

Evidence on the role of civil society in security and justice reform

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Question

What role does civil society play in enabling the impetus for security and justice reform?

Contents

1. Summary
2. Background
3. Examples
4. References

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1. Summary

This rapid literature review finds that while civil society is widely believed to be an important factor in security sector and justice reform (SSR), there are few successful examples of SSR driven by civil society across the world. Civil society can have a positive role on SSR through advocacy, knowledge production and political pressure, but other supportive factors are needed for successful SSR.

The report focuses on the role of civil society in SSR in a number of contexts. It finds that donor driven SSR is seen to have failed to include civil society, and that such efforts have been focused on training and equipping security forces. Donors have been able to successfully develop civil society capacity or engage civil society groups in reforms, as in Sierra Leone. There are several examples of security and justice reforms undertaken by local popular movements as part of regime change, namely Ethiopia and South Africa. In other contexts, such as Indonesia, the role of civil society has led to partial successes from which lessons can be drawn.

The theoretical and empirical literature attributes a number of potential roles to civil society in SSR. These include making security and justice institutions accountable, mobilising a range of social groups for reform, publicising abuses and advocating for reform, offering technical expertise, and improving security-citizen relations. The literature also points to the inherent difficulties in implementing SSR, namely the entrenched nature of most security systems.

Factors seen to increase the effectiveness of civil society SSR efforts include:

- The technical knowledge/capacity to effectively contribute to policy making.
- Maintaining a cohesive front between civil society organisations and across society.
- Strategy in applying pressure for reforms and achieving support from sections of the elites, and in countering attempts to deflect reforms.
- Timing in pushing for reforms during periods of disruption to repressive regimes, before security elites can regroup.
- Maintaining pressure throughout the time needed for the completion of reforms.

While the review focuses on the role of civil society, in all cases factors external to civil society are identified as usually being necessary or helpful for substantive reform:

- Alliances with sections of the security sector are often required.
- Links to broader reform movements such as armed insurgencies, or transitional governments, have shown to be effective in some contexts, although armed insurgencies may limit reforms that curtail their own powers.
- Support from foreign donors in the form of funds, capacity building and political will can support civil society organisations, and put pressure on governments and security services.
- A democratic culture such as traditions of parliamentary influence, a free media, or civil society activism, is often useful.

The literature emphasises that security sector reform is a political process, as authoritarian or predatory security systems are usually backed by powerful, skilled and tenacious vested

interests. Dislodging them from power therefore requires significant political will – civil society can be one part of this.

The evidence base for the topic is relatively thin. While there is much literature on the theory of SSR from a donor perspective, there are fewer empirical studies. Moreover, scholars have identified relatively few successful examples of SSR. The role of civil society is found to be greater in more economically developed countries, meaning there is less discussion of the role of civil society in many African SSR contexts, for example (except to note its absence). In addition, most research discusses the role of civil society alongside that of other actors such as donors, security services or political elites, limiting analysis of the specific role of civil society.

2. Background

Definitions

The OECD's definition of security systems is the most widely accepted and includes (quoted in Detzner, 2017, pp. 117-8):

'core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)'

In authoritarian, weak or kleptocratic states, the security and justice sector may be variously unable to ensure security for the population; serve private interests; and lack accountability and oversight.

Reform of security and justice institutions has long been a goal for donors and NGOs. However, Detzner notes that much SSR leads to 'superficial' changes to security institutions, and that 'transformation' is required in the form of civil/constitutional control, institutional culture, professionalism, effectiveness and accountability to human rights and stakeholders (Detzner, 2017, p. 18). Desired outcomes of reforms might include: ensuring civilian control of security matters, and parliamentary oversight; ensuring the rule of law is maintained; anti-corruption measures; the handover of commercial assets owned by security forces; complaints procedures; and professionalisation and the efficient running of institutions.¹ Broadly speaking, civil society is more often assigned a role in reforming the governance of security and justice services, such as subordinating them to civilian control and oversight.

There is debate over what constitutes success for SSR reforms. Much of this debate hinges on the question of to what degree it is possible to have Western-style liberal security and justice institutions in developing or fragile states. Sedra (2018) identifies three schools of thought on success in SSR: monopoly (emphasising the need for stronger institutions), 'good enough' (which also seeks a Western style system, but allows for incremental reforms and working with non-

¹ <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-Overview>

state actors), and hybrid (focused on more engagement with the many forms of local authority). In assessing SSR, 'quantitative and qualitative measures can be employed, including crime rates, judicial statistics, public perceptions (as measured by opinion polls and focus groups), and reports from both international and local human rights organizations' (Sedra, 2018, p. 54).

This literature review does not attempt to develop a definition of success for SSR. Instead, it discusses the role of civil society in SSR efforts as discussed by the literature, including both positive and negative examples as found by the literature. Given the variation in security sectors, political cultures and civil society capacities between countries, as well as the specificities of wars or regime changes enabling SSR, success is understood contextually as significant changes to the security and justice sector. However, it is not always possible to isolate the effect of civil society actions from other factors, so lessons rather than definite conclusions are drawn.

International SSR programmes often assume that Western concepts of justice focused on the state can be applied elsewhere (Gurler & Philipps, 2019). Indeed, in developing countries, security and justice is not always provided by the state (Detzner, 2017, p. 119; Kaldor et al, 2020, p. 16). Baker (2010, p. 208) points to 'customary leaders, religious organizations, ethnic associations, youth groups, work-based associations, community police forums, conflict resolution non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the lowest and informal levels of local government and entrepreneurs' as actors providing security and justice in many contexts. It is estimated that these actors can provide 80% of justice services in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, they are often linked to the state police in some way (Baker, 2010, p. 208). In many conflict settings studied there are a plurality of justice systems applied 'customary, religious and statutory law, as well as international humanitarian and human rights law, codes of conduct, and ad hoc regimes (e.g. arms embargo and financial sanctions)' (Kaldor et al., 2020, p. 15). In seeking to reform security and justice, donors and others should therefore seek to understand the links between state and non-state actors and the existing security and justice systems.

Civil society is a broad term that is understood in many ways. It usually describes 'a broad variety of associational forms that mediate the space between the family (private sphere), the market (economic sphere) and the state (political sphere)' (Caparini, 2010, p. 245; Loada & Moderan, 2015, pp. 4–5). Civil society often includes charities, issue-based groups, social movements and professional associations. Some observers include faith-based groups, political parties, trades unions, traditional authorities, the media and business associations, while others may not (Caparini, 2010, p. 245). In some formulations, civil society is understood as the 'public sphere', i.e. spaces such as the media, internet or public spaces where citizens discuss common issues (Verkoren & Leeuwen, 2014, p. 464). It is important to emphasise that the make-up of each context is different, and that 'different manifestations of civil society differ highly in the extent to which they are inclusive and have local legitimacy' (Verkoren & Leeuwen, 2014, p. 464). Civil society actors do not always mediate between private citizens and the state, and in fragile contexts may govern territory or deliver services (Verkoren & Leeuwen, 2014, p. 464).

In Ethiopia, for instance, reform of the military in the 1990s was brought about by a broad populist movement that overthrew the previous regime. However, while the movement had a popular base, this could not be characterised simply as 'civil society' given its links to an armed insurgency that later took control of the state. Indeed, the nature of the new regime may have also limited the extent of further reforms. Nevertheless, it may be seen as fulfilling some of the

functions assigned to 'civil society' in the theoretical literature, namely providing a voice to citizens and some degree of accountability.

Donor-led SSR seeks to foster 'local ownership' of reforms to make them legitimate, sustainable and democratic. 'Ownership describes a state in which national actors design and implement development policies, institutions and activities, with external actors providing support on demand to processes that have been initiated and are led by national actors' (Eickhoff, 2020). There is no consistent donor definition of local ownership (Mobekk, 2010). Scholars point to a continuum between minimalist and maximalist local ownership with the former focused on national elites who can implement reforms, and the latter approach seeking a broader set of owners usually including civil society (Donais, 2010, p. 9). Local ownership is sometimes used to mean reforms drafted and implemented by state bodies, but can include consultation, or a deeper engagement, with a cross-section of society. Consultations can lead to 'declaratory' reforms with little substance, however (Lottholz, 2020). Moreover, research has found that 'in practice external actors tend to focus primarily on the national authorities' (Ball, 2014, p. 290).

Civil society actors such as pressure groups and think tanks are not necessarily representative of the whole of society. Civil society is often seen as a valuable because of its independence and ability to represent ordinary people separately from the interests of the state (or sometimes the market). However, many civil society organisations will have links to the state or the market. Indeed, the nature of civil society varies between contexts. Mobekk (2010, p. 237) notes that forms of civil society in less developed countries may not be recognisable to Western donors. Donors may focus on 'local NGOs' with whom they share values and language, but who do not necessarily represent the population. 'Civil society may divide along sectarian or ethnic lines, or into a 'donor-friendly' contingent of non-governmental organisation (NGO) vs other organisations that are less approachable but more representative' (Detzner, 2017, p. 125).

Civil society may limit reforms, seen from a liberal perspective. Civil society actors do not always advocate for reform of security services. In Argentina, conservative civil society group have called for 'a heavy-handed response to crime [and] derailed promising attempts to restructure the police' (Eaton, 2008; González, 2019). The forms of justice and security advocated by civil society actors may not fit liberal models of SSR and may, for example, be disadvantageous to women (Gordon, 2014b, p. 5). Local organisations may not necessarily be representative of the population as a whole and may marginalise certain groups (Gordon, 2014a).

Lessons on the role of civil society in SSR

Much of the literature discussing SSR highlights the importance of civil society (Loada & Moderan, 2015, pp. 21–27). This is particularly the case in 'second-generation' SSR models, which seek to move away from donor-driven, technocratic and state-centric approaches, to ones that focus more on engaging non-state actors, norms and structures and to acknowledge the political nature of security and justice reform (Sedra, 2018). It is claimed that input from civil society can provide **accountability** for security and justice institutions, can provide a **voice to citizens**, and can **inculcate democratic values** (Caparini, 2010).

Security and justice reforms led by international donors have been criticised for failure to institute more than superficial, often technical changes to security and justice institutions. Second generation SSR literature has therefore emphasised the political nature of

security and justice regimes. As part of this focus, the role of civil society as a driver or enabler of reforms has been emphasised (Sedra, 2018). Nevertheless, the report finds scant evidence of donor-led SSR reforms involving civil society in a significant way. However, the literature points to several countries where civil society, understood broadly, has had a significant role in SSR, usually following a change of regime. In other cases, lessons are drawn from the partial successes and failures of civil society actions.

There are few examples of successful SSR. For instance, Detzner (2017) argues that only a 'tiny number of SSR efforts [are] generally deemed successful' in Africa and highlights post-war Sierra Leone, post-apartheid South Africa and post-war Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, the insurgents who carried out reforms after taking power had undertaken informal consultations throughout the civil war. In South Africa, civil servants undertaking reform carried out hundreds of consultations with civil society for defence review. In both cases, the reforms were underpinned by a strong reformist movement that had taken power decisively from the previous regime. In Sierra Leone, by contrast, SSR was led by donors, who deliberately sought to develop civil society. In all cases, however, the role of civil society is shaped by contextual factors such as the strength of the state, security institutions, external support and political culture, among others. In all examples, civil society requires some degree of collaboration with security services in order to effect reforms.

In non-democratic countries, meaningful reform is hard to achieve because security and justice constitutes a key pillar of support for elites. All the literature points to the power struggles at the heart of security and justice reform. Security systems are by their nature often well entrenched in the state and are able to deflect reform attempts. There is wide agreement that 'the process is at its core political, and necessitates robust political legitimacy to succeed' (Sedra, 2018, p. 58). Organised civil society may be significant in contributing to substantive reforms, but a combination of factors such as reformist elites or international support is usually also required.

Many successful reforms therefore occur after transitions, although a transition is not in itself a guarantee that security services will be made more accountable and effective. Hanggi (2004, pp. 10-11) argues that the context in which SSR reforms occur is important. The level of economic development, the nature of the political system and the security situation are key variables. He distinguishes less economically developed, post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts as requiring different SSR approaches.

While a post-conflict situation may promise a 'clean slate' on which to implement reforms, evidence points to the need for strong governance to be able to implement reforms. The SSR model 'has achieved the greatest impact in countries making transitions from authoritarianism or poverty, where large-scale conflict is absent. Such countries – including South Africa, Indonesia, and the former Warsaw Pact states – have provided more stable conditions for reform, such as high levels of security, significant institutional and human capacity, local political consensus, and some form of liberal governance tradition' (Sedra, 2018, p. 59). On the other hand, security elites that survive a transition are likely to be able to exert formal or informal resistance to reforms against their interests (Manea & Rüländ, 2020).

Knowledge production has been identified as a necessary but not sufficient factor for civil society to exercise an effective role in SSR.

- The media in particular can help shift politicians' incentives by generating outrage at poor security and justice performance (González, 2019, p. 70). In East Central Europe and the Balkans, Caparini (2014) argues that the media can have a 'potentially important role'. In post-communist states, the press has taken an active interest in intelligence, but it can be sensationalist or manipulated by governments. In the Polish context, international NGOs such as Amnesty have investigated illegal rendition more than the media. Ultimately, 'a relatively free press will not necessarily provide robust public oversight of intelligence and security scandals when these are perceived to serve strongly held state interests' (Caparini, 2014, p. 514).
- The security and justice sectors can be hard for outsiders lacking technical knowledge to understand (Nathan, 2007, p. 98). CSOs can therefore struggle to effectively exert pressure for reforms, or to prevent their reforms being co-opted by security insiders with detailed knowledge. Conversely, if CSOs are able to generate credible policies, then their calls for reform are likely to have more traction (Africa, 2010; Lottholz, 2020).
- Local level reforms, such as offering legal services, have some potential to lead to wider reforms. A recent LSE report argues that 'small gains at local level have the potential to be amplified through documentation, recognition, advocacy and support' into social norms and legal precedents (Kaldor et al., 2020, p. 16).

There are limits to the role expertise can have in stimulating reforms. Lottholz (2020) shows how the 'Civic Union 'For Reforms and Results'', an NGO network, became involved in policy debates in Kyrgyzstan. Supported by the Western NGO Saferworld and the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, it worked in communities to develop community security approaches, and developed expertise and policy suggestions based on this. The Union organised public hearings, produced an 'Alternative Conception' of security in Kyrgyzstan and presented it to lawmakers, and publicised its efforts in the media. However, the government response has been largely 'declaratory' and there have been no significant national reforms. The Council for Reform and Development of the System of Law and Order' has been dissolved and talk of reforming Soviet-style police has so far not materialised. Lottholz points to the generational and professional differences between reformers and security insiders as a reason for the lack of substantive progress.

Pro-reform actors need to act cohesively. The democratisation of security and justice services is usually the result of power struggles where significant pressure is used to dislodge security elites. The LSE's Conflict Research Programme finds that civic pressure through pro-reform coalitions are 'the only path to durable progress' in security sector reform (Kaldor et al., 2020, p. 19). In discussing the security reforms accompanying the democratisation of South Africa, Africa (2010) highlights the 'distribution of power between the contesting political and social forces', of which civil society was one facet. Effective links with armed groups and political parties was also necessary.

The strategy and timing of civil society efforts to push for SSR are important factors in its success. (Berhe & Detzner, 2020) emphasise the importance of disruptions to existing ruling coalitions, such as regime change or splits within the elite. Civil society needs to act coherently and involve a broad, representative range of voices and actors. In many cases, it will need to find common cause with reformist factions of the security or civilian elites. Reforms may take a long time, meaning a sustained engagement is needed (Sedra, 2018, p. 57). When reformed institutions are not put in place soon after a transition, they can often be indefinitely delayed

(Detzner, 2019, p. 406). In many cases reforms will be contested for a number of years (Costa, 2006; Manea & Rüländ, 2020a). Some argue that the effect of civil society campaigning against security forces may backfire as they react from fear of prison or loss of power (Edwards, 2020). The careful building of alliances and making of compromises is therefore necessary.

Donors may seek to support civil society actors financially, through capacity building or in the form of political support. There are 'many examples of successful donor sponsored work to build the capacity of civil society to articulate its views in a coherent way. This has involved working on media capacity-building, with NGOs or trade unions or other grassroots organisations, building society's capacity to participate in an informed dialogue with government' (Martin & Wilson, 2010). They may provide necessary financial support that would otherwise be difficult to obtain in developing countries (Lottholz, 2020).

The commitment and type of engagement of donors can be an important factor. Outside pressure can help push for reforms 'from above', through mechanisms such as direct support or treaty commitments, and can be particularly effective if working in concert with domestic reform pressures (Detzner, 2019). However, the organisational imperatives of foreign donors and NGOs can severely limit 'local ownership' (Eickhoff, 2020). Short-term support may not be enough to see reforms implemented. Manea and Ruland (2020) use the idea of norm diffusion to show how liberal security and justice ideas advocated by Western institutions can be mimicked, rejected as alien, or adapted by local norm entrepreneurs in countries of the global south. That is to say, in countries where liberal ideas of security and justice reform are seen as coming from outside, their transplantation will not be straightforward.

3. Examples

Sudan

A recent study assesses the prospects for security sector reform in Sudan following regime change in April 2019 (Berhe & Detzner, 2020). The old regime of Omar al-Bashir was reliant on security forces, which it played off against each other for support. Since 2019, a Transnational Military Council (TMC) has been in charge. The TMC is made up of the 'Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and senior commanders of the Rapid Support Force (RSF)', as well as the reformist Forces for Freedom and Change Alliance. The latter is a coalition of civil society organisations.

The study emphasises the importance of three factors supporting the possibility of security sector reform. **First, a disruptive political transition is often needed to provide a moment of opportunity.** This has occurred in Sudan with the end of Omar Al-Bashir's regime.

Secondly, the 'demand factor' of a reform coalition. A shared reform agenda is needed. Successful examples of Indonesia and Peru, and unsuccessful ones from Kenya and Nepal, show the importance of united coalitions of interest groups. The reform coalition 'will prove durable if based on clearly-articulated shared goals and thickened ties below the level of senior leadership'. The report recommends the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders.

Thirdly, timing is important. Reforms need to take root before a 'new kleptocracy' can take root. The negotiation of reforms needs to both be widely acceptable to the various interests, and to be advanced in a 'coherent and well-rooted manner' before they can be sidelined.

The FFC, made up of business people and educated Sudanese, needs to stay united and to ally with armed groups and communities from Sudan's peripheries. However, the study points to the potential for mistrust given Sudan's history of ethnic/regional divisions and poor communications infrastructure, and that some communities already distrust the FCC since it joined the TMC.

Armed groups are accustomed to receiving rents from the regime to maintain their local power. However, since this is no longer possible, there are some signs they may be responsive to demands from the communities they represent or control for security reform. In the Juba peace talks between the TMC and armed groups, they have shown interest in reforms.

The reform coalition also needs to win support from reformist factions of the security services. In this respect, the report notes the potential for social, family and other ties between protesters and security services to facilitate reforms. It notes the examples of Peru and South Africa where police and military unions helped reform efforts. It also suggests that the rank and file security services have much to gain from reforms. Judicial reform can anchor other reforms by giving current elites a safe way to accept reforms. In Mexico and Senegal, the ruling powers pushed for independent judiciaries before they lost power, to prevent being targeted by new elites.

South Africa

The reforms of South Africa's security sector following the fall of the apartheid government are seen as an example of the effective role of civil society in SSR (Nathan, 2007). In the period of transition between the apartheid and democratic governments, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), a representative body that managed South Africa's transition to democracy, set up sub-committees to address reform of security and justice services. The security services were successfully brought under civilian control as both the former national army and the armed wings of the ANC were integrated.

There was broad political support for significant reform of the security services. Nathan (2007) points to the favourable circumstances of South Africa: a relatively strong state, democratic system and civil society.' South Africa's new government had 'been brought to power by popular movements' pushing for radical change and the security services were widely unpopular (Detzner, 2017). The 'leadership was familiar with consultative processes and building consensus from their time in the resistance and established patterns which fuelled the South African defence review process' (Detzner, 2017, p. 123). Civil society groups had campaigned for changes to police and military practices under the apartheid regime. The Mass Democracy Movement coalition had called for troops to leave townships, political prisoners to be released and the state of emergency to be ended, for example (Africa, 2010). During the transition, the academic Military Research Group provided expertise for the reformist position, which strengthened the ability to reform security services who emphasised their expertise (Detzner, 2019).

The effectiveness of defence reform efforts waned somewhat. Nathan (2007) notes that the reform of the defence sector, represented by the milestones of the Defence White Paper (1996), the Defence Review (1998) and the Defence Act (2002), took eight years following the country's

democratisation in 1994. Africa (2010) suggests that efforts to reform security services lost momentum over time. On some issues the role of civil society remains strong. CSOs have taken on important roles in promoting accountability for police abuses, and support for crime victims. They also have a role in running services such as child protection (Detzner, 2019, p. 201).

The 1996 White Paper on Defence was drafted after public consultation. Following an initial draft written by the armed forces and civil servants, wider public comments were invited in 1995, and included hundreds of consultations. The White Paper emphasised civil control, and the defensive orientation of the military. This was followed by a Defence Review in 1997 to plan reforms in more detail. However, while it deliberately involved civil society, according to Africa (2010), this consultation 'was not on the scale seen during the heightened mobilisation and political involvement of the transition period' (Africa, 2010, p. 183). She argues that this is one reason why 'a Secretariat for Safety and Security was disbanded after several years', and South African police are ineffective. In some aspects of the review, the limitations of civil society 'were cruelly exposed' as they lacked military expertise and were unable to prevent the purchase of expensive weapons inconsistent with the White Paper (Nathan, 2007, p. 98). Despite citizen consultations, Africa (2010) argues that the 'top-down delivery of security services, the executive initiated debates on changes in strategy, and a persistent culture of secrecy make it difficult for the public to insert itself meaningfully into the process'. Unlike the defence white paper, the white paper on intelligence was not shaped by civil society: it was not debated within the intelligence community, or submitted to public scrutiny.

Ethiopia

Security reform followed the coming to power of a new government backed by popular movements in 1991. The insurgent army, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had 'a unique security culture characterised by the primacy of political leadership over its army in its internal architecture' (Berhe, 2017, p. 162). The army focused on the importance of civilian support, and drew personnel from communities attacked by the national army. The insurgents had undertaken informal consultations with the population on which their support was based throughout civil war (Detzner, 2017, p. 123). It institutionalised good civil-military relations 'through systematic training, institutional rules that reinforced discipline, and regular appraisals of the performance of units and individuals on their assigned tasks'.

On taking power, the new government separated the EPRDF from the party, demobilised the dominant Tigray contingent, and allowed the EPRDF to act as the national army until the new constitution was complete. A new constitution was ratified in 1995, which included directives on a professional National Defence Force. After the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, many soldiers were demobilised and a white paper on security policy was developed and discussed with 'key civilian institutions such as universities and the chamber of commerce' (Berhe, 2017, p. 173). The consultation led to a commitment to focus on economic development and cap defence spending at 2% of the budget (down from 40%). Berhe (2017) attributes the success of the reform of the army to the fact that the EPRDF achieved a total victory over the Derg regime, allowing it significant scope to change security and defence institutions. The EPRDF's security culture was based on a different understanding of security, developed through insurgency. However, the army is still not fully separate from politics and the professionalisation of the army 'is a work in progress' and has been involved in political disputes, and the military industries.

In 2006, policing reforms were instituted by the national government and focused on community policing. They included 'family police' and local conflict resolution committees. To some extent it formalised the multiple forms of security provision at the local level in the country. It has, according to a study of the service in Ahmara, increased access for some and community-police relations (Denny & Kassaye, 2013).

Jackson et al (2019) argue that in the system of community policing, 'local traditional authorities can play a role in some approaches to crime, conflict and justice, there is also a clear use of community policing to assert the power of the constitution, human rights law and formal systems.' It demonstrates a balance between state and non-state, local and national, which is particular to Ethiopia. The reforms of policing do not all conform to liberal ideals of policing. Community policing excludes women and girls, for example by ceding issues such as domestic violence to community authorities (Denny & Kassaye, 2013; Jackson et al., 2019).

While the reforms of the military and police have been focused on community involvement, this has not taken the form of drawing on a 'civil society' entirely independent of the state. Community policing has been instituted from the top, and has given the state more surveillance powers (Denny & Kassaye, 2013). Civil society in the form of registered civil society organisations (CSOs) was hampered by a 2009 bill restricting foreign funding, although these restrictions may soon be ended. There may therefore be a limited independent voice for reform. Given the strong role of the state, it is argued that 'broader transformations in Ethiopian policing require a decoupling from politics that is probably not possible in the current political context' (Denny & Kassaye, 2013, p. 29).

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone's SSR is widely seen as a success. Following the civil war, the country's security and intelligence systems were 'non existent' (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009). Much of the impetus for reform therefore came from external actors such as the UK's implementation of one of the longest-lasting donor SSR investments (Detzner, 2019, p. 210). During and after Sierra Leone's civil war, donors worked to reform the country's security services. The UK's Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) aimed to bring the military under civilian control and programmes trained the armed forces. Reforms included fair recruitment, better budgeting, awareness of human rights, and more transparency. A key factor in the success of the reforms was the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes also being run (Almohamad, 2019).

Donor and government reforms made efforts to engage civil society to encourage accountability and sustainability of reforms. While reforms initially focused on creating working state institutions for security and justice, efforts were later made to involve civil society from around 2006 (Albrecht & Jackson, 2009, p. 29). This included police partnership boards made up of local community members (Horn et al., 2006, p. 117). The Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) involved civil society input. The security review included a range of civil society actors, and led the government to emphasise poverty reduction being linked to security. In this case, SSR reform was largely driven externally. Civil society was divided after the war. Donors later sought to develop civil society organisations as a way of making reforms responsive to people's needs, as a form of accountability in the form of CSOs, as well as a way to deliver security and justice where the state was unable to (Detzner, 2019, p. 227).

Indonesia

Indonesia has been highlighted as a country where civil society has played a role in security sector reforms with partial success (a list of SSR achievements: Muna, 2010, p. 241). Most of this success came in the initial period of democratisation between 1999 and the early 2000s, and reforms are seen to have stalled since then. The literature highlights the importance of civil society in contesting reforms which might otherwise be co-opted or diluted by the security sector – noting, for instance, the role of the reformist coalition and street protests that brought down President Suharto's government in 1998 and later pushed for SSR. However, it also highlights the need for supportive institutions such as a strong parliament, reformist elites, and the value of external support for CSOs and reform. Civil society has therefore had some effect in negotiating reforms of the security sector, but the reforms have also been diluted by the security services to a significant degree.

One key factor has been the contestation of reforms by civil society, which has pressured the security services and government to make some concessions. Manea and Rüländ (2020) compare democratisation and security reforms in Nigeria and Indonesia, arguing that Nigeria showed a pattern of 'mimetic reforms', whereas Indonesia's were 'localised'. In Nigeria's case, civil society and parliament were weak. The epistemic community of defence experts was also smaller and more tightly controlled, leaving less space for reformist ideas from within the military. Reform was largely as a response to Western pressure, in the form of sanctions, and negotiated by inner circle of military figures. As such, although it mimicked the language of security reform advocated by Western donors, it did relatively little to dilute military power (Manea & Rüländ, 2020, p. 170).

In Indonesia by contrast, there was significant contestation of the reforms. The Suharto dictatorship had allowed a *keterbukaan* (conditional opening) for civil society in its later years. The regime has been toppled in part by popular pressure, although the security apparatus remained in place (Scarpello, 2014, p. 134). By the time the regime fell in 1998 the student-led civil society movement Reformasi, as well as think tanks, parts of academia and NGOs, all worked for security reform. Sections of the elite were also disillusioned with the regime and therefore willing to reform.

Civil society works at several levels. Scarpello (2014) argues that the CSO community's effect can be understood through a three-step approach: 1) acting as a watchdog; (2) acting as a conduit for people-centered SSR; and (3) contributing to policymaking. He argues that Indonesian civil society was formed of four layers: human rights NGOs focused on advocacy; a small number of academics working to lobby the sector formally and informally; SSR-focused think tanks working to develop policy; and NGOs or coalitions of NGOs working on specific SSR issues, such as the Coalition to Preserve Civil Liberties (Koalisi untuk Keselamatan Masyarakat Sipil, KKMS).

Civil society has been more effective when it has been able to present a cohesive front (Lorenz, 2015, p. 231). In the initial period of democratisation, 1998-2004, there was cooperation among CSOs. For instance, the Indonesian Working Group on Security Sector Reform (IWG-SSR) was formed by academics, think tanks and NGOs. It drafted alternative versions of the National Security Bill in 2004, among others (Scarpello, 2014, p. 140). This approach was initially successful in winning changes to the Bill, before the Bill was rejected by the national police in

2007. One internal weakness of the CSO sector since the 2000s has been a lack of cooperation between different organisations (Scarpello, 2014, p. 143).

Other findings related to civil society tactics include the assertiveness of civil society.

Lorenz emphasises the importance of 'assertive tactics like large-scale demonstration and continuous public pressuring campaigns' in overcoming resistance (Lorenz, 2015, pp. 34–36). If a reform is not in lawmakers' interests, then reformers may be able to influence them to implement it by changing their perception of costs and benefits, using tactics ranging from manipulation to 'legislative subsidy' (e.g. helping draft legislation, offering support, or providing ammunition against political opponents), to threats of sanction such as public shaming. The form that these tactics take will vary by context, but Lorenz highlights that the degree of assertiveness must be enough to overcome the obstacle to reform. In many cases, extra parliamentary methods can be useful as in Indonesia, when a law on state security that maintained military representation in legislative bodies was met with street protests, leading the government to delay its ratification (Manea & Rüländ, 2020).

CSOs' ability to influence reform has been variously enabled and limited by external factors: the nature of the Indonesian state, as well as outside funding. In Indonesia, international support for Indonesian CSOs has declined since the 2000s. The state's openness to reform has also declined. In the early years, Western governments and the IMF worked to push for reforms, and the existence of civil society reformers meant that conservative elites could not easily co-opt or dilute reforms (Manea & Rüländ, 2020). The stronger role of parliament in Indonesia compared to other formerly authoritarian states, as well as insider reformists, were also necessary for reforms to take hold.

There are distinct limits to the success of the security reforms, particularly since the initial years of reform. Moreover, following the 'war on terror' which ended the US refusal to work with the Indonesian military, and a surge in nationalism, the impetus for reform has stalled and civil society is the only source of scrutiny for the security sector as public support for the military has increased (Manea & Rüländ, 2020). The military has also developed ways to further its interests in a democratic context. While it still uses its influence at the Ministry of Defence, it has also set up think tanks and civil society groups to represent its views (Lorenz, 2015, p. 233).

For instance, parliamentary scrutiny of procurement scandals is limited and there have been no legal consequences for irregularities. Oversight of covert operations is limited. The military has delayed or diluted calls for it to transfer its business to the state. Despite lobbying and public pressure, off-duty military crimes are not subject to civilian courts following successful military efforts to delay and dilute measures (Scarpello, 2014, p. 147). NGOs also lobbied in the media for the military to hand over their businesses, and lobbied through academics and parliament, but again had limited success as measures were delayed, and then undermined. Partly this was because the armed forces were not fully under civilian control, and partly because the state was reluctant to cover the losses to the military budget.

As a result of Indonesia's mix of authoritarian institutions and a reformist civil society, both the reformists and military have had to go through a 'pruning' exercise: 'reformists had to prune their ultimate objective to eliminate all of the armed forces' reserved domains and effectively curtail military impunity, while the military had to prune important elements of the cognitive prior such as its political role and to give up, though not entirely, its insulation from parliamentary oversight' (Manea & Rüländ, 2020, p. 174).

Americas

In the democratisation of Latin American states in the 1980s and 1990s, human rights NGOs pushed for military reform, and civil society was particularly influential in Argentina where trials were held for the military (Eaton, 2008). However, reforms of security services have not been completely successful, and civil society has not always pushed for liberal reforms. For example, in Argentina civil society is split on the issue of police reform between those lobbying for reform and those arguing to bolster police powers and public order (Eaton, 2008).

In Peru, civil society organisations played an important role in reforms. Following the weakening of President Fujimori's authoritarian regime and protests by unions, students and others, a transnational government, committed to juridical reform and democratisation was formed. Human rights organisations sat in the transitional cabinet to provide capacity (Detzner, 2019, p. 247). Police reform was accompanied by consultations throughout the country and on television. Civil society organisations under the National Coordinator for Human Rights coalition pushed for the courts to prosecute those accused of abuses during the civil war, on the basis of the American Convention of Human Rights signed by Peru years previously. They also were key in getting a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Detzner, 2019, p. 254). On the other hand, defence restructuring had mixed results, although a Ministry of Defence was created, and police reform has not always advanced smoothly (Costa, 2006). Some argue that the effect of human rights campaigning against security forces may backfire. In Peru, the military threatened the civilian government after it was implicated in human rights investigations, prompting the government to offer immunity (Edwards, 2020).

Moreover, some reforms have come from the state with little input from civil society. A number of states in Latin American have instituted participatory police reforms. These involve citizen input into security issues, the identification of problems, and helping generate solutions regarding local security. According to Gonzales (2019, p. 68), 'participatory mechanisms allow politicians to dis-aggregate and decentralize societal discontent, acting as a "safety valve" to manage pressure for reform by improving the image of embattled politicians or police forces' (González, 2019, p. 68). They are typically implemented when police-society relations are poor, or when the police lack resources and capacity. Gonzales (2019) shows how the Argentine civil society group Coordinadora Contra la Represión Policial e Institucional (CORREPI) and others argued that the participatory reforms work to legitimise repressive policies. Participatory policing can also reinforce patterns of police violence in contexts where a proportion of citizens favour 'strong' policing. Nevertheless, she points out that participatory policing 'represents a different institutional response to crime and violence' than, say, the militarisation of security (González, 2019).

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