Parliamentary Strengthening to Improve Accountability and Responsiveness in Pakistan

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Question

- What interventions have been used to encourage parliaments and political parties to improve accountability and responsiveness in Pakistan and other developing countries and how effective are they?
- How effective are interventions that increase participatory decision-making, including increased dialogue between policymakers and citizens in Pakistan and other developing countries?

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The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.

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1. Summary

A wide range of programmes have been developed to improve political accountability and participatory decision-making, however evidence on the impacts of these interventions is very limited. Debate therefore continues as to which types of interventions are most effective to improve accountability and decision-making, and also whether improvements in these areas can or should be led by external actors (Casey et al., 2012). The need for detailed political economy analysis and a thorough legislative needs assessment is one of the most widely cited recommendations for international support to parliamentary strengthening. Increased coordination between development partners is also widely encouraged, and this is particularly relevant in the case of Pakistan where a number of international and national agencies are actively working to strengthen parliamentary effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness.

This report summarises findings from a rapid review of the literature on parliamentary strengthening and evidence on the effectiveness of different types of programme interventions. The report draws on findings from diverse contexts but includes a specific focus on the case of Pakistan. Section 2 begins with a short summary of relevant initiatives led by international agencies in Pakistan. Section 3 provides an overview of legislative assessments and monitoring initiatives. Section 4 examines programmes related to supporting political parties. Section 5 looks at initiatives seeking to build capacities in budgeting and budget transparency. Section 6 explores programmes related to improving inclusion and representativeness in parliamentary processes and in participatory decision-making.

Challenges to measuring the impacts of these programmes include “the lack of exogenous variation in institutions, the difficulty of measuring institutional performance and the temptation to ‘cherry pick’ estimates from among the large number of indicators required to capture this multifaceted subject” (Casey et al., 2012, p.1755). Despite this gap in evidence, a number of cross-country studies have examined the experiences of various programmes, largely drawing on observational data, and a range of common recommendations can be observed from these studies:

- A detailed, up-to-date political economy analysis is widely seen as a prerequisite for any parliamentary strengthening programme to develop a deep understanding of the appropriateness of programmes to context (DFID, 2010; European Communities, 2010; OECD, 2014; Rocha Menocal & O’Neil, 2012). Assessment of parliamentary capacities and the root causes of parliamentary weakness has also been suggested to take place before the design of parliamentary development activities (European communities, 2010; OECD, 2014). Sharing these analyses among donors has also been encouraged (DFID, 2010).

- A deeper understanding of parliaments’ incentives structures has been identified as a common gap in parliamentary strengthening programming (DFID, 2018; OCED, 2014). “Many support programmes assume that all parliamentarians would like a stronger parliament and that donor assistance will inevitably be welcomed. This is rarely the case. A politician’s attitude is likely to depend on a number of factors, including… whether it affects their chances of re-election and how it affects their working conditions and pay” (OECD, 2014, p.117).

- Integrated programmes that work with other parts of the political system, with civil society and in support of other areas of accountability is encouraged (DFID, 2018;
IPU, 2014; OCED, 2014; Rocha Menocal & O'Neil, 2012). “Support programmes should seek to increase the extent to which parliaments engage with outside institutions … and ensure that other programmes designed to strengthen other mechanisms of accountability feed into and strengthen the parliament (OECD, 2014, p.117).

- **Local ownership**, building on existing social capital and promoting the inclusion of wide sections of societies is seen as critical to foster political and behavioural change (Hudson & Wren, 2007; OECD, 2014, p.118). In fragile and conflict affected contexts such as Pakistan, recent analysis suggests “small interventions which build on personalised relations of trust, create safe spaces for groups to come together, and for slowly engaging authorities” are needed (Gaventa & Oswald, 2019).

- **Better coordination between donors and key stakeholders engaged in parliamentary activities and wider accountability measures** has been emphasised in a number of studies (DFID, 2018; Hudson & Wren, 2007; Rocha Menocal & O'Neil, 2012, OECD, 2014; Wilton Park, 2008). This is particularly relevant in the context of Pakistan where a number of programmes have been funded or implemented by a range of actors over the last two decades.

- **Improved monitoring and evaluation of parliamentary strengthening and participatory decision-making activities** is needed to track progress of ongoing programmes and to generate evidence on how to improve future programming (DFID, 2018; Rocha Menocal & O'Neil, 2012). New programmes are encouraged to build in adequate monitoring and evaluation components and to make the results of evaluations publicly available.

2. Parliamentary strengthening programmes in Pakistan

Parliamentary democracy is relatively young in Pakistan and the executive and legislative branches of government have tended to dominate the governance agenda (International Crisis Group, 2013). Up until 2008, Pakistan underwent a pattern of civilian regimes that began with high expectations, then following poor delivery and misgovernance, returned to military rule (Afzal, 2019). The National Assembly elected in 2008 is said to have been more assertive than previous legislatures (International Crisis Group, 2013), from which point “the military - though it certainly remains Pakistan’s most powerful institution – seems content to not be ostensibly in control of the government, so far as it can still control the two things that matter most to it: security and foreign policy” (Afzal, 2019).

Pakistan’s first democratic transfer of between civilian powers took place following the 2013 election where the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), led by Mamoon Hussain, was elected to power. The election results were initially challenged by opposition parties but were eventually accepted as legitimate. The subsequent election in 2018, also deemed by international observers to be ‘uneven’, saw a second transfer of power to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) led by Imran Kham, a former cricketer turned anti-corruption campaigner (Afzal, 2019).
There have been a number of governance programmes implemented in Pakistan aiming to strengthen parliament and generate broader political accountability between citizens and government. The following programmes were identified for this review:

**Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development (SDPD): Interparliamentary Union (IPU) / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

The SDPD programme was initiated at the request of support from the Parliament of Pakistan to the IPU to strengthen its operations (De Vrieze et al., 2012, p.7). The first phase of the project ran from 2004 to 2007 and a second phase ran from 2009-2013. The programme involved implementing partners from civil society, academic institutions, the media, the Secretariats of the Senate and National Assembly and other donor funded projects (De Vrieze et al., 2012, p.7). Activities carried out as part of the SDPD include but are not limited to:

- Placement of research assistants with selected committee chairpersons
- Orientation sessions for new Senators on parliamentary procedures, the committee system and the administrative structure of parliament
- Support to the Women's Parliamentary Caucus
- Training on legislation drafting, budgeting processes, parliamentary oversight, research
- Training for community organisations on parliamentary processes and legislative bills
- Development of an aid coordination mechanism for support to the Federal Parliament

(De Vrieze, 2012)

**FATA Institutional Strengthening Project: USAID**

This USAID project to support governance systems in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ran from 2008-2016. The project was focused primarily on capacity development and modernising governance systems based on a theory of change that “by helping with systems development, training and critical information technology support, the project supports efforts by these institutions to develop and manage programs at the agency and community level, monitor their implementation and engage in more effective communication” (USAID, 2013). The main activities of the programme included:

- Automating planning processes, building staff capacity, and development of an online information portal
- Day-to-day IT support through maintenance, repair, and connectivity of equipment, and on-the-job training
- Strengthening human resource management through expanding tracking systems, training for capacity enhancement, developing standard job descriptions, installing biometric attendance systems
- Strengthening women's empowerment

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1 This is not a comprehensive list. Due to the limited scope of this report, a targeted search of large-scale internationally led programmes was conducted.
EU initiated support to Pakistan to consolidate democracy, institutions and processes began in 2012 (EU, 2020). The SUABI programme operated from 2016-2019 with the aim of improving "the functioning of … provincial and legislative assemblies. It worked together with the assemblies in building professional parliamentary institutions" (EU, 2020). Subai worked with the provincial assemblies of Balochistan, Kyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh and the legislative assemblies of Azad Jammu, Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. Programme activities included:

- Development of a standardized legislative drafting manual and targeted training
- Support to 90 Young Parliamentarian Associates (YPAs) allocated to support MPAs in researching and drafting legislation and budget oversight
- Interprovincial and international exchange visits to stimulate interprovincial learning and build support networks
- Support for assembly newsletters to improve public understanding of the role and activities of the assembly
- Research and comprehensive reports on public expenditure to improve budget oversight

According to a Subai review document, some achievements of the programmes include:

- The first law to register Sikh marriages in the world came into force in Punjab with support from SUBAI. The bill was tabled by a minority member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly and SUBAI assembled the Punjab Provincial Government Human Rights and Law Department, Sikh religious scholars, and the legislation wing of the assembly to discuss and agree revisions of the bill.
- The support of YPAs contributed to the passing of nine pieces of legislation including the Sindh Injured Persons Compulsory Treatment Act and the Gilgit Baltistan Persons with Disabilities’ Act. YPA support also contributed to spending reviews and assembly newsletters.

Locally known as Tabber, the CDIP is expected to operate between 2016-2021 with the objectives of increasing the "capacity, accountability, and responsiveness of Pakistan's political institutions" (DAI, 2020). The programme has four set of activities:

- Improvements to election management and election oversight processes
- Supporting Parliamentary processes to be more inclusive, and Parliamentarians more effective in holding government to account
- Helping political parties across the mainstream political spectrum to better represent, respond to and deliver for their constituents
- Expanding democratic space to improve policy dialogue, political debate and public discourse

(DFID, 2018)
Based on a mid-term evaluation in 2018, the CDIP has been found to be achieving a number of intended results. Key achievements cited in the evaluation include:

- Improved coordination through the development of a Parliamentary Support Group (PSG)
- Developing a partnership with the Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Studies to provide cross-cutting institutional support
- Information sessions for 13 political parties to boost their policy capacity, to understand the 2017 Elections act and improve women’s political representation
- Civic education provided to over 16,000 citizens

(DFID, 2018)

Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes (SELP): USAID, FCDO, Government of Japan

SELP is a multi-donor programme partnering with the Election Commission of Pakistan, the Senate, the Provincial Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The project is expected to run from 2013-2021 with the aim of “improving the supply side of governance by enhancing the capacity of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the Senate and Provincial Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan” and “supporting the demand side by developing the capacity of civil society in advocacy and civic engagement” (UNDP, 2020).

Achievements that have been reported by the programme so far include:

- “Support [to] the Balochistan and KP Provincial Assemblies to strengthen their committee systems and build effective oversight mechanisms including support to Women Parliamentary Caucuses, SDG Task Forces and Parliamentary Committees.
- Successful deployment of United Nations Civic and Voter Education Youth Volunteers (UNVs) to conduct civic and voter education activities in schools, colleges, university campuses and communities.”

(UNDP, 2020)

3. Legislative strengthening through assessment and monitoring

Legislative needs assessments have been recommended to determine the root causes of parliamentary weaknesses, entry points for political behavioural change, and priorities that align with parliamentary objectives (IPU, 2008; OECD, 2014). Legislative assessments can be carried out as a ‘self-assessment’ by parliaments themselves or by supporting agencies intending to carry out PS programming. OCED (2015, p.45) recommends a combination of self-assessment and external assessment and has developed a framework for external legislative

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needs assessments involving three phases: a preparatory phase to understand the political, social and economic context in which the parliament operates; a main phase gathering information from key stakeholders on the key functions of parliament, its strengths and weaknesses; a third phase of project design, testing and building support. To determine root causes of parliamentary weakness in the main assessment phase, the European Commission recommends using a matrix similar to the sample matrix in Figure 1 to indicate how support might be best targeted.

Figure 1: Sample matrix for legislative assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Institutional performance</th>
<th>Seriousness of issues (1 = high, 5 = low)</th>
<th>Underlying Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong (S)</td>
<td>Adequate (A)</td>
<td>Weak (W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initiation/drafting</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Debating</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Scrutinizing</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Amending</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Communities (2010) p. 55. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

**No recent comprehensive self-assessment or external assessment by an institution supporting parliamentary strengthening in Pakistan was identified for this review.** PILDAT conducted an evaluation in 2008 in cooperation with members of parliament, analysts and the media using IPU’s self-assessment matrix, though parliament has changed significantly since this evaluation took place. The impacts of the self-assessment have reportedly been limited given that many of the recommendation of the assessment were not acted upon, however “the secretary of the National Assembly credits the evaluation with promoting the decision to allow the opposition leader to chair the Public Accounts Committee and with encouraging the National Assembly’s continued efforts at self-assessment” (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016, p.159). Since then, PILDAT has published a number of monitoring reports, however these provide top level indicators of parliamentary activity rather than in-depth analysis of political economy factors and incentive structures.

**A recent academic study (Abbasi, 2018) was identified in this review that provides a legislative assessment based on interviews with 50 Parliamentarians and 50 Senators**

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3 Assessment of PILDAT’s monitoring publications based on a rapid review of free publications available on the PILDAT website: [https://pildat.org/parliamentary-monitoring](https://pildat.org/parliamentary-monitoring)
from 2018. The study employed a matrix evaluation of internal and external factors, and its findings include:

- Most parliamentarians are not familiar with the legislative process, preventing them from playing an active role in the legislative process.
- The majority of parliamentarians are not able to submit contracts, bills and resolutions due to insufficient knowledge, limited skills and scarce resources.
- Nearly all were dissatisfied with current levels of transparency and the functioning of oversight mechanisms.

(Connors, 2018).

There has been a proliferation of Parliamentary Monitoring Organisations (PMOs) around the world in the last decade. PMOs "aim to strengthen the accountability of parliaments to the electorate, citizen engagement in the legislative process and access to information about parliaments and their work" (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016, p. 155). International support has been directed to these organisations, and many serve as implementing partners for externally funded parliamentary strengthening programmes as demonstrated by the range of partners identified in Pakistan in section 2.

4. Support to political parties

Political parties have the potential to act as interlocutors between citizens and the state. However, many parties, particularly those in opposition, remain weak in many contexts (European Communities, 2010; Rocha Menocal & O’Neill, 2012). A gulf has been observed in many contexts between strong ruling parties that commonly have “higher levels of institutionalisation geared to winning elections, and a number of weak and fragmented opposition parties” (Rocha Menocal & O’Neill, 2012, p.5). Party fragmentation is also a weakness of parliamentary systems where “parties can split, decay, or start up seemingly overnight (Rocha Menocal & O’Neill, 2012, p.6). Party weaknesses can be exacerbated by the absence of robust legal, regulatory and financial frameworks that can lead to funding discrepancies between the ruling party and opposition parties. “Opaque party finances are a common feature across many contexts but do pose particular challenges for the development of more institutionalised and responsive parties in the long run” (Rocha Menocal & O’Neill, 2012, p.6).

International support to political parties has traditionally been directed towards support for elections, but it has broadened more recently to include “the election cycle as a whole and to building party structures and systems between elections (Rocha Menocal & O’Neil, 2012, p.v). Bilateral and multilateral donors are the most common funders of party assistance, and an increasing number of institutes and foundations are supporting programmes as implementers (Rocha Menocal & O’Neil, 2012, p.v).

A review of international support to election processes and political parties by DFID recommends that support must, where possible, “adopt uniform diplomatic and development standards to avoid accusations of bias (DFID, 2010). This lesson is highlighted in the review using the case of Pakistan where “the international community has not only sent out contradictory messages, but also created a degree of mistrust among ordinary people about their role and intentions” (DFID, 2010, p.22).
The review found very limited information on either the specific activities involved in international support to political parties or on the impacts of such programmes. The lack of publicly available documentation on this type of support may be due to the political sensitivity of such programmes given that they “tend to be politically more controversial and difficult to negotiate with parliaments and particularly with executives” (OECD, 2014, p.83). Activities to support political parties include:

- “Enabling each party caucus to engage dedicated research staff able to draft legislative amendments, conduct research into executive programmes and develop a clear political orientation
- Providing capacity-building training to party caucus leaderships, including in-situ workshops, study missions and exchanges
- Supporting a process to clearly define the roles, including rights and responsibilities, of party caucuses, and the political majority and opposition within parliament
- Developing training to define the roles, responsibilities and appropriate interactions between parliamentary party caucuses and the extra-parliamentary political party in order to promote better representation and participation
- Offering training and advice to party caucuses on how to engage and consult with civil society during legislative and oversight processes; and
- Providing training to party caucuses on how to interact and cooperate with the media for more transparent and accountable legislative and oversight processes.”
  (OCED, 2015, p.83-84)

The EU and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) have facilitated peer-peer visits among parliamentarians that have some evidence of effectiveness. The EU’s Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) “supports parliaments in new and emerging democracies outside the EU [with] tailored training and counselling as well as networking and peer-to-peer exchanges with parliamentarians and the relevant administrative services of the European Parliament” (OECD, 2014, p. 94). A review of WFD’s peer support in Morocco cited that women MPs found that “engagement with their peers from the region … helped ‘raise their consciousness’” and that “participation in the regional forum had motivated them towards taking public action in their own countries” (Hext & Deveaux, n.d.).

5. Capacity building for budget transparency and accountability

International support to strengthen the budgetary role of parliaments has increased over the last decade as a means to improve government transparency and accountability (Fölscher, 2010; Straussman & Renoni, 2009). The strategic role of parliaments in the national budgeting process has been characterised by their potential engagement “not only in the debate and approval of the state’s annual budget, but also in the ex-ante analysis of fiscal reforms and their fiscal impact, auditing public spending, monitoring public investment, and ex post accountability for executing the budget (Straussman & Renon, 2013, p.2)”. Support to improve the transparency of national budgets and of public financial management can also “lead to broader public debate and better policy outcomes … [by] empowering citizens to participate in public processes and hold their governments to account (Fölscher, 2010, p. 9). Donor-led
activities to build capacities in national budgeting and public financial management include
grant-making, training for finance committee members and other staff, establishing peer-
learning networks, placing advisers in a government entity to work in an advisory capacity,
replacing a presumptive post-holder or outsourcing and area of activity, and support for civil
society organisations to monitor budget processes.

A review of four Budget Office development programmes in Afghanistan, Jordan, Kenya
and Morocco found that Budget Offices were generally seen as credible, their reports
were generally utilised to inform legislation, and their recommendations were heeded in
some instances (Straussman & Renoni, 2009). The key functions of these four Parliamentary
Budget Offices involved reporting back to parliament on budget execution and government
performance, producing economic forecasts and responding to MPs’ requests (Straussman &
Renoni, 2009). Based on their evaluation the authors recommend: “a concerted effort to ensure
that elected legislators see it in their interest to take an active role in budgeting as part of their
representative and oversight responsibilities” and that “such an office requires requisite support
agencies willing to make legislators effective (p. 6).

According to the International Budget Partnership’s (IBP) ‘Open Budget Survey’, Pakistan
ranks among the lowest in the world on budget transparency (IBP, 2019). The index assess
public access to information on how the central government raises and spends public resources.
Pakistan scored 28 out of 100 in 2019 on the index while the global average is 45 out of 100
(IBP, 2019). The country’s transparency score has fluctuated over time, but the latest figure in
2019 is the country’s lowest since IBP began measuring budget transparency in 2010 (see
Figure 2). Pakistan ranks even lower on public participation in the budget process at 4 out of
100, compared to a global average of 14 (IBP, 2019).

6. Inclusivity and representativeness

Barriers to participation in political discourse and public decision-making are complex,
and programming must be aware of formal and informal processes and behaviours that
might inhibit certain groups from engaging in them. Based on recent research into
accountability measures in Pakistan, Gaventa & Oswald (2019, p.8) observe that “the
governance chain is long, with several layers of (male) intermediaries brokering access to services between poor and marginalised households and public authorities. Quite often there are a multitude of intermediaries, with success being a matter of contacting the right one”. This finding reinforces the importance of political economy analysis and needs assessments and suggests that these should include an analysis of formal and informal barriers to participation faced by marginalised groups.

Support to improve the representativeness of political parties and parliaments has been an area that has received significant attention, including in Pakistan. The first phase of the SDP programme in Pakistan sought to increase youth engagement through the development of a Youth Parliamentary school and a Children’s Parliament. The second phase of SDPD also sought to increase the proportion of women to men in parliament. Support to the Women’s Parliamentary causes has been found to have had an effect according to an evaluation of the second phase of the SDPD programme:

“Soon after the formation of the Caucus, the SDPD project focused its assistance towards developing a strategic plan for the Caucus. Within a week of the Caucus’ establishment, a project of women police stations’ monitoring and evaluation was launched. This practice has continued, and similar assistance has been provided on issues like acid-throwing incidences, home-based workers, [and] reproductive health during the last four years… A befitting Secretariat for the Caucus, with committee rooms, offices and all needed facilities was funded by the SDPD…The National Assembly of Pakistan has been able to pass more than 28 bills related to women and children, making it the most effective Legislature in Pakistan’s history to have focused on a social reforms agenda… The fact that almost all important bills related to women were drafted [in the Secretariat] is a manifestation that equipping the women parliamentarians in this manner has gone a long way in improving their efficiency.”

(De Vrieze et al., 2012, p.28)

While the strengthening of links between parliament and civil society is seen as a critical step to improving accountability and participatory decision-making, evidence in this area appears to focus primarily on the challenges of achieving this rather than on strategies to achieve it. Areas of concern in this area highlighted in the case of Pakistan are fear and lack of trust. Evidence generated by Governance Diaries in Gaventa & Oswald’s recent study indicate that states failure to protect citizens from threats such as the Taliban poses challenges to collective action and reinforces lack of trust in both public institutions and trust between different groups in society (Gaventa & Oswald, 2019).

This review identified USAID’s RADA programme in Ukraine as a programme seeking to improve public engagement in political process that has undergone evaluation and demonstrated positive results. The programme, initiated in 2013 following a ten-year Parliamentary Development Program, also led by USAID, sought to: improve public representation in the legislative process, expand the role of citizens in monitoring parliament and strengthen the role of the legislature in providing oversight of the executive branch (Lis et al.,
The mixed methods evaluation\(^4\) found the programme’s ‘Model District’ component to be particularly influential in fostering a greater connection between MPs and citizens, demonstrated by public comments on legislation being incorporated into law. The programme worked with:

> “a group of competitively selected lawmakers… to improve communication and interaction between MPs and voters as well as employ [an] e-democracy toolkit in parliamentary work. Activities include[d] press tours, MP reports to constituencies, public discussions of draft legislation and other public events. A virtual MP’s Mobile Office is also being developed under the project.”

(USAID, n.d.)

The programme was structured around a comprehensive package of support to link the government to citizens, which USAID describes as “ambitious, even for quiet times, let alone the times of political turmoil” which Ukraine was judged to be at the time of the intervention (USAID, n.d.).

Civic education programmes have also been implemented in a range of contexts to increase political information, political empowerment, and to encourage individuals to engage in public discourses and political decision-making (Finkel, 2014). A review of civics education programme evaluations in the Dominican Republic, Poland, South Africa, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo found that “exposure to the civic education ‘treatment’ had significant effects on political knowledge of various kinds, with some of these effects being quite large in magnitude” (Finkel, 2014, p.174). The studies reviewed also found “a consistent and relatively large effect… on local-level political participation” though “less success in changing democratic values than in fostering civic competence, engagement and political participation” (Finkel, 2014, p.175).

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\(^4\) The evaluation included document reviews, key informant interview, focus group discussion and “mini-surveys” of MPs, staff, local official, civil society organisations and journalists (Lis et al, 2018, p.ii).
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**Suggested citation**


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