOs, UN agencies and the private sector. Nonetheless, and counterintuitively, within our sample, governments at various levels are more likely to be involved in implementation in high-intensity crisis settings than in low-intensity settings.

On closer inspection, overall government involvement tends to be at higher levels of policy- and decision-making (such as national or federal ministries and technical departments), rather than in frontline delivery at the subnational and local levels. The lower level of government involvement in delivering programmes on the front line implies that other non-governmental authorities must assume a significant role in providing the host of complementary services and support that are necessary for cash-plus programmes. Indeed, for the programmes under review, UN agencies and INGOs are more likely to feature as implementing partners in high-intensity crisis settings than they are in low-intensity settings.

In summary, we find that cash-plus programme models in protracted crises largely resemble those in contexts that are more peaceful and stable. This raises questions over whether cash-plus models should adapt their designs and operations to reflect the different dynamics and drivers of vulnerability existing in protracted crises. Additional focus on addressing more structural causes of weakened livelihoods, while difficult for programmes that inherently focus on individuals and households, is nonetheless appropriate and necessary in protracted crisis settings. As Roelen *et al.* (2017: 33) note, 'While the rationale of 'cash plus' interventions explicitly recognises the need for supply-side investments, positive change remains predicated on the notion of individual action rather than structural change.'

There is debate around the suitability of cash-plus approaches in settings where conflict- and displacement-related processes generate vulnerability and constrain livelihoods. This reality means a host of other interventions to address the structures of violence, insecurity, legal limbo and lack of protections that pertain for particular groups are necessary – and, indeed, fundamental – to strengthen the livelihoods of people affected by crises. Indeed, there is still very little evidence of cash-plus design features explicitly aiming to address protection issues arising from crises at structural or even individual levels, though these are sometimes apparent, such as gender-based violence and mental health challenges.

5.2 What are the results of cash-plus outcomes and impacts in protracted crises?

A complementary aim of this paper is to review the evidence of the outcomes and impacts of cash-plus programmes in protracted crises. We have gone into the evidence in detail to understand the methods of evaluation and who carried out impact evaluations. Evaluations were obtained for only around half the programmes reviewed here. This dovetails with Roelen *et al.* (2017), who similarly found a lack of monitoring data to assess impacts of cash-plus programmes. Notably, in our review, we find that there is a distinct lack of independent evaluation: many evaluations were undertaken by the agencies involved in programme implementation themselves.

Almost half the evaluations use quantitative methods only to assess impact (compared with only 10 per cent that use only qualitative methods); mixed methods are used in 40 per cent of the programme evaluations we identified. The most common indicators to evaluate programme impacts and outcomes are incomes and economic inclusion dimensions, followed by cohesion and peacebuilding, social inclusion, food security and assets. Generally, most impacts reported are modestly positive or neutral.²⁸ Impacts are reported either at the individual or household levels, and in some cases, these are disaggregated by gender and/or poverty levels.

In settings with weaker social protection systems, improvements in food security, consumption and nutrition are more frequently reported compared to programmes implemented in settings with stronger systems. This likely reflects the greater prioritisation of relief objectives in settings with weaker systems. In settings with stronger systems, where complementary services to enable the promotion focus of cash-plus programmes are more likely to exist, greater improvements are recorded in indicators such as economic and social inclusion, diversification, and agricultural or livestock production.

In summary, limited impacts and outcomes of cash-plus programmes underscore the challenge of improving livelihoods when these are stand-alone interventions – even those whose design is informed by a recognised need for coordinating and connecting transfers with a wider range of services and support. Roelen *et al.* (2017) specify investment in high-quality supply-side services and support as a key criterion for cash-plus programming success. However, in protracted crises, these services and support are often missing, have been destroyed because of conflict (Jeong and Trako 2022), or are unavailable due to security constraints or legal obstacles, such as the status of displaced people. Finally, this study supports the call for more research and evaluation to build an evidence base on cash-plus impacts and outcomes in protracted crises. As Andrews *et al.* (2021) find for economic inclusion programmes, there is a need for a wider range of assessment to complement impact evaluations, including real-time operational research, programme monitoring assessments and qualitative work.

5.3 How can cash-plus programmes better adapt to protracted crisis settings?

Based on the limited adaptation of cash-plus programmes to protracted crisis settings this review has found, the natural question to pose that may result in policy and/or operational recommendations is what better adapted approaches would look like. Thus far, there is little lesson learning or best practice guidance on how cash-plus programmes could be designed specifically for protracted crisis settings. To address this gap, as an initial step this review has sought to generate evidence on the landscape of cash-plus programming in these settings, seeking to draw distinctions across both the scale of crisis intensity and settings characterised by social protection systems of variable strength.

²⁸ See Annexe 1 on the different and relevant biases acknowledged in this review, including publication bias and discoverability bias.

As emphasised elsewhere in this paper, this evidence points to the need to develop explicit links between cash-plus interventions and the wider architecture and systems that determine vulnerability. For example, this could involve efforts to situate cash-plus programming in wider peacebuilding efforts, where feasible and appropriate, through negotiation (e.g. of resources) between programme implementers and key stakeholders in the peacebuilding arena in ways that encourage coordination and violence reduction.

What is the scope for cash-plus programmes to reduce drivers of vulnerability? Beyond the need to link cash-plus programmes to wider socio-political or legal agendas, the extent to which cash-plus programmes can counteract root causes of vulnerability is still an open area for research. This may involve connecting cash-plus programmes with initiatives to encourage the protection of particularly vulnerable groups, with targeting criteria as an entry point.

In terms of identifying the most vulnerable people (considering intersecting vulnerabilities) and those most in need in a specific crisis context, there is an urgent need to expand the evidence base. While the majority of the programmes in the review target women, there appears to be little effort to address women's specific risks and vulnerabilities in protracted crises, including increased care responsibilities, increased risk of violence and discriminatory social norms. Also, few programmes target forcibly displaced people, who often lack legal protections and are excluded from work opportunities. While cash-plus programmes targeting individuals and households are not equipped to address such legal or policy barriers, further research could explore the possibilities of coupling cash-plus interventions with wider advocacy efforts. Building on this paper, we will undertake engagement work with key stakeholders in this thematic area to continue refining more specific recommendations.

In conclusion, there is a need for a far greater emphasis on how and under what conditions cash-plus programmes might better link with weakened social protection systems, as well as the wider architecture of conflict prevention and mitigation, peacebuilding and protection (of safety, security and rights), as well as climate resilience and adaptation. In their review of the factors for successful implementation of cash-plus programmes, Roelen *et al.* (2017: 33) call for 'critical realism about the extent to which interventions targeting households and individuals can achieve positive change in contexts of addressing widespread poverty, inequality and power imbalance.'

As previously stated, this review finds little evidence that programmes are adapted to address situations of forced displacement or other conflict-related processes that generate and/or worsen vulnerability. The emphasis is on tweaking delivery processes to work *in* protracted crises, but not necessarily *on* a design to work on protracted crisis. While necessary and something to be encouraged and investigated further, there are limits to best practice-oriented adjustments to technical design and delivery.

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Annexes

Annexe 1

Methods for programme identification

We acknowledge the potential biases associated with the types of literature engaged with. These include:

- **Language bias** – Our focus on documents published in English and French may exclude relevant studies, which may be published in national languages or other ‘international’ languages. This limits not only the range of documents considered, but may also be associated with particular assessments of cash-plus programmes in crises (Egger *et al.* 1997; Konno *et al.* 2020).
- **Publication bias** and **discoverability bias** – Our focus on grey literature and academic journal articles will result in disproportionate representation of documents available on well-indexed websites or published in international scholarly journals and by high-profile international organisations, potentially excluding studies conducted by lower-profile researchers in low- and middle-income countries. Furthermore, particularly in the case of journal publications, research with statistically significant results and positive results may be more likely to be published than research with ‘non-significant’ or negative findings (Dwan, Gamble, Williamson and Kirkham 2013).

To mitigate these biases, we have included books and book chapters, as well as PhD dissertations, with the intention to expand the reach of our results to Southern and lower-profile researchers. We have also used multiple databases and websites to collate documents from geographically diverse sources.

Description of activities

Activity 1: keyword search of databases and web-based search engines, using a structured approach that allows for systematic review and replication.

To identify relevant literature, we conducted searches of publications: (1) in electronic academic and open-source databases relevant to the fields of social assistance and livelihoods programming; and (2) by leading social assistance, livelihoods and development research organisations (both research-focused, and international or regional organisations). Selection of these sources was based on our understanding of key databases and organisations relevant to the topic from prior research engagement on some of the countries highlighted, as well as existing review studies to note additional organisations.

The list of proposed databases and organisational websites (Table A1.1) has been reviewed by BASIC Research’s management group. The sources listed below have been selected for inclusion because, overall, they cover a range of disciplines relevant to the topic and are accessible via our institutional affiliations, as well as providing results on grey and academic literature, book and book chapters, and PhD dissertations.

Table A1.1: List of suggested websites and databases

BASIC Research Zotero group library	WFP documents database	World Bank project operations database
BASIC SPACE and TAS documents	FAO documents database and website	PEI Data Portal and report
Markets in Crisis DGroups	UNDP documents database	African Development Bank Group
Social Protection Crisis Contexts DGroups	UN database	Asian Development Bank
University of Sussex library database	UNICEF	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
Google Scholar	IRC	ODI
Google	World Vision	Socialprotection.org
Scopus	Mercy Corps	CaLP database
Web of Science	OECD publications database	Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
ALNAP		

Further documents were collated through direct consultation and follow-up with key stakeholders with relevant experience, as well as contact people from relevant programmes, who were asked for references to relevant programme documents and/or associated evaluations. We used those documents to triangulate with our own selection, adding additional relevant programmes and including impact evaluations that may not have been found in the public domain.

Table A1.2 shows the keywords used. These were combined with the different shortlisted country names (also in English and French variations) within the websites listed in Table A1.1.

Table A1.2: Keywords used in searches – streamlined implementation approach

In English (for all 16 countries)	In French (for the five French-speaking countries)*
'Cash-plus'	'Transferts productifs; transferts monétaires'
'Graduation approach'	'Approche graduation'
'Productive inclusion'	'Inclusion productive'
'Economic inclusion program'	'Programme d'inclusion économique'

* Burkina Faso; Cameroon; DRC; Mali; Niger

Three search strategies were adopted to identify relevant evidence:

- First, we conducted searches of databases and organisational websites (Table A1.1).
- Second, we reviewed reference lists and annexes of relevant documents and systematic reviews for additional sources, using a snowballing approach (a high focus on this strategy increased the number of programmes identified).
- Third, we conducted Google searches to identify additional materials using the same keywords.

Activity 2: initial review of keywords on titles, tables of contents, abstracts and summaries, introductions, and full papers to define programmes to include.

The **inclusion criteria** for cash-plus programmes in protracted crisis settings are:

- **Document type** – academic journal articles, grey literature, books and book chapters, and PhD dissertations.
- **Modalities** – cash transfers or public work programmes or grants, which can be accompanied by skills training, asset transfers and agricultural extension, microcredit, access to finance and animal health services.
- **Year of publication** – studies published in the past 10 years (since 2012), for programmes active at some point during that period.
- **Languages of publication** – English and French.
- **Countries covered** – Afghanistan; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; DRC; Ethiopia; Iraq; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan; Syria; Uganda; Yemen.

Activity 3: identification of impact evaluations and assessments for selected programmes.

Once confirmed that a programme met the inclusion criteria, we conducted searches to identify impact evaluations and assessments of the corresponding programmes in the databases and Google, using keywords such as ([name of the programme] + 'impact evaluation', 'impact assessment', etc.).

Activity 4: recording and coding of programmes and impacts according to key criteria.

We recorded and coded programmes (and impacts) and their sources that met the inclusion criteria according to a number of key factors (in English) in an Excel database of social assistance and livelihood programmes in protracted crises.

The coding framework included:

- Programme name
- Country and region
- Start year
- End year
- Funding agency
- Delivery partners
- Social assistance modalities – transfers, public works programmes or grants
- Social protection modalities – skills training, asset transfers, agricultural extension, microcredit, access to finance and animal health services (and any additional modalities)
- Conditionalities
- Lump-sum vs frequent transfers
- Scale and coverage (person/household)
- Targeting criteria
- Programme objective(s) (select from social protection framework developed per the template)
- Impacts and outcomes by component/arms/overall (if any)
- Evaluation methods (if any)
- Links to sources and documents

To address gaps in the coding, we conducted further searches in the public domain to obtain missing data, or we contacted relevant implementers or partners. However, if we could not find information relevant for most of the coding elements in the public domain or by contacting implementers for missing documents or information, then we excluded the programme from the database.

Annexe 2

Table A2.1: List of cash-plus programmes identified for the study

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
1	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme	Afghanistan	Aug-10	Mar-16	F C (work)	STCB + JM	Yes
2	Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST)	Afghanistan	Jan-11	Jan-15	L U	STCB	Yes
3	Livelihoods Improvement in Tajik-Afghan Cross-Border Areas Phase II Project (LITACA II)	Afghanistan	Jan-18	Dec-20	L C (business)	STCB + MLI	
4	National Solidarity Program (NSP) Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Jul-03	Jan-16	L C (business)	STCB + AFM + MLI	Yes
5	Road to Jobs (R2J)	Afghanistan	Jan-15	Dec-20	L C (business)	STCB + MLI	Yes
6	Targeting the Ultra-Poor (TUP) graduation program	Afghanistan	Jun-16	Jun-17	F U	STCB + CMSS + AFM + AT + AS	Yes
7	Women for Women International (WfWI)	Afghanistan	Jan-02	Ongoing	F C (training/health)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes
8	Réduire la vulnérabilité des moyens d'existence agricoles à travers l'approche 'Caisses de résilience' au Sahel/Reducing the vulnerability of agricultural livelihoods through the 'Resilience Funds' approach in the Sahel	Burkina Faso	Oct-16	Feb-19	F U, C (work)	STCB + AE + AFM	Yes
9	Activités de subsistance inclusives pour les femmes vulnérables et personnes handicapées dans la province du Koulpélogo/Inclusive Livelihoods Project for Vulnerable Women and Persons with Disabilities in Ouargaye	Burkina Faso	Jan-18	Dec-21	L U	STCB + CMSS + AFM	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
10	Burkina Faso-Youth Employment and Skills Development Project (PEJDC)	Burkina Faso	Mar-14	Dec-19	F C (work)	STCB + CMSS + JM	
11	Programme 'LRRD' de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables dans les provinces du Soum et du Loroum/LRRD programme to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities in the provinces of Soum and Loroum	Burkina Faso	Aug-17	Dec-19	? U	STCB + AE	
12	Programme d'appui au développement des économies locales (PADEL)/Support programme for the development of local economies	Burkina Faso	Jan-17	Dec-20	F U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM	
13	Projet de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables du Sahel et du Nord/Project to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities in the Sahel and the North	Burkina Faso	Jun-17	Dec-19	F U	STCB + AE + AFM + AT	
14	Projet filets sociaux Burkina-Naong-Sa Ya (PFS/BNS)/Social Safety Net Project	Burkina Faso	Jan-14	Dec-24	F U	STCB + CMSS	
15	Projet multisectoriel intégré de résilience des ménages pauvres et très pauvres face à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les provinces septentrionales de la Boucle du Mouhoun au Burkina Faso/Integrated multisectoral project for the resilience of poor and very poor households to food and nutrition insecurity in the northern provinces of the Boucle du Mouhoun in Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	Sep-17	Dec-19	F U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS	
16	Renforcement durable de la résilience des communautés et des ménages vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle de la province du Yagha dans la région du Sahel au Burkina Faso (RESA)	Burkina Faso	Jun-17	Feb-20	F U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
17	Renforcer durablement et de manière intégrée la résilience des populations vulnérables à l'insécurité nutritionnelle dans la région de l'Est au Burkina Faso/Strengthening the resilience of populations vulnerable to nutritional insecurity in the Eastern region of Burkina Faso in a sustainable and integrated manner	Burkina Faso	Sep-17	Dec-19	? U	STCB + AE	
18	Réponse d'urgence et appui à l'amélioration de la résilience des populations vulnérables dans les zones à risque du Burkina Faso 2018-2021/Emergency response and support to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso 2018-2021	Burkina Faso	Jun-18	Dec-21	F U, C (work)	CMSS + AE + AT + AHS	Yes
19	Transferts productifs (CASH+)/Productive transfers (CASH+)	Burkina Faso	Jan-13	Dec-15	L U	AE + AT + AHS	Yes
20	Trickle Up/Trickle Up+	Burkina Faso	Jan-07	Ongoing	L C (training/health)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes
21	Adaptive Safety Nets and Economic Inclusion Project/Projet pour le développement de filets de protection sociale adaptative et l'inclusion économique	Cameroon	Mar-22	Mar-28	F, L U, C (work, training/health)	STCB + CMSS + AFM + MLI	
22	Cameroon Social Safety Nets	Cameroon	Jan-14	Dec-22	F U	STCB	
23	Transitional Safety Net for Central African Refugees	Cameroon	Jan-18	Dec-20	F U	STCB + AFM + AS	
24	DRC Eastern Recovery Project (STEP, in French) – extended to June 2020	DRC	May-14	Jun-20	F C (work)	STCB + AE + AFM	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
25	DRC Multisectoral Nutrition and Health Project	DRC	Apr-20	Jul-24	F U	STCB + AE + AT + AS + FAES	
26	Productive Inclusion Project (cancelled in February 2020)	DRC	Jun-18	Feb-20	F U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	
27	STEP 2 (continuation/extension of DRC Eastern Recovery Project/STEP)	DRC	Jul-20	Feb-24	F U, C (work)	STCB	
28	Stronger Woman, Stronger Nations Program	DRC	Jan-04	Ongoing	F U	STCB + AFM + AS	Yes
29	Supporting the graduation of extremely poor and marginalised households out of extreme poverty in Manono Territory	DRC	Jan-17	Dec-22	F, L U	STCB + CMSS + AFM	
30	Ethiopia Competitiveness and Job Creation Project	Ethiopia	Aug-14	Jun-20	L C (business)	STCB + MLI + JM	
31	Household Asset Building (HAB)	Ethiopia	Jan-15	Dec-16	L C (savings, training/health, business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	
32	IN-SCT pilot/Livelihood Component – PSNP [Productive Safety Net Programme]	Ethiopia	Jan-17	Jan-20	F C (work, training/health, business)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + AT + MLI + AS	Yes
33	Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME)	Ethiopia	Oct-12	Sep-17	F C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + MLI + AHS	Yes
34	Strengthen PSNP4 Institutions and Resilience (SPIR)	Ethiopia	Jan-16	Dec-21	L U	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + MLI	Yes

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
35	Mekelle Prison Project	Ethiopia	Jan-09	Dec-12	F C (work)	STCB + AFM	
36	Asset Replacement/Asset Recovery Emergency Livelihoods Program	Iraq	Jan-18	Dec-18	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AE	
37	Funding Facility for Stabilization	Iraq	May-15	Dec-23	F, L U, C (work, business)	STCB + CMSS + APE	Yes
38	IQ-Youth Livelihoods Development in Southern Iraq	Iraq	Jan-11	May-15	L C (business)	STCB + APE	
39	Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP)	Iraq	Oct-14	Dec-21	F, L C (work, training/health, business)	STCB + APE + JM	Yes
40	Réduire la vulnérabilité des moyens d'existence agricoles à travers l'approche 'Caisses de résilience' au Sahel/Reducing the vulnerability of agricultural livelihoods through the 'Resilience Funds' approach in the Sahel	Mali	Oct-16	Feb-19	L U	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + AT + AHS	Yes
41	Alliance pour la Résilience Communautaire (ARC)	Mali	Dec-16	Mar-20	F, L U	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + AS	Yes
42	Emergency Safety Nets Project (Jigisemejiri)	Mali	Apr-13	Dec-19	F, L U, C (work, training/health)	STCB + CMSS + FAES	Yes
43	Transferts Productifs (CASH+)	Mali	Apr-15	Feb-17	F, L U	STCB + AE + AT	Yes
44	Mali Reinsertion of Ex-combatants Project	Mali	Jul-17	Jun-22	L C (training/health)	STCB + CMSS	
45	Skills Development and Youth Employment Project	Mali	Nov-14	Dec-21	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
46	Cash Assistance and Resilience to Environmental Shocks (CARES)	Niger	Jan-19	Jan-21	F U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS	
47	Increasing Resilience of the Most Vulnerable in Rural Tahoua District Communities	Niger	Jan-12	Dec-12	F U, C (work)	STCB + AE + AT	
48	Transferts Productifs (CASH+)	Niger	Jan-13	Dec-15	F U	STCB + AE + AT	Yes
49	Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI)	Niger	Jan-14	Ongoing	F C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AT	
50	Projets Filets Sociaux (PFS) Niger/Niger Safety Net Project; Projet Filets Sociaux Adaptatifs/Adaptive Social Safety Nets Project; Projet Filets Sociaux Adaptatifs II – Wadata; Adaptive Social Safety Nets Project II – Wadata	Niger	Jan-11	Dec-19	F U	STCB + AE + AFM	Yes
51	PARCA Niger (Niger Refugees and Host Communities Support Project)	Niger	Mar-19	Sep-23	F, L C (work, business)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM	
52	Programme de résilience/Resilience programme	Niger	Jul-21	Jun-24	F U	STCB + AE + AT + AHS	
53	Projet Filets Sociaux Adaptatifs II/Adaptive Social Safety Nets Project II – Wadata Talaka	Niger	Jan-19	Dec-26	F U	STCB + CMSS + AFM + AS	
54	Projet Pilote des Filets Sociaux par le Cash Transfert (PPFS-CT)/Pilot Cash Transfer Social Nets Project	Niger	Jan-11	Jun-12	F U	AFM	Yes
55	Youth Employment and Productive Inclusion Project (PEJIP)	Niger	Jun-18	Jun-23	L U	STCB + CMSS + AFM	
56	Agro-Processing, Productivity Enhancement, and Livelihood Improvement Support Project (APPEALS)	Nigeria	Dec-19	Sep-23	F, L C (work, business)	AE + AT + MLI	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
57	FADAMA III AF II	Nigeria	Mar-09	Dec-19	F, L C (work, business)	STCB + AE + AT + FAES	Yes
58	Feed the Future Nigeria Livelihoods Project (FtFNLFP)	Nigeria	Sep-15	Mar-17	F U	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM	Yes
59	Gender Graduation Program	Nigeria		Ongoing	F U	STCB + CMSS + AFM + AT	Yes
60	Inclusive Basic Service Delivery and Livelihood Empowerment Integrated Programme (IBSDLEIP)	Nigeria	Jan-17	Dec-23	F, L U, C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AT	
61	National Cash Transfer (NCTP) Programme or HUP (component of National Social Safety Nets Project (NASSP))	Nigeria	Sep-16	Ongoing	F U, C (training/health)	STCB + CMSS	Yes
62	Nigeria for Women Project	Nigeria	Jun-18	May-23	L U	STCB	
63	Nigeria Youth Employment and Social Support AF	Nigeria	Aug-16	Jun-20	F U, C (work, training/health)	STCB	
64	Community Resilience Malakand	Pakistan	May-11	Dec-17	F C (work)	STCB	Yes
65	Ehsaas National Poverty Graduation Initiative/Programme (NPGI or NPGP)	Pakistan	Jan-17	Jan-23	L C (business)	STCB + AFM	
66	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Rural Livelihoods and Community Infrastructure Project for Pakistan (RLCIP)	Pakistan	Apr-12	Dec-18	F C (work, training/health)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AT + AHS	Yes
67	Community Driven Livelihood and Food Security Initiatives (CLFSI)	Somalia	May-10	Apr-13	F, L C (work, business)	AE + AT	Yes

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
68	Enhancing Durable Solutions for and Reintegration of Displacement Affected Communities in Mogadishu and Baidoa (EIDACS)	Somalia	Mar-17	May-20	L U, C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes
69	Joint Programme on Youth Employment	Somalia	Jun-15	Jun-18	F C (work)	STCB + MLI + AHS	Yes
70	Somalia Crisis Recovery Project	Somalia	May-20	May-25	F C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AHS + AS	
71	Sustainable Employment and Economic Development in Somalia (SEED) II	Somalia	Dec-10	Mar-15	F C (work)	AE	Yes
72	Wadajir – Enhancing Durable Solutions for and Reintegration of Displacement Affected Communities in Somaliland	Somalia	Mar-17	Feb-20	F, L C (work, business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM + MLI	Yes
73	Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement (BRACE) II	South Sudan	Sep-15	Sep-23	F C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AE	Yes
74	Famine Response Project	South Sudan	Oct-17	Dec-17	F U, C (work)	STCB + AE + AT	Yes
75	Private Sector Development Project	South Sudan	Jan-12	Jun-16	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes
76	Safety Net and Skills Development Project (SNSDP)	South Sudan	Jun-13	Feb-19	F C (work)	STCB	Yes
77	South Sudan Safety Net Project (SSSNP)	South Sudan	Jan-20	Jan-22	F U, C (work)	STCB	Yes
78	Sustainable Agriculture for Economic Resiliency (SAFER)	South Sudan	Aug-17	Aug-20	L C (business)	STCB + AE + AFM + MLI	

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
79	Sustainable Food Security through Community-Based Livelihood Development and Water Harvesting II	South Sudan	Sep-16	Dec-18	L C (business)	STCB + AFM + MLI	
80	Youth Business Start-Up Grant Program (terminated early)	South Sudan	Dec-14	Dec-16	L U	STCB	Yes
81	Education Fee Waivers and Student Support Grants (zakat funded)	Sudan	Jan-86	Ongoing	F C (training/health)	STCB + AFM	
82	Sudan Social Safety Net Project	Sudan	Jan-16	Jan-20	F C (work)	STCB + AFM	
83	GOAL Syria	Syria	Jan-21	Dec-21	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS	Yes
84	The Investing in Syrian Humanitarian Action (ISHA) program	Syria	Jan-15	Dec-19	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS	
85	Bridges to the Future	Uganda	Jan-12	Dec-16	L C (savings, training/health)	STCB + CMSS + AFM + AS + FAES	Yes
86	Graduating to Resilience	Uganda	Jan-17	Jan-24	F C (business)	CMSS + AFM + AT	
87	Third Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF 3)	Uganda	May-15	Jun-21	F, L U, C (work, business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM + MLI	Yes
88	Ultra-Poor Graduation (UPG) program	Uganda	Jan-17	Jan-19	F U	STCB + CMSS + AE + AFM + AT + AS	Yes
89	Village Enterprise Program	Uganda	Jun-13	Jun-15	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes

Programme number	Programme name	Country	Start date	End date	Cash-only component	Cash-plus component	Impact evaluations
90	Women's Income Generating Support (WINGS)	Uganda	Apr-09	Dec-11	L C (business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	Yes
91	Emergency Livelihoods Response Plan	Yemen	Jan-18	Dec-18	F C (work)	STCB + AE + AT + AHS	
92	Enhanced Rural Resilience in Yemen Programme (ERRY)	Yemen	Mar-16	Dec-20	F, L U, C (work)	STCB	Yes
93	Multi-Purpose Cash (MPC) project	Yemen	Oct-17	Apr-19	F U, C (work)	STCB + AFM + MLI	Yes
94	Smallholder Agricultural Production Restoration and Enhancement Project (SAPREP)	Yemen	Jul-17	Aug-20	F C (work)	STCB + CMSS + AE + AT + AHS	
95	Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project	Yemen	May-21	May-25	F, L U, C (training/health, business)	STCB	
96	Yemen Social Protection Programme (YeSP)	Yemen	Sep-18	Mar-22	F U, C (work, training/health)	AFM	
97	Youth Economic Empowerment Programme (YEPP)	Yemen	Jan-12	Mar-14	F, L C (work, business)	STCB + CMSS + AFM	

Key: AE = Agricultural extension; AFM = Access to finance and microcredit; AHS = Animal health services; APE = Apprenticeships placements and education; AS = Access to healthcare, counselling and other social services; AT = Asset transfer; C = Conditional transfer; CMSS = Coaching, mentoring and sensitisation; F = Frequent transfer; FAES = Food assistance and education supplements; JM = Job matching; L = Lump sum transfer; MLI = Market links and information; STCB = Skills training and capacity building; U = Unconditional transfer.

Annexe 3

Table A3.1: Impacts and outcomes reported by available impact evaluations, by intensity of conflict (%)

Impact evaluations available	Low-intensity protracted conflict = 12				Medium-intensity protracted conflict = 26				High-intensity protracted conflict = 10				Total = 48			
	N°	+	-	0	N°	+	-	0	N°	+	-	0	N°	+	-	0
Income	83	83	0	0	73	62	0	12	80	70	0	10	77	69	0	8
Economic inclusion	33	33	0	0	69	62	0	8	60	50	0	10	58	52	0	6
Cohesion, peacebuilding	42	42	0	0	42	31	4	8	60	40	10	10	46	35	4	6
Social inclusion	33	33	0	0	42	27	4	12	70	60	10	0	46	35	4	6
Food security	50	50	0	0	46	46	0	0	30	30	0	0	44	44	0	0
Assets	42	42	0	0	54	46	0	8	20	20	0	0	44	40	0	4
Health/education behaviours	42	33	0	8	38	35	4	0	20	20	0	0	35	31	2	2
Investment/labour diversification	25	25	0	0	38	35	0	4	30	30	0	0	33	31	0	2
Consumption	17	8	8	0	46	31	4	12	20	20	0	0	33	23	4	6
Wellbeing, satisfaction, expectations	25	17	8	0	35	27	0	8	30	20	0	10	31	23	2	6
Living standards, life quality, decent work	50	50	0	0	27	27	0	0	30	30	0	0	33	33	0	0
(Self-)employment	33	8	8	17	23	12	0	12	40	40	0	0	29	17	2	10
Negative coping strategies	33	0	25	8	27	8	15	4	30	0	30	0	29	4	21	4
Agricultural/livestock production	50	50	0	0	19	19	0	0	20	20	0	0	27	27	0	0
Nutrition	33	33	0	0	27	23	4	0	10	10	0	0	25	23	2	0
Cost-effectiveness	17	17	0	0	19	19	0	0	20	20	0	0	19	19	0	0
Work behaviours	8	8	0	0	12	8	0	4	20	20	0	0	13	10	0	2
Protection outcomes	0	0	0	0	12	8	0	4	20	10	0	10	10	6	0	4
Animal health	8	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0

Note: 'negative coping strategies' has been coded as '-' in the cases where use of these strategies reduced and '+' where it increased.

Table A3.2: Impacts and outcomes reported by available impact evaluations, by strength of social protection system (%)

Impact evaluations available	Weaker = 31				Stronger = 17				Total = 48			
	N°	+	-	0	N°	+	-	0	N°	+	-	0
Income	74	61	0	13	82	82	0	0	77	69	0	8
Economic inclusion	52	45	0	6	71	65	0	6	58	52	0	6
Cohesion, peacebuilding	55	45	3	6	29	18	6	6	46	35	4	6
Social inclusion	42	32	6	3	53	41	0	12	46	35	4	6
Food security	48	48	0	0	35	35	0	0	44	44	0	0
Assets	42	42	0	0	47	35	0	12	44	40	0	4
Health/education behaviours	39	32	3	3	29	29	0	0	35	31	2	2
Investment/labour diversification	32	32	0	0	35	29	0	6	33	31	0	2
Consumption	35	26	6	3	29	18	0	12	33	23	4	6
Wellbeing, satisfaction, expectations	23	16	3	3	47	35	0	12	31	23	2	6
Living standards, life quality, decent work	39	39	0	0	24	24	0	0	33	33	0	0
(Self-)employment	32	19	3	10	24	12	0	12	29	17	2	10
Negative coping strategies	35	3	29	3	18	6	6	6	29	4	21	4
Agricultural/livestock production	26	26	0	0	29	29	0	0	27	27	0	0
Nutrition	29	26	3	0	18	18	0	0	25	23	2	0
Cost-effectiveness	26	26	0	0	6	6	0	0	19	19	0	0
Work behaviours	10	10	0	0	18	12	0	6	13	10	0	2
Protection outcomes	13	10	0	3	6	0	0	6	10	6	0	4
Animal health	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	2	0	2	0

Note: Negative coping strategies' has been coded as '-' in the cases where use of these strategies reduced and '+' where it increased.

Source: Authors' own.

Annexe 4

Table A4.1: Comparison of impacts between cash-plus and cash-only arms

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>2. Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST) (Afghanistan), group H</p> <p><i>Components:</i> lump-sum UCT + technical and vocational education and training (TVET)</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i> (1) TVET; (2) a one-time UCT; (3) TVET with a one-time UCT; and (4) control (no intervention)</p>	<p><i>Arm 2:</i></p> <p>+: support for government (immediate effect with backlash months later)</p> <p>0: economic outcomes; perceptions of government; psychosocial wellbeing (immediate)</p> <p>–: support for armed groups (significant)</p>	<p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>+: days worked; cash earned 6–9 months later (significant)</p> <p>0: attitudes related to political violence</p>	<p><i>Arm 3:</i></p> <p>–: largest reduction in willingness to engage in armed groups actions 6–9 months later (additional 4 percentage-point decrease from cash only)</p> <p>0: no additional effect on economic outcomes from cash-plus-only (economic effects come from 'plus' element)</p> <p>+: perception of government responsiveness immediately afterwards</p>
<p>7. Women for Women International (WfWI) (Afghanistan), group H</p> <p><i>Components:</i> frequent conditional cash transfer (monthly stipend for attendance to trainings) and training in sustaining income, health and wellbeing, family and community decision-making, social networks and safety nets, women's rights, numeracy, business skills, vocational skills, social empowerment; coaching; financial services facilitation; savings channels</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i> (1) control received US\$10 per interview; (2) treatment received cash transfer, training; coaching; access to finance</p>	<p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>+: consumption, children's education</p>	<p><i>Not analysed</i></p>	<p><i>Arm 2:</i></p> <p>+: physical IPV, depression (insignificant); food security, earnings (39 per cent higher compared to cash-only), savings (significant, compared to cash-only); gender-equitable attitudes, household decision-making, mobility (compared to Arm 1)</p>

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>34. Strengthen PSNP4 Institutions and Resilience (SPIR) (Ethiopia), group M</p> <p><i>Components:</i> lump-sum UCT + starting village economic and social associations, financial literacy training, agriculture and livestock value chain development, home gardening and forage production; plus (1) social analysis and action to improve women's access to markets; (2) aspirational promotion activities in randomly selected kebeles</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i> intervention L: SPIR livelihood activities: starting village economic and social associations, financial literacy training, agriculture and livestock value chain development, home gardening and forage production. Intervention L*: SPIR livelihoods activities plus (1) social analysis and action to improve women's access to markets, (2) aspirational promotion activities in randomly selected kebeles (subdistricts), and (3) targeted poultry or cash livelihood transfers. Intervention N: SPIR nutrition activities: nutrition behaviour change communication (BCC); water, sanitation and hygiene activities. Intervention N*: SPIR nutrition activities plus (1) timed and targeted counselling (more intensive nutrition BCC); (2) community-based participatory nutrition promotion; (3) male engagement in BCC; and (4) interpersonal therapy in groups interventions for women screened for depression (provided after the midline survey), all supported by a community health facilitator</p> <p>(T1): L*+N*, (T2): L*+N, (T3): L+N*, (T4): Productive Safety Net Programme only</p>	<p><i>Arm 4:</i></p> <p>+: nutritional knowledge; women's dietary diversity</p>	<p><i>Arm 3:</i></p> <p>+: financial inclusion; access to health services; men's gender-equitable attitudes</p> <p>0: women's decision-making or self-efficacy; mental health; IPV</p> <p>Less poor:</p> <p>0: livestock assets and production</p> <p>+: savings; access to credit; housing</p>	<p><i>Arms 1 and 2:</i></p> <p>+: livestock-related production; financial inclusion; access to health services; men's gender-equitable attitudes</p> <p>0: women's decision-making or self-efficacy; mental health; IPV</p> <p>Extremely poor:</p> <p>+: livestock assets (significant); village economic and social associations membership; savings</p> <p>0: other durable goods ownership; consumption two years later</p>

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>48. Transferts Productifs (CASH+) (Niger) – only assessed vs a baseline, no control group, group L</p> <p><i>Components:</i> UCT spread over a few months or weeks (depending on amount); agricultural input kits (seeds and fertiliser for 1ha) and technical training; livestock kits (3 goats and agricultural input kit)</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i>²⁹ (1) cash only (FCFA150,000 over 4 months); (2) agricultural inputs and technical training only; (3) cash (FCFA115,000 over 3 months) and agricultural inputs and technical training; (4) cash (FCFA 20,000) + agricultural inputs and technical training + livestock (3 goats)</p>	<p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>+: income, productive assets (livestock, durable assets, land under cultivation/owned), food security, child nutrition (6–23 months old)</p> <p>0: percentage of households moving upwards in terms of social category</p> <p>–: spending (consumption), dietary diversity, household nutrition</p>	<p><i>Arm 2:</i></p> <p>+: income (48.55 percentage points more than cash only), spending (consumption) (34.19 percentage points more than cash only), productive assets (livestock, durable assets, land under cultivation/owned) (17.28 percentage points less than cash only), percentage of households moving upwards in terms of social category (6.50 percentage points more than cash only), food security (2.38 percentage points less than cash only), child nutrition (6–23 months old) (43 percentage points less than cash only)</p> <p>–: dietary diversity (20 percentage points more than cash only), household nutrition (1 percentage point less than cash only)</p>	<p><i>Arm 3:</i></p> <p>+: income (31.20 percentage points more than cash only), spending (consumption) (23.50 percentage points more than cash only), productive assets (livestock, durable assets, land under cultivation/owned) (10.23 percentage points less than cash only), food security (19.91 percentage points more than cash only), child nutrition (6–23 months old) (45 percentage points less than cash only)</p> <p>0: percentage of households moving upwards in terms of social category (same as cash only)</p> <p>–: dietary diversity (56.08 percentage points less than cash only), household nutrition (12 percentage points less than cash only)</p> <p><i>Arm 4:</i></p> <p>+: income (0.01 percentage points less than cash only), productive assets (livestock, durable assets, land under cultivation/owned) (30.43 percentage points more than cash only), percentage of households moving upwards in terms of social category (29.44 percentage points more than cash only), food security (11.63 percentage points more than cash only), time women spent caring for children (66.67 percentage points less than cash only)</p> <p>–: spending (consumption) (5.06 percentage points more than cash only), dietary diversity (38.10 percentage points less than cash only), child nutrition (6-23 months old) (92 percentage points less than cash only), household nutrition (5 percentage points less than cash only)</p> <p><i>Very little sense of what might be driving results/outcomes, the results are very descriptive in nature.</i></p>

²⁹ To access this evaluation, click on the link; then download 'Annexes' (Word) document; then double-click on 'Rapport evaluation finale Niger VF.pdf' document.

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>50. Projet Filets Sociaux Adaptatifs/Adaptive Social Safety Nets Project (Niger), group L</p> <p><i>Components:</i> frequent UCT from national programme and coaching, saving and loans group, and entrepreneurship training and lump-sum capital grant, psychosocial element (life skills training and community sensitisation on aspirations and social norms)</p> <p><u>Evaluation arms:</u> (1) control group only receives the regular cash transfers from the national programme. All three treatment arms include a core package of group savings promotion, coaching and entrepreneurship training, in addition to the regular cash transfers from the national programme; (2) also lump-sum cash grant; (3) psychosocial interventions (life skills training and community sensitisation on aspirations and social norms); (4) cash grant and the psychosocial interventions</p>	<p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>+: school attendance; yearly in transfers</p> <p>0: borrowing; agricultural assets' value</p>		<p><i>Arms 2, 3 and 4:</i></p> <p><i>The impacts tend to be larger in the full treatment, followed by the capital and psychosocial treatments. Only small differences in impacts on intermediate outcomes emerge over time between the capital and psychosocial packages.</i></p> <p>+: consumption and food security (medium term – significant relative to control); earnings (women led self-employment off-farm); savings and asset accumulation (relative to control); psychosocial wellbeing (larger impact in full treatment, followed by the capital and psychosocial treatments); benefit-cost ratio for psychosocial package is 126 per cent; full package, 95 per cent; and capital package, 58 per cent; full package tends to have the largest impacts on welfare, food security and income-generating activities; wage employment (significant for full package); economic diversification (significant); participation in household businesses (significant); investments in off-farm businesses (significant for full package vs other treatments); intra-household dynamics (significant from psychosocial package); social cohesion (significant short term from psychosocial and full packages, significant medium term for all packages); collective action (significant); women's empowerment (significant); school attendance (significant for capital package but not others); children's participation in housework (but insignificant medium term)</p> <p>0: women's revenues from agriculture (insignificant for capital package); time spent on agriculture or salaried employment (insignificant); intra-household dynamics (insignificant, all but psychosocial package); women's decision-making power over household resources (insignificant)</p>

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>89. Village Enterprise Program (Uganda), group M</p> <p><i>Components:</i> lump sum capital grants (UCT); business training, mentoring and saving groups</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i> (1) full graduation programme; (2) business-in-a-box (business inputs instead of grants); (3) graduation programme without business savings group; (4) UCTs; (5) UCT and behavioural/mindset intervention; and (6) comparison/control</p>	<p><i>Arm 4:</i></p> <p>0: poverty</p> <p>+: assets (mixed and insignificant)</p> <p><i>A cost-equivalent cash transfer appeared to have less promising medium-term impacts on poverty reduction and subjective wellbeing than the micro-enterprise programme, though estimates are more ambiguous.</i></p>	<p><i>Arm 2:</i></p> <p><i>Indicators not specified in project documents</i></p>	<p><i>Arms 1, 3 and 5:</i></p> <p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>+: consumption, assets (livestock), and cash inflow (due to more self-employment activities); subjective wellbeing over time (for arm 1); food security and dietary diversity; nutrition; and cost-effectiveness</p> <p>0: other health-related outcomes</p> <p>–: poverty</p> <p>Savings group differential:</p> <p>0: consumption; assets;</p> <p>+: entrepreneurship; women's empowerment</p> <p><i>Arm 5:</i></p> <p><i>Indicators not specified in project documents</i></p> <p><i>Arm 5:</i></p> <p>+: psychological wellbeing; assets</p> <p>0: consumption</p> <p><i>Simplifying the integrated programme tended to erode its impact. The micro-enterprise programme led to increased consumption, assets, and income, as well as improvements in nutrition and subjective wellbeing. Adding a light-touch behaviour change component to the cash transfer changed the investment patterns of cash transfer recipients and improved subjective wellbeing somewhat, but cannot be characterised as a substitute for the much more hands-on training and mentorship interventions of the micro-enterprise programme.</i></p> <p><i>Overall, the results suggest that training and mentorship components of integrated poverty alleviation programmes are sensible and cannot simply be removed (or substituted for cash transfers). But as they are complex, more research is needed on the issue of scaling them while maintaining their quality.</i></p>

Programmes (number, name, country, crisis category, components, evaluation arms, link to evaluation)	Cash-only arm (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Plus-only arm (if one exists) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')	Cash-plus arm(s) (indicators that increased, decreased or did not change; include 'significant')
<p>43. Transferts Productifs (CASH+) (Mali), group L</p> <p><i>Components:</i> lump-sum UCT + 3 goats, livestock feed, breeding knowledge, veterinary observation with preventive and remedial treatment, zotechnical support, sensitisation on nutrition and child feeding and hygiene, culinary demonstration kits, soap distribution</p> <p><i>Evaluation arms:</i> (1) cash only; (2) cash and productive inputs; and (3) comparison group (no intervention)</p>	<p><i>Arm 1:</i></p> <p>0: engagement in and profits from non-farm activities</p> <p>+: aspirations for children's education (higher than cash-plus, significant), hand washing</p>	<p><i>Not measured</i></p>	<p><i>Arm 2:</i></p> <p>+: food security (7.1 per cent more than cash only); hand washing frequency; average gross income from livestock (higher than control and cash only); livestock volume (higher than cash only, significant); aspirations for children's education (significant, less than cash only)</p> <p>0: engagement in and profits from non-farm activities (insignificant); expectations of future socioeconomic conditions (insignificant)</p> <p><i>Livestock feed provided to cash-plus beneficiaries (50kg) insufficient – some people buy more with their own money.</i></p>

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