

COUNTRY REPORT

March 2023

Conflict-Sensitive Social Protection: Somalia Country Report

Izzy Birch

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Summary

This is one of three country case studies (the others being of Kenya and Sudan) that explore the interaction between social protection and conflict in the Horn of Africa. In a context of weak central political authority and persistent conflict, Somalia's fledgling social protection sector continues to lean heavily on humanitarian actors for its delivery. It is also largely externally driven and financed, with consequences for the calibre of sector coherence. Social protection policy documents and programmes incorporate some measures to manage conflict-related risks, but the extent to which these impinge on the fundamental drivers of conflict in Somalia, such as the structural exclusion of minorities and the country's deep governance deficit, is less clear.

Keywords

Conflict; political instability; social protection; shock-responsiveness; humanitarian assistance; Somalia.

Authors

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Acronyms

BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
CWG	Cash Working Group
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GBV	gender-based violence
IDP	internally displaced person
ILED	Inclusive Local and Economic Development
KII	key informant interview
MoHADMD	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
MoLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMT	proxy means test
SAGAL	Social Transfers to Vulnerable Somali People
SCC	Somali Cash Consortium
SNHCP	Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project
SNLRP	Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response Project
SRSP	Shock-Responsive Social Protection
TAF	Technical Assistance Facility
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WRC	Women's Refugee Commission

1. Introduction

This report is part of a multi-country study exploring the interaction between social protection and conflict in the Horn of Africa (the other countries of focus are Sudan and Kenya). Irish Aid commissioned the study to inform its work on social protection, particularly in fragile contexts, as a key policy instrument to reach those furthest behind, to reduce extreme poverty, and respond to shocks and emergencies (Government of Ireland 2019; Irish Aid 2017).

Conflict and fragility challenge the design and delivery of social protection while simultaneously heightening the vulnerabilities it seeks to address. This study considers both these aspects, that is, how social protection programmes function in situations of conflict and instability as well as the extent to which they respond to conflict and conflict-related shocks. The three research questions are:

1. To what extent and in which ways do social protection programmes and policies consider conflict-related risks?
2. What features enable the effective delivery of social protection during conflict and in response to displacement? What features mitigate against this?
3. What can development partners do to make social protection programmes and systems more conflict sensitive and conflict responsive?

These questions illustrate how social protection and conflict intersect in the following dimensions:¹

1. **Sensitivity:** understanding the realities of operating in areas affected by or at risk of conflict in order to adapt programmes and interventions in ways that minimise harm and, where possible, have a positive impact on conflict dynamics.²
2. **System resilience:** maintaining the systems and structures necessary for the delivery of social protection during and after conflict.
3. **Response:** mobilising social protection to respond to the additional needs created by conflict.
4. **Transformation:** designing and delivering social protection to facilitate and promote peacebuilding and social justice.

¹ The first three dimensions are informed by analysis undertaken by Slater and Longhurst on the delivery of social assistance systems in protracted crises (summarised in Slater and Longhurst 2022).

² Besser (2021); Directorate-General for International Partnership, European Commission (2021).

Social protection is understood as,

all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups. (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: iii)

It includes non-contributory social assistance and social care, contributory social insurance, and labour market policies and interventions (*ibid.*: 13).

The social protection sector in Somalia is in its infancy and limited to social assistance, specifically social transfers, which are therefore also the focus of this report. The sector is building on many years of social transfer provision through the humanitarian system and involving many of the same actors which has led to some blurring of lines between the two (Sinclair 2020). Lessons from humanitarian cash-based assistance are incorporated in this report although its primary interest is the emerging social protection sector.

Somalia is once again in the midst of a major humanitarian crisis. Five consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, compounded by conflict and institutional challenges, have left 8.3 million people in need of assistance,³ more than 300,000 of these facing famine (FSNAU 2022). Consequently, there is real urgency to find ways of expanding access and providing as much assistance as possible through both humanitarian and social protection channels.

The design of this research was limited in scope. The methodology involved a rapid but thorough review of available literature supplemented by eight online interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders in Somalia.⁴ This did not allow for direct contact with government officials, but several of the informants have worked closely with either the federal or state governments.

The next three sections introduce the social protection sector and provide some background to the conflict in Somalia and the humanitarian response, including through social transfers. This is followed by a discussion of conflict sensitivity and conflict responsiveness based on the experience of the two main social protection programmes in Somalia. The penultimate section summarises the features that have either enabled or undermined the delivery of social protection, and the report concludes with recommendations to Irish Aid.

³ **UNOCHA – Somalia** (accessed 15 March 2023).

⁴ The contributions of all informants and reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.

2. The emerging social protection sector in Somalia

Somalia is gradually establishing its federal and state institutions, built upon a politically fragile power-sharing settlement between its clan elites (Dalrymple and Thomas 2021; Menkhaus 2018). The federal government adopted a social protection policy in 2019, followed a year later by an implementation framework for the period 2020–24 (FGS 2019, 2020).⁵ Policy development and programme design were supported and coordinated by a number of donors through a Donor Working Group, established in 2017–18, and a Technical Assistance Facility which operated between 2019 and 2021 (McLean and Ammoun 2021).⁶

Somalia's policy defines social protection as:

Government-led policies and programmes which address predictable needs throughout the life cycle in order to protect all groups, and particularly the poor and vulnerable, against shocks, help them to manage risks, and provide them with opportunities to overcome poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion.
(FGS 2019: 10)

The policy recognises that its overall agenda is ambitious in the current context and therefore prioritises the development of social transfers and the systems and capacities these require (*ibid.*: 27). It highlights social protection's potential contribution to peace and stability by addressing the needs of vulnerable youth, through skills development and employment opportunities, thereby demonstrating the tangible benefits of peace (*ibid.*: 9, 19). It acknowledges the 'day-to-day reality' of conflict in many parts of the country and the challenge of access to large parts of south and central Somalia, though without discussing how that challenge might be overcome (*ibid.*: 4, 49). Finally, the policy argues that the formal social protection system should 'complement and align' with the values and assumptions of informal safety nets, expressed through religious or cultural practices and remittances, while acknowledging that 'corrective measures' will be required because these 'do not work equally well for all as certain communities and vulnerable households from marginalised groups can be excluded' (*ibid.*: 16).

In many respects, therefore, the policy appears progressive. The reference to informal safety nets, for example, opens up a link to conflict since these

⁵ The government in Somaliland has also been **developing a social protection policy** (accessed 29 September 2022).

⁶ See **Terms of Reference** (accessed 18 September 2022).

mechanisms are often those that communities also use to respond to conflict-related dynamics and processes. Somalia compares well with other fragile and conflict-affected countries whose social protection policies are more conflict-blind (Harvey and Mohamed 2022). However, the extent to which the policy is nationally driven and owned is unclear. It is heavily reliant on external technical and financial support, which international agencies have used to ‘pollinate’ the expansion of social protection policies, systems, and cash transfer programmes across Africa (Devereux 2020). The policy is reportedly being used by the federal ministry, but its development was a top-down process that generated little traction at the sub-national level.⁷

There are now two multi-year and comparatively large-scale social protection programmes that are ‘government-led’ in that they operate under the oversight of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). Both aim to strengthen government systems and one is on-budget. Funding is entirely from donor sources, although small allocations by the federal government are anticipated in the near future (Poole 2021: 27). As Table 2.1 illustrates, one dwarfs the other in financial value. As a point of comparison, the World Food Programme (WFP) reached nearly 4.9 million people with food and cash transfers in 2021, 75 per cent of these in cash to a value of US\$206,411,153 (WFP 2021: 5).

The other significant social protection initiative implemented under government oversight is the School Feeding Programme supported by WFP through the state education ministries and reaching over 20 per cent of primary schools (Kyallo *et al.* 2020; FGS 2019: 15).

⁷ KII with social protection expert, online, 7 September 2022.

Table 2.1: Baxnaano and SAGAL

	Baxnaano⁸	SAGAL⁹
Timeframe	2019–24	2020–24
Donors	World Bank	European Union
Funding	US\$433m in regular and emergency transfers On-budget, although funds do not pass through the federal treasury	€27m Off-budget
Implementing partners	WFP and UNICEF	Somali Cash Consortium (SCC)
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Provide cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households and establish the key building blocks of a national shock-responsive safety net system. – Support households to strengthen their resilience and avoid negative coping mechanisms. – Promote human capital investment by linking beneficiary households to complementary nutrition services and continuing to smooth consumption gaps. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Improve resilience of households to conflict and climate-related shocks and disasters. – Provide cash-based social transfers complemented by systems building with government for delivery of social protection.
Coverage	220,000 households (regular transfers) 315,000 households (emergency transfers)	44,221 households, with a focus on internally displaced people, returnees and host communities

⁸ **Baxnaano** is supported by two World Bank projects: the Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project (SNHCP) and the Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response Project (SNLRP). These are now referred to as two ‘windows’ within the overall Baxnaano programme: see World Bank, (2022d: 10).

⁹ **SAGAL** (Social Transfers to Vulnerable Somali People) is one of the three components of the Inclusive Local and Economic Development (ILED) programme, funded by the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

	Baxnaano ⁸	SAGAL ⁹
Geographical focus	Predominantly rural, in 21 districts, ¹⁰ but now expanding to urban	Predominantly urban, in four corridors ¹¹
Targeting	Three-layered approach: (i) district selection using a 'distress index'; (ii) community selection based on availability of services and partners; and (iii) community-based targeting	Categorical (first 1,000 days, youth, elderly) then community-based
Delivery mechanism	Mobile money ¹²	Mobile money
Shock-responsive mechanism	Yes	Yes
System strengthening	Predominantly at federal level	With federal, state and district governments

¹⁰ Somalia has 90 districts, of which 18 are in the self-declared but unrecognised state of Somaliland (FCA 2021).

¹¹ Juba, Shabelle, Central North, and Somaliland. See **Inclusive Local and Economic Development – ILED Social Safety Nets Component**.

¹² The Covid-19 pandemic prompted WFP to shift from vouchers to mobile money (World Bank 2022c: 38).

3. Conflict and aid in Somalia

Somalia has endured armed conflict and violence since the late 1980s, which precipitated the collapse of the state in 1991. A federal government structure was finally established in 2012: four Federal Member States (FMS)¹³ joined the previously autonomous state of Puntland under a provisional constitution while Somaliland maintained its separatist stance. Contemporary conflict in Somalia has multiple interconnected layers: low-level communal violence at a local level, often linked to clan affiliation and control over natural resources; territorial claims and contestation at the national level, between factions within the state as well as with armed groups such as Al-Shabaab; and the internationalisation of the conflict through the Islamist ties of these groups and the responses they provoke from a range of external actors (Eklöv and Krampe 2019).

In the absence of state structures, some level of basic service provision and social protection has been provided by a mix of humanitarian actors, customary authorities, clan networks, and the private sector. Humanitarian agencies remain closely involved in service delivery, including of social protection; observers attribute this to a degree of path dependency that is proving difficult to break (Medinilla *et al.* 2019), and to the country's deep and protracted governance deficit which prevents the state from fulfilling its responsibilities.¹⁴

The federal government's territorial reach is modest and largely limited to urban enclaves.¹⁵ Al-Shabaab is not only deeply embedded within large parts of rural southern Somalia but successfully infiltrates areas outside its direct control (Ahmad *et al.* 2022; Hiraal Institute 2020; Marchal 2019). There are renewed calls for the recently elected federal government to test the feasibility of political dialogue (ICG 2022). At a time when humanitarian need is once more at crisis levels, there are also demands for far greater urgency in reaching populations under Al-Shabaab control and for donors and agencies to lower their risk thresholds and rethink their approach to counter-terrorism and humanitarian exemptions in order to do so (Majid *et al.* 2022).

Informants to this study report that some donors are noticeably more vocal on this point than in the past and more open to considering how the restrictions on humanitarian agencies created by sanctions regimes might be eased.¹⁶ A degree of access has always been possible: some agencies engage bilaterally with Al-Shabaab (Jackson and Aynte 2013); others quietly apply remote methodologies or work through customary authorities, relying on the quality of their relationships

¹³ Jubbaland, Southwestern, Hirshabelle, and Galmadug.

¹⁴ Key informant interview (KII) with UN representative, online, 31 August 2022.

¹⁵ See **Somalia Control Map and Timeline – December 2021** (accessed 18 September 2022).

¹⁶ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

with elders for protection.¹⁷ Local administrations, civil society, and the private sector also work together to relieve those cut off by fighting.¹⁸ Al-Shabaab provides its own disaster relief and has set up a Humanitarian Coordination Office, controlling and taxing external humanitarian assistance (Eklöw and Krampe 2019). It provides some level of basic service provision beyond its security, legal, and administrative systems, coordinating community relief and social welfare efforts and redistributing resources to those in need (Ahmad *et al.* 2022; Marchal 2019). However, more open, concerted, and substantive action is required to secure access on a scale demanded by the current crisis (Majid *et al.* 2022). Those familiar with government sensibilities on this subject note that even less thought is being given to access for long-term development and social protection.¹⁹

There are long-standing concerns about the so-called ‘business of aid’ in Somalia (EAJ Program 2020: 27) and how this is interwoven with conflict dynamics. The political manipulation of aid stretches back to the 1970s (Maxwell *et al.* 2014). A body of recent research has demonstrated the continuities, (Thomas and Opiyo 2021; Jaspars *et al.* 2020; EAJ Program 2020; UNAP 2018; Majid and Harmer 2016), which include:

1. The concentrated control over food and cash assistance among a political and business elite;
2. The prevalence of corruption and aid diversion among all categories of actor in Somalia;
3. Failure to address the structural exclusion that underpins the vulnerability of those such as minority clans and ethnic groups who receive less protection from informal safety nets, are less well represented in local administrations and business networks, constitute a large part of the displaced population, and account for the majority of excess mortality in emergencies; and,
4. The political and economic advantage of protracted displacement for numerous actors, from Al-Shabaab to the aid system itself and to the authorities and gatekeepers in the areas to which people flee.

Exclusion must be addressed if peace and reconciliation are to be achieved (UNAP 2018). Some feel that ‘ears have finally opened’ – that there is now more recognition of its gravity, even if concrete measures to address it are few.²⁰ Similarly, Earle (2021), writing about displaced populations in Mogadishu, finds that there is now more awareness of the need to engage with gatekeepers and

¹⁷ KIIs with international NGO representatives, online, 25 August and 21 September 2022.

¹⁸ KIIs with local NGO representative and social protection expert, online, 7 and 19 September 2022.

¹⁹ KII with social protection expert, online, 7 September 2022.

²⁰ KII with social protection expert, online, 7 September 2022.

address the limited citizenship of the city's vulnerable residents. A consistent priority in the Humanitarian Country Team's Centrality of Protection Strategy since it was adopted in 2017 has been to address exclusion in its various forms, whether related to disability, gender, or clan status (Young 2022); the Human Rights and Protection Group has recently completed a clan mapping of local power-holders, security actors, and the media landscape in the UN's Priority 1 areas, and a second of police presence.²¹ Despite these signs of movement, universality of protection in Somalia is very far from being achieved. A key question for the emerging social protection sector is whether it is repeating or rejecting these entrenched patterns of bias and exclusion.

²¹ KII with UN representative, online, 31 August 2022.

4. Humanitarian social transfers

Somalia was a pioneer of cash-based humanitarian assistance, its growth facilitated by the country's trade-based economy, money transfer systems, and telecommunications capacity (Jaspars *et al.* 2020: 9). It is estimated that half of all humanitarian response during the 2017 emergency was provided in the form of cash (Daniels and Anderson 2018: 35).

Humanitarian cash transfers have laid the groundwork for the emerging social protection sector. A 2014 feasibility study commissioned by a group of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) explored how to move on from short-term humanitarian response to a more formal social protection system. It drew three distinctions between the two:

Firstly, social protection should operate within the rubric of government policy with regard to minimum living standards, even if external partners are involved in exclusively or in part of [*sic.*] elements of its delivery and funding. Secondly, transfers made through the social protection programmes, whether conditional or unconditional, should be long term and predictable. Lastly, and particularly importantly given the long-term nature of the transfers, selection and targeting of beneficiaries should be transparent and easily understood.

(Dunn and Brewin 2014: 16)

The social protection policy acknowledges its debt to the 'knowledge, expertise, design features, operational systems, and coordination mechanisms' developed by humanitarian actors while noting their limitations from a social protection perspective ('short term and project-based, operate without predictable long-term finances, provide only low coverage of the population... and often do not involve the FGS and FMS'), making it clear that future systems must be owned by government and meet its requirements (FGS 2019: 15, 29).

Both social protection programmes under MoLSA's oversight rely on humanitarian partners. Social Transfers to Vulnerable Somali People (SAGAL) is implemented by the Somali Cash Consortium (SCC) whose NGO members have been part of the long history of cash-based programming in Somalia. Baxnaano relies on the systems and methods of WFP and UNICEF although, as section 5 explains, these are starting to evolve. The 2022 work plan of the Somalia Cash Working Group, which is responsible for coordinating cash assistance under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), includes the promotion of linkages between humanitarian cash and social protection through mapping, monitoring, and system interoperability. All these are indications that


the recommendation in an evaluation of humanitarian cash-based assistance in 2017 that agencies should support the development of government social protection programmes and find ways of using them to deliver emergency assistance is in several respects being taken forward (Daniels and Anderson 2018: 41).

5. Conflict sensitivity of social protection in Somalia

Conflict sensitivity is often presented as a continuum (Figure 5.1): at one end, the minimalist goal of ensuring that an activity at least does not worsen social tensions, and at the other, finding ways in which it might also reduce them and contribute to peacebuilding.

This section focuses on Baxnaano and SAGAL and looks in particular at conflict sensitivity in programme design and targeting.²² At this stage, it is not possible to comment with any confidence on either programme's effects on conflict dynamics since both are at a comparatively early stage and the published evidence is not yet available. However, a concluding discussion highlights a number of potential risks raised by study informants.

Figure 5.1: The social protection conflict-sensitivity continuum



Source: Adapted from FAO (2019) and Besser (2021).

5.1 Design

SAGAL is funded by the EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa which makes displacement central to its purpose. It focuses on urban areas where internally displaced people (IDPs) tend to concentrate: one in four of Somalia's urban population is thought to be an IDP (Poole 2021: 13). Conflict sensitivity was not a

²² There is more documentation publicly available on Baxnaano than SAGAL which accounts for the relative weight attached to each in this section.

prominent consideration at the design stage, except within the shock-responsive component (see section 6).²³ SAGAL's NGO implementing partners report making more effort to commission and integrate conflict analysis in their humanitarian cash programming, particularly when working in areas where lack of recent access means that knowledge is low.²⁴

The design of Baxnaano was completed relatively quickly. The World Bank's approach in less stable countries is for rapid design combined with continuous learning and review in order to achieve faster results that might then contribute to trust- and state-building.²⁵ Baxnaano's implementation model can adjust in response to Somalia's overall rate of progress. As country systems consolidate further, the government's responsibility for implementation increases, including through an expansion of authority to the FMS; external partners then provide only technical support. Were country systems to regress or collapse, the roles would reverse (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 9, 39).

Baxnaano's project documentation anticipates many risks likely to face the programme and sets out a range of measures to avoid harm and promote social cohesion. These include: (i) clear and objective targeting criteria; (ii) community consultations and a functional grievance redress mechanism; (iii) working through partners who understand the local context and its challenges; (iv) third-party monitoring, contracted by the government rather than by WFP; (v) a gender-based violence (GBV) action plan, including outreach and integration with referral pathways; and (vi) special attention to the inclusion of minority and marginalised groups, for example by integrating this in project guidance, training, and monitoring frameworks (World Bank 2022b, 2019: 21–22).²⁶ However, the focus is very much around the 'do no harm' part of the spectrum in Figure 5.1. The term 'conflict sensitivity' is not explicitly used.

5.2 Targeting

Targeting is essentially a system of rationing finite resources and therefore an inherently conflictual process.²⁷ Consequently, it receives significant attention in discussions of conflict sensitivity and social protection. Conflict and displacement inform the targeting of Baxnaano and SAGAL in different ways.

SAGAL's overall geographical focus was set by higher-level Inclusive Local and Economic Development (ILED) decisions, taken in consultation with other donors who selected areas where they wished to concentrate resources in the interests

²³ KII with international NGO representative and development partner representative, online, 25 August and 16 September 2022.

²⁴ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

²⁵ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

²⁶ Also, KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

²⁷ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

of synergy, efficiency, and impact.²⁸ Other considerations were the high levels of displacement-driven urbanisation in Somalia and to balance Baxnaano's rural presence.²⁹ IDP status is not, however, a condition of eligibility.³⁰

SAGAL is testing four different models of social transfer, three of them targeted categorically: to the first 1,000 days of life, to youth, and to elderly at risk of contracting Covid-19 (a model which has now ended). The fourth is being designed jointly with MoLSA based on what has been learnt. Given limited resources, categorical targeting is followed by community-based targeting by local committees.³¹ SAGAL's response to displacement is therefore twofold: it prioritises IDPs' inclusion through the choice of location but then considers them as part of the urban population during the targeting process.³²

Those implementing SAGAL recognise the strengths and weaknesses of community-based targeting. Its principal advantage from a conflict-sensitivity perspective is its potential to tap into grass-roots understandings of vulnerability and risk and connect with the structures that manage social tensions at that level. The principal risk is reinforcing the biases of those structures and the consequent exclusion of certain groups. The SCC is responding to this risk by adding another layer of geographical targeting informed by a mapping of where minority groups are most concentrated. It also relies on the calibre of its teams who must be 'very active, very present' in monitoring how things are being done.³³

Targeting in Baxnaano operates at three levels (MoLSA 2021: 64–73):

1. **District selection.** Within each state, districts are ranked against a distress index and three are selected.³⁴ The choice is then adjusted to take account of security, access, and clan dynamics; for example, in Hirshabelle, Jalalqsi was replaced by Balcad to ensure a different clan affiliation between the state's three districts, while in Somaliland, Gebiley was prioritised due to the presence of minority groups. The total number of households targeted by the programme is distributed across the districts in proportion to their share of the total number of households with children under five, based on the 2014 population data.

²⁸ KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

²⁹ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

³⁰ KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

³¹ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

³² KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

³³ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

³⁴ The distress index considers: (i) the proportion of the rural population in the district's total population; (ii) the number of times the district has received a crisis or emergency IPC rating since December 2012; and (iii) the incidence of both severe and moderate acute malnutrition in children under five years (MoLSA 2021: 64)

2. **Community selection.** Within each district, communities are selected by considering two factors – the availability of nutrition services and WFP/UNICEF partners, and the presence of WFP partners with experience of implementing cash-based transfers.
3. **Household selection.** This uses a community-based approach. A selection committee prioritises households into four categories using criteria provided by the programme. One of these criteria was those with children under five, but this is now changing.

Targeting is being adjusted in the following ways:³⁵

1. **Community-based household-level targeting replaced with a proxy means test (PMT), followed by community validation of the results.** The World Bank argues that this is more appropriate and feasible for a government-led national system. A period of testing and evaluation has established that three formulae will be required: one for urban areas, one for rural areas, and a third for urban IDPs. The principal source for the PMT is the High Frequency Surveys for Somalia, which include indicators of displacement, and which are analysed to identify the strongest predictors of poverty. However, others have limited confidence that these provide a suitable and sufficiently accurate base for constructing a PMT.³⁶
2. **Eligibility** broadened beyond households with young children: anyone in poverty could be eligible.
3. **Expansion into urban areas.** Additional World Bank finance secured in June 2022 is enabling Baxnaano to add a further 20,000 households to its core clients. These are likely to be some of the long-term displaced living in informal settlements in Banadir. The plan is to use a combination of PMT and community-based targeting in urban settings, although the distinct operational challenges and conflict sensitivities in doing so have not been recognised.³⁷

There is other evidence of conflict influencing Baxnaano's targeting. First, the decision to allocate an equal number of districts to each FMS/Somaliland was motivated by a concern to manage inter-state dynamics and accommodate perceptions of fairness (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 34). Second, there are cases where changes in the geography of the conflict have influenced the choice of district: in 2019, for example, the newly liberated KM 50 replaced Baidoa in South West State (MoLSA 2021: 71) so that the government could respond quickly to a previously inaccessible population.³⁸

³⁵ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

³⁶ Personal communication, social protection expert, 13 March 2023.

³⁷ Personal communication, social protection expert, 13 March 2023.

³⁸ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

5.3 Discussion

A key question raised by informants to this study is the extent to which measures to enhance conflict sensitivity and mitigate risk are being applied and having results. While evidence is not yet publicly available, those with knowledge of both programmes raise a number of concerns. Three are discussed here: exclusion, protection, and sector coherence.

5.3.1 Exclusion

Both programmes demonstrate a clear awareness of the risks of exclusion. Those responsible for SAGAL know that community-based targeting can reinforce structural bias, while those responsible for Baxnaano recognise that conflict sensitivity is always ‘work in progress’³⁹ and that, for example, its implications for clan and ethnic dynamics need further analysis and attention (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 67). However, observers note the high level of political influence on the selection of Baxnaano communities, despite the geographical targeting criteria – targeting being one area where the ministry at both federal and state level demonstrates significant ownership – as well as unexplained discrepancies between programme quotas and actual population profiles.⁴⁰ A further concern is that using pre-existing agency presence as one of the geographical targeting criteria is likely to exclude many areas that need assistance most.

5.3.2 Protection

Women are the direct recipients of Baxnaano’s regular transfer and there are conflicting views on the extent to which this has exposed them to risk. A recent World Bank discussion paper acknowledges ‘some tensions and difficulties within the household’ but suggests that these tend to stabilise and create a new role for women (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 56). The programme has responded by emphasising to stakeholders that targeting women is a programme requirement. It has also invested in grievance mechanisms and referral systems, including recently mapping all GBV service provision in partnership with UNICEF.⁴¹ However, other observers question whether GBV referral pathways are strong enough and whether women’s access to grievance mechanisms is in practice constrained by literacy and numeracy levels and by their need to speak with other women.⁴² There is also anecdotal evidence of recipients’ vulnerability,

³⁹ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

⁴⁰ KIIs with UN representative and social protection expert, online, 31 August and 7 September 2022.

⁴¹ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

⁴² KII with UN representative, online, 31 August 2022. Several humanitarian agencies have studied the protection implications of cash assistance. A CARE Somalia study found that mobile money provided a

their transfers reportedly ‘taxed’ by gatekeepers and community leaders and then shared with others under pressure. The extent of these risks would be clearer if there were adequate field-level research on Baxnaano, but at present this is limited to WFP’s post-distribution monitoring reports.⁴³

5.3.3 Sector coherence

The cabinet endorsed terms of reference for a National Social Protection Steering Committee in 2020 but the group has not yet met due to ‘complex political dynamics’ on the ground (World Bank 2022c: 39). The committee’s functions include the determination of social protection priorities as well as oversight over implementing ministries and authorities. In the absence of this structure, it is not clear how the government is exercising leadership over social protection programming, or its position on key policy questions.⁴⁴ For example, Baxnaano and SAGAL and their donors hold differing positions on issues such as targeting and the unified social registry now in development.⁴⁵ Both work under MoLSA, but the project teams are said to have little interaction.⁴⁶ In a context where aid dependency is so high, the incentive for both is to prioritise reporting to donors above reporting to the government.⁴⁷ Despite the evident need for stronger coordination, donorship has fragmented. The Donor Coordination Group does not meet frequently and early momentum in this area appears to have been lost.⁴⁸

Targeting is a clear area of difference. The national social protection policy advocates a lifecycle approach on grounds that include social cohesion, noting that lifecycle risks are common to all FMS and communities and therefore that design can more easily be standardised across the country, and that poverty targeting ‘will be fraught with difficulty and risk undermining social cohesion’ (FGS 2019: 33). The arguments in support of categorical targeting in Somalia are that it is more consistent with a rights-based approach and easier to explain and understand. Complex targeting may exacerbate social divisions and instability (Smith 2014: 107, 112; Tran 2020: 73). Targeting criteria can be lost in

safeguard against violence for some women and girls in displaced settings, reducing both their interaction with armed gatekeepers and their exposure to violence outside camps (Foster *et al.* 2019: 38–9). The Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC) and Adeso, piloting a toolkit for mainstreaming GBV considerations in cash assistance, found that most recipients felt safe accessing the transfers but had taken various precautions in order to do so (Adeso and WRC 2018). **See the full toolkit** (accessed 27 September 2022).

⁴³ Personal communication, social protection expert, 13 March 2023.

⁴⁴ A working group that brings together government and development partners is in place (World Bank 2022c: 39).

⁴⁵ KIIs with development partner representatives, online, 16 and 19 September 2022.

⁴⁶ KIIs with international NGO and development partner representatives, online, 25 August and 16 and 19 September 2022.

⁴⁷ KII with social protection expert, online, 7 September 2022.

⁴⁸ Personal communication, social protection expert, 13 March 2023.

translation as they pass down the sub-contracting chain and are rarely contextualised.⁴⁹ Categorical targeting may be easier to manage with finite resources, adding more population groups as fiscal space expands.⁵⁰ Others speculate whether it would also be more acceptable to armed groups than an approach which is more opaque or open to challenge.⁵¹

In areas where most people consider themselves poor, poverty-based targeting may be experienced as inaccurate and unfair (Goodman and Majid 2019: 34). In Somalia it has also failed to consider intra-community resource sharing as well as the power relations that determine who benefits (Jaspars *et al.* 2020: 32). The introduction of a PMT into Baxnaano is presented as a way to replace the subjectivity of community-based targeting with ‘objective and measurable criteria’ that are more appropriate and feasible for a government system to apply (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 48),⁵² but as noted above, it is not clear to what extent such arguments represent the considered view of government. Poverty-based targeting would appear to contradict the government’s own policy position.

The long-term vision for Baxnaano appears to be to move away from a single targeting mechanism, of whatever kind, and towards a multi-layered approach that uses a mix of methods for different purposes, reviewing and adjusting these over time, and all drawing from a shared database and ultimately a social registry (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione 2022: 51–52). Other observers concur that a blend of approaches may help avoid reinforcing exclusionary practices.⁵³ The SCC is already demonstrating this with its additional mapping of minority group distribution.

All this suggests that the space for consensus and compromise between institutional orthodoxies could be greater than at first seems – although the extent to which the government is actually in a position to arbitrate between differing institutional positions and set its own agenda for the sector is not clear. The leverage of SAGAL and Baxnaano is far from equal: modelling and learning to inform government thinking is an integral part of SAGAL’s design while Baxnaano is not a pilot programme but rather the prototype of the national system itself, and with the weight of substantial resources behind it.⁵⁴ It is also light on evidence: despite the intention to transition to government social protection systems by the end of 2024 and reduce the involvement of UN

⁴⁹ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

⁵⁰ KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

⁵¹ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

⁵² KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

⁵³ KII with social protection expert, online, 7 September 2022.

⁵⁴ KII with international NGO and development partner representatives, online, 25 August and 16 and 19 September 2022. Certain measures, such as the social registry, are also benchmarks in the debt relief process (KII with development partner representative, 16 September 2022).

implementing partners, there is reportedly no agreed plan as yet to evaluate the impact of this phase of the programme, as well as the possible risks that an overly rapid handover may bring.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Personal communication, social protection expert, 13 March 2023.

6. Shock-responsive social protection and conflict

Somalia's social protection policy recognises that the social protection system must respond to covariate shocks, including those associated with conflict – although not yet:

Testing [of a 'temporary seasonal safety net'] will take the most prevalent shock, drought, as the starting point, given its predictability relative to other natural disasters and the challenges of implementation inside conflict zones... In the longer term, consideration will be given to ways to adapt these [shock response] mechanisms to better support needs arising from conflict. (FGS 2019: 34)

Shock-responsive guidance prepared for MoLSA by the ECHO-funded Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) sets out a number of key messages.⁵⁶ The guidance clearly incorporates displacement: conflict is one of five shocks, and for each there is an indication of likely caseloads, impacts, and triggers and the implications for different social protection interventions (Manji *et al.* 2021: 48–49). The TAF also developed a protocol for shock response which has three clusters of indicators relating to climate, displacement, and nutrition (Leseni 2020). This was tested by NGOs under the umbrella of the Somali Cash Consortium (SCC), funded by ECHO, although outside conflict areas and in response to other shocks (McLean and Ammoun 2021: 9, 19).⁵⁷

Both SAGAL and Baxnaano have a shock-responsive component and both have scaled up to differing degrees in response to the current crisis. However, neither is yet in a position to deliver assistance on a significant scale, let alone one that is commensurate with the severity of the current humanitarian crisis. SAGAL's shock-responsive component is funded by ECHO and likely to use flood prevention as its entry point.⁵⁸ SAGAL has added a small number of women to the first of its four cash transfer models, reflecting the importance of protecting child health and nutrition in crisis. Beyond that, it was decided that more

⁵⁶ These include: (i) Understand and do not undermine the traditional systems of solidarity and support which provide the initial response; (ii) Ensure the continuity of social protection programmes and basic services; (iii) Ensure that contingency funds are readily available; and (iv) Agree decision protocols, triggers, and risk-based response plans in advance, tailored to the different types and magnitude of shock (Manji *et al.* 2021: 47).

⁵⁷ NGOs in the Somalia Joint Response Coalition (SOMJR), in partnership with the Dutch Relief Alliance, have also tested crisis modifiers in response to Covid-19 and flooding (Harrity 2020).

⁵⁸ See **Linking humanitarian cash and social protection – ECHO's vision and practical examples from Somalia and Jordan.**

substantial adjustments to the long-term transfers would be hard to justify to beneficiaries given that other sources of humanitarian assistance, and the shock-responsive component, were available.⁵⁹

Those involved in Baxnaano's design hoped that the transfers might prevent people moving for assistance during emergencies.⁶⁰ There is some evidence to this effect from the humanitarian sphere where cash that supported basic needs and livelihoods in 2017 helped avert displacement, or at least kept it localised to nearby villages (Daniels *et al.* 2018: 32). Baxnaano's shock-responsive window can now accommodate both vertical and horizontal scale-up: the most recent tranche of additional finance will allow emergency transfers to be paid to over 180,000 households among the existing regular beneficiaries as well as an additional 155,000 households (Al-Ahmadi 2022).

The SCC has also worked with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADM) to review the early warning data available from independent sources such as the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and develop its own multi-hazard dashboard. This includes indicators of displacement, with some attempt to distinguish the particular driver (such as drought or conflict). The process has also sought to balance the rural bias in most early warning systems by including data of particular relevance in urban settings, such as price movements and labour demand. The Ministry has set up its own early warning centre though this is not yet fully operational.⁶¹

In summary, conflict-related shocks are clearly on the agenda for shock-responsive social protection in Somalia, but the mechanisms to operationalise this are not yet fully in place, and for the time being other shocks are being prioritised. Conflict early warning and early response are recognised as challenging. The drivers of displacement are often multiple and intertwined,⁶² while the need for additional ground-truthing may increase just as access becomes more challenging.⁶³ Reliable local-level reporting is likely to remain a key resource (McLean and Ammoun 2021: 19). The SCC pilots confirmed the value of the district level in Somalia which is among the first to raise the alert and can monitor conflict trends closer to the ground.⁶⁴ All 18 SAGAL districts now have district-level committees of government representatives and others which are responding at least to localised shocks. One constraint is that the nature of the 'response' is currently limited to what the SCC's members can provide (i.e.

⁵⁹ KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

⁶⁰ If households do move, the use of mobile money means that they can still access their transfers (KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022).

⁶¹ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

⁶² KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

⁶³ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

⁶⁴ The importance of the district is also noted by those working to address the root causes of displacement, who find this level an effective entry point for area-based approaches that build social cohesion and layer interventions across the triple nexus (Medinilla *et al.* 2019; Osofisan and Keen 2019).

cash); links to complementary measures, such as conflict resolution and peacebuilding, are not in place.⁶⁵ This may reflect the comparative neglect of grass-roots mediation and social cohesion processes when set against the international community's preoccupation with stabilisation and security.⁶⁶ Fixed notions of conflict as being about Al-Shabaab can feed the formulation of one-sided approaches that miss the critical local dynamics that shape vulnerability and determine the scope for operability.

⁶⁵ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

⁶⁶ KII with international and local NGO representatives, online, 25 August and 19 September 2022. Medinilla *et al.* (2019: 16–7) also finds that grass-roots-based peacebuilding is the weakest leg of the triple nexus in Somalia. One initiative to redress this is the appointment of a climate security and environmental advisor to the UN, in part supported by Irish Aid. See **For Somalia, nature is key to lasting peace: UN expert**, and also Eklöv and Krampe (2019: 37).

7. Enabling features

This section discusses some of the measures that may either enable or undermine effective delivery of social protection in conflict and in response to displacement. The capacity of Baxnaano and SAGAL in this respect is largely untested: neither operate in areas of Somalia directly affected by conflict. Baxnaano's predominantly rural presence extends only to 'relatively permissive' parts of the country (World Bank 2019: 32), in part because it functions within UN security parameters. However, both are being implemented in a country where state institutions are emerging from decades of instability and where political authority is contested. This process of contestation has implications for policy ownership, sustainability, and the pace of delivery. In Somaliland, for example, only partial implementation of Baxnaano is possible because its government will not sign a subsidiary agreement with the FGS that would allow funds to flow. In its absence, only the transfers are possible, channelled through WFP, not the support to government systems.⁶⁷ Observers also note a different policy discourse in Somaliland where senior government officials have more concerns about social protection and dependency than those in other parts of the country.⁶⁸

Given the limited evidence relating to Baxnaano and SAGAL, this section brings in lessons from the experience of humanitarian cash-based programming that may be relevant to social protection. Four issues are considered: (i) digital technologies; (ii) local knowledge; (iii) consortia; and (iv) accountability.

7.1 Digital technologies

The expansion of mobile money in Somalia has been part of a shift towards remote monitoring and learning in a context where operating risks are high (Wiggins *et al.* 2021: 98). Early cash transfers used the *hawala* system of trusted agents, but by 2012 this was being replaced by mobile money using the platforms of the dominant telecom company, Hormuud (Jaspars *et al.* 2020).

Digital technologies help agencies overcome the constraints on physical access imposed either by the security situation or by donors in line with anti-terror legislation. Some organisations have developed an entirely remote methodology to deliver cash, with targeting, monitoring, and post-distribution supervision all carried out through mobiles held by trusted community members.⁶⁹ However, digital technologies also present new risks and vulnerabilities, including data

⁶⁷ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

⁶⁸ KII with development partner representative, online, 16 September 2022.

⁶⁹ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

privacy and surveillance, vulnerability to network shutdowns, and the exclusion of certain groups or individuals, whether politically motivated or a function of their socioeconomic status. Furthermore, remote technologies arguably run counter to localisation: they may mask rather than surface and engage with political realities (Jaspars *et al.* 2022, 2020). They also cannot provide the nuanced understanding of context on which both conflict-sensitive approaches and protection monitoring depend. In this respect, the conflict early warning systems that make use of digital platforms may have useful lessons to offer about working with local monitors.

7.2 Local knowledge

The foundation of conflict sensitivity is a thorough understanding of the context and its interaction with external interventions. Local actors have a deeper understanding of their own environments and the long-term presence and relationship capital needed to work on conflict (NEXUS 2021a, 2021b). At the same time, they reflect the structures of their societies including, in the case of Somalia, their clan identity (UNAP 2018). There are few strong Somali NGOs from marginalised groups and relatively few staff from these groups in humanitarian agencies (Majid *et al.* 2022: 10). An evaluation of cash and voucher response in 2011–12 illustrated how an organisation's clan make-up either facilitates or impedes their access and effectiveness in conflict. However, it also confirmed the priority local NGOs attach to adherence to humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, including as a way to keep staff safe (Hedlund *et al.* 2012: 58–59).

Somali actors are increasingly organised and vocal, most recently through the formation of the NEXUS platform of eight Somali NGOs supported by two international ones.⁷⁰ 'Local actors' to NEXUS includes local authorities and the private sector. NEXUS members recognise that they are inevitably a product of their clan areas, but as a collective, with members from across the country, they represent a larger constituency. Their strategies for managing competing group pressures are dialogue and clarity, for example of policies and their application.⁷¹ They also advocate a more collectivist and less individualised approach to the targeting and distribution of cash-based assistance, perhaps reflecting their socially rooted perspective.

⁷⁰ NEXUS.

⁷¹ KII with local NGO representative, online, 19 September 2022.

7.3 Consortia

Large parts of the humanitarian system in Somalia operate in consortia, including those that deliver multi-year cash programming.⁷² These vary in their level of coherence and commitment to self-reflection (Goodman and Majid 2017: 26) but several now include a learning partner. Most are also a mix of international and local agencies though the latter are the junior partners. In durable solutions programming, consortia have allowed partners with different expertise across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus to come together, albeit often still under humanitarian leadership (Wiggins *et al.* 2021: 96; ReDSS 2019).

The SCC's experience is that consortium working offers particular advantages for conflict sensitivity. First, its six member agencies provide a wide geographical coverage and therefore a spread of knowledge of different conflict areas which can be pooled. For NEXUS as well, its members value the opportunity to cross-fertilise ideas through exchange visits and joint projects. Second, each brings their distinct skills and expertise, for example in protection, which again can benefit the whole.⁷³ Third, each member may have a different level of risk appetite, which allows the consortium to work at different speeds in areas that are less secure or contested. The key to realising these benefits, and the principal challenge, is good consortium management.⁷⁴

7.4 Accountability

Strong accountability mechanisms, including monitoring systems and those for managing complaints and feedback, are key to identifying tensions and addressing them before they escalate.⁷⁵ Specific things that can create difficulties and require attention are: (i) procedures not being followed; (ii) poor targeting; (iii) unclear communication; (iv) failure to act on perceptions of bias or grievances arising through the complaints mechanism; and (v) diversion of funds.⁷⁶ There are differing views on some of the sensitivities involved, such as whether clan identity can be included in routine monitoring systems, particularly quantitative,⁷⁷ or whether the level of receptiveness to such questions is linked to the identity of the questioner (such as whether they are providing aid). A recent review of minority inclusion recommends that agencies push back on the

⁷² Examples include the SCC and **BRCiS (Building Resilient Communities in Somalia)** (accessed 29 September 2022).

⁷³ NEXUS has found the same: one of its members has expertise in protection which is available to other members of the platform (KII with local NGO representative, online, 19 September 2022).

⁷⁴ KII with international NGO representative, online, 25 August 2022.

⁷⁵ KIIs with local and international NGO representatives, online, 25 August and 19 and 21 September 2022.

⁷⁶ KIIs with local and international NGO representatives, online, 19 and 21 September 2022.

⁷⁷ KII with development partner representative, online, 19 September 2022.

suggestion that the question is somehow off-limits (Thomas and Opiyo 2021: 16, 44).

At present, social protection accountability systems focus on those who receive assistance rather than those who do not.⁷⁸ The emphasis is on ensuring that those who are not entitled to benefit do not do so, with much less consideration given to what happens to those left out.⁷⁹ Their concern is generally with the effectiveness of the delivery chain rather than with how the various aspects of delivery intersect with wider social dynamics. Accountability mechanisms could help build the public trust and confidence on which social protection systems depend if they widen their scope of interest, reverse the default setting from exclusion to inclusion, and integrate a commitment to inclusion in reporting frameworks in line with the principle of leaving no one behind.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ See also Thomas and Opiyo (2021: 44).

⁷⁹ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

⁸⁰ KIIs with UN representative and social protection expert, 31 August and 1 September 2022.

8. Conclusions and recommendations

Conflict magnifies the challenges that any social protection programme must contend with, such as deciding who should benefit and how best to reach them.⁸¹ The contradiction between a programme's intent and the messy reality of its delivery is also more pronounced in conflict settings. To some extent the answers lie in what has always been known about effective programming: that quality work and local ownership are the keys to sustaining delivery during periods of instability,⁸² and that conflict-sensitive practice depends to a very large degree on the quality of personnel on the ground: the care with which they are recruited and managed, their skills, seriousness, and focus, and the quality of their relationships with local stakeholders.⁸³ The very uncertainty of conflict-affected environments requires individuals with the skills, knowledge, and trust to navigate complexity effectively, as well as organisations which give them the space and support to do so (Caravani *et al.* 2021).

Social protection in Somalia is at a formative stage. The system is being developed in a situation of ongoing conflict and very weak central political authority. The process has been externally driven and funded so far, leaning on humanitarian agencies for delivery and implementation. Yet, the speed at which cash transfers took hold in Somalia and the persistence of these now over time are encouraging signs that long-term support systems are possible, even if these might need to adhere to a model that looks quite different from other settings where systems are premised on the notion of strong state direction, leadership, delivery, and funding.

Those involved in social protection interventions are aware of conflict-related risks and dynamics and are taking steps to address them, although the effectiveness of those measures – particularly in finding meaningful solutions to long-standing problems of marginalisation and exclusion – are not yet clear. The building blocks of a shock-responsive system are also being assembled. Those consulted in the course of this study have identified a number of areas of potential strength and weakness and in that light, Irish Aid and other development partners might consider the following:

⁸¹ KII with social protection expert, online, 1 September 2022.

⁸² KII with international NGO representative, online, 21 September 2022.

⁸³ KIIs with local and international NGO representatives, online, 19 and 21 September 2022.

1. **Access:** Work with other donors to expand access in Somalia and provide greater consistency and clarity to partners and prospective grantees on this issue. Support organisations to be more assertive about operating in conflict and to take risks within the limits of what each finds acceptable.
 2. **Exclusion:** Encourage more open discussion of exclusion and bias and look for practical ways to address it, whether through more systematic application of politically informed analysis and practice, or through closer engagement with, and increased support for, organisations that are led by and centred on the priorities of marginalised groups, whether relating to gender, disability, ethnicity, or clan. Consider funding a social protection intervention that explicitly targets minority clans and focuses on their long-term needs.
 3. **Accountability:** Structure accountability frameworks around the principles of inclusion and leaving no one behind. Require that grantees integrate conflict-sensitive indicators in accountability frameworks and build reflection and learning into the programme cycle, giving them the capacity to flex and adapt as required. Continue strengthening the voices of local actors in policy and programme development and advancing the localisation agenda.
 4. **Coordination:** Use any opportunities through donor networks and policy dialogue to encourage greater coherence and compromise within the emerging social protection sector. Consider funding programmes that are designed to provide stronger evidence of effective conflict-sensitive approaches and of their political acceptability, a key condition for fiscal sustainability.
 5. **Shock-responsive social protection:** Investigate the scope to reinforce current efforts and identify what further capacity the government or its partners may need to develop their early thinking on shock-responsiveness and conflict. At an appropriate time, commission some reflection on the extent to which conflict and displacement were factored in to the scale-up of social protection during the current crisis.
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