Evidence on resilience approaches in fragile and conflict-affected states and protracted crises

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Question

What evidence is there for resilience approaches in fragile, conflict-affected contexts, and protracted crises? Specifically:

- What evidence that delivery of resilience-protecting and resilience-building programming is feasible in these contexts, and under what conditions?

- What evidence about the impact of resilience programming in these contexts, on individuals, households, institutions, countries, and systems?

  - What does the available evidence suggest on the effectiveness of single-sector deep approaches versus integrated multi-sector approaches?

  - What does the available evidence state about resilience programming in Syria specifically?

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The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.

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1. Summary

This rapid literature review explores lessons on resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) and protracted crises. Resilience programming has shown to be effective in helping recipients respond to previous shocks. There is less evidence that it can enable recipients to build resilience to future shocks because of both the time needed to judge this, and the nature of many FCAS or protracted crises means it is not always possible to build sufficient resilience to large shocks. It is widely argued that because resilience is a complex phenomenon, resilience programming should seek to be holistic in addressing different facets of a single sector, and linking with other sectors. Evidence from surveys of populations’ survival strategies supports this. Most evaluations stress the importance of such programming, either undertaken by individual donors/NGOs, or achieved through co-operation between donors and, where possible, local governance. There is limited evidence on the impact of resilience programmes in Syria. However, several surveys of Syrians’ resilience strategies provide strong evidence on the likely feasibility of resilience programmes in the country.

For the purpose of this review, resilience is defined as the ability of individuals, households, communities, countries, and systems to absorb, adapt to, anticipate, and recover from shocks and stresses (Sturgess & Sparrey, 2016; Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2020, forthcoming). In the Syrian context, and other conflict-affected and protracted crises, resilience approaches can include resilience-protecting and resilience-building objectives, and can be framed in relation to both past and future shocks and stresses. Resilience programming therefore begins by asking resilience of what, to what, with analysis of resilience capacity within particular social groups or institutions, and of the shocks and stresses in that environment. It is often divided into absorptive, anticipatory, adaptive and transformative resilience, or a similar formulation (Sturgess & Sparrey, 2016).

Resilience is a broad concept applied in many different ways, and therefore the evidence base has some gaps. There is currently less research on resilience programming in conflict situations, partly because of a focus on environmental and economic stressors until recently, as well as the difficulty of implementing more development-oriented programmes in conflict situations (Maxwell et al., 2017; Twigg, 2015; Twigg, J., & Calderone, M., 2019; Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2020, forthcoming). Resilience can take a number of forms in programming, from providing support in diversifying livelihoods, food security, agricultural support, support for markets, accumulating or protecting assets, the development of community safety nets, infrastructure, early warning systems, credit, migration, community dispute resolution, peace forums, or the development of formal local and national governance institutions (Sturgess & Sparrey, 2016). Resilience has typically been used in specific sectors and there is less evidence for more holistic forms of resilience building that seek to build peace, for example Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2020, forthcoming).

The main criticisms of resilience are (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p. 6) that it misses the role of power and politics in determining vulnerability, as well as internal sources of vulnerability; it places the onus for strength or recovery primarily on the individual (or household or community) while overlooking inherent and structural conditions; it is too vague to allow for effective programme or policy design; it detracts attention and funds away from needed forms of support, including conditions in which emergency assistance is inevitable. These broad criticisms do not apply to all types of resilience programming and are much more relevant for single sector approaches than to integrated/holistic approaches.
While definitions of fragile states differ, common features are the state's loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. Protracted crises are 'when a significant proportion of the population is vulnerable to death, disease or disruption of their livelihoods over a long period of time', often featuring natural hazards and conflict.

In FCAS, or protracted crises, a number of difficulties arise. These include:

- Breakdown in governance and resulting difficulty in institutionalising changes programmes seek to make through local or national government
- Increased number and magnitude of macro-level shocks (e.g. inflation, food shortages)
- Greater disruption to production, markets and livelihoods systems needed to sustain resilience
- Security problems (e.g. conflict, extortion) either in communities or at a regional/national level
- Increased informal governance (e.g. through religious leaders, or armed groups)
- More impact on particular groups (e.g. people with disabilities, certain ethnic groups)

Resilience programmes in these settings run the risk of exacerbating conflict. If not sufficiently conflict-sensitive, they can worsen inequalities within or between communities, and thereby contribute to local conflicts. Resources provided by programmes can become the target of theft or violence by armed groups (Peters et al., 2020).

This review has focused on programmes explicitly packaged as 'resilience' work or featuring a significant resilience component. While there is much development work that could be considered resilience building, this review has not usually considered such programmes. The report surveys evaluations and academic papers on resilience in FCAS. It focuses on discussion of feasibility (e.g. how to frame programming, engage with local actors etc.) and impact. The report is divided geographically. Section 6 focuses on evidence from Syria. Evidence is taken both from programme evaluations and reports, and from analyses of community resilience strategies that can be used to inform programmes. Analyses of community resilience are used to show how NGO programmes may be able to build on existing sources of resilience. While there is relatively little evidence of the impact of resilience programmes in Syria, there are several analyses of local resilience capacity within the country that can inform programming (e.g. Stein, 2020). All evaluations mention the importance of targeting programmes to vulnerable groups. This includes programming focused on women and gender-sensitive programming. There is also some mention of people with disabilities as a vulnerable group. However, several reports note that some of the extant resilient institutions in FCAS, or donor-supported ones, favour certain sectors of the population (e.g. the well-connected).

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1 https://fragilestatesindex.org/frequently-asked-questions/what-does-state-fragility-mean/

Feasibility

Evidence on feasibility considers the way that resilience is framed, understood and measured; the way that programming is implemented; and the barriers and opportunities in given contexts. Evaluations and academic literature are used to show the lessons on the feasibility of programming.

Conceptual clarity is linked to feasibility. Programming needs to be linked to a plausible analysis of the situation, and good coordination among relevant actors. For example, Cusumano and Hofmaier (2020) argue that in authoritarian states, resilience of society is contradictory to resilience of state institutions. They show how interventions in Mali focused on supporting the armed forces are therefore ineffective at building resilience as they do not address all the factors, and call for more coordination and make sure one form of resilience does not contradict another. Some argue that a resilience framing of some problems is misguided and unfeasible. In one example, by focusing on the resilience of civilians to attacks by armed actors, and not addressing the problem of the attacks (Shah, 2015), programmes are said to have focused on bolstering absorptive capacity instead of seeking to transform stressors. Framing resilience also an attribute of a particular segment of society can also be counterproductive. Kaya (2018) notes that in Iraq, too heavy an emphasis on the ‘community’ and ‘cultural factors’ as sources of vulnerability and resilience came at the expense of considering legal and political barriers and opportunities.

Undertaking resilience work in FCAS requires the willingness to engage in a conflict zone, and to adapt working criteria and methods of engagement. For example, the World Bank had to adapt its funding mechanisms to work in Yemen during the conflict (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). All reports agree on the importance of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity (e.g. Maxwell, D., Stites, E., Robillard, S. C., & Wagner, M., 2017; Bond, 2017; Boresha 2020). This can provide early warning for conflict shocks, analysis of how aid may make recipients a target, or play into war economies, and how aid can help reduce tensions. Conflict sensitivity can be practised by using local staff loyal to the programme (rather than local groups involved in a conflict), with good mediation skills, or local partners (Boresha, 2020; Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; Singh and Brandolini, 2019; Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). The added importance of demonstrating neutrality to all recipients and partners in a conflict zone is widely agreed on (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018; Morais and Ahmed, 2010).

Resilience work in FCAS should be realistic about what can be achieved. Because of the complexity of conflict, natural disasters and other shocks in FCAS, ‘interventions to build resilience are not a quick fix but rather require extensive commitments in time, planning and follow-up’ (Stites and Bushby, 2017). Small-scale conflict resolution work around natural resources is possible, although there is a limited evidence base (e.g. Twigg, 2015; Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; USAID, 2020). Resilience to past shocks is more likely to be feasible than resilience to future shocks in a FCAS. There is less likely to be a linear progression from less to more resilient beyond a certain point, as continued shocks from conflict situation or macro-economic environment are possible (Ward and Qatinah, 2019; Shah, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2015). Moreover, flexible funding to respond to shocks, changed circumstances, and to switch between ‘emergency’ and ‘development’ or ‘reconstruction’ funds if needed. In some particularly fragile contexts, a focus on absorptive resilience may be realistic (Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; Pickwick, 2020; Twigg and Calderone, 2019; Care, 2020). It is important to ‘sequence, layer and target’ interventions to help the most needy onto ‘resilience pathways’. Interventions should be carefully targeted to specific income or occupation groups (SomRep, 2018).
Resilience programming should be framed based on evidence of local coping strategies and resilience structures, rather than pre-determined political priorities. For example, EU work in East Africa and the Sahel prioritised preventing migration, but evidence shows that migration is an important resilience strategy (European Commission, 2017). Linked to this, the evidence shows the importance of specific knowledge of existing livelihoods and resilience strategies and barriers in a given context in order to appropriately target responses. **Social networks, social capital and trust are important sources of resilience**, and are not always immediately visible (Twigg and Calderone, 2019). Programmes should therefore seek to build these up, as well as to be aware that they can lead to increased resilience for the better connected.

**Resilience often requires co-operation with many local actors, from civil society, the private sector, and local and national government.** In FCAS, such co-operation is sometimes difficult to achieve for a number of reasons, so programmes should carefully consider how best to achieve this. A European Commission (2017) evaluation emphasises the importance of working with government where possible or NGOs elsewhere in order to provide broad service provision and sustainable programmes, and to make use of existing capacity (see also Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). It is possible to engage with the governments of FCAS in many cases. The FCAS ‘category includes a broad spectrum of conditions – from states with relatively robust systems but political or regime instability, to states with extreme limits on sovereignty or capacity. Rarely, however, can a fragile state do nothing. Indeed, the very malleability of state institutions in periods of instability can be viewed as an opportunity – rather than necessarily a risk – for positive external influence’ (Taylor, 2014).

**Impact**

Due to the long-term and complex nature of resilience, there are gaps in the available evidence of impact. There is considerable evidence on the impact of programming on resilience to past shocks. However, there is less on resilience to future shocks. Some evaluations have also drawn preliminary lessons from on-going or recent programmes, which have also been included.

In FCAS, evaluations stress the importance of understanding the cyclical nature of shocks. Cash transfers or food aid may improve resilience among recipients, allowing them to pay off debts or focus on livelihoods, but this should not necessarily be seen as ‘progress’ or sustainable resilience because another shock could leave them in need again (e.g. SomRep, 2018; Cash Alliance, 2018; Bonilla et al, 2017). In fragile contexts, there is therefore stronger evidence on programmes improving resilience to past events than building resilience for the future. The latter is seen as harder to measure (given that time needs to pass), and harder to implement given the number of potential shocks in a fragile context (European Commission, 2017).

**Measurements of impact on resilience to future shocks are sometimes imperfect.** For example, the EU does not have a tool and the measures it uses in some programmes (e.g. food security measures) ‘fall short of understanding the extent to which the capacity for withstanding future crises has increased’.

**The nature of FCAS can sometimes skew programming priorities.** There was some evidence that resilience work in conflict-affected areas is not needs-based (i.e. stays away from conflict, or works only in government-controlled areas) (Mena and Hilhorst, 2019; Tranchant et
al., 2019). Some note a possible contradiction between targeting the most vulnerable and resilience outcomes, as those able to contribute to increased economic activity, for example, are less likely to be vulnerable (EU, 2019, p. 12). Many effective mechanisms for increasing resilience, such as voluntary loan and savings associations, often attract the comparatively better off (SomRep, 2018; D’Errico, Ngesa, & Pietrelli, 2020).

There are lessons from different programming modalities. Cash transfers are widely seen as effective and favoured by recipients. They have been shown to enable recipients to pay debts, reduce expenditure on food, and participate in local markets more. They can also overcome problems such as theft, and enable more accurate targeting (e.g. Stites, E., & Bushby, K., 2017; D’Errico, M., Ngesa, O., & Pietrelli, R., 2020; Cash Alliance, 2018; Morais and Ahmed, 2010; Bonilla et al, 2017). In addition to increasing resilience to disasters, some authors argue that DRR can be effective building resilience to low-level conflict, although evidence is limited. However, conflict can also restrict DRR work - in contexts with national conflict, more DRR projects are undertaken in government-held areas (e.g. Peters, et al., 2020; Twigg, 2015; Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; USAID, 2020). Voluntary savings and loans (VSLAs) in Somalia built social capital, self-esteem and empowerment, and helped share ideas and expertise. VSLAs and NGO efforts to strengthen governance were also found to be important - e.g. committees for disasters (SomRep, 2018). Working through local customs, such as informal loan systems among pastoralists, can be effective, although inclusion criteria should be carefully considered (Bevins, 2019; Iyer, 2019; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015).

Single-sector deep approaches versus integrated multi-sector approaches

It is widely argued that resilience is complex and that therefore programming needs to address multiple facets. All agree that vulnerability is the result of complex interactions of shocks and stresses in FCAS, and that resilience programming should seek to address this (Peters et al., 2020). Both the vertical integration of single sectors, and multi-sector integration/co-ordination, are widely asserted to be necessary for effective resilience, particularly to create transformative resilience. Many evaluations report that co-ordination between different sectors can be effective in realising the benefits of resilience work.

For example, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) summarises its approach to resilience: ‘Resilience is multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral, reflecting the range of livelihood dimensions and coping strategies of households and communities, as well as the concurrent requirements, standards and policies that need to be put in place by local, national and global institutions to ensure the protection and progression of development gains. Agencies working on resilience recognise that their efforts need to be strongly underpinned by collaboration and partnerships with a range of other actors and partners’ (FAO, 2016, p. 52). Mercy Corps (Howe et al., 2018) on Syrian resilience adapted their livelihoods through seven years of conflict recommends that donors and NGOs research the ‘system-wide impact of interventions to understand effects beyond those involving direct beneficiaries and after the end of programme activities’ (p. 45). Many agencies advocate for linking livelihoods, food or other forms of resilience with resilience from conflict. The FAO argues that ‘a sustainable impact on peace is more likely when food security and livelihood-related initiatives are implemented as part of a broader set of multisectoral, humanitarian, developmental and peace-related interventions’ (FAO, 2018, p. 57).

Holistic interventions can be achieved through complementary partnerships as well as multi-sector programming. For example, an EU report argues that resilience is multi-sectorial,
but programming need not be as long as it can effectively complement other programming or state work (European Commission, 2017). A report on World Bank programmes in Yemen suggested interventions in one sector should be ‘tightly linked’ to other sectors in order to ensure all facets of resilience can be improved and can reinforce each other (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). An evaluation of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) work in Syria emphasises that the donor should support livelihoods in a strategic way, built on a nuanced understanding of context and partners, and include clearly articulated intended outcomes (DFAT, 2019). Some recommend working in line with security forces in conflict situations, given the potential for violent conflict to cause shocks and disrupt resilience in other sectors (Mercy Corps, 2015). Cash support can have a multi-sectoral effect, by allowing households to respond effectively to a wide variety of shocks and needs in different sectors (Bonilla et al., 2017).

Evidence on Syria

There are several studies of existing resilience in Syrian society and institutions, from which programming lessons can be drawn. They show that there are multiple sources of shocks in the context, as well as damage to pre-war systems of agriculture and food security, social capital, livelihoods security and health systems.

A number of resilience-supporting factors have been negatively affected by the conflict. Evidence on conditions hindering resilience within Syria includes that the food security index fell significantly during the war. Declines in production occurred due to loss of manpower, targeting of opposing parties’ food supplies, the centralisation of food by the warring parties, siege strategies. This led to increased dependence on imports and aid (Ismail et al., 2019). The report also identified the decline of social capital, and activities such as smuggling, theft, royalties, looting and participation in fighting as associated with deteriorating food security (Ismail et al., 2019). Health facilities and personnel have been attacked by the Syrian regime (Douedari & Howard 2019). The health sector has received uneven funding, either because the state will not fund those in opposition areas, or because foreign donors will not, or will only fund certain forms of support (Douedari & Howard 2019). Experienced governance professionals and health workers have been killed or migrated (Douedari & Howard 2019).

Research has identified factors encouraging resilience in Syria, on which programming can build:

- An analysis of sectarianism identified political and social mechanisms for mediating among sectarian communities, urban planning allowing for mixing of social groups, and barriers to outside forces (e.g. other states) that might have an interest in instrumentalising sectarian identity, as sources of resilience against sectarianism (Rizkallah et al., 2019)
- Functioning markets, access to loans and capital are shown to be effective in building resilience (Howe et al., 2018)
- Social networks are shown to be important in Syria as sources of jobs and support. Programming should work with these, or seek to rebuild them in areas where migration has weakened them (Howe et al., 2018).
- Women and youth earning money report better self-esteem and self-reliance, and other welfare outcomes. However, working youth spend less time in education and women have increased overall their workloads as they usually have to still do the housework. Vulnerable men may be losing out (Howe et al., 2018).
- Existing adaptive strategies such as home schooling or tutoring, growing more food at home to overcome disrupted supply chains, or entrepreneurship in North East Syria, can be supported. Less positive adaptations, such as the use of unsafe fuels in the home, can be reformed (Stein, 2020).

Lessons and evidence from programmes undertaken in Syria include:

- An evaluation of DFAT work in Syria recommends that the organisation limits its focus on resilience on one or two sectors, so that it can be effective with a relatively small programme (DFAT, 2019).
- The need for long-term planning and integrated programmes to build resilience.
- Support ‘grassroots governance’ such as health directorates in opposition-controlled areas (Douedari & Howard, 2019).
- Seek to discourage attacks on healthcare, food or other systems vital to citizens’ resilience (Douedari & Howard, 2019; Ismail et al., 2019).
- The need to co-ordinate effectively between actors.
- Cash assistance is reported as the most favoured form of assistance by recipients, followed by livelihood programmes and some types of skills training (Mercy Corps, 2019; Stein, 2020).

2. Synthesis reports


Conflict presents distinct challenges for resilience programming. Moreover, the report notes that there ‘has been significantly less research and application in the case of conflict’.

Some of the main differences brought about by conflict include that assets, which would normally help households be more resilient, can become liabilities as they are looted or attacked; and that membership of certain social groups, which may act as support in ordinary times, can also lead to targeting (pp. 8-9). Assets can also be indirectly stripped through processes such as erosion of market systems, insecurity leading to a lack of mobility, loss of infrastructure, collapse of health, education and social security systems, land occupation, environmental degradation, collapse of local governance, marginalisation of certain groups, and erosion of social and political networks.

The main findings of the report are that:

- The destruction or theft of assets, and the disruption of economic systems, undermines livelihoods and people’s ability to recover.
- Those displaced by conflict are cut off from their livelihoods. They often adapt by taking up dangerous livelihoods, although some find new, improved opportunities in new settings with different power structures.
- Conflict may exacerbate other vulnerabilities such as natural and economic hazards, competition over natural resources, chronic poverty, poor governance or marginalisation based on identity.
- Social networks can help people survive conflict and other shocks, but can impose particular obligations on some such as women.
The effects of conflict, such as disability, displacement or economic destruction, can be long-lasting.

Investing in livelihoods cannot alone stabilise conflict-affected societies. Therefore it is important to understand conflict dynamics in order to minimise the risk of doing harm through programming and, where possible, to contribute to peace.

It suggests that Raven-Roberts (2006) is a key framework for analysing resilience in conflicts.


The report notes that there has been little research on ‘the relationships between insecurity and fragility and resilience, based on empirical evidence from programmes’ (p. 8). There is more on ‘issues linked to climate resilience or informal coping mechanisms’.

The report focuses on two programmes run by Cesvi in Somalia and Zimbabwe, discussed below. There is relatively limited evidence on impact for both projects, which the report notes are ‘delivering long-term and potentially sustainable gains at scale’.

Discussion of the projects raises important points about feasibility and effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. These include:

- In FCAS, donors need adaptive management and flexible programming.
- The need to invest in background analysis to understand context-specific vulnerabilities and resilience.
- That migration and urbanisation are adaptive strategies, and can contribute to development.
- The need to target marginalised groups to reduce vulnerability.
- Accountable and participatory programming.
- A governance-oriented approach involving public and private actors to help build sustainable resilience.
- The need for a long-term vision and durable solutions (e.g. reintegration of displaced persons).
- The need for multi-dimensional solutions to build resilience to interrelated risks.
- Innovative methodological approaches to help tackle health, social and economic issues, using multi-stakeholder collaboration.


The programme started by targeting households for DRR, WASH and shelter, and livelihoods support, before moving to an approach with ‘sectors identified by communities themselves’. The programme moved a from humanitarian-first (ie disaster management plans and early warning systems) to a graduated approach to community resilience (community mobilisation and training).

Findings of the report showed:
• there were sometimes tensions between participants and non-participants, and stressed the need for links through trade and migration. Programmes should therefore work across sectors and scales (p. 16).
• The importance of a ‘systems approach’ to understand resilience by, for example, considering migration as a mode of resilience too.
• The importance of an ‘adaptive approach’, which helped the programme to deal with shocks and barriers (floods, instability etc).
• Resilience was measured on the Dietary Diversity Score, the Food Consumption Score, the Household Asset Score and the Coping Strategy Index. However, the impact of the scheme was hard to gauge, because of poorly designed questionnaires. ‘Inconsistencies in data collection, trimming and sample selection made an overall quantitative estimate of the programme’s impact difficult, to the point where there was insufficient valid information to draw conclusive insights from the evaluation’.

Zimbabwe

A five year programme (2011-16) in Zimbabwe, funded by the EU and implemented by Cesvi. One of its main components was the Shashe citrus initiative. The programme featured community and partnership elements to allow communities to ‘build adaptive capacity and institutions’. It introduced new crops and aimed to foster contract farming. It was recognised that the shift from subsistence to commercial farming would need ‘the acquisition of new skills and competencies, which might take several years to develop.’

Consideration was given to local power dynamics. Initially, the programme planned to create a cooperative but this was seen as vulnerable to government bureaucrats, so a ‘common property management’ system was used instead. The programme found that ‘developing resilience partnerships is often complex and time-consuming, especially under difficult operating conditions.’ in this case, it sought to work with well-established civil society organisations. External shocks and barriers included poor economic conditions and governance. The report found that this may have ‘opened up space to engage with private sector actors’. There is little evidence of impact, although the report points to income from Cesvi schemes in 2016.


This guide, produced with input from a number of NGOs, notes that ‘while these contexts may be the hardest ones to work in, arguably it is these contexts that would most benefit from resilience programming. In FCAS, resilience is critical to provide a strong foundation for meeting humanitarian and development goals – ranging from keeping families safe and protected to improving incomes and health outcomes’ (p. 10).

NGOs undertaking resilience work in FCAS:

• Need a conflict sensitive or peacebuilding approach
• Fragile contexts can change suddenly, and crises are likely to happen at any moment. Resilience programmes in fragile contexts need to maintain the capacity to switch into emergency response mode rapidly. Having crisis modifiers designed into programmes from the outset make this switch both possible and efficient.
- In contexts where the reach of the state is limited, programmers can still establish Disaster Management Committees (or similar) and aim to work through them' link to state if possible.


The report analyses the informal mechanisms of survival in five post-conflict cities: Cali, Dohuk, Hargeisa, Karachi and Kathmandu. It is based on fieldwork in these cities. It shows the role of the informal economy and solidarity networks in supporting resilience and recovery, as well as the potential persistence of conflict economies such as drugs and arms trade.

The feasibility of programmes is therefore determined by the stage of the conflict. During the 'conflict relief' stage, programmes should focus on 'doing no harm' and supporting local capacity to cover gaps in basic services. In the 'stabilisation' stage, programmes should help provide basic infrastructure and support worker organisations and solidarity economies. In the 'development' stage, programmes should help build workers’ rights and social security. Improved shelter, land rights, a safe environment, and basic services for livelihoods and living accommodation are needed. All programming should therefore involve multiple stakeholders from civil society, local and national governments, and donors.

It suggests supportive interventions to help informal economic activity. Those planning interventions should consider what stage of the conflict the city is in and tailor the focus of their interventions accordingly (conflict relief, stabilisation and development). All interventions should play close attention to context, and acknowledge the capacity of informal systems when building partnerships. Based on this, it suggests specific entry points for programmes to support resilience. There is little information on impact.


The report outlines the community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) approach, which includes the following steps:

- Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment & Analysis (based on hazard, vulnerability and capacity analysis, all 3 of which are related to the overall disaster risk).
- Joint Action Planning, for disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction activities.
- Set up of community level DRR Committees or (district/urban level) DRR MultiStakeholder Platforms.
- Implementation of DRR Action Plans, with community, government and donor resources.
- Monitoring and Evaluation, including documenting best practices.
- Knowledge sharing and Advocacy, for sustainability and upscaling.

It describes its use in several context. The South Sudan project ‘Interlinking Peacebuilding, Decentralisation and Development (IPDD)’ 2013-2017.asserted to ‘increase human security in (former) Western Bahr el Gazal and Eastern Equatoria states through interlinking and
strengthening community-based peacebuilding initiatives, decentralised government services and socio-economic development (peace dividend). Work included community risk assessments, early warning systems, peace conferences, the establishment of committees on risk and resources including different groups of people, training in farming and conflict transformation, lending and saving groups and public water management works.

There is no evidence on the impact of the programme. However, the following lessons were learned:

- The project strengthened trust and relationships between different ethnic communities, and between communities and local, traditional and state authorities;
- Women and youth are effective change agents, so they need to be involved in all project phases and activities;
- Combining DRR and Peace dialogue activities reduces conflict risks;
- In a fragile context, it is important to use a flexible approach so one is able to adapt activities according to the changing reality.

Cordaid’s experience shows the importance of analysing conflict risks as well as natural hazards. It has developed a Conflict (Risk) Analysis Tool for use in FCAS. It has six steps:

- Step 1: Conduct a conflict (risk) analysis. When doing this step, ensure that you consider in your analysis: Conflict Profile (incl. type of conflict, level of conflict – e.g. local, national); Conflict Causes (environmental, political, economic, socio-cultural); Conflict Actors (stakeholders involved, power relations, role in conflict); Conflict Dynamics (analysing trends, risks, opportunities); Summary of data, and analysis (high – medium – low conflict risk).
- Step 2.a: Determine the scope and focus of the project (part of planning phase). Discuss what is appropriate in the context. Work on a conflict sensitive resilience/DRR project, or on Conflict risk reduction.
- Step 2.b: Community Action Planning for the Resilience project in a context or area affected by conflict, considering conflict risk and disaster risk (including climate change).
- Step 3: Establish or strengthen Community structures for the Resilience project. This may include existing development, DRR, or other committees at a community level, and/or specific peace committees.
- Step 4: Implementation of Resilience measures, to address disaster risks and/or conflict risks. A focus on livelihood security in this stage is important.
- Step 5: Monitoring and Documentation of the outputs and outcomes of the Resilience project (including collecting stories of change).
- Step 6: Advocacy & Fundraising for upscaling the work done, to further enhance people’s resilience.

As well as increased analysis, it recommends a multi-stakeholder approach, involving different groups in working, and the advocacy for more government and CSO capacity and resources to enhance resilience.

change-conflict-and-fragility-evidence-review-and-recommendations-research-and-action

This report reviews evidence on the links between climate change and conflict, and discusses how programming can be implemented in fragile or conflict-affected contexts.

Poorly designed climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes have the potential to exacerbate inequalities in communities and create greater frictions – with social tensions and even the potential for small-scale armed violence. Where such programmes are not conflict-sensitive, they can inadvertently deprive some groups to the benefit of others and inflame social tensions (p. 9).

Evidence on the link between climate change and conflict is mixed, with climate likely only one factor. The report emphasises the need for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) in conflict contexts. Such programmes should ensure they ‘do no harm’ (i.e. do not contribute to the conflict). There is also ‘potential for well-designed disaster risk reduction initiatives to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding’. DRR is thought to be able to reduce risks of conflicts arising from conflict (p. 17).

However, ‘little scholarship exists on how DRR can effectively be implemented in fragile or conflict-affected contexts (and even less on lessons learned, or what was tried and failed)’ (p. 18). There is an evidence gap on how disasters are managed by non-state armed groups. There is also a ‘gap in the ability of implementers to be able to effectively design and deliver (and for donors to effectively procure and select) implementation activities that will be conflict sensitive’ (p. 28).

The report recommends, among other things, that conflict sensitivity should be considered in every stage of programming. However, ‘donors should not require conflict-sensitive outcomes to be measured in results frameworks: projects should not be penalised for noticing negative impacts on conflict, since this is a core step in conflict sensitivity.’ Moreover, ‘the skills and experience within teams carrying out research or implementing projects in FCAS need to be interdisciplinary, ensuring coverage across themes, sectors and institutional types. At least one conflict advisor and a gender and marginalisation expert should be included within teams’ (p. 28).

Programmes need to consider the complexity of interrelated shocks and stresses in FCAS. Programmes ‘need to incorporate consideration of these multiple challenges in their design and implementation’ (p. 34). More generally, it advises ‘establishing an integrated cadre of experts from across the climate, disaster, conflict and peace disciplines’ to provide guidance on how to undertake DRR in conflict areas.


Tearfund’s programmes focused on ‘local and collectively-owned solutions, individuals and communities reduce their dependence on external support (money, training, handouts) over time, building long-term resilience’. They included disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) work. They sought to build resilience in humanitarian responses, build social capital, and contribute across multiple sectors. The report describes how their work contributed to resilience.
It emphasises the role of local civil society organisations. In Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis (2014), Tearfund conducted research in Delta villages on 'the role of local faith communities (LFCs), particularly that of the local Christian church, in supporting the resilience and coping strategies of the villages'. It argues that one village recovered a lot better - building infrastructure, improving shelters, population growth - than another because 'the church in Village A was very inclusive of the Buddhist community, which fostered a sense of unity; the pastor was committed to equality and acceptance regardless of religious differences. In contrast, the church in Village B encouraged suspicion of the Buddhist community, which led to social segregation and damaged any hope of building a sense of community' more community focused leadership, sense of community.'

It emphasises the importance of social capital, in the form of networks of trust between groups. It points to self-help groups in Nazareth (Adama) town in central Ethiopia. 12,000 are funded by Tearfund across Ethiopia and often paid for by local churches, meaning they are very sustainable. They provide support and allow members to share skills, provide loans based on member savings. These provide important safety nets - money and support - for disasters (p. 42).


This scoping study highlights the potential role of local faith communities (LFCs) in supporting resilience. It is based on a literature review and discussion with practitioners belonging to the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI). The positive roles of LFCs are their existing volunteer networks and communications, leadership roles in communities, links across communities and countries, buildings, their ability to provide mobilising narratives to spur recovery, as well as psychosocial support to believers, the authority to challenge social norms and the social and political capital to broker peace. Negative effects can include a lack of neutrality, especially in mixed-faith areas, and a lack of inclusion in some areas. It argues that further research is needed to understand these dynamics.


The report suggests that there is a 'lack of clarity' on how resilience can be measured and evaluated.

It surveys strategies used by populations in FCAS, as well as donor interventions seeking to make populations more resilient.

Strategies and tools used by populations to adapt to shocks in FCAS include: diversification; urbanisation; and migration; the use of social capital and connectedness (e.g. connections beyond the family and community allowing people to access support) (pp. 11-15).

The report notes that research has highlighted the importance of social connections in promoting resilience: 'we see that the most important variable in surviving the famine – who you know and how well you are able to leverage these relations – can be difficult to influence
through external interventions’. However, they hard for donors or policymakers to discern and act upon (p. 15).

**In siege situations, such as those found in Syria, adaptations include:** rooftop gardening and home production of medical supplies; use of the black market; joining armed groups; local, ad hoc forms of governance; (p.12)

**Evaluations of livelihoods interventions show:** political economy analysis can help donors ‘do no harm’, for example by trying to avoid situations where humanitarian aid is taken by armed groups.

They note a theoretical distinction between ‘interventions that contribute to civilian protection and meet basic needs; help protect and recover assets; and strengthen institutions and influence policy to improve livelihood strategies and the accumulation of assets’, but that many programmes implement aspects of all three types of intervention (p. 16).

**The report discusses the evidence on a variety of aid modalities.**

**Cash** is popular in conflict zones ‘because it allows people to choose how to support their own livelihood strategies’, and can support local markets (pp. 18-19). Cash transfers are also efficient, meaning more resilience programming can be undertaken. It is not appropriate in all situations, e.g. where there are weak markets. It therefore notes that ‘tools that incorporate market analysis, nutrition, modality-specific references, risk- or harm-mitigation tools, process-oriented tools, and – importantly – livelihood-specific tools’ are available and useful.

**Food aid** means households ‘they can direct some of their resources towards other, potentially longer-term, livelihood goals. In addition, food assistance is often sold or exchanged in conflict settings, allowing households to acquire other essential commodities.’ However, the report is unsure of how it links to longer-term resilience (p. 20). Cash was found to be safer than **vouchers** in one study and to allow recipients to buy more diverse items.

On **infrastructure**, the review suggests targeting was a major challenge to infrastructure programmes, and that there was limited evidence to suggest that investing in infrastructure yields stabilisation benefits.’ It can be a stimulus for growth, but can also bring conflict to remote areas. On public works in conflict areas, there is some limited evidence. The effectiveness of **foreign direct investment** is also context-specific. It requires good governance, markets, etc. to work.

**Livestock and farming interventions** can be effective, but need to be targeted effectively so that livestock do not lead to recipients being targeted. Mobility is seen as a key resource for farmers and pastoralists and ‘interventions that promote security, especially in cross-border areas where migration patterns are common, would bolster pastoral and agrarian livelihoods further’.

**Microfinance** can be effective, but should be used carefully. The authors note that in some cases after tsunami, lenders exploited microfinance to lend at high rates. It has been effective in certain regions, although the poorest often cannot access. There is limited evidence on programming on ’making markets work for the poor’ (M4P) in conflict situations.

**Value chain development** needs to analyse both formal and informal sectors. Donors need ‘deep understanding of local contexts’ to see who it will benefit. Political economy analysis is crucial, especially in conflict areas.
On **taxation policies**, which can increase the resilience of state institutions and provide public goods, the authors note the need to understand informal taxation too. In many fragile or conflict-affected areas, non-state actors collect informal ‘taxes’.

On **job creation**, evidence points to the need to assess the economy and power relations. Programmes need good links to private sector and education. There is little evidence on links between jobs and stability. On **training**, the authors note that that provided by donors does not always fit the context. However, it can have benefits for livelihoods.

The authors highlight a number of themes arising from their analysis: the need for PEA; the dangers of elite capture; the need for conflict sensitivity, to try to do no harm, and reverse power dynamics behind conflict; the gender analysis; robust needs assessments; market analysis; targeting of programmes; and the variable quality of evaluations, with many focusing on outputs rather than rigorously assessing impacts.

Overall, their review of existing evaluations and academic literature shows:

- Relatively little analysis of resilient livelihoods in the face of conflict (p. 7)
- Because of the complexity of conflict, natural disasters and other shocks in FCAS, it is agreed that ‘interventions to build resilience are not a quick fix but rather require extensive commitments in time, planning and follow-up’.

https://odihpn.org/resources/disaster-risk-reduction/  

The book contains a short chapter on DRR, social crisis and conflict. It notes that conflict has many negative effects on resilience, and that for reasons of security and prioritisation, DDR is less likely to be undertaken in conflict zones. Where it is implemented, DDR needs to be conflict sensitive to avoid doing more harm than good.

It suggests that there is ‘some potential for linking DRR and conflict management work.’ The two can be linked effectively, especially in disputes over resources. Conflict sensitivity is essential, however.

Given the difficulties of conflict, ‘where there are different communities, social, religious and ethnic groups in a particular location, with associated inter-group tensions, agencies should try to locate themselves and their interventions so that they can give support across group divides, without losing sight of the need to help the most vulnerable’ (p. 294).

It gives the successful example of the Society for Health, Education, Environment and Peace (SHEEP), which began a community-based DRR project in the area in 2009 in Central Java. Dialogues and collection of information on land and water were used to improve awareness of the causes of flooding, and allowed an early warning system to be set up (p. 292).

### 3. Africa

The report evaluates the EU's resilience programming in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the Sahel; and Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in the Horn of Africa. This encompassed several programmes including AGiR in West Africa from 2012, SHARE in East Africa from 2011, and RESET in Ethiopia.

On feasibility, the evaluation drew a number of lessons. These included:

- The need to better adapt programming to complex emergencies and fragile states, and particularly conflict situations. It found that the gaps in service provision in areas with weak institutions made it hard for the comprehensive package of support to be delivered (p. 63).
- Working with governments where possible, and without where necessary. In Somalia the EU worked mainly through NGO consortiums, but increasing worked with 'nascent' governments at national and local levels. In Mali and Burkino Faso, the EU worked with NGO-consortiums in fragile areas of the countries, and the government where it operated effectively (p. 21).
- Emphasising that resilience is multidimensional, and is therefore complex to understand and act upon (p. 7).
- The need for conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity in certain contexts (p. 16).
- Although the EU's analysis of conflict drivers was insufficient, there was some good practice. This included 'the increasing attention to and planned investment in addressing livestock migration routes; and securitisation through structural programmes in West Africa; the EU-commissioned food security analysis in Ethiopia was an innovative example of an analysis of root causes including climate change, demographics, and technological, policy and governance factors.'
- It was noted that a policy focus on using resilience programming to prevent migration was misguided. Most research shows that political reasons more often drive migration; that migration is itself an important coping strategy and thus aids resilience; and that development and resilience programming is often found to facilitate migration in the short-term (until an area's income reaches $7,000/capita). In this case, the decision to focus on preventing migration was a choice informed by political priorities rather than research (p. 11).

On impact, the report could not measure resilience to future shocks. This is because the EU does not have a standardised approach to doing so. While 'established food security indicators were used to signal short-term progress', they 'fell short of being able to explain changes in latent capacities to manage future shocks' (iii).

The programmes' successes were mainly in the area of support for weather and economic shocks than those driven by conflict or governance issues.

On the question of whether interventions should be integrated single-sector or multi-sector, the report worked from the assumption that because resilience is complex, it requires integrated support across sectors (p. 66). However, it argued that its own intervention could achieve this by seeking to complement other interventions in other sectors (p. 66):
For one donor to approach resilience from a sectoral perspective does not contradict the resilience approach per se. Ultimately sectoral ministries need to take ownership of resilience programming. What is important is that the EU intervenes in relevant sector(s) where it has a comparative advantage and that these sectoral interventions are appropriately coordinated within a multi-sectoral framework.

Given this limitation of working within a small number of focal concentration sectors achieving resilience outcomes, coordination with development partners appeared to be key to providing the necessary range of complementary sectoral interventions.


It takes a critical stance to the EU’s resilience focus, suggesting that there is a lack of consistency in its use of the concept and that it ’cherry picks’ where it tried to foster resilience. EU programmes sometimes seek to increase state resilience by supplying security equipment to oppressive regimes, and sometimes to fund anti-regime civil society groups to increase social resilience.

The authors argue that the EU’s resilience programmes in its neighbouring countries are security focused and neglect other facets of resilience. They suggest that instead, ‘it would be worthwhile for the EU to act in a comprehensive manner, valorising and integrating its different instruments and sectors of expertise: resilience in the Sahel would be fostered by implementing a truly integrated and sustainable approach, able to take into consideration the different fragilities and challenges which are shaping the local and the regional environments’.

EU work packaged as ‘resilience’ is too ‘siloed’ and does not link enough with resilience work in other sectors. For example, the EUCAP Sahel Niger programme helps build capacity in the Nigerien security sector. It has various objectives including curbing migration, but ignores the fact that migration is a source of resilience in Niger. Similarly, EUTM Mali provides training for security forces, but no consideration of the political dynamics that cause instability. MINUSMA in Mali is also security-focused and fails to address social cohesion, governance or climate shocks affecting Mali. The authors argue that the EU focuses on ‘stressors’ rather than ‘fragilities’ in these states.


The Somalia Resilience Programme is a consortium of seven NGOs (ACF, ADRA, CARE, COOPI, DRC, Oxfam and World Vision). Its work includes:

- Enhancing livelihood diversification and improved access to markets, financial services and basic livelihood services (adaptive capacity);
- Fostering collective community action for effective disaster risk management, the adoption of positive coping strategies and improved access to formal and informal safety nets (absorptive capacity);
- Strengthening equitable and sustainable natural resource management, and;
• Improving community governance for transformative capacity.

The study used a positive deviance (PD) framework to show the factors that allowed a minority to achieve well-being. It used interviews and household surveys of food security and recovery from drought.³

SomReP staff identified what they hypothesized to be high impact interventions. These included Savings Groups (Village Savings and Loans Associations or VSLAs); Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), interventions focused on improving water for human consumption and livelihood production; and Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) committees or Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) systems.

The report found that these high impact interventions were associated with better coping and food security status.

• It found that the programmes could not respond to shocks quickly enough.
• The VSLAs did not attract the most vulnerable households. Membership was dominated by households that could afford to save.
• It therefore finds that it is important to ‘sequence, layer and target’ interventions to help the most needy onto ‘resilience pathways’. Interventions should be carefully targeted to specific income or occupation groups.
• VSLAs were not sufficient to cope with large co-variate shocks. The report argued that mitigating mechanisms - contingency livestock management practices, planting and storing food, livelihood diversification and timely humanitarian assistance - were needed to deal with shocks.
• Qualitative assessments showed that VSLAs built social capital, self-esteem and empowerment, and helped share ideas and expertise. VSLAs and NGO efforts to strengthen governance were also found to be important - e.g. committees for various disasters.
• Those identified as PDs also reported cultural factors helping their resilience: optimism, entrepreneurialism, community and family networks, and culture of preparedness and sharing. Others surveyed saw PDS as wealthier, having multiple livelihood strategies and better access to credit and better networks.
• The report also found that ‘other important predictors of Food Consumption and Household Hunger Scores include livelihood zone and type (pastoralists and peri-urban were worst off while salaried/self employed and crop or mixed farmers were best off). Multiple income sources had a strong effect. Drought severity as reported by respondents was significantly related to outcomes as were selling livestock as a coping strategy (positive) and taking children out of school (negative)’
• Being in regular communication with people outside of their community was also associated with better food security outcomes, although the report did not identify the reason for this.

³ The measured used were: Food Consumption Score: this reflects the weighted average of the frequency of consumption (during the week before the interview) of basic food groups, coded to consumption adequacy groups • Household Hunger Score: the frequency of experiencing hunger, coded to severity of hunger categories • Household Food Insecurity Access Scale Groups (HFIAP) • Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) • Perceived Recovery

The assessment considers to what degree USAID’s programmes ‘simultaneously contribute to reducing the risks of intercommunal tensions and building resilience against climate shocks and stresses’ in the largely arid and semi-arid lands in which they worked.

Peace Centers for Climate and Social Resilience (PCCSR)
The PCCSR was funded by USAID and run by Haramaya University and fostered collaborative activities in pastoral communities (kebeles) in three districts (woredas) in the Borana Zone of Ethiopia.

These aimed to use peacebuilding to foster greater freedom of movement and enable better access to natural resources; foster collaborative community action; create more adaptive capacity and strengthen conflict prevention, mitigation and reduction (PMR) capacity.

USAID’s assessment found that:

- Created ‘attitudinal change among its beneficiaries’
- Increased awareness of conflict responses among authorities, involving women's and youth networks.
- Collaborative CCA activities (ponds, bush thinning) 'contributed to increasing the sense of mutual understanding and solidarity among the different groups'

The assessment drew the following lessons:

- Climate change as an 'external threat' can be used as an organisational principle and bring together potentially conflicting groups.
- Some activities work as to foster collaboration more than others.
- Long-term commitment is needed to foster resilience and peaceful.
- The involvement of beneficiaries in planning increased their commitment.

Peace III in East Africa
The programme was run by Pact and Mercy Corps (2014-19) in the border areas between Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda.

It aimed to foster cross border dialogue; support ‘peace actors’ such as women’s groups; help local governments’ conflict prevention; facilitate peace and natural resource agreements; encourage outreach and engagement between border forces and security; help to draft a national peace policy in Uganda.

USAID’s assessment found that the programme was ‘largely successful in reducing instances of inter-communal conflict and building resilience in the targeted communities'. It highlighted that creating lines of communication between communities was effective. Women’s forums were also effective. Cross-border peace and natural resource agreements were found to be helpful, as were cross-border CCA projects. The project helped improve capacity among
national actors to strengthen national security bodies’ ability to provide early warnings and maintain security.

It drew the following lessons:

- Collaborative capacity brings resilience, through new norms and practices for managing resources and conflict and linkages between communities.
- Beneficiaries need climate knowledge and its implications for their livelihoods as well as CCA adaptations.
- External conflict shocks/security challenges can threaten the project.
- Long-term government support is needed to ensure sustainability by creating new institutional arrangements to respond to conflict.

Improving Community Resilience in the Face of Conflicts and Environmental Shocks: Mellit and Umm Keddada Localities in North Darfur State

The programme included climate change adaptation (CCA) to increase community resilience; enhance livelihood strategies; reduce local conflicts and improve natural resource management (NRM); the creation of higher committees for the community, with sub-committees on water, women, youth etc.; exchange visits between villages; youth centres; training on peacebuilding, CCA, NRM, microfinance for women, youth, leaders, pastoralists and farmers; and technical interventions such as drought-resistant crops.

USAID assessed the programme to be successful in improving integration between communities and inclusivity. Peace committees involving women and youth were seen to be essential. Technical interventions such as solar energy were also found to enhance resilience to climate and providing job opportunities for women. It was noted that the project only ran for a short period, and there were concerns over the sustainability of some of the governance issues, however (pp. 19-20).

Lessons learned were:
- The importance of understanding community dynamics and fitting programmes to these
- That communities should be empowered to help design programmes.
- Long-term engagement is needed to ensure sustainability.

Overall lessons include:
- Need to mitigate marginalisation and the potential for existing elites to dominate new structures.
- Participatory needs assessments are useful tools to produce relevant, sustainable interventions and ensure commitment from the communities involved.
- Dispute resolution mechanisms are useful in areas with a history of natural resource disputes, but must be embedded into state institutions to be sustainable.
- Interventions ‘need to be inscribed within broader, multi-sectoral efforts to create the conditions for these interventions to be sustainable and scalable’. For example, new solar power sources helped implement new water availability measures.
A short time-frame can limit ‘reach and sustainability’.


The Stabilizing Vulnerable Communities in the Central African Republic through the Promotion of Inter-Community Dialogue and Economic Cooperation (SVC) began in 2014. It aimed to increase the resilience of populations to conflict, and particularly their capacity to resolve disputes and build trust. It was a response to fighting between Muslim- and Christian-led armed groups and warnings of genocide the previous year, which had been stabilised by African Union and UN peacekeeping. The programming was funded by USAID’s Complex Crises Fund (CCF).

The programme had the following goals:

- Strengthening the capacity of local leaders in Muslim and Christian communities to resolve community conflicts and deal with the legacy of violence in an open, inclusive, and sustainable manner;
- Reinforcing sustainable dispute resolution methods and generating increased trust through joint social and economic initiatives benefiting both Christian and Muslim communities;
- Promoting attitudes of tolerance and non-violence through support of inter-faith peace messaging.

This work utilised community leaders (e.g. religious figures), youth engagement, and radio broadcasting, as well as economic initiatives. Mercy Corps provided conflict resolution training, forums for discussion, and encouraged the signing of reconciliation documents.

A random survey showed improved perceptions that the conflict was being resolved peacefully and trust of the ‘other’ group. Fighters disarmed and joined peace committees facilitated by the programme, and ‘community leaders’ signed a reconciliation pact in Bouar. This included trade integration between communities. Surveys also found that insecurity was the main reason people fled during the violence, and, along with reconciliation and economic activities, one of the main reasons for return. Dialogues, religious peace messages and radio messages were seen as the most effective of the programme’s methods for promoting cohesion. However, there is little evidence on longer-term impact.

Lessons include:

- Community capacity to mitigate conflict can erode as conflicts play out. Therefore conflict management efforts such as those undertaken in this programme should be implemented before conflict has been resolved and while emergency relief is still being given, if necessary.
- The programme’s community-led conflict management activities were effective, and can be replicated in other similar crises.
- **Physical security and peacekeeping forces are needed** to end violence and allow space for the programming.
• Peacebuilding activities take time to implement because of fear and grievances, and communities should not be pressured to do so. Funding should reflect this, and the report recommends multi-year, multi-sector funding.
• It recommends reinforcing peacebuilding efforts and recovery programmes to help maintain resilience in the face of tensions arising from elections and similar events in future.


The report assesses cash transfers implemented by the Cash Alliance for Somalis affected by drought in 2017. It distributed cash to 46,613 households.

The programme was found to improve recipients’ short-term resilience and ability to cope with the shocks brought by the drought. Cash transfers improved recipients’ food security and financial situation. This was found to be especially true for IDPs, who often lacked other safety nets. However, it was not sufficient to improve access to health or education. The impacts are also not thought to be sustainable. Recipients asked for training to help them improve their livelihoods after the famine.

It was found that mobile money enabled recipients to keep their cash transfers secret and therefore less likely to be stolen. However, few recipients reported conflict arising from the transfers other than community jealousy. This was reduced by a participatory selection system. In IDP camps, ‘gatekeepers’ charged some recipients of cash transfers, and forced those who did not pay to leave. Gatekeepers were less of a problem outside of IDP camps.


The article provides a statistical analysis of the aid supplied to conflict-affected regions of South Sudan. It uses a survey of households in Lakes, Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghaza, asking questions on productive and non-productive assets, dwelling features, education, social networks and social safety nets (including access to credit), access to basic services (including schools, health facilities and markets), food and non-food consumption, conflict and income-generating activities. This was combined with data on conflict events.

The analysis shows that assistance did not reach most in-need. Levels of assistance were lower where conflict was more intense. It finds that inaccessibility was not a factor in reducing access to aid. Instead it shows that social networks and the lobbying of community groups was key, as there was ‘a positive association between participation in farmers’ and community police groups, and access to formal assistance’.

It recommends mobile cash transfers as a way to reduce corruption, diversify livelihoods and allow better targeting in conflict areas. They can allow beneficiaries to access financial services. It also recommends interventions combining the distribution of inputs with rehabilitation of local markets to help overcome disruption to services.

The report assesses World Vision’s work in Rutshuru in the Eastern DRC, from 2002. Programmes focused on building community resilience through livelihoods, health, nutrition, WASH, education, and school feeding. It identified the following broad factors leading to success: (1) a strong, people-centred, community-based approach; (2) flexible project parameters and flexible funding; (3) strong leadership and staffing retention; and (4) a willingness to take on and manage risk.

It pointed to the problem of working in insecurity, noting that it was ultimately outside of World Vision’s control (p. 9). Considering the difficulties of working in conflict-prone areas, the report considered whether World Vision could include peacebuilding in its activities. It noted a tendency to fall back on usual humanitarian activities as ‘non contentious’. However, it argued that the relationships it built could ‘create an opportunity to safely go deeper and tackle the more contentious root causes of fragility, such as land rights, governance issues and ethnicity, if done in a sensitive manner and with a good risk assessment. This programming could include local social accountability activities to continue to build communities’ capacity to strengthen their relationships with decision makers and in turn advocate for their own needs and issues (with NGOs playing more of a facilitation role). Another option is working with faith leaders to empower them to play a role in addressing such issues and/or in wider development activities or through other peacebuilding approaches. Integrating such activities into multi-sectoral programmes would widen the scope of the project in working across the nexus and would also bolster sustainability’ (p. 10).

**Lessons include:**
- The value of a community based and participatory approach.
- Partnering with other donors in order to work effectively across the nexus.
- A willingness to take on risk of working in a conflict area built communities’ trust and acceptance and ‘an increased investment in security risk management and flexibility in planning and operations’.
- Joint context analysis and monitoring between donors to understand the complexities of FCAS.
- Build root cause analysis into programmes to understand the causes of conflict.
- ‘Sustainable, flexible, multiyear, and multi-sectoral programme funding. This can be done by including context modifiers/contingency funding to allow flexibility for adaption to changes in the context (for worse or better), including to move amongst sectors and/or operating modalities. If crisis modifiers do exist in contracts, implementing agencies should familiarise themselves with them and request them in a timely and straightforward process as needed’.
- ‘Programmes in fragile contexts are most likely to succeed when they are well focused geographically, multiyear, take an integrated, multi-sectoral approach (including a stress on peacebuilding/social cohesion when appropriate) and aim to be impact rather than funding driven’.
- The need for incentives and management support for staff on the ground to make decisions to adapt to local conditions/risks.
Ways to assess vulnerabilities on the ground, not just at the macro level.


Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA) is a 3-year (2018-2020) cross border project implemented by a consortium of the Danish Refugee Council, World Vision, WYG and CARE International with funding from European Union Trust Fund for Africa.

The brief discusses implementing conflict sensitivity in the cross-border Mandera triangle (Liban and Afder zones in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, Gedo in Somalia and Mandera in Kenya). The region has seen conflict over resources, which has been worsened by limited state functions, marginalisation, the increased flow of small arms, and violent extremism.

The programme is multi-sectoral and supplies cash, goods, services and skills into communities. In order to prevent these supplies fostering competition and conflict, BORESHA:

- Carried out assessments of the socio-political, ecological and economic context, to show how goods, services and people moved across borders, and noted where conflict occurred.
- Staff were given conflict sensitivity training. This included principles of conflict analysis (understanding the profile, causes, actors and dynamics), conflict sensitivity (participation, inclusion, respect, transparency and equity), conflict sensitivity in practice, conflict sensitivity as it relates to Do No Harm, and use of the conflict sensitivity self-assessment form.
- Established a community feedback mechanism. It tracks: beneficiaries' selection and registration to assess process fairness, cases of corruption, satisfaction with services (delivery approach, quality, relevance and timing), awareness and use of feedback channels and entitlements in the project, follow-up support and recommendations from beneficiaries.
- Established standardised rates for beneficiaries, governments, community members etc. to minimise potential conflicts arising from aid.
- Collaborated with clan elders to ensure inclusion and participation. In-depth consultations were held with community members in project design. e.g. rangeland management involved the community in discussion the issues, causes of environmental degradation, and rehabilitation plans.
- Sought to include marginalised groups, and to make sure that leaders were legitimate.
- Made guidelines accessible to stakeholders, and held stakeholder meetings to show transparency.
- Sought to employ staff not allied to clan politics, with high levels of competence and knowledge of the local area.
- Also collaborated with regional programmes and local governments.

It notes that some vulnerable groups are still excluded, that borders have been closed at times, and that governments have attacked the programme for not providing goods such as fuel at times.
An analysis of the effects of humanitarian aid on households in Mali during conflict. It does not use the term resilience, but does talk about the 'protective effect' of food transfers on households' food security. Households were able to reduce expenditure on good, and increases in micronutrient availability, food consumption and the height of children aged to 2–5 years were recorded. However, the analysis also found that less aid was given in areas where armed groups operated, pointing to a trade-off between scaling up programmes and needs-based aid.


The report analysed the effects of the FAO's food programme on resilience, food security, and conflicts in the community.

It surveyed locations before and after the programme, including a control group (although baseline data did not cover resilience). Resilience was measured using questionnaires on coping strategies: selling household assets, using credit to purchase food, spending savings, selling productive assets, consuming stored seeds, selling their house or land, and removing children from school to measure resilience.

- The programme increased the food consumption score and decreased likelihood of using a harmful coping strategy among beneficiaries.
- Effects varied according to the degree of conflict. The programme effects on resilience were strongest for IDPs and those in low conflict areas
- An individual's or household's resilience could be derailed by 'a personal shock, like theft or loss of a family member. These households require additional support to build resilience'.
- The programme may have worsened perceptions of security. 'the programme may have induced beliefs that the expected returns to robbery increased, increasing worries among both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about walking alone at night'

The authors recommend:

- More and better micro data (especially on resilience) is imperative for understanding and monitoring the full diversity, nature and interrelations of food security and conflict.
- Strengthening food insecurity and resilience requires context-specific and conflict-sensitive policy approaches that integrate immediate assistance and long-term impacts.
- Whenever and to the extent possible, programme and policy responses should be designed, monitored and evaluated in a way that allows one to assess causal impacts.
Lutheran World Relief implemented Habbanayé-based programmes in order to increase community resilience to droughts, armed conflict, loss of remittances or other shocks. It was used in Dakoro in Niger (2005-8), Tahoua in Niger (2010-13; 2014-16) and Est in Burkino Faso (2013-16).

Habbanayé involves wealthier members of a community loaning out a female cow or goat to poorer friends or family, who keep the offspring. It therefore serves to help the poorer members of the community build up their stock of animals. It works through social networks. It is practised among some pastoralist groups including Fulani in Niger.

The projects focused on women, who often stayed at home to tend sheep and goats while men took cows out to find pasture. Habbanayé Solidarity Groups (HSG) were formed, sometimes built on women's savings groups. They provide loans and insurance to those who pay in, and buy animals from the market for members. As well as helping start Habbanaye groups, LWF helped the groups partner with government veterinary agents, provided training to farmers' cooperatives, feed warehouses, and training on animal fattening, and feed blocks to help animals survive.

The report argues that it is 'one tool among many' to increase resilience. It helps build local capital, provide more economic resources, increase trust in local networks, and improve self-organisation.


The paper discusses informal mutual insurance systems, based on ethnographic field research involving 80 participants in Karamoja, Uganda. Research showed how loans and gifts of livestock between 'stock friends' was used as a form of insurance. Although such systems sometimes exclude poorer people, they help to insure against short-term shocks and to build social capital which will help longer-term resilience. It notes Oxfam in the 1970s and 1980s and Lutheran World Relief have worked to encourage and bolster similar practices.

It suggests lessons for resilience programming are:

- Knowing the influential nodes (persons) in the village or area network, particularly those with greater wealth or reliable income, can serve as important lenders during a shock and can, therefore, be supported in conflict-sensitive ways.
- Understanding transfer norms can assist in developing a similar lending programme as Habbanaye and aid in restocking of herds.
- A context- and conflict-sensitive community project based on social networks of support could result in greater social cohesion, support to customary systems, and be a truly community-based approach.

The drought response was only partially successful in restoring affected people’s livelihoods and were often not able to prevent affected people from becoming less resilient to droughts and other crises over time. This is due to the rapid succession of several droughts; a response that did not sufficiently focus on livelihood interventions, especially in agriculture and WASH; and a lack of funding for livelihoods and resilience interventions.


These reports consider the implementation of the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) programme in fragile and conflict-affected states. SUN is a multi-sectoral intervention that aims to engage states, making it harder to implement in areas with poor governance that are also more likely to need it. The analysis argues that it is possible to engage with local governance, even in FCAS. FCAS encompasses a broad range of governance capacities. These capacities can be improved with programmes such as SUN.

Taylor’s articles analysed a number of FCAS according to whether they has signed up to SUN. It used bivariate regression and principal component analysis to identify associations among various factors likely to encourage a state to join SUN (e.g. whether there were high levels of malnutrition, active civil society agitation etc., or whether there was strong governance, health systems or economic performance. It found that ‘engagement with SUN was driven more strongly by what we may call the policy ‘supply-side’ (interest and capacity within government) rather than from the demand-side’ (need or pressure for action from the population). It also found that the FCAS label encompassed a range of governance capacities, and that ‘some fragile states were able to activate the necessary government and governance apparatus to coordinate and then navigate accession to the SUN initiative, in a sense irrespective of the ambient level of instability and/or violence’.

Although not packaged as a resilience initiative, SUN works to improve individuals' resilience and governance capacity, and the programme offers lessons specific to FCAS. Specifically, it suggests that there are more entry points for resilience programming that engages with local governance capacity than might be assumed. Moreover, that SUN itself improved governance and was attractive to government actors because it could attract development rather than humanitarian aid (i.e. can create a virtuous circle).

The evaluation looks at UNICEF’s ARCC II Programme providing unconditional cash transfers to 23,480 families in the eastern DRC. It was a humanitarian programme, but was partly evaluated on the criteria of resilience. A resilience index looking at food security, welfare, income sources, livestock holdings, saving and debt, school enrolment and access to health services, was used.

Recipients faced many shocks including many armed groups, kidnapping, lack of access to fields, uncertainties, debt, weather, hosting IDPs, etc (p. 54). Cash meant they could meet the wide range of needs arising from a conflict situation.

The evaluation found that households were able to increase their well-being and resilience, including increase food security and consumption, and better protective capacity and coping strategies such as increasing savings, school enrolment, agricultural activity and ownership of agricultural assets.

While it helped meet household needs, most informants felt the resilience produced was limited: ‘the majority of informants demonstrated that although the transfers may have helped to overcome certain shocks, they did not create sustainable resilience for beneficiaries...although the transfers enabled some beneficiaries to overcome certain shocks and prepare for future ones, the most vulnerable beneficiaries still perceived their situation as precarious.’

4. Asia


The article analyses livelihoods programming in Tamil-held areas of Sri Lanka with respect to their impact on resilience. It focused on an Oxfam livelihoods project ‘focused primarily on conflict-affected people in the non-tsunami areas.’ It is based on interviews with 75 microfinance recipients.

It found a positive association between cash provision and diversification into supportive income-earning activities. Cash benefits had enabled the target groups either to divert part of the earnings of their main activity to complementary options, or to increase the level of savings that they could invest in these options. It also pointed to the reactivation of social bonds, access to finance, and regaining access to land, as factors that helped returnees from displacement. Education and skills were also helpful in allowing returnees to recover.

It recommended close attention to the strategies households used to adapt and recover. For instance, it found that many converted their loans in portable assets in the form of gold jewellery (which could be used as dowries or financial assets). This was a strategy in case of displacement and in anticipation of potential future disruptions.

Noting that some loans failed, for example after the recipients tried to enter a new field of work, it suggested that 'understanding household circumstances, mapping context-specific constraints that could affect productive initiatives, finding causal pathways, and equipping local people with
knowledge about the risks involved in various livelihood activities would ensure better outcomes'.

**Recommendations on working with armed groups include understanding the dynamics of the groups’ authority and its effect on citizens' resilience, and carefully seeking to avoid political co-option or controversy.** In the Tamil-held area, NGOs worked under the direction of the authorities. They therefore had a strong network, but did not always have much expertise as many were former combatants. Moreover, taxation by the authorities made it harder for individuals and households to make a living. Adaptive strategies included selling goods to other households, keeping a low profile, restricting production to subsistence levels, and postponing expansion.

The report suggests that attempts by foreign donors to attach conditions on their aid did not work. However, foreign NGOs found they could contribute because the Tamil NGOs were ‘de-linked from the functions of other political institutions of the rebels’. It recommended that foreign donors focus on building local NGO capacity, rather than attaching conditions on aid.


There are a small number of disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes in conflict situations. This article analyses the implementation of DRR in Afghanistan.

Strategies used to overcome conflict risks and lessons were:

- Conflict occurs on multiple levels. The article notes that macro effects of the conflict situation meant that NGOs only worked in government-controlled areas. Micro-level conflicts, on the other hand, took the form of disputes over resources, building, or job opportunities from the DRR. All resilience work in conflict settings needs conflict sensitivity, and to consider how interventions might exacerbate tensions or create conflict.

- Many NGOs focused on building visible infrastructure rather than institutional development. This contradicts DRR best practice which also seeks to improve institutions, and came about because NGOs working from Kabul wanted visible evidence of their work.

- NGOs were reliant on local staff with mediation skills. While these staff could provide understanding of local power balances and disputes, mediation nevertheless took time.

- Most NGOs began undertaking conflict analysis on an ad hoc basis. However, some began to formalise this over time. One developed a conflict analysis manual and trained its staff.

- NGOs mainly implemented DRR where they already worked, and appended it to other programmes. This meant they understood social and cultural context, and that they could deal with short funding cycles. It also meant that DRR programmes were not allocated based on need.

- In interviews, all NGOs emphasised the need for programme flexibility and flexible funding.
The programmes suggest that DRR can foster community collaboration. Communities appreciated the work. However, long-term impact is hard to measure, because many of the projects surveyed are small. For more impact, the authors suggest the need to link DRR to livelihoods and poverty reduction in more integrated programming.

5. Middle East


This policy brief analyses the resilience framing of programmes for displaced women in Iraq. It considers the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2016-2017 for Iraq, UNDP’s Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme 2014-2017 and UN Women’s LEAP Programme in Iraq. It also refers to interviews with Iraqi women.

It argues that in this case, resilience framing places emphasis too heavily on the community as a source of resilience (at the expense of ignoring national institutions). Resilience framing identifies cultural norms and economic factors as vulnerabilities, but does not always understand the form these take in context. 'Cultural factors' are sometimes posited as a reason for vulnerability that could be better described in terms of law and policy.

By contrast, the author argues that institutional and practical regulation have a big role in shaping vulnerabilities (e.g. IDPs need to register at Ministry of Migration, and women are often registered under their husband's names). Programmers therefore 'need to carefully consider limitations and assumptions inherent in the resilience policy framework when operationalising it on the ground'. The author recommends an emphasis on institutions and state capacity and responsibility in order to avoid shifting too much of the burden to communities. She also recommends using perceptions assessments to inform understandings of vulnerability.


The article looks at two single-sector programmes to improve the psychological resilience of Palestinian children following Israeli attacks. They are CARE’s Eye to the Future programme (psychosocial support) and the NRC-supported Better Learning Programme (BLP), psycho-educational intervention. They worked with teachers and counsellors to help the children understand their fears and to create supportive classroom environments. It notes that both programmes helped the children be resilient to past shocks, i.e. it led to clear improvements in PTSD symptoms and reductions in anti-social behaviour among the children. They also strengthened the capacity of local community based organisations (CBOs) and parents involved in the implementation. However, the author questions the focus on the resilience of children, given the continued violence in the area makes it impossible for the resilience to be sustainable.

The report provides an analysis of gender-based impacts of the conflict in Yemen, as well as women’s coping mechanisms and resilience. It was based on a secondary data review and information from 544 households across Yemen, including household interviews, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews with or ‘key informants’, and case studies/stories.

It finds that:

- There are barriers to livelihoods as a result of the war. There are examples of both positive and negative coping strategies including street selling, help from neighbours, child labour and eating less food. The use of curfews and security risks, alongside cultural beliefs and cost of transport, means there are restrictions on men’s and women’s freedom of movement. There is increased danger collecting water or grazing livestock.

- ‘Female-headed households are generally more at risk of food insecurity, due to the fact that there are few work opportunities for women. Women are generally excluded from economic transactions in the local markets. Respondents identified the most vulnerable groups as the marginalized groups (‘Muhamasheen’), women who are disabled, widows, divorcees, prisoners and wives of prisoners, wives whose migrant-worker husbands fail to send remittances, female refugees, youth and elderly women.’

- Household responses to shocks are gendered. There is household conflict if men lost their jobs and women become more important in earning income. Most men share their income with the family, whereas only some women share all of their income with the family. This may be to motivate men to get a job, or a belief that women are good at conserving household resources.

- There is some evidence that conflict has reduced the impact of restrictive cultural norms and traditions around women’s participation in community life and employment;

- Increases in marriage and an increase in polygamy have been reported as coping strategies. There is increased pregnancy due to more men out of work and lack of contraceptives or family planning, as well as the belief that more children will help Yemen recover.

- There have been reductions in the coverage of Yemen’s social welfare fund and citizens have limited access to financial services. The resources of indigenous women’s saving groups (Hakbah) are reported to be insufficient to meet the demands brought by the conflict.

- Some door-to-door sellers have had to stop because of a lack of credit to buy food. Social guarantees (i.e. credit given to introduced customers) are a common way for Yemenis to buy on credit.

- The role of formal government in providing services has declined while the ‘the perceived importance of informal protection service providers increased’. There has been a reductions in health services and difficulties accessing them. Access to these is gendered, and women usually access tribal leaders via their wives.

- There is a lack of women’s involvement in decision-making structures, and an increasing use of informal structures (e.g. tribal or armed groups). Women often involved in aid programmes and communities committees.
- Women and girls are particularly at risk of violence.

The report makes recommendations to inform humanitarian programming based on these findings:

- Gender-responsive initiatives to support the resilience of men and women in Yemen should build on existing capacities at community and household levels, including local conflict-mitigation schemes.

- Community-based and community-level preparedness structures should be supported to build communities’ resilience to shocks and conflict, through participatory planning, mitigation, and assessment of available resources (including alternative shelter, water resources, financial resources, or community contingency plans) with an explicit inclusive approach to ensure the participation of female IDPs, marginalised groups and wage labourers.

- The outreach capacity of community-level networks and stakeholders need to be strengthened, especially women’s groups, community development groups and women’s saving groups.

- Notwithstanding the need to increase engagement with women-led local NGOs, new gender-responsive strategies should include (more) males in community mobilisation efforts, in recognition of their significant control over household resources and practices.

- Newly established committees should have, whenever possible, a membership of 50% women and 50% men, and equal numbers of women and men in leadership positions.

- At household level, gender-sensitive response initiatives can build on the growing role of women in income generation and their resulting increasing role in household decision-making. Building on that, family-based income-generation projects can be further developed, preferably run by local community organisations that have been supported through training and capacity building.

- Efforts to increase women’s participation in community decision-making should be rooted in strong, inclusive and participatory local gender and power analyses. Every community has different dynamics; for example, in some communities, local councils have high acceptance and play an active role, while in others the tribal leaders have more say, etc.

- While promoting women’s access to livelihoods is critical, organizations should also ensure that men and youth have adequate access to livelihoods activities. There are opportunities to work with men to diversify their skills and livelihoods activities as a way of building resilience.

- Programmes aimed at improving women’s access to livelihoods should address the wide range of mobility issues women face, particularly in rural areas and areas controlled by armed groups.

- The reactivation and improvement of Social Welfare Fund programmes should be advocated, including a review of beneficiary lists and benefits. In light of current deficiencies in the lists, international organizations should use participatory approaches to identify and target the poorest households.

- Small-scale producers should be supported to improve marketing of their produce to be better able to compete with imported goods in agricultural markets.
• Efforts to improve access to medical services should focus on increasing the number of female medical staff, the availability of maternal and child healthcare, and the affordability of healthcare.

• There needs to be development and improved availability of vocational training and education that would enable both literate and illiterate youth to gain access to immediate livelihood opportunities. Work to ensure that any trainings offered reflect the current aspirations and preferred learning styles of youth.

• Interventions for small-scale electrification projects (‘off the grid’ systems) should be piloted at community and household levels to provide households with alternative energy sources, including exploring ways to support existing women-led initiatives using solar power.

• The availability of mobile phone networks and internet connectivity could be a favourable entry point for targeted interventions to empower women, including the promotion of social media as a tool to introduce better coping mechanisms, early warning, availability of aid and more.

• Male and female participants in focus group discussions requested more initiatives to support income-generating opportunities, especially for IDP women and host communities, including: a) inputs to support home-based work and training, b) special provision to help women with their care-giving responsibilities, c) support to vulnerable people who are not able to participate in such activities, and d) activities to prevent the recruitment of minors by armed groups.

• The interviewed male and female populations also emphasised the importance of being always consulted by relief providers in the design and implementation of humanitarian interventions, in order for their views to be taken into account. Concerns included the whole range of access to information about available aid, registration, targeting, distribution, and the availability of complaint mechanisms.

• When providing non-food item support, agencies should respect ‘do no harm’ principles. The provision of gas stoves might support some families, while it imposes economic pressure on others who are forced to buy expensive gas bottles instead of using their limited resources for other purposes. Wood stoves also increase the risk of fire, especially for IDP families living in improvised shelters and tents.

• The specific needs of polygamous households should be addressed when it comes to providing food, non-food items, hygiene kit distribution and shelter assistance, ensuring all the wives and their children have the same access to humanitarian resources.

• When making cash transfers conditional on girls’ access to education, agencies should ensure that the ‘do no harm’ principle is respected. While it is good to create an increase in the number of girls going to school, households are sometimes putting their girls at risk while significantly increasing pressure on mothers, in order to qualify for cash transfers.


The Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY) programme. It aimed to enhanced resilience through support to rehabilitation of community infrastructure; livelihoods stabilisation and recovery; social cohesion and local governance; and improved access to sustainable energy. It offered seven types of intervention: cash for work and assets; crops and livestock value chains;
microbusinesses; solar energy, social cohesion, local governance and skills development. It ran from 2016 to 2019, was funded by the EU and run by UNDP, FAO, ILO and WFP.

The programme sought to work with individuals, communities and local government. As well as livelihoods interventions, training was offered, infrastructure improved and efforts were made to improve social cohesion at the local level. For example, agricultural activities were ‘framed along a value chain approach’, including both help to individual producers and communities in managing public goods such as water or markets. 213 communities developed resilience plans through village cooperative councils (VCCs).

The evaluation found that ERRY had been successful in improving resilience:

- There were improvement in household incomes and food security. Technical and financial support to microbusinesses helped diversify household incomes. Training of farmers and distribution of seeds and tools increased yields.
- It helped with livelihoods viability restoration of capital assets, through the cash for work programme and other interventions. For example, the 'installation of photovoltaic solar systems allowed the recovery and expansion of health and education services and of livelihoods in agriculture, food processing, clothing production'.
- It helped with the mitigation of local conflicts. The 'Insider Mediators' trained by the programme have helped solve local conflicts, such as those around water.
- Some increase in capacities to recover from shocks and stresses was recorded.

The evaluation was published in 2019, and so cannot judge the longer-term impact of the programmes. However, it states that all but the temporary humanitarian programme (cash for work and assets) showed signs of sustainability. The rehabilitated assets were being used by the communities (pp. 70-1).

The reach of the programme was limited by the conflict situation. The evaluation found that 'the institutional and macro-economic instability limits the synergies inside and outside the programme with other initiatives to consolidate and expand resilience.' Reinforcing the capacity of local service providers and the institutional framework would help in this respect.

The evaluation also found that co-ordination with other humanitarian organisations was burdensome and delayed programmes. It recommends that partners find ways to better co-ordinate among themselves to better ensure multi-dimensional resilience.

Individual components were linked to strengthening the capacity of local authorities. This has been limited by insecurity, the poor macro-economic conditions, and limited co-ordination of the different programme elements.

The report evaluates a cash transfer programme and community asset rehabilitation and skill building programming in the governorates of Abyan and Amran in Yemen from 2017 using quantitative measures of food consumption, savings and other aspects of household resilience, and interviews. It offered cash transfers and 69 community support projects. It was funded by the EU and run by CARE Yemen and Action contre la faim.

Effects and lessons included:

- The programme led to significant reductions in ‘negative coping behaviour’ and increases in food consumption. It allowed the recipients to repay debt and be less reliant on neighbours, as well as make investments in livestock or save money. Recipients were able to diversify their incomes to some degree.
- Consistency of income streams allows recipients to plan better. The evaluation warns that households investing in resources for longer-term survival (e.g. debt repayment, new livestock) should not be taken as a sign that they have gone beyond needing help with basic needs, and may only be investing because they are receiving basic needs support. The evaluation found there was no linear progress in household resilience, as shocks in this context could return.
- The programme helped markets grow and other signs of community resilience, but there were signs that this declined after the transfers stopped, probably because of the extreme needs in the country.
- Women were not targeted, and were later found to be investing in livelihoods or skills training. Barriers remained for people with disabilities and old people. In targeting to help the vulnerable, the report recommends distinguishing between vulnerable people who will need significant continued support (extreme age, illness, or infirmity), and those more likely to be able to overcome their vulnerability in the short to medium term.
- The projects inclusive planning discussions were reported to have increased community cohesion, but not planning or risk management. However, in surveys households often did not cite infrastructure rehabilitation projects as helpful to their livelihoods (even if these projects addressed issues such as water scarcity that they had raised in discussion with the NGOs). The most commonly cited projects were those more directly linked to households (savings groups, market access roads, money to invest in livestock and agricultural inputs). The evaluation suggests that this may be a 'perception problem', and the respondents may simply not have connected the projects to their households.
- Qualitative surveys indicate that voluntary savings and loan associations were seen as helpful. Few respondents reported skills training as helpful for livelihoods.
- Respondents to the surveys emphasised existing support networks within the community.


The Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (ECRP) has sought to continue the World Bank’s development objectives through the conflict. It aims to preserve Yemen’s human and social capital, to help with recovery and rehabilitation. It has engaged with public institutions, namely the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Public Works Project (PWP). It builds on the design and experience of a pre-existing national system of cash transfers, and engages local private sector service providers.
The feasibility of the project was dependent on the World Bank's willingness to use an 'exceptional' approach to engage with a conflict country and adjust its funding mechanisms to do so. It was also helped by the existing capacity and delivery systems in Yemen. The report also emphasises the programme's ability to show that it is a non-political force in the conflict, and to enact this through programming decisions (e.g. beneficiary selection).

As well as immediate income relief, the ECRP includes longer-term resilience programmes:

- enhancing Yemen’s social protection delivery system;
- extending access to basic services (roads, water, health, education, irrigation, etc.);
- supporting families by investing in their children’s health and education;
- assisting youth in acquiring skills;
- promoting entrepreneurship;
- building social capital (through village development councils, community self-help groups, and local councils);
- preserving the capacity of Yemen’s critical social protection institutions
- building the capacity of youth advocates.

Emerging lessons include:

- Engaging with Yemen’s pre-existing capacity and delivery systems (the social welfare fund and public works programme) helped emergency response, and improvement of resilience (p. 23)
- ‘A transparent targeting strategy ensures political neutrality and increases buy-in by diverse – and often opposing – political actors’ (p. 24). It uses a distress index to target beneficiaries. It uses participatory process to adjust its targeting (for example, it was refined to overcome concerns that areas without IDPs were not being targeted enough). The method ‘has allowed ECRP to be seen by all parties as a politically neutral programme’.
- Inclusive targeting helped social cohesion by being sensitive to the needs of different groups. Some programmes also link different communities - such as hosts and IDPs - through a shared development goal. Different groups were allowed equal opportunities to participate, and respondents to surveys approved of the beneficiary selection process.
- Remote and third party monitoring helped overcoming the security challenges of gathering data. The programme also trained community members to provide feedback using phones and the internet.
- Local partner institutions are used to both gain acceptance of the programme and to create a better understanding of local political and social dynamics. They can reassure authorities, on either side of the conflict, that the programmes are non-political. They can also help the programme be aware of potential conflicts or tensions, and to tailor communications so as not to cause or worsen conflicts.
- In this case, one of the implementing agencies, the SFD enjoyed a large degree of organisational autonomy from central government. It was thus able to make agreements with NGOs, or respond on the ground, without reference to central government.
- Donors to the SFD have ‘clearly communicated’ to the conflict parties that they are neutral and are not willing to compromise this.
• External donors have continued to fund the SFD, meaning that the capacity can be maintained. This has maintained their staff, and will be able to help recovery and reconstruction after the conflict.

• Coordination of efforts by different agencies has been useful. It has been supported by the World Bank in particular, which had strong links with Yemeni institutions.

• An adaptive design was important in allowing ECRP to adapt to problems brought by the conflict, or other shocks. Adaptations in response to the war include generated conflict-related data and conflict analysis to target beneficiaries instead of household surveys; switching from field monitoring to remote and third-party monitoring; and switching to mobile money or delivery by commercial banks instead of manual transactions.

• The interventions were ‘tightly linked’ to other sectors such as health, education and water. This multi-sector approach allowed ECRP to consider how social protection could identify and help at-risk households and their lack of money or behavioural challenges, while health programmes could help provide health services for these households.

• A risk mitigation framework was built into the design of the project, and risks have been monitored throughout.

6. Syria


The report is an econometric analysis of food security in Syria. It does not provide evidence on programming impact directly, but can indirectly be used to address feasibility through its identification of causes of lack of food security and recommendations for policy makers and the international community.

The food security index fell significantly during the war. Declines in production occurred due to loss of manpower, targeting of opposing parties' food supplies, the centralisation of food by the warring parties, siege strategies. This led to increased dependence on imports and aid

The report also identified the decline of social capital, and activities such as smuggling, theft, royalties, looting and participation in fighting as associated with deteriorating food security.

Its broad policy recommendations include, at the national level, the need to stop violence and authoritarian institutions and build the productive economy.

Broad recommendations more relevant to humanitarian actors identify the areas most needed to improve food security, although many are based on a cessation of conflict and the ability to reconstruct and rebuild. They include:

• To remedy the damage to natural resources from waste and pollution from the war;
• Involve civil society;
• Target the most affected groups through development;
• Look to help community reconciliation and trust building.
• Rehabilitate irrigation systems, dams, groundwater and artesian wells that supply irrigated land with water needs, provide raw materials for pumping water such as electricity and fuel.

• Provide seeds, fertilisers and food for agricultural producers and rehabilitation of wetlands and livestock sheds destroyed during the war, as well as loans to buy inputs and price stabilisation.

• Work to form local teams from the public and private sector and civil society to follow up the implementation of reconstruction plans and rehabilitation at the local level. Help local committees work with state institutions, to expand their administrative competence and therefore independence.

• Provide employment opportunities for citizens as a priority in the areas where the displaced need to return and resettle.

• Ensure the availability of essential foodstuffs in the local market at appropriate prices, raise the value of wages so as to take into account the required food basket, provide job opportunities to reduce unemployment, develop social security programmes for families that lost their breadwinners and support the disabled.

• Provide an appropriate environment for increase women’s participation in work.

• Increase the role of consumer protection organisations to ensure the quality of food and to put an end to monopolisation, which contributed to the distribution of low-quality products at high prices.

• Provide petrol products, including cooking gas to all regions at reasonable prices, control of sales by local brokers and the development of deterrent penalties for violations related to distribution and prices on the black market.


This book analyses the factors that encourage resilience to sectarianism in Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria and Iraq. It focuses more on factors already existing in these societies than on donor programming, but lessons can be drawn from the analysis for donor programming.

The books argues that the following common factors allow societies to be resilient to sectarianism: political and social mechanisms for mediating among sectarian communities, the nature of the physical environment, and the proximity and access of outside forces that might have an interest in instrumentalising sectarian identity.

It argues that 'communities with higher levels of existing cross-sectarian interaction can further boost resilience, even in the face of sectarian-driven armed conflict, as occurred during the height of the civil war in Iraq' and points to neighbourhoods with areas where different communities can mix. It also suggests that 'less pronounced socioeconomic gaps improve a community’s ability to resist sectarianism.'

It emphasises the importance of civil society at the local level, governance reform, promotion of local media, and urban planning to increase interactions between communities as ways to increase resilience to sectarianism. Support for civil society should take the form of fostering free media and association rather than supporting specific groups.
It also suggests that border management can help by preventing the influx of foreign support for sectarian or extremist groups (such as that provided by Turkey and Qatar in Syria). It notes that political elites can help or hinder sectarianism.

Carpenter’s chapter on Iraq considers, amongst other things, the role of formal conflict resolution provided by Mercy Corps, who trained the ‘Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF), Dohuk University and the Interfaith Dialogue programme (p. 107). She argues that while resilience in Baghdad depended on local actors, resilience in Dohuk relied much more on international actors who mitigated the humanitarian crisis, created jobs, and mediated tensions between local and national government.


This brief report on evaluated Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT)’s Syria response, including resilience. It found ‘mixed results with resilience-building activities. While education programs achieved good outcomes, a more contextually-grounded approach to livelihoods programming is required to realise maximum impact as well as greater integration between humanitarian and resilience-building activities’. This was attributed to the lack of strategic focus on resilience in the programming, in favour of immediate humanitarian programmes.

It recommends that in future work in Syria, DFAT should ‘build on knowledge gained and work to date by continuing to focus on education and livelihoods without expanding into any new sectors. Support for livelihoods should be more strategic, built on a nuanced understanding of context and partners, and include clearly articulated intended outcomes.’


The article explores the challenges to maintaining health systems in areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army through interviews with staff from the health systems, NGOs, donors and service users. It analyses the civilian governance in opposition-controlled areas, and the establishment of Health Directorates (HDs) in 2014. These are subject to shelling and lack of funding, among other issues.

Its interviews revealed a number of issues about health systems governance, which can help build better resilience in the system. It was found that HD leaders had some strategic plans to rebuild but in practice had to focus on maintaining basic services; and service users were positive about health services given the constraints of the war, among other things (p. 236). The HDs therefore demonstrated ‘grassroots governance’ and a form of resilience (p. 241).

Interviewees reported that NGOs had no positive role in supporting health system governance. They did not co-ordinate project planning with local authorities sufficiently, and thus contributed to fragmentation. Armed groups were not reported to be interfering with health systems (p. 241).

The main challenges identified were:

- Security (e.g., targeting of health facilities and personnel by the Syrian regime)
Uneven funding (because opposition HDs were not recognised, they could not always receive funding from UN agencies; while NGOs could often fund health projects, but not governance). Currently ad hoc methods are used by HDs, such as collecting fees, finding staff part-time jobs.

Capacity (loss of experienced governance professionals and health workers)

The interviewees' suggested solutions were:

- Supporting HDs through new funding mechanisms, supporting governance, and recognising HDs as the health authorities in their area.
- Addressing health-worker loss, with possible methods including higher salaries, salaries for currently unpaid jobs, and more training to compensate for losses.
- Improving coordination to overcome fragmentation

The article’s recommendations to international donors are:

- Political recognition of local health authorities is necessary if initial grassroots governance initiatives are to succeed.
- Financial and technical support of local health authorities is urgently needed if they are to survive.
- To protect fragile health system governance initiatives, the international community must do more to end bombings of health facilities and health-workers in opposition-controlled areas.


The research sought to understand Syrians' perceptions of the shocks affecting them, and the strategies and resources they use to deal with them. It is based on ethnographic research and interviews with 328 participants in opposition-controlled areas: Idleb, Al Hassakeh, Raqqa, Aleppo and one host community in Jordan. 96% of the participants were displaced, and the majority were women. The research seeks to capture participants’ changing circumstances over time (e.g. multiple displacements) to understand resilience as a process. It is structured around CARE's typology of resilience capacities: anticipatory, absorptive, adaptive and transformative. It focuses on social capital, as this was identified as a key source of resilience in the context.

The research found that displacement (74%), exposure to a conflict event (69%), economic struggle (69%) were the most common shocks and stressors, followed by immediate loss, acute health issues, experience of trauma or destruction of home (p. 28). Most reported receiving warnings via formal or informal sources. It was hard to gauge the reliability of the information, or how to respond based on it. Official warnings were more consistent and reliable in rural or camp areas than urban areas. Young people were seen as good sources of warnings due to mobility and access to the internet.

Respondents’ preparation improved over time. Techniques included: planning best location to flee to, identifying safest and fastest routes out of town, having well-established communication channels, stocking food / securing residence for a long-term stay without leaving and having access to cash or other objects that could be liquefied easily. These techniques were constantly
adapted as circumstances changed. However, many people's savings and income declined over time, making it hard to prepare.

Given the ongoing conflict, resilience was mainly anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive. Syrians remained extremely vulnerable to shocks. A number of resilience strategies, at the individual and community level, were reported. However, 'most people’s recovery is incredibly fragile, and individuals and households remain worried about basic survival even with seemingly resilient factors present.' The resilience capacities used can often only ensure basic survival, and Syrians are vulnerable to the repeated shocks they face.

Social capital was key to resilience strategies, as many sought loans, advice or other support within their communities. It found that communities often stayed together or fled together and provided support for each other. When people fled, they often had to rely on aid, especially if they fled somewhere without family or friends. In camps this was more forthcoming, whereas in urban areas they had to seek it out. Levels of aid support were seen as unreliable. Communities provided vital social and emotional support, and collective decision-making. The psychological effects of displacement and loss varied. Richer individuals, for example, may have felt worse at having lost more money.

Livelihoods strategies included men and women taking second jobs (or women working outside the home). Some were able to look to build a longer-term livelihood, although this was not always possible. Many respondents were keen on them or their children continuing education. While there were many barriers, many improvising through home schooling/individual study or community-run schools. Skills training and capital were seen as needed to improve livelihoods.

While women often took on extra work, and even felt empowered in some cases, there were also reports of restrictions on movement, and crime, in cities such as Raqqa. Early marriage was also seen in rural areas. There was mixed evidence on whether Syrians would like women's increased role to continue after the war.

Social capital was strong within groups, but inter-group tensions may have been worsened by the war. Pre-war communities may also be less cohesive because of deaths, trauma, destruction and displacement. This may make it harder to rebuild after the war, given the importance of social bonds in Syria.

Low levels of trust in local and national government were reported. Views of NGOs were often negative, particularly in urban areas.

Resilience programming should:

- Be 'multi-sector and holistic, in order to address both the impact of an individual shock itself, as well as to build and/or support the capacities of beneficiaries to better withstand such a shock (or others) in the future.'
- Identify and work with resilience capacities embedded at the individual, household, and community level, and connect these to governance systems for sustainable recovery.
- 'Programmes must be flexible and nimble in order to deliver aid that is relevant and effective in a manner that is timely and efficient, and tailored to different people’s needs.' This includes 'quick, absorptive humanitarian interventions' to deal with shocks.
• Should support interventions fostering long-term livelihoods opportunities, with appropriate linkages between, for example, training and employment opportunities or finance.

• Support education, in person or via long-distance methods, scholarships, transportation to exams, or other methods.

• Support women's opportunities, and involve women and men in dialogues about women's increasing role.

• Work with community structures and social networks, including IDPs and marginalised groups, to identify needs and proposed solutions. Then facilitate dialogue between communities and governance structures.

• Seek to regain trust with Syrians, partly by improving communications and being more consistent with assistance.

• Provide psycho-social support to all sectors of society.

• Support IDPs, those in besieged areas, people with disabilities, and other hard to reach groups.


Assessment of Syrians’ resilience strategies with a view to leveraging them in resilience programming. It focused on loss of livelihood, loss of purchasing power, interruption of education, displacement, disruption of social networks and discrimination.

It was undertaken by the Syria Resilience consortium, comprising CARE, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity and Inclusion (HI), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

The report uses previous research from consortium members (transcripts from interviews ad focus groups), as well as 24 interviews with NGO staff. A disproportionate number of the interviews were in Kurdish-controlled territories, and there is little evidence on vulnerable groups' resilience strategies. The report does not use any data from interviews conducted in areas that have changed hands since they were conducted, although future changes in the political and economic situation may make the information less useful.

It documents the high levels of disruptions to livelihoods, markets and education. Two thirds of households have lost one or more of their main income sources since the start of the crisis. The centrally planned agriculture system that existed before the conflict has been ended, meaning farmers have had to switch quickly to a market system and value chains have collapsed.

It classifies responses into positive and negative coping strategies. Negative coping strategies are defined as behaviour or strategies that: increase the risk that certain groups will be exposed to harms such as conscription, kidnapping, and conflict; are detrimental to household and/or individual resources; exacerbate existing inequalities between groups; compromise household and/or individual socio-economic well-being (including health); harm the environment; seek to deliberately avoid mainstream systems and institutions, thereby reinforcing less efficient parallel systems or structures within Syria.
Table 1: Positive and negative coping strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community type</th>
<th>Positive coping strategies</th>
<th>Negative coping strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Decreased cultivation of crops that require irrigation</td>
<td>Cessation or reduction in cultivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced dependence on the use of chemical fertilisers and herbicides</td>
<td>Land rental and profit-sharing agreements between smallholder farmers and more prosperous farmers (that disadvantage smallholders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs and women provide more casual labour to farms</td>
<td>Reduction in the size of livestock holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of grain for household consumption or replanting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preference for small ruminants over cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small-scale household production of vegetables (primarily in North East Syria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export of livestock by large breeders (primarily in North East Syria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Start-up of small and medium sized enterprises (especially by women)</td>
<td>Working multiple jobs or doing casual labour alongside a full-time job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relocation of existing small businesses to areas that are more secure</td>
<td>Facilitation of civil documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teaching and tutoring (especially by women)</td>
<td>Remaining on Syrian government payrolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment with INGOs, NGOs and UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment with the Kurdish self-administration (primarily in North East Syria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural and urban</td>
<td>Diversifying income sources</td>
<td>Use of in-kind loans from traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of family and community social networks for support</td>
<td>Emigration and dependence on remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of new social networks by IDPs (especially women) with host community members</td>
<td>Sale of humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relocation to communities where economic opportunities are perceived to be greater</td>
<td>Sale of household assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of informal loans from friends and family</td>
<td>Polygamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Early marriage and survival sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joining an armed group, theft and smuggling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reproduced with kind permission from Stein (2020, pp. 8-9)
Table 2: Positive and negative coping strategies on education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive coping strategies</th>
<th>Negative coping strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of alternative class schedules and locations</td>
<td>Part-time attendance at school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-teacher collaboration to support home-based learning</td>
<td>Travel time for educational activities (primarily in North East Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutoring and self-instruction</td>
<td>Enrolment at schools using Syrian government curriculum (primarily in North East Syria)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reproduced with kind permission from Stein (2020, p. 10)

It suggests the following approaches for consortium members undertaking resilience programming:

- Recognise the importance of social relations in enabling access to credit and job opportunities in Syria. The war has narrowed social networks and many are reliant on their immediate family. It therefore argues that programming should support social relations between groups and help to expand social networks. It suggests that activities should be planned to bring together diverse groups.

- It notes the adaptations farmers have made after not being able to afford certain inputs, such as chemical fertilisers. It suggests that this is an opportunity to help implement more environmentally friendly farming practices.

- It points to reports of a better business environment in north eastern Syria and suggests programming can help by 'supporting the start-up and expansion of businesses in north eastern Syria that produce goods which were previously sourced from western Syria, and by training business owners and entrepreneurs in financial planning and management, risk assessment and mitigation'.

- Supporting women to adapt to changing food systems in response to the war - more household vegetable, poultry and small ruminant production.

- Taking into account the time women spend looking after children at home, which has increased because of the war. Programming should consider supporting this.

- Programming should consider that the high cost of fuel makes it hard for some, including vulnerable groups, to travel to work. It should consider subsidising transport or other solutions to help.

- Help mitigate the dangerous effects of cheap cooking, heating and lighting fuel sources currently being used with ventilation or other solutions.

- Use online payments or cash transfers to help increase purchasing power as much as possible.

- Help support informal teaching and learning systems such as home teaching or tutoring as a source of income, by teaching parents mentoring skills, or developing tutors' teaching skills.

- Help children secure lost educational documents (proof of enrolment, certificates, etc.)

- Consider that many children are working and going to school part-time. Classes outside of working hours can help these children.

- Help schools manage classes that include older pupils.
• Provide supplements to salaries in schools where they are lower, to overcome disparities between Kurdish-, government- or NGO-funded schools.

• Help children returning from abroad re-integrate into Syrian schools (or schools in the Kurdish-run area, where instruction is in Kurdish)

• Help engage in risk education around the explosive remnants of war (ERW) that may be found around schools.


Surveys of 1,168 randomly selected households in 124 communities, 350 purposively chosen (those who has started a new livelihood in the last 12 months) community key informants in 115 communities, 46 young people in three regions and 36 key informants in local governance, business, humanitarian action, or health and education, were used to understand resilience strategies. Informants were asked about food security, expenditure, savings, hunger, well-being, their housing, and the following enabling factors for resilience were considered: market functioning, access to capital, social capital and networks, humanitarian aid received, and livelihood dynamics.

It found that the following factors were enabling Syrians to adapt livelihoods and improve welfare:

• Functioning markets

• Access to loans and capital (usually from friends, relatives or local businesses)

• Social networks help Syrians to find jobs, and are associated with better food security, higher expenditure and better housing.

• Women and youth earning money report better self-esteem and self-reliance, and other welfare outcomes. However, working youth spend less time in education and women have increased overall their workloads as they usually have to still do the housework. Vulnerable men may be losing out.

• Cash assistance is reported as the most favoured form, followed by livelihood programmes and some types of skills training.

It therefore recommends NGOs and others should focus on supporting these factors. In addition, it suggests supporting small-scale producers' ability to produce food, to help local markets; identifying in-demand skills to provide training in; ensuring that humanitarian aid is not divisive, strengthens social networks, and builds on pre-existing skills as well as vulnerability; include men in livelihoods programmes; support a wider role for women and youth with caution, and seek to engage conservative leaders when overturning cultural norms; support technology-based skills development; combine 'emergency' and 'recovery' funds; look for systems-wide interventions where possible.
7. Other works cited


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