Lessons Learned from Community Based Approaches to DDR

William Avis
University of Birmingham
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Question

What are the main lessons learned from community based approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR)?

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1. Summary

While the literature on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programmes (including those with a community element), their evolution and experience in individual countries, is considerable, there are numerous challenges in drawing conclusions on the long-term effectiveness of DDR interventions given methodological challenges, lack of monitoring and evaluation and the context specific nature of initiatives. This rapid literature review collates available evidence of lessons learned from community based approaches to DDR. The literature collated presents a relatively consistent picture that community based approaches are often best placed to address reintegration challenges, but that these interventions are mediated by an array of contextual factors that are location and group specific. Case studies are drawn from a range of contexts where a spectrum of community based approaches have been attempted with various levels of success and sustainability. The review provides a series of readings and case studies that are of use in understanding how community based approaches can support reintegration (these should be considered indicative rather than representative). Case studies are drawn from a range of contexts including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Colombia, Somalia, Uganda and Afghanistan.

The review illustrates that DDR programming has evolved significantly in response to changing situations and emerging challenges; from traditional DDR programmes implemented in post-conflict situations where a peace accord was in place and involved defined armed groups to second generation programmes, which have emerged to address less stable peace situations and engage communities, not just combatants. More flexible, ‘third generation’ DDR programmes, wider in scope and negotiated based on the local context, have also been identified. Despite this evolution, many challenges remain in designing and implementing DDR programmes, particularly those that seek to support a community based approach to reintegration. Key messages that emerge in this review include:

- Experience shows that holistic and community-based approaches are more successful and sustainable. Positive examples include preparatory work with the receiving community before, during and after reintegrating former combatants, and psychosocial and economic support to both community members and reintegrated former combatants. Cases studies of USAID initiatives in DRC illustrate the link between willingness of communities to support programmes and success.

- A holistic approach is challenging to put in place because it requires funding, organisational capacity and resources that many implementers are lacking. It is important to monitor progress and change continuously, but is likewise extremely challenging due to the limited availability of resources. Studies have shown that stronger coordination with other community stabilisation programmes is imperative for maximising impact.

- Some examples of DDR processes showed both advantages and challenges when adopting a holistic approach. In some contexts disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are negotiated separately by different teams, with different expertise and objectives. The same challenge is evident when linking community based efforts with wider development or peace building initiatives.
• DDR processes tend to fail when they are not inclusive, particularly when, community members perceive former combatants are rewarded with economic opportunities through DDR programmes, thus creating a feeling of injustice. Profiling participants prior to the design of the project allows initiatives to be well designed and to specifically target and address local needs. Project Approval Committees allow for communities to be involved in design of projects, nurturing ownership and ensuring that they are context-relevant and efficient.

• Communities often have a hard time accepting former combatants back among them, because of existing grievances and an uncompleted healing process. The way former combatants and the new role they are associated with are presented to the rest of the community is crucial. Case studies have shown that rebuilding social bonds between communities and combatants, fostering acceptance within communities for disengaged combatants and addressing drivers exploited by armed groups to recruit individuals is key to sustainable integration.

• In line with the current thinking on the humanitarian development-peace nexus, DDR programmes should be accompanied by conflict-sensitive development programmes and humanitarian assistance to address existing issues (e.g., lack of economic opportunities, lack of access to basic services, etc...). For example, training and education projects can play a role in removing stigmatisation and providing a positive environment for reconciliation. In particular, communities need to be empowered to have both the economic and social capacity to absorb ex-combatants. This is done through the implementation of development programmes that will boost the local economy, empower local businesses to increase employment capacity, and encourage reconciliation mechanisms.

• Functioning traditional dispute settlement mechanisms are often overlooked by the international community, which tends to enforce practices that are not necessarily helpful to local communities. Leveraging existing community practices by building a DDR process around them could increase both local ownership and effectiveness of the DDR process overall. Community meetings, durbars barazas and religious leaders have all supported conflict resolution during interventions. ‘Reconciliation Commissions’ or peace courts with XCs integrated providing XCs with a viable non-violent conflict resolution mechanism can also play a role.

• Providing communities with the task of monitoring and evaluating DDR processes has proven successful in assessing the effectiveness of DDR initiatives thanks to a better understanding of local dynamics and priorities. Community development councils for example can enhance good governance in local communities by gathering data on impact and monitoring effectiveness.

• Gender continues to receive less attention, despite efforts to mainstream it. Regardless of the special needs of women and girls, specific measures are rarely taken to assist them to reintegrate. The level of intervention will depend on the specific needs and priorities revealed by a gender-sensitive situation assessment.

2. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

The process of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating ex-soldiers after conflict is long established, with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) assuming a central
place in conflict responses led by the international community. It is frequently advanced as a key pillar of multilateral and bilateral stabilisation and reconstruction efforts (Muggah & O’Donnel, 2015). The results of DDR are, however, subject to much debate and far from even (Muggah & O’Donnel, 2015).

A range of authors have commented that the contexts in which DDR is conducted are changing (e.g. grappling with new geographies of organised violence and crime) and proponents have, by necessity, adapted their approaches (Ayissi, 2020; Transition International, 2015). Further to this, DDR is being implemented in increasingly complex legal and operational environments, challenging the identification of when, how and with whom to engage. DDR has always been in a state of flux, influenced by the context of the conflict and the nature of the peace. While no two DDR processes are the same, DDR practitioners have often learned and adapted lessons for use in subsequent DDR operations. A broad range of challenges and lessons have been gleaned from past DDR initiatives, these include those listed in table 1.

Table 1: Challenges and Lessons in DDR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Lessons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disarmament</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ongoing armed conflict</td>
<td>• Disarmament exercises may not resolve insecurity, and may actually become the source of further insecurity</td>
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<td>• Lack of political will for disarmament</td>
<td>• Disarmament is not always the most effective component with which to launch a DDR process</td>
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<td>• Real numbers of weapons not easily obtained and verified</td>
<td>• A DDR framework/strategy is needed to address irregular armed groups</td>
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<td>• Initial commitment to disarming may be low</td>
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<td>• High number of weapons circulating in community</td>
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<td>• Lack of legal framework governing weapons ownership</td>
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<td>• Proliferation of militias and fluctuating numbers of members, and thus difficulty in defining who is a militia member, which greatly challenges the generation and management of lists and baselines</td>
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<td><strong>Demobilisation</strong></td>
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<td>• Often poor understanding of the types of groups and organisations that are being demobilised (militias, clans, ethnic groups), as well as of their needs and agendas</td>
<td>• It is important for these groups to be provided with a positive and constructive activity.</td>
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<td>• It should also be decided whether or not command structures should be destroyed, weakened or left intact. Incentives should be attractive, pertinent and linked to reintegration strategies</td>
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<td><strong>Reintegration</strong></td>
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<td>• Reintegration is a much longer process than disarmament and demobilisation</td>
<td>• It is critical that all actors in the integrated mission work closely and in tight coordination. Joint planning, coordination and capacity development as well as sustained funding are crucial</td>
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<td>• Lack of national economic recovery; creating alternative livelihoods and/or jobs is exceptionally difficult in post-conflict or conflict settings, with severely challenged economies</td>
<td>• UN agencies should develop long-term reintegration or development opportunities that</td>
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complement and reinforce the overall DDR process

Source: Author's Own

The United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), initially developed between 2003 and 2006, sought to better collect lessons learned from the 1990s through the mid-2000s to provide guidelines for future DDR operations. These guidelines have been reviewed and updated in 2019.\(^1\) While the IDDRS provides a helpful tool and reference for DDR, gathering a consensus on how to meet the changing dynamics of DDR has proven difficult. Different “Generations of DDR” that take into account the growing scope and mandate of DDR offer some updated guidance for DDR practitioners and planners.

**First Generation DDR** - “First generation” DDR programmes are generally designed and implemented in the aftermath of conflicts between States or within one State, either following the definitive victory of one of the parties, or at the end of a conflict in which peace has been achieved through an agreement. The legal parameters for DDR processes are typically included within a peace agreement (Piedmont, 2015). DDR is based on the willingness of the parties in the conflict to engage within the framework of an agreement, underpinned by a basic level of security. In first generation DDR, also referred to as “traditional DDR,” a focus is placed on the disarmament and demobilisation of the signatories to a peace agreement and has strong operational and military components (UN, 2010).

**Second Generation DDR** - By the mid-2000s, a shift had occurred in approaches towards DDR. Traditional DDR practices were perceived as insufficient to fully address reintegration needs as well as broader peacebuilding objectives. Calls were made for approaches that could do more for sustainable reintegration and broader peacebuilding goals, particularly in responding to the new types of conflict and political scenarios. “Second generation” programming attempts to reach beyond disarmament and demobilisation by expanding its scope and increasing the number of reintegration beneficiaries. Most significantly, where first generation DDR engagements focus on individuals who left military groups, second generation engagements build on these programmes to take a more holistic and inclusive approach by involving entire communities in the return and reintegration process (UN, 2010). These programmes typically help identify and mitigate risk factors, enhance resilience and increase the protective capacity of communities at risk.

**Third Generation DDR** - Third generation DDR builds upon the type of engagement typically seen in the second generation, including strengthening community resilience, fostering constructive debate and dialogue and promoting education and economic opportunities, but it is also more thorough in how it addresses factors that influence the vulnerability of individuals to recruitment by armed groups. Third generation DDR is characterised by a shift in focus from socioeconomic integration to include social and political engagement. This is increasingly connected to broader conflict management and peacebuilding operations (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015:5). By rebuilding social bonds between communities and combatants, fostering acceptance within communities for disengaged combatants and addressing drivers exploited by armed groups to recruit

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\(^1\) [https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/](https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/)
individuals, third generation DDR aims to offer a more sustainable economic, social and political alternative to conflict.

Community-based programming

A theme that emerged across second and third generation DDR was the need to engage better with communities throughout the integration process. This aligns with Ayissi’s (2020) finding that a major lesson that emerged from three decades of DDR in Africa was that the most effective way to guarantee the success and sustainability of programmes is to make sure that these serve not only ex-combatants, but also, and above all, all the populations and communities affected by violent conflict, including the most vulnerable among them. As such, as many African countries emerging from crisis continued to deal with the impact of armed violence on civilian populations, it has become common practice to assess the efficiency of a DDR project holistically i.e. how well has it served the whole community that has been devastated by armed conflict?

Ayissi (2020) comments that DDR programmes implemented in countries emerging from conflict have historically focussed on “those bearing arms” who were considered and treated as a distinct group, different from the rest of the community. Consequently, instead of strengthening social cohesion after conflict, DDR programmes became a divisive factor in communities, re-fuelling conditions that led to armed violence.

Given the above, contemporary DDR programmes are increasingly designed to foster community-based development, social cohesion, reconciliation, and peacebuilding. According to the UN’s IDDRS, such community-based DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which ex-combatants can live as law-abiding citizens, while building capacity for long-term peace, security, and development.²

Moving beyond this, Asiedu (2010) argues that for a programme to be community-based it must be chosen, selected and/or controlled by the community. Thus, an outside agency’s programme, which is merely located in a community and has some level of community participation, cannot claim community based status, but rather it is community led.

Terminological difference across organisations when referring to community based reintegration further complicate identifying those programmes that fall under this broad umbrella. An example is USAID’s reference to “Community-Focused Reintegration” (CFR) which takes into consideration the need “to promote reintegration by creating a safe environment in which elements of divided communities could interact” (USAID, 2005). Another example is what Pax Christi refers to as “Community Based Reintegration and Security” (CBRS), which seeks to help communities affected by armed crises respond to the challenging issue of transitional justice via a programme that recommends that DDR efforts should “take root at local levels, which is essential to their legitimacy and sustainability.” Examples of different terms used to refer to broad “community-based” approaches include the following (Muggah, 2006; Transition International, 2015):

- **Area-based DDR** is grounded in the expectation that, by targeting affected communities rather than individuals, particularly communities with large clusters of ex-combatants, more sustainable returns and reconciliation can be promoted. Implementing agencies seek to harness the labour of ex-combatants and

² [https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/](https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/)
unemployed civilians through quick-impact projects to rebuild public infrastructure. Reconciliation activities are thus indirectly stimulated through the creation and strengthening of a range of services, including marketing boards, schools and vocational institutes, transport and communication facilities and community policing. This represents a distinct shift away from rewarding returning combatants with individual monetary incentives.

- **Community-centred DDR** is often undertaken following participatory consultations with communities of return. The programme is executed by civilian/combatant committees at the municipal level. The designation of beneficiaries is determined locally, incentives emerge democratically and the definition of priorities for advancing and measuring community security are context-specific. Implementing agencies support ‘peace agents’ from within the community, and bolster existing social and customary norms that stigmatise arms misuse. The programme thus inculcates ownership from below, as well as through national enabling mechanisms such as DDR Commissions.

- **Community Based (Re)integration and Security (CBRS)** aims to create and foster an enabling environment in support of reconciliation, the effective participation of target groups in local social and economic structures and development processes, and a commitment to community security and arms control. It provides a new approach for context driven and locally led programming, realising that each location has its unique variables. CBRS is an approach designed to be planned for, implemented, and monitored by local actors. While context will further determine its implementation modalities, the point of departure is that the local government, the communities, and the local private sector should be the main drivers and owners, supported by external actors. While some CBRS activities might be short term, and external support might exit after a few years, the overall approach will require a long term process.

Transition International (2015: 5-7) have outlined the core components of CBRS below and Specht (2013) has provided an overview of different models of CBR:

- **Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS).** CBRS is largely implemented through ICRS at the local level.

- **Targeted (re)integration assistance.** Individual assistance provided to specific target groups and a selected number of people in target communities, with (depending on the context) special focus on male and female ex-combatants, supporters, returnees, internally displaced persons, refugees, children associated with armed forces and groups and other vulnerable children.

- **Local Economic Development (LED) and Infrastructure.** Many settings are characterised by poor socio-economic infrastructure, and absorption capacities are too limited to ensure sustainable integration of job seekers. It is necessary to stimulate local economic recovery though LED interventions, including the improvement of economic infrastructure with the aim to create more (re)integration opportunities and to increase productivity of the local population.

- **Social Component.** Based upon solid and participatory social analyses, tailor-made activities geared towards social (re)integration, social cohesion, inclusion and reconciliation should be developed.

- **Security and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) management component.** Based upon a solid assessment of conflict dynamics, perceived security and existing conflict mitigation mechanism(s) in the community, this component focuses on
strengthening community capacity and the community linkage to state/locality authorities to address and resolve conflicts and increase security.

Figure 1: Components of CBRS

Source: Transition International, 2015: 5 reproduced under CC BY 4.0

Table 2: Models for CBR

This Table has been removed for Copyright reasons. The table can be viewed in Specht, I. (2013). Reintegration Framing Paper Good practice in community-based reintegration approaches & its application in Eastern DRC. P.52-53.

Community Violence Reduction

A key objective of many community-based reintegration approaches is not only to reintegrate ex-combatants but also address potential sources of violence. DDR programmes are often criticised for adopting top-down approaches and for considering quantitative outputs, such as the number of weapons collected and surrendered, as the benchmarks of success (Bryden, 2012). However, there is increasing recognition that DDR programmes will only address the root causes of wider insecurity if they are based on a deep contextual knowledge and seek to address the long-term security and development needs of citizens and communities, including marginalised segments of society.

Community Violence Reduction (CVR) refers to programmes, implemented by the DDR or CVR component of a peace operation, aiming at preventing and reducing violence at the community level in ongoing armed conflict or in post-conflict environments. CVR has the same strategic objectives as DDR: to contribute to peace and security by supporting programmes that reduce armed violence; creating political space and helping to build a secure environment conducive to recovery and development. CVR differs from DDR in that it works with target communities to find solutions to causes of armed violence from within, and
explicitly targets youth at risk of recruitment by armed groups in addition to ex-combatants. CVR utilises a bottom-up approach, emphasising community engagement (UN DDR, 2017).

Community-based security and violence reduction approaches are considered to be particularly valuable in building social cohesion and accountability mechanisms and in lifting vulnerable groups into local governance and conflict management processes (Kilroy, 2014).

Community security programmes are a good complement (or framework) for DDR programmes. Broad community security programmes offer a comprehensive approach in which DDR programmes can be articulated. XCs are only one part of the security equation, and community policing, transitional justice, and the strengthening of local governance can protect and maximise the costly investment in DDR programmes (Kilroy, 2014).

3. Case Studies

Evaluations of the effectiveness and relevance of DDR programmes (including those that have a community based or community located element) have suffered from methodological dilemmas, shortages of baseline data, reliance on qualitative or limited, localised quantitative evidence of success or failure in individual dimensions of each programme. Terminological, contextual and implementation differences also challenge comparisons across initiatives. The few existing large-N studies have provided conclusions at times contrary to the strengths and weaknesses identified in internal reports for each programme (Sharif, 2018). The discrepancy between the results of quantitative studies and the conclusions of case field reports can be partially explained by the fact that large-N studies which treat ex-combatants as independent agents, rather than parts of an armed organisation. They ignore the critical role played by social networks in determining post-war outcomes at the organisational and regional levels (Sharif, 2018).

In what follows, a series of examples of the broad spectrum of ‘community-based’ approaches employed in a variety of conflict and post conflict settings. Examples are accompanied, where possible by a summary of lessons learned.

Overarching Reviews


The objective of this Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Policy Meeting was to gather analysis and recommendations of civil society experts for the development of the new EU Strategic Approach to support disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). Specific objectives included:

- Identifying lessons learned and recommendations on making EU support to DDR processes (more) successful;

• Identifying lessons learned and recommendations on how to better connect EU support to DDR to other types of support, e.g., security sector reform (SSR), mediation and transitional justice;
• Identifying best practice in safeguarding human rights and international standards throughout.

The report called for a holistic and community-based approach:

• Reintegration is a long-term approach, which not only involves the targeted individuals but also the community in which former combatants are reintegrated. Experience shows that holistic and community-based approaches are more successful and sustainable. Positive examples include preparatory work with the receiving community before, during and after reintegrating former combatants, and psychosocial and economic support to both community members and reintegrated former combatants. When some of these elements are missing, the likeliness of former combatants re-joining armed groups increases.

• A holistic approach is challenging to put in place because it requires funding, organisational capacity and resources that many implementers are lacking. It is important to monitor progress and change continuously, but is likewise extremely challenging due to the limited availability of resources.

• Some examples of DDR processes showed both advantages and challenges when adopting a holistic approach. In some contexts disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are negotiated separately by different teams, with different expertise and objectives. This allowed for detailed policy frameworks on each component, but brought challenges in the implementation because of the resulting lack of coherence in policy and synergy and coordination among teams working on these components.

• DDR processes tend to fail when they are not inclusive. In many contexts, DDR processes exclusively target individuals who have been arrested by the government and tend to overlook the rest of the community. When programmes fail to be inclusive, community members might perceive former combatants being rewarded with economic opportunities through DDR programmes, and this creates a feeling of injustice. The resulting tensions can lead to the collateral effect of people radicalising and joining an armed group in retaliation for the exclusion from DDR processes.

• Communities often have a hard time accepting former combatants back among them, because of existing grievances and an uncompleted healing process. The way former combatants and the new role they are associated with are presented to the rest of the community is crucial. One way of making reintegration smooth and effective is to make sure former combatants take on the role of service providers, so that the rest of the community can see the benefit of having them back.

• Reintegration usually has to take place in communities where violence is still widespread and the grievances at the basis of the conflict have not completely been addressed. This exacerbates tensions between former combatants and community members: as the first are often stigmatised for the role they had in the conflict, the latter keep feeling insecure. To address this issue, it is important to sensitise the communities on the challenges associated with reintegration.

• DDR initiatives should be implemented when communities are ready to receive former combatants. The international community often pushes for quick reintegration, without paying enough attention to the context. In line with the current thinking on the humanitarian development-peace nexus, DDR programmes should be accompanied
by conflict-sensitive development programmes and humanitarian assistance to address existing issues (e.g., lack of economic opportunities, lack of access to basic services, etc…) which risk being exacerbated by tensions introduced by reintegration programmes.

Importance of local ownership

- Informal community-led reintegration processes exist outside formal government and NGOs-led DDR processes and have some success. These examples should be looked at more carefully by practitioners for best practices and as indicators of fertile ground for reintegration. Functioning traditional dispute settlement mechanisms are often overlooked by the international community, which tends to enforce practices that are not necessarily helpful to local communities.

- Similarly, more synergy between the international community and the local governments should be sought. For example, the Nigerian government has rolled out several initiatives on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), which also include components of reintegration. Co-operation with the international community in the implementation of these policies has failed.

- DDR processes also seem to be constructed separately from existing local mediation activities and peace committees. Leveraging existing community practices by building a DDR process around them could increase both local ownership and effectiveness of the DDR process overall.

- Local ownership can also be increased by engaging traditional local and religious leaders, which sometimes tend to have more authority and be more trusted than representatives from the government, international organisations or NGOs.

- Providing communities with the task of monitoring and evaluating DDR processes has proven successful in assessing the effectiveness of DDR initiatives thanks to a better understanding of local dynamics and priorities. In addition, monitoring is particularly important to make sure no new groups enter the vacuum left by demobilised groups.

- A DDR process can also be improved by a better involvement of local media. Successful DDR examples from DRC include setting-up youth-led media outlets in which former combatants became journalists and discussed DDR-related issues.

DRC


USAID launched its CB programme in 2004 in the eastern part of the DRC. The programme aimed to create the opportunities for people to develop social and technical skills to improve security. A six month programme was introduced, incorporating the following modules:

(1) health and wellbeing;
(2) reaffirmation of values (including gender and rape sensitisation and psychosocial assistance in relation to dealing with war trauma);
(3) how to deal with conflict management and leadership;
(4) development of agricultural skills, income generation and project management;
(5) how to bring into effect democracy and good governance.
These training programmes were selected to assist participants adjust to the post conflict environment and to equip them with basic skills to earn incomes. As part of the programme, USAID provided communities with small grants in order to take up projects which would benefit them and foster reconciliation. The programme funded about 130 projects, totalling approximately US$2.7 million.

The programme targeted youth due to the high percentage who were unemployed. It encouraged greater independence and discouraged them from re-arming for economic survival. The programme targeted 60 people from each community, the selection being made by the communities, themselves. Communities also selected their own community management committees. Lessons learnt from the DRC programme were as follows:

1. the programmes benefited communities and fostered reconciliation among community members, despite the small amounts of money received as grants;
2. communities were empowered through decision-making processes;
3. communities identified their own programmes, which were beneficial to them;
4. it was essential to take account of the willingness of communities to support programmes which would then be likely to result in success.


CVR was first introduced in 2015 in DRC as a bottom-up approach to address the challenges of increasing armed violence at the community level that the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program III (PNDDRIII) seemed unable to address. Originally there was no specific operational document for the programme. But in 2017, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) DDRR Section developed a new concept for CVR that resulted in the following theory of change: “Violence at the community level could be reduced if members of armed groups – both reintegrated through the PNDDRIII and others self-demobilised and youths-at-risk -- are offered alternative source of income to prevent recidivism and recruitment by armed groups and criminal networks.” However, this was not developed to any specific logic model that would clarify how this change would happen through micro-scale projects.

CVR was a small-scale programme but was lauded for introducing a collective approach and compensated for this absence in traditional DDR. CVR projects harnessed wider support and positive perception from stakeholders who criticised PNDDRIII. Some described the CVR projects as successful as they helped destigmatise ex-combatants and dissolve the idea that ex-combatants are rewarded for their violence.

According to its objectives, CVR was a stop-gap measure to address the challenges related to the ex-combatants emerging from PNDDRIII and to foster the prevention agenda. CVR adopted a community-based approach through an inclusive system of project identification and selection that brings core issues of the communities to the fore of the intervention.

In addition to addressing the risks associated with ex-combatants from PNDDRIII, CVR served as window for a number of armed group members who wished to exit the conflict but were hesitant to enrol themselves in PNDDRIII. Key challenges included:
There was no evaluation of impact at the individual or meso-level. The DDRRR section did not have the mandate to issue demobilisation certificates to “self-demobilized” combatants, but in several cases the latter enrolled within the youth-at-risk category to benefit from the CVR projects. There was therefore no tracing either of these individuals or PNDDRIII beneficiaries who entered the CVR programme;

There was not a counterfactual; no mechanisms were put in place to compare communities and/ or locations that benefited from the CVR programme compared with those that did not.

The report concluded that:

- CVR could be an effective tool though it has to be improved from a stop gap measure to a real strategy and programmatic instrument for reducing systemic community violence including through prevention and rigorous community-driven socio-economic programmes that address some of key conflict/violence dynamics including criminality.

- A national CVR strategy should be tailored to specific local contexts and include project design, targeted groups, theory of change and monitoring and evaluation. This should be preceded by a thorough conflict mapping across eastern Congo.

- CVR design should benefit from the lessons learned from the previous reintegration shortcomings.
  - It does not need to involve long-term ambitions of income generation or self-employment of the individual.
  - It could be small-scale or part of larger-scale public works projects and broader economic recovery.
  - Community involvement is imperative to strengthen local ownership and social cohesion. There is an unexplored redemptive/reconciliation possibility in public service as infrastructure rehabilitation, given that ex-combatants destroyed much of it, including private property.

- CVR should not become the sole domain of MONUSCO but part of wider strategies that aim at empowering communities through citizen engagement, social cohesion, human capital, and vocational training.

- Where local agreements with targeted armed groups would be possible, short-term DDR interventions could be appropriate to ensure an immediate support to ex-combatants in their initial transition phase.

- Immediate referral to existing CVR or other community stabilisation programmes is essential for sustainability and reducing recidivism. Stronger coordination with other community stabilisation programmes is imperative for maximising impact.


Save the Children designed a community-driven reintegration programme to build unity and peace and subsequently development and reintegration in Walungu. Forty per cent of the participants in the programme were XCs and sixty per cent civilians. Communities assisted
in arranging temporary homes for children who had lost their families during the war, before they were fully reintegrated into communities. Training was an important element of the programme, as skills and education levels were low. It was necessary to organise training programmes for both ex-child soldiers and civilians in trades. Local service providers were used in these programmes to improve the sense of community ownership. Roads that led to markets were rehabilitated and new markets were built in the area, to encourage inter-community trade and to stimulate the economy. Access to education was created for the ex-combatants and for community members. Accelerated Learning programmes were also used to enable those who were behind their peers in education to catch up. The following lessons were learned from the programme

- Destroyed infrastructure poses a significant threat to children (lack of access to health care and education etc). CB projects must address this threat.
- Children may have been removed from their families at an early age, or may have been orphaned. Temporary homes therefore need to be made available.
- Projects must address economic root causes of conflict and provide livelihoods.
- Command structures place a significant challenge. Former commanders feel responsibility towards ex-combatants and their influence can be used in a positive manner, but they must not be ignored as they may become ‘spoilers’.
- Civilian children and ex-combatant children can best be mixed together in training and education projects to remove stigmatisation and provide a positive environment.
- Accelerated Learning programmes can provide the opportunity for ex-combatant and other children to catch up with their peers.
- Skills training must counter the ‘brain drain’ effect of conflict.
- Businesses and service providers can provide learning opportunities via apprenticeships.
- It is possible to have low costs, while assisting more people.
- Communities need to be empowered to have both the economic and social capacity to absorb ex-combatants. This is done through the implementation of development programmes that will boost the local economy, empower local businesses to increase employment capacity, and encourage reconciliation mechanisms. If this is not done, the communities will remain weak, and have little absorption capacity.
- CB reintegration can foster peace and development and allows communities to see ex-combatants as partners in development.
- No market study was carried out before the project which means that the opportunities that were pursued were not necessarily viable. As a result, the skills learned might not lead to employment.


The Community-based reconciliation and reintegration in Maniema project began by using two pilot sites within Maniema and targeted both community members and XCs. The main goal was to enhance social cohesion by giving community members a participatory role in
the economic and peaceful development of their community. Thus it worked not only with XCs but also with victims of sexual violence and other war-affected people. It implemented community projects to boost the local economy and encourage trade. The programme included the following activities:

- Provision of agricultural tools for farming and seeds for agriculture (seeds are given on a rotating credit basis);
- Provision of micro-credit facilities;
- Rebuilding of social infrastructure by XCs and other members of the community, as a ‘weapons for development’ initiative. Weapons were handed in, in return for assistance. This process was used as a reconciliation tool for the XCs in the community.
- Vocational training for youth (both XCs and other youth) and provision of start-up kits on completion of the training;
- Twelve civil society organisations were responsible for long-term follow-up.

Lessons learned

- Presence of community-owned weapons can pose a threat to the stability of the peace, but can also be used in exchange programmes.
- Profiling participants prior to the design of the project allows initiatives to be well designed and to specifically target and address local needs.
- Psychosocial assistance is necessary in communities affected by war.
- Civil society organisations can be engaged in the project to create community involvement and local ownership.
- The possibility of re-recruitment into armed groups must be addressed by creating employment opportunities and alternative livelihoods (through micro-credit facilities and jobs in rehabilitation of infrastructure).
- If the issues affecting communities are not addressed, there will be potential for conflicts to emerge between XCs and the receiving communities. Sustainability of economic activities cannot be measured yet.
- Community involvement fosters reconciliation and peace.
- Communities often have their own means of addressing justice and reconciliation.
- It is necessary to take XCs and young people from the communities into account, and to empower them through training so that they are given alternatives other than rejoining armed groups or resorting to violence. XCs and community members can work together if an enabling environment is created.


The Community Recovery for North Katanga (UNDP) programme aimed to revive economic and social infrastructure, reconstruct roads and medical services, and achieve social and educational reintegration of the Mayi Mayi XCs and their supporters in order to stabilise the province of Katanga. Its goal was to increase the capacity of the community to re-absorb the
returning XCs. UNDP decided to adopt a community-driven approach to make the communities feel that they owned the project. The targeted recipients were both XCs and community members:

- Members of Mayi Mayi groups within Katanga who had been demobilised;
- Civilian populations most affected by armed conflict in the targeted communities, i.e. vulnerable groups (widows, orphans, female victims of sexual abuse, IDPs);
- Other members of the community. The communities determined the level of priority given to rebuilding the various infrastructures in co-operation with partners.

The project generated the following lessons:

- Programme design and implementation can be devised to include community in decision-making, as this has proven to have a direct impact on reintegration of XCs.
- Project Approval Committees allow for communities to be involved in design of projects, nurturing ownership and ensuring that they are context-relevant and efficient.
- The rehabilitation of infrastructure can boost local economies. It creates jobs by using local materials and provides opportunities for community and XCs to work together.
- Infrastructure rebuilding can address social issues such as lack of health care and education facilities, which increases the capacity of the community to absorb XCs.
- The needs of women and youth must be given attention in design of projects and inclusion of CBOs in the discussion can support selection of projects that provide representation for these groups.
- Communities participated in projects when they felt they were empowered by them.
- The project has shown that, especially where the number of XCs is high, it is possible to implement a large-scale project while still maintaining an acceptable cost per XC.


The Reintegration of female victims of war in Ituri was undertaken by the Union of Women for Development (UFD) targeted those between 15-22 years of age. Skills training was identified as an important way to enable them to gain a source of livelihood. The programme brought together female XCs and female community members by training them and providing start-up kits. To achieve its objectives, the UFD, funded by the Dutch Interchurch Organisation for Development, designed a project aimed at 600 women affected by the conflict. Of these, 63 were XCs, while the rest were women who were selected to participate because they had been affected by the war. Their inclusion in the programme was determined by their degree of vulnerability.

UFD staff members solicited the participation of local businesses and craftsmen to provide vocational training. The programme was anchored in local traditions and institutions, and used local materials and services where possible.

Lessons learned included
- The post-conflict phase is an opportunity to rebuild or establish gender equality.
- Women had different experiences than men during the conflict and face additional difficulties after the conflict, requiring special consideration.
- Feelings of distrust remain between multiple groups after the conflict and projects need to address this if sustainable peace is to be achieved.
- After conflict, it may be that a change in economic activities is required as XCs and some community members are not willing to go back to their previous activities.
- Local materials and services should be used to increase cooperation and boost the local economy. This creates an enabling environment for new business to begin.
- Local partner organisations can be used to increase the sense of community ownership.
- Profiling of participants prior to project allows the project to adapt to specific needs.
- Existing community reconciliation and decision-making mechanisms should be used where they are available.
- Looking at the divergent groups of XCs and the different tribes in the region, all indications suggested that only a CBR approach would work in Ituri.
- Female XCs and community members are now able to work together, indicating that, when given the enabling environment to collaborate, groups can cohabit peacefully.
- The community is pivotal in a reintegration programme, and the community members should be engaged through dialogue in the development of strategies and programmes.
- The CBR approach helped remove stigmatisation and cultural barriers that impeded the reintegration process for women who had not previously participated in the process.
- Young people are more easily reintegrated when accepted by communities. In context where communities struggle to accept XCs, young people find it hard to reintegrate.
- When the ratio of XCs to community members is low (approximately 10 per cent of the total participants), reintegration is likely to become more successful, yet the cost becomes higher. The optimum ratio of XCs to community members needs to be established, to achieve successful reintegration at acceptable cost.


The Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) and Peace Direct evolved a peacebuilding programme where XC reintegration is part of a wider community development strategy. Involving both civilians and XCs, the programme combined livelihood co-operatives with an emphasis on livelihood diversification, micro-finance for wives of XCs and other vulnerable women, radio clubs for community mobilisation and peace courts.

The programme has integrated an M&E approach with indicators of sustainable reintegration identified by XCs and communities. The indicators suggest that social reintegration and community mobilisation has been positive, with 90% not wanting to return to a militia and over 65% married. However, only 36% felt basic needs were met. CRC
requires more skills to enable diversity of beneficiary livelihoods and reflects a need to increase its budget per XC. The programme includes:

- Support for livelihood co-operatives mixing civilians and XCs;
- A public code of conduct developed by the communities and XCs;
- Radio Clubs in communities for sensitisation and community mobilisation for self-help and development;
- ‘Reconciliation Commissions’ or peace courts with XCs integrated providing XCs with a viable non-violent conflict resolution mechanism.

This project implemented ‘Community-owned/driven DDR’, in which the community played a leading role, from design to implementation stage, CRC was crucial to the pre-DDR negotiations with XCs. Lessons learned included:

- Social reintegration was more successful than economic reintegration.
- When using the co-operative model, greater emphasis needs to be given to developing individual business plans to encourage independence from the co-op.
- Micro-finance should target the wives of XCs.
- There is appetite amongst XCs to provide labour for community work and infrastructure.
- Radio Clubs are a tool to mobilise communities for development.
- DDR programmes need to be better evaluated and advocate for improved practices.


While the demobilisation of child soldiers from armed forces and armed groups has received widespread attention since the UN multiplied efforts aimed at ending the use of children in hostilities, the critical question of the reintegration of self-demobilised child soldiers has often been taken for granted, instead of being critically studied. Demobilisation does not necessarily signify reintegration. Juma comments that in the DRC more child soldiers have self-demobilised without being reintegrated. The reintegration of self-demobilised child soldiers faces five major challenges.

- Local organisations and families lack funding to ensure the effective reintegration of children. This is partially due to a failure to mobilise and utilise locally available resources to mount projects that generate income. They also fail to resort to traditional means of dealing with psychological problems. This is due to reliance on foreign help to run their projects rather than exploring locally available resources. Moreover, families are seriously impoverished to the extent that rather than children being assisted by them, families pin their hope on self-demobilised children for help. This puts more strain on the children and may push them back into military work an opportunity is offered or into substance abuse as a way of dealing with stress. It is essential to empower families to be able to assist self-demobilised children to reintegrate back into communities.
- There is a lack of support from the government and international organisations. There is still a gap between the national and international call to demobilisation and the assistance provided to ensure the effective reintegration of self-demobilised child soldiers. Often the response is that ‘the problem of these children is so complex, their number is small compared to adult combatants going through DDR processes, and they do not represent a threat to peace and security’. It is widely recognised that long-term reintegration requires not only internal but also external support.

- There is a lack of skills in stress management and trauma healing. This lack of capacity means that local organisations' workers fail to understand and respond effectively to children’s needs. The lack of awareness of the necessity for children to learn coping mechanisms in this area leaves them powerless when faced with stress.

- Ongoing conflicts pose a challenge to working with self-demobilised child soldiers. Where social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants has not been adequately provided for, and where they are left with no legitimate means to support themselves, the risk of sexual violence against women and other human rights abuses increase significantly.

- The lack of capacity in restorative justice and peer mediation means that those working with self-demobilised children are not able to empower them with the knowledge and skills to deal constructively with conflict with other children when encountered.

Lessons Learned

- Both healing and reconciliation are essential for self-demobilised child soldiers to live in peace. Additionally, restorative justice and other forms of peaceful conflict resolution are critical to children’s reintegration.

- There is a link between the labour market and psychosocial reintegration. The failure to carry out an analysis of the labour market before conducting life skills training for children resulted in some skills not being useful for children. Consequently, they could not find jobs and thus became frustrated. In order to run the training in the best interests of self-demobilised children and to prevent stress arising from a lack of job opportunities, it is essential to provide them with skills that match the requirements of the conflict-affected labour market in the geographical area where reintegration is taking place.

- Life skills training, e.g. conflict resolution and stress management strategies, are effective in reintegration and reconciliation. It creates a space where self-demobilised child soldiers from various armed groups, can come together. It also accords an opportunity to self-demobilised child soldiers and the community to work together. Training is an important tool for peace processes, political stabilisation and national reconciliation.

- Gender continues to receive less attention, despite efforts to mainstream it. Regardless of the special needs of self-demobilised girl child soldiers, no specific measures are taken to assist them to reintegrate. The level of intervention will depend on the specific needs and priorities revealed by a gender-sensitive situation assessment.
Understanding cycles of (re)mobilisation in eastern DRC is important to evaluating the prospects for delivering sustainable reintegration support. There is a complex array of contextual and individual factors that push individuals into establishing or abandoning civilian lives and (re) mobilising into armed groups. Key factors propelling cycles of insecurity, (re)mobilisation and violence include:

**Absence of Security and Services:** Reintegration mapping reveals that local contextual factors are important for understanding individuals’ decisions to reintegrate or (re)mobilise. Insecurity is the core issue for many - especially in terms of rule of law. Police and military are often absent from rural settings in eastern DRC and even when present, capacities may not be adequate to represent a credible source of security. The absence of services, especially health and education, contributes to a sense that there are few opportunities available. Economic services such as agricultural, business development, and/or financial services are weak or absent in many settings. As a result, private sector activity is stifled and livelihood opportunities diminished.

**Poverty and Absence of Livelihood Opportunities:** In many communities in eastern DRC, there are few livelihood opportunities. Traditional means of support, such as agriculture or fishing, are dependent on access to natural resources which are often controlled through local power structures based on social or ethnic affiliation. Without access, many turn to activities such as artisanal mining - which often lack clear formal or social regulation. This dynamic can fuel competing resource claims which sometimes escalate to violence.

**Stigma and Discrimination:** there are specific factors on individual level that amplify contextual conditions which increase the risk of (re)mobilisation. These include discrimination based on age, gender, ethnic affiliation, and ex-combatant status. Stigma is a clear barrier to accessing social support in the community. Perhaps most importantly, stigma can hinder acceptance in family structures which are a vital source of support for individuals’ reintegration, and a building block for further community acceptance. This is most true for female ex-combatants and associated persons, for whom which the stigma-based barriers to reintegration are profound.

Key opportunities for improving community-based reintegration support in eastern DRC include:

**Local Reintegration Plans – Improving Coordination and Legitimacy:** These local reintegration plans can serve as the basis for improving overall coordination and establishing the local legitimacy of reintegration support. Local reintegration plans can serve as a rallying point for communities and the diverse range of local, national, and international actors working with them to coordinate their action around. While long-term donor support remains essential, more coordinated approaches present the prospect of a more efficient use of local resources towards collective outcomes. Further, local reintegration plans should be integrated into provincial and national planning processes to ensure that community-based reintegration support connects to more long-term development work. Local reintegration plans can empower community owned and driven conflict resolution mechanisms. Trusted local actors, moral authorities such as religious leaders, local government, and other intercommunal structures such as Baraza can play a vital role in facilitating communal
acceptance of returning male and female ex-combatants. This local legitimacy cannot be short cutted, and is key to rebuilding social cohesion in the community.

**Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Projects:** Investments in infrastructure such as street lights in insecure areas, improved roads to strengthen commerce, as well as other community development projects that improve access to services and resources can have important short term effects on stability. This is especially the case when these labour-intensive activities are carried out by a mix of male and female ex-combatants and persons associated with armed groups, members of receiving communities, as well other vulnerable groups as a part of cash-for-work projects which create vital incomes streams. When ex-combatants and community members work together for the improvement of their communities, it creates a space for trust-building which can contribute to breaking down stigma.

**Context-Specific Support for Traditional Livelihoods:** Traditional livelihoods such as agriculture, livestock, and fishing can sometimes constitute opportunities for sustainable reintegration. However, the challenge is that these livelihoods are often closely linked to particular ethnic identities and distinct local power structures that regulate access to natural resources. Supporting reintegration opportunities in one sector over another may therefore run the risk of being perceived as supporting one ethnic group over another. Poorly conceived reintegration support in these sectors can instigate new conflicts over resources. Likewise, there are significant gendered aspects of access to natural resources. It is clear that approaches to supporting traditional livelihood opportunities for reintegration must be anchored in exhaustive and ongoing analysis of specific local contexts.

**Urban-Based Reintegration Support:** Ex-combatants report that when rural communities remain insecure and with few opportunities, they prefer to reintegrate into urban settings. The service sector, motorcycle taxi, and farming related trade (for example livestock trade or agricultural supply) are livelihood pathways of significant interest and where opportunities for reintegration support exist. Moving to an urban setting is not without challenges. In many cases this means foregoing support that communal and, especially, familial social networks represent. For many, this informal social support is the difference between a sustainable (re)integration trajectory or (re) mobilisation, and in its absence, formal reintegration support becomes even more important. This report highlighted that reintegration support has primarily been developed to meet the needs of male participants. This can lead women to not identify themselves as combatants and instead “self-reintegrate”. Adapted reintegration pathways should be created for female combatants who do not reintegrate as a part of a formal DDR process.

**Ongoing Assessments and Analysis:** Because community-based approaches to reintegration support are specific to each community, deep contextual analysis is paramount. Generic approaches will continue to prove insufficient. Local situations can change quickly and with regularity, therefore, an emphasis should be placed on assessments and analysis through innovative and robust approaches to monitoring and evaluation at the local level. Specific attention should be given to understanding the needs of women and girls in reintegration.

**Sierra Leone**

Asiedu, V. (2010). *From Combat to Community: a Study of how Community-based Approach to Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) can Contribute*
Asiedu comments that the DDR of ex-combatants is one of the vital elements of peacebuilding with the objective of reconciling ex-combatants into communities and reducing the likelihood of renewed violence. However, DDR has been criticised for its focus on ex-combatants rather than communities, sometimes creating divisions among community members and straining the peacebuilding process. Academics and practitioners alike are increasingly arguing for a community-based (CB) approach, especially during the reintegration process, as a way of addressing resentment.

Table 3: Community based reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone (Asiedu, 2010: 121)

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In this analysis of CB reintegration in Sierra Leone, Asiedu found that:

- Programmes that could be considered CB, improved livelihoods of ex-combatants through employment creation. Unlike many of the community-located (CL) programmes, which used external facilitators, CB programmes employed locals (including ex-combatants) to plan and implement reintegration programmes. The use of local facilitators addressed issues of unemployment in many communities and offered regular employment and earning opportunities. These forms of individual, as well as team building capacities, which resulted from active participation in CB programmes, encouraged communities to initiate more long-term programmes to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

- Ex-combatants’ livelihoods continued to improve because many CB programmes continued after funding from donors ceased. This was made possible due to the active participation of community members during the planning and implementation of the programmes and, also, the acquisition of valuable skills and competencies. Unlike CL programmes, where NGOs implemented programmes, CB programmes offered community members the opportunity to participate actively in such programmes and to develop various skills. Many ex-combatants used these skills favourably for personal development, to increase their individual earning capacity and for the development of their communities to aid effective peacebuilding.

- CB programmes enhanced good governance through equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability and respect for basic human rights. Unlike CL, CB programmes encouraged democratic processes, where both ex-combatants and non-combatants were given opportunities to be represented on management committees. The use of the management committee to initiate community owned reintegration programmes empowered communities to participate in these programmes, and facilitated transparency and accountability. These transparent processes not only stopped malpractices, such as corruption, but they were fundamental to attempting to confer basic human rights.

- CB programmes enhanced human security by creating an enabling security environment that facilitated reintegration, eliminated tension and fear in communities and ensured food security. CB programmes employed the services of the community
police force to protect basic raw materials, used in the reintegration programmes, from burglary, and ex-combatants from being attacked by their victims. Communities employed these initiatives because the civil police could not protect the citizens from attacks. Unlike CL programmes, where private security was used to protect offices and equipment, the use of community police by CB programmes created an enabling security environment for communities, thus facilitating reintegration of ex-combatants. It also brought both ex-combatants and non-combatants together and helped rebuild trusting relationships.

- A CB approach to reintegration programmes enhanced social reconstruction because reintegration programmes focussed on both ex-combatants and non-combatants to address issues of resentment. Practically, it was evident that some programmes targeted specific groups e.g. youth, or women, but decisions to target groups were not made by programme implementers, such as NGOs, but community members (at community meetings or durbars). Unlike CL programmes where external actors sometimes restricted community participation in decision-making processes, CB programmes were locally owned, thus specific issues affecting ex-combatants were given prompt attention.

Asiedu concludes that when communities are assisted in developing their own programmes, they are in a better position to identify means to aid the reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities. It can thus be argued that CB reintegration programmes, in many post-conflict communities in Sierra Leone, improved livelihoods of ex-combatants and non-combatants, enhanced social reconstruction, enhanced good governance, and improved human security; all of which is fundamental to more effective peacebuilding.

**Aceh, Indonesia**


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303518492_Community_Driven_Development_in_the_Context_of_Conflict-Affected_Countries_Challenges_and_Opportunities

In 2005 in Aceh, Indonesia, the World Bank financed the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP), which was designed to fight poverty within local communities in the region. The main objectives were to reduce poverty and improve local governance in rural areas, to institutionalise participatory processes in local government, to provide cost-effective basic social and economic infrastructure, and to strengthen the capacity of the microfinance institutions.

The KDP targeted communities, however, the programme was confronted with corrupt practices due to lack of transparency in the KDP project cycle. To fight corruption, it was stipulated that all financial transactions should be signed by no fewer than three parties. As part of the programme, communities received 600 USD for each ex-combatant, who returned to the community, for infrastructure development using funds from the World Bank, the EU and the United States, with a maximum cost of USD 1.8 million. This form of CB development helped to avoid tension and distinctions between ex-combatants and the locals and thereby facilitated the reintegration process. The level of acceptance by community members of ex-combatants in this form of CB development was around 90%. The programme helped:
• in the reconstruction of public infrastructure in Aceh. Getting access to basic services, such as health and education was vital to communities.

• The KDP also provided employment opportunities for ex-combatants, as well as community members. In post-conflict environments, income earning projects is necessary because it can prevent ex-combatants from rearming as a way of survival.

Angola


In Angola, the Third Social Action Fund (FAS III) was initiated to support decentralisation, so that previously inaccessible areas could be reached. FAS III was built on FAS I and II to incorporate a more intensive CB approach to allow for a greater involvement in communities and local government in their decision-making about service delivery. FAS III encouraged a culture of accountability and service delivery, at the community level, to assist in the reconciliation throughout the entire country.

The planning and implementation process focussed on transparent resource management, which was intended to build confidence in communities, and contribute to reconciliation. The projects, however, were not linked to other development programmes, due to lack of coordination. Linking FAS programmes to the overall development projects of the country could have helped solve some problems such as duplication of projects. Coordination could have also ensured that the different approaches were both sustainable and complementary.

The FAS transferred responsibility for project implementation to local government and placed emphasis on building social capital, at the local level, by establishing inclusive community forums. Programmes were managed by community members and this encouraged transparency and accountability. Lessons learned from the FAS III projects were

(1) the improvement of infrastructure development, such as, schools, health posts, water and sanitation facilities, roads, and markets, was necessary;

(2) the enhancement of participatory decision-making processes, through a 5-member community committee that was elected;

(3) the building of trust among community members through community programmes;

(4) the need to build local capacity through decentralisation;

(5) the necessity to facilitate developmental programmes to enhance community livelihoods.

Burundi


In Burundi, USAID launched a CB programme in 2004, which promoted CB reintegration and reconciliation. USAID opted for a CB approach in the granting of loans to community members, after the previous stand-alone programme has been unsuccessful. As part of the programme, CB leadership and vocational skills training were initiated to offer beneficiaries the chance to develop competencies so that they could use the grant to set up small
workshops. A 1-month CB leadership training was initiated to prepare leaders in basic management processes, effective communication and conflict resolution programmes. The vocational skills training (VST) programme took four to six months, and trainees were introduced to carpentry, metalwork, tie and dye making, hairdressing and motor mechanics. Beneficiaries were also trained in numeracy and literacy skills. According to USAID, by September 2005, approximately 6,200 people had received training.

The planning focussed on communities rather than ex-combatants. According to USAID, one-quarter of students were women, 55% were from vulnerable groups (who had remained in the communities during the conflict), and the rest were equally divided among ex-combatants from different armed groups, returned refugees and IDPs. Local facilitators (artisans) were used during the training process and given one month leadership training to prepare them for training others. On completion of the training, communities decided how to use the grants given to them by USAID. These grants were designed to improve capacity building and community infrastructure and foster cooperation. Lessons learned from the Burundi programme included:

(1) the necessity to build trust through decision-making processes;
(2) the desirability of enhancing reintegration and reconciliation through the use of small grants and training activities;
(3) the need to promote an all-inclusive approach (ex-combatants and non-combatants) to programmes; and
(4) the requirement to build community capacity through leadership programmes.

Haiti


In 2003 in Haiti, UNDP worked in conjunction with the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) DDR section to establish a CB DDR approach. It was based on an integrated management structure. The programme aimed to reduce violence in communities through the use of information campaigns, conflict resolution support, and micro-project assistance, for community groups, as well as ex-combatants. The programme was multi-faceted, based on negotiation, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups (male, female, children, elderly) those associated with them; community disarmament and conflict prevention; and control of small arms proliferation through political and legislative structures.

The programme targeted youth, women and men, the elderly, civil society organisations and armed groups and mobilised resources from various countries.

As part of the programme, communities formed an organisation called the Committee for the Prevention of Violence and for Community Development (CPVD) to identify potential threats and how to prevent them. The Committee members represented various communities (ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs,) and these members were elected through democratic processes. The CPVD worked with UNDP and MINUSTAH to achieve the aim of reducing violence in the country. The success achieved could, in part, be attributed to the contributions made by communities when fighting crime. Lessons learnt from this programme include:
(1) the formation of the CPVD created institutions for local governance in the country;
(2) interactions of community groups encouraged social reintegration; and
(3) having an integrated management structure addressed issues of exclusion and resentment and facilitated the building of trust among community members.


CVR was first initiated by MINUSTAH in 2006 following Security Council Resolution 1702, which recognised that conditions for DDR did not exist in Haiti and that “alternative programmes were required to address local conditions. It became clear that armed groups, in particular armed gangs, were the main source of insecurity in Haiti, and not the disbanded army (FADH). In 2007, MINUSTAH re-oriented its DDR approach prioritising CVR to tackle root causes of i.e. poverty and the absence of rule of law. For over a decade MINUSTAH implemented CVR programmes, contributing to the reduction of violence in target communities, until the mission closed in 2017. The new peacekeeping mission (MINUJUSTH) is continuing the implementation of CVR.

CVR has been implemented in three of Haiti’s ten departments (Ouest, Nord and Artibonite). Initially, CVR involved labour-intensive projects and temporary work programmes as alternatives to criminality and unemployment for community members, especially youth at risk of recruitment into gangs. More targeted projects provided professional skills training, small enterprise start-up, business development and apprenticeship placement in the private sector. A special focus was given to incentivising youth-at-risk of recruitment to join these programmes. CVR also established legal aid centres, promoted community-based policing and led social reinsertion activities for former inmates, including women and minors. The CVR programme in Haiti implemented 31 projects, reaching over 188,984 direct beneficiaries, including 60,939 women. Selection criteria for CVR projects are based upon consultation with communities, which are selected due to their proximity to violence-affected areas and in areas with large numbers of youth-at-risk, and with government counterparts. Projects are designed through mapping exercises conducted at the community level.

For less than 200,000 US dollars, the CVR project in Fort Saint Michel provided temporary employment opportunities to youth-at-risk of recruitment and rehabilitated infrastructure, contributing to reduced insecurity and criminality while improving the living conditions of this vulnerable community.

Liberia


In Liberia, a CB reintegration programme, Youth Education for Life Skills (YES) was launched by USAID for ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees and locals to facilitate the reintegration process to advance an inclusive, peaceful political transition. In response to urban needs, a 3-month Urban YES programme was designed for youth in Monrovia. Apart from the training programmes, small grants averaging $5,000 were given for projects such as infrastructure (schools, health centres, community centres) renovations, purchase of communal cassava mills, and training in animal husbandry to facilitate the reintegration process in the communities.
The YES programme provided life skills training for about 30,000 youth, between the ages of 18 and 30, to be economically responsible after 14 years of violent conflict. The training programmes were conducted by master trainers and learning facilitators with management committees constituted by each community to provide supervision. Though decisions about the selection and location of projects were made by communities through the voting system, in some cases they led to division. The programme on the whole, achieved its aim of facilitating the reintegration process; however, lack of jobs in rural communities led to beneficiaries migrating to nearby cities for jobs. The following lessons were learnt:

1. the programme targeted short-term programmes with the aim of meeting the immediate needs of the affected population, rather than offering long-term sustainable programmes;
2. the programme encouraged young people to respect each other and to use dialogues to address differences;
3. the drop-out rate of participants was high because participants were not given any form of allowance;
4. the magnitude of the programmes, in terms of cost and management, resulted in rushing through programmes without considering community needs.

Central African Republic


The Central African Republic has been characterised by a proliferation of armed groups and recruitment since conflict broke out in 2013. Due to this complex context, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA’s) mandate has adapted to the evolving political process. Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) urged “the CAR Authorities to address the presence and activity of armed groups by implementing a comprehensive strategy that prioritizes dialogue and the urgent implementation of an inclusive DDR/R(Repatriation) programme.” Among the mission’s DDR-related tasks, the mandate lists CVR programmes to be implemented “for members of armed groups non-eligible for participation in the national DDRR programme”. The December Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018) subsequently authorised MINUSCA to “support the CAR Authorities and relevant civil society organizations in developing and implementing CVR programmes, including gender-sensitive programmes, for members of armed groups including those non-eligible for participation in national DDRR programme”.

While the mission’s CVR strategy is developing, it builds upon an earlier pre-DDR programme which contributed to security and stability, created space for dialogue, and reduced intra-communal violence during the 2016 elections by providing alternate livelihoods for combatants and communities. CVR is designed to maintain and sustain pre-DDR accomplishments and expand them to target elements associated with armed groups, youth at risk of recruitment and community members in hotspot locations. Focus areas consist of priority regions in which conflict has occurred and where there is a proliferation of armed groups, militias or gangs. Both members of armed groups and communities are eligible to participate based on a ratio established in each context. Local committees, representing combatants, communities and local authorities support beneficiary selection processes.

Since 2016, MINUSCA has implemented CVR projects in nine hotspot locations, targeting more than 17,000 direct beneficiaries. In the financial year of 2017/18, MINUSCA
implemented CVR in eight locations, reaching 6,283 beneficiaries (including 1,581 women). Funds were secured through assessed contribution of 7 million USD and with additional funding from the Peacebuilding Fund and other donors. The project was implemented in partnership with IOM and UNOPS.


Since 2014, IOM has implemented a multi-faceted Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme in the CAR. The programme aims to support perpetrators of violence ineligible for inclusion in potential DDR processes and their communities in order to build trust and recover from the effects of conflict. In coordination with MINUSCA, and with the support of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office and European Union funded community stabilisation projects, IOM provides assistance to communities that are at risk of violence. This approach has reduced the risk of ex-combatants/fighters returning to violence and laid the groundwork for future DDR processes.

Community stabilisation programming is an important example of how the IOM approach has adapted to the challenges of ever changing circumstances. IOM contributes to stability in the transition phase through various measures and by making use of the scope of methodologies at its disposal, including: a multiagency and multidimensional human security approach that reinforces the strength and legitimacy of the rule of law in high risk areas; holistic community stabilisation projects to revitalise markets, build capacities and focus on dialogue enhancing projects within communities; reducing the potential for community violence by addressing root causes and engaging with perpetrators of violence who are ineligible for the DDR process. Key lessons include

- Since delays can hamper progress, cause loss of momentum and allow for the possibility of interference, respecting implementation deadlines is critical;
- Transitional pre-DDR initiatives should be incorporate in the overall peacebuilding strategy in order to enhance the chances of achieving expected results;
- For DDR and CVR programming in ongoing conflict situations, a strategy for minors at risk of recruitment by armed groups and/or criminal gangs should be implemented;
- Socialisation and employment initiatives with armed elements and communities should be planned in advance and community violence reduction engagements should be strengthened to ensure sustainability;
- To deepen the impact of community stabilisation models, those in temporary employment initiatives should participate in a minimum three-year cycle of "virtual cantonment" including socialisation initiatives, civic education, business start-up/alphabetsation training and income generating activities supported by long-term investment.

Sudan


UNAMID was first mandated to support the Government of Sudan in implementing DDR programmes in 2007 through UN Security Council Resolution 1769. The mandate was renewed in 2018 to continue to provide technical and logistical assistance to the Sudan DDR
Commission and urged the Government of Sudan to conduct comprehensive disarmament process, given the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

UNAMID has implemented community based labour-intensive projects (CLIPs) from 2011-2015, and since 2015 the Mission is implementing community stabilisation projects (CSPs). These projects support the stabilisation of communities through reducing community violence and preventing the recruitment of youth-at-risk to armed movements or criminal groups by promoting alternative livelihood and capacity building opportunities, strengthening resilience of local communities and bolster peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The CSPs and CLIPs are focused on promoting community security, strengthening governance, institution development and community empowerment, durable solutions for conflict affected communities and basic social services and economic service delivery. The design and implementation of CSPs is based on a consultative process, which includes local authorities, community members and local partners. Selection criteria for beneficiaries include violence affected communities, the presence of youth-at-risk of recruitment and other vulnerable communities, and other community-determined priorities. The CSPs also aim to strengthen local administration, enhance administrative capacity for the rule of law, health and education, promote ecological resiliency etc.

From 2011-2018, UNAMID implemented 201 projects across Darfur. North Darfur (58 projects), West Darfur (61 projects), South Darfur (40 projects), Central Darfur (22 projects) and East Darfur (20 projects). These 201 projects have reached 10,786 direct beneficiaries, 4,311 of whom are women.

Community Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS)

The CBRS approach has been designed in Sudan, merging DDR and community security approaches. It is a decentralised effort to demobilise and reintegrate combatants, increase security at local levels, stimulate local economies and increase the delivery of quality services. The community based nature of the programme allowed for context specific interventions and capacity development. The expected outcomes of the programme are improved community security, social stabilisation and inclusive economic growth. The programme has the following components:

1. Disarmament and SALW management.
2. Demobilisation.
3. Targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance for XCs and WAAFG.
4. Social reintegration, conflict mitigation, reconciliation and community security.
6. Economic assistance to community youth with Conflict Carrying Capacities.

The simultaneous implementation of these components sought to create a multiplier effect for the interventions. The process aims to support reconciliation, and provide a platform to prevent feelings of resentment and jealousy that targeted assistance can create. The broader community accrue direct benefits from the community economic infrastructure component, which aim to reinforce economic revitalisation including increased economic opportunities, production and access to markets. The improved security situation resulting from the SALW control and the conflict mitigation interventions will further improve living standards of the community as a whole. Further, by merging Disarmament and SALW, a more integrated approach to disarmament with the relevant government structures can be developed, closer linked to SSR. For the targeted beneficiaries the economic infrastructure projects will increase the chances of success of their economic endeavours. Finally, the
strong focus on increasing capacities of local service providers will result in better and more support to the target beneficiaries and the community as a whole.


The conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile curtailed key components of DDR in Sudan and forced a rethink of goals and modalities. Recruitment and mobilisation worked against DDR’s stated aims of disarming and demobilising 90,000 soldiers. Following a February 2013 workshop of DDR stakeholders in Khartoum, the NDDRC endorsed a national strategy that moved from traditional, individual disarmament to a community-based approach.

This approach offered a softer and more expansive means of implementing DDR by emphasising community projects in areas with a high concentration of ex-combatants and where community violence persisted. Youths were targeted because they were seen to be most likely to return to the battlefield. The military and other stakeholders initially opposed this approach, saying it blurred the lines between community and military beneficiaries.

Sudan’s DDR effort was executed by a range of government, UN, and NGO partners.

- Community-based reintegration activities were implemented in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Khartoum, North Kordofan, Sennar, and White Nile states. But results were uneven in both qualitative and quantitative terms. While the political and military context is largely to blame, a set of 2010 evaluations by donors and UNDP painted an unflattering picture of the programme prior to the return to conflict.
- Eastern Sudan provided the most positive picture: the full caseload of 3,951 combatants, divided into two phases (the first composed of 1,697 Eastern Front fighters, the second of 2,254 SAF and PDF), completed the full DDR cycle. DDR in the East was executed under the terms of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.
- DDR in Darfur was governed by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) that initiated an abortive disarmament campaign, and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The government demobilised 4,027 combatants as part of the DPA, but after 315 of these fighters passed through a phase of reintegration, funds were not forthcoming and the programme stalled. Community-based preparation for DDR in Darfur was undertaken but was not continued given the funding problems and ongoing conflicts.
- In South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the ‘Central Sector’ of North Kordofan, Khartoum, Sennar, and White Nile states, 36,251 combatants (including 5,975 women) were demobilised before fighting started again in 2011.

**Colombia**


IOM initiated a programme aimed at promoting community reintegration and protective environments against recruitment and utilisation to support the efforts of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, this project consisted of:
• Creating and strengthening processes for bringing stakeholders together to restore trust, and foster reconciliation within communities and strengthen the legitimacy of state institutions;
• Addressing youth recruitment risk factors;
• Evaluating the results in order to promote adequate development and sustainability at the national level.

Key lessons included:

• In order to adapt to changing contexts, institutional policies, and the evolving needs and expectations of reintegration participants at the community level, flexibility is an essential part of the effectiveness and sustainability of DDR programming. Furthermore, it is important to tailor reintegration approaches to the needs of individuals, while still adapting to changing conflict dynamics at the macro level;
• During the DDR implementation phase, innovation and the incorporation of new technologies is essential, especially at the community level.

Somalia


Since 2013, IOM has supported the Federal Government of Somalia in developing and implementing the National Programme on the Treatment and Handling of Disengaging Combatants and Youth at Risk. IOM has endeavoured to adopt an organic, community-based approach to DDR and anti-extremism programming that views community stabilisation and preventing violent extremism activities among its primary objectives. Although DDR and anti-extremism activities are central components, promoting community resilience, acceptance and ownership are also seen as critical requirements for success.

Relevant activities include community dialogue and dispute resolution sessions, trauma healing and sports/arts events. Strategic communication activities focus on building community understanding and awareness of the disengagement and reintegration process, enabling them to see the benefits of the programme and promote community ownership.

Key Lessons Learned

Discussions held with ex-combatants/fighters in transition centres indicated that economic opportunities provided by Al-Shabaab are one of the main drivers of recruitment. By focusing solely on more traditional DDR activities, ex-combatants/fighters were reintegrated into an environment where the same socioeconomic drivers of violent extremism and incentives for recruitment existed.

Accordingly, DDR programmes in third generation contexts should consider all relevant push/pull factors of violent extremism and address the fundamental issues of community stabilisation and recruitment.

Strategic communications, outreach and capacity-building activities that promote community stabilisation can provide a more conducive environment for sustainable reintegration. These critical activities increase awareness and understanding of the receiving communities, which enable them to see the benefit of addressing the drivers of violent extremism. These activities also empower ownership of the disengagement and reintegration process.
Uganda


For several years after the end of the conflict between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), IOM supported the recovery of conflict affected areas through a socioeconomic, community-based approach. Reintegration initiatives targeted vulnerable conflict affected groups such as female-headed households, returnees and ex-combatants/fighters who were at risk of being economically marginalised. Community based interventions contributed to the enhancement of competitive skills and human capital development for vulnerable groups, thereby facilitating access to economic markets.

Primary IOM objectives included supporting the development of a strong agricultural economy in the post-conflict and post-displacement period, mitigating potential friction in the post-conflict economy through community dialogue and enabling the reintegration of youth, women and ex-combatants/fighters associated with the LRA. IOM focused on creating employment opportunities, enhancing competitive skills and human capital development for youth, as well as increasing household incomes and promoting equity.

Afghanistan


In 2002, in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was instituted as a nation-building exercise that emphasised local governance. Under the programme, communities received grants and decided on how to use those grants in community participatory decision-making processes. These processes were instigated by community development councils (CDCs), which were elected by the communities. The CDCs produced development plans and prioritised them on behalf of the communities. This helped to legitimate local leadership and strengthened relationships between communities and the local government. A precondition of being given grants was that communities were to invest in reconstruction activities. Facilitating partners assisted communities in the election of CDCs, in the planning and implementing of sub-projects, and in building capacity for financial management. Local facilitators were used to build local capacities and to improve livelihoods. Coordination between communities, and facilitating partners, was necessary to avoid project duplication.

The NSP delivered resources to community members to enable them to plan and implement programmes, so that they could re-establish ties among community members, and also to re-establish communication between communities and state institutions. The World Bank estimated that more than 80% of sub-projects involved infrastructural work (irrigation, rural roads, electrification and drinking-water supply), which was critical for recovery.

The following lessons were learnt:

(1) creation of CDCs, was vital to in enhancing good governance in local communities;
(2) infrastructure development was needed to assist the recovery process;
(3) a participatory approach to decision-making processes was essential to facilitate the reintegration process (though women’s influence was considered to be too low).
Guidance on women and girls


Reintegration assistance for women should be community-based, limited in time, and linked to longer-term programmes, policies and initiatives benefiting war-affected women. All training and education opportunities should be supplied as part of the wider provision of services for adults, including women, bringing together DDR participants and other civilians, ideally in a 1:1 ratio. All activities should be informed by communities’ views and cultural norms, and involve their participation, while not being discriminatory towards women. Options made available should include the following:

- Education, including accelerated or catch-up education.
- Employment–oriented vocational training or apprenticeship for a profession, e.g. food production, carpentry, tailoring, plumbing, welding, driving, transport, mechanics, brick making, masonry, hairdressing, hotel work, catering, crafts, agriculture, private security.
- Income-generating activities, e.g. crop farming, petty trade, small businesses, animal husbandry, urban gardening.

Programming must be flexible (e.g. evenings, part-time) and geographically accessible as women are likely to be overwhelmed with household responsibilities and will otherwise be unable to attend. Crucially, reintegration options should not be confined to stereotypical roles for women, which may limit their economic and social prospects. Preventable obstacles to women’s reintegration, such as employers refusing to train or hire women, education institutions refusing to educate them or their children, or narrow expectations of the work women are permitted to undertake, must be identified and addressed before the reintegration process begins.

Matching women to reintegration opportunities must be undertaken by suitably qualified social workers on a case-by-case basis using pre-determined criteria, e.g. wishes of individual, strengths, labour market prospects, socio-economic profile, proximity, and special needs and vulnerabilities. Counselling must be deeply informed and realistic about economic prospects in different sectors and communities. Participants should not be treated as a homogenous group. Vetting of all training and education providers is essential. This should include a focus on institutional capacity to cater to the needs of women (e.g. basic sanitation, safety precautions, space for breast feeding mothers). Assisting mothers with child care is essential in order to make education and training opportunities accessible; extended families are best placed to provide this. Incentives may also be provided to women to engage in reintegration activities with their children. These include the provision of medical care while mothers are attending training or educational facilities.

4. References


Suggested citation

About this report
This report is based on six days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info.

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