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Research Report

Building Back Better: Sustainable Development Diplomacy in the Pandemic Era

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Jing Gu, Danielle Green and Jiadan Yu
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Summary

This report critically examines the nature of the distinction between traditional inter-state diplomacy and sustainable development diplomacy. It then sets out the institutional changes which are necessary for the achievement of sustainable development diplomacy. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have been identified as a key means of implementation for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Given the increasing centrality of the United States (US)–China relationship in global development cooperation, understanding the modalities of their engagement may provide useful insights into how partnerships may be cultivated and deepened to realise the SDGs.

The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges of the world. Sustainable development diplomacy is needed now more than ever to prioritise development strategies of different states and work on common shared challenges. Sustainable development diplomacy can only work when different actors recognise the value of the common goals and are willing to make an effort to accomplish them. Global sustainable development diplomacy requires a stronger policy agenda and greater cohesion.

This report explores the idea of sustainable development diplomacy and, through two sectoral case studies, explores the nature, function, and rationale for interactive engagement. The form and structure of multi-actor relationships are a response to complex, trans-border political, social, economic, and environmental challenges which require a more nuanced and varied management approach than narrowly defined state-led development. However, the power dynamics, the modalities, and experiences of engagement that underpin these dynamic relationships, remain understudied, especially with regard to their impact on sustainable development.

Keywords

sustainable development diplomacy; climate change; global health governance; Covid-19 diplomacy; United States; China; pandemic; global development.
Authors

**Jing Gu** is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. She has extensive experience in research and advisory work in governance, development diplomacy, business and sustainable development. Jing leads the IDS China Centre. Her research and advisory work focus on China’s foreign policy and international development strategies, South–South cooperation and sustainable development. She has led many interdisciplinary research projects involving multi-country teams, including the ground-breaking pioneering research on China’s outward investment in Africa. She is an academic editor of *Third World Quarterly*. She is also a member of the UK Research and Innovation International Development Peer Review College. Recent publications include ‘China’s Development Finance and African Infrastructure Development’ in *China–Africa and an Economic Transformation* (2019, Oxford University Press).

**Danielle Green** is the Climate and Sustainable Development Networks Lead for the Ditchley Foundation. She has had a range of roles across international development and education, most recently as an outreach tutor for the St John’s College Inspire Programme and the Harrow School. She has a strong interest in Education for Sustainable Development and is developing a series of children’s stories relating to sustainable development. She is also a Global Youth Ambassador for Sarah Brown’s charity, Theirworld. Danielle holds an Oxford BA in Philosophy and French and an MA in Development Studies from IDS, University of Sussex. She is an avid language-learner and is eager to see where her travels will take her next.

**Jiadan Yu** is a young professional working at the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in Geneva. Prior to joining UNITAR, she worked as a Research Assistant at IDS, University of Sussex, where she obtained an MA in Globalisation, Business and Development. During the last six years, Jiadan was intensively engaged in education and development programmes in South Africa, Sri Lanka, Morocco, China, UK, and Switzerland.
Executive summary

To understand the problems of managing climate change, global Covid-19 strategies and forms of economic development, one has to realise the necessity for new forms of international diplomacy. These are not issues that can be resolved through inter-state diplomacy but require methods for defining issues and ranges of participants which necessitate revolutionary changes in the style of global governance. What is needed is sustainable development diplomacy.

What is the difference between traditional diplomacy and sustainable development diplomacy? The former is confined to inter-state interests, the primary one being national security, with a tendency to zero-sum alternatives. These are customarily dealt with at the inter-state level and by senior state officials. In contrast, sustainable development diplomacy – which could cover the fields of climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the SDGs – is usually interconnected in innumerable ways and concerns more fundamentally the welfare of peoples across boundaries, that is, ‘the common welfare of mankind’.

In sustainable development diplomacy, everyone together are the winners, or together they become the losers. Inevitably, stakeholders must be identified much more broadly than simply states, and the question then arises of whether these stakeholders have any prospect of effective participation in decision-making.

Yet immediately one has no choice but to recognise a fundamental difficulty in establishing a system of sustainable development diplomacy. The US and China have to find effective ways to establish common interests and thereby resolve the issues, above all, of climate change, but also large-scale development projects and a multilateral pandemic response in the development context. To the extent that geopolitical rivalry overtakes commitment to the ‘common welfare of mankind’ the world community is caught in a variant of the so-called ‘Thucydides trap’. That is to say that all sustainable development issues will be overshadowed by the fearful tensions between the two superpowers.

It is difficult to see how a new style of sustainable development diplomacy can emerge. The task of scholarly reflection is to provide significant indications of the direction which needs to be taken. For instance, there has to be a change in the intellectual tools and methods of diplomacy. Sustainable development issues have a very large amount of scientific and professional content, which is provided by specialised agencies, above all, leading United Nations (UN) bodies and non-governmental organisations.
In the present practice of inter-state diplomacy, these bodies which are crucial to generating expertise are not directly able to participate in executive-style decision-making at the international governance level. Factual, scientific studies point directly to what must be done. Yet a crucial conceptual issue has to be confronted for a new sustainable development diplomacy to flourish. Is it possible to continue with the idea that scientific advice is one matter and policy decisions with respect to the scientific advice are another?

How can scholarly reflection advance on this issue of the distinction between scientific advice and supposedly democratic policymaking? For instance, specialist UN bodies have a key role in elaborating sustainable development, and it is accepted that the UN lead defines the issues rather than the states. But for an issue to become political policy it usually has to be weighed against other issues. Yet, the issues under discussion – especially climate change and Covid-19 diplomacy – are absolute priorities and therefore sustainable development diplomacy would require a more categorical insistence that once scientific conclusions are reached, they have to be implemented.

The whole of international institutional decision-making has to change for sustainable development diplomacy to work. To achieve this, all the significant actors or players in climate change, Covid-19 and sustainable development must be identified – such as the business sector, medical professions, economists, banks, specialist UN and regional intergovernmental organisations. These are at present usually advisory bodies. In addition, as well as individual states having a role, all the pressure groups operating within states, that is, below the national level, also need to be involved internationally – this would be a revolution in the nature of international diplomacy.

Of course, these recommendations are affected by the issue of US and Chinese geopolitical rivalry, which could overturn any real prospect of progress. The fundamental challenge is that the UN is the only forum where agreement can be brokered among 190+ countries.

So, in the final analysis, scholarly reflection has to keep constantly focused on the challenges posed by the US and China. However, there are in fact issues where the solutions could be favourable for both the US and China, which could encourage movement in a positive direction. For instance, the US president, Joe Biden, recognises that the US has to concentrate more on its own internal economic and social problems and he said in his UN speech that he does not want a cold war. Also, President Xi Jinping has spoken about a common shared future for mankind and this is a humanist concern with the whole of humanity, not with increasing the power of China.
Both the US and China have domestic and international goals, as outlined above, which could favour a new diplomacy, a sustainable development diplomacy. At the same time, scholarly reflection has to keep very firmly in view obstacles which are probably not going to go away. It is believed that if the two superpowers could bury their geopolitical rivalry to make way for a common future of mankind, all else would probably fall into place to ground a new sustainable development diplomacy.
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Acronyms

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
B3W   Build Back Better World  
BRI    Belt and Road Initiative  
CCS   carbon capture and sequestration/storage  
COP  Conference of the Parties  
COVAX COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access  
EU    European Union  
GDP   gross domestic product  
IMF   International Monetary Fund  
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency  
NDC   Nationally Determined Contribution  
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission  
NGO non-governmental organisation  
SDD   sustainable development diplomacy  
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals  
UN    United Nations  
UNDP United Nations Development Programme  
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme  
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
US    United States  
WHO   World Health Organization  
WMO   World Meteorological Organization
1. Introduction

Global development is at a turning point. We need to recognise there are differences and competition while still promoting development cooperation. Global challenges require global responses and local solutions. There is a pressing need for people to build up the capacity to better understand and better participate in global and national development. How to build an essential foundation and rules-based international order to share responsibilities and build mutual trust and understanding will be the critical challenge in the pandemic era. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the General Assembly at the start of the General Debate on 21 September 2021:

We are on the edge of an abyss – and moving in the wrong direction. Our world has never been more threatened. Or more divided... The Covid-19 pandemic has supersized glaring inequalities. The climate crisis is pummeling the planet... A surge of mistrust and misinformation is polarizing people and paralyzing societies. Human rights are under fire... Solidarity is missing in action... We must act fast.

(Guterres 2021)

The speech points out severe challenges facing humankind: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, rising inequalities, technological threats, and geopolitical tensions. In addition, remarks by US President Biden at the United Nations General Assembly also illustrate the necessity of tackling the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, technological threats and exploitation, and terrorist threats, and the need for solidarity to cope with these shared challenges through sustainable diplomacy and political negotiations, with no intention to seek a new cold war, despite differing values and political divergence (Biden 2021). President Biden emphasises the fact that the security, prosperity, and freedom of each country are very interconnected, and therefore different countries must work together towards a shared agenda.

These statements demonstrate the bottom line of diplomacy entering a new era: working together to address the most defining issues of our time is a priority and fits the best interests of all nations. Borderless global challenges require collective cooperation and response as well as a new form of diplomacy: sustainable development diplomacy (SDD). Traditionally, ‘diplomacy is the institutionalized communication among internationally recognized representatives of internationally recognized entities through which these representatives produce, manage and distribute public
goods’ (Bjola and Kornprobst 2018: 6). SDD underscores the propriety of promoting the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the context of the still-raging coronavirus pandemic, the climate crisis and geopolitical divisions. It builds on and advances traditional diplomacy by taking the global context into consideration and conducting evidence-based decision-making. More importantly, the essence of SDD is to seek mutual gains, as it results from meeting all parties’ needs to seek possible solutions (Moomaw et al. 2016). Consequently, SDD enables states to work together on common interests and prioritise their development strategies.

The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the interconnectedness of the world, as well as the interconnection between world challenges. The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021, published by the UN, illustrated that the Covid-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on every SDG (UN 2021a). In other words, a health crisis has not only affected society in health sectors, but has also taken a toll on socioeconomic development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2020) stated that ‘global human development – a combination of education, health, and living standards – could fall this year for the first time since 1990, when measurements began’. In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic has the potential to drive more than 1 billion people into extreme poverty by 2030, with 25 million people already living in extreme poverty due to the pandemic (ibid.). The Covid-19 pandemic is still spreading, and the global economy is in recession. As a consequence, the 2030 SDGs are delayed and difficult to progress.

Meanwhile, climate change also poses a threat to social development and the economy, as well as bringing about political hardship, and it inevitably thwarts the SDGs. Extreme weather that results from climate change and global warming is damaging the planet and bringing devastating economic and social consequences (WMO 2021). Strong evidence has shown that economic crisis driven by climate change can give rise to conflict in certain countries and contexts (Koubi 2019). However, climate action is currently insufficient, and greenhouse gas emissions are off-schedule and nowhere close to meeting reduction goals (WMO 2021).

These facts indicate the failure of global governance and the missing effective global leadership. The complexity of challenges facing global leaders requires sophisticated solutions to dismantle the built-in complexity, the ability to link issues together and understand their interconnections, and effective leadership that is cooperative and open-minded to tackle shared crises (Najam, Christopoulou and Moomaw 2004). Broader engagement between different actors and stakeholders is indispensable in addressing global challenges due to the scale of challenges and
intricacy of problems (Moomaw et al. 2016). The health crisis and climate crisis around the globe partially result from a lack of SDD that links different issues together and promotes more effective cross-border cooperation.

The US–China relationship is the defining geopolitical contest of the twenty-first century. As two great powers of the world, the US and China are obliged to lead the international community (Allison 2017). Whether or not the US and China can cooperate with each other is a pivotal factor for tackling shared crises. Given the inherent complexity of and connections between the issues involved, SDD is needed to link multiple issues together in order to address any of them. In addition, effective leadership is critical to successful diplomacy, and a global and inclusive mindset is required to change traditional diplomacy to a more flexible approach that can respond to rapidly changing conditions, while meeting internationally agreed goals. This report will first examine the current crisis and the urgent need for SDD, analysing two of the most urgent challenges of the time through case studies, and then attempt to establish the US–China approach to SDD. The report will argue that, with shared crises and common interests, geopolitical contests between states should be oriented by common goals and mutual benefits, and limited to healthy competition and stable tension. It further discusses the missing pieces of SDD in the global governance crisis in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and the essential elements for building back better.
2. Strengthening multilateral diplomacy and the SDGs

In this report, we discuss SDD by shedding light on the Covid-19 health crisis and climate change. The conceptual framework presented in this research report draws on research undertaken by Najam et al. (2004) and Gu et al. (2016) to support sustainable development governance and new diplomacy.

The SDGs were adopted by the UN in 2015 as a roadmap to improve and build a better world (UN 2021a). With 17 goals and 169 targets, they offer a shared vision of peace and prosperity for human beings and the planet by 2030. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has been the most comprehensive agenda ever negotiated by UN member states (Kamau, Chasek and O’Connor 2018). However, the several crises facing humankind have driven the SDGs in the wrong direction, nowhere near the expected targets.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, has described the Covid-19 pandemic as the greatest test since the establishment of the UN, indicating that it is not only a health emergency around the globe, but also a systemic crisis that takes its toll on economies and societies in many dimensions (UN 2021b). In addition, the consequences of climate change and global warming are disrupting societies all over the world: this year alone, harsh heatwaves have killed hundreds of people in the US and Canada, floods have brought devastating disasters to Germany and China, and wildfires have spiralled out of control in Siberia, Turkey, and Greece (Plumer and Fountain 2021). Strong evidence has shown the link between global warming and extreme weather disasters. The higher that global temperatures get, the more unpredictable and serious hazards there will be, and the greater the risk to humankind (IPCC 2021, forthcoming). These elements are all interconnected.

The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have indicated the interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges within the world. We are reminded by the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change that some of our greatest challenges are not limited within borders, and immediate actions must be taken by nations. These great borderless global challenges of our time demonstrate the bottom line of nations and the need for a new type of diplomacy: working together to address the most defining issues of our time is in the best interests of all nations, and it requires collective cooperation and response via SDD.
Traditional diplomacy refers to ‘the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents’ (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011: 1). In other words, ‘Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors’ (Barston 2014: 1). Traditional diplomacy aims to protect sovereignty, economic interests, and territoriality, making it defensive in nature (Moomaw et al. 2016). By definition it seems that diplomacy is quite far away from development in the past. In 1973, Manuel Collantes mentioned development diplomacy the first time, saying that:

> all foreign affairs operations of the State are heavily directed towards the goal of national development... foreign policy is nothing but an extension of domestic policies projected towards the external and so it cannot drastically depart from the objective situation in the domestic sphere...

(Collantes 1989: 55, cited in Barston 2014)

In addition, in order to elaborate on the role of diplomacy in development, Collantes further stated that:

> Diplomacy is heavily oriented towards economic ends such as maximizing trade, through negotiations, aid through cooperation and investments through incentives... diplomacy for development should be understood as a general guideline which seeks to the maximum terms realizable, the economic and social development needs of the country. This policy guideline now permeates the whole structure and scope of our foreign policy implementation programme.

(ibid.)

Collantes pointed out the essence of traditional diplomacy in the above speech: it is about the national interests of a state. It further indicates that the external relations and diplomacy of a state highly relies on economic interests and development needs.

According to Najam et al., new diplomacy:

> talks in the language of rights; it also shifts the emphasis from states and sovereignty to human condition, from hierarchical to networked systems, from privileges to obligations, and from a discourse focused on the management of inter-state conflicts to a dialogue about cooperation.

(Najam et al. 2004: 33)

By contrast, SDD goes beyond these narrow concepts and evolves consistently over the process of inter-state interactions and the
development of national and international priorities, building on traditional diplomacy and new diplomacy. It is not just for the national interests of one single state, but rather the best interest of all nations for a shared future. It is not an actor-oriented approach, but is a goal-oriented diplomacy, and it builds on and advances beyond traditional diplomacy by taking the global context into consideration and conducting evidence-based decision-making. In other words, SDD results from the current complex global situation and is the solution to global problems.

The SDGs enable member states to fight for a shared future with common goals. As a consequence, adapting SDD to cope with global challenges is the best way to proceed for the international community. SDD underscores the priority of promoting the 17 SDGs within the context of the still-raging Covid-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and geopolitical divisions. Against this backdrop, SDD is diplomacy for the SDGs. The complexity of challenges facing global leaders requires sophisticated solutions to dismantle the built-in complexity, the ability to link issues together and understand their interconnections, and effective leadership that is cooperative and open-minded to tackle shared crises (Najam et al. 2004). In other words, given the inherent complexity and interconnections of the issues involved, SDD is needed to link multiple issues together in order to address any of them. In addition, effective leadership is critical for successful diplomacy, and it requires a global and inclusive mindset to change traditional diplomacy to a more flexible approach that can respond to rapidly changing conditions, while meeting internationally agreed goals (Li et al. 2018). The health crisis and climate crisis around the globe partially result from a lack of SDD that links different issues together and promotes more effective cross-border cooperation.

President Biden’s speech at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2021 pointed out five challenges of our time: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, autocracy, technological threats and exploitation, and inequality (Biden 2021). He called for the solidarity to cope with these shared challenges through sustainable diplomacy and political negotiations, with no intention to seek a new cold war, despite different values and political divergence. Although President Biden did not mention China explicitly, there is no doubt that China is one of the challenges facing the US (Yan 2021). In addition, it seems that at least two out of the five challenges are associated with China. The speech is also reminiscent of the speech delivered by former Vice President Mike Pence in 2018:
... many of Beijing’s policies most harmful to America’s interests and values, from China’s debt diplomacy and military expansionism; its repression of people of faith; construction of a surveillance state; and, of course, to China’s arsenal of policies inconsistent with free and fair trade, including tariffs, quotas, currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, and industrial subsidies.
(Pence 2018)

The speech provides a good insight into so-called ‘technological threats’ and global power dynamics. It is apparent that the relationship between China and the US has not been ideal in recent years, and has featured various negative events: a new cold war, intellectual property theft, the Huawei ban, the trade war, the South China sea, cybersecurity attacks, Xinjiang issues, Taiwan issues, Covid-19 virus conspiracy theories, and so on. These partly result in the US placing China as a strategic competitor and considering China the biggest threat. According to the US Threat Assessment Report (ODNI 2021), China has been at the top of the threat list, and it is considered a rising challenge to the national security of the US.

The US–China relationship seems to be one of the best interpretations of Thucydides’ trap, which refers to the inevitable disorder that follows from a growing power threatening to uproot a ruling power (Allison 2017). Roger Cohen shared his thoughts about China in the New York Times: ‘keeping a low profile was yesterday’s story... the United States is now in a direct ideological war with China over the shape of the world in the twenty-first century’, as he believes that the message from the Chinese government is clear: ‘we’ll... one day run the world’ (Cohen 2019).

By contrast, Mahbubani believes that Chinese leaders:

have no missionary impulse to take over the world... China's role and influence in the world will certainly grow along with the size of its economy. Yet, it will not use its influence to change the ideologies or political practices of other societies.
(Mahbubani 2020: 254)

In addition, the Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Yan (2021) observes that China has no means to confront the US fully; instead, China is trying to narrow the competition to a few areas such as Covid-19 control, poverty reduction, trade, international development, 5G technologies, and digital payment systems. Unfortunately, such statements cannot change the majority perception of the China threat theory, resulting in an inevitable geopolitical contest between the two countries (Mahbubani 2020).
The most urgent and important question here is: who can benefit from the US–China clash? And what does that mean for the SDGs and significant global challenges such as the Covid–19 pandemic and climate change? Both China and the US face the looming threats of climate change and dealing with the Covid–19 health crisis, and in order to address the most significant challenges to humankind, they must work together. The inherent complexity and interconnections of global challenges means that cut-throat competition would have unpredictable effects globally and thwart internationally agreed goals. To work together, both sides must make an effort to create a cooperative environment by respecting each other’s bottom lines. It is indispensable to know that US–China cooperation for SDD fits the best interests of all nations and it is the only way out. China and the US are the two biggest greenhouse gas emitters in the world (Plumer and Fountain 2021), and their participation and cooperation hold the key to success of solutions to global challenges. SDD demands sustainable development governance. Good governance is supposed to be based on the values of economic development, social justice, and ecological health (Najam et al. 2004). A new cold war or hostile attitudes towards each other is nowhere close to sustainable development. More importantly, it would further damage the SDG agenda and bring turbulence to the world.

The following two case studies examine different actors and their significant roles in climate change and SDD, and global health governance, with a specific focus on China. The first case study will explore climate change as a form of SDD, the challenges to climate diplomacy, and the pathways that it may take going forward. It addresses the impacts of climate change and SDD between countries across the West, and those outside the West (most notably, China). The second case study will explore China’s position in terms of global health governance by shedding light on its strategies, policies, interactions, and implementations on global health issues within the international community.
3. Climate change and sustainable development diplomacy

Climate change is arguably the most serious challenge that the world will face this century, resulting in myriad impacts across the globe. It is a problem which defies boundaries because the actions of one country can impact upon many others. Therefore, it is important for countries to work together to mitigate climate change, both for their own self-interest and to protect others. In 2015, the world came together through the UN to create the historic Paris Agreement at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21, with each signatory country promising to play its part in tackling the global crisis. However, it is no mean feat for nearly 200 nations to work in tandem to deliver on the promises they have made, where there are often conflicts of interest on an economic or political level. Effective and efficient climate diplomacy is therefore essential and needs to take place before the challenge spirals out of control and results in irreversible and highly damaging effects. COP 26, held in Glasgow in November 2021, is the next major opportunity to achieve this.

This case study of climate change as a form of SDD serves as a literature review of climate diplomacy and policy across the world as it currently stands, in addition to an analytical report of the challenges to climate diplomacy and the pathways that it may take going forward. It begins by laying out the impacts of climate change on a physical and societal level, before considering what can be done to mitigate climate change and analysing why it is so difficult to meet the Paris Agreement targets.

Next, the case study explores climate and SDD between countries across the West, and those outside the West (most notably, China). Two mapping exercises are conducted. First, there is a map which explores the actors and organisations involved in this space, including prominent climate diplomats, government bodies focused on climate, and other organisations with an interest in or influence on policy. Second, there is a map of the structure of climate and SDD, including key frameworks, agreements, and targets set by countries.

Following this, the policy objectives and strategies of selected Western nations and of China are laid out, in addition to the climate policy dynamics between some of these countries. Then there is a discussion of the synergies and opportunities, as well as the complications and challenges, for global governance of climate change. Finally, there are sections which discuss the role of development diplomacy, particularly in the context of the post-Covid-19 world.
3.1 Meeting targets on climate change mitigation

3.1.1 The impacts of climate change

The types of climate change can be categorised into a four-part structure, as follows (Cannon 2020):

1. Slow-onset changes, such as rising sea levels, melting glaciers, and changes to the patterns of El Niño/La Niña;
2. Stronger and more frequent natural hazards, such as floods and hurricanes;
3. Increased variability, such as seasons changing and weather patterns becoming less predictable;

Vulnerability to climate change is a function of these physical elements, and social elements (Few 2007). The changing physical elements mean that social elements will also have to adapt in order to ensure that vulnerability does not increase to a dangerous level. Furthermore, each of the above climate changes has impacts on human systems, such as on agricultural resources, which are core to rural livelihoods (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010), and on health-care systems as a result of increasing intensity, frequency, and duration of health problems (Frumkin and Haines 2019). Job losses are likely due to changes in industries resulting from climate change mitigation measures (ILO 2021). Climate change is therefore not a standalone issue, but one which will impact on every level of society.

Given that climate change and its impacts will affect different regions and people to varying extents and in different ways, with poorer people and developing regions likely to suffer most, the question of ensuring a just transition is core to current debates on mitigating and adapting to climate change. This includes being sensitive to job losses in the context of reducing usage of fossil fuels (Evans and Phelan 2016), and other concepts such as a just transition as a framework for justice, or a governance strategy (Wang and Lo 2021). Furthermore, there is concern about ensuring equitable access to transport (Schwanen 2020), energy (Healy and Barry 2017) and sustainable products (Schröder 2020) throughout the transition to a green economy, for all members of society.

1 For example, small island developing states, such as Tuvalu, are predicted to be among those nations most seriously impacted by climate change (IPCC 2018).
3.1.2 What do we have to do to mitigate climate change?

In order to mitigate climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. However, the exact method by which this is achieved is up for debate (UNEP 2017), and is at the core of the disagreements among diplomats regarding climate action.

Increasing energy efficiency is one effective way to reduce emissions (IEA 2019a). However, energy efficiency alone cannot eliminate emissions.

Some argue that the priority is for the whole world to strive to use renewable energies rather than fossil fuels. For example, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2020a) proposes that up to 80 per cent of energy could be supplied through renewable sources by 2050. While renewables have a lot of potential, there are various challenges associated with using them. This includes the fact that wind and solar are variable energy sources which are only available when the conditions are conducive to energy production (IRENA 2020b), and the problem of the lack of battery storage options and infrastructure for feeding these energies into national energy grids (Regen Power 2021), which are not only inconvenient problems, but expensive to remedy. The challenges associated with renewables have led some to argue that fuels such as natural gas (IEA 2019b) and nuclear (Jawerth 2020) must play a role as transition fuels towards a green future.

For the emissions that remain, carbon capture and sequestration/storage (CCS) technologies are frequently proposed as a way of preventing carbon dioxide from being emitted into the atmosphere during energy production or industrial processes (Gonzales, Krupnick and Dunlap 2020). Captured carbon dioxide is usually either stored long-term in geological formations, or repurposed in industry (e.g. for making fizzy drinks) (Osman et al. 2021). While progress is being made in the development of CCS technologies that can be applied at scale, there remain many elements which require further research and development before this can become a large-scale part of climate mitigation efforts (ibid.). Furthermore, concerns are often raised that CCS is floated as a justification for continuing to use polluting fuels rather than seeking to invest in cleaner energies (Budinis 2020).

In order to achieve international emissions targets past 2050, the world will have to become carbon negative, removing more greenhouse gases from the atmosphere than are emitted into it (Budinis 2020). Given that Bhutan and Suriname are the only carbon-negative countries in the world at the time of writing (Wallach 2021), there is still a lot of progress to be made here.
3.1.3 What are the costs of mitigating climate change?

The Climate Policy Info Hub (2015) argues that, while there is huge variation in the estimates of how much it will cost to mitigate climate change, it is clear that delaying mitigation will result in greater costs overall.

McKinsey & Company (2009) estimate that it will cost around €200–350bn per year by 2030 to pursue all the low-cost carbon abatement opportunities available, which Ritchie (2017) observes will be less than 1 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). This cost estimate also puts into perspective the relatively small size of the US$100bn per year climate finance pledge made by developed countries through the Paris Agreement to help developing countries to pursue a green transition.

The New Climate Economy (2014) estimates that the savings resulting from the co-benefits of climate mitigation often far outweigh the costs. These savings manifest in the form of lives saved due to reduced air pollution, less waste and higher energy efficiency, among other benefits (Grantham Research Institute 2018). When estimating the costs of climate mitigation, it is therefore crucial to also consider the savings resulting from the measures implemented.

3.1.4 What are the difficulties in meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement?

Diplomacy is key to resolving the difficulties in meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement, many of which revolve around disagreements on the details of the methods that should be taken in order to achieve the targets. The Paris rulebook, which is designed to be a roadmap towards the goals that were agreed upon at COP 21 in Paris, was (mostly) accepted by signatories to the Agreement at COP 24 in Katowice (World Resources Institute 2019). The rulebook requires countries to periodically submit targets called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), but leaves each country to determine what their NDCs will be and how they will achieve them. Agreeing on the details of the policies to implement, both within and between countries, is a sticking point for many nations.

A contributing factor to this difficulty is clashes in national interests, which are discussed in further detail below. When what is most economically or politically beneficial for one nation puts another at a disadvantage, it is difficult to come to an agreement about what approach to take. This is prevalent in the climate space, where the impacts of climate change affect different countries to different extents and not all in the same way, and where the human and capital resources required to pursue climate solutions are not evenly distributed across the world.
Furthermore, climate change mitigation involves actions which flow against the current model of economic development. For example, reducing consumerism (Phillips 2015), and investing lots of money to replace energy systems which are still functioning (although they do often have longer-term economic benefits). In the absence of incentives to counteract this, it is self-undermining for actors to pursue such climate solutions.

Regarding COP 26 as the next significant opportunity for climate diplomacy to make steps towards implementing the Paris Agreement, there are major concerns around the inequitable distribution of Covid-19 vaccines globally because of fears that delegates from many countries (particularly developing countries) will be unable to attend in person or will be putting their families at risk when they return home (Farand 2021). This is an indication of how major global crises, such as pandemics and climate change, are interlinked. Parallels can also be drawn between the Covid-19 and climate crises regarding how countries must put their own pure pursuit of self-interests aside sometimes and remember that no one is safe until everyone is.
3.2 Mapping the actors and organisations in climate and sustainable development diplomacy

Figure 3.1 Map of the climate space

Source: Authors’ own
3.2.1 Analysis of climate and sustainability map

Figure 3.1 maps out the key actors and organisations involved in the climate space. Each of the sections of this map is explored in further detail below.

**Climate diplomats**

Some countries have specific climate diplomats who represent their country in climate-related negotiations. Current key diplomats include John Kerry, the United States Special Envoy on Climate selected by Biden, Xie Zhenhua, China’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, and Alok Sharma, President of COP 26 (UK). These individuals are significant because they have a high level of authority on climate-related policy in their respective contexts. The relationships between them can have an important impact on the progress that is made in climate diplomacy.

In some other countries, other government officials are in charge of determining climate policy and diplomatic endeavours. For example, Shih (2021) explains that, in South Korea, it is the presidents who have played the most significant role in climate negotiations and treaties such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement.

It is important to pay attention to the announcements made by key climate diplomats, which may be reflective of the deeper policy position of the country or body that they represent.

**National climate change bodies**

In certain cases, it is generic/broad branches of governments which are tasked with taking care of climate diplomacy, such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in China. Some countries have specific bodies or government branches focused specifically on climate, such as the UK Committee on Climate Change, the New Zealand Climate Change Commission, and the Australian Climate Change Authority. Since the climate field is still relatively new, it is significant to analyse the relationship between these bodies, as some appear to be modelled on or inspired by others.

In the US, there is currently no federal agency whose job is to develop a systemic understanding of climate change impacts on society (Carr 2020); several government branches and initiatives are involved in climate policy, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Global Change Research Programme.

**Banks and financial sector initiatives with a strong interest in climate change**

Most major banks and financial actors publish regular climate reports. For example, Goldman Sachs has produced reports on risks and opportunities related to climate change in terms of harnessing the innovative capital market (2019), and on how their approach to climate
rests on the pillars of climate transition and inclusive growth (2020). Morgan Stanley has reported on their commitment to transitioning to a low-carbon economy, assessing climate risks, achieving operational resilience, and being transparent (Morgan Stanley 2020). The involvement of the financial sector in climate action and sustainability offers substantial opportunities for governments to collaborate on leveraging capital for a climate transition. This is also relevant to the domain of public–private partnerships, which are often discussed as a way to encourage private investment incentivised by government regulations or offers.

Organisations involved in finance and development also often display an interest in climate policy and action. For example, Hawkins (2020) observes that the International Monetary Fund has proposed a package of policies related to climate action. These include the following:

- An 80 per cent subsidy rate for the production of renewable energy;
- A ten-year programme for investment in renewable energy, low-carbon transport, and energy-efficient buildings;
- Carbon pricing adjusted to aim for an 80 per cent reduction in emissions by 2050;
- Compensation for poor households when carbon price affects their purchasing power.

The World Bank has advocated for nature-smart policies (Johnson et al. 2021) and has collaborated with the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development on the Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report (2021). As demonstrated by this work, which combines climate policy with the SDGs, global financial institutions are in a position to tackle multiple elements of sustainable development simultaneously, using the SDGs as a framework.

Global bodies with a strong interest in climate change

The UN is the root of several climate change bodies and initiatives. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) together established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose job is to thoroughly review the science behind climate change. UNEP has also established the Intergovernmental Panel on Ecosystems and Biodiversity, which recently collaborated with the IPCC on a workshop relating to biodiversity and climate change (Pörtner et al. 2021). Furthermore, the UN is the source of the SDGs, including SDG 13 on climate action. Global multilateral bodies such as these are uniquely able to craft frameworks and policies which can influence a vast array of countries around the world, which can incentivise collaboration (and, where appropriate, competition) to achieve climate action globally.
Companies/initiatives with a strong interest in/influence on climate policy
There are a number of initiatives designed to influence the way that private sector actors behave in the face of climate change. These include Business for Social Responsibility Corporation 2020, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders. These are important because they can establish incentives and provide frameworks and learning for private sector companies to pursue environmental, social and governance factors, which include a climatic component. It will become increasingly important for this to involve the establishment of standards, so as to avoid greenwashing.

Also notable are the Chinese national oil companies, which are state-owned but believed to have a significant influence on climate policy in China (Aidoo et al. 2017). These are the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). It is a challenge when there are actors influencing policy for whom climate action is not in their best interests in the short term, because it flies in the face of reason for them to restrict their own growth by advocating for emissions reductions.

A note on local diplomacy
Figure 3.1 focuses on international and national-level climate diplomacy. However, action on all levels will be necessary when it comes to climate action, including on the regional and local levels. The South African Cities Network (Pillay and Potgieter 2021) notes that city diplomacy networks are relevant to this discussion. Some of the mechanisms that city diplomacy networks may use include sharing best practice, public–private partnerships and building of regional and local networks to enable climate action. Local diplomacy is arguably one of the most important levels of diplomacy with regards to climate action because the need for swift action and changes to lifestyles will require significant positive buy-in locally in order to build trust and avoid protests against the policies necessary to protect the environment and societies.

A note on non-state actors involved in climate diplomacy
Climate diplomacy involves a range of actors from within and outside of the government. Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) observe that there are three categories of actors in forest diplomacy: state actors, market actors and civil society actors. The same can be observed for climate diplomacy more generally. There are a lot of different actors involved in oil diplomacy in China alone, for example, at all levels of governance. This includes local people and organisations, international institutions, multinational corporations and state-run corporations (Aidoo et al. 2017).
Moomaw et al. (2016) and Sénit (2020) argue that state and non-state actors should be involved in SDD. Barritt (2018) explains that it is important for new diplomatic actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations to have a right to participate and influence climate change negotiations because they represent the interests of those who cannot themselves be present (e.g. animals, the environment). Since climate change has surfaced as a result of neglecting the ‘interests’ of the environment, it is important to change systems so that avoiding damaging externalities is built into the approach.

However, while non-state actors such as NGOs do get involved in climate policy, framework, and target discussions, such as at the COPs to the UNFCCC, they often have no formalised role in deciding which policies will be selected. Sénit (2020) explains that civil society actors usually have no formal voting rights in these instances, meaning that their influence is limited to persuasion of those who can vote, or participation in informal spaces with no direct influence on policy. It may be necessary to consider the mechanisms through which non-state actors are able to influence climate policy in order to ensure true participation and representation of the interests of the environment.
3.3 Mapping the structure of climate and sustainable development diplomacy

Figure 3.2 Map of climate frameworks, agreements, and targets

Source: Authors’ own
3.3.1 High-level description of frameworks, agreements, and targets

Influence of the UNFCCC and IPCC over global climate policy

The UNFCCC is significant in that it has near-universal membership (197 parties) and is the parent treaty of other influential agreements, namely the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2021). Country commitments to the Paris Agreement are often tracked by climate accountability structures (see below). This is therefore the defining framework that underpins all other action on climate around the world.

The IPCC is a very well-known UN body whose task is to review the science behind climate change. Its work is invaluable for ensuring that all members have access to accurate scientific assessments of the causes and probable impacts of climate change. However, it does not itself create climate policies because its focus is on science rather than diplomacy. Kouw and Petersen (2018) note that science cannot resolve conflicts because it is not in itself a referee. It can only provide information which can be used by diplomats to make decisions. The most recent IPCC report describes human influence on global warming as ‘unequivocal’ (2021: 6). This strong and certain language, despite being descriptive rather than prescriptive, backs up the necessity for policymakers to act in the best interests of the environment and societies threatened by climate change, motivated by a confident foundation in climate science.

Climate targets and accountability structures

Countries which are subscribed to the Paris Agreement agree to set climate targets for themselves, known as NDCs. One part of this is often to set a target year for achieving net zero emissions. For example, the European Union (EU), UK, US, Canada, and New Zealand have set a target of achieving net zero emissions by 2050; China has set its target as 2060, and Australia has not yet set any firm target. Countries may also set other targets under their NDCs or as part of their national climate policy; a selection of China’s targets are shown in Figure 3.2 for illustrative purposes.

There are several independent bodies that monitor country climate action commitments and progress. These include the Climate Change Performance Index, Climate Action Tracker, and Climate Equity Reference Project. One challenge in terms of accountability is the fact that, for many countries, their climate targets are not legally binding. This means that there is ample room for avoiding or falling short of targets.

Influential climate reports

Various national and international bodies produce climate-related reports for a variety of purposes. For example, the IPCC produces Assessment Reports, which provide information on topics such as the physical science basis for climate change, in addition to
special reports such as the well-known report *Global Warming of 1.5°C* (2018), which are used to inform policy decisions.

Some government bodies release their own documents, policies, and pledges. The UK Committee on Climate Change publishes a regular carbon budget (now in its sixth iteration), and a detailed report on how the UK will achieve net zero emissions. The US is in its fourth iteration of the National Climate Assessment. Canada has produced a net zero emissions document too, in addition to a climate plan for a healthy environment and economy. These documents can have an impact not only upon national policies, but also on the policies of other jurisdictions which observe their data and act upon their recommendations.

### 3.4 The implications of national climate approaches for multipolar global governance

#### 3.4.1 Policy objectives and strategies of Western nations, and of China

**Western nations**

Western nations do not have a uniform approach regarding their climate strategies and policies. It is therefore necessary to observe each nation individually.

However, Western democracies do face a shared set of challenges that are distinct from those of autocracies when it comes to the politics of addressing climate change. Barritt (2018) argues that democracies have to be sensitive to the range of values and interests that are involved when it comes to approaching environmental policy. For example, it is challenging to incorporate damage to the environment into democratic decision-making; is the solution to treat the environment like a democratic subject? Also, it is difficult for democracies to have to work towards predefined goals (namely, protecting the planet), because this flies in the face of what they usually do.

**United States**

The climate policy of the US has undergone multiple transitions over the past three governments. President Obama instated a range of policies, which were repealed by the Trump administration, famously including the removal of the US from the Paris Agreement. This move correlated with a rise in US emissions (Gallagher and Zhang 2019).

Since President Biden has come to power, he has rejoined the Paris Agreement, hosted the Leaders Summit on Climate, and convened the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change, making it clear that climate change is to henceforth be a core pillar of US
foreign policy (Lewis and Edwards 2021). He has also pledged nearly US$2tn towards green energy and infrastructure, to be invested over the coming decade (Holden 2020; McDonald 2020).

Ritter Jr (2021) argues that there are several steps that President Biden will need to take regarding climate, aside from reinstating the policies that President Trump repealed. This includes:

- Putting pressure on other countries to commit to significant climate action (as John Kerry has already begun doing);
- Transitioning towards clean energy in the power sector (this may be a challenge because decisions made in this domain at the federal level may be repealed at the state level, owing to the nature of states usually taking the lead in monitoring what occurs in the power sector);
- Transforming the transport industry, which is currently the single biggest carbon dioxide emitter of all sectors in the US;
- Instating a climate bill which ensures that an incrementally increasing cap is placed on emissions over time.

Lewis and Edwards (2021) propose that the main priorities of the US when it comes to climate policy and diplomacy are domestic economic recovery following the Covid-19 pandemic, and stimulating green growth. President Biden’s strategy to achieve these goals involves bringing the whole administration on board, so that climate is integrated into all aspects of policy (Ritter Jr 2021). Hilton et al. (2021) suggest that the US could lead in offering clean power and aid programmes to developing countries, in order to assist in climate action while gaining soft power.

**Canada**

For Canada, transitioning to climate-friendly policies is a tall order because oil extraction makes up a significant proportion of economic activity. Canada produces 4.7 million barrels of oil per day, 80 percent of which are from the province of Alberta, where low taxes have resulted in the Alberta Heritage Fund being limited in value (Campbell 2021). The Canadian government continues to subsidise the production of fossil fuels, having provided around US$14.6bn since early 2020 (which is roughly the same amount that was spent on green energies) (ibid.). Emissions in Canada increased by over 20 percent between 1990 and 2019, mostly due to the development of the oil sands industry, and it is predicted that oil production will rise by 41 percent between 2018 and 2040 (ibid.).
There are several additional challenges for Canada regarding climate policy, including the following:

- Environmental protection is not a constitutional right in Canada, and no comprehensive climate law exists (MacLean 2020);
- The climate policy process is limited in inclusivity and equality. Trade unions and NGOs are not often consulted (Campbell 2021);
- Private petroleum corporations have the ability to influence climate policy, and are able to make all their own production and investment decisions. They are accountable to no-one but their shareholders (ibid.);
- The influence of the federal government on climate policy is weak (ibid.);
- Climate is a politically difficult issue. There are disagreements across parties, across different regions (which are all affected to different extents and in different ways), and certain provincial governments are against introducing a carbon tax (ibid.).

Harrison (2020) presents a pattern which seems to occur regularly when it comes to Canadian climate policy:

1. The government announces a bold emissions target, set in the distant future.
2. Years later, the government releases a much less bold plan than that which they announced in (1).
3. The plan announced in (2) is not really followed through.
4. Certain subsidies are introduced, which are popular, but have limited impact.
5. Those policies which are likely to be genuinely effective are delayed repeatedly due to having to pass through several rounds of consultations, and then they are scrapped.
6. A new government takes over and shames the previous government for not having achieved any effective climate measures.
7. Return to step (1).

Despite this pattern of unsuccessful policies, Harrison (2020) notes that the most recent plan could be different because this time regulation is a key feature.

Some of the policies which Canada has introduced include creating a law for reducing emissions by over 30 per cent compared to 2005, banning Arctic offshore drilling for at least a limited time (Campbell 2021), and tripling the national carbon price between 2022 and 2030 (Harrison 2020).
United Kingdom
Hunt and Fitzgerald (2020) observe that UK climate plans tend to have two pillars:

1. Reducing emissions as fast as possible.
2. Removing greenhouse gases at the same rate as unavoidable emissions are being released.

They argue that the UK ten-point plan for a green industrial revolution relies mostly on the first of these pillars, and that it is a very ambitious plan. However, there are concerns that, while the UK's ten-point plan is indeed ambitious, it does not lay out in sufficient detail a roadmap for achieving its own targets. Without a set of practical policies to realise the ambitions, the plan will remain a plan, rather than reality.

Europe
Muinzer (2019) outlines the EU Green Deal, which aims to ensure that the EU can reach net zero emissions by 2050. The strategy underlying this plan is a growth strategy, where climate is seen as an opportunity for economic growth and modernisation of the economy. In order to achieve this, an investment figure of €260bn per year is proposed. The EU's recent Fit for 55 package outlines in detail the proposed methods by which this will be achieved, including the Emissions Trading Scheme and a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Oroschakoff 2021) to protect the competitiveness of European products against imports from countries which have a lower price on carbon (Holden 2020).

Australia
Australia has been criticised for not reducing its emissions sufficiently quickly; Pacific leaders from neighbouring nations in particular have called for Australia to do more to tackle climate change (McDonald 2021). Previously, Australia’s Climate Change Authority had a highly influential role regarding Australia’s carbon budget and emissions targets, but this influence faded once the Clean Energy Act was repealed in 2014 (Stephens 2021). Stephens (2021) argues that, in order to be effective, Australia’s climate laws must be legally binding, and that voluntary recommendations will have no impact.

The Australian prime minister has pledged AUS$539m towards clean hydrogen and carbon capture and storage development (McDonald 2021). McDonald (2021) suggests that this investment in technology is Scott Morrison’s way of finding a compromise in the face of competing pressures. Quiggin (2020) reports that the Australian federal budget was split between non-renewable and renewable energy sources and initiatives. On the former side, the government pledged to upgrade a coal-fired power station in New South Wales, as well as allocating AUS$52.9m to the gas
industry. On the latter side, they gave AUS$5m towards the promotion of electric vehicles, and AUS$1.4bn for renewables over the following decade.

**New Zealand**

Hall (2020) proposes that New Zealand is a fast follower, rather than a leader, on climate. In other words, they observe the commitments of other nations and then make their own policies and pledges such that they are in line with international ambitions.

Some of New Zealand’s climate policies are as follows:

- Reduce emissions by 30 per cent compared to 2005 levels (although note that this figure is for net emissions rather than gross emissions, meaning that in practice, New Zealand could increase its emissions overall and still reach its target) (McLachlan 2020);
- The Zero Carbon Act, which enshrines in law the requirement for New Zealand to have net zero emissions by 2050 (Hall 2020; McLachlan 2020);
- An Emissions Trading Scheme (McLachlan 2020);
- A Green Investment Finance Fund, worth NZ$100m (Hall 2020);
- Establishment of a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (*ibid.*).

**China**

China’s approach to climate policy and diplomacy is significant on the global stage, given that China releases 28 per cent of the world’s emissions (Tan *et al.* 2020). Wu (2018) argues that China’s climate and energy approach is characterised by three main factors. First, policies are tailored to ensure that China can sustain economic growth. Second, policies are impacted by interdependence with other countries and norms related to climate protection. Third, climate is not a policy priority for China compared to the goals of ensuring wealth for its citizens and enhancing its status as a global power.

On the contrary, Kahn (2016) argues that climate policy is in fact highly relevant for China, due to factors such as reducing air pollution, winning green export opportunities, and increasing soft power internationally, while Brown (2021) notes China’s wish to decrease its dependence on other nations. Furthermore, Xie (2021) adds that protection of water resources, food security and regional security are all additional motivating factors for China to want to protect the environment. Maizland (2021) observes that there have been a rising number of protests within China resulting from a growing public awareness of climate change and environmental degradation, which may serve as an additional incentive for action.
Other factors influencing China’s climate policy include the UNFCCC (Yu 2008), the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (Moore 2011) and the desire to increase wealth and exploit economic opportunities (Wu 2016; Wintour 2021).

China currently has a range of climate targets and pledges, including the recent goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2060, in addition to peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and creating 1.2 billion kilowatts-worth of solar and wind generators by 2030 (Maizland 2021). Gallagher and Zhang (2019) predict that China’s emissions will in fact peak in advance of the 2030 target.

There are over 100 policies in place to back up China’s climate targets (ibid.), including: energy efficiency standards for power plants, transport and buildings; a tariff policy for renewable energy generators, which offers a guaranteed price for the energy they produce; limits to coal consumption; and a national emissions trading scheme (ibid.). China also offers subsidies to people who purchase electric cars (Kahn 2016). Local provinces are allowed to pioneer small environmental projects without seeking permission from the central government first (Farhan 2017; Gu et al. 2018).

However, Tan et al. (2020) observe that China has allowed some room for manoeuvre in many of its pledges and policies. For example, they ‘aim to’ achieve net zero, they may make climate action conditional based on developed countries providing it with support (as stipulated in the Paris Agreement), and there appears to be some very selective calculation of emissions figures, which involves excluding exports (ibid.).

Many of China’s climate-damaging policies involve its actions abroad, such as its heavy investment in overseas oil extraction amounting to 946.4m barrels between the 1990s and 2013 (Aidoo et al. 2017) and having financed coal plants overseas through the Belt and Road Initiative (Gallagher and Zhang 2019).² China is also currently building coal plants at 60 locations within China (Brown 2021), and while many of the most inefficient coal plants are being shut down, they are being left dormant and reopened to cover gaps in energy needs (Lewis and Edwards 2021). However, energy demand is set to decrease due to increased energy efficiency and the movement of the economy towards the service and digital technology industries (Tan et al. 2020).

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² China announced at the recent UN General Assembly that it would no longer finance coal plants abroad in an effort to reduce emissions (Sun 2021).
3.4.2 Climate policy dynamics between countries

Australia as unambitious compared to other Western nations

The international community has been critical of Australia, which is currently one of the only large, developed countries to not have set a big climate target (Grattan 2020). There are several factors which have put pressure on Australia to make a move in this space. The National Farmers’ Federation of Australia, which is usually a more conservative organisation, has called for climate action, as did the leaders present at the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum (McDonald 2020). Most recently, President Biden’s approach to climate, which has restored climate ambition for the US, has left Australia isolated among developed countries regarding its less ambitious stance on climate (ibid.).

Zali Steggall, independent member of parliament for Warringah, has proposed a Climate Change Bill, modelled on the UK Climate Change Act (Stephens 2021). If this were to be passed, it would include a net zero by 2050 target, the creation of an independent body to advise the government (like the UK Climate Change Committee), and the setting of carbon budgets every five years (ibid.). This would assist in increasing climate ambition in Australia.

The US putting pressure on China

Hilton et al. (2021) have suggested that the US and China could pick up on the climate diplomacy template that Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping created, now that Biden is the president of the US.

The United States Special Presidential Envoy on Climate, John Kerry, has been putting pressure on China to make its climate targets and policies more ambitious since shortly after Biden assumed office. He has criticised China for giving itself a longer timeline than other countries to reach net zero emissions (Worland 2021), and has said that the US will monitor China’s climate progress using American satellites (Boyle 2021). Questions have been raised on the legitimacy of the US criticising other nations when it has no set carbon price and has not had the most ambitious track record on climate policy over the preceding years.

Nonetheless, Xi Jinping attended a climate conference hosted by the US in April 2021 (Maizland 2021). This suggests that, despite the tensions between these two countries, there is potential for them to cooperate in this area.

China’s ambition puts pressure on the West

Despite the criticisms that have been made in the West towards China’s climate policy, Tan et al. (2020) argue that China’s push for climate puts pressure on the West – particularly Australia. This is because the policies which China is now implementing will potentially reduce imports from Australia, such as iron ore and coking coal (ibid.).
Furthermore, Nair (2019) proposes that overconsumption patterns, as well as governance structures which do not permit sustained action in the economy against vested interests, make it difficult to advance climate change policies in the West. On the contrary, China’s political approach allows the state to intervene and steer the economy more easily (ibid.).

3.5 The role of development diplomacy in the context of the SDGs and global climate policy initiatives

Naupa (2017) argues that countries need to strive to create agreements around common goals, through bilateral, multilateral and multi-actor relations. Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) propose that attempting to come to a unanimous agreement in SDD contexts can distract from other solutions – in other words, that it is important to not make best the enemy of the good.

In summary, the roles of SDD include:

- Finding mutual areas of benefit;
- Holding each other accountable;
- Identifying and securing national security threats;
- Considering climate policies against other issues;
- Supporting other countries in sustainable development (e.g. through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Build Back Better World (B3W)).

3.5.1 Synergies and opportunities

Promoting healthy competition

Hilton et al. (2021) suggest that constructive competition in clean energy may better suit the dynamic between the US and China than pure cooperation, and Maizland (2021) claims that the plan in the US is to expand green energy for this very reason. Wen (2021) and Hilton et al. (2021) note that competition does not have to be a negative thing, so long as the intended outcome is progress.

Promoting collaboration

Moomaw et al. (2016) observe that SDD attempts to identify mutual gains for those involved because, ultimately, a sustainable world is one from which everyone can benefit.

There are many examples of collaboration between countries with regards to sustainable development. Japan and Indonesia have worked together on the Joint Crediting Mechanism Initiative, resulting in clean
energy provision to buildings within Palembang, Indonesia (Robertua and Sihura 2020). The US and Japan work with countries in Southeast Asia on private investment projects to increase water security (Namba 2019). Japan, South Korea and China have held meetings to discuss approaches to dealing with smog and acid rain (Maizland 2021), and the EU is helping China with its emissions trading scheme (ibid.).

Although competition is the target for many areas of the US–China sustainable development relationship, Lewis and Edwards (2021) propose that the US should work with China when it comes to increasing climate ambition and reaching net zero emissions.

Promoting science diplomacy and collaboration
Thompson (2018) argues that the global North and global South need to work together when it comes to science diplomacy for sustainable development, because science can build trust between countries and help overcome artificial boundaries of geography. According to Pisupati (2020), the Covid–19 pandemic has demonstrated the great extent to which countries of the world are interconnected through science, and that we therefore ought to emphasise science diplomacy going forward.

Moomaw (2018) proposes that scientists and diplomats need to learn each other’s skills in order to collaborate effectively. Ruffini (2018) suggests that when diplomats do not understand the science of, for example, the IPCC reports, science diplomacy faces challenges.

An existing example of science diplomacy for sustainable development is the cooperation that exists between the UK and Russia on research in the Arctic (Berkman et al. 2017; Gutenev 2020). This demonstrates how science diplomacy may be a way for countries to collaborate even when there are other issues that they disagree on (Berkman et al. 2017).

Kleinhaus et al. (2020) argue that one important case where science diplomacy for sustainable development is needed is between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia on the protection of the Red Sea Reef, which is threatened by the impending impacts of climate change.

3.5.2 Complications and challenges
Which diplomatic levers should feature?
Hilton et al. (2021) propose that countries need to use diplomatic levers in order to further climate action. Having said this, Stashwick (2021) notes that it does not make sense for China, for example, to attempt to use climate policy as a bargaining chip against other issues it believes are important, because it needs climate change to be dealt with for its own sake. On this note, John Kerry has said that the US will not make
deals with China which promote ambitious climate policies at the cost of ignoring human rights concerns. While it is important to develop climate policy in tandem with policies on other issues, climate ambition should not be conditional upon compromises in other domains.

**National security threats**

One challenge for countries trying to implement more ambitious climate policies is to balance this with national security requirements.

For example, for China, coal is a more secure energy source than (the cleaner) natural gas because there is much more of the former available within China (Kahn 2016). Premier Li Keqiang has pointed out that coal is a secure energy option for China, and the Chinese Communist Party has said that energy security is a priority (Lewis and Edwards 2021). This makes transitioning to cleaner fuel options at speed a challenge.

Another example is how countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council have a tendency to avoid dependence on other countries by developing their own energy and sustainability policies (Al-Saidi, Zaidan and Hammad 2019). It is important that no country must be forced to compromise its national security while transitioning to cleaner fuel sources.

**Lack of coordination**

The volume and range of actors within the sustainable development space can make diplomacy very complicated. Robertua and Sihura (2020) claim that the lack of coordination between the government, private sector and civil society is holding back countries such as Indonesia when it comes to climate policy. Establishing common frameworks which can be implemented at different levels is important for ensuring that action is coordinated and that climate action is inclusive.

**Conflicts of interest**

Barritt (2018) notes that climate change pays no attention to borders, and that whatever decision one country makes will impact upon another. Furthermore, regarding climate change and sustainability, there are a great variety of interests involved that are not relevant to other forms of diplomacy, such as those of non-nationals, future generations, animals, plants and ecosystems (ibid.). It is difficult to create policies where all such interests are accounted for.

Ruffini (2018) observes that science diplomacy tends to suffer when there are mismatches between different countries’ interests. Countries must be willing to acknowledge these differing interests and prevent others from being put at a disadvantage in order to ensure that climate diplomacy progresses at the speed necessary to avoid further damage to the environment.
Historical injustices

Denton (2018) argues that historical contributions to climate change feature prominently when it comes to creating climate policies. They are often framed in a discourse and used to back up policy proposals (ibid.). Climate justice in relation to historical emissions is another factor to be taken into account in the context of climate diplomacy.

3.5.3 The role of multilateral diplomacy in achieving climate action

What COP 26 needs to achieve

The COP 26 website itself designates the following four main targets for the conference (UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021 2021):

1. Secure global net zero by mid-twenty-first century and keep 1.5 degrees Celsius within reach.
2. Adapt to protect communities and natural habitats.
4. Work together to deliver.

A total of 137 countries have now committed to achieving net zero emissions, most by 2050 at the latest (Wallach 2021). Therefore, as Rutter (2021) argues, the emphasis must shift from high-level targets to practical steps and agreements to make those targets achievable. Mobilising finance and working together to deliver will be key parts of this.

What the UN can do to assist climate action

The UN has been central in mobilising countries to pay attention to climate change. The UNFCCC is the core framework from which many familiar climate-related bodies and procedures have arisen, including the IPCC and the COPs. Steiner (2007) claims that ‘the United Nations is the only forum in which an agreement aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions... can realistically be brokered among... 190 plus countries’.

Going into the future, the UN must continue to play this brokering role, acting as a forum through which countries can meet to make progress in climate diplomacy. The UN must hold countries accountable to their climate targets in order to ensure not only ambition, but deliverability.

Climate diplomacy in a post–Covid–19 world

Yixiu (2021) claims that, despite the tumultuous experiences brought about by the Covid–19 pandemic, there have been some positives in the year 2020. These include: a forced re–thinking about how people relate to the natural world; beginning to take seriously the idea of finding nature–based solutions to climate change; the introduction of a net zero pledge by China; the concept of ‘Build Back Better’. In the post–Covid–19 world, countries
must acknowledge how our world is truly global, such that challenges faced in one country can spill over into other countries. This is the case for climate change, where one country’s actions can impact others, even those which are far away. We must show respect to other countries by not causing damage and work together to find solutions to global crises.

3.6 Analysis

In order to meaningfully mitigate climate change, a rapid and universal response is required. This is not a crisis which can be solved by any individual country alone, and any country which does not act swiftly and radically holds back not only itself, but other countries around the world. The impacts of climate change will be devastating if business as usual persists. It is not solely the environment that will be (and in many cases, is already being) affected, but also human health and safety, jobs, and livelihoods.

It is therefore in everyone’s best interests to mitigate climate change as rapidly and effectively as possible. However, this is easier said than done when facing challenges in coordinating actors across society, in sourcing the investment required for massive green infrastructure projects in transport and energy systems, and in maintaining public support through a transition that will be disruptive to people’s lifestyles and economic stability. Climate change is not a standalone issue, and any solution which is proposed to mitigate emissions or enable adaptation must also consider the ripple effects on access to energy and on the ability of people to maintain or gain a high quality of life – particularly regarding the impact on already disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. This is important for all countries to consider, but especially those such as Canada which have regions where a great many people are likely to be deeply affected by the transition.

Despite the difficulties posed by the transition, all countries need to act swiftly and decisively in favour of climate action. The US should continue with its renewed climate ambition, pushing ahead with the B3W and installing the necessary incentives to transform the energy industry and transport sector. The UK needs to flesh out a roadmap to achieving its ambitious targets. Australia needs to catch up with other nations and make its climate targets official.

In this time of crisis, it is more important than ever for countries to come together to support each other through diplomacy, sharing strategies which have been successful and finding areas of mutual benefit to work on through joint schemes and initiatives. Fostering healthy competition to encourage innovation will also help us discover and create the technologies that will one day allow us to be not only a net zero world, but a net negative one.
Setting strong policies and incentives is an essential step for all actors who are in a position to do so. Markets will not respond automatically to the environmental crisis unless there are financial incentives and regulations to nudge them in the right direction. And given the vast array of responsibilities and issues they have to deal with on a day-to-day basis, governments will not prioritise targets which are set to be achieved in several decades’ time unless they are held to account for their steps towards them today. The UN, and climate accountability structures, play an important function in mandating governments to act now rather than postponing until 2049.

This case study laid out the key policy approaches related to climate change of a variety of different countries, in addition to the diplomacy dynamics in this space.

Climate change is set to impact not only the natural environment, but structures at every level of human society. It is therefore an issue which cannot be treated on its own but must be considered in the context of a just transition, protecting people’s livelihoods, jobs, and safety around the world.

While most Western nations have now set climate targets such as a net zero by 2050 goal, Australia lags behind; meanwhile, China appears to have begun to increase ambition on its climate policy while leaving room for manoeuvre within its targets. It is important for all countries to come together at COP26 to lay out a clear policy agenda which is not only agreed upon verbally but also implemented actively and rapidly.

There are some points of tension which are likely to remain challenging throughout the climate transition. These include anywhere where clashes in national interests occur (such as the need for some countries to import the majority of the natural resources for their green energy technologies), times when controversial issues external to climate are brought to the table as negotiating levers, and attempts to reach an agreement on how to practically source and deliver climate finance for countries which cannot afford to transition alone. All these issues involve countries having to make counterintuitive compromises, which they will be reluctant to do on the basis of national security and economic development.

However, despite these difficulties, there are numerous points of opportunity to pursue. Few other world issues put all countries in the same boat quite like climate change does. Although their respective contributions to the problem and the level and types of impact they will experience vary dramatically, no country is completely shielded from the changing climate. This should be seen as an extraordinary opportunity for countries to work together to find solutions that truly benefit everyone. Given the fact that climate intersects with so many other issues such
as health, economic development and poverty, this is also a chance to transfer holistic, mutually beneficial systems thinking to other domains.

Furthermore, the solutions to the climate crisis require many of the things which countries usually wish to foster, such as increased innovation, new jobs, healthy environments (leading to healthier people), and opportunities for all to be competitive in the global market. The US and China have the potential to compete in the domain of green technologies and infrastructure, and Africa has the potential to make an enormous contribution to the market for generating renewable energies – which could in turn transform the economies of many countries within Africa. These benefits have the potential to improve the economic prospects of billions of people internationally.

Given that mitigating and adapting to climate change is a necessity for most countries, there is plenty of potential to find points of collaboration, although a dynamic of competition may suit certain policy areas given the pre-existing rivalry between countries. Yet ultimately, whether countries choose to work together or work competitively, provided that progress is being made, then this is good news for the world of climate and SDD.

So long as action is fast and no one is left behind in a transition which is just, the exact methods of achieving the targets do not matter. Nonetheless, it is up to global policymaking institutions and governments around the world to set the right mandates and incentives to encourage climate action today, rather than delaying until it is too late.

4.1 Global health: introduction

The world is becoming more and more interconnected due to globalisation. As a consequence, there is an increasing need for joint efforts to deal with shared global public health issues. The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend.

Traditionally, global health actors are mainly restricted to the World Health Organization (WHO) and national health ministries (Szlezák et al. 2010). However, the scope of global health governance is developing with the scale of complexity of the global health environment. Civil society, NGOs, private firms, and other actors are joining the global health stage and shaping the formal and informal rules and norms over the interaction with old actors (ibid.).

The current global health governance architecture consists of five types of key stakeholders: intergovernmental organisations such as the WHO, UN, and World Bank; states such as the G20; regional groupings and regional initiatives such as the African Union; public–private partnerships; and non-state and private actors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Youde 2017).

Global cooperation and solidarity are vital to combat the negative influence of the Covid-19 pandemic. Given the scale of challenges and intricacy of problems in global health, broad engagement of different actors and stakeholders is indispensable in addressing global challenges (Moomaw et al. 2016). Collective action and coordination among different actors play a critical role in global health crises. In other words, SDD needs deeper participation of all relevant stakeholders. In addition, it is significant to promote more informal dialogues in an era of uncertainty.
4.2 China’s role in global health governance and vaccine diplomacy

With around 1.4 billion people, counting for one fifth of the world’s population, China has always been one of the most significant actors for global health. In addition, a number of international infectious disease such as SARS and the Asian flu were first detected or appeared in China (Afari 2020). The role of China in the global health system is not only significant for Chinese people, but also important for the global population. The engagement of China in global health governance is significant, although the role of the Chinese government remains unclear and uncertain (Gauttam, Singh and Kaur 2020).

China has been engaging in global health governance in its own way. Although the Chinese government reiterates that China is a strong supporter of multilateralism, its foreign policy and development diplomacy reflect a more bilateral approach than a multilateral one (Genevaz 2021). For example, during the regional Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, China donated US$123m–worth of humanitarian aid to fight the Ebola epidemic, whereas it only contributed US$56,500 to the WHO for two combined years. It seems that China is playing health diplomacy over partner countries (ibid.). This has become even clearer from China’s role in global health governance during the Covid–19 pandemic. Health diplomacy is ‘political activity that meets the dual goals of improving health while maintaining and strengthening international relations’ (Chattu and Knight 2019: 151).

More than 4.8 million people globally have died as a result of the Covid–19 pandemic (Worldometer 2021). The pandemic has threatened the achievements of recent years in the public health sector, and the entire world is suffering from a series of setbacks from Covid–19 and its knock–on impacts. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director–General, stated that vaccine inequality is the biggest obstacle to stopping this pandemic and recovering from Covid–19 (WHO 2021). During the first International Forum on Covid–19 Vaccine Cooperation, the UN Secretary–General António Guterres stated that a key to ending the pandemic is to get 70 per cent of the world population vaccinated, meaning that we need over 11 billion doses (UN News 2021). He underscored the necessity of a global vaccine plan to boost vaccine production and ensure equal distribution by using COVAX (Covid–19 Vaccines Global Access) as the platform, and reiterated that the international community, especially the G20, must coordinate to tackle vaccine inequality (ibid.). In a joint news release on 22 July 2021, UNDP, WHO, and the University of Oxford stated that Covid–19 vaccine inequity will have a profoundly negative effect on socioeconomic recovery in the global South if there is no immediate action to convert this trend, and this would inevitably undermine global economic recovery (WHO 2021).
Against this backdrop, China proposed to build the Healthy Silk Road to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. As a result, China has provided 1.2 billion doses of vaccines and stock solutions to more than 100 countries and international organisations and has provided anti-epidemic material assistance to more than 150 countries and 14 international organisations (China News 2021). China is the country that has provided the most vaccines to developing countries (China International Development Cooperation Agency 2021). President Xi Jinping delivered a written speech to the Global Health Summit in May 2021, suggesting that China will continue to do its best to help developing countries cope with the pandemic. Throughout this year, China will strive to provide 2 billion doses of vaccine to the world and has decided to donate US$100m to COVAX (CGTN 2021). It seems that China intends to play a leading role in this global vaccine plan. There is no doubt that China is becoming an important force in promoting the equitable distribution of global vaccines. In addition, China is also working to promote its image by providing medical supplies and assistance to countries hit hard by coronavirus.

The Covid-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity for China to exercise and expand its leadership via health diplomacy and vaccine diplomacy, and it allows China to further exert its international development agenda on aid-receiving countries (Gauttam, Singh and Kaur 2020). In other words, China has integrated health diplomacy into its foreign policy as a way of expanding geopolitical influence. By providing international aid and vaccines to countries that joined the Healthy Silk Road, the bilateral relationship between China and aid-receiving countries is strengthened, and this will inevitably contribute to China’s geopolitical influence. China’s increasing assertiveness and participation in global health governance indicate its attempt to claim international leadership (Weiss 2021).

There is no doubt that China plays an irreplaceable role in tackling global challenges. Its active participation in COVAX and global health governance is an essential element in building back better after the pandemic. The security, prosperity, and freedoms of each country are very interconnected; therefore, different countries must work together towards a shared agenda (White House 2021).

4.3 China’s evolving approach to SDD in the context of the priority of climate change

The careful mapping exercise on all the elements necessary for effective SDD in climate change – integrated into SDD generally – is extremely difficult to put into practice because of the overwhelming roles of not
merely nation states, but two hegemonic states (China and the US). It is nevertheless essential to recognise the necessity of responding to climate change and achieving sustainable development.

China has preferred to start its own club rather than playing by norms set by the West (Allison 2017: 23). This is especially so when it comes to its SDG progress and diplomacy. In September 2013, President Xi announced China’s intention to invest US$1.4tn in building a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, connecting China directly with 65 countries across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Allison 2017; Sacks 2021). The BRI countries account for over 40 per cent of global GDP, 40 per cent of world trade, and 60 per cent of world population, over 50 per cent of whom are living under the extreme poverty line (UNDESA 2019). However, the BRI has identified five priority areas for international cooperation: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond (NDRC 2021). These priorities link closely to the 17 SDGs. In addition, the BRI is an open development proposal and welcomes other countries to join (UNDESA 2019). Therefore, the joint efforts to build and promote the BRI would also facilitate the SDGs and benefit the world as a whole (Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). There are 140 countries and 32 international organisations that have joined the BRI (Xinhua News 2021).

The BRI illustrates that China has integrated the SDGs into China’s long-term international development strategies. The BRI can create synergy and complementarity between the international agenda and domestic strategies (Zhou 2020; Gu and Kitano 2018). President Xi Jinping made it clear in his speech in 2017 at the 19th Party Congress that China will actively promote international cooperation through the BRI to facilitate its sustainable development agenda. The speech indicates that the BRI is a method and promoter for the SDGs.

More importantly, the BRI is an outstanding example to illustrate how development strategy can serve a role in diplomacy. Through the BRI, economic and social connections are increasing between partnership countries and China. Economic ties between low- and middle-income countries and China are growing (Gu and Carey 2019). The total volume of trade in goods between China and the countries along the BRI routes reached US$9.2tn in 2021 and the cumulative direct investment in the countries along the route was US$136bn (Xinhua News 2021). China is the top-listed trading partner of most countries in East, Central, and South Asia, with enormous economic ties with the rest of the globe (Kastner and Pearson 2021).
However, although the BRI involves many countries around the world, it strengthens the bilateral relationship between the BRI countries and China. The investment and resources of China are tilting towards BRI partnership countries. China has implemented thousands of complete sets of projects and material assistance projects, tens of thousands of technical cooperation and human resource development cooperation projects, and more than 400,000 personnel trainings, as well as providing medical materials to more than 160 countries and international organisations, and aid and vaccines to more than 100 countries and international organisations (China International Development Cooperation Agency 2021).

With the consistently changing global social and economic environment, China has proposed a new agenda built on the BRI but with bigger vision and positioning. On 10 January 2021, the official White Paper China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era, issued by the State Council Information Office (SCIO 2021) pointed out that, regarding international development cooperation, China’s mission is to promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind via its BRI platform under the framework of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (Gong, Gu and Teng 2019). It further illustrates the interconnection between the SDGs and the BRI, as well as the combination of Chinese SDD with political interests in China’s international development strategy. In a way, the new mission shifts the China-centred development approach to a China-proposed sustainable development strategy, and it is based on the recognition of interconnection and interdependence of the global village and a shared future facing the global villagers.

However, both the BRI and the new mission came under attack and has received growing suspicion and negative feeling among some nations, particularly the US. According to the report of the US Department of Defence, ‘China intends to use BRI to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to or stance on sensitive issues’ (cited in Kastner and Pearson 2021: 19).

The BRI has been named ‘debt trap diplomacy’ by Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney in 2017 (Rana and Ji 2020). Some people believe that the aim of the BRI is to spread the Chinese Model and authoritarianism abroad to increase China’s political engagement and global influence (Dezenski 2020). In addition, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the BRI is full of secret deals and corruption in exchange for political influence (Reuters Staff 2019). Similarly, former US National Security Advisor John Bolton argued that ‘China uses bribes, opaque agreements and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive
to Beijing’s wishes and demands’ (cited in Landler and Wong 2018). It seems that impressions of the BRI have always been associated with political empowerment and manipulation. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that the BRI partly enables the Chinese government to achieve its geostrategic agenda and advance foreign policy (Kastner and Pearson 2021).

In fact, the BRI has become the focal point of geopolitical competition between China and the West. United States President Joe Biden’s administration, along with the G7, announced a new initiative called Build Back Better World (B3W), seen as an alternative to China’s BRI, collectively providing hundreds of billions of US dollars of financial support for infrastructure to low- and middle-income countries with transparency and sustainability (Holland and Faulconbridge 2021). The B3W connects the different parts of the world, and different G7 partners are responsible for different geographic orientations (White House 2021). Such arrangements can reduce risks on one single country and grant more flexibility to mobilise resources and facilitate the operation and implementation. B3W has a different emphasis to China’s BRI: it is a values-driven initiative with special focuses on climate, health and health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality (ibid.). The B3W reflects a simple fact: the US and the West are recognising the value of the BRI, and therefore they have to catch up to the advantages that China has made in its international development strategy. It also partly indicates that China’s international engagement works positively in BRI countries, and the West would like to duplicate the Chinese model in terms of SDD. Clearly, there is some tension between the BRI and the B3W, because the latter has been explicitly announced as a ‘green alternative’ to the BRI (Wintour 2021). Over 60 per cent of energy funding in the BRI has been spent on non-renewables (Maizland 2021), although China has now scaled back investment in coal plants for the BRI (Brown 2021).

4.4 Stable tension: shared crisis or shared future?

With the US-led unipolar international order fading away, the global balance of power has dramatically shifted and China has risen in power due to the following reasons (Allison 2017). Firstly, the US counted for 50 per cent of the global economic market after the Second World War, but it has been constantly declining in the global market – to 22 per cent in 1980, and then 16 per cent today – due to the rising power of China. Secondly, over this same period, China’s share of the global economy was soaring, from 2 per cent in 1980 to 18 per cent in 2016, and it is predicted to be on its way to 30 per cent in 2040. China’s annual growth is 10 per cent a year, which is 6 per cent higher than the US economy on average. Finally, China has
already surpassed the US on most indicators such as steel and furniture, and has become the manufacturing powerhouse of the world. To put it simply, ‘since the Great Recession, 40 per cent of all economic growth globally has occurred in just one country: China’ (Allison 2017: 25). The US administration has adopted major foreign policy on rebalancing China’s growing weight to counter the influence of China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific region (ibid.).

GDP reflects national power, although GDP does not translate directly into a country’s economic or military power (ibid.). The concept of balance of power has shifted from largely military power to a combination of economic and military power, namely, ‘geo-economics, which is the use of economic instruments such as trade, investment policy, sanctions, cyberattacks and foreign aid to achieve geopolitical goals’ (ibid.: 68). GDPs of great powers play a proportional influence in shaping international affairs on the international stage. For China, influencing foreign policy through economic instruments is normal as it has the capability to do it. China is the largest trading partner for more than 130 countries. Its trade with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounted for 15 per cent of ASEAN’s total trade in 2015, while the US accounted for only 9 per cent (ibid.). This imbalance will accelerate in the absence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as China moves quickly to establish its own equivalent in an emerging co-prosperity area (ibid.: 70).

In 2012, Xi Jingping proposed to President Obama that the US and China should jointly invent a ‘new form of great power relations’, in which each would respect one another’s bottom lines. For Xi, this meant to respect each other’s de facto sphere of influence, which for China includes Taiwan and Tibet, as well as China’s claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the Obama administration rejected this proposal (ibid.: 227). After Obama, the Trump administration did not hide its hostility towards China, and it even declared a ‘trade war’ with China that has lasted until today.

The cruelty of the international community does not lie in the existence of competition but in the fact that when hegemonic countries create competition rules that are beneficial to them, they become the prevailing standards in the world, which small countries are forced to obey (J. Wang 2021). The liberal international order, which was built to facilitate collective action through conducting decision-making processes and establishing shared values and norms, was formed after the Second World War by a limited number of powerful states and decisions are up to these founding states (Slaughter and LaForge 2021). It is clear that China, as one of the great powers in the world, is not a leading or a founding member of this, nor does it call the shots in these relatively exclusive international institutions. Although China has reiterated its support of multilateralism, it has no intention of
accepting a set of values and rules that the West makes without any consultation with China (Yan 2021; Carty and Gu 2021). International orders involve a set of values and principles (Slaughter and LaForge 2021). However, values, principles, and laws can be very different from one country to another. China has been trying to frame and promote its notion of ideology, such as social security and economic development, instead of its counterpart democracy and freedom that is upheld by the West (Yan 2021), but its differences might create a barrier to exerting SDD on the international stage.

As mentioned in the last section, to cope with China's increasing geopolitical influence, the US and G7 leaders launched the B3W partnership, a counterpart to China's BRI, to meet the tremendous infrastructure demands of the global South, in June 2021 (White House 2021). The BRI and B3W are open to the same group of countries and partners, so it is important for these countries to know the nature of B3W. Is it a healthy competition proposal, or a side-choosing game between the US and China?

The B3W illustrates a dilemma for many countries in the global South: BRI and B3W, which club to join? Singapore President Li Xianlong told the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC):

... it is very difficult for countries in Asia to choose sides. For example, from a trade perspective, even for US's allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, they have deeper relations with China than the US... the development of China is unstoppable, and it is not wise to stop it. The wise thing to do is to build up relationship with each other and develop relationship constructively by bringing China into international system. However, if the US response is to be prepared and feel that the growth of new competitors poses a threat to the US and it does everything possible to prevent the other party from becoming the number one as the US must maintain its top position, then it would be meaningless and troublesome. (Vaswani 2021)

Meanwhile, international cooperation will increasingly be based around issue-specific coalitions (Yan 2021; Gu, Li and Zhang 2021). This is because the US and China might sometimes belong to some of the same clubs, sometimes not, depending on issues. Yan describes in her article what could happen in the long run:

... countries [must] decide which to join on a case-by-case basis, depending on which arrangement best serves their national interests... A club-based international system will bring complications of its own: a country that joins some coalitions led by Washington and others led by Beijing will be a less trustworthy partner for both powers... It could also
become common for members of the same coalition to punish one another for actions required by their membership in other clubs. Such conflicts are likely to heighten political instability and accelerate the trend toward deglobalisation in the decade ahead, but they are preferable to a world split into rigid geopolitical blocs.
(Yan 2021: 46)

A rigid geopolitical bloc is the exact thing that the world needs least.

Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, commented on the US–China relationship, saying that it is normal for both sides to step on each other’s toes as the world’s two largest economies, but it would endanger the entire human race if they solve problems and manage their relationship by confrontation and conflict all the time (Vaswani 2021). International cooperation would not be effective if two powers were clashing with each other with the expectation of side-choosing for other states. Given the scale of global challenges and the intricacy of problems in the current circumstances, global cooperation and solidarity are vital to the achievement of agreed SDGs and agendas.

Historical experience, culture, beliefs, and myths shape a nation’s self-perception (Kagan 2021). Self-perception plays a role in defining the national interest of a state (Constantine, Shankland and Gu 2015). The so-called ‘century of humiliation’ (1840–1945) has had great influence on China as it looked inward for causes of humiliation and methods to prevent it from happening again. At the same time, a view of the Western moral value was also initiated in China, which still persists today. Not long after the start of the century of humiliation in 1840, China started its much-needed inward-looking reflection as to why it was so vulnerable to Western invasions. As a consequence, for China, increasing political and economic power is a precondition of security. America’s influence following the Second World War granted it the chance to intervene globally in terms of economics, politics, and diplomacy as well as through the military (Kagan 2021). It is natural that both sides have divergences.

Former US diplomat (and Director of the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States) Robert Daly states that both the US and China have prejudice and deep suspicions towards each other, and we are on an inevitable path where both sides believe that all problems can be attributed to the other party’s intentions and improper conspiracies (Xing 2020). In other words, both the US and China made a mistake by only seeing the worst part and denying the complexity of each other. It is important for both China and the US to reflect and reconsider their strategy towards each other. Misunderstandings and misperceptions lie at the heart of the
relationship. The complexity of China cannot be explained clearly with the theory of totalitarianism and either black or white, and the West has to continue consistent interaction and communication to know more about China. It is clear that the overseas activities and projects of China are diverse; it is unwise to label it with one purpose and intention (Renwick and Gu 2020). Daly (cited in Xing 2020) said that the US must accommodate other countries within a certain range to find a new balance and explore the boundary to work with China. Also, he stated that the Chinese Communist Party must realise that there is no difference between inside and outside affairs as a great power, because anything they are doing in China is part of its international public relations, and it is not realistic to convince others to play in its favour if it does not accept international rules (cited in Xing 2020). In short, both the US and China have problems in their external diplomacy and strategy, and effective cooperation requires a global and inclusive mindset to change traditional diplomacy towards a more flexible approach that can respond to a rapidly changing environment.

In fact, it is possible for China and the US to rebuild relations, and Mahbubani summarised four essential observations (Mahbubani 2020). First, there is no conflict regarding the fundamental national interests of each country. The fundamental national interest of both China and the US is to improve the wellbeing of their people. Second, both China and the US are facing the same challenges: climate change and a public health crisis. There is no doubt that we have more chances to find solutions if the two biggest powers of the world cooperate with each other and work in the same direction. Third, an ideological battle is not inevitable. As Mahbubani explained:

It is commonly believed that a key driving force in the Sino-American geopolitical contest is a deep and profound ideological divide. Over 40 years ago, when China was presented with a concrete choice, it chose to promote China’s national interests and sacrificed the ideology of communism. It also stopped promoting communism globally... Instead, the success and competitiveness of the Chinese economy and society is the real challenge. To meet this challenge, American thinkers should focus on ensuring the success and competitiveness of the American economy and society.

(Mahbubani 2020: 160–62)

China has expressed its willingness to play an active role in global governance and in tackling global shared challenges such as climate change and the Covid–19 pandemic in cooperation with other nations on the General Assembly 2021. Wang Yi’s comment on China–US relations at the annual press conference is insightful: ‘It is not surprising that China
and the United States have emerged in the fusion of interests. The key is to compete on a fair and just basis’ (W. Wang 2021). China has publicly made it clear that it has objectively formed a ‘competition’ for its global leadership position with the US, although China may not necessarily have this willingness subjectively, and hopes that there will be more cooperation elements. Wang Yi suggested that the two countries ‘should jointly explore the peaceful coexistence of different systems and civilizations’ (ibid.). In fact, at the 2018 press conference, when faced with a question from Bloomberg about Trump’s aggressive evaluation of China, Wang Yi has said frankly about the US–China relationship: ‘If there is competition between China and the United States, it should also be a healthy and active competition’ (cited in W. Wang 2021). More importantly, both China and the US should establish the bottom lines of each side, and respect each other’s bottom line, paving the way for cooperation for global challenges and a shared future. In the post-Covid-19 era, the best scenario would be cooperation based on effective competition; as Yan (2021: 46) described the US–China relationship: ‘even if competition carries the day, it would be best thought of as a race, not a boxing match: each other is doing its best to get ahead, but neither has any intention of destroying or permanently changing the other’.
5. Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges of the world. Sustainable development diplomacy is needed now more than ever to prioritise development strategies of different states and work on common shared challenges. Sustainable development diplomacy can only work when different actors recognise the value of the common goals and are willing to make an effort to accomplish them. Global sustainable development diplomacy requires a stronger policy agenda and greater cohesion. Competing effectively without sacrificing the benefits of this integration and the potential to cooperate on climate, health, and other global issues of common concern, or escalating into all-out hostilities, is a complex challenge. Sustainable development diplomacy could be an effective solution to dismantle the built-in complexity of challenges facing global leaders under the current global context.

In addition, sustainable development diplomacy needs deeper participation of all relevant stakeholders. It is essential to promote more informal dialogues in an era of uncertainty. A new diplomacy is required that recognises the inherent complexity of issues and the changed realities of sustainable development governance. Moreover, world leaders must realise that the interconnections of the world and of global challenges require effective leadership to tackle climate change and other crises.

The US–China relationship is the defining geopolitical contest of the twenty-first century. The US–China relationship will play a defining role in tackling these shared challenges. Whether or not the US and China can cooperate with each other is key to tackling the shared crises. Their cooperation would directly influence the lives of billions of people. It is normal to step on each other’s toes as the world’s two largest economies, but they cannot confront and compete at the cost of endangering the entire human race (Vaswani 2021). With shared crises and agendas, geopolitical contests between states should be oriented by common goals and mutual benefits, and limited to healthy competition and stable tension. Sustainable development diplomacy and effective leadership to adopt actions immediately are prerequisite to building back better under the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Climate change is one of the main issues where symmetry can be found between China and the West. However, even here, for the world as a whole there are considerable dangers in merely trying to reduce tensions between the two. As shown by the mapping exercise for climate change (which would also be applicable for sustainable development in general
and for Covid–19 diplomacy) the programmes are very unlikely to succeed if the decisive actors are limited to nation states, given their virtually irresistible tendency to zero–sum rivalry, to the exclusion of third–party interests. That is why it should be continuously stressed that a more radical institutional reform must be strived for at global, national and local levels. Success – especially of the climate change and health aspects of SDD – requires an international organisation, a kind of sustainable security council, supported by the technical bodies of the UN, including the WHO and many other bodies named in the report. The new executive security council should include voting participation from professional bodies and NGOs. The actions of international bodies such as these, which are able to represent the interests of most nations as well as non–governmental actors, can ensure that the US–China rivalry does not become the predominant force that determines the outcome of climate change.

The report sets out the nature of the distinction between traditional inter–state diplomacy and sustainable development diplomacy. It then sets out the institutional changes which are necessary for the achievement of sustainable development diplomacy. These are at three levels: above the inter–state level would be the apex of a UN supranational body; and beneath the inter–state level there would be institutionalised participation of both professional experts and NGOs representing international civil society. All three levels should have effective voting participation in a new sustainable development human security council. The analytical conclusion of the report is that without these institutional innovations, health pandemics and climate change – especially the latter – will remain unresolved. These are globally interconnected, long–term issues which cannot be defined as a function of defined, isolated interests of individual states.
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