Climate justice and losses and damages – linkages and donor policies

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Question

What are the linkages between climate justice and losses and damages from climate change?
Has climate justice been incorporated and defined in any donor’s policies?

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1. Summary

International attention on debates and issues around loss and damage and climate justice has never been higher, spurred on by global impacts of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This rapid review explores linkages between climate justice and losses and damages, and the inclusion of climate justice ideas in donor policies. Both climate justice and losses and damages are complex issues with large, diverse and growing literature bases, touching on a huge array of interrelated issues. Yet the meaning, scope and practical implications of both concepts are still contested. Hence, this rapid review only provides a snapshot of the ideas discussed and the literature available. It is recommended to explore the references for more detailed debates and discussions.

The first section of the review provides a brief discussion of the development of climate justice as a term and its different and contested definitions, drawing on Newell et al. (2021). The next section provides a brief history of losses and damages in the UNFCCC process and the varied framings of the term. This is especially important as there is no universally agreed definition and ambiguity remains around the concept. The third section includes a discussion of the linkages between losses and damages and framings of climate justice. These relate strongly to ethical considerations around distributive climate justice, fair burden-sharing, compensations, disproportionality and vulnerability. The final section focuses on identifying any donor climate justice policies or if climate justice (and also losses and damages) are explicitly included in donor climate change strategies and how climate justice is defined (if at all). G7 donor countries (minus the UK) are the focus for this section, although information on Denmark is also included.

The review draws from academic, policy and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sources and was limited to English language material. A broad search strategy was utilised to identify papers on climate justice and losses and damages, searching in academic journal indexes, websites of organisations known to work on the subject, general search engines (e.g. Google and Google Scholar), as well as searching references of references (“snowballing”). For donor related strategies on climate justice, strategic documents were identified through database and donor website searches. Further key word searches were undertaken within the documents to identify whether climate justice and losses and damages issues were mentioned or discussed. Key words included: “just*”; “loss*”; “damage*”; “rights”; “equity”; “fair”. These searches are not exhaustive but were aimed at identifying climate policies and strategies that explicitly include climate justice and/or losses and damages issues.

Gender, disability and other marginalised groups in developing countries are central to climate justice and losses and damages debates, as they are often the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change but have done the least to contribute to it. The donor government approaches section also touches on whether gender, disability and/or marginalisation has been included in the policy(ies) of donor countries, using key word searches for “gender”, “women”, “disab*” and “margin*”. Although it must be stressed that this section of the review is only indicative and does not provide an in-depth, systematic or critical review of donor policies and positions around climate justice and losses and damages, which is beyond the scope of this rapid review.

There is some ambiguity in the literature on the use of Loss and Damage (capitalised), loss and damage (lower case letters) and losses and damages (plural form and lower case letters). The capitalised singular form – “Loss and Damage” – has been used in research to refer to the
political debate under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), following the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) in 2013 (e.g. see the glossary to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on the ocean and cryosphere (IPCC, 2019)). While “losses and damages” (plural form and lower case letters and “loss and damage” (lower case letters) both refer broadly to harm from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks of climate change (IPCC, 2019). This rapid review uses “losses and damages” and “loss and damage” interchangeably, and tries to reflect the term used in the literature being referenced and quoted.

2. Definitions of climate justice

Definitions

The term “climate justice” has been used for over 30 years “to account for and contest how climate change is having the most severe effects on those with the least responsibility for causing it, and who, at the same time, are often excluded from decision-making processes regarding responses to the problem, whether with regard to climate mitigation or adaptation” (Newell et al., 2021, p.2). Another broad definition of climate justice can be understood either as “justice in relation to the responsibility for climate change and its impacts, or as justice regarding the effects of responses to climate change” (Newell et al., 2021, p.3). Sultana (2021, p.118) argues that climate justice is fundamentally about “paying attention to how climate change impacts people differently, unevenly, and disproportionately, as well as redressing the resultant injustices in fair and equitable ways.” She points to the “common but differentiated responsibility” that countries have for climate change and the impacts it has, as captured in the 1992 UNFCCC.

The term “climate justice” was coined in 1989 (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014 cited in Newell et al., 2021, p.3), but its precursors go much further back to an array of influences including environmental justice movements, gender justice, the global justice or anti-globalisation movement etc., and climate justice has now “become a galvanizing force among social movements, indigenous movements, and youth movements” (Sultana, 2021, p.119). The fifteenth UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen in 2009 is often highlighted as where things came to a head with mass mobilisation around climate justice and calls from global south leaders for recognition of wealthy nations’ responsibility for climate change (Gabbatiss & Tandon, 2021).

The scope of climate justice is broad, encompassing the unequal distribution of impacts on a variety of groups, including Indigenous people, people of colour, women and disabled people (Gabbatiss & Tandon, 2021). There is a diverse and growing literature on procedural, distributional, recognition and intergenerational dimensions in climate justice (Newell et al., 2021). Broadly, these four pillars of climate justice can be defined as:

- **Procedural**: ensuring the processes for making decisions about the impacts of and responses to climate change are fair, accountable and transparent. “This includes access to information and meaningful participation in decision-making and the existence of legal procedures for achieving redress (Centre for Policy Research, 2019; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014)” (Newell et al., 2021, p.4). Issues are around for example participation and access in natural resource management, energy and international negotiations.
- **Distributive**: how the costs and benefits of climate change and action are shared. “There are three main aspects to this: (1) identifying the goods and ills that are being distributed (2) identifying the entities between whom they are to be distributed; and (3) identifying the most appropriate mode of distribution as well as what this is based on (e.g., status, need, merit, rights or ascriptive and social identities). Many studies have highlighted the racialized, gendered and class-based nature of exclusions, access to resources and the impact of climate solutions (Newell, 2005, 2021b; Terry, 2009)... At the international level, the distributive dimensions focus on who gets to use what resources in a carbon-constrained world which raise issues of climate justice in the form of responsibility (current versus historical) and entitlement (whose needs are most pressing and who decides who can emit how much) (Caney, 2014)” (Newell et al., 2021, p.5).

- **Recognition**: Recognising differences between groups (specifically subaltern, Indigenous and other marginalised) in how they experience climate change and their right to express these differences. It is closely related to both procedural and distributional justice. “At a minimum, it supports the idea that they should be guaranteed a fair representation of their views without distortion or fears of reprisal (McCauley et al., 2019; Sovacool et al., 2019). Recognition justice emphasizes understanding differences alongside protecting equal rights for all, especially given the uneven capacity to exercise and defend rights” (Newell et al., 2021, p.6).

- **Intergenerational**: has “gained renewed traction in the wake of Fridays for Future campaign. ... An intergenerational framing dates from at least the Brundtland report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED], 1987) which conceived of sustainable development as the ability of current generations to meet their needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, but it is also central to many indigenous environmental ethics (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019). In climate justice struggles, justice to future generations is a central mobilizing claim: holding the current generation of decision-makers and polluters to account now for failing to act and imposing on future generations risks and dangers for which they are not responsible (Page, 2006) as well as protecting future generations from harm” (Newell et al., 2021, p.6).

Although there is some variation in the issues and practice of climate justice, Sultana argues that “the overarching commonality of understanding and mobilization focuses on equity and fairness in climate governance and redressing climate-related harms” (Sultana, 2021, p.119). Furthermore, “Climate justice approaches seek to expose the root causes of climate change to address and dismantle [] systemic issues and structures in different ways”, accounting for differentiated vulnerabilities and uncertainties (Sultana, 2021, p.119). The role of power, power structures, and social disparities are of particular concern. In an in-depth article for Carbon Brief, Gabbatiss and Tandon (2021) highlight some of the key common central concepts in the many framings of climate justice:

- **‘Fair shares’ of emissions** – For example, the geographical inequality of emissions since pre-industrial times, the “rich people vs. poor people” framing of climate justice, the differences in capacity to deal with and adapt to climate change, dividing the carbon budget up “fairly” with wide differences in the interpretation of what’s fair. While the UNFCCC has always recognised nations’ “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” to address climate change, some have argued that this principle
has been “watered down” under pressure from richer nations, with the Paris Agreement sidestepping the contentious issue of what makes a “fair share” and allowing countries to set and justify their own “fair shares” in Nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

- **Climate debt and climate finance** – A central narrative of climate justice has been around the idea that industrialised countries owe the global South a “climate debt” (an extension of the idea of “ecological debt” from the 1990s). This would require massive redistribution of wealth between countries to fund both climate mitigation and adaptation, i.e. “climate reparations”, emphasising the links to histories of colonialism, slavery and exploitation.

- **No “false solutions”** – Climate-justice activists oppose what they see as “false solutions” to climate change, namely technologies and policies that may cut emissions, but run counter to the wider cause of justice, such as technological “fixes”, market-based mechanisms (carbon trading) and geoengineering. This feeds into the concerns that the injustice of climate change could take on another dimension if the costs of addressing it predominantly harm poor and vulnerable people.

- **Just transition** – This is central to the idea of climate justice, where workers and their communities are supported in the shift to a low-carbon economy. The concept of just transition originated in US labour unions who forged alliances with environmental justice groups in the 1990s. It has now become a key part of international climate discussions. However, some authors caution that a low-carbon transition will not necessarily solve wider issues of social justice and marginalisation and may perpetuate pre-existing sets of winners and losers.

- **Fossil fuels** – At the centre of many climate justice framings is the need to keep fossil fuels in the ground.

- **Unequal climate change impacts** – The negative impacts of climate change are unequally distributed around the world, with low-income countries bring the most vulnerable to natural disasters. This is because they face some of the most frequent extremes, have the least resources to adapt to the changes and generally have the most rapidly expanding population.

### Contested meanings and transformational climate justice

However, the meaning, scope and practical implications of climate justice are still contested, and this is further complicated by the rapidly changing broader landscape within which climate justice is situated (such as the rise in popularism, geopolitical reconfigurations, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic). Newell et al. (2021) undertook a review to take stock of climate justice literature in view of this new context, finding that there are a number of “disconnects and tensions between more philosophical and academic treatments of the subject on the one hand, and “activist”-oriented approaches to climate justice on the other” (Newell et al., 2021, p.1). The climate justice literature is dominated by Northern voices and often falls into silos around scales (from global to local) and between mitigation and adaptation or draws distinctions between climate justice and other forms of (in)justice. This argues Newell et al. (2021, p.1) inhibits “understanding of climate justice that can address more directly its underlying root causes in an historically constituted global economic system and intersecting set of social inequalities.” Newell et al. (2021) highlight the need to move towards more diverse understandings of “climate justice” which recognise and value multiple cultures, subjective representations and practices of well-being, justice, and
They argue for a research agenda centred “on a transformative approach to climate justice, placing analysis of power in its various guises at the center of its enquiry, focusing on the social and institutional relations and inequalities that both produce climate change and profoundly shape responses to it” (Newell et al., 2021, p.1). In other words, they argue that it is power that needs to be confronted and transformed, with the redistributions of power and resources away from the powerful incumbent actors that currently benefit from the dominant organisation of the economy and reliance on fossil fuels. The authors put forward three cross-cutting future directions for transformative climate justice study:

- **Inclusive climate justice**: This dimension “aims at opening up climate policy and politics to a broader range of actors and voices, especially including those most subject to climate-related injustices. This covers research and practices on social movements and alliances for climate justice, the role of gender and the importance of vernacular understandings of climate justice” (Newell et al., 2021, p.8).

- **Deepening climate justice**: “This dimension aims at extending current conceptions and applications while also addressing the root causes of climate injustice. It addresses questions of just transition pathways, discussions around supply-side climate policy, just responses to climate disasters and justice for nature (and the climate)” (Newell et al., 2021, p.9).

- **Governance for climate justice**: This dimension “covers questions of access to justice, law, democracy and climate justice beyond the state. Strengthening and deepening democracy for climate change is critical to tackling incumbent structures of power and improving the voice and representative of excluded groups and those most vulnerable to climate injustices (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014)” (Newell et al., 2021, p.10).

They conclude by emphasising that climate justice cannot be delivered in isolation from other justice claims, such as gender justice, water and food justice, conflict prevention etc., and how these claims are “squared” presents “a wicked governance problem” (Newell et al., 2021, p.12). Sultana (2021, p.122) argues that climate change is “not only about finances or technology, but a shift in mindsets and framing of issues”, with critical climate justice being “as much about development, democracy, and citizenship as about international politics, financing, geographies, and histories.”

### 3. Brief history of “losses and damages”

**Definitions**

Although the concept of losses and damages is not new, it is still quite vague and there is no officially politically agreed definition (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021). In UN climate negotiations losses and damages/loss and damage is a general term used to refer to the consequences of climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to, or when options exist but a community does not have the resources to access them (Bhandari et al., 2022). Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer and Watson (2021, p.11) highlight that “While it has been argued that the ambiguity around the definition of loss and damage has allowed for progress around agreements on loss and damage in the political realm, the lack of a formal definition throws up challenges in the preparation of plans, policies and strategies to minimise, avert and address loss and damage.”
Given the lack of a generally accepted definition, a range of ‘framings’ on losses and damages have emerged, each with different legal, financial and ethical implications (Kreienkamp & Vanhala, 2017, p.2). Climate scholars often refer broadly to “loss” and “damage” dimensions as the negative impacts of climate change (Kreft, Warner, Harmeling, & Roberts, 2013; UNFCCC, 2012 all cited in Roberts & Pelling, 2020, p.759), and more narrowly as the impacts of climate change that are not avoided by mitigation and adaptation (Roberts & Pelling, 2018; Verheugen, 2012). Surminski and Lopez (2015) propose that framing loss and damage has both a technical dimension which focuses on the practical aspects of avoiding, minimising and addressing loss and damage and a political dimension with its focus on historical liability and compensation. Verheugen (2012, p.6) characterises loss and damage into three categories that are highly dependent on adaptation and mitigation efforts: avoided, unavoided and unavoidable. Avoided risk is damage prevented through mitigation and/or adaptation measures. Unavoided refers to losses and damages not avoided due to technical, institutional or financial reasons, despite the possibility of avoidance had stronger mitigation and adaptation efforts been implemented. Unavoidable refers to losses or damages that could not be stopped by any mitigation or adaptation action.

Boyd et al. (2021, p.1366) summarise that scientists, policy-makers and practitioners all have different perspectives on the meaning of loss and damage and the varying definitions sit on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, some consider all climate-related impacts as potential loss and damage and see it as “a distraction from mitigation and adaptation” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1366). At the other end, loss and damage is thought of “as an existential matter [and a matter of climate justice] that requires mapping and an unpacking of the drivers of losses; for example, L&D is really about claims of compensation for historical harms and to address restrictions on vulnerable peoples’ capacity to adapt to climate change” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1366). The science community refers to “the science and measurement of loss and who experiences everyday loss from climate change impacts”, thinking about it in relation to adaptation limits and maladaptation (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1366). Generally, most have settled on an intermediate definition of loss and damage as being “to avert and minimize the residual risks associated with climate change impacts (i.e., when mitigation and adaptation have failed)” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1366).

Loss and damage however defined has both economic and non-economic costs and can be caused by both extreme weather events like tropical cyclones and floods and slow onset climatic processes such as sea level rise, glacial melt and rising temperatures, as well as events triggered by a combination of processes with multiple factors (Stamp out Poverty et al., 2021b, p.1; Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021). Factors such as natural climate variability, exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity must also be taken into account alongside anthropogenic climate change (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.12). Hence, loss and damage will in part be a result of underlying socio-economic conditions (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.6). The IPCC strongly acknowledged the issue of loss and damage for the first time in its 2018 Special Report on 1.5°C global warming, stating that “there are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (medium confidence)” (IPCC, 2018, p.10).

It is important to distinguish between economic and non-economic losses in loss and damage. Economic losses refers to the loss of resources, goods and services. Non-economic losses are understood as losses that can impact individuals, society and/or the environment (e.g. loss of place and identity, loss of knowledge and culture, and effects on mental health and wellbeing,
loss of biodiversity) (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021). Loss and damage impacts the most vulnerable and marginalised in vulnerable developing countries. It can impede human rights, particularly women’s rights, as women and girls in vulnerable countries on average experience greater levels of loss and damage than their male counterparts. This is due to a number of interlinking issues, including: unequal access to resources and decision making processes; limited mobility; socio-cultural norms; limited access to the information and skills needed to avoid loss and damage (Stamp out Poverty et al., 2021a, p.2).

**History and context**

There is a long history of contention around loss and damage. Until 2008, the international debate was characterised by conflict over two proposed normative framings of adverse climate change impacts and the institutional implications of these framings (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016, p.127). One, backed by mainly developing countries, was based on notions of historic culpability and the global injustice of climate change. The other, mostly backed by developed countries, focuses on risk and insurance and rhetorically minimises questions of culpability. In 2008, stakeholders began to use a broader, more ambiguous overarching “loss and damage” frame, in line with the language of the 2007 Bali Action Plan – and allowed for varying interpretations by different parties (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016, p.127). Progress to advance efforts to address loss and damage has been slow and it remains both a technically complicated and politically contentious issue (Roberts & Pelling, 2020, p.767).

As Table 1 demonstrates there is a large history behind the development of loss and damage and its inclusion in international climate change negotiations. Pill (2022, pp.1-2) highlights three key milestones in the history of loss and damage: i) the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) in 2013 at COP19; ii) the prioritisation of loss and damage in the standalone Article 8 in the Paris Agreement established in 2015 at COP21; and iii) the inclusion of L&D in the New and Enhanced Transparency Framework (NETF) in the Katowice Climate Package at COP24 in 2019.

That loss and damage might result from anthropogenic climate change was recognised and conceptualised at least as early as 1991, appearing “in a proposal to address impending sea level rise by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee, the body tasked with drafting the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.6). Although the proposal was not successful, the call for the need to address loss and damage related to climate change never really went away. But it took over 20 years for loss and damage to be formally recognised and underpinned through the WIM agreed in 2013 at COP19 (see Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016). In the 2015 Paris Agreement, loss and damage was embedded as a self-standing Article, “creating a more solid political legitimacy in the negotiations for loss and damage” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.6). However, although “concrete actions to avert, minimise and address loss and damage are set out in Article 8.4, but the development of a coherent plan for implementing them is still in progress. The principal outstanding issues relate to measures to address loss and damage”, i.e. how to systematically collect, record and report information and related financial needs (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.18). Furthermore, the wording of Article 8 “– namely ‘cooperative’ and ‘facilitative’ – was deliberate, to move away from more compensation or liability framings and interpretation for support” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.18).
Table 1: Brief timeline of major international events and decisions related to losses and damages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>AOSIS Submission</td>
<td>AOSIS proposed the establishment of an international fund and insurance pool to compensate the most vulnerable small island and low-lying coastal developing countries for loss and damage resulting from sea level rise (AOSIS, 1991).</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>COP13, Bali</td>
<td><em>Consideration of means to address loss and damage first introduced.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bali Action Plan launched enhanced action on adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of disaster-reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>COP14, Poznan</td>
<td>AOSIS proposed the multi-window mechanism on loss and damage.</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>COP16, Cancun</td>
<td><em>Work programme established.</em></td>
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<td>Decision 1/CP.16 Cancun Adaptation Framework agreed to a work programme on loss and damage.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognised the need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise in order to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and slow-onset events – the ‘Cancun Agreements’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>COP17, Durban</td>
<td>Decision 7/CP.17 agreed to continue the work programme on loss and damage and, in particular, to assess the risk of loss and damage, develop approaches to address such, and consider the role of the Convention in addressing loss and damage.</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>COP18, Doha</td>
<td>Decision 3/CP.18 agreed on the role of the Convention in addressing loss and damage.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agreed that institutional arrangements to address loss and damage as a result of climate change would be firmly established under the Convention.</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>COP19, Warsaw</td>
<td><em>The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts (WIM), and an executive committee (Excom) to implement the functions of the WIM was established by Decision 2/CP.19.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Through its functions, decided that the WIM shall fulfil the role of the Convention in promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Decision Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>COP20, Lima</td>
<td>Decision 2/CP.20 approved the initial two-year workplan of the Excom of the WIM. Gave the Excom the authority to establish subgroups to help it do its work.</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>COP21, Paris</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement includes a dedicated Article on addressing loss and damage (Article 8). The Article includes that Parties should enhance understanding, action and support on loss and damage. Recognises the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow-onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>COP22, Marrakech</td>
<td>Decision 3/CP.22 and Decision 4/CP.22 First review of the WIM, which: (1) includes calls for the secretariat to prepare a technical paper on elaborating the sources of financial support for loss and damage; and (2) recommends that the Excom establish an expert group on action and support.</td>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>COP24, Katowice</td>
<td>Decision 18/CMA.1 Annex on the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support, para. 115, foresees including information on loss and damage in the biennial transparency reports, which will be reviewed on a collective basis under the GST. GST Decision 19/CMA.1 speaks to taking loss and damage into account (para. 6.b.ii) and asks the Excom (among other constituted bodies) to prepare a synthesis report on an explicitly identified set of information (para. 36 of the same decision). Mentioned efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage under the COP and invited Parties to consider developing policies, plans and strategies, as appropriate, and to facilitate coordinated action and the monitoring of progress, where applicable, in their efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. Also asked Parties to take into consideration future climate risks when developing and implementing their relevant national plans and strategies.</td>
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<td>2019</td>
<td>COP25, Madrid</td>
<td>Decision 2/CMA.2 (second review of the WIM) requests the Excom to collaborate with the GCF on clarifying how developing countries might access funding for loss and damage. Decision 2/CMA.2, Decision 12/CP.25 (report of the GCF) and Decision 6/CMA.2 (guidance to the GCF) invite the GCF to continue providing financial resources for activities relevant to averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage for developing country Parties.</td>
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Decision 2/CMA.2, para 43 agreed to establish the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage, to catalyse technical assistance for averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage in vulnerable developing countries.

However, an agreement on the governance arrangements for the WIM was not reached.

Decision 1/CMA.3, para 73 (Glasgow Climate Pact) calls for the establishment of the “Glasgow Dialogue between Parties, relevant organizations and stakeholders to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address Loss and Damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change”.

Decision 1/CMA.3 (Glasgow Climate Pact) also agreed that “the Santiago Network will be provided with funds” to undertake its work, and the process through which it will be made operational was determined in Decision 19/CMA.3. As part of the process to fully operationalise the Network, Party and non-Party stakeholders have been invited to submit their views on issues such as the Network’s operational modalities and structure, the role that Excom shall play, and the “terms of reference of a potential convening or coordinating body”. A final decision on the operationalisation of the Santiago Network is expected to be taken at COP27.

Agreement on the governance of the WIM remained elusive, and it was decided negotiations related to the WIM governance will be re-initiated at COP27.

Source: Author’s Own using data from Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer and Watson, 2021, pp.15-17, it draws on submissions and various decisions of the Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP) as referenced in the text.

Scale and financing of losses and damages

Loss and damage is strongly concentrated in poorer populations – as richer people are less exposed to climate impacts and have more assets to draw on to withstand disasters. Intersectionality of income inequality, race, gender and ethnicity creates even greater vulnerability to climate impacts (Carty & Walsh, 2022, p.3). Carty and Walsh (2022, p.3) point to raising humanitarian needs as “an important indicator of rising climate impacts and associated loss and damage”, with Oxfam research estimating that today, funding requirements for UN humanitarian appeals linked to extreme weather are eight times higher than 20 years ago (Carty & Walsh, 2022, p.3). However, the true scale of loss and damage goes beyond humanitarian appeals, and is rising.

Much of the recent research on losses and damages is around financing and the development of a financial mechanism (see, for example, a series of three papers from Heinrich Böll Stiftung on unpacking finance for loss and damage[^1]; Carty & Walsh, 2022; Pill, 2022). Financing for loss and damage is a critical area as it has largely been overlooked until recently. While there is

agreement that financing for loss and damage is important to support vulnerable communities, “there are divergent views on this relating to historical responsibility and principles of equity” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1368). Although there are no official and commonly accepted estimates on the amount of finance needed by developing countries to deal with loss and damage (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.7), some estimates put projected economic costs of loss and damage by 2030 as ranging from US$290 billion to US$580 billion a year in developing countries alone (Baarsch et al., 2015; Markandya & Gonález-Eguino, 2018 cited in Stamp out Poverty, et al., 2020, p.3). These estimates do not include non-economic losses and damages, which is also profound and far-reaching and for which funding is currently extremely limited (Carty & Walsh, 2022; Stamp out Poverty et al., 2020, p.3).

Loss and damage has “historically and intentionally been separated from finance discussions” and sits outside the climate finance commitments for developed countries to collectively mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2020 (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.6). The urgency of enhancing financing for loss and damage has been recognised in decisions under the UNFCCC, but “concrete work has been left to the Excom, in collaboration with the Green Climate Fund (GCF), to the extent it can be made consistent with its existing investment, results framework and funding windows” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.6). There are increasing calls for a global fund or facility on loss and damage (Richards & Schalatek, 2017; Climate Action Network, 2018; Richards et al., 2018; Hirsch et al., 2019; Schäfer & Künzel, 2019; UN General Assembly, 2019 all cited in Stamp out Poverty, et al., 2020, p.2).

The first Global Stocktake (GST) of the Paris Agreement in 2023 also presents an opportunity for progressing loss and damage finance challenges, where loss and damage is included as a cross-cutting issue. It is argued that the GST can “be used to lay the groundwork and develop a framework around which discussions on loss and damage support, including finance needs, can be had” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.7)

However, a key challenge in articulating support to address climate-related loss and damage is “the issue of multicausality, where multiple factors combine with the physical events that deliver loss or damage” (Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer & Watson, 2021, p.14). Both technical and political challenges also hinder the conceptualisation and realisation of financial support for loss and damage as a category separate to adaptation or mitigation or, indeed, as part of climate finance. Pandit Chhetri, Schäfer and Watson (2021, pp.20-28) describe these challenges as broadly being:

- There is a lack of capacity to model loss and damage and articulate finance needs;
- It is unclear which countries have the greatest need for loss and damage finance;
- The roles of different sources of finance in averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage are not clear;
- The current climate finance architecture does not necessarily have the right framework and expertise to programme loss and damage finance;
- It is hard to differentiate loss and damage finance from development and humanitarian finance.
Transformation

Transformation has become associated with loss and damage and both have become synonymous with the limits to adaptation. Roberts and Pelling (2020) explores what is meant by transformation in the context of loss and damage, a burgeoning idea in the literature and integrated into the global climate change regime as part of the workplan of the Executive Committee guiding the implementation of the WIM. Roberts and Pelling (2020, p.758) identify three types of transformation as a response to loss and damage:

- Transformation as adaptation (an intensification of dominant socioecological relationships);
- Transformation as extension (when the limits of established adaptive capacity are reached); and
- Transformation as liberation (adopting development pathways that address the root causes of vulnerability).

They propose transformation as liberation “as a deeper change to social-technological systems to avoid and minimize loss and damage in ways that enhance social justice and sustainability” (Roberts & Pelling, 2020, p.758). But more research is needed to better understand the social, political and cultural complexities of transformation and to provide the kind of information decision makers need to plan and implement transformation as liberation, for example, on how to plan in a way that ensures the most equitable outcomes and how individuals and societies cope with deep-rooted social and economic change (Roberts & Pelling, 2020, p.767).

4. Climate justice and losses and damages

Ethical considerations

Loss and damage suffers from the lack of a clear definition and measurability and is further complicated by debates on climate justice and shared but differentiated responsibilities. International attention on debates and issues around loss and damage and climate justice has never been higher, spurred on by global impacts of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which have highlighted the disproportionate inequalities and vulnerabilities and intersections between peoples’ situations and social structures (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1365). Over recent years, justice dimensions especially loom large in discussions under the WIM (Newell et al., 2021, p.3).

Boyd et al. (2021, p.1366) see losses and damages as being “matters of social justice”, shedding light on the root causes of underlying differentiated vulnerability (especially informal and invisible governance processes). Bhandari et al. (2022) also argue that addressing loss and damage is a matter of climate justice as it will continue to harm vulnerable communities the most. Kreienkamp and Vanhala (2017, p.2) highlight how “The issue of loss and damage invites a range of ethical questions” related to: the need for fair burden-sharing and technical and financial support (distributive justice) but also corrective justice – i.e. compensation – which will remain a taboo topic for many developed states. Kreienkamp and Vanhala (2017, p.13) further posit that “The application of corrective justice in the context of climate change, however, is not just contentious, it also poses scientific challenges as it requires attribution of climate impacts to specific anthropogenic drivers. In addition, it raises the question of who exactly should be liable”.
An article by Toussaint and Martínez Blanco (2020) explores a human rights based approach to loss and damage. The background to this article highlights some of the ways that loss and damage can impact human rights, such as: "impacts on civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty and property (Humphreys, 2009, p. 9), economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to work, education, social security, highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate food, clothing and housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions; as well as collective rights, including the right to development, self-determination, peace, a healthy environment, and minority rights more generally" (Toussaint & Martínez Blanco, 2020, p.744). They argue that “the threat posed by loss and damage to the fulfilment of a range of fundamental human rights, brings the issue within the scope of international human rights law” (Toussaint & Martínez Blanco, 2020, p.744).

Compensations, disproportionality and justice in the international regime

The history of loss and damage is long and contentious as it brings with it the issue of compensation from Annex I countries to non-Annex I countries (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1366). Newell et al. (2021, p.3) highlight how justice is embodied in the UNFCCC from 1992 through its adoption of a “polluter pays” principle as well as the inclusion of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC). Closely related to this is the recognition of the differential vulnerability and impacts of climate change across different countries and social groups, and the responsibility of the main emitters to provide funding to support those that are most vulnerable and have the fewest resources and least capacity to adapt (Adger et al., 2006 cited in Newell et al., 2021, p.3).

There are multiple links between social movements as collective actions and the evolution of loss and damage policy and debates at the international level, with advocacy by the Association of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and by the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) at COP negotiations being key as well as the influence of non-governmental organisations to the inclusion of a separate article on loss and damage in the Paris Agreement. Although, as Boyd et al. (2021, p.1368) point out, “the driving aim was to formalize discussions related to compensation for damage from climate change, sharp divisions between rich and poor countries emerged early on and prevented a shared formalization of liability as a precondition to compensation.” These calls for compensation “are an extension of calls for reparations, and both are linked to the language of climate debt. In turn, the language of climate debt has its roots in the concept of ecological debt” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1368). Climate debt “raises the central question of historical responsibility and who owes whom for what. Holding wealthier countries responsible and ensuring payment of such debts is an ongoing political struggle fought in the name of climate justice” (Boyd et al., 2021, p.1369) and goes beyond solely monetary terms to include rights to mobility and the acknowledgment of responsibility in legal frameworks.

Notions of historic culpability and the global injustice of climate change still lie at the heart of the idea of loss and damage for many, but they have been unsuccessful in achieving a specific, legally embedded understanding of loss and damage that includes acknowledgment of culpability or the possibility of compensation. This is mostly due to the reluctance on the part of developed states to embed the idea of liability for climate change harms in international law (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016, p.127). Even the Paris Agreement final text includes the explicit exclusion of claims for compensation or assertions of liability (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016, p.127).
Non-economic losses and damages (such as loss of coastal burial grounds of SIDS to sea-level change, and the reduction in efficacy of Indigenous and local knowledge tied to a particular place and climate), as argued by Boyd et al. (2021, p.1369) “pull into focus the ethical and justice dimensions of climate change, where countries and peoples across the world are disproportionately affected, and their cultures and ways of life, meanings, and purposes are being severely affected.” Hence, “disproportionality” is a central and contentious element of international climate change negotiations and was instrumental to the emergence of loss and damage as a concept and its place in the political climate change debate. However, the lack of a clear definition for “disproportionality” in the science on loss and damage (as it remains largely implicit and undefined) further complicates the lack of definition of loss and damage (see Dorkenoo, Scown & Boyd, 2022 for further discussion).

5. Donor government approaches to climate justice

This section focuses on identifying any donor climate justice policies or if climate justice (and also losses and damages) are explicitly included in donor climate change strategies and how climate justice is defined. It also touches on whether gender, disability and/or marginalisation has been included in the policy(ies). The section has a focus on G7 donor positions (minus the UK2). The G7 Foreign Ministers (and the High Representative of the European Union) recently released a joint statement on Climate, Environment, Peace and Security in May 2022, which made one reference to “losses and damages”, although not to climate justice:

“stress that peace and stability are often decisive in mitigating against and adapting to the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation and reducing the losses and damages caused by climate change, just as climate and environmental action is a critical aspect of sustainable peace”. (G7 Foreign Ministers, 2022)

It must be stressed that this section of the review is only indicative and does not provide an in-depth, systematic or critical review of donor policies and positions around climate justice and losses and damages; this is beyond the scope of this rapid review. For example, looking at whether axes of difference (such as race and class) or issues of colonial harm and racial harm have been referenced in the policy is outside the reach of this review.

Canada

Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy outlines the government’s strategy for contributing to global poverty eradication efforts and to building a more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous world (Government of Canada, n.d. a [online]). As part of this, six Action Area policies provide additional guidance and help to define the broad parameters for Canada’s international assistance (Government of Canada, n.d. a [online]). The Policy and its Action Area on Environment and Climate Action does not explicitly mention “climate justice” or make reference to losses and damages. However, it recognises that environment and climate action will be most effective when women and girls play an active role in designing and developing

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2 For UK relevant research, the Climate Justice Debate Pack produced by the House of Commons Library and written by Priestly and Sutherland (2020) includes brief information on the use of climate justice in UK Government / Parliament.
strategic responses to climate change and environmental issues. The whole policy puts gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls at the centre of Canada’s international assistance efforts, specifically:

“Canada’s approach to environment and climate action is human rights-based, and aims to challenge the discrimination faced by women and girls, and by all marginalized and vulnerable individuals, such as Indigenous people, migrants and people with disabilities. Effective action against climate change and environmental degradation will support the rights of people living in developing and fragile states, whose basic needs are threatened by the effects of climate change, including conflict over the growing shortage of natural resources.” (Government of Canada, n.d. [online])

It is interesting to note that a recent discussion paper released by Canada to initiate feedback from citizens on Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy (slated for release by the end of 2022), refers to “taking action in a just and fair way so that climate change preparations are widespread and benefits are shared” (Government of Canada, 2022 [online]).

France

The Agence Française de Développement (AFD) Group’s Climate & Development Strategy 2017-2022 aims to give direction to the action of the AFD Group for Climate mainly through commitments, analyses and partnerships, without prescribing definite types of action sector by sector, which will largely depend on national contexts (AFD, 2017). The strategy makes no reference to “climate justice” or “losses and damages”. However, in the mid-term review of the strategy from June 2020, AFD makes reference to the “just transition” (25 times) throughout the report and “climate justice”, including once under the sub-heading “Better exploiting climate synergies with other SDGs” (AFD, 2020, p.28). Specifically:

In several sectors, the search for climate co-benefits that are not fully exploited will be strengthened and encouraged. This will allow us to seek a better understanding and operational application of the subject of just transition, digital and synergies between gender and climate projects....The margins for seeking climate co-benefits in governance projects are large, particularly in terms of climate justice and green budgets. (AFD, 2020, p.28)

The review adds an additional five areas to AFD’s climate ambitions, including:

“Contribute to a pro-climate recovery in the context of the Covid-19 crisis. The Group is investing in the Just Transition approach, which emphasises both environmental and social SDGs, as part of its support for climate adaptation and mitigation strategies.” (AFD, 2020, p.6)

Furthermore, the review includes an appendix with AFD’s Framework on Just Transition and Prospects for the AFD Group. Within this it describes that:

“The aim [of the just transition] is to make the ecological transition a tool for social justice, while social justice is a driving force for the ecological transition in a context of sustainable development. This vital integrated approach echoes the two structuring commitments of AFD’s SOP [strategic orientation plan]: the 100% social link and 100% Paris Agreement.” (AFD, 2020, p.59)
The framework also sets out how AFD plans to undertake an internal consultation in 2020 to:

“review AFD’s practices and to better support its partners in combining the two social and environmental dimensions in their public policies, programmes and development projects. It will allow to clarify the definition and the scope to be given to the just transition within AFD Group… By the end of the year, it should result in a just transition roadmap for the Group.” (AFD, 2020, p.59)

However, no further information on a just transition roadmap for AFD was identified during this review. The mid-term review also does not make reference to "losses and damages".

The inclusion of climate justice and a just transition in the mid-term review reflects the increasing momentum that social justice and a “just transition” in relation to climate change (however that is interpreted) has gained in international arenas in recent years, especially as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

AFD also published an Institutional Document in February 2021 on AFD and Environmental and Climate Justice (AFD, 2021). This document sets out AFD’s vision in relation to the environmental rule of law and “the need to take action and provide a more effective framework for a fair ecological transition, protecting everyone’s rights, particularly those who are the most vulnerable” (AFD, 2021, p.1). Specifically, AFD’s projects “in the field of environmental and climate justice aim to adapt normative frameworks to the environmental and climate context as well as a stricter application of the environmental law in force in our partner countries” (AFD, 2021, p.1). According to this document AFD works in three key areas to do with environmental and climate justice: Ensuring a legal solution to the ecological crisis; Encouraging civil engagement; and Informing and raising awareness about rights.

Germany

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has defined five long-term “core areas” it will concentrate on in its “BMZ 2030” reform agenda. This includes the Core Area Strategy Responsibility for Our Planet – Climate and Energy, released in 2021, which provides a framework for the BMZ’s activities in this field.³ It focuses on approaches that support the social, environmental and economic transformation that is needed to achieve the 1.5 degree target and the goals of the 2030 Agenda. Within this core area, focus is on three areas of intervention: Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, and Sustainable Urban Development (BMZ, 2021).

The Core Area Strategy does not make explicit reference to “climate justice”. However, it does make reference to “socially equitable” throughout the document in four places. All of these references are in relation to the required energy transformation and energy reform processes needed to address climate change. BMZ takes “socially equitable” to be synonymous with "just

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energy transition”. For example, the Annex on “Vision 100” makes reference to the “just energy transition” under the fourth basic principle of Vision 100, equating it to “socially equitable”:

“Fundamental change: Energy systems worldwide need to undergo a fundamental transformation. Massive investment in energy efficiency, renewable energy, future-proof power grids and efficient energy storage are key to that. The use of fossil power plants needs to be reduced as quickly as possible and using gas as a transitional fuel must be critically reviewed to avoid lock-in effects and stranded assets. At the same time, transitional processes in the energy transformation must be made socially equitable (“just energy transition”).” (BMZ, 2021, p.35)

The document also makes reference to the "energy transition" but does not relate this specifically to being just in its Glossary definition or throughout. It also refers to applying the “recover forward” approach, which it defines as “An approach (cf. “Build Back”) to socially and environmentally sustainable recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic which is consistently aligned with the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. “Green recovery” refers to the environmental component of this approach” (BMZ, 2021, p.33).

The Core Area Strategy also makes reference to “losses and damages” (also “loss and damage”) three times, although it does not provide a precise definition of what it defines this as. Firstly, it makes reference twice on page 7 in relation to the challenges and development potential of climate change:

“For those who are hit particularly hard by climate change, climate-related losses and damages need to be averted, minimised and addressed, including loss and damage which are difficult to measure in economic terms, such as the loss of one’s familiar surroundings, intact ecosystems and cultural heritage.” (BMZ, 2021, p.7)

And again on page 10 in relation to the status quo and Germany’s experience to date with tackling climate change. Referencing how:

“Germany has gained particular credibility in climate negotiations on dealing with climate-related losses and damage, in the course of which the BMZ champions innovative approaches. … Germany has proven to be a reliable and committed partner which assumes responsibility for countries and people most severely affected by the consequences of climate change. At the same time, a more systematic approach needs to be adopted when it comes to dealing with its partner countries’ vulnerability.” (BMZ, 2021, p.10)

The Core Area Strategy highlights that “quality criteria as defined in the BMZ 2030 reform strategy must be taken into account and incorporated as cross-cutting issues into all of the BMZ’s activities” (BMZ, 2021, p.17). BMZ 2030 currently applies six quality criteria: “Human Rights, Gender Equality and Disability Inclusion”, “Anti-corruption and Integrity”, “Poverty Reduction and Inequality Reduction”, “Environmental and Climate Impact Assessment”, “Conflict

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4 Vision 100 is “a call to adopt an ambitious climate and energy policy and for the donor community and partner countries to engage in concerted action so as to pave the way for a fundamental energy transition in the coming three decades. …It has two core objectives: 100 per cent needs-based energy access by 2030 and 100 per cent net decarbonisation in all energy-related sectors by 2050.” (BMZ, 2021, p.35)
Sensitivity (“Do No Harm”), and “Digital Technology”. Hence, every project in the entire core area must take account of the BMZ’s quality criteria. The document gives the following example:

“Poverty Reduction and Inequality Reduction” as well as promoting “Human Rights, Gender Equality and Disability Inclusion” are also guiding principles of the BMZ’s climate policy. Systematic account is taken of the poorest and most disadvantaged population groups, and women are incorporated in a targeted manner. Human-rights risks and impacts as well as gender analyses are considered or rather conducted in relation to all bilateral projects.” (BMZ, 2021, p.17)

Italy

No information or policies on Italy’s international development cooperation on climate change or climate justice was identified during this rapid review (searches were limited to materials in English only).

Japan

The most up-to-date Climate Change Cooperation Strategy from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) identified in this rapid review is from September 2016 (JICA, 2016). This strategy identifies four priority areas for JICA and its cooperation approach. It does not include any reference to climate justice, rights or losses and damages. It does make brief reference to gender in relation to ensuring human security and giving special consideration to vulnerable countries and poor and socially vulnerable people (JICA, 2016, p.2). JICA’s Cooperation on Climate Change: Towards a Sustainable and Zero-carbon Society released in October 2021 (10 pages long) provides information and updates on the four priority areas set out in the 2016 document. It also does not make explicit reference to “climate justice”, “losses and damages”, the just transition, issues of gender or marginalised people.

USA

USAID released their Climate Strategy 2022-2030 in April 2022. The strategy builds on lessons learned from USAID’s previous Climate Change and Development Strategy, an analysis of their past programme evaluations and lessons learned, more than 40 listening sessions with partners and stakeholders, and a number of analyses, including a gender analysis (USAID, 2022, p.8). The strategy “transitions USAID toward a much more holistic and whole-of-Agency approach” (USAID, 2022, p.8). The strategy, according to a speech by Administrator Samantha Power at its launch, was developed to be “as thoughtful about climate justice as it was about climate change” (Power, 2022). It explicitly mentions “climate justice” (4 times), with the first mention occurring on page 2 in the Executive Summary. Although the paper does not give a definition of what it means by climate justice, climate justice has its own “Special Objective”:

“SPECIAL OBJECTIVE: DOING OUR PART: Strengthen operations and approaches to programming to address climate change and further climate justice within USAID and our partner organizations”. (USAID, 2022, p.36)

The strategy includes a short paragraph about the special objective and the commitment of USAID “to doing [their] part to confront the climate crisis by transforming the Agency’s operations and supporting [their] implementing partners to undertake similar efforts” (USAID, 2022, p.36). It
also explains that the reforms build on previous U.S. government commitments outlined in several Executive Orders and USAID objectives detailed in the Agency’s Climate Readiness Plan and Sustainability Plan. Examples of actions under this Special Objective include: Reducing USAID’s operational greenhouse gas emissions; Strengthening the diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility of the climate workforce; Integrating climate resilience and mitigation more robustly in programming (USAID, 2022, p.36).

The strategy also makes explicit reference to “loss and damage” (1 time), in the context of:

“The dual climate change priorities of mitigation (reducing and sequestering emissions) and adaptation (reducing climate vulnerability and improving resilience to climate impacts) cut across the Strategic Objectives and are embedded throughout the Strategic Framework…Under both of [the strategic] objectives, USAID will support actions that avert and minimize loss and damage to the extent possible.” (USAID, 2022, p.8)

Although it does not give a definition of loss and damage in the Glossary or link it explicitly to the climate justice special objective. The strategy also refers to a “just transition” (10 times within the main body) and defines this in the Glossary as:

“Just Transition, applied to global climate change, refers to transitioning the global economy to a low-carbon, resilient one in a way that seeks positive environmental, social, and economic outcomes together, delivers equitable benefits, and does no harm. To do so, there must be inclusive, gender-equitable, and participatory decision-making and development processes that ensure justice in the transition, growing low-carbon and resilient firms, institutions and communities, fostering good livelihoods, developing demand-driven skills and labor-matching, protecting and enhancing workers’ rights, safeguarding community health, and human rights of affected individuals, including in indigenous and local communities.” (USAID, 2022, p.48)

There is also a strong focus on gender and women in the strategy, as well as other marginalised groups (including persons with disabilities), with a specific Intermediate Result to:

“Enable and empower women and youth and other marginalized and/or underrepresented groups to lead climate action. …Successful climate action should also take an intersectional approach. …In combination with systems of inequality, these intersecting identities can lead to varying degrees of power and privilege that, in turn, create unique power dynamics, effects, and perspectives for contribution to climate solutions” (USAID, 2022, p.23).

The strategy also makes reference to other USAID action plans and policies, which will inform USAID climate actions. These include: the U.S. Government National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, the U.S. Women’s Entrepreneurship and Economic Empowerment Act, USAID’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy, the U.S. Government’s Gender-Based Violence Strategy, USAID’s Youth Development Policy, USAID’s Policy on Promoting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, USAID’s LGBTQI Vision for Action, and USAID’s Disability Policy Paper.

**Denmark**

Although not a G7 member, Denmark is included as an example of other donor approaches.
The Danish Government launched its Global Climate Action Strategy ‘A Green and Sustainable World’ in October 2020 (The Danish Government, 2020). The strategy sets the direction for Denmark’s international climate efforts over the years ahead, and includes foreign, development and trade policy. Although the term “climate justice” is not included in the strategy, “just” is included eight times throughout the 32 page document in relation to the term “socially just green transition”. The first mention is in the Preface to the document and reads as:

“We will work for a socially just green transition that creates growth and opportunities for all, and which fights inequality” (The Danish Government, 2020, p.4)

“It is also about solidarity. The Government wants to help the poorest countries, which are hardest hit by climate change. We will take the lead in support of a just green transition that creates skilled jobs – particularly in developing countries – and does not increase inequality.” (The Danish Government, 2020, p.5)

A further example of the type of language used is:

“To be a leading country, Denmark must show the way to a socially just and cost-effective transition that does not result in job losses, unequal redistribution and increased inequality, but rather in new green jobs and opportunities for more people.” (The Danish Government, 2020, p.6)

Under the Strategic initiatives and efforts heading, the following is one of the bullet points:

“The Government will work for a socially just global green transition in which civil societies – particularly vulnerable groups and young people – are involved in shaping the green future.” (The Danish Government, 2020, p.13)

The strategy also makes one reference to losses and damage, in the following context:

“We must contribute to preventing and reducing the risk of losses and damage as a result of climate change, and help with rebuilding efforts in the wake of climate disasters. We will thereby help to save human lives, reduce inequality, prevent conflict and displacement, and support positive economic development in the years to come.” (The Danish Government, 2020, p.19)

Some references to gender and women and girls are made within the document in relation to investments in women’s and girls’ education and sexual and reproductive health and rights, which comes under opportunities for positive synergy between a green transition, climate adaptation and gender equality (p.20). No reference is made to disability issues or people with disabilities.
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