

The logo for the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) and the Centre for Global Development (CGD), featuring the letters 'ICTD' in a bold, white, sans-serif font. The letters are partially overlaid by a grey circular graphic consisting of three concentric circles.

ICTD

Working Paper 119

Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide

Javier Garcia-Bernardo and Petr Janský

March 2021

BILL & MELINDA
GATES *foundation*

The logo for the Institute of Development Studies, consisting of a white circle above two horizontal white bars.

institute of
development
studies

The logo for UKaid, featuring a stylized Union Jack flag above the text 'UKaid' and 'from the British people' below it.

UKaid
from the British people

ICTD Working Paper 119

Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide

Javier Garcia-Bernardo and Petr Janský

March 2021

Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide

Javier Garcia-Bernardo and Petr Janský


ICTD Working Paper 119

First published by the Institute of Development Studies in March 2021

© Institute of Development Studies 2021

ISBN: 978-1-78118-783-8

DOI: [10.19088/ICTD.2021.005](https://doi.org/10.19088/ICTD.2021.005)



This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 International license, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but the work is not used for commercial purposes. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode>

Available from:

The International Centre for Tax and Development at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK

Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261

Email: info@ictd.ac

Web: www.ictd.ac/publication

Twitter: @ICTDTax

Facebook: www.facebook.com/ICTDtax

IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England

Charity Registration Number 306371

Charitable Company Number 877338

Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide

Javier Garcia-Bernardo and Petr Janský

Summary

Multinational corporations (MNCs) avoid taxes by shifting their profits from countries where real activity takes place towards tax havens, depriving governments worldwide of billions of tax revenue. Earlier research investigating the scale and distribution of profit shifting has faced methodological and data challenges, both of which we address. First, we propose a logarithmic function to model the extremely non-linear relationship between the location of profits and tax rates faced by MNCs at those locations – that is, the extreme concentration of profits without corresponding economic activity in a small number of low-tax jurisdictions. We show that the logarithmic model allows for a more accurate identification of profit shifting than linear and quadratic models. Second, we apply the logarithmic model to newly available country-by-country reporting data for large MNCs – this provides information on the activities of large MNCs, including for the first time many low- and lower-middle-income countries.

We estimate that MNCs shifted US\$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which implies approximately US\$200-300 billion in tax revenue losses worldwide. MNCs headquartered in the United States and Bermuda are the most aggressive at shifting profits towards tax havens, while MNCs headquartered in India, China, Mexico and South Africa the least. We establish which countries gain and lose most from profit shifting: the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Netherlands are among the most important tax havens, whereas low- and lower-middle-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue relative to their total tax revenue. Our findings thus support the arguments of low- and lower-middle-income countries that they should be represented on an equal footing during international corporate tax reform debates.

Keywords: multinational corporation; corporate taxation; profit shifting; effective tax rate; country-by-country reporting; global development.

Javier Garcia-Bernardo is a postdoctoral researcher at Charles University's CORPTAX and a data scientist at the Tax Justice Network. Javier completed his PhD with the title 'tax avoidance by multinational corporations' in the CORPNET group of the University of Amsterdam. Javier did his MSc in Computer Science at the University of Vermont, specialising in Complex Systems.

Petr Janský is an associate professor of economics, principal investigator of CORPTAX and head of department of European economic integration and economic policy at Charles University, Prague. With academic degrees from Charles University and the University of Oxford, Petr specialises in public finance, corporate taxation, tax havens and inequality. Petr has a book published by Oxford University Press, and publishes in scholarly journals such as *International Tax and Public Finance*.

Contents

	Summary	3
	Acknowledgements	7
	Acronyms	7
1	Introduction	8
2	Methodology for estimating profit shifting	10
	2.1 Semi-elasticity model	10
	2.2 Addressing the extreme non-linearity: a logarithmic model	11
	2.3 Reallocating shifted profits	12
	2.4 Misalignment model	13
3	Data	14
	3.1 Use of data in the logarithmic and misalignment models	15
	3.2 Data limitations and corrections: imputing missing data	17
4	Results	20
	4.1 Estimation of profit shifting (2017 US data): the logarithmic model versus other models	21
	4.2 Estimation of profit shifting (2016 OECD data)	25
	4.3 Profit shifting and tax revenue loss by income group	30
	4.4 Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses	32
5	Conclusion	33
	Appendix A General supplementary figures	36
	Appendix B General supplementary tables	46
	Appendix C Data-driven calculation of the effect of tax on profit shifting	58
	Appendix D Sensitivity analysis, extra information	60
	Appendix E Modelling missing employees and revenue	64
	References	68
Tables		
Table 1	Summary statistics for the 11 countries of the sample used in the log-model, for data containing ‘Sub-Groups with positive profits’	17
Table 2	Summary of selected advantages and disadvantages of CBCR data	18
Table 3	Comparison of semi-elasticities for the logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad) and linear (Linear) models	22
Table 4	Percentage of profits shifted into countries with lowest ETRs (weighted by profits), for misalignment (Misal), logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and the DLM models	24
Table 5	Regression table for the CBCR data	27
Table 6	Share of profit shifted into countries grouped by ETR	28
Table 7	Estimates of profits shifted and tax revenue loss (TRL) for misalignment and logarithmic models	28
Table 8	Top 7 destinations of profit shifting (PS (B)) for misalignment and logarithmic models and as a percentage of the total profits booked in the jurisdiction (PS (% booked))	29

Table B1	Number of jurisdictions available per country (aggregated included)	46
Table B2	Expected number of large MNCs headquartered in country (according to Orbis), number of companies observed in CBCR data (using all sub-groups), and ratio between the two	46
Table B3	Countries acting as profit destination, estimated by the misalignment model	47
Table B4	Countries acting as profit origins, estimated by the misalignment model	49
Table B5	Profits (in US\$ million) reported by groups with positive profits (Profits (+)) and all groups (Profits (all groups))	53
Table D1	Regression table using US data and applying other specifications that allow for extreme non-linearities	61
Table D2	Results of a robust linear model, where share of profits book in a country is regressed against share of employees, capital, sales and wages	63
Table E1	Variables and data sources used to model missing employees and revenue	66
Figures		
Figure 1	Country availability in the CBCR data	16
Figure 2	Graphical representation of Table 3 for the logarithmic, quadratic, linear and DLM models	22
Figure 3	Profits shifted in and out of countries using 2017 US data, estimated with misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models	24
Figure 4	Profits shifted in and out of countries using the CBCR data, estimated with the misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models	29
Figure 5	Profits shifted as a percentage of GDP for countries in different income groups, as estimated by the misalignment (left graph) and logarithmic (right graph) models	30
Figure 6	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue for countries in different income groups (top row) and different geographical regions (bottom row), as estimated by the misalignment (left side of graph) and logarithmic (right side of graph) models	31
Figure 7	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue estimated with the misalignment and logarithmic models	32
Figure A1	Loss-making affiliates as a profit shifting strategy, using 2017 US data	36
Figure A2	Profit per employee as a function of the ETR for OECD data	36
Figure A3	Comparison of profits shifted out (A) and profits shifted in (B) for the misalignment and logarithmic models for the 2017 US data	37
Figure A4	Available information by CBCR. Colour denotes increasing GDP per capita	37
Figure A5	Comparison between the redistribution formal (eq. 8) (A) imputing missing data vs using raw data of firms with positive profits; (B) imputing missing data vs using share of GDP	38
Figure A6	Relationship between GDP and domestic employees, sales and tangible assets for countries in 2016 OECD data	38
Figure A7	Relationship between the number of large MNCs (extracted from Orbis), and total profits reported domestically in the country	39
Figure A8	Graphic representation of Table 5 for logarithmic, quadratic, linear and DLM models	39
Figure A9	Comparison of logarithmic and misalignment models	40
Figure A10	Graphical representation of Table 5 for logarithmic model, at country level	40
Figure A11	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of corporate income tax revenue	41

Figure A12	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of GDP	42
Figure A13	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of health expenditure	43
Figure A14	Tax revenue loss as a percentage of government education expenditure	44
Figure A15	Distribution of scale of profit shifted estimated by misalignment model at country level	45
Figure A16	Distribution of tax revenue losses for lower-income countries, visualised with a boxen plot	45
Figure C1	Variables found in the models	59
Figure C2	The found dependency between ETR and profits is visualised	59
Figure D1	Comparison with estimates of profit shifting by Tørsløv et al. (2020)	60
Figure D2	Effect of parameter t in the logarithmic model	60
Figure D3	Graphical representation of Table D1 for the $\log(\tau + ETR)$, $1/(\tau + ETR)$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^2$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^3$ and $\coth(\tau + ETR)$ models	62
Figure D4	Graphical representation of Table D1 for the model with extra dummies variables for following categories of ETR: <1%, 1-5%, 5-10%, 10-15%, 15-20%, 20-25%, 25-30%, >30%	62
Figure D5	Profits shifted in and out of countries using CBCR data, estimated with misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models	63
Figure E1	The boosting model was fit on 60% of the sample and tested in the other 40%	64
Figure E2	A penalised linear regression model was fit on 60% of the sample and tested in the other 40%	65
Figure E3	Permutation importance of each variable for the prediction of profits (ln_pi, not used in paper), (ln_emp), and sales (ln_revt)	65

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Diego d’Andria, Sebastian Beer, Katarzyna Bilicka, Kimberly Clausing, Dharmika Dharmapala, Tim Dowd, Daniel Haberly, Martin Hearson, Tomáš Křehlík, Dominika Langenmayer, Jan Luksic, Ronen Palan, Miroslav Palanský, Caroline Schimanski, Victor Steenbergen, Francis Weyzig and Ludvig Wier for excellent comments. We acknowledge support from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) and from the Czech Science Foundation (CORPTAX, 21-05547M).

Acronyms

BEPS	Base erosion and profit shifting
CBCR	Country-by-country reporting
DLM	Dowd, Landefeld and Moore (Dowd et al. (2017))
ETR	Effective tax rate
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
MNC	Multinational corporation

1 Introduction

One reason why globalisation is viewed as inequitable is corporate tax avoidance. If multinational corporations (MNCs), which benefit from globalisation, exploit it to avoid paying taxes, it is no surprise that other taxpayers view this as inequitable. Publicised case studies, such as those based on the Panama and Paradise Papers, have detailed how little some large MNCs pay in corporate income tax as a result of their use of low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens. A simplified description of such behaviour would be that MNCs carry out their activities and generate profits in a variety of countries worldwide, but shift a large share of those profits to tax havens. To what extent this represents a general pattern has so far remained unclear. Despite recent growth in research interest in corporate tax avoidance, we still lack reliable information on the scale of profit shifting, and on the origin and destination of those profits.

This paper develops a novel methodology and exploits a new dataset to address the question of the scale of profit shifting of MNCs worldwide. On the one hand, we ask which are the most important tax havens, the amount of profits shifted to them, and what share of the profits reported in tax havens have been shifted there. On the other hand, we address the question of which countries tend to lose more tax revenue from profit shifting, both absolutely and relative to their total tax revenue. In addition to country-level results, we investigate whether profit shifting affects countries differently according to their region or their income level. Moreover, we examine whether MNCs differ in the aggressiveness of their tax planning depending on the country of their headquarters. The current lack of definitive answers to these intrinsically linked questions is the result of methodological and data challenges that we address in this paper, with two innovations.

As the first, methodological contribution, we propose a logarithmic function to model the extremely non-linear relationship between the location of profits and the tax rates of MNCs. In estimating the semi-elasticity of profits to tax rates, we build on the literature that confirmed the existence of profit shifting, pioneered by Hines and Rice (1994). Its headline specification of that approach assumes a linear semi-elasticity, which Dowd et al. (2017) show to underestimate profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions, and propose a quadratic semi-elasticity instead. While it is an improvement, we show that this quadratic model is still not able to capture the empirically observed extreme non-linearity in the data: 85-90 per cent of profit shifted takes place towards countries with tax rates below 10%. In this paper, we introduce a logarithmic model to fully capture the extreme non-linearity of the semi-elasticity of profits to tax rates.

Our second innovation is to pioneer the use of country-by-country reporting (CBCR) data, detailing the activities, profits and taxes of large MNCs in 195 countries, aggregated at the headquarter country level. This unique data was first made available by the OECD in July 2020, thanks to a new regulation that requires all large MNCs to report in every country, including tax havens. While it includes the most reliable country-level information about the tax payments and profits of MNCs worldwide, it only covers the year 2016, when reporting by companies was not yet mandatory in all countries, aggregates small countries into categories (e.g. 'Other Africa'), and might be prone to limited double-counting in profits due to confusion in intercompany dividends and so-called stateless entities. We address these concerns by excluding stateless entities, developing a method to estimate missing data, disaggregating categories into individual countries, and using data for 2017 for the United States – the only country that made CBCR data available for that year.

We apply the logarithmic model to the CBCR data to establish the scale and distribution of profit shifting in many countries worldwide, revealing four main findings. First, MNCs shifted US\$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which in turn implies US\$200-300 billion in revenue losses for other countries. The overall estimated scale of profit shifting is similar whether we use logarithmic or quadratic function to model the relationship between the location of profits and tax rates, or a simpler model measuring the misalignment between profits and economic activity. Our total estimates of profit shifting are broadly comparable to, or somewhat higher than, existing estimates such as Tørsløv et al. (2020), who estimate profit shifting to be over US\$600 billion in 2015, albeit using a smaller sample of countries.

Second, we estimate which are the most important tax havens. The large majority of shifted profits are shifted to ten countries with extremely low effective tax rates (ETRs). Moreover, over 75 per cent of the profits booked in those ten countries are artificially shifted there. The Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and Puerto Rico are the largest profit shifting destinations. In contrast with the consistent estimates across models of the overall scale, the most important tax havens – as well as the countries affected by them – differ substantially between models. Both the logarithmic and misalignment models find that countries with ETRs below 1 per cent account for 40 per cent of profit shifting, while the linear and quadratic model find that they account for 30 per cent. Similarly, countries with ETRs above 10 per cent account for 9-18 per cent of profit shifting in the logarithmic and misalignment model, but 27-30 per cent in the linear and quadratic models.

Third, we contribute to the ongoing discussion of which countries lose more tax revenue due to profit shifting, equipped with new data on MNCs. This data has much higher country coverage (195 countries), including many lower-income countries for the first time. We find that lower-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue due to profit shifting relative to their total tax revenue, directly contravening one of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: to ‘Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to lower-income countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection’. In addition, we find that among the affected high-income countries, the United States is estimated to suffer the most from profit shifting in absolute terms according to most of the methods, while Germany and France are estimated to lose between one quarter and two-thirds of their profit base due to profit shifting.

With these findings we contribute to the ongoing discussion of which countries lose more to profit shifting. Few existing studies identify how countries in various income groups are distinctly affected by profit shifting, and the nature of these differences varies across the studies. On the one hand, the theoretical case for such countries’ higher vulnerability is strong (Hearson 2018), and several studies indicate that low- and lower-middle-income countries (which we label as lower-income countries) are more vulnerable to profit shifting by MNCs than countries at higher levels of income (Fuest et al. 2011; Johannesen et al. 2020). On the other hand, Janský and Palanský (2019) compare five sets of country-level estimates – Clausing (2016), Cobham and Janský (2018, 2019), Tørsløv et al. (2020) and their own estimates – and four of the five do not suggest that lower-income countries are disproportionately affected by profit shifting.

Fourth, MNCs headquartered in the US and Bermuda are the most aggressive in terms of profit shifting, among headquarter countries with available data. In contrast, we find no evidence of profit shifting towards tax havens by MNCs headquartered in India, Mexico, South Africa or China. While most previous research has been carried out on US-headquartered MNCs due to data availability, our results highlight that these are not necessarily representative of the universe of all MNCs, and that there are important

differences across countries. Consequently, policymakers might negotiate international agreements differently if they know how aggressive their MNCs and other countries' MNCs are in terms of profit shifting.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the new logarithmic model to estimate the scale and distribution of profit shifting to tax havens, and compares it with specifications found in existing literature. We then describe how we reallocate the shifted profit from tax havens to other countries, as well as the so-called misalignment model as an alternative to the semi-elasticity model. Section 3 details the available datasets used to estimate profit shifting, focusing on the country-by-country data released by the OECD in July 2020. Section 4 shows how our methodology improves profit shifting estimation using US CBCR data, applies the methodology to the OECD CBCR data to obtain global estimates, and describes how profit shifting differs by countries' per capita income. In Section 4, we also summarise the 12 robustness checks and sensitivity analyses with which we show that our findings are robust to changes in the methodology. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Methodology for estimating profit shifting

In this section we first introduce the traditional methodology for estimating profit shifting using linear and quadratic specifications (Section 2.1). We then detail our logarithmic specification as this paper's preferred way of estimating the scale of profit shifting to tax havens (Section 2.2). We proceed to describe how the shifted profit is reallocated from tax havens to other countries on the basis of economic activity (Section 2.3). Finally, we describe how we apply that shifted profit reallocation's logic to estimate the scale of profit shifting itself as the so-called misalignment model (Section 2.4).

2.1 Semi-elasticity model

MNCs can, and many of them do, engage in shifting profit to tax havens where they seek lower taxation of their profits – an excellent review of the literature is provided by Beer et al. (2020a). Consequently, the profit booked in a jurisdiction i by MNCs (π_i) can be expressed as sum of the 'real unobserved profits' (p_i) and profits shifted into the jurisdiction (S_i) minus the cost of profit shifting incurred by the MNCs (c_i):

$$\pi_i = p_i + S_i - c_i. \quad (1)$$

While various methodologies have been used to estimate profit shifting (e.g. Alvarez-Martinez et al. 2018; Auerbach et al. 2017; Crivelli et al. 2016; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Weichenrieder 2009), profit shifting is most frequently modelled using the method proposed by Hines and Rice (1994). This method assumes that the cost of profit shifting increases quadratically with the fraction of profit shifted. The booked profits (π) is maximised subject to the existence of profit shifting, and approximated using either first-order or second-order Taylor expansions. Subsequently, theoretical profits are identified with the Cobb-Douglas production function, yielding equation 2 for the first-order Taylor expansion (the most commonly used specification), and equation 3 for the second-order Taylor expansion.

$$\log(\pi_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(K_i) + \beta_2 \log(L_i) + \beta_3(\tau_i) + \beta_4\chi + \epsilon, \quad (2)$$

where π_i represents profits booked in country i , including both real profit and profit shifted, and K_i and L_i are the capital and labour components of the Cobb-Douglas production

function, usually operationalised with total tangible assets and wages. τ_i is either the tax rate of the subsidiary, the difference of tax rates between the subsidiary and the parent, or, less frequently (due to lacking data), between the subsidiary and other subsidiaries, and χ are controls including, for example, GDP per capita and population.

$$\log(\pi_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(K_i) + \beta_2 \log(L_i) + \beta_3(\tau_i) + \beta_4(\tau_i)^2 + \beta_\chi \chi + \epsilon, \quad (3)$$

Both equations are currently viewed as traditional methods. However, follow-up studies use equation 2 and its modifications much more than equation 3. Recent research has revisited the possibility of significant curvature in the relationship between tax rates and reported profits. In particular, Dowd et al. (2017) apply equation 3 to a panel dataset of US tax returns over the period 2002-2012 and find that the effect of tax on profit shifting is not linear – that incentive to shift profits from a country with a tax rate of 20 per cent to one with a tax rate of 0 per cent is more than double compared to incentive to shift profits from a country with a tax rate of 20 per cent to one with a tax rate of 10 per cent. Dowd et al. (2017) account for this non-linearity by including a quadratic term.

2.2 Addressing the extreme non-linearity: a logarithmic model

In this paper, we argue that the non-linearity of tax semi-elasticity is too extreme to be adequately accounted for using linear or quadratic models. We argue that the assumption of the quadratic relationship between the fraction of profit shifted and the cost of profit shifting, while suitable for the transfer pricing of physical goods where arm-length prices are more readily available, is not suitable for profit shifting strategies based on financial assets such as intellectual property or intra-group lending. In these strategies, the costs of profit shifting are largely fixed. As such, the cost as a fraction of profits shifted is high for low fractions of profit shifted and decreases subsequently (Dischinger and Riedel 2011). Moreover, these costs are comparable regardless of which tax haven profits are shifted to. As such, firms have an incentive to shift profits toward the tax havens with the lowest effective taxation available, not merely to countries with lower ETR, and models including a logarithmic semi-elasticity would more effectively model profit shifting.

This theoretical prediction is empirically backed by three empirical observations. The first is the extreme non-linearity in the profitability of firms in tax havens. The reported profit per employee is relatively constant around US\$30,000 to US\$50,000 per employee in all countries with an ETR above 10 per cent, and exponentially increases as the ETR falls below that level (Figure A2). The second is the empirical results by Dowd et al. (2017). Their discontinuity model yields semi-elasticities for ETR below 10 per cent twice as large as their quadratic model, indicating that the extreme non-linearity is not fully captured with a quadratic term. The third is our data-driven exploration of the data (see Appendix C), in which we used symbolic regression to obtain the models that best fitted the data. All these models included a term that allows for extreme non-linearity semi-elasticities: the logarithmic term.

In order to model the extreme non-linearity, we propose to modify the equation as follows:

$$\log(\pi_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(K_i) + \beta_2 \log(L_i) + \beta_3(\tau_i) + \beta_4 \log(t + \tau_i) + \beta_\chi \chi + \epsilon. \quad (4)$$

We argue that including the logarithmic term enables us to capture the extreme non-linearity better than by including the quadratic term, and we show this empirically in the results section. In equation 4, τ is the tax rate faced by the subsidiary that we proxy by ETRs. Overall, ETRs are a better alternative than statutory rates, since ETRs are more realistic and more likely to be used by MNCs for making profit shifting decisions (despite the downside of

ETRs being potentially endogenous to profit shifting, since, for example, governments might lower ETRs to attract shifted profits). t is an offset parameter, included in order to avoid obtaining extremely high differences in the tax semi-elasticity for countries with similar but extremely low tax rates. We obtain the optimal value of the offset (0.0014 for US data and 0.0007 for OECD data) numerically by iterating over the range 0-1 and keeping the value that minimises the Bayesian Information Criterion. In section 4.4 we show that our results are highly robust to the choice of the offset, and that including this parameter in the linear and quadratic models does not increase their predictive power.

We further include headquarter-country fixed effects to account for differences in profitability and data reporting methods between MNCs headquartered in different countries, and interaction terms between the country fixed effects and $\log(t + \tau_i)$, which capture differences in the profit shifting aggressiveness of the MNCs of different reporting countries.

Consistently with the literature, we operationalise capital (K) using tangible assets, and labour (L) using wages. A limitation of the operationalisation of the capital component through tangible assets is that tangible assets are affected by profit shifting strategies. For example, US MNCs in Luxembourg report the second highest value of tangible assets in Europe according to the CBCR data, with a combined value of US\$220 billion (the value reported in Germany, France and all of Africa combined). As a consequence, using tangible assets will yield conservative estimates of the tax semi-elasticity. Since the data does not include wages, we model them using the product of employees and the average salary in each country, obtained from the International Labour Organization. Missing values in the average salary are estimated using a linear model containing log-GDP and log-Population ($R^2 = 0.91$).

After estimating the tax semi-elasticities using equation 4, we calculate for each pair of countries (headquarter country and jurisdiction of operation) the underlying profits without profit shifting, \hat{p}_i . For this, we remove the effect of tax rates by comparing the profits reported in country i with the profits in the hypothetical case that the country would have had an ETR of 25 per cent:

$$\hat{p}_i = \pi_i \cdot \frac{e^{\beta_4(0.25_i) + \beta_5 \log(t+0.25)}}{e^{\beta_4(\tau_i) + \beta_5 \log(t+\tau_i)}} \quad (5)$$

This ETR threshold of 25 per cent corresponds roughly to a zero marginal effect of the ETR on profits in the quadratic and logarithmic models, as explored further in the results section. Since MNCs do not appear to shift profits towards countries with ETRs above 15 per cent, and our threshold is 25 per cent, \hat{p}_i is almost always larger than π_i . The results are robust to changes in this threshold. A threshold of 20 per cent reduces the estimate of profit shifting using the logarithmic model by 5 per cent, the estimate using the quadratic model by 18 per cent and the estimate using the linear model by 24 per cent. This is expected, since the vast majority of profits are shifted towards countries with extremely low tax rates, which the logarithmic models can account for.

2.3 Reallocating shifted profits

In this paper, we assume that the costs of profit shifting are largely fixed, and do not differ significantly with the size of financial flows. Once a tax-haven-based tax avoidance structure is in place (e.g. intellectual property located in a tax haven), we assume that the costs do not increase much with each additional dollar of profit shifted through it. Consequently, since

they constitute a small share of their overall costs, and are typically much lower than the tax avoided through profit shifting, these costs are minor for large MNCs (the only ones included in the CBCR data). By contrast, smaller companies may not find it worthwhile to set up such tax-haven-based tax avoidance structures at all. This dichotomy has been observed previously (Davies et al. 2018; Johannesen et al. 2020), and, indeed, large MNCs tend to be responsible for the bulk of profit shifting (Reynolds and Wier 2018). Profit shifting is calculated as the difference of the booked profits and the estimated profits, assuming that the cost of profit shifting is small:

$$\hat{S}_i = \pi_i - \hat{p}_i \quad (6)$$

Since \hat{p}_i is almost always larger than π_i , S_i does not correspond to profit shifted in or out of the country (i.e. $\sum_i \hat{S}_i > 0$). For this to happen, we need to redistribute shifted profits to where real economic activity takes place:

$$\Delta P_i = -\hat{S}_i + \left(\sum_i \hat{S}_i \right) \cdot R_i, \quad (7)$$

where the change in profits due to profit shifting, ΔP_i , is defined as the profits shifted out of the country, $-\hat{S}_i$ (we reverse its sign since $-\hat{S}_i$ measures profits shifted into a country), plus the share of total profit shifted redistributed back to the country.

We define the redistribution formula, R_i , operationalising real economic activity, as

$$R_i = 1/4 \frac{L_i}{\sum_i L_i} + 1/4 \frac{W_i}{\sum_i W_i} + 1/2 \frac{Rev_i}{\sum_i Rev_i}, \quad (8)$$

where 25 per cent of the weight is given to employees (L_i), 25 per cent to wages (W_i) and 50 per cent to unrelated party revenues (Rev_i). We use unrelated party revenues, which are less affected by tax-planning strategies than, for example, tangible assets. This is the same formula used by the misalignment model described in section 2.4. The reallocation of shifted profits to the jurisdictions where economic activity takes place is also used in the (OECD 2020) BEPS plan in both pillar one (excess profit allocation) and pillar two (undertaxed payments rule), as well as by Beer et al. (2020b). In the sensitivity analysis, we test that our results are robust to changes in the redistribution formula.

After the redistribution, the sum of the change in profits due to profit shifting, $\sum \Delta P_i$, sums to zero.

Finally, tax revenue loss, TRL_i , is the product of the change in the profit base and the ETR (and we use the statutory rate as a robustness check):

$$TRL_i = \Delta P_i \cdot ETR_i \quad (9)$$

2.4 Misalignment model

In addition to various semi-elasticity model specifications, we estimate the scale of profit shifting based on profit misalignment. The misalignment model applies basic arithmetic to the data to observe how well the location of reported profits are aligned with the location of economic activity, typically approximated by a combination of labour (measured using wages and employees), capital (often approximated with tangible assets) and revenue. Profit

misalignment is then calculated as the difference between reported profits (π) and estimated theoretical profits (\hat{p}). In our version of this method, and as in equation 8, we calculate \hat{p} giving 25 per cent of the weight to employees, 25 per cent of the weight to wages, and 50 per cent of the weight to unrelated party revenues (eq. 10). Since the majority of profits are shifted towards a small number of tax havens, the exact formula has little impact on the aggregated estimation of profit shifting, although can affect the results for individual countries (which we explore in section 4.4 Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses).

$$\hat{p}_i = R_i \cdot \sum_i \pi_i. \quad (10)$$

Profit shifting is again calculated as the difference between booked profits and the estimated profits (eq. 6). In a pure misalignment model, the sum of profit shifting is equal to zero ($\sum \hat{S}_i = 0$ and $\Delta P_i = \hat{S}_i$). We, however, add one extra constraint, similarly to OECD (2020). We set the profit misalignment of all foreign observations (pairs of reporting and investment countries where the reporting and investment countries are different) with a tax rate higher than 25 per cent to zero, since we assumed that an MNC would not shift profits to a country with a tax rate over 25 per cent. This corrects for extreme outliers, such as the high profits of Bermudian companies in Peru and high profits of MNCs in resource-rich countries compared with the economic activity in the countries. In order to ensure that $\sum \Delta P_i = 0$, we redistribute the profits as in section 2.1.

3 Data

Our paper exploits the CBCR dataset that became available in July 2020, and is of unprecedented quality. The dataset was created thanks to a CBCR regulation that stems from OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, and requires all large MNCs to report how much tax they pay in individual countries, including tax havens. The regulation impacts MNCs with consolidated annual group revenue of €750 million and above, headquartered in any country that has adopted the CBCR regulation. The firm-level data is collected by the headquarter country, aggregated by country of operations, and published by the OECD. The published data, which we use in this paper, is thus aggregated at the country level for each reporting country – for example, India publishes data on the operations of India-headquartered MNCs in Ghana, Switzerland and many other countries.

To our knowledge, there are several research papers using CBCR data from the US (Clausing 2020b; Cobham et al. 2019; De Mooij et al. 2019; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021) and Germany (Fuest et al. 2021), and this is the first paper using the OECD CBCR data.

We use the 2016 OECD CBCR data, which contains data for 26 headquarter countries (see Table B1). The 2017 CBCR data is expected to be released by the OECD in July 2021. Since reporting by US MNCs was voluntary in 2016, we replaced the 2016 data on US MNCs provided by the OECD with the 2017 data published by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The US IRS has been publishing CBCR data 17 months before it is published by the OECD, which has allowed previous researchers to compare US CBCR with other sources (Clausing 2020b; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021), and established a good correlation between various types of data sources. Moreover, the CBCR data is outstanding in at least three dimensions.

First, one of the most obvious advantages of CBCR data over other data sources is its much more substantial country coverage. This is especially relevant for lower-income countries and

for selected parts of the world, for which coverage from other data sources is notoriously limited (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). For example, US CBCR data includes information on taxes and profits for US MNCs in 25 African countries, while the frequently used data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce only covers 3. CBCR data includes data on large MNCs' profits and tax payments in, for example, up to 141 (US) and 163 (India) jurisdictions in the full dataset. The exceptional data coverage of up to 195 countries enables us to estimate the scale of profit shifting for lower-income countries. This country coverage is one reason why UNODC and UNCTAD (2020) propose to use this CBCR data for the Sustainable Development Goals indicator of illicit financial flows, likely in a similar way that we implement the profit misalignment method outlined in Section 2.4.

Second, CBCR ensures that profits and taxes are defined consistently with the concepts of corporate profits and taxes. By contrast, this is not the case with, for example, Bureau of Economic Analysis data, where profits are imputed from a combination of net profits, intra-group dividends, interest paid and other variables, as recently discussed by Blouin and Robinson (2020), Clausing (2020a), Clausing (2020b), Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2021). Consequently, CBCR data excludes double-counting in revenue and likely in profit (with the exception of stateless entities dropped from our analysis and intercompany dividends, for which companies have neither instructions nor incentive to double-count). Since CBCR data offers the best available information on MNCs' tax payments for many countries, it thus provides us with the first suitable dataset for a high-quality cross-country comparison – until now various proxies for profits were used, for example, by Haberly and Wójcik (2015), Bolwijn et al. (2018) or Damgaard et al. (2019).

Third, CBCR data is provided in two separate datasets, for all subsidiaries ('All Sub-Groups'), as well as for those subsidiaries that had positive profits and so not losses ('Sub-Groups with Positive Profit'). While the data on affiliates with positive profits has lower coverage (Table B1), it allows for accurate estimates of the ETR.

3.1 Use of data in the logarithmic and misalignment models


We use different subsets of the data for different parts of the methodology.

We estimate ETR as the ratio of accrued taxes over profits, using the data on 'sub-groups with positive profits'. By using the data with positive profits only, we avoid offsetting firms with losses and firms with profits, and we can thus estimate ETRs more precisely. Since taxes are typically paid by companies earning profits, including companies making losses would overstate ETRs. We use ETRs in two parts of the paper: to calculate profit shifting in the semi-elasticity models, and to calculate tax revenue losses. For the semi-elasticity models we remove outliers – country dyads with tax rates above 50 per cent or smaller than 0 per cent. We also remove observations when reported profits are below US\$1 billion. This eliminates outliers and allows for a more efficient estimation of the semi-elasticities. To calculate tax revenue losses we use the average ETR in the country, using the average ETR paid by foreign MNCs and the statutory tax rate as robustness checks. The average ETR is weighted by profits booked: $\frac{ETR_i \pi_i}{\sum \pi_i}$. For countries that are only available in the data on all sub-groups but not in the data on sub-groups with positive profit, we used the statutory corporate income tax rate.¹ The ETRs are reported in Table B5.

¹ This was the case for Andorra, Armenia, Belize, Brunei, Central African Republic, Georgia, Gambia, Haiti, Kyrgyz Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Moldova, North Macedonia, New Caledonia, North Korea, French Polynesia, Sudan, Togo, Chad, and Uzbekistan.

First, we estimate the semi-elasticity model (detailed in section 2.1) using data on ‘sub-groups with positive profits’ for the 11 countries that reported data on at least 8 offshore financial centres (Figure 1).² Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the CBCR data for the countries in this sample, distinguishing between domestic and foreign activities of MNCs – domestic ones are those in the reporting (i.e. headquarter) countries, while foreign ones are those in all other countries (i.e. except for the domestic one). For most countries domestic profits and activities are higher than foreign ones. The exceptions are mainly Bermuda and Luxembourg, which are often considered tax havens, as well as Belgium. The observed balance between domestic and foreign activities provides useful guidance for when we estimate missing data in Section 3.2.

Figure 1 Country availability in the CBCR data



Note. Countries (horizontal axis) reporting on large offshore financial centres (vertical axes) are depicted with black squares.

Second, we reallocate profits shifted (equation 8) using the dataset including all sub-groups for the 27 countries that reported some information. Using the complete dataset allow us to more accurately measure information on real economic activities of MNCs regardless of whether the affiliates are profit- or loss-making. Since MNCs prefer to report losses in countries with high taxes while locating their profits in countries with low taxes, excluding loss-making affiliates would exclude an important component of profit shifting (see Figure A1 for a visualisation of this behaviour in the CBCR data, and De Simone et al. (2017) for an empirical confirmation using tax returns data in the United Kingdom). The dataset on all sub-groups is also more suitable for comparison with other datasets (e.g. from the Bureau of Economic Analysis).

Finally, and for the same reasons explained in the previous paragraph, we used data on all sub-groups for the misalignment model. The ETRs (used to calculate tax revenue losses) are still calculated from the data on sub-groups with positive profit. Since the misalignment method is not affected by outliers we keep all observations in the sample.

² We run a robustness check and find no significant differences with the full sample, see section 4.4 for more information.

Table 1 Summary statistics for the 11 countries of the sample used in the log-model, for the data containing ‘Sub-Groups with positive profits’

Reporting	Partner	Firms	Profits	Tax accrued	Tax paid	Employees	Revenue	Assets	ETR (%)	ETR (%)
		profits>0	US\$bn	US\$bn	US\$bn	Thousands	US\$bn	US\$bn	accrued	cash
Australia	Domestic	94	69.8	13.9	10.0	949.9	365.2	340.7	19.9%	14.3%
	Foreign	758	26.5	3.1	2.7	335.3	124.2	92.9	11.6%	10.1%
Belgium	Domestic	43	18.7	1.0	0.8	146.0	88.4	90.8	5.4%	4.1%
	Foreign	52	82.2	7.1	8.5	499.3	167.5	101.2	8.7%	10.3%
Bermuda	Domestic	26	12.7	0.0	0.0	2.1	10.4	9.1	0.2%	0.1%
	Foreign	26	88.7	9.4	12.8	530.3	520.5	620.3	10.6%	14.5%
China	Domestic	77	391.8	65.5	77.9	11543.8	2785.2	5471.2	16.7%	19.9%
	Foreign	905	57.3	5.3	5.2	355.6	376.7	336.1	9.2%	9.1%
Denmark	Domestic	35	17.0	2.4	2.5	120.5	44.7	24.0	13.9%	14.5%
	Foreign	39	10.0	0.7	0.8	783.4	74.9	40.5	6.6%	7.7%
India	Domestic	146	74.8	18.4	22.2	3891.3	564.2	864.0	24.6%	29.7%
	Foreign	N/A	15.0	2.3	5.9	548.5	130.5	121.8	15.5%	39.6%
Italy	Domestic	104	48.3	6.6	7.4	630.5	340.7	209.1	13.6%	15.4%
	Foreign	130	44.9	5.7	6.4	612.8	263.0	148.2	12.6%	14.3%
Luxembourg	Domestic	52	8.2	0.1	0.1	8.8	8.6	18.4	1.4%	0.9%
	Foreign	119	34.3	2.4	2.8	1142.9	372.1	128.6	6.9%	8.1%
Mexico	Domestic	60	26.5	6.4	6.8	1228.6	139.3	100.6	23.9%	25.5%
	Foreign	334	9.8	2.3	2.3	340.9	114.2	79.0	23.1%	23.4%
United States	Domestic	1094	1310.5	257.9	209.6	19601.7	9426.7	4880.5	19.7%	16.0%
	Foreign	1548	873.6	102.5	100.5	10972.0	3338.4	1722.2	11.7%	11.5%
South Africa	Domestic	34	16.5	1.7	2.4	604.3	69.5	77.0	10.1%	14.6%
	Foreign	574	5.2	1.2	0.9	316.9	43.7	41.1	23.8%	18.1%

Note. The aggregated number of firms ('Firms profits>0'), profits, tax accrued, tax paid, number of employees, unrelated-party revenue, tangible assets and ETRs (accrued and cash-based) are shown for domestic activities (financial reporting of MNCs in the reporting (i.e. headquarter countries) and foreign activities (financial reporting in all other countries). Since we are using sub-groups with positive profits, the number of firms included in the domestic section can be lower than the number of firms reporting on foreign operations. Non-available data is marked with N/A.

3.2 Data limitations and corrections: imputing missing data

While the substantial country coverage, as well as the other advantages of CBCR data, open new avenues for research, several challenges associated with the new data source remain (we summarise them and the above-discussed advantages in Table 2). First, a certain extent of double counting in profit due to intercompany dividends is inevitable – MNCs are instructed not to double count intercompany dividends in revenue, but not instructed to do so explicitly in profit. Some countries (e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden) have published associated notes together with their data, showing that domestic operations of MNCs may be considerably affected by this. This potential double counting is one consequence of CBCR data being based on financial accounting rather than tax accounting, a limitation shared with most other data sources. However, the potential double counting is expected to have a

limited effect – since we exclude income of stateless entities,³ which might account for 38 per cent of the potential double counting for US MNCs (Horst and Curatolo 2020); since using financial accounting has been found to underestimate profit shifting (Bilicka 2019); and since the US CBCR data produces totals reassuringly consistent with other data sources (Clausing 2020b; Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). Moreover, there do not seem to be incentives for double counting profits in tax havens, since MNCs know that this data is used for assessing transfer pricing risk.

Table 2 Summary of selected advantages and disadvantages of CBCR data

Selected advantages

Includes data on large MNCs' profits and tax payments in around 100 jurisdictions for at least 5 headquarter countries.
Does not include double counting in revenue and limited in profit.
Enables to use data on large MNCs and those with positive profit only (the latter estimates ETRs more precisely).

Selected disadvantages

Might include some double counting in profit due to intercompany dividends or stateless entities (which we drop).
Includes a sample of large MNCs for 2016 for some countries in aggregated and anonymised form (which we address).

Second, while the availability of CBCR data constitutes a significant step forward, and partially corrects this issue, the data is still not complete and is not systematically disaggregated by jurisdiction. The CBCR regulation has been implemented by approximately 100 countries so far – only 26 of them agreed to share their data publicly in aggregated and anonymised form; moreover, some have chosen to aggregate data to a far greater extent than others (Figure 1). Of the 137 jurisdictions included in the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, 58 jurisdictions agreed on collecting CBCR, 35 received data from 20+ MNCs, 26 jurisdictions shared a limited amount of data, and only 10 jurisdictions disaggregated the data on more than 60 countries, with the US and India (137 and 163 jurisdictions, respectively) leading the way (Table B1). In the remainder of this section, we deal empirically with three issues related to data completeness: the lack of completeness in the data of reporting countries; the varying combinations of countries in the aggregated country categories; and the lack of reporting by some countries. Other limitations of the CBCR data (e.g. revenue unavailable according to the location of the final customer) are discussed by the OECD, which published the data with an 'Important disclaimer regarding the limitations of the country-by-country report statistics', and by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2021) and Clausing (2020b).

The first limitation concerns the lack of completeness in the data of reporting countries. We address this limitation by comparing the number of companies in Orbis, a frequently used database covering over 300 million public and private firms worldwide, with the number of companies observed in CBCR (Table B2). Orbis has good coverage regarding the number and consolidated revenue of large MNCs (Garcia-Bernardo and Takes 2018), but poor information at the subsidiary level (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021; Phillips et al. 2020). While the number of companies observed and expected are similar for most countries, we observe large differences in the case of some countries. We therefore multiplied all reported financial information by a ratio listed in Table B2 in case that ratio was above one, with the exception of two countries – the US and China. In the case of the US, we expected 1,501 companies according to Orbis. Instead, we find 1,101 companies in the 2016 data. This is due to a lack

³ Stateless entities include not only entities whose stateless status results from a mismatch between the legislation of two jurisdictions (e.g. the case of Apple Sales International in Ireland), but also includes flow-through entity (tax-transparent entities). The latter are not considered separate legal entities from their owners, and whose profits are taxed at the level of the owner.

of completeness of 2016 data in the US (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2021). US IRS data for 2017 indicates that we should observe approximately 1,575 companies – 1,548 with profits in at least one jurisdiction. In order to correct for this disparity we use US data for 2017 (the US is the only country that has published data for 2017). In China, instead of the expected 583, only 82 companies reported satisfactory data to the OECD. However, those 82 companies reported US\$2.9 trillion of sales domestically, and US\$0.45 trillion abroad; for comparison, the numbers for the US in 2016 were US\$7.8 trillion domestically and US\$3.4 trillion abroad. This indicates that the data is not as erratic as it may appear. Lacking a better heuristic, we multiply the financial information for China by a conservative factor of two, and run robustness tests to assess the impact of our correction (Section 4.4).

The second limitation concerns the combination of countries in aggregated categories – for example, Chile and the British Virgin Islands may be grouped together in ‘Other Americas’. The aggregation criterion is different for different countries. While India and South Africa do not seem to aggregate data, the US aggregates countries with a low number of reporting MNCs. This is problematic, as aggregation affects particularly lower-income countries and low tax jurisdictions. For instance, only three countries report information on Zambia, and only two countries report on the Isle of Man. The other countries aggregate information on Zambia and the Isle of Man in larger categories such as Other Africa and Other Europe. If we decided to ignore this grouped data, we would be missing a significant part of the operations in those countries, leading to an underestimation of the extent of profit shifting. This is acknowledged by the Economic Analysis and Impact Assessment of the OECD (OECD 2020), who impute missing sales by extrapolating using a gravity model using data available in the CBCR, Orbis, and the OECD’s Activity of Multinational Enterprises database, as well as foreign direct investment and GDP data.

We address these biases by modelling the location of employees and sales for each pair of countries using a Histogram-based Gradient Boosting Regression Tree, a type of gradient boosting based on decision trees that frequently outperforms other machine learning algorithms, while offering some interpretability on the most relevant features (Friedman 2001; Ke et al. 2017). Specifically, we use the Python implementation in scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al. 2011). Another of its advantages is that it offers native support for missing values, and as such is able to use a large range of features without data imputation. We train the location of profits, employees, sales and tangible assets using variables from the gravity dataset of CEPIL, imports and exports from UN Comtrade, and foreign direct investment from the World Bank, as well as from other sources detailed in Table E1 in Appendix E. We obtain a mean out-of-sample R-square of 0.59, 0.45, 0.47 and 0.39 respectively for employees, sales, profits and tangible assets.

We use the model to estimate the total number of employees, unrelated party sales and tangible assets for each pair of countries in the world. For reporting countries, we then adjust the estimated values so their sum corresponds to the aggregated sum in CBCR. We demonstrate our approach using the following model scenario: French MNCs have 10,000 employees in Other America, and Other America comprises Paraguay and Suriname – we can establish this by checking which countries are missing from the CBCR data of France. If our model estimates 6,000 employees in Paraguay and 5,000 employees in Suriname, we multiply the employees of those countries by 10,000 and divide by 11,000. In the next step, we compare for each country the sums of those estimated values with the sums of the values observed in the CBCR data. We then use the lowest of the two ratios (estimated vs. reported employees and sales) to adjust the profits shifted in order to correct for the combination of small countries in aggregated groups. We cap this ratio at 10 – that is, if the model expects that the OECD data is less than 10 per cent complete, we consider it to be 10 per cent complete. While the estimation of missing economic activity increases total shifted profits by

approximately 30 per cent, it is key with respect to accounting for missing data in countries underrepresented in the sample – typically lower-income countries. Without this step, we would redistribute too few profits to those countries. Figure A4 shows the available information on CBCR, displaying how data coverage is especially worrisome in the case of lower-income countries.

The third limitation concerns the lack of reporting by some countries, including Germany, Spain and the UK, which excludes MNCs headquartered in those countries from the sample – but we do have the operations in those countries of MNCs headquartered in reporting countries. This limitation is partially addressed in the previous step, where financial information for all pairs of countries is estimated, even for non-reporting countries. However, the information on domestic activities of MNCs is important, especially for large countries. This is addressed by estimating the number of domestic employees and revenue for all non-reporting countries. We do so by using a linear model based on the number of expected companies in each country, its GDP, population, the average ETRs and the total consolidated banking claims on an immediate counterparty basis (Table B4 of the BIS data) (R-square 0.97, 0.98 respectively for employees and sales; see also Figures A6 and A7).

Importantly, in the logarithmic model, we only use the fixes to the second and third limitations to redistribute profits back to the home countries, but not to calculate profit shifted. We do this since we do not have accurate estimates of ETR for MNCs of non-reporting countries. Instead, we divide the total profit shifted by the share of GDP of the countries of the sample (49%). This is a similar figure to the available economic activity estimated in the CBCR data using the fixes to the second and third limitation (45%). Using the GDP in the logarithmic model may be a conservative strategy, since we are assuming that the MNCs of non-reporting countries (the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and Ireland) are similar to those of reporting countries.

Finally, we assess our results' sensitivity to the estimation of missing information. To do so, we train the models 1,000 times using bootstrapped samples of the data (i.e. the gradient boosting ensemble to address the second limitation and the linear regression to address the third limitation) and record the impact in our results. Since the sampling randomly removes information, samples without important dyads (e.g. USA-Netherlands, or China-Hong Kong) will be more affected. This thus offers a conservative strategy that allows us to partially understand how our results depend on methodological choices. In the end, we use median values as our preferred point estimates.

The difference between the observed and estimated location of employees and sales is visualised in Figure A5. In comparison with the observed location of the economy, the estimated location is more balanced, giving less weight to reporting countries, and affecting especially Asian and African countries – see the largest outliers in Figure A5A. Our estimated location of the economy matches closely the share of GDP for richer countries, while departs for developing countries (Figure A5B). This is expected given the lower presence of large MNCs in developing countries.

4 Results

The results section is composed of four parts. In the first part we demonstrate the advantage of our methodology using the 2017 US CBCR data. In the second part we apply our methodology to the 2016 OECD CBCR data, and compare it to estimates generated using other methodologies. In the third part we test whether the scales of profit shifting and

associated tax revenue loss are higher or lower in some country groups. In the fourth part, we present a series of robustness tests and sensitivity analyses.

4.1 Estimation of profit shifting (2017 US data): the logarithmic model versus other models

We first test our methodology using only 2017 US CBCR data. Restricting our analysis to US data allows us to compare with previous analysis, including one of the best-regarded papers on profit shifting using tax semi-elasticities, Dowd et al. (2017). The results of our regressions (Table 3) shows that the logarithmic model fits the data better than any other model. This not only involves a higher R-square and lower Bayesian information criteria, but also a better disaggregation of the origin and destination of profits shifted. Figure 2 shows a graphical interpretation of the coefficients. The logarithmic model is capable of accounting for extreme ratios of profit shifted in small countries with low ETRs, while at the same time avoiding the overestimation of profit shifted in countries with tax rates between 15-25 per cent.

Empirically, the misalignment strategy shows that profit is not misaligned with economic activity in those countries. However, the quadratic model assumes that 18-43 per cent of profits in those countries have been shifted in. By contrast, the logarithmic model assumes that only 5-19 per cent have been (Table 4).⁴ Importantly, the logarithmic model and the misalignment model clearly identify that the majority of profits in small countries with extremely low tax rates are shifted there. This effect is less pronounced for the quadratic model, and especially so for the linear model (Table 4). For an ETR of 1.5 per cent (e.g. Bermuda), the logarithmic and quadratic model estimates that 94 per cent and 90 per cent of the booked profits have been shifted into the country, while the linear model estimates that only 61 per cent have.


The estimates of tax semi-elasticity from Dowd et al. (2017) (hereinafter referred to as DLM) are considered to be one of the best currently available (e.g. Clausing 2020b). However, using these semi-elasticities to estimate profit shifted at the country level shows that DLM are likely to underestimate profit shifting by up to 80 per cent in tax havens. The elasticities reported by DLM imply that merely 23-38 per cent of the profits booked in Cayman Islands have been shifted there (Table 3), while both the quadratic and logarithmic models estimate that over 90 per cent of the profits have been shifted there. This corresponds extremely well with the misalignment strategy: US MNCs book 2.86 per cent of their profits in the Cayman Islands, but only 0.06 per cent of their estimated economic activity is in fact carried out there, resulting in a misalignment of 98.0 per cent.

⁴ Note that for countries with a tax rate above 15%, even when the estimated profits shifted are 20% of the total profits, this is usually offset by the redistribution of profits in tax havens back to the origins; we explore this at the end of this section.

Table 3 Comparison of semi-elasticities for the logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad) and linear (Linear) models

	Log	Quad	Log+Quad	Linear	DLM-Quad	DLM-Linear
Intercept	-6.8326*** (2.0061)	-0.8160 (2.1996)	-7.3478*** (2.1783)	-0.8683 (2.4403)		2.482 (0.136)
ETR	5.5093*** (1.4594)	-17.2618*** (3.0732)	8.5732 (5.1545)	-4.0226*** (1.0793)	-3.748	-1.076 (0.108)
log(0.0014 + ETR)	-1.5176*** (0.1920)		-1.6464*** (0.2834)			
ETR ²		28.5306*** (6.2822)	-4.8589 (7.8373)		7.184	
log(Population)	0.3694*** (0.1051)	0.2885** (0.1235)	0.3671*** (0.1056)	0.1807 (0.1344)		
log(GDPpc)	0.4721*** (0.1628)	0.4953** (0.1926)	0.4698*** (0.1634)	0.4917** (0.2137)		
log(Tangible Assets)	0.4874*** (0.0748)	0.6354*** (0.0832)	0.4841*** (0.0753)	0.7436*** (0.0885)		
log(Wages)	0.1617* (0.0929)	0.0291 (0.1066)	0.1648* (0.0934)	-0.0670 (0.1159)		
N	91	91	91	91	96,959	96,959
R2	0.90 222.58	0.86 253.21	0.90 226.67	0.82 268.68	0.465	0.465

Figure 2 Graphical representation of Table 3 for the logarithmic, quadratic, linear and DLM models



Notes. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C, D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C respectively, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%. Note that the marginal effects for the logarithmic model decreases faster than other models as the ETR approaches 0%.


The main reason why the estimated semi-elasticities of DLM are three times below the ones estimated by us is likely the difference in the aggregation level and type of model used by DLM (firm-level and within model) and us (country-level and between model). While firm-level data is generally preferred, it is rarely available with characteristics comparable to the CBCR data (and almost invariably only for individual countries and in collaboration with tax administrations, such as in the case of DLM), and may lead to an underestimation of the scale of profit shifting if a within model is used. A between-country estimation exploits differences across countries, implicitly reflecting all historical developments up until today. In contrast, a within-firm or within-country approach ignores profit shifting taking place at the beginning of the studied time period. In our opinion, a within-between model (first proposed by Mundlak 1978) would be preferred to analyse profit shifting, since it can simultaneously model the within and between effects, and as such model both the potential effects of changes in tax rates, and the scale of profit shifting. Our data is more similar to that of Hines and Rice (1994) and Clausing (2016), which estimate a constant tax semi-elasticity in the range of 6-13 and 2-5 respectively – both of which are among the studies with higher values of estimated semi-elasticities, as reviewed by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) and Beer et al. (2020a).

Figure 2 shows a U-shaped relationship in the effect of ETRs on profits. The semi-elasticity is negative until the ETR reaches approximately 25 per cent, thereafter becoming positive. This is due to high profits in countries rich in natural resources, such as Angola, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Norway and Nigeria. These countries levy resource taxes while carrying out activities that produce vast amounts of profit in relation to the labour and capital costs. In order to correct for this in our estimates of profit shifting, we assume a tax semi-elasticity of zero if the ETR is higher than 25 per cent. This approach is also used in the Impact Assessment of the BEPS plan (OECD 2020).

Next, we redistribute the profits shifted according to equation 8 to calculate global profit shifting. The logarithmic model yields an estimate of US\$365 billion of profit shifted, comparable to the US\$304 billion of profit shifted found by the misalignment strategy (Figure 3).⁵ The destination of shifted profits is similar between models (Figure 3 and A3). The majority of these profits are in a small group of tax havens. The large majority of profits shifted, are shifted to the top 10 countries shown in Table 4. Moreover, over 75 per cent of the profits booked in those 10 countries are artificially shifted there. The Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and Puerto Rico are the largest destinations. However, several differences may be observed. Profit shifted to Luxembourg is three times larger in the logarithmic model. This is due to the presence of many companies with losses. Compared with the US\$24 billion of profits found in Luxembourg in the data on 'All Sub-Groups' (used for the misalignment model), we found US\$60 billion of profits in the data on 'Sub-Groups with positive profits'. Similarly, while the 'Other Europe', 'Other Asia&Oceania' and 'Other America' groups appear as profit destinations in the logarithmic model, they appear as places of profit origin in the misalignment. This is due to the higher granularity of the data with 'All Sub-Groups' used for the misalignment model. There, 'Isle of Man', 'Barbados', 'Gibraltar', 'Macao' and 'the British Virgin Islands' appear as standalone countries, with US\$24 billion shifted into those countries.

⁵ Since our objective in this section is to compare the different methodologies and not to present the scale of profit shifted for individual countries, we do not try to disaggregate categories (e.g. 'Other Europe') into individual countries, as detailed in section 3.2 and as applied in section 4.2.

Figure 3 Profits shifted in and out of countries using 2017 US data, estimated with the misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models



Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country (compared to booked profits).

Table 4 Percentage of profits shifted into countries with lowest ETRs (weighted by profits), for misalignment (Misal.), logarithmic (log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and the DLM models

Country	ETR	Profits (+)	Profits (all)	Misal.	Log	Quad	Linear	Quad (DLM)	Linear (DLM)
Jersey	0.1%	\$14.2 bn	\$11.7 bn	96.1%	99.6%	91.9%	63.2%	38.3%	23.5%
Cayman Islands	0.5%	\$62.4 bn	\$58.5 bn	98.3%	98.5%	91.3%	62.7%	37.5%	23.2%
Other Europe	0.7%	\$14.4 bn	\$0.0 bn	-	97.7%	91.0%	62.3%	36.9%	23.0%
Luxembourg	0.9%	\$60.4 bn	\$24.9 bn	88.5%	97.0%	90.7%	62.1%	36.5%	22.8%
Puerto Rico	1.4%	\$35.2 bn	\$34.3 bn	92.8%	94.5%	89.9%	61.2%	35.3%	22.4%
Bermuda	1.5%	\$35.4 bn	\$32.5 bn	97.8%	94.3%	89.8%	61.2%	35.2%	22.4%
Other America	2.3%	\$12.8 bn	\$-0.1 bn	-	89.9%	88.4%	59.9%	33.4%	21.7%
Singapore	4.5%	\$56.8 bn	\$54.6 bn	69.0%	76.1%	83.7%	56.1%	28.4%	19.8%
Switzerland	5.5%	\$59.2 bn	\$49.4 bn	70.5%	69.8%	81.2%	54.4%	26.2%	18.9%
Netherlands	6.8%	\$70.0 bn	\$40.0 bn	71.3%	61.4%	77.5%	51.9%	23.4%	17.8%
Hong Kong	11.1%	\$13.6 bn	\$12.3 bn	25.7%	36.7%	62.1%	42.9%	14.9%	13.9%
United Kingdom	11.6%	\$81.7 bn	\$18.1 bn	-	33.9%	59.7%	41.6%	13.9%	13.4%
Ireland	12.4%	\$34.2 bn	\$29.5 bn	34.6%	30.3%	56.4%	39.7%	12.5%	12.7%
Canada	15.2%	\$40.1 bn	\$31.7 bn	-	18.8%	43.1%	32.5%	8.0%	10.0%
Australia	15.3%	\$18.1 bn	\$14.8 bn	-	18.5%	42.7%	32.3%	7.9%	9.9%
United States	19.7%	\$1310.5 bn	\$1180.0 bn	-	6.6%	21.4%	19.3%	2.8%	5.6%
Japan	20.5%	\$25.5 bn	\$24.9 bn	11.6%	5.0%	17.5%	16.5%	2.1%	4.7%
China	23.0%	\$28.5 bn	\$26.8 bn	-	1.5%	6.9%	7.7%	0.6%	2.1%
Germany	24.9%	\$19.8 bn	\$6.8 bn	-	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	-	0.1%
Brazil	25.5%	\$12.0 bn	\$5.9 bn	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	26.7%	\$17.7 bn	\$15.6 bn	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	33.0%	\$13.7 bn	\$11.8 bn	-	2.1%	-	-	3.3%	-

Note. Only countries with at least US\$10 billion in profits booked are shown. The column 'profits (+)' indicates the profits of affiliates with positive profits, the column 'profits (all)' indicates the profits of all affiliates. Only positive values of profit shifting are displayed.

The origin of shifted profits is, however, considerably different across the models – 72 per cent of the employees, wages and sales of US MNCs are located in the US. Since the ETR of the US is 20 per cent, this implies that no profits are shifted into the US, and approximately 72 per cent of the global shifted profits are redistributed back to the US in the models relying on semi-elasticity. In the misalignment model a lower fraction of the profits is redistributed to the US, since 65 per cent of the profits are already reported in the US – the misalignment between profits and economic activity is small. However, some of the 65 per cent of profits may have been reported in the US due to the double-counting discussed in Section 2. If this is the case, then the real misalignment for the US would be larger. In addition to the US, the UK also seems to lose out in the misalignment model, but not in the other models (Figure 3). In the tax semi-elasticity models, the low ETR of the UK (12%) implies that profits are expected to be shifted into the country. In the misalignment model profits are found to be shifted out of the country, since the profits reported in the UK (1.0% of the total) are lower than their share of the economy (3.2% of the total). The low aggregated profits recorded in the UK are a consequence of MNCs reporting zero or negative profits (Bilicka 2019).

Overall, while we consider the logarithmic specification to be more accurate with respect to estimating the global scale of profit shifting, the misalignment method might provide more accurate estimates of the redistribution of these shifted profits. The misalignment method takes into consideration the current distribution of profits, and in this respect provides a more accurate way of redistributing profits. The location of profits and economic activity is often more balanced (i.e. less misaligned) in countries with high per capita income (Figure A3 in the Appendix). The logarithmic model is agnostic to this fact, and redistributes the profits only as a function of the location of economic activity. As a consequence, the misalignment model typically redistributes more profits back to lower-income countries.

How the redistribution of shifted profits works differently in the two methods is best illustrated using a simple example. Assume that US\$9 million profits are located in the US, US\$0 million are located in India and US\$1 million are located in the Cayman Islands. In contrast, the wages and sales in the US add up to US\$9 million, US\$1 million in India and in US\$0 million in the Cayman Islands. Both the logarithmic and the misalignment models would find that the shifted profit or the total misalignment is approximately US\$1 million (located in the Cayman Islands), but the redistribution would differ. The logarithmic model would redistribute 90 per cent of those shifted profits to the US and 10 per cent to India. Since the profits in the US are comparable to the economic activity, the misalignment model would redistribute 0 per cent of those profits to the US and 100 per cent to India. Since the misalignment model takes into consideration the degree of profit shifting out of a country – as our example illustrates – the redistribution of profits is more accurate and realistic under the misalignment model than under the logarithmic specification.

4.2 Estimation of profit shifting (2016 OECD data)

Having shown that the logarithmic model is superior to both the quadratic and linear models, we apply it to the 2016 OECD CBCR data, complemented by 2017 US data (Section 2.1). We use the same methodology as in the previous section, but add fixed effects for the reporting countries to correct for differences in profitability due to the location of headquarters, and add an interaction between the reporting country and either $\log(t + ETR)$, ETR^2 or ETR in our logarithmic, quadratic and linear models.

Table 5 shows the estimates of tax semi-elasticity using the OECD data (with an interpretation of the coefficients given visually in Figure A8). The US is used as the reference group for country comparisons. We again observe that the logarithmic model fits the data better than the quadratic and linear specifications. The logarithmic model estimates that over

40 per cent of profit shifting takes place towards countries with an ETR below 1 per cent (Table 6). The quadratic and linear models are not able to capture this fully, while at the same time estimating that over 24 per cent of profit shifting takes place to countries with ETR above 15 per cent (Table 6). The misalignment model yields similar results to the logarithmic model, reinforcing the accuracy of the logarithmic model.

The location of MNCs' headquarters has been shown both theoretically and empirically to be an important consideration in the profit shifting carried out by MNCs (Dischinger et al. 2014). A significant number of existing studies observed profit shifting in the case of US-headquartered MNCs (Clausing 2020b; Dowd et al. 2017; Guvenen et al. 2017). Moreover, previous research has suggested – although, to the best of our knowledge, not empirically confirmed – that US MNCs are more aggressive than other MNCs with respect to their tax planning strategies. For example, the ETR paid on foreign profits by US MNCs in sectors other than oil has fallen by half since the late 1990s, and nearly half of this decline is estimated to be the outcome of the rise of profit shifting to tax havens (Wright and Zucman 2018).

The introduction of the interaction term between the country fixed-effect and $\log(ETR)$, ETR^2 or ETR allows us to understand the aggressiveness of each country's MNCs with respect to profit shifting. We find that US MNCs are the most aggressive (the magnitude of the interaction is more negative), and that the difference is statistically significant for all countries with the exception of Belgium, Bermuda and Luxembourg (Table 5). In fact, the relationship completely disappears for South Africa, Mexico, China and India (Figure A10). Japan would be an interesting case to study due to its historically perceived distinct attitude towards tax planning (Izawa 2019). However, the CBCR data reported by Japan only disaggregated in 12 jurisdictions, which prevents us from accurately estimating profit shifting by MNCs headquartered in Japan. We thus expect that even more comprehensive data should provide us with a more definitive international comparison in the future. The US stands out among those headquarter countries that report data of sufficient quality, but also among those headquarter countries that are more aggressive at shifting profits to tax havens.

Next, we calculate the extent of profit shifting for all models and compare it with the two DLM specifications and with the misalignment model. We reach an estimate of US\$965 billion shifted for the logarithmic model and a 95 per cent confidence interval of US\$889–1,174 billion for the misalignment model, of which we use the median, US\$994 billion (Table 7 and Figure 4). We compare the results obtained using both methodologies in Figure A9 in the Appendix. In general, there is a good correlation between the origin and the destination of profit shifted, albeit with some outliers (Japan, the UK, Luxembourg and Belgium), with Luxembourg and the UK previously discussed in Section 4.1. Our total estimates are broadly comparable to or somewhat higher than existing estimates such as Tørsløv et al. (2020), who estimate profit shifting to be over US\$600 billion in 2015, albeit using a smaller sample of countries (a comparison of our and their estimates is in Figure D1). Our findings imply that revenue losses total approximately US\$200-300 billion. This is comparable with recent leading estimates of revenue losses that range from US\$100 to US\$600 billion, as reviewed by Cobham and Janský (2020). Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that some aspects of our methodological approach are conservative. For example, we aggregate at the country level and as such offset profits shifted in with profits shifted out. The estimated scale of profit shifting and tax revenue loss would be higher if we do not net gains and losses.

Table 5 Regression table for the CBCR data

	Logarithmic	Quadratic	Log*FE + Quad	Log + Quad*FE	Linear
ETR	0.8875 (0.7719)	-8.5032*** (1.6584)	1.9793 (2.5847)	0.0754 (2.6843)	-3.6634*** (1.2751)
ETR2		11.9405*** (4.2511)	-2.1320 (4.8163)	-1.6397 (5.3813)	
log(0.0007 + ETR)	-0.8665*** (0.1642)		-0.8957*** (0.1770)	-0.3379*** (0.0838)	
Australia*tax	0.4306** (0.1998)	1.0065 (7.8104)	0.4330** (0.2000)	-0.7650 (7.7249)	-0.3838 (2.6301)
Belgium*tax	0.2948 (0.1790)	-4.5105 (4.5443)	0.3008* (0.1796)	-4.2598 (4.4877)	-1.7723 (1.9625)
Bermuda*tax	0.0943 (0.2169)	-3.5274 (4.2640)	0.0956 (0.2171)	-3.8274 (4.2111)	-0.9763 (1.9457)
China*tax	0.8757*** (0.1945)	13.2458** (5.4004)	0.8777*** (0.1947)	12.5428** (5.3355)	5.5597** (2.1749)
Denmark*tax	0.3397** (0.1615)	-3.7208 (3.8300)	0.3466** (0.1623)	-2.7414 (3.7897)	-1.8929 (1.6508)
India*tax	0.7779*** (0.1947)	8.0289 (4.9194)	0.7821*** (0.1950)	8.1251* (4.8578)	4.2697** (2.1596)
Italy*tax	0.6494*** (0.1857)	6.1330 (6.4195)	0.6505*** (0.1858)	4.8425 (6.3470)	1.4175 (2.2274)
Luxembourg*tax	0.2824 (0.1837)	5.0685 (5.2002)	0.2859 (0.1840)	4.3634 (5.1380)	-0.0267 (2.0815)
Mexico*tax	0.9279*** (0.1825)	9.8344** (4.1190)	0.9364*** (0.1837)	10.2409** (4.0686)	5.5226*** (1.8670)
South Africa*tax	0.9362*** (0.1829)	9.7287** (4.1038)	0.9404*** (0.1840)	10.1278** (4.0486)	5.4227*** (1.8683)
log(Population)	0.0990** (0.0387)	0.0641 (0.0397)	0.0978** (0.0388)	0.0789** (0.0394)	0.0334 (0.0390)
log(GDPpc)	0.1027* (0.0573)	0.1262** (0.0597)	0.1024* (0.0574)	0.1206** (0.0590)	0.1238** (0.0599)
log(Tangible assets)	0.3251*** (0.0240)	0.3136*** (0.0243)	0.3254*** (0.0240)	0.3167*** (0.0240)	0.3183*** (0.0246)
log(Wages)	0.2440*** (0.0334)	0.2198*** (0.0344)	0.2442*** (0.0334)	0.2352*** (0.0341)	0.2172*** (0.0344)
FE interaction	log	quad	log	quad	lin
N	622	622	622	622	622
R2	0.73	0.71	0.73	0.72	0.71
BIC	2220.79	2270.04	2227.02	2259.72	2268.14

Note. Country-tax represents the interaction effect between the country and log (0.0007 + ETR), ETR² and ETR for our three specifications (logarithmic, quadratic and linear). The intercept and country fixed effects are not shown and are generally negative and significant at the 0.1% significance level; since the treatment group is the US, this indicates the higher profitability of US MNCs. Significance level: p<0.05 (*), p<0.01 (**), p<0.001 (***).

Table 6 Share of profit shifted into countries, grouped by the ETR

ETR	Misalignment	Logarithmic	Quadratic	Linear
<1%	40.0%	41.6%	31.0%	30.1%
1-5	17.5%	21.6%	17.8%	16.2%
5-10%	24.9%	27.8%	24.3%	23.6%
10-15%	3.5%	2.9%	2.7%	2.5%
15-25%	13.7%	6.1%	24.2%	27.6%
>25	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

Note. The quadratic and linear models are not able to account for the large share of profits shifted into countries with ETRs below 1%.


Table 7 Estimates of profits shifted and tax revenue loss (TRL) for the misalignment and logarithmic models

	Profits shifted	TRL (total ETR)	TLR (foreign ETR)	TRL (CIT)
Misalignment	\$994 bn	\$205 bn	\$214 bn	\$307 bn
Logarithmic	\$965 bn	\$186 bn	\$200 bn	\$300 bn

Notes. Three different tax rates are used, the total ETR (both domestic and foreign MNCs), the foreign ETR (only foreign MNCs), and the statutory tax rate (CIT).

In addition to outlining the overall scale of the practice, Figure 4 provides an overview of the origins and destinations of profit shifting. Using both the logarithmic model and misalignment methods, we estimate that the Cayman Islands and the Netherlands have 94-99 per cent and 45-65 per cent of their respective booked profits shifted in from other countries, while also ranking among countries most benefiting from profit shifting in absolute terms. The US and Japan are estimated to suffer the most from profit shifting in absolute terms according to most of the methods, while Germany and France are affected to a substantially greater degree relative to estimated profits (66-67% for both using the logarithmic model and 45% for Germany and 24% for France using the misalignment method). Table 8 shows the largest destinations of profit shifting. Tables B3-B4 and Figure A9 in the Appendix show profit shifting at the country level for all countries (we present estimates for 192 countries in total), and we visualise the uncertainty of our results in Figure A15.

Figure 4 Profits shifted in and out of countries using the CBCR data, estimated with the misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models



Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country (compared to booked profits).

Table 8 Top 7 destinations of profit shifting (PS (B)) for misalignment and logarithmic models and as a percentage of the total profits booked in the jurisdiction (PS (% booked))

Country	Misalignment			Logarithmic		
	P (all groups)	PS (B)	PS (%booked)	P (groups>0)	PS (B)	PS (%booked)
Cayman Islands	148,968	147,879	99.27	136,653	128,895	94.32
Netherlands	212,366	140,896	66.35	166,854	75,624	45.32
China	1,000,565	94,385	9.43	1,746,828	50,073	2.87
Hong Kong	160,805	90,199	56.09	185,760	94,270	50.75
Bermuda	63,542	62,992	99.13	113,955	101,749	89.29
British Virgin Islands	60,895	60,895	100.00	81,794	78,354	95.79
Switzerland	129,518	51,611	39.85	127,879	61,244	47.89
Puerto Rico	44,639	42,565	95.35	72,012	63,336	87.95
Ireland	65,106	28,062	43.10	76,753	18,496	24.10
Singapore	111,477	22,850	20.50	129,768	63,969	49.30
Luxembourg	28,228	17,536	62.12	146,916	119,057	81.04


Note. The total profits for all groups ((P (all groups)) and groups with positive profits (P (groups>0) are shown for comparison. Puerto Rico, Ireland and Luxembourg are not part of the top seven jurisdictions, but are included to provide context. The full tables can be found in Tables B3 and B4.

4.3 Profit shifting and tax revenue loss by income groups

The analysis presented above compares different methodology approaches and establishes the largest origins and destinations of profits in absolute terms. In this section, we focus on the distribution effects of profit shifting, and find that lower-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue relative to their total tax revenue.


We first focus on profit shifting. While countries from all income groups lose similarly relative to their GDP, profit shifting takes place predominantly to high-income countries (Figure 5). This is expected, since the majority of tax havens are included in this group. Although we present results for both the misalignment and the logarithmic model, we argue that the results of the misalignment model might be more accurate for two reasons. First, we use all available data in the misalignment model, imputing missing data. As previously mentioned, countries often do not report on small countries, but group them together into categories (e.g. 'Other Africa'). For example, only South Africa and India report operations on Botswana (three and five MNCs respectively), while the remaining reporting countries group Botswana with other African countries. For the logarithmic model this leads to an underestimation of the losses of lower-income countries. For the misalignment model, we estimate the expected employees and revenue of all country pairs, and use this information to correct the amount of profit shifted more accurately (Section 2.4). While this only increases total profit shifted by 30 per cent, it is key to estimating profit shifting in lower-income countries accurately. A second, closely related, reason in favour of the misalignment model is its observation that profits are less aligned with economic activity in lower-income countries (discussed in Section 4.1). We continue by looking at tax revenue loss (the product of profits shifted and the ETR) as a function of the total tax revenue in each income group and region (Figure 6). In general, we find that lower-income-countries – those in Africa and Latin America – tend to lose more tax revenue relative to their total tax revenue. Countries with low and middle per capita incomes (Figure 6), are thus the largest profit-shifting losers. MNCs shift an equivalent of 5.03 per cent (95% CI; 2.96-7.53) of their total tax revenue out of low-income countries, while receiving influxes equivalent to 0.28 per cent (0.004-0.89). On the other hand, high-income countries lose an equivalent of 1.01 per cent (0.57-1.35), while gaining 0.30 per cent (0.12-0.76). The low gains for high-income countries contrast with the high flows of profits shifted in those countries (Figure 5). Furthermore, losses for lower-middle-income countries (2.49-9.24) are also significantly higher than those of higher-income countries, while upper-middle-income countries exhibit only moderate losses (0.38-3.78).

Figure 5 Profits shifted as a percentage of GDP for countries in different income groups, as estimated by the misalignment (left graph) and logarithmic (right graph) models



Note. Confidence intervals show 95% intervals, calculated via bootstrapping.

Figure 6 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue for countries in different income groups (top row) and different geographical regions (bottom row), as estimated by the misalignment (left side of graph) and logarithmic (right side of graph) models




Note. Confidence intervals show 95% intervals, calculated via bootstrapping.

When analysing each country separately (Figure 7), we once again find that lower-income countries lose significantly more tax revenue than high- and upper-middle-income countries. Similar results are found for comparisons of tax revenue losses with corporate income tax revenue (Figure A11) and GDP (Figure A12). There are, however, differences within lower-income countries. In general, African countries tend to lose the higher share of their tax revenue to profit shifting (Figure A16). Our results confirm the theoretical arguments that lower-income countries are more vulnerable to profit shifting (Fuest et al. 2011; Hearson 2018; Johannesen et al. 2020), and indicate that the previous lack of empirical confirmation may have driven by data limitations.

Our analysis shows that only a small number of countries gain any tax revenue. Profit shifting is thus a phenomenon where the majority of countries lose, and especially so lower-income countries. The magnitude of the tax revenue loss in those countries can be better appreciated by comparing it with public expenditure. Lower-income countries loss the equivalent of 28.2-82.4 per cent of their government health expenditure (Figure A13), or 8.65-31.9 per cent of their government education expenditure (Figure A14).

Figure 7 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of total tax revenue estimated with the misalignment and logarithmic models



Note. Each dot represents an individual country, and the median values are visualised with a dashed line. The data is split into low- and lower-middle-income countries (LowMiddle, light orange) upper-middle- and high-income countries (UpperHigh, darker red). The statistical differences between the median are assessed with a Mann-Whitney test. Significance level: $p < 0.05$ (*), $p < 0.01$ (**), $p < 0.001$ (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown.

4.4 Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses

We address the data and methodology limitations of this paper by testing the consistency of the main results to our methodological choices. In total, we carry out 12 robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. We briefly summarise them here.

- i. We use a variety of methodological approaches, including models based on linear, quadratic and logarithmic semi-elasticities, as well as the misalignment method. The scale of profit shifting is similar for all models (between US\$0.9 and US\$1.04 trillion), and the origin and destination of profits is broadly comparable (Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
- ii. We test the robustness of the 25 per cent ETR threshold in equation 5. Reducing the threshold to 20 per cent would reduce our estimate of profit shifting by the logarithmic model by 5 per cent. Increasing the threshold to 30 per cent would increase the estimate of profit shifting by 6 per cent.
- iii. We compare our results to those of Tørsløv et al. (2020), observing a high correlation with a much increased country sample (Figure D1).
- iv. We compare the tax revenue loss with a variety of benchmarks including, for example, GDP, total tax revenue and health expenditure (Figures A11–A14). We find that lower-income countries lose comparatively the most in all specifications, as discussed above in 4.3. These are the main sensitivity analyses of our methodology, and results that are not related to the data.

We test the consistency of the main results to other methodological choices in four additional ways:

- i. We compare our results, in which we limit the sample to those countries that report information on at least eight offshore centres with the full sample. The effects on the estimated coefficient are minimal, the coefficient of $\log(0.0007 + ETR)$ becomes -0.8475 (with standard deviation 0.1583), statistically indistinguishable from our estimated 0.8665 (with standard deviation 0.1642) reported in Table 5.

- ii. We analyse the sensitivity of our results to the offset in the logarithmic model, showing a robust estimation of the coefficients for a wide range of offsets (Figure D2).
- iii. We compare the logarithmic specification with other specifications that can accommodate extreme non-linearities, including $1/(\tau + ETR)^1$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^2$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^3$ and $\coth(\tau + ETR)$. The logarithmic specification allows for higher non-linearities, and exhibits a higher R^2 and lowest Bayesian Information Criteria (see Table D1 and Figures D3 and D4).
- iv. We test a different redistribution formula. For this, we first regressed the share of profits booked in a country against the shares of employees, capital, sales and wages (Table D2). We then used the coefficients as our new redistribution formula, after normalising them to sum to one. Profit shifting is reduced by 7 per cent, with a similar distribution of the origin and destination of profits (Figure D5).

Additional robustness checks and sensitivity analyses focus on the data itself and, in particular, on missing data imputation. In accordance with the design of the individual methods, this missing data imputation does not affect our preferred semi-elasticity methods of estimating the scale of profit shifting, but only influences the measures of misalignment and the subsequent redistribution of the shifted profit for all methods:

- i. We estimate missing data using 1,000 bootstrapped data samples (Section 3.2) to show the consistency of our results in relation to variations in data coverage. In the main results we use the median of the samples. The confidence intervals are included in Figure A15.
- ii. We compare the location of employees and revenue according to our missing data model with the information in the original data as well as GDP, showing how our method addresses the limitations of these two alternatives (Figure A5).
- iii. We compare our missing data imputation method with other models, including with penalised linear regression (Appendix E), showing that our method has higher predictive power.
- iv. Finally, we run a robustness test in which the data of China was not adjusted. This decreases profit shifted by 9 per cent, especially reducing profit shifted towards China.

These robustness checks and sensitivity analyses show how our results are robust to changes in the methodology.

5 Conclusion

Exploiting the combination of a new methodology and a new dataset, we establish that MNCs shifted US\$1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which in turn implies US\$200-300 billion in revenue losses for other countries. Moreover, we estimate that MNCs headquartered in the US and Bermuda are the most aggressive in profit shifting. We then turn to the distributional impacts of profit shifting. Our results show that existing linear and quadratic models underestimate the profit shifting to countries with extremely low tax rates, and at the same time overestimate it for countries with moderate rates. Conversely, the new logarithmic model (theoretically grounded) and the misalignment model (based on extreme ratios of profit per economic activity) are able to accurately capture this behaviour. Using the two models, we show that around 40 per cent and 85-90 per cent of profit shifted is shifted to countries with an ETR below 1 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. Finally, we show that while profit shifting affects both lower- and higher-income countries, lower-income countries lose a higher share of their tax revenue due to profit shifting. Overall, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that MNCs exploit the combination of globalisation and the

sovereignty of individual countries, including tax havens, to avoid paying taxes, at the expense of countries worldwide at all levels of income.

Two main lessons can be learned from our findings. First, the extremely non-linear relationship between the location of profits and tax rates has implications for both research and policy. In research, we show that accurately accounting for this relationship affects the estimated scale, as well as the distribution, of profit shifting. Accounting for the extreme non-linearity shows that less than 10 per cent of profit shifting takes place to countries with ETRs above 10 per cent, versus 30 per cent of profit shifting if the non-linearity is not addressed. In policy, this modelling choice can highly affect our assessment of international tax reform, as may be the case in the assessment of the global minimum tax rate proposal (OECD 2020). The so-called Pillar Two proposes that MNCs with tax rates below the minimum tax rate in a jurisdiction would face a top-up tax. This would reduce the incentive for MNCs to shift profits to tax havens. The impact assessment estimates that the largest reduction of profit shifting will happen through those spillover effects of this minimum tax rate. However, the current methodology uses a linear model, and as such assumes that the incentives for profit shifting decrease linearly as the minimum ETR increases. Our results empirically show that MNCs tend to seek the jurisdiction with the lowest possible ETR – that is, the linearity assumption does not hold. It is therefore plausible that MNCs will continue shifting a similar share of their profits to countries offering the minimum ETR, or contrarily that the minimum tax rate will completely eliminate profit-shifting incentives. In reality, the specific value of the minimum tax rate will determine which of the two alternatives we are likely to see as an outcome.

A second lesson arising from our results concerns the unequal impact of profit shifting across countries, with implications for research and policy on tax and development. In research, CBCR data of MNCs has been hailed as a potential panacea for the analysis of profit shifting from low-income countries to tax havens (Wójcik 2015). We provide a cautious, data-supported answer, showing that lower-income countries tend to lose more tax revenue relative to total tax revenue compared to higher-income countries. Our results show that the aggregation of small countries in the data increases the uncertainty about the full effect of profit shifting in these countries. This could nudge lower-income countries' governments into using confidential tax returns data for a more detailed profit shifting analysis – as South Africa recently did, and learnt that profit shifting is highly concentrated among a few large MNCs (Reynolds and Wier 2018). In policy, our results indicate that the current international tax system may be hindering the achievement of one of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: to 'strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to lower-income countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection' UN (2015). This supports the frequent arguments of lower-income countries that they should be represented on an equal footing when international corporate tax system reform is being debated and decided at the OECD or G20 forums, and, furthermore, that the reform itself should create a level playing field in the corporate taxation of MNCs.


The analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations that open up additional avenues for future research. We see two of them as especially fruitful. The first one is obtaining more accurate estimates as new CBCR data becomes available in the future. The next release is expected in July 2021, and is expected to have an even larger country coverage. The guidelines to report intra-company dividends have been updated, and the 2019 data (expected in 2022) will contain no double counting. The second avenue is to obtain more accurate estimates of tax semi-elasticity using firm-level data. An increasing number of MNCs (e.g. Vodafone and Shell) are voluntarily publishing their own CBCR data, and more of them are likely to do so, or be forced to do so by governments, in the future. This firm-level data would enable us to understand even more accurately the extent of profit

shifting, as well as which specific MNCs and tax havens are responsible for the bulk of profit shifting.

Appendix


Appendix A General supplementary figures

Figure A1 Loss-making affiliates as a profit shifting strategy, using 2017 US data




Note. The total profits made by profit-making affiliates is plotted against the percentage of profits offset by losses. Three types of countries are highlighted with boxes. In red are 'profit centres', reporting very high profits not offset by losses. In green are 'coordination centres' (or conduits), reporting very high profits offset by losses. In blue are origin countries, reporting profits offset by losses. Only countries reporting at least US\$10 billion profits are reported, the USA (profits of US\$1,310 and offset ratio of 10% is excluded). Countries in red exhibit profitabilities above US\$100,000 per employee.

Figure A2 Profit per employee as a function of the ETR for OECD data




Note. Colour indicates the ETR (below or above 10%). Note that the x axis is logarithmic, and as such the effect of ETR on the profitability per employee, which is driven in a large part by profit shifting, is extremely non-linear.

Figure A3 Comparison of profits shifted out (A) and profits shifted in (B) for the misalignment and the logarithmic models for the 2017 US data




Note. Each dot represents a country, coloured by region. Note that profit shifting out of African countries is higher in the misalignment model.

Figure A4 Available information on CBCR. Colour denotes increasing GDP per capita




Note. Countries with availability below 20% are annotated. All countries with availability below 10% are placed to the left of the 10% horizontal line.

Figure A5 Comparison between the redistribution formula (eq. 8) (A) imputing missing data vs using raw data of firms with positive profits; (B) imputing missing data vs using share of GDP




Note. The estimated shares of the economy for African countries are higher than the shares of the economy for those countries in the raw data, but lower than the share of GDP of those countries.

Figure A6 Relationship between GDP and domestic employees, sales and tangible assets for countries in 2016 OECD data




Notes. Each dot corresponds to one country in the data.

Figure A7 Relationship between the number of large MNCs (extracted from Orbis), and total profits reported domestically in the country




Note. Estimated values using a regression with GDP, population, the average ETRs and the total consolidated banking claims on an immediate counterparty basis (Table B4 of the BIS data) are visualised in grey. Empirical values are visualised in blue.

Figure A8 Graphical representation of Table 5 for the logarithmic, quadratic, linear and DLM models




Note. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C respectively, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%. Note that the marginal effects for the logarithmic model decreases faster than other models as the ETR approaches 0%.

Figure A9 Comparison of logarithmic and misalignment models




Note. Isle of Man, Barbados and Gibraltar only appear for US-headquartered MNCs for the dataset on all sub-groups, with results on a higher estimate for the misalignment model.

Figure A10 Graphical representation of Table 5 for logarithmic model, at country level



Note. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C respectively, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%.

Figure A11 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of corporate income tax revenue




Note. Significance level: $p < 0.05$ (*), $p < 0.01$ (**), $p < 0.001$ (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown.

Figure A12 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of GDP



Note. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Significance level: $p < 0.05$ (*), $p < 0.01$ (**), $p < 0.001$ (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown.

Figure A13 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of health expenditure




Note. Significance level: $p < 0.05$ (*), $p < 0.01$ (**), $p < 0.001$ (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown.

Figure A14 Tax revenue loss as a percentage of government education expenditure




Notes. Significance level: $p < 0.05$ (*), $p < 0.01$ (**), $p < 0.001$ (***). Only observations within a distance from the median of 5 interquartile ranges are shown.

Figure A15 Distribution of the scale of profit shifted estimated by misalignment model at country level



Note. The largest origins (top two rows, in blue) and destinations (bottom two rows, in red) are shown. The variance observed is created by the bootstrapping process detailed in Section 3.2. Non-reporting countries (Germany (DEU), the UK (GBR), Cayman Islands (CYM) have higher uncertainty than reporting countries such as France (FRA), Italy (ITA) or Bermuda (BMU). The 5% percentile, the median, and the 95% percentile are annotated.

Figure A16 Distribution of tax revenue losses for lower-income countries, visualised with a boxen plot



Note. Countries are coloured by geographical region – green (Africa), blue (Asia), orange (South America), purple (Europe), yellow (Oceania), red (Caribbean Islands). A boxenplot is similar to a boxplot, but where the whiskers are replaced with smaller boxes. The central box visualises the interquartile range, leaving 25% of the data at each end. The smaller boxes increasingly leave smaller fractions of the data at each end (12.5%, 6.25%, etc). Outliers are represented with dots.

Appendix B General supplementary tables

Table B1 Number of jurisdictions available per country (aggregates excluded)

	IND	USA	ZAF	ITA	MEX	DNK	CHN	FRA	LUX
All sub-groups	163	137	127	103	102	96	90	83	80
Sub-groups with positive profits	134	84	87	77	73	93	53	32	79
	BMU	AUS	BEL	IDN	JPN	CHL	SGP	CAN	SVN
All sub-groups	72	56	40	33	29	14	12	8	5
Sub-groups with positive profits	57	39	32	26	12	11	22	3	5
	POL	AUT	NLD	NOR	IRL	SWE	FIN	KOR	
All sub-groups	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Sub-groups with positive profits	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Note. Jurisdictions with 1 observation only report on domestic activities of MNCs.

Table B2 Expected number of large MNCs headquartered in country (according to Orbis), number of companies observed in CBCR data (using all sub-groups), and ratio between the two

Country	# Expected (Orbis)	# Observed (CBCR)	Ratio	Country	# Expected (Orbis)	# Observed (CBCR)	Ratio
China	583	82	7.11	AUS	111	110	1.01
Denmark	69	39	1.77	US (2017)	1501	1548	0.97
Bermuda	60	39	1.54	India	158	165	0.96
Singapore	48	32	1.50	Norway	55	60	0.92
US (2016)	1,501	1,101	1.36	Chile	29	32	0.91
South Africa	58	44	1.32	Finland	48	54	0.89
Japan	891	715	1.25	Netherlands	136	155	0.88
Italy	151	130	1.16	Australia	64	73	0.88
Indonesia	22	19	1.16	Belgium	45	54	0.83
France	206	180	1.14	Poland	24	29	0.83
Canada	179	160	1.12	Slovenia	5	7	0.71
Korea	205	185	1.11	Mexico	40	74	0.54
Sweden	95	88	1.08	Luxembourg	30	120	0.25
Ireland	47	45	1.04				

Table B3 Countries acting as profit destination, estimated by the misalignment model

Country	Profits Shifted (M)	Profits booked (M)	TRG (M)	PS (%GDP)	PS (%Prof-its booked)	TRG (% tax revenue)	TRG (% corp. tax revenue)	TRG (%health)	TRG (%edu-cation)
Cayman Islands	147,879	148,968	592	3039.55	99.27	56.86	482.43	165.44	276.75
Netherlands	140,896	212,366	6,904	16.33	66.35	3.54	30.68	11.65	14.69
China	94,385	1,000,565	15,385	0.76	9.43	0.63	3.31	4.53	6.61
Hong Kong	90,199	160,805	5,953	28.69	56.09	13.42	31.96	25.77	55.20
Bermuda	62,992	63,542	630	1059.50	99.13	49.55	420.41	144.17	641.01
British Virgin Islands	60,895	60,895	61	6361.74	100.00	30.01	254.62	87.31	171.26
Switzerland	51,611	129,518	3,768	7.47	39.85	2.65	18.68	15.21	10.80
Puerto Rico	42,565	44,639	426	41.37	95.35	1.93	16.41	5.63	6.59
Gibraltar	29,815	29,815	0	1413.50	100.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Barbados	28,248	28,248	1,836	580.41	100.00	148.56	1486.94	1096.91	716.27
Ireland	28,062	65,106	2,273	9.21	43.10	3.50	30.16	11.47	15.27
Jersey	27,777	28,179	194	nan	98.57	nan	nan	nan	nan
Isle of Man	23,684	23,715	0	350.10	99.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Singapore	22,850	111,477	1,417	6.96	20.50	3.18	11.01	25.13	14.46
Taiwan	21,367	72,656	3,932	3.59	29.41	3.09	26.20	8.99	15.03
Vietnam	20,875	59,312	2,505	9.25	35.20	5.84	30.23	43.03	22.63
Luxembourg	17,536	28,228	316	27.39	62.12	1.83	10.31	10.12	12.27
Sweden	12,796	54,232	973	2.34	23.60	0.53	6.43	1.94	2.38
Canada	9,651	147,347	820	0.56	6.55	0.18	1.44	0.62	0.90
Chile	7,576	35,316	1,038	2.81	21.45	2.26	9.39	10.17	8.00
Libya	7,117	7,769	1,423	15.08	91.61	202.63	90.84	78.76	161.48
Denmark	6,483	34,730	960	1.93	18.67	0.62	10.71	3.33	3.58
Cyprus	4,243	6,119	93	17.90	69.34	1.65	6.58	13.32	6.15
Hungary	3,799	18,505	122	2.68	20.53	0.34	5.23	1.78	1.91
Mauritius	3,745	4,643	131	28.14	80.65	5.40	40.86	44.62	22.48
Malaysia	3,132	34,434	504	0.95	9.10	1.06	2.23	7.89	2.98
Thailand	2,978	51,083	477	0.62	5.83	0.57	2.06	3.59	2.20
Norway	2,455	34,035	601	0.56	7.21	0.46	1.86	1.67	1.83
Kazakhstan	2,347	13,840	207	1.27	16.96	0.48	3.35	5.73	3.93
New Zealand	1,652	13,008	302	0.86	12.70	0.49	3.44	2.17	2.35
Curaçao	1,545	1,727	404	49.44	89.46	60.46	512.91	175.89	262.14
Iraq	1,544	2,716	232	0.73	56.84	0.58	3.30	9.07	5.87
Bolivia	1,385	2,603	427	3.78	53.23	3.81	22.07	30.66	40.88
Myanmar	1,258	1,914	24	1.77	65.74	0.45	2.92	5.03	2.05
Algeria	1,111	8,080	329	0.62	13.75	1.29	15.91	4.20	6.46

Azerbaijan	1,100	2,863	52	2.08	38.43	0.72	2.43	8.84	3.81
Jordan	777	2,531	129	1.94	30.71	2.12	12.96	7.24	8.79
Croatia	744	3,855	28	1.30	19.29	0.21	2.36	0.82	1.10
Panama	592	4,522	43	1.09	13.08	0.79	3.11	1.82	2.48
Georgia	558	861	84	3.28	64.79	1.94	16.51	21.33	15.97
Guinea	405	785	116	3.60	51.66	7.80	265.25	184.53	42.98
Cambodia	353	1,024	30	1.57	34.48	1.01	6.19	10.01	7.34
Monaco	353	1,241	2	5.33	28.42	0.15	1.27	1.95	2.24
Burkina Faso	318	857	18	2.18	37.05	0.77	4.69	6.19	2.49
Papua New Guinea	284	1,758	6	1.22	16.17	0.14	2.11	1.37	1.24
Marshall Islands	278	293	0	139.51	94.69	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maldives	261	296	84	5.42	88.15	9.93	48.75	32.77	45.46
Guatemala	209	2,073	15	0.30	10.06	0.20	0.65	1.00	0.74
Timor-Leste	110	169	0	7.07	65.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bhutan	91	169	15	4.04	53.51	4.68	9.81	26.48	10.50
Faroe Islands	69	116	1	2.58	59.66	0.11	0.92	0.32	0.53
Liberia	27	135	0	0.87	19.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bulgaria	24	2,763	0	0.04	0.85	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Afghanistan	18	35	1	0.09	52.04	0.09	0.61	1.54	0.21
Vanuatu	1	2	0	0.12	42.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note. Profits booked reflect all sub-groups. PS stands for profit shifted, TRG stands for tax revenue gain. We compare PS with the country's GDP. We compare the TRG with the total tax revenue, the corporate tax revenue, and the public health and education expenditure.

Table B4 Countries acting as profit origins, estimated by the misalignment model

Country	Profits Shifted (M)	Profits booked (M)	Tax Revenue (M)	Rev-Loss	PS (%GDP)	PS (%Potential base)	TRL (% tax revenue)	TRL (% corp. tax revenue)	TRL (%health)	TRL (%education)
United States	238,046	1,370,399	44,753		1.28	14.80	1.24	11.91	2.91	4.87
Germany	101,907	280,369	20,585		2.75	26.66	2.43	30.95	6.61	11.42
France	91,048	123,454	17,572		3.38	42.45	2.31	27.45	7.48	14.85
Brazil	65,036	48,840	15,609		3.22	57.11	3.34	25.16	21.00	13.06
Italy	50,226	48,520	8,137		2.46	50.86	1.32	17.86	5.91	9.80
Mexico	38,330	55,304	9,659		3.12	40.94	6.87	28.94	26.28	15.56
United Kingdom	37,776	240,111	3,815		1.35	13.59	0.52	5.14	1.80	2.43
India	33,371	96,561	8,243		1.32	25.68	4.47	28.29	35.70	8.53
Colombia	30,791	-11,319	12,347		9.33	158.13	19.08	112.66	75.28	82.34
South Africa	21,642	20,606	2,554		6.10	51.23	2.58	13.07	16.85	11.86
Poland	19,654	18,977	2,024		3.68	50.88	1.87	20.04	8.51	7.85
Nigeria	19,279	7,048	10,488		4.28	73.23	31.82	205.02	458.10	81.74
Russia	18,396	49,430	3,679		1.05	27.12	0.85	6.37	6.76	5.48
South Korea	17,517	116,355	3,416		1.17	13.09	1.22	6.47	5.77	4.96
Indonesia	17,331	45,788	3,709		1.69	27.46	3.34	9.42	32.72	10.74
Saudi Arabia	12,494	10,963	2,136		1.72	53.26	16.99	54.15	8.78	6.69
Australia	12,054	107,435	2,447		0.86	10.09	0.63	3.65	2.84	3.37
Turkey	11,486	19,945	2,113		1.42	36.54	1.45	15.53	7.61	13.95
Spain	10,569	92,787	1,131		0.78	10.23	0.39	3.87	1.30	1.91
Japan	10,450	528,834	2,100		0.20	1.94	0.23	1.07	0.45	1.17
Philippines	9,437	14,021	1,793		2.80	40.23	3.97	14.69	42.59	18.69
Argentina	8,926	19,698	2,660		1.77	31.18	2.21	17.70	8.51	9.66
Romania	7,947	6,300	890		3.57	55.78	2.16	18.78	10.34	13.12
Belgium	7,217	46,717	671		1.41	13.38	0.43	4.00	1.64	2.00
Egypt	6,401	4,851	2,330		2.19	56.88	6.17	19.54	51.47	27.94
Ukraine	6,349	1,510	863		4.39	80.78	2.46	19.49	18.50	10.00
Venezuela	5,357	-267	386		1.81	105.25	0.84	13.49	7.01	6.97
Pakistan	4,813	5,508	1,304		1.79	46.63	4.79	41.89	65.63	18.98
Peru	3,852	51,292	948		1.81	6.99	2.92	9.84	15.57	12.75
Iran	3,845	3,070	0		0.84	55.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Paraguay	3,836	-2,866	326		10.18	395.47	9.11	43.33	29.34	24.04
Guernsey	3,526	-3,303	46		nan	1584.88	nan	nan	nan	nan
Portugal	3,501	8,646	718		1.55	28.82	1.29	10.40	5.23	6.26
Uzbekistan	3,224	-3,191	242		5.15	9683.95	1.99	33.38	13.17	6.42
Angola	3,030	2,824	3,776		2.82	51.76	12.33	303.68	245.49	123.36

United Arab Emirates	2,768	21,799	877	0.71	11.27	1.39	8.96	8.94	5.14
Austria	2,301	26,144	175	0.54	8.09	0.15	1.88	0.55	0.75
Israel	2,192	16,370	353	0.67	11.81	0.42	3.51	2.40	1.88
Morocco	2,148	2,962	588	1.91	42.04	2.35	11.25	22.83	18.39
Bangladesh	2,109	2,740	711	0.86	43.49	3.50	17.20	62.53	14.09
Bahamas	1,940	-1,690	0	16.70	776.70	0.00	nan	0.00	0.00
Congo, Rep.	1,733	-1,376	0	15.30	485.69	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Greece	1,526	7,496	262	0.68	16.91	0.46	7.58	2.27	2.66
Slovakia	1,506	5,640	264	1.53	21.07	1.53	8.81	4.89	6.50
Ethiopia	1,451	1,401	373	1.85	50.88	3.95	122.37	55.44	9.57
Sudan	1,353	-1,327	473	3.72	5165.89	22.29	334.23	88.91	48.11
Kuwait	1,321	2,668	42	0.93	33.12	2.93	1.18	1.01	0.68
Czechia	1,249	18,366	76	0.57	6.37	0.18	1.00	0.58	0.75
Kenya	1,175	-177	510	1.48	117.71	4.01	18.00	32.47	11.97
Macao	1,156	8,560	126	2.36	11.90	0.80	21.47	3.49	9.53
Mozambique	1,156	-438	374	7.68	160.94	12.04	639.17	174.57	41.03
Serbia	1,108	1,531	78	2.29	41.99	0.71	9.93	3.02	4.10
Chad	1,054	-794	395	9.15	405.96	25.35	881.35	360.41	142.87
Ecuador	1,023	3,549	727	1.00	22.38	5.02	60.50	16.85	14.45
Uruguay	1,005	1,721	45	1.82	36.85	0.42	3.20	1.37	1.76
Honduras	980	349	243	4.29	73.76	6.23	32.55	32.18	16.73
Lithuania	947	564	162	1.99	62.68	2.03	25.15	8.01	7.51
Costa Rica	918	2,682	173	1.61	25.50	2.30	11.82	5.40	4.36
Guyana	875	-778	333	23.37	907.62	41.64	268.17	357.03	173.05
Trinidad and Tobago	832	1,490	224	3.36	35.83	4.22	35.82	31.11	20.55
Latvia	817	206	34	2.67	79.84	0.55	7.10	3.33	1.99
Slovenia	799	1,887	80	1.62	29.73	0.74	10.95	2.65	3.06
Iceland	798	322	33	3.98	71.23	0.48	7.00	2.46	2.20
Lesotho	777	87	128	31.64	89.94	14.34	194.94	97.93	74.94
Sri Lanka	773	1,031	100	0.95	42.86	1.08	9.99	7.55	5.64
Cote d'Ivoire	718	777	229	1.45	48.02	2.84	40.01	43.66	9.78
Gabon	658	78	128	3.98	89.44	4.10	23.26	46.03	26.41
Sierra Leone	636	-420	119	15.92	294.95	28.63	278.40	223.72	81.99
Estonia	626	666	1	2.35	48.43	0.02	0.29	0.10	0.09
Congo DRC	622	-174	49	1.50	138.83	1.28	9.22	23.26	6.01
Laos	590	-154	104	3.71	135.33	4.94	33.78	96.90	26.93
Tanzania	589	176	348	1.07	77.02	5.78	44.59	47.32	16.40
Dominican Republic	558	1,627	96	0.70	25.56	0.91	6.07	4.49	6.47
Oman	553	2,026	45	0.74	21.43	2.47	5.12	2.05	1.23
Mongolia	552	-340	55	4.29	260.33	2.09	16.21	18.10	9.13
Rwanda	463	-265	139	5.01	233.64	10.51	64.65	67.13	37.42
Tunisia	435	517	1,150	1.06	45.74	13.18	74.90	71.03	43.41
El Salvador	417	605	90	1.67	40.82	2.14	11.04	7.48	9.45

North Macedonia	403	7	40	3.42	98.19	2.07	25.77	8.29	18.31
Uganda	400	406	60	1.24	49.62	1.72	47.85	16.35	7.25
Mali	392	101	56	2.48	79.48	2.63	91.16	40.25	10.00
Ghana	383	1,096	55	0.64	25.91	0.81	4.10	5.46	1.75
Zambia	368	516	100	1.53	41.63	2.86	36.06	25.98	9.95
Montenegro	344	84	13	6.84	80.36	1.05	20.20	9.02	14.28
New Caledonia	339	-43	0	3.51	114.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Malta	331	353	18	2.78	48.38	0.58	2.52	2.66	2.21
Bahrain	328	1,252	0	0.97	20.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Senegal	326	302	69	1.51	51.93	2.11	23.67	28.76	6.26
Lebanon	320	746	0	0.63	30.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03
Qatar	313	8,093	-2	0.17	3.73	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.03
Cameroon	303	216	100	0.84	58.37	2.14	10.61	40.05	9.85
Tajikistan	296	-50	127	3.75	120.40	7.87	412.58	86.28	36.56
Togo	265	320	46	5.36	45.31	5.37	53.44	69.10	19.31
Brunel	254	-26	47	1.69	111.67	1.47	12.43	15.86	8.96
Belarus	251	926	54	0.40	21.35	0.35	2.96	2.36	1.77
Jamaica	246	104	45	1.59	70.19	1.20	11.28	8.69	5.01
Nicaragua	244	365	68	1.99	40.13	3.29	Inf	12.79	13.46
Albania	216	23	34	1.54	90.20	1.31	15.07	5.64	7.14
Zimbabwe	163	394	70	0.79	29.24	1.99	16.90	12.45	6.02
Bosnia and Herzegovina	158	401	16	0.83	28.20	0.37	6.51	1.27	4.44
Madagascar	154	280	30	1.17	35.48	2.17	58.19	10.58	8.18
Kyrgyz Republic	139	37	14	1.79	78.79	0.90	7.15	5.64	2.77
Armenia	138	23	28	1.12	85.98	1.25	9.31	14.54	8.19
Malawi	136	330	44	1.95	29.25	4.10	20.51	28.14	13.11
Central African Republic	131	-16	39	6.15	114.26	26.41	163.81	244.16	166.53
Yemen	130	72	30	0.43	64.32	1.59	25.44	10.94	3.66
Finland	111	18,665	9	0.04	0.59	0.01	0.14	0.05	0.05
Botswana	105	756	11	0.61	12.21	0.27	1.98	1.67	3.52
Namibia	86	687	17	0.70	11.10	0.43	3.05	3.40	4.37
Greenland	85	90	5	3.03	48.53	0.81	6.85	2.35	3.93
Guinea-Bissau	70	0	10	5.65	99.99	9.19	203.20	129.85	39.62
Syria	69	0	17	0.33	99.68	0.82	20.75	5.18	2.99
Moldova	65	1	8	0.62	98.29	0.39	4.23	1.84	1.20
South Sudan	61	225	1	0.66	21.31	0.11	2.86	1.35	0.87
Seychelles	58	74	23	4.10	43.94	5.41	24.75	48.06	44.97
Benin	54	0	11	0.41	99.25	0.55	5.78	8.34	1.79
Niger	48	63	14	0.41	43.21	0.86	31.47	7.05	2.53
Eswatini	46	120	12	1.02	27.56	1.07	10.91	8.50	3.91

Fiji	33	168	4	0.65	16.52	0.29	2.24	3.29	1.78
Aruba	32	149	6	1.11	17.60	1.00	8.28	2.84	3.27
Haiti	20	-6	6	0.23	138.64	0.54	17.97	8.15	2.48
North Korea	17	-16	6	0.09	1395.95	0.29	7.38	2.70	1.06
Gambia	16	-15	5	1.02	1629.27	3.11	81.15	33.62	11.85
Solomon Islands	10	44	3	0.78	18.78	0.82	4.48	6.81	8.26
French Polynesia	5	161	0	0.10	3.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
St. Lucia	5	807	1	0.25	0.61	0.37	3.99	3.46	1.77
St. Kitts and Nevis	2	390	1	0.25	0.59	0.43	4.00	3.89	3.11
Mauritania	2	7	0	0.03	20.90	0.05	0.56	0.44	0.23
Andorra	2	0	0	0.05	101.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tonga	0	1	0	0.08	30.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Belize	0	0	0	0.00	109.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note. PS stands for profit shifted, TRL stands for tax revenue loss. We compare PS with the country's GDP. We compare the TRL with the total tax revenue, the corporate tax revenue, and the public health and education expenditures.

Table B5 Profits (in US\$ million) reported by groups with positive profits (Profits (+)) and all groups (Profits (all groups)). ETRs accrued (signified with 'a') and cash-based (signified with 'c')

Country	Profits (+)	Profits (all groups)	ETRa (wmean)	ETRc (wmean)	ETRa (median)	ETRc (median)	Number of reporters	ETRa for (wmean)	ETRc for (wmean)	N. reporters
Reporting on										
India	90,546	82,790	24.7	29.7	25.5	29.3	14	25.0	30.0	163
United States	1,082,724	949,320	18.8	17.8	19.0	19.3	17	18.3	22.0	137
South Africa	19,438	15,169	11.8	15.8	20.7	22.7	14	21.0	22.5	127
Italy	60,549	30,237	16.2	18.5	29.8	31.6	15	26.3	31.0	103
Mexico	45,370	38,807	25.2	27.0	28.7	30.0	16	26.9	29.1	102
Denmark	19,295	16,700	14.8	15.6	13.6	11.2	11	21.6	24.0	96
China	494,930	490,202	16.3	19.0	16.5	22.0	17	14.8	15.5	90
France	107,634	94,925	19.3	16.8	23.3	24.1	14	19.9	19.2	83
Luxembourg	35,695	-32,253	1.8	1.4	2.6	2.7	13	1.9	1.5	80
Bermuda	46,813	36,426	1.0	1.0	0.1	0.1	10	1.3	1.3	72
Australia	88,363	77,064	20.3	16.1	21.8	18.4	16	21.9	22.9	56
Belgium	29,364	31,409	9.3	8.6	15.4	18.2	14	16.1	16.5	40
Indonesia	23,968	31,940	21.4	21.2	20.7	22.7	14	22.7	24.0	33
Japan	416,711	400,686	20.1	23.2	25.4	22.7	15	22.5	23.1	29
Singapore	36,591	49,695	6.2	6.2	5.8	6.4	16	6.2	6.2	23
Chile	19,980	19,180	13.7	12.1	9.8	12.9	13	13.5	11.4	14
Canada	131,584	108,573	8.5	9.0	17.3	17.5	16	15.5	18.5	9
Slovenia	612	606	10.0	10.0	17.0	10.7	7	8.8	8.7	5
Poland	5,469	10,326	10.3	11.2	14.5	16.3	13	10.3	11.2	4
Ireland	64,742	45,786	8.1	7.8	4.9	4.2	14	10.1	9.4	1
Netherlands	141,954	124,295	4.9	5.4	5.0	5.5	17	3.5	3.9	1
Norway	31,309	28,112	24.5	22.6	23.2	29.1	13	44.8	51.9	1
South Korea	103,079	97,487	19.5	19.8	21.5	19.6	15	17.9	25.1	1
Sweden	47,504	44,738	7.6	12.8	8.6	14.6	14	10.7	52.9	1
Austria	22,257	20,858	7.6	5.8	13.5	12.2	15	22.2	14.8	1
Finland	15,020	13,439	7.8	9.1	15.0	12.7	12	10.3	16.2	1
Nepal	130	130	30.6	30.5	30.6	30.5	1	30.6	30.5	0
Oman	149	-178	8.2	-2.0	2.7	-2.6	7	8.2	-2.0	0
Pakistan	174	589	27.1	55.0	12.6	52.0	5	27.1	55.0	0
Nicaragua	188	170	28.0	28.8	25.9	27.7	4	28.0	28.8	0
Panama	1,551	1,086	7.2	7.6	1.3	3.4	10	7.2	7.6	0
Nigeria	1,500	-909	54.4	57.8	16.8	14.1	9	54.4	57.8	0
Peru	18,456	16,707	24.6	31.4	21.8	22.4	12	24.6	31.4	0
Philippines	2,775	2,643	19.0	19.4	12.8	16.6	13	19.0	19.4	0
Niger	14	4	1.7	3.4	1.7	3.4	2	1.7	3.4	0
Papua Guinea	New 298	508	2.0	5.5	1.9	5.9	7	2.0	5.5	0

New Caledonia	0	-24	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
New Zealand	4,378	4,701	18.3	20.1	24.3	24.9	12	18.3	20.1	0
Mauritius	1,216	1,991	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.1	10	3.5	3.6	0
Namibia	318	338	19.4	20.3	9.3	-0.6	6	19.4	20.3	0
North Macedonia	2	1	13.7	6.1	13.7	6.1	4	13.7	6.1	0
Latvia	82	-4	4.2	4.9	9.8	11.9	9	4.2	4.9	0
Macao	2,140	3,661	10.9	8.7	11.2	9.1	8	10.9	8.7	0
Morocco	1,162	911	27.4	20.2	19.5	13.3	10	27.4	20.2	0
Monaco	101	318	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.9	3	0.6	0.9	0
Moldova	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Madagascar	1	54	19.4	31.5	11.8	19.1	3	19.4	31.5	0
Maldives	29	29	32.1	17.3	32.1	17.3	1	32.1	17.3	0
Marshall Islands	4	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0
Mali	11	12	14.3	1.6	14.3	1.6	2	14.3	1.6	0
Malaysia	9,561	8,556	16.1	15.7	13.3	17.3	15	16.1	15.7	0
Malta	2	373	5.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	8	5.5	1.0	0
Myanmar	301	305	1.9	1.2	0.8	0.2	6	1.9	1.2	0
Montenegro	13	12	3.9	31.3	6.4	19.2	2	3.9	31.3	0
Mongolia	0	-36	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0
Mozambique	233	-344	32.4	35.5	32.0	10.0	8	32.4	35.5	0
Mauritania	1	1	24.7	46.1	24.7	46.1	2	24.7	46.1	0
North Korea	0	-2	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Malawi	62	61	32.2	34.6	32.0	29.4	3	32.2	34.6	0
Puerto Rico	39,193	38,873	1.0	1.5	13.9	13.9	5	1.0	1.5	0
Russia	6,547	5,628	20.0	19.7	16.0	13.8	12	20.0	19.7	0
Portugal	835	1,152	20.5	12.1	18.4	19.3	12	20.5	12.1	0
Paraguay	7	-601	8.5	2.9	10.1	3.6	4	8.5	2.9	0
Timor-Leste	14	14	8.6	1.1	5.9	18.7	2	8.6	1.1	0
Tonga	0	0	55.7	48.4	55.7	48.4	1	55.7	48.4	0
Trinidad and Tobago	209	-551	26.9	28.2	29.6	21.8	4	26.9	28.2	0
Tunisia	41	189	264.1	271.7	10.7	17.4	6	264.1	271.7	0
Turkey	2,547	1,792	18.4	21.1	19.8	20.3	12	18.4	21.1	0
Taiwan	3,090	6,223	18.4	18.4	12.2	12.6	13	18.4	18.4	0
Tanzania	154	39	59.0	49.1	30.6	36.1	4	59.0	49.1	0
Uganda	178	145	15.0	21.3	22.0	25.1	4	15.0	21.3	0
Ukraine	999	103	13.6	10.4	15.8	13.4	10	13.6	10.4	0
Uruguay	1,195	1,268	4.5	2.8	5.7	3.0	10	4.5	2.8	0
Uzbekistan	0	-155	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
Venezuela	2,060	-2,355	7.2	5.9	5.3	1.5	9	7.2	5.9	0
British Virgin Islands	23,391	23,591	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	10	0.1	0.1	0
US Virgin Islands	0	19	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Vietnam	1,328	39,407	12.0	12.9	11.4	12.7	13	12.0	12.9	0
Vanuatu	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0
Samoa	0	0	29.3	46.1	29.3	46.1	1	29.3	46.1	0
Yemen	7	7	23.3	0.0	45.9	77.2	3	23.3	0.0	0

Zambia	238	173	27.2	23.5	25.7	18.1	5	27.2	23.5	0
Turkmenistan	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Tajikistan	1	-10	42.8	89.5	42.8	89.5	2	42.8	89.5	0
Thailand	20,386	19,883	16.0	15.9	13.0	13.8	14	16.0	15.9	0
Solomon Islands	1	4	2.7	0.5	2.7	0.5	2	2.7	0.5	0
French Polynesia	0	72	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Qatar	2,153	2,065	-0.6	7.6	3.0	6.7	6	-0.6	7.6	0
Romania	1,024	1,803	11.2	11.2	14.8	13.3	11	11.2	11.2	0
Lesotho	57	57	16.5	33.1	16.5	33.1	1	16.5	33.1	0
Rwanda	0	-54	23.4	14.6	23.4	14.6	2	23.4	14.6	0
Saudi Arabia	1,881	1,207	17.1	18.9	9.1	15.0	10	17.1	18.9	0
Sudan	0	-129	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
Senegal	5	72	21.1	0.0	21.1	0.0	3	21.1	0.0	0
Sierra Leone	3	-40	18.7	10.3	18.7	10.3	3	18.7	10.3	0
Togo	0	12	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
El Salvador	412	410	21.5	23.7	30.0	28.6	4	21.5	23.7	0
Serbia	359	283	7.0	6.3	15.5	5.9	9	7.0	6.3	0
South Sudan	64	64	1.7	2.6	81.1	123.5	2	1.7	2.6	0
Slovakia	1,024	1,555	17.5	16.4	21.1	21.4	10	17.5	16.4	0
Eswatini	54	52	26.7	26.8	26.7	26.8	2	26.7	26.8	0
Seychelles	7	7	40.2	33.9	9.7	6.3	3	40.2	33.9	0
Syria	0	0	0.3	4.7	0.3	4.7	2	0.3	4.7	0
Chad	0	-72	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
Lithuania	142	108	17.1	8.7	15.0	5.3	8	17.1	8.7	0
Aruba	3	179	18.8	19.4	18.8	19.4	2	18.8	19.4	0
Sri Lanka	105	156	12.9	12.3	3.8	6.5	5	12.9	12.3	0
Brunei	4	-4	9.2	35.6	9.2	35.6	3	9.2	35.6	0
Bouvet Island	2	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0
Botswana	204	215	10.7	6.4	10.8	6.3	4	10.7	6.4	0
Central African Republic	0	-1	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Switzerland	43,524	4,060	7.3	7.1	10.6	9.7	13	7.3	7.1	0
Cote d'Ivoire	445	547	31.9	32.4	32.3	24.6	7	31.9	32.4	0
Cameroon	1	61	89.9	35.3	57.0	53.4	5	89.9	35.3	0
Congo DRC	56	-13	7.8	10.4	7.8	10.4	2	7.8	10.4	0
Congo, Rep.	16	-547	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	5	0.0	0.1	0
Colombia	5,096	-9,833	40.1	41.9	28.6	38.2	13	40.1	41.9	0
Costa Rica	1,103	936	18.8	19.1	15.9	33.9	8	18.8	19.1	0
Curaçao	0	179	0.0	12.1	0.0	12.1	2	0.0	12.1	0
Cayman Islands	31,737	25,371	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	12	0.4	0.2	0
Cyprus	2,393	2,262	2.2	1.9	2.1	3.1	8	2.2	1.9	0
Czechia	2,170	4,636	6.1	8.6	10.6	9.1	12	6.1	8.6	0
Germany	34,316	28,889	20.2	22.9	23.7	21.3	14	20.2	22.9	0
Dominican Republic	800	782	17.2	15.3	12.3	10.3	8	17.2	15.3	0
Algeria	1,443	3,176	29.6	-3.5	52.5	9.7	7	29.6	-3.5	0
Ecuador	976	742	71.1	24.3	37.7	23.7	11	71.1	24.3	0

Egypt	1,947	-55	36.4	36.5	25.5	17.2	10	36.4	36.5	0
Bhutan	16	16	16.3	16.9	16.3	16.9	1	16.3	16.9	0
Barbados	3	1,321	6.4	4.7	6.9	5.1	4	6.4	4.7	0
St. Lucia	0	55	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
Brazil	16,865	4,492	24.0	24.0	24.0	26.1	15	24.0	24.0	0
Angola	514	-518	124.6	107.6	149.3	123.6	4	124.6	107.6	0
Albania	26	-2	15.8	16.9	15.8	16.9	3	15.8	16.9	0
Andorra	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Netherlands Antilles	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0
United Arab Emirates	5,385	4,337	31.7	29.1	0.1	0.3	10	31.7	29.1	0
Argentina	5,557	6,691	29.8	33.2	32.9	31.4	13	29.8	33.2	0
Armenia	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
American Samoa	22	22	12.7	7.1	12.7	7.1	2	12.7	7.1	0
Azerbaijan	140	16	4.7	2.0	5.7	2.8	3	4.7	2.0	0
Benin	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0
Burkina Faso	96	181	5.6	2.3	22.7	27.7	3	5.6	2.3	0
Bangladesh	521	439	33.7	34.5	22.6	15.9	5	33.7	34.5	0
Bulgaria	727	685	0.5	2.9	9.7	7.9	9	0.5	2.9	0
Bahrain	114	131	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0
Bahamas	4	21,806	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4	0.0	0.0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	95	7.0	5.2	4.9	3.4	7	7.0	5.2	0
Belarus	69	106	21.5	22.1	20.7	19.8	5	21.5	22.1	0
Belize	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Bolivia	605	554	30.8	20.1	30.6	20.1	6	30.8	20.1	0
Spain	19,887	15,590	10.7	12.6	10.7	16.9	14	10.7	12.6	0
Estonia	47	80	0.2	8.2	0.0	0.0	7	0.2	8.2	0
Ethiopia	107	314	25.7	26.0	25.6	23.8	3	25.7	26.0	0
Fiji	28	40	11.0	11.1	13.3	12.6	3	11.0	11.1	0
Isle of Man	78	-30	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0
Iran	0	-19	22.4	-3.3	11.5	-1.7	5	22.4	-3.3	0
Iraq	20	501	33.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	6	33.1	0.0	0
Iceland	4	-289	4.1	2.2	4.1	2.2	3	4.1	2.2	0
Israel	3,044	2,616	16.1	23.2	16.2	19.8	8	16.1	23.2	0
Jamaica	3	63	18.2	8.2	60.7	4.1	3	18.2	8.2	0
Jersey	72	-53	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	5	0.7	0.6	0
Jordan	32	245	-4.8	-5.5	0.7	3.5	6	-4.8	-5.5	0
Kazakhstan	4,695	4,633	8.8	10.3	22.7	27.7	7	8.8	10.3	0
Kenya	202	-33	43.4	43.8	35.2	40.9	8	43.4	43.8	0
Kyrgyz Republic	0	3	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Cambodia	64	88	8.6	9.5	8.6	9.5	3	8.6	9.5	0
St. Kitts and Nevis	0	66	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	2	NaN	NaN	0
Afghanistan	4	3	8.0	12.0	8.0	12.0	2	8.0	12.0	0
Kuwait	27	94	3.2	1.9	3.2	1.9	4	3.2	1.9	0

Laos	38	-28	17.6	15.4	8.8	7.7	2	17.6	15.4	0
Lebanon	17	140	0.1	0.0	7.9	3.0	5	0.1	0.0	0
Liberia	8	-7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0
Libya	0	1,423	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0
Hungary	7,327	7,701	3.2	17.2	3.5	5.7	11	3.2	17.2	0
Haiti	0	-1	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Croatia	722	802	3.7	3.1	20.1	16.2	9	3.7	3.1	0
Guadeloupe	0	0	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Faroe Islands	7	6	0.9	-0.1	0.9	-0.1	1	0.9	-0.1	0
Gabon	30	-55	19.4	19.4	18.9	18.8	5	19.4	19.4	0
United Kingdom	94,754	47,438	10.1	9.4	11.7	10.2	16	10.1	9.4	0
Georgia	0	12	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	3	NaN	NaN	0
Guernsey	117	378	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.3	5	1.3	1.1	0
Ghana	468	229	14.3	10.2	21.9	19.9	7	14.3	10.2	0
Gibraltar	40	40	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	5	-0.0	-0.0	0
Guinea	105	105	28.7	5.2	28.7	5.2	2	28.7	5.2	0
Gambia	0	-1	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Honduras	201	123	24.8	28.1	30.3	27.7	5	24.8	28.1	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0.0	-13.0	0.0	-13.0	1	0.0	-13.0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	440	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	1	NaN	NaN	0
Greece	664	579	17.2	24.1	15.8	22.3	8	17.2	24.1	0
Greenland	14	8	5.7	0.0	5.7	0.0	1	5.7	0.0	0
Guatemala	1,015	780	7.0	6.3	13.6	9.9	6	7.0	6.3	0
Guam	0	75	15.7	125.6	15.7	125.6	2	15.7	125.6	0
Guyana	1	1	38.1	33.3	38.1	33.3	1	38.1	33.3	0
Hong Kong	64,552	59,546	6.6	8.3	10.4	8.4	15	6.6	8.3	0
Zimbabwe	163	207	43.2	36.2	43.2	36.2	3	43.2	36.2	0

Note. Three types of ETRs were calculated, the weighted ETR by profits (ETR_x (wmean)), the median (ETR_x (median)) and the weighted ETR by foreign profits (ETR_x for (wmean)). The number of countries disclosing data on the country (N. reporters) and the number of countries reported by the country (Reporting on).

Appendix C Data-driven calculation of the effect of tax on profit shifting

An alternative method of profit shifting analysis adopts a model-agnostic approach. Instead of fitting the data to a pre-determined model, we can use symbolic regression to search for models that fit the data well. The search space (i.e. potential models) in symbolic regression is, however, infinitely large. The state-of-the-art method uses evolutionary algorithms – algorithms inspired by biological evolution, widely used in optimisation problems, to find the best model, balancing the fitness of the model with its complexity in order to avoid overfitting. These algorithms start with a pool of solutions (in this case models), which are *re-combined* and *mutated*, increasing the pool of solutions. The best solutions found in this augmented pool are *selected* and allowed to be combined and mutated in the next generation. The algorithms efficiently explore the search space and reach a near-optimum solution. The main challenge in symbolic regression is how to score the solutions in order to find the best model, since using an error term alone will lead to finding highly complex models (overfitting). Here, we use the software *Eureqa* (Schmidt and Lipson 2009). In order to avoid overfitting, the software keeps the best model for each level of complexity, where the complexity is determined by the number of variables included and the operations (e.g. a log-transformation costs 4 units, an addition cost 1 unit) and the best model by the R^2 . The model ‘profits = 20’ is very simple, but has a very low R^2 . A model with 20 variables interacting with each other may be able to fit the data perfectly, but will most likely result in data overfitting.


The model tries to find the best model for the location of profits, based on the following variables: revenue from unrelated party, employment, tangible assets, ETR, $\log(\text{ETR})$, wages, population, gross fixed capital formation, consumption, gdp, tax complexity, statistical capacity, and revenue resources. The first five variables come from CBCR, wages are approximated as $\text{employment} \times \text{gdp} / \text{population}$, the last variable from the ICTD / UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 2018, and the rest from the World Bank. We do not include revenue from related parties since it is heavily affected by profit shifted. Employees and tangible assets are less relevant to tax avoidance structures. All variables except for the last three are log-transformed. While the evolutionary algorithm can transform variables, that transformation is costly and seldom found.

We let the algorithm run for 20 hours using eight CPU cores, until it reached a ‘Percent Coverage’ of 100 per cent; ‘Percent Coverage is actually designed to replace the older stability and maturity metrics by providing an improved estimate of how close the search is to the plateau point where continuing the search will most likely not turn up any better solutions. It is based on the early stopping rule of thumb estimate and tracks how long has it been since any significant improvement on the validation data set.’ (Eureqa documentation).

Figure C1 shows the variables included in at least one model. Our dependent variable (π) is logically included in all models. Revenue from unrelated party and ETRs were almost always included, while tangible assets, revenue from natural resources, expenses/GDP and wages were only included in more complicated models. The absence of statutory corporate income tax in all models is perhaps surprising.


Figure C2 shows the relationship between $\log \pi$ and the ETR. We see an extreme non-linear relationship for all models, independently of their complexity. In general, when the ETR is 1 per cent, the profits increase 6 to 14 times in comparison with the minimum. Interestingly, all models allowed for a U-curve, and the minimum effect found is achieved when ETR is 20 per cent. This could reflect the importance of resource-rich countries.

Figure C1 Variables found in the models



Note. 25 different models were found, and unrelated party revenues, ETRs, and tangible assets were found in the majority of them.


Figure C2 The found dependency between the ETR and profits is visualised



Note. The complexity of the model is depicted with a number.


Appendix D Sensitivity analysis, extra information

Figure D1 Comparison with estimates of profit shifting by Tørsløv et al. (2020)



Note. Countries not included in the sample of Tørsløv et al. (2020) appear in the left of the plots. Estimates of profits shifted using the misalignment model are visualised in blue. Estimates using the logarithmic model are visualised in grey. A light grey line is used to connect the blue and grey points corresponding to the same country.

Figure D2 Effect of the parameter t in the logarithmic model




Note. (A) The coefficient of $\log(t + ETR)$ is affected by the election of t . (B) The effect of t on our estimate of total profits shifted is small. Dots indicate the parameter and results of this paper.

Table D1 Regression table using US data and applying other specifications that allow for extreme non-linearities. A graphical visualisation is presented in Figure D3


	$\log(ETR)$	$1/(ETR)^1$	$1/(ETR)^2$	$1/(ETR)^3$	$\text{coth}(ETR)$
$\log(0.0014 + ETR)$	-1.5176*** (0.1920)				
$(0.0260 + ETR)^{-1}$		0.1502*** (0.0218)			
$(0.0580 + ETR)^{-2}$			0.0169*** (0.0025)		
$(0.0940 + ETR)^{-3}$				0.0040*** (0.0006)	
$\text{coth}(0.0260 + ETR)$					0.1502*** (0.0218)
ETR		2.6417** (1.1588)	1.9011* (1.0794)	1.6490 (1.0534)	2.5927** (1.1535)
Intercept	-6.8326*** (2.0061)	1.6570* (0.9598)	2.2231** (0.9585)	2.3595** (0.9591)	1.6555* (0.9598)
ETR	5.5093*** (1.4594)				
$\log(\text{Population})$	0.3694*** (0.1051)				
$\log(\text{GDPpc})$	0.4721*** (0.1628)	-0.0101 (0.0934)	-0.0080 (0.0932)	-0.0063 (0.0931)	-0.0101 (0.0934)
$\log(\text{Tangible Assets})$	0.4874*** (0.0748)	0.5426*** (0.0776)	0.5424*** (0.0775)	0.5432*** (0.0775)	0.5426*** (0.0776)
$\log(\text{Wages})$	0.1617* (0.0929)	0.3564*** (0.0820)	0.3555*** (0.0818)	0.3542*** (0.0817)	0.3564*** (0.0820)
N	91	91	91	91	91
R2	0.899	0.884	0.884	0.884	0.884
BIC	222.58	230.37	230.28	230.23	230.37

Figure D3 Graphical representation of Table D1 for $\log(\tau + ETR)$, $1/(\tau + ETR)$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^2$, $1/(\tau + ETR)^3$ and $\text{coth}(\tau + ETR)$ models



Note: Semi-elasticities calculated using US data. The τ offset is calculated independently for all models. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%.

Figure D4 Graphical representation of Table D1 for the model with extra dummies variables for following categories of ETR: <1%,1-5%,5-10%,10-15%,15-20%,20-25%,25-30%,>30%




Note. Semi-elasticities are calculated using US data. (A, B) Marginal effect of ETR on profits. (C,D) Relative increase in profits due to profit shifting, compared with a country with an ETR of 25%. Plots B and D are close-ups of plots A and C, constraining ETRs between 5 and 50%.

Table D2 Results of a robust linear model, where share of profits booked in a country is regressed against shares of employees, capital, sales and wages

	Share of profits
Share of employees	0.0315*** (0.0007)
Share of capital	0.1188*** (0.0004)
Share of sales	0.6598*** (0.0007)
Share of wages	0.0256*** (0.0004)
N	770
R2	0.98

Note: We used data on sub-groups with positive profits to reduce effect of profit shifting.

Figure D5 Profits shifted in and out of countries using CBCR data, estimated with misalignment, logarithmic (Log), quadratic (Quad), linear (Linear) and DLM (Linear-DLM, Quad-DLM) models



Note. MNCs shift profits from countries with negative shifted profits to countries with positive shifted profits. The largest origins of the profits are visualised in blue, and the largest destinations in red. All other countries are visualised together in grey. The annotations indicate the percentage of profit shifted out of the country (compared to estimated profits) or into the country (compared to booked profits).


Appendix E Modelling missing employees and revenue

We train the location of profits, employees and sales using variables from the gravity dataset of CEPII, World Bank data (WBD), United Nations data (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN COMTRADE database (COMTRADE), LinkedIn, Tax Justice Network financial secrecy and corporate tax haven indexes (TJN), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), International Labour Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), and Government Revenue Dataset (UNU-WIDER GRD). A complete list of variables can be found at the end of this Annex.

We used these variables to predict the location of employees and revenue. We tested several models, and a Histogram-based Gradient Boosting Regression Tree – a type of gradient boosting based on decision trees, which frequently outperforms other machine learning algorithms while offering some interpretability on the most relevant variables (Friedman 2001; Ke et al. 2017) – was shown to perform the best. A sample of the prediction power of the algorithm is visualised in Figure E1, and a comparison with Lasso regression in Figure E2. Since Lasso does not have native support for missing values, these are imputed using the *sklearn* function *IterativeImputer*, which provides a strategy for imputing missing values by modelling each variable as a function of other variables in a round-robin fashion.


Finally, we investigated which variables were more important in the estimation using permutation feature importance (Breiman 2001). The permutation feature importance is defined as the decrease in the R-square of the model when the values of a variable are randomly shuffled. We permuted the values of the original data (i.e. not of the 1000 bootstrap samples) 100 times to get a confidence interval, which is visualised in Figure E3. For the estimation of profits (ln_pi, not used in the paper), we find that outward FDI and Portfolio Investment are the most important variables. For the estimation of employees (ln_emp) and sales (ln_revt), outward FDI and Exports are the most important predictors. Importantly, we are not trying to rationalise the variables chosen by the algorithm, just to create an accurate model to impute missing values.

Figure E1 The boosting model was fit on 60% of the sample and tested in the other 40%



Note. In-sample estimations are depicted in light grey, while out-of sample estimations of employees, unrelated party sales and tangible assets are visualised in blue. Note that this is one split of the data. The cross-validated r-squares are displayed in the main text. The parameters (learning_rate=0.2, l2_regularisation=125 and min_samples_leaf=20) were set using cross-validation.

Figure E2 A penalised linear regression model was fit on 60% of the sample and tested in the other 40%



Note. In-sample estimations are depicted in light grey, while out-of sample estimations of employees, unrelated party sales and tangible assets are visualised in blue. Note that this is one split of the data. The penalty parameter ($\alpha=0.5$) was set using cross-validation.

Figure E3 Permutation Importance of each variable for the prediction of profits (\ln_{pi} , not used in the paper), (\ln_{emp}), and sales (\ln_{rev})




Table E1 Variables and data sources used to model missing employees and revenue

Variable	Description	Source
iso3	ISO-3 code	N/A
revt, emp, pi, txc	Revenue, employees, profits and cash taxes	CBCR
Bilateral Variables		
ln_Import	Log of total imports from origin to destination	COMTRADE
ln_Export	Log of total exports from origin to destination	COMTRADE
ln_FDI_inward	Log of total FDI from origin to destination	IMF CDIS
ln_FDDI_outward	Log of total FDI from destination to origin	IMF CDIS
ln_PortI_inward	Log of total portfolio investment from origin to destination	IMF CPIS
ln_PortI_outward	Log of total portfolio investment from destination to origin	IMF CPIS
ln_dClaims	Log of total banking claims (derived from partners)	BIS Table A6.2
ln_dLiabilities	Log of total banking liabilities (derived from partners)	BIS Table A6.2
ln_distw	Ln of distance between countries	CEPII GravData
tdiff	Time zones difference (hours)	CEPII GravData
transition_legalchange	Dummy, 1 if common legal origin changed since transition	CEPII GravData
eu_to_acp	Dummy, EU/member exporting to an ACP country (a preferential trade agreement on imports)	CEPII GravData
acp_to_eu	Dummy, ACP country exporting to an EU/member (a preferential trade agreement on imports)	CEPII GravData
col45	Dummy, colonial relationship post 1945	CEPII GravData
col_fr	Dummy, origin of colonial relationship post 1945	CEPII GravData
col_to	Dummy, destination of colonial relationship post 1945	CEPII GravData
colony	Dummy, colonial relationship (ever)	CEPII GravData
comcol	Dummy, common colonizer post 1945	CEPII GravData
comcur	Dummy, common currency	CEPII GravData
comlang_ethno	Dummy, common language (>9% population)	CEPII GravData
comlang_off	Dummy, common official language	CEPII GravData
comleg_posttrans	Dummy, common legal origins after transition	CEPII GravData
comleg_pretrans	Dummy, common legal origins before transition	CEPII GravData
comrelig	Religious proximity index	CEPII GravData
contig	Dummy, contiguity	CEPII GravData
curcol	Dummy, current colonial relationship	CEPII GravData
cursib	Dummy, current sibling relationship (common colonizer)	CEPII GravData
sibling	Dummy, ever sibling relationship (common colonizer)	CEPII GravData
fta_wto	Dummy, regional trade agreement (WTO)	CEPII GravData
gsp	Dummy if donator in Generalized System of Preferences	CEPII GravData
heg_o	Dummy, 1 if origin is current of former hegemon of destination	CEPII GravData
heg_d	Dummy, 1 if destination is current of former hegemon of origin	CEPII GravData
gsp_d_d	Dummy, 1 if origin is donator in Generalized System of Preferences	CEPII GravData
gsp_o_d	Dummy, 1 if destination is donator in Generalized System of Preferences	CEPII GravData
Unilateral Variables: Included for the reporting and partner countries		
Legislative/historical/Geographical		
entry_proc	Start-up procedures to register a business (Number)	CEPII GravData
entry_time	Time required to start a business (days)	CEPII GravData
entry_tp	Days+Procedures to start a business	CEPII GravData
gatt	GATT member	CEPII GravData
EU28	Dummy, country belonging to the EU-28	N/A
OECD	Dummy, country belonging to the OECD	N/A
Ukt	Dummy, UK-territory	N/A
region_tjn	Region	TJN
ln_area	Log of area in sq. kms	CEPII GravData
ln_entry_cost	Log of cost of business start-up procedures (log of % GNI per capita)	CEPII GravData
english	Official language 1 in the CEPII GeoDist dataset	CEPII GeoDist
governance	First PCA component of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project	WBD
Socio-economic and financial		
Nurses_per_1000	Nurses per 1000 inhabitants	WBD

Physicians_per_1000	Doctors per 1000 inhabitants	WBD
In_Nurses	Log of number of nurses	
In_physician	Log of number of doctors	
In_pop	Population (source CEPII)	CEPII GravData
In_population	Population (source WBD)	WBD
In_POP_int	Population (manually completed)	Following order of preference: WBD, UN, CIA, manually completed
In_GDP_int	GDP (manually completed)	
In_gdp_d	GDP	CEPII GravData
In_gdpcap_d	GDP per capita	CEPII GravData
In_gdppc_d	GDP per capita	In_GDP_int - In_POP_int
In_Health_expenditure_gdp	Log of health expenditure (% of gdp)	WBD
In_uhnwi	Log10 of the number of high net worth individuals (adults with wealth above 50 millions)	Global Wealth Report 2018 by Credit Suisse
ratings	Trading Economic credit rating, composed from the credit ratings by Moody's, S&P, Fitch and DBRS	Feb. 2019 tradingeconomics.com
In_n_companies_orb	Log of number of MNCs with a turnover higher than 750M in Orbis	Orbis
In_GreenfieldFDI_inward	Total greenfield FDI into the country	UNCTAD
In_GreenfieldFDI_outward	Total greenfield FDI out of the country	UNCTAD
In_BIS	Log of total consolidated banking claims on an immediate counterparty basis	BIS (Table B4)
In_ExternalDebtStocks	Log of External Debt Stock	WBD
In_consumption	Log10 of final consumption expenditure by households and non-profit institutions serving households (constant 2010 USD)	Mean 2014-2018 NE.CON.PRVT.KD
In_gfcf	Log10 of gross fixed capital formation (constant 2010 USD)	Mean 2014-2018 NE.GDI.FTOT.KD
In_FDI_Inflows_WDI_d	Log of total FDI inflows	WBD
In_imports_wbd	Log of total imports in the country	WBD
In_ip_payments_wbd	Log of IP payments in the country	WBD
In_ip_receipts_wbd	Log of IP receipts in the country	WBD
In_exports_wbd	Log of total exports in the country	WBD
In_month_wage	Log of monthly wage	ILO
In_govt_exp_educ_sgdp_wb	Log of government expenditure in education (%GDP)	WBD
In_who_gvt_health_expenditure	Log of public expenditure in health care	WHO
In_cit_revenue	Log of government revenue from corporate income tax	UNU - WIDER GRD
In_resource_revenue	Log of government revenue from resource taxes and fees	UNU - WIDER GRD
In_resource_taxes	Log of government revenue from resource taxes	UNU - WIDER GRD
In_resource_revenue_gdp	Log of government revenue from resource taxes and fees (% GDP)	UNU - WIDER GRD
In_total_taxes_revenue	Log of total government revenue from taxes	UNU - WIDER GRD
Secrecy and tax		
Total FSI	Financial Secrecy Score	TJN Mean 2014 - 2018, Janský, Petr; Palanský, Miroslav (2019)
cit	Statutory Corporate Income tax rates	
cthi	Corporate Tax Haven Score	TJN
etr_real	Effective tax rate, capped at 0.6 and using CIT for missing and negative values.	CBCR weighted average
In_cit	Log of cit	KPMG, EY, PwC
In_etr_real	Log of etr_real	CBCR weighted average Mean 2014 - 2018, IC.TAX.DURS (WBD)
tax_complex	Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours)	
In_accountant_d	Log of number of accountants	
In_all_tax	Log of number of all tax professionals	
In_audience	Log of number of linkedin users	
In_banker	Log of number of bankers	
In_ceo	Log of number of CEOs	Linkedin (Garcia-Bernardo and Stausholm, Forthcoming)
In_cfo	Log of number of CFOs	
In_coo	Log of number of COOs	
In_cxo	Log of number of Chief Executives	

In_engineer	Log of number of engineers in country
In_finance	Log of number of finance workers
In_other_corporate	Log of number of corporate tax professionals
In_wealth	Log of number of wealth managers
In_transfer_pricing	Log of number of transfer pricing specialists
In_tax_compliance_audit	Log of number of tax compliance experts and auditors

References

- Alvarez-Martinez, M., Barrios, S., d'Andria, D., Gesualdo, M., Nicodème, G. and Pycroft, J. (2018) *How Large is the Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A General Equilibrium Approach*, CESifo Working Paper No. 6870, Munich, Germany, retrieved 7 February 2018 from <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144296>
- Auerbach, A., Devereux, M., Keen, M. and Vella, J. (2017) 'International tax planning under the destination-based cash flow tax', *National Tax Journal* 70(4): 783-802
- Beer, S., de Mooij, R. and Liu, L. (2020a) 'International Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots', *Journal of Economic Surveys* 34(3): 660-688, <https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12305>
- Hebois, S., Keen, M. and Liu, L. (2020b) *Exploring Residual Profit Allocation*, IMF Working Papers 2020/49, <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513528328.001>
- Bilicka, K. (2019) 'Comparing UK Tax Returns of Foreign Multinationals to Matched Domestic Firms', *American Economic Review* 109(8): 2921-2953, <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180496>
- Blouin, J. and Robinson, L. (2020) *Double counting accounting: How much profit of multinational enterprises is really in tax havens?*, SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3491451, Rochester NY: Social Science Research Network, retrieved 5 December 2019, from <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3491451>
- Bolwijn, R., Casella, B. and Rigo, D. (2018) 'Establishing the baseline: Estimating the fiscal contribution of multinational enterprises', *Transnational Corporations* 25(3): 111-142, <https://doi.org/10.18356/de4a3b2c-en>
- Breiman, L. (2001) 'Random Forests', *Machine Learning* 45(1): 5-32, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324>
- Clausing, K. (2020a) '5 Lessons on Profit Shifting from the U.S. Country-by-Country Data', *Tax Notes International and Tax Notes Federal*
- (2020b) 'Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act', *National Tax Journal* 73(4): 1233-1266, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3274827>
- (2016) 'The effect of profit shifting on the corporate tax base in the United States and beyond', *National Tax Journal* 69(4): 905-934
- Cobham, A., Faccio, T. and FitzGerald, V. (2019) *Global inequalities in taxing rights: An early evaluation of the OECD tax reform proposals*, draft paper
- and Janský, P. (2020) *Estimating Illicit Financial Flows: A Critical Guide to the Data, Methodologies, and Findings*, Oxford University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854418.001.0001>
- (2019) 'Measuring Misalignment: The Location of US Multinationals' Economic Activity versus the Location of their Profits', *Development Policy Review* 1-38, <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12315>

- (2018) 'Global distribution of revenue loss from corporate tax avoidance: Re-estimation and country results', *Journal of International Development* 30(2): 206-232, <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3348>
- Crivelli, E., de Mooij, R. and Keen, M. (2016) 'Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries', *FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis* 72(3): 268-301, <https://doi.org/10.1628/001522116X14646834385460>
- Damgaard, J., Elkjaer, T. and Johannesen, N. (2019) *What Is Real and What Is Not in the Global FDI Network?*, IMF Working Paper 19/274
- Davies, R., Martin, J., Parenti, M. and Toubal, F. (2018) 'Knocking on tax haven's door: Multinational firms and transfer pricing', *Review of Economics and Statistics* 100(1): 120-134
- De Mooij, R., Liu, L. and Prihardini, D. (2019) *An Assessment of Global Formula Apportionment*. IMF Working Paper 19/213
- De Simone, L., Klassen, K. Seidman, J. (2017) 'Unprofitable Affiliates and Income Shifting Behavior', *The Accounting Review* 92(3): 113-136, <https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51555>
- Dharmapala, D. and Riedel, N. (2013) 'Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-shifting: Evidence from European multinationals', *Journal of Public Economics* 97: 95-107, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.004>
- Dischinger, M., Knoll, B. and Riedel, N. (2014) 'The role of headquarters in multinational profit shifting strategies', *International Tax and Public Finance* 21(2): 248-271, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9265-5>
- and Riedel, N. (2011) 'Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms', *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7): 691-707, retrieved 19 September 2012 from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272710002045>
- Dowd, T., Landefeld, P. and Moore, A. (2017) 'Profit shifting of U.S. multinationals', *Journal of Public Economics* 148: 1-13, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.005>
- Friedman, J. (2001) 'Greedy Function Approximation: A Gradient Boosting Machine', *The Annals of Statistics* 29(5): 1189-1232
- Fuest, C., Hebous, S. and Riedel, N. (2011) 'International debt shifting and multinational firms in developing economies', *Economics Letters* 113(2): 135-138, retrieved 24 November 2015 from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511002606>
- Hugger, F. and Neumeier, F. (2021) 'Corporate Profit Shifting and the Role of Tax Havens: Evidence from German Country-by-Country Reporting Data', CESifo Working Paper 8838
- Garcia-Bernardo, J., Jansky, P. and Tørsløv, T. (2021) 'Multinational Corporations and Tax Havens: Evidence from Country-by-Country Reporting', *International Tax and Public Finance*

- and Takes, F. (2018) 'The effects of data quality on the analysis of corporate board interlock networks', *Information Systems* 78: 164-172, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.is.2017.10.005>
- Guvenen, F., Mataloni, J., Raymond, J, Rassier, D. and Ruhl, K. (2017) *Offshore Profit Shifting and Domestic Productivity Measurement*, Working Paper No. 23324, National Bureau of Economic Research, <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23324>
- Haberly, D. and Wójcik, D. (2015) 'Tax Havens and the Production of Offshore FDI: An Empirical Analysis', *Journal of Economic Geography* 15(1): 75-101, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu003>
- Hearson, M. (2018) 'When do developing countries negotiate away their corporate tax base?', *Journal of International Development*, 30(2): 233-255, <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3351>
- Heckemeyer, J. and Overesch, M. (2017) 'Multinationals' profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels', *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*, 50(4): 965-994, <https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12283>
- Hines, J. and Rice, E. (1994) 'Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 109(1): 149-182
- Horst, T. and Curatolo, A. (2020) 'Assessing the Double Count of Pretax Profit In the IRS Summary Of CbC Data for Fiscal 2017', *Tax Notes International* 98(4): 427-432
- Huizinga, H. and Laeven, L. (2008) 'International profit shifting within multinationals: A multi-country perspective', *Journal of Public Economics* 92(5-6): 1164-1182, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.002>
- Izawa, R. (2019) *Who, me? Tax Planning and Japanese Multinational Enterprises, 1887–2019*, Working Paper 291, Faculty of Economics, Shiga University
- Janský, P. and Palanský, M. (2019) 'Estimating the scale of profit shifting and tax revenue losses related to foreign direct investment', *International Tax and Public Finance* 26(5): 1048-1103, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-019-09547-8>
- Johannesen, N., Tørsløv, T. and Wier, L. (2020) 'Are Less Developed Countries More Exposed to Multinational Tax Avoidance? Method and Evidence from Micro-Data', *The World Bank Economic Review* 34(3): 790-809, <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz002>
- Ke, G., Meng, Q., Finley, T., Wang, T., Chen, W., Ma, W., Ye, Q. and Liu, T.-Y. (2017) 'LightGBM: A Highly Efficient Gradient Boosting Decision Tree', in I. Guyon, U. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan and R. Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 30, Curran Associates, Inc., retrieved 5 October 2020 from <http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6907-lightgbm-a-highly-efficient-gradient-boosting-decisiontree.pdf>
- Mundlak, Y. (1978) 'On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data', *Econometrica*, 46(1): 69-85, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1913646>

- OECD (2020) *Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Economic Impact Assessment*, Paris: OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-economic-impactassessment-0e3cc2d4-en.htm>
- Pedregosa, F., Varoquaux, G., Gramfort, A., Michel, V., Thirion, B., Grisel, O., Blondel, M., Prettenhofer, P., Weiss, R., Dubourg, V., Vanderplas, J., Passos, A., Cournapeau, D., Brucher, M., Perrot, M. and Duchesnay, E. (2011) 'Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python', *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 12: 2825-2830
- Phillips, R., Petersen, H. and Palan, R. (2020) 'Group subsidiaries, tax minimization and offshore financial centres: Mapping organizational structures to establish the 'in-between' advantage', *Journal of International Business Policy* 1-22
- Reynolds, H. and Wier, L. (2018) '*Big And Unprofitable*': How 10% Of Multinational Firms Do 98% Of Profit Shifting, WIDER Working Paper Series, 2018/111, <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2018-111.pdf>
- Schmidt, M. and Lipson, H. (2009) 'Distilling Free-Form Natural Laws from Experimental Data', *Science* 324(5923): 81-85, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1165893>
- Tørsløv, T., Wier, L. and Zucman, G. (2020) *The Missing Profits of Nations*, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24701, 2018, revised April 2020, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w24701>
- UN (2015) *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, New York: United Nations
- UNODC and UNCTAD (2020) *Conceptual Framework for the Statistical Measurement of Illicit Financial Flows*, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/IFF/IFF_Conceptual_Framework_for_publication_15Oct.pdf
- Weichenrieder, A. (2009) 'Profit shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany', *International Tax and Public Finance* 16(3): 281-297, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-008-9068-x>
- Wójcik, D. (2015) 'Accounting for globalization: Evaluating the potential effectiveness of country-by-country reporting', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 33(5): 1173-1189, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X15612338>
- Wright, T. and Zucman, G. (2018) *The Exorbitant Tax Privilege*, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24983, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w24983>