



Agricultural Policy Research in Africa



DIVERGENT TERMS OF MARKET INTEGRATION OF AGRO-PASTORALISTS: MARKETISATION AND DISTRESS SELLING OF LIVESTOCK IN SOUTH OMO, ETHIOPIA

Fana Gebresenbet

Working Paper

WP|27
February 2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT



This working paper presents a longer, more detailed analysis of a chapter published in *Land, Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring East Africa's Pastoral Drylands* (Edited by Jeremy Lind, Doris Okenwa and Ian Scoones, James Currey, 2020).

I thank Jeremy Lind, Ian Scoones, and Andy Catley for commenting on an earlier literature review on a similar topic in 2017, and guiding the development of this research project. I also thank Andy Catley for introducing me to the proportional piling participatory method, which was very useful during the fieldwork. I thank Andy Catley and Edward Jed Stevenson who reviewed earlier versions of the working paper. I also thank all the informants from Tsemay and Bodi communities, as well as woreda and zone government officials/experts for taking their time and sharing their views.

Fana Gebresenbet (e-mail: fana.g@ipss-addis.org) is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies of Addis Ababa University. He also serves as the academic coordinator to the PhD programme in Peace and Security Studies.

This research was conducted with funding from UK aid of the UK government. The findings and conclusions contained are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect positions or policies of the UK government or the Department for International Development (DFID).

ACRONYMS

CSA	Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia
DA	Development Agent
DRSLP	Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme in the Horn of Africa
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESC	Ethiopian Sugar Corporation
FGD	focus group discussion
IGAD LPI	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Livestock Policy Initiative
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
JESH	Jijiga Export Slaughter House
KSDP	Kuraz Sugar Development Project
MetEC	Metal and Engineering Corporation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
PARIMA	Pastoral Risk Management
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Programme
PRIME	Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Marketing Expansion
SEPD	Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
TOT	Turn Over Tax
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPEACE	University for Peace
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WG	wealth group

CONTENTS

Executive summary	5
1 Introduction	8
1.1 Trends in pastoralist livestock commercialisation in Ethiopia.....	8
2 Introducing the Bodi and the Tsemay in South Omo	11
2.1 Government interventions in Bodi territories: Konso settlement, sugar estates, and sedenterisation	11
2.2 State intervention in Tsemay: road building and commercial farming	12
2.3 Comparing state intervention in Bodi and Tsemay.....	13
3 Market actors and livestock trade dynamics in Tsemay and Bodi	15
3.1 Livestock trade in South Omo Zone: emerging trends	15
3.2 Market actors and dynamics in Tsemay	16
3.3 Market actors and dynamics in Bodi.....	17
4 Socioeconomic implications of the trade	20
4.1 Terms of market integration	20
4.2 Wealth categories and dynamics	21
4.3 Socioeconomic implications of emergent livestock trade dynamics.....	24
5 Marketisation vs distress sale: the story of livestock trade in South Omo	26
6 Conclusion	28
References	29
Endnotes	32
Tables	
Table 2.1 Timeline of major state interventions in Bodi and Tsemay territories	12
Table 3.1 Number of livestock sold from South Omo to central market (2015/16-2017/18 FY)	13
Table 3.2 Livestock population by type	15
Table 4.1 Wealth groups (WGs) and livestock trade dynamics per WG in Bodi	16
Table 4.2 Wealth groups (WGs) and livestock trade dynamics per WG in Tsemay	22
Table 5.1 Summary of state and market integration for Benna-Tsemay and Salamago Woreda.....	23
Figures	
Figure 2.1 Administrative map of South Omo Zone.....	26

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The increasing trend of livestock marketing and commercialisation, and its attendant socioeconomic consequences, has attracted academic and policy interest. This interest has mainly been restricted to the Somali and Borana areas, and to some extent Afar. This study investigates the processes of linking pastoralists to the market, and the drivers which shape the response of pastoralists to the market. It adopts a comparative perspective, examining the market characteristics of livestock trade and drivers linking pastoralists to the livestock market in Benna-Tsemay Woreda,¹ characterised by decades of exposure to the market, and a higher number of livestock heads marketed; and Salamago Woreda with about a decade of exposure to the market, and a lower number of livestock heads marketed. The study therefore contributes to an understanding of the functioning of livestock markets in pastoral areas (relatively) weakly and recently integrated to the market.

South Omo is a deep periphery in Ethiopia, bordering Kenya to the south and South Sudan to the west. The administrative zone is home to numerous ethnic groups, often of small numbers, including the Tsemay (in Benna-Tsemay Woreda) and the Bodi (in Salamago Woreda). The Tsemay are located in the north-eastern parts of the zone, bordering the Weyto River. The Bodi are located at the western extent of the zone, bordering the Omo River.

The particular locations of the Tsemay and the Bodi led to different modes of interaction with the Ethiopian state. In the case of the Bodi, up until the 2000s, the main mode of interaction was indirect. The settlement of food-insecure Konso farmers in the Bodi territory necessitated the renovation of the road linking Hana, Samalago's capital, to the zonal capital, Jinka. Since the early 2010s, the conflictual relationship with the Konso eventually led to the impossibility of practising rain-fed agriculture in the mid-altitude areas by the Bodi. The Bodi are also deprived of the possibility of practising flood-retreat agriculture with the commencement of the filling of the Gibe III Dam in 2015. Sugar industrialisation activities led to a more concerted state intervention, including physical infrastructure and political control, in the early 2010s. As such, the experience for the Bodi was a rupture from a century of indirect contact with the government.

The Tsemay had a different experience. Aiming to reach the Borana (located across the Weyto River) and the border with Kenya, the imperial government was engaged in constructing a road across their territory. Furthermore, the imperial government was also engaged in 'civilising' works to equip the Tsemay with 'modern' ways of farming and dressing. During the 1980s, the road linking Jinka with the national political and economic centre through Tsemay territory was also completed. A commercial farm was established in the late 1980s, displacing the Tsemay, who were left feeling embittered by the failure of authorities to deliver planned services in the new village centres.

Of the different agro-pastoral *woreda* in the South Omo Zone, higher rates of market engagement are recorded for Benna-Tsemay, Hamer, and Dassanech. While the first two are more known for providing goats for the market, the Dassanech sell more cattle: this is mainly a reflection of the herd composition. The remaining two pastoral *woreda*, Nyangatom and Salamago, are poorly accessible by road, are more insecure, and have lower prices. The number of animals put for sale from these *woreda* is very small.

Livestock trade is decades old in Tsemay, while both volume and prices have been increasing after 2008. The bustling livestock trade in Tsemay is increasingly dominated by male Tsemay traders. For the past decade, they have been taking over from traders coming from central parts of the country. The case of one trader who supplies directly to exporters in Modjo is particularly interesting. Although he buys directly from market centres, he also has six agents sourcing from informal bush markets in further removed areas. Woito Town is full of life on Saturdays, the weekly market day. Many pastoralists bring animals to the market, and later entertain themselves in the restaurants and bars in town. In addition to buying essentials, including food, pastoralists also pay government loans (for fertilisers), land use fee, and party membership fee from the proceeds.

Before 2011, the Bodi had the opportunity to sell to only a limited number of civil servants in Hana Town. The influx of labour force and restaurants catering for them meant an increase in the volume they could sell.

The volume they sell is mainly limited to this immediate demand: at times (especially during times of conflict), not even meeting the demand. Prices have increased over this period. There are no traders buying from pastoralists; rather, the restaurant owners buy directly from pastoralists. The weekly market day in Hana, also Saturdays, are dreaded, unlike the case of Woito Town. The trading happens in a rushed manner, and the market gets closed by 2.00pm. Movement in the town is limited, with the *woreda* police effectively pushing the Bodi from coming into the central parts. The fear is that the Bodi will get drunk with the money, and attack the town's residents. The main beneficiaries of the trade are the restaurant owners (as they get the meat at a relatively lower price) and small bars which sell the *areke* (a traditional hard liquor) to the Bodi.

The terms of market integration differ in the two communities. In the case of the Tsemay, the trend is a continuation of a long-term process and the increasing monetisation of their socioeconomic life. The main determinant forcing them to sell animals is the necessity of buying grain, while they also need to sell animals to pay loans, fees, as well as buying small consumable products and basic commodities. There is an increasing ownership and utilisation of motor bikes as taxis by the youth. Donkey-powered carts and mill houses are also becoming common, both of which reduce the labour demand on women. The greatest indication of the monetisation of their culture is the inclusion of money in bridewealth negotiations.

The Bodi are forced into selling animals at higher numbers, despite the *woreda* and zonal governments' dominant view that the Bodi are resistant and are not selling enough in proportion to their large stock and the relatively good pasture of their land. The primary reason the Bodi present to sell animals is 'hunger'. This is mainly the case as they have not been able to practise flood-retreat agriculture since 2015, and rain-fed agriculture since the early 2010s. Thus, the Bodi are left to rely on the market to fulfil their grain needs.

The second reason the Bodi present is cattle diseases. The veterinary officers are fearful of the Bodi and do not venture outside the limits of the town. Moreover, there are no publicly available veterinary drugs. Thus, if one animal is sick, the Bodi plan to sell it before it dies, partly aiming to buy drugs for the remaining animals.

The third reason is related to the imprisonment of more than 300 men in Jinka, as part of the government's attempt to secure the Konso settlers and the sugar industrialisation activities. In addition to visiting them, wives have to maintain the traditionally sanctioned birth

cycle. Culturally, a wife is expected to give birth every two and a half to three years, which the imprisonment of husbands is interrupting. The strategy adopted is to bribe the police officers for an unofficial 'conjugal visit', in addition to expenses related to travel, lodging, food, and money given to the men in prison. Roughly 1.5 to 2 cattle have been sold per prisoner for every year a man has been in prison, including by the extended family.

The final reason they give is drinking, while they are quick to add that very few sell animals just to drink. Rather, many spend the surplus money on drinking, only after covering the other basic necessities. As such, for the Bodi, it is an abrupt experience and mainly is a result of the interruptions of previous livelihood options, reigning insecurity in the area, and imprisonments.

The story of livestock trade is not homogenous for areas at the early stages of market integration, such as South Omo. The differing 'state experiences' of Benna-Tsemay and Salamago Woreda led to divergent modes of market integration. In the case of the Tsemay, intensification of the trade over the past decade is leading to, and further augmented by, the monetisation of the local economy. This process is accompanied by an increase in inequality. Wealth is now circulating out of and back to the livestock sector, by the wealthier groups 'withdrawing' from the livestock sector and investing in service sectors, and also re-investing back in livestock, mainly goats. Some young men are benefiting from this trade, while the privileged position of non-Tsemay traders is now significantly eroded.

Tsemay livestock traders are now taking advantage of their poor ethnic folks by strategising when and where to buy and sell. Moreover, the division of their herd – between 'breeding and herding' and 'market' herds – implies that such Tsemay traders might be strategically dividing their herd between core/financial capital/savings and a section to meet domestic needs and to make opportunistic sales. Investment in the service sector (i.e. transportation (motor bikes) and grain-mill houses) and in real estate illustrates that the socioeconomic position of the wealthiest group is being solidified, and is becoming more resilient to drought and associated livestock losses. As such, livestock marketisation is in full swing in Tsemay areas, with the attendant transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich and increases in inequality. This dynamic indicates that the Tsemay are proceeding in the direction of commercialisation, with the possibility of following the trend in Somali and Borana areas.

We have a different story in Bodi. The story is far from the 'normal sales' all pastoralist communities engage

in. It is primarily undergirded by insecurity caused by the combined pressure of hunger, high disease incidence (lack of veterinary care), and imprisonments. All these are related to the nature of state intervention in Salamago, which has led to increasing insecurity, alienation of key land resources, poor government provision of veterinary services, and the hindering of recession and rain-fed farming. These pressures put the Bodi in a quagmire – they can only survive by selling cattle from their herd. As such, the Bodi are in a distress mode of selling animals. The government and the incoming labour force are benefiting from the availability of cheap meat (prices of animals, meat, and food are lower in Hana than in Woito) from sources close by. This is ignored by the *woreda* and zone governments, as well as those working for the different projects in the *woreda* and residing in Hana Town, who blame the Bodi for drinking with the money and causing trouble.

As such, what we see is the Bodi themselves inadvertently (through distress selling) subsidising sugar development on the land taken away from them. Beyond meeting immediate consumption and cash

needs, no Bodi individual/group accumulates from such trade dynamics. Rather, the Bodi are being pushed into collective impoverishment. What this means for the Bodi is yet to be seen, but this adds to the alarm bell many have been ringing regarding the negative implications of sugar development and Gibe III for a long time now, on other grounds.

To conclude, the findings reported in this working paper highlight the divergent processes of livestock trade in South Omo Zone, Ethiopia. In the Tsemay community, the marketisation of the past decade has been experienced as a continuation and intensification of an old process of state and market integration. The Bodi, however, are in a process of collective impoverishment, while a section of Tsemay young men seem to be benefiting from the livestock trade. These findings strongly indicate that the extent to which agro-pastoralists engage in livestock trade and the terms of their integration are contingent on the nature of the state's interest and relation to them.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Trends in pastoralist livestock commercialisation in Ethiopia

The volume of formally exported live animals and meat from Ethiopia, and export earnings garnered thereof, has shown a major increase over the past decade and a half. Eid (2014 citing Dawit *et al.* 2008) states that as much as 95 per cent of Ethiopia's exports are originally from pastoralist and agro-pastoral areas, the vast majority of these being from the Borana and Somali lowlands (Aklilu and Catley 2014). This counters the dominantly held view that pastoralists in Ethiopia are market averse, and do not produce for the market.

This emergent commercialisation of livestock trade in this part of Ethiopia has enticed a range of government and non-governmental interventions, as well as studies over the past decade. The majority of these studies examined the socioeconomic implications of this trend, mainly in the Somali and Borana areas, with the more incisive studies coming from Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University and the Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) project. The available literature reveals that those at the lowest levels of economic stratification are benefiting the least from this trend, as they sell when they absolutely need the cash (Aklilu and Catley 2010a, 2010b). The poor view their livestock as a 'bank on hooves'² and require an absolute necessity to 'withdraw' through commercial off-take (Barrett, Bellemare and Osterloh 2004). For the poor, the rational economic strategy is building their financial assets, meaning herd growth, thus limiting sales. Conversely (and understandably), richer pastoral households have the potential to cash out more money from the system through sales (*ibid.*) Thus, as one gets richer, income from livestock sales increases and frequency of going to the market to put livestock on the market also increases (Aklilu and Catley 2010b, 2010c).

Moreover, there is a major difference between the timing of the poor and the rich to sell livestock. The rich benefit from price fluctuations, for example by buying animals at the end of the dry season and selling later as prices get better (Aklilu and Catley 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). On top of this, as the poor go to the market when there is absolute necessity, there is a window for

richer households to buy from them at lower prices, to wait for better market conditions, and improve the condition of the livestock (Aklilu and Catley 2010b, 2010c).

This difference, combined with the risk-averse nature of the poor, is leading to an increasing wealth differentiation trend in pastoral areas. While the proportion of the poor/destitute (measured in ownership of livestock) and the extent of poverty is increasing (see Aklilu and Catley 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), the rich are becoming richer with a relatively smaller increase in the members of this category as a whole. This has led some to argue that livestock commercialisation in pastoral areas is in effect leading to the transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich. Aklilu and Catley (2010b) state that there is an annual increase in the number of wealthy pastoralists at a rate of 2.5 per cent, with a counter increase in the number of poor households by 4.1 per cent in the Somali and Borana areas. The 'moving up, moving out' scenario – explained by issues related to changes in demography, drought, and access to productive rangelands, in addition to commercialisation (Catley and Alula 2010) – makes outmigration a last resort for destitute pastoralists. This, however, is countered by the government's donor-funded programmes on safety nets and asset building (Aklilu and Catley 2010b).

Another factor maintaining, or further widening, the gap between rich and poor households is access to pasture, which is the main type of feed, and among the strategic limiting factors to the livestock sector in Ethiopia. Through a combination of better access to land and utilisation of economic and/or political influence, richer households have better access to pasture. As wealth increases, access to pasture lands increases. Moreover, the very few households who use supplementary feed tend to also be wealthier (PRIME 2014). As a result of all of the above, the herd increase in wealthier households is higher than that in poorer households in the Afar, Somali, and Oromia pastoral areas (*ibid.*). Long-term processes of privatisation of land and rangeland enclosures benefit higher wealth groups more, and sustain the transfer of wealth from the poor; that is, the commons, towards the wealthier groups (Napier and Solomon 2011).

In many pastoral societies, wives/women can only (at best) be consulted before livestock is put out for sale. Normatively, the male head of the household makes the decision. This power differential in the decision to engage in livestock trading likely extends to how the proceeds from market engagement are distributed within the household. In extreme cases, as Akllilu and Catley (2010b) state, there is the risk of men squandering the proceeds and using it for *khat* or alcohol consumption.³ However, a product of livestock origins over which women have near complete control is milk (for the case of the Hamar, in South Omo, for example, see Getnet and Dawit 2011). While herders rely on the milk of the animals they keep with them for part of their diet, some lactating animals are left close to the homestead, for use by women and younger children. In areas close to urban centres (where demand for dairy products is high enough), a proportion of the produced milk is supplied to market. In Borana, for example, the proportion of the annual milk produced from all animals (in decreasing order from cattle, camel, and shoats) put to the market reaches 44 per cent, with 31 per cent being consumed at home, 14 per cent being served as a gift, and the remaining 11 per cent being processed (Yonad Business Promotion and Consultancy PLC n.d.).

The marketing of milk serves as the main stream of cash revenue for wives/women. There are some differences in the marketing of milk by women depending on their wealth group and the location of their homestead. Poorer households will have lower milk production; thus, the proportion of milk marketed will be lower and possible increases will be realised at the expense of household consumption and/or social security (reducing the gift proportion) (*ibid.*). However, marketing of greater proportions of household milk production comes at the cost of nutrition, especially child nutrition. Milk is the dominant diet for children especially, and is particularly preferred for its protein, calcium, and vitamin contents. The conversion of milk to grain, although preferred due to the higher volume of grain compared to milk of the same value, will thus lead to amino acid and vitamin deficiencies (Sadler and Catley 2009; Sadler *et al.* 2009).

Among governments, regional bodies, and aid donors in the Horn, the commercialisation of livestock production and marketing in pastoralist areas has often been viewed as a pathway for poverty reduction. In Ethiopia, the Somali and Borana areas are considered to be the most commercially orientated, and therefore, most of the research on livestock markets has been done in these areas. In contrast, this working paper contributes to an understanding of livestock

commercialisation trends by focusing on changes in the very remote area of South Omo, in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia.

This focus is not only a change in study area because South Omo is qualitatively different from other pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, especially in terms of its physical and political isolation, and its diversity of ethnic groups and related socio-cultural contexts. Notably, South Omo is a deep periphery which has only been 'initiated' towards serious political, economic, and market integration since the early 2000s (see Markakis 2011). While the Somali and Borana areas have responded to demands from substantial livestock markets (including across the Red Sea and in Nairobi) over many years, market demand for livestock in South Omo has been low, until recently. Moreover, state engagement (and NGO engagement until the passing of the restrictive 2009 Charities and Societies law) in South Omo has focused on managing pastoral conflicts, with relatively limited support to livestock marketing.

Despite its long history of isolation, South Omo has attracted international attention from environmental and human rights groups since 2006 when the Government of Ethiopia began to implement a new hydroelectric scheme, based on the construction of the Gibe III Dam across the Omo River. The scheme included plans to establish large-scale, irrigated sugar plantations. It follows that the story of livelihood change and market orientation in South Omo can be framed around a massive government infrastructure and industrial-scale agricultural development in an area that was hitherto extremely isolated and under-developed.

This study aimed to investigate processes of linking pastoralists to the market, and the drivers which shape the response of pastoralists to the market. It adopts a comparative perspective, and examines market characteristics of livestock trade and drivers linking pastoralists to the livestock market in Benna-Tsemay Woreda, characterised by decades of exposure to the market, and higher number of livestock heads marketed, and Salamago Woreda with about a decade of exposure to the market, and lower number of livestock heads marketed. The study therefore aims to contribute to an understanding of the functioning of livestock markets in pastoral areas (relatively) weakly and recently integrated to the market.

The paper asks the following: What are the drivers pushing pastoralists to sell their trade? Are the drivers the same in the two *woreda*? Will longer exposure to livestock markets and higher integration with the market

translate into orienting the pastoral production system to the market (a change in the production system)? Will a longer exposure to the market and extent of market integration make pastoralists dependent on the market to meet basic needs? What are the social, cultural, and economic changes brought about by increasing market exposure?

This paper is based on long-term fieldwork engagement (since 2012) in the Salamago and Nyangatom *woreda* of South Omo Zone.⁴ The particular research for this work was conducted for three weeks in July and August 2018 in Benna-Tsemay and Salamago *woreda*. A total of 20 individuals were interviewed in this period (12 from Benna-Tsemay, and eight from Salamago) and another 50 took part in focus group discussions (30 (six women) from Tsemay, and the remaining 20 (six women) from Bodi). In these FGD sessions, participatory methods, specifically proportional piling, were used to get a sense of livestock distribution within the community and the market behaviour of different wealth groups.⁵

The remainder of this working paper is structured in four parts. Section 2 introduces the study area (South Omo Zone) and the two communities studied (Tsemay and Bodi) to the reader, with a particular focus on the historical dynamics of state making. Section 3 gives broad indications of trends of livestock marketing in the zone and the two communities. Section 4 goes deeper into the terms of market integration in Tsemay and Bodi, the dominant market actors, and the socioeconomic implications of the emerging trends. Section 5 analyses through a comparative lens the dynamics of livestock sales in Tsemay and Bodi, as marketisation and distress selling, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 INTRODUCING THE BODI AND THE TSEMAY IN SOUTH OMO

South Omo is the most diverse administrative zone in Ethiopia. It is home to 16 ethnic groups, of which the most populous and agrarian Aari and Maale make up about half of the population. Most of the remaining 14 are agro-pastoral groups in the vast lowlands extending to Kenya and South Sudan. These agro-pastoral groups are located in six *woreda*, namely Benna-Tsemay, Dassanech, Hamer, Nyangatom, and Salamago. This study is focused on the Bodi of Salamago Woreda and the Tsemay of Benna-Tsemay Woreda.⁶

Traditionally, the Bodi economy is based on flood-retreat agriculture, rain-fed farming, and livestock rearing. The Bodi practise retreat agriculture following the flooding of the eastern banks of the Omo River, usually after mid-August. Rain-fed agriculture is practised in the mid-altitude areas where the rains are higher and more reliable. The low-lying areas are roamed by Bodi cattle.⁷ The Salamago Woreda is also inhabited by the Mursi (who also practise a combination of the three livelihood mechanisms), the Kwegu (who mainly rely on fishing, farming, and small stock) and the Dime (who live in mid-altitude areas and practise rain-fed agriculture). The balance of the Bodi and the Mursi between the three modes of production (flood-retreat agriculture, rain-fed agriculture, and mobile livestock rearing) was disrupted following the impossibility of flood-retreat agriculture due to the filling of the Gibe III Dam after 2015, and the difficulty of rain-fed agriculture after the settlement of Konso farmers there in the mid-2000s.

The Tsemay live beside a relatively smaller river, the Woito River. This river used to enable the Tsemay's retreat agriculture before the advent of commercial farming and regulation of the water. Although the Tsemay are sedentary (with young people moving with cattle during dry periods) and their subsistence is related to farming, livestock continue to play a key role in culture and 'ideological orientation'. Livestock, primarily cattle, are the primary form of accumulation of wealth (Melese 1995, 2009). Goats dominate their herd, however.⁸ The Tsemay are known as honey producers, and they also hold a key role in cultural affairs, including bridewealth payment (Melese 1995, 2007, 1995).⁹ The Tsemay have stronger neighbours (in terms of population and arms ownership): the Konso, the Borana Oromo, Arbore, Hamer, Benna, and Maale.

2.1 Government interventions in Bodi territories: Konso settlement, sugar estates, and sedenterisation


South Omo did not figure in the attention of the Ethiopian government, elites, and Ethiopia's donors in the past.¹⁰ Gibe III Dam, the largest and most consequential of the Gibe cascade of dams, put South Omo on the map. Before the commencement of the dam's construction, very few analysts and academics took an interest in the lower Omo Valley. In previous decades, the rich cultural diversity of the valley mainly attracted anthropologists. The immediate response to the Gibe III Dam's construction was discursive resistance from international NGOs and also some anthropologists. This was intensified when the sugar industrialisation plans of the Ethiopian government, intending to convert thousands of hectares of pastoral territory into plantation in the proximity of the dam, were announced in 2011 (see Meles 2011).

The sugar industrialisation plans affected, first and foremost, the Bodi, a small agro-pastoral ethnic group (less than 10,000, according to the 2007 Population and Housing Census, CSA (2008)) residing at the northern margins of the zone (see Figure 2.1). These agro-pastoral groups had not been significantly affected by state projects in the twentieth century, save for intermittent pacification, and minimal servicing and tax collection attempts. The Bodi associate the Derg with 'food aid, machete and clothing' (following the 1984 famine) and the EPRDF (before the 2000s) with 'education'.¹¹ For the Bodi, the most significant, permanent, and consequential direct state intervention happened with the 2004 resettlement of food-insecure agriculturalists of a different ethnic origin, the Konso, to the mid-altitude areas along the fuzzy boundary with their agriculturalist neighbours, the Dime (Ayke 2005). The commencement of sugar industrialisation attempts and a scheme to sedentarise all Bodi in 2011/2012 (Stevenson and Buffavand 2018) led to what Buffavand (2017: 64) called the 'completion of state building'.

By the time sugar industrialisation and sedentarisation-related activities seriously commenced, violent conflict was simmering between the Bodi and the Konso. This

conflict had its roots in the perception widely held by the Bodi that the government promised that the Konso would leave after becoming food secure, which was assumed to take five years.¹² Other reasons relate to the spontaneous influx of relatives and friends of the original resettlers and territorial expansion. While this process was playing out in the eastern bounds of the Bodi territory, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC) – a state-owned enterprise entrusted with the establishment of new sugar estates – was clearing land in the south, closer to the Omo River. This involved the rapid movement of vehicles, mainly trucks and heavy duty vehicles, on the gravel road upgraded initially for the resettlement of the Konso and rehabilitated for a second time for the plantation works. These activities also demanded the inflow of thousands of labourers from other parts of the country, some settling in the rapidly expanding *woreda* town, Hana. The Bodi also saw the sedentarisation scheme as part of a bigger government plot to restrict their mobility and take more of their land for sugar industrialisation and resettlement (various interviews; see also Buffavand 2017; Fana 2018; Tewolde and Fana 2014).

Figure 2.1 Administrative map of South Omo Zone



Source: Lind, Okenwa and Scoones (forthcoming, 2020).

Thus, for the Bodi, the early 2010s were a particular period of intense pressure on their cultural, socioeconomic, and political autonomy (for a synthesis of the latest literature on this, see Hodbod *et al.* 2019). In addition to the territorial takeover and sedentarisation, these schemes encouraged the influx of people from

other parts of Ethiopia. On top of the mutual cultural irritation this created, the Bodi became numerical minorities on their own land. Conservative estimates for job creation by the sugar plantations estimated that more than a hundred thousand people would be in Salamago, half of whom would be in Bodi territory (Tewolde and Fana 2014; years later, the created jobs and hectares cleared were much smaller; see Kamski 2016). While this provided the much-needed safety valve for (mainly) the densely populated highlands of the SNNPRS, it was seen as a (cultural) threat by the Bodi (Asnake and Fana 2014). Despite the failures of meeting the ambitious sugar production and job creation targets – for reasons as diverse as the swindling of funds by the military-run Metals and Engineering Corporation (MetEC) which took the turnkey project from the ESC, poor planning and design, and poor contract management skills (see Fana and Kamski 2020; Kamski 2016) – the ‘harm’, from the perspective of the Bodi, is already done (as will be elaborated below).

The government found it very difficult to convince the Bodi that ‘development’ (read as sugar plantations and industrialisation, and sedentarisation) is a good thing. About 24 ‘consultation’ sessions were organised, and representatives of various sections of society (youth, elders, women) were taken on trips to see how other pastoralists live side by side with plantations (as in Tsemay and also as far as Karrayu near Addis Ababa) and based on small - scale irrigation schemes (for example, in Nyangatome, South Omo) (Tewolde and Fana 2014). The government also had a second line of ‘breaking’ Bodi unwillingness and resistance. A security/pacification campaign was undertaken just before the main activities commenced.¹³ This moment was chosen to ‘hunt’ and imprison suspected criminals who had been ‘loose’ for a long time. In the eyes of the community, this was meant to frustrate them into submission.¹⁴ There has been an effective curfew in the town after 10.00pm since early 2016.¹⁵ By August 2018, more than 300 Bodi men were in prison.¹⁶ The end result was that resistance was pushed underground,¹⁷ and that a very tense and insecure environment was created, be it on the road linking Hana to Jinka, the zone’s capital or in Hana Town itself.

2.2 State intervention in Tsemay: road building and commercial farming

The experience of the second agro-pastoral community the fieldwork was conducted amongst, the Tsemay, is very different. While the Bodi are located at the north-western extreme of the zone bordering the Omo River, the Tsemay are located on the north-eastern extreme of the zone bordering a significantly smaller Woito

River (see Figure 2.1). The oldest Tsemay experience of state intervention was during the construction of a gravel road to Teltele (Borana, across Woito River) and further south to Hamer and Dassenech¹⁸ in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The Tsemay were coerced into contributing labour: in the words of an elder, ‘Haile Sellassie flogged us’ to work the roads.¹⁹ Even then, they state that ‘government only came to’ their territory during the Derg and EPRDF,²⁰ implying that the state was more present over the last four decades only.

Encroachment onto Tsemay land and resources started during the last years of the Derg and intensified in the early 1990s. A new route was designed and a gravel road linking Arba Minch–Konso–Woito–Jinka was constructed in the mid-1980s. The oldest irrigated commercial farm to be leased in the Tsemay area is the Bra’ile farm (now Omo Valley farm) in early 1990, covering some 4,000ha for 30 years (Melese 2009),²¹ while the community dependent on the land was forcibly resettled in Duma and Enchete villages. Most of the more than 2,000 people working on the commercial farm in the 1990s were brought from hundreds of kilometres to the north, from Wolaita (Jacob and Baechler 2002) and also from Konso (Melese 1995). Although there was a tense situation in the 1990s (*ibid.*),²² over claims of absence of land to graze animals and the destruction of beehives,²³ and despite the 1994 heavy-handed government response to it,²⁴ now the labour force brought from Wolaita (and Konso) and the Tsemay are, in the words of one elder,²⁵ ‘like blood and milk’. This phrase is used to show intermarriage, emerging oneness, and lower levels of conflict.

This history explains the relatively low level of resistance when the government came decades later, in 2009, and leased a total of 2,500 hectares of land to the Nassa and Sagla cotton commercial farms, and communities living on and dependent on these lands were put in

Gisma, a new village (see Asebe and Korf 2018; Asebe, Yetebarek and Korf 2018). Before the actual sedenterisation in Gisma, the government promised the delivery of a range of services (including education, health), and that the settlers would receive a plot of hand with access to irrigation water. However, when the river water stopped reaching downstream due to excessive water extraction upstream,²⁶ including by the three commercial irrigated farms in Tsemay, and also upstream to the *woreda* and zone, they did not take a violent path to attack the farms and/or labourers.²⁷

In sum, after the mid-1990s, there was no major violent resistance of state plans in the Tsemay area. In hindsight, some elders surmise that it was ‘ignorance’ which forced them into resisting and killing Woalita labourers in the mid-1990s. They stress that had it not been for the farms and roads (i.e. government interventions) they would still be living on the edges of the mountains, for fear of attacks from the Borana and Konso. Elders also stress that many people would have died had it not been for a government presence in the area.²⁸ Furthermore, in regard to the construction of the road, one elder explained that ‘the road is like the shade you build on your entrance. It is tiresome and difficult to build, but afterwards will save you from the direct sun and warmth of the house by relaxing there...’.²⁹ The general perception in Tsemay, therefore, is that the positives of state intervention (at least in the long term), whether this is farms or infrastructure projects, outweigh the negatives.

2.3 Comparing state intervention in Bodi and Tsemay

One qualitative difference is in the nature of state intervention in the two areas (see summary in Table 2.1). In the case of the Tsemay, the oldest intervention was not so much to extract resources and alienate

Table 2.1 Timeline of major state interventions in the Bodi and Tsemay territories

Nature of major state interventions			
	1960s	1970s–1990s	Since mid-2000s
Bodi	Indirect contact, through missionaries and <i>komorut</i>	Indirect and intermittent	Resettlement of Konso; changes in hydro-social processes due to Gibe III; sugar estates; sedenterisation; influx of labour force
Tsemay	Road building; ‘civilising’	Road building; commercial farming; sedenterisation; influx of labour force	Commercial farming; sedenterisation

Source: Author’s own.

land. Rather, the interest was mainly to pass through their territory to the more politically and security important Borana, Hamar, and Dassenech areas. Of course, there were direct attempts to 'civilise' the Tsema by teaching them ox-plough farming and acquainting them with clothes.³⁰ Attempts by Highlanders³¹ to introduce the Tsema to trade/barter are as old as these attempts.

In the case of the Bodi, however, in the old times, the state was not there directly to influence their life. The 'civilising' mission was passed to a church mission and tax collection powers were entrusted to the *komorut* – 'a hereditary office whose role is to ensure the well-being and prosperity of the land' – in the late 1890s (Buffavand 2017: 21). The intention of successive governments was to only halt the sometimes-aggressive attacks of the Bodi on their neighbours, mainly the Mursi. The exchange of cattle mainly happened with the Mee'enit – a group which essentially is the same as the Bodi, only different in name, but residing across the Omo River in Bench-Maji Zone – to get female cattle and to buy guns/bullets.³² Moreover, until the mid-2000s, the Bodi's geographical location made them unattractive for significant infrastructure and social service delivery. They are found bordering the Omo on their west and south, and the Dime, Basketo, and Aari highlands. For a long time, their wedged position, combined with the little resource interests, meant that the state was disinterested to 'reach', service, 'civilise', and control the Bodi.

As will be shown in the remainder of this paper, this difference in state and market experience is inscribed deeply in the livestock trade characteristics of the two communities. While for the Tsema, engagement of/with the state and the market is an incremental experience covering decades, for the Bodi, their introduction to the powers and capabilities of the state and the market is abrupt. The disorientation and difficulty/unwillingness of the Bodi to adapt has accorded them a name for being 'unchangeable', in the eyes of government officials.³³

3 MARKET ACTORS AND LIVESTOCK TRADE DYNAMICS IN TSEMAY AND BODI

3.1 Livestock trade in South Omo Zone: emerging trends

Until very recently, South Omo Zone was viewed as being isolated from livestock markets in other parts of Ethiopia. As is common reference to other pastoralist communities too, the local government criticises the agro-pastoral groups for keeping livestock away from the market, and rearing them for 'aesthetic' reasons. Moreover, it is added that a combination of insecurity and absence of proper infrastructure conspired against the potential of the area.³⁴ Although there are reports of an emerging increase in the number of livestock put for market since 2008, the picture differs across different *woreda*. Agro-pastoral groups in Benna-Tsemay are taken as leading in this for goats, followed by the Hamer, while the Dassanech take the lead for putting cattle for the market. The stated reason for this is the relative peace in these areas and the preferred meat quality of animals from these areas.³⁵

It should be added here that these are also the communities who have been 'exposed' to longer and more continuous state and market contact across decades. Recent state investment in infrastructure, roads, and market centres helped improve the accessibility of local markets: by reducing security

risks (buying from further away/inaccessible bush markets) and contributing to price increments.³⁶ Generally, prices are taken as better for Benna-Tsemay and Hamer *woreda*, and worst for Salamago. Data to support these ideas are, however, hard to come by. The Benna-Tsemay and Salamago *woreda* governments do not have well-recorded data to draw and share, while the data at the zonal government is available only for the past three fiscal years: 2015/16 (July 2015–June 2016),³⁷ 2016/17 (July 2016 to June 2017), and 2017/18 (July 2017 to June 2018). Moreover, the data available at the zonal government only shows the number of animals sold to the 'central market',³⁸ for which the nearest municipality has to use a special voucher to collect Turnover Tax (TOT) and channel the same to the *woreda* government it belongs to.

As indicated in Table 3.2, the biggest proportion of animal sales to outside the zone happens from the Benna-Tsemay, Dassanech, and Hamer *woredas*. While the Dassanech have more potential in cattle, the Benna-Tsemay and Hamer specialise more in goats. According to informants, it is only the Hamer *Woreda* which sells a significant number of sheep (which could be justified by the much higher number of sheep ownership; see Table 3.2). To the contrary, Salamago sells the least number of animals, considering its high

Table 3.1 Number of livestock sold from South Omo to central market (2015/16–2017/18 FY)

Fiscal year (FY)		Woreda						
		Benna-Tsemay	Dassanech	Hamer	Nyangatom	Maale	Salamago	TOTAL
2015/16	Cattle (No.)	10,563	5,946	7,337	3,150	5,970	3,450	36,416
	Sheep and goats (No.)	21,446	9,254	24,745	7,124	1,950	3110	67,629
2016/17	Cattle (No.)	4,903	3,533	152	760	360	112	9,820
	Sheep and goats (No.)	52,240	8,478	16,157	1,939	3,509	0	82,323
2017/18	Cattle (No.)	9016	5,136	469	998	361	0	15,980
	Sheep and goats (No.)	40,685	11,395	24,230	3,535	9,136	0	88,981

Note: The figure for 2015/16 is only for eight months (July 2015 to February 2016). Source: unpublished data, South Omo Zone Trade and Industry Bureau (July 2018), adapted by the author.

Table 3.2 Livestock population by type³⁹

Woreda	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Poultry	Horses	Mules	Donkeys	Camels
Benna-Tsemay	564,042	202,791	571,049	177,808	0	60	30,930	254
Dassenech	676,126	358,060	542,392	50,353	0		25,626	1,407
Hamer	717,362	525,833	1,172,037	59,004	0		15,856	1,349
Nyangatom	685,506	186,627	233,571	13,807	0		16,664	
Maale	370,972	120,730	583,207	397,494	48	4,487	26,702	
Salamago	308,355	16,821	56,286	113,396	0		600	
Total	3,322,363	1,410,862	3,158,542	811,862	48	4,547	116,378	3,010

Source: Unpublished data, South Omo Zone Livestock and Fishery Development (May 2019), adapted by the author.

potential.⁴⁰ The thousands sold in the 2015/16 fiscal year, in Salamago as well as in the other *woreda*, indicate more the ‘rush’ of pastoralists to sell at the peak of that year’s severe drought. Many informants in Tsemay had the same thing to say on the drought’s impact on wealth: it ‘equalised everyone’, by turning the rich poor.

In Salamago, the very high 2015/16 sales to central markets (3,450 cattle) were mainly from Gero market, closer to Basketo and Gamo Goffa, not from the Hana area (where the study focused), and it is possible to see that only 112 cattle were sold in the following fiscal year (FY), and none in 2017/18. This tells us that the Bodi and Mursi (the agro-pastoralists of the *woreda*) were not yet selling much as significant demand was created only after the commencement of the sugar works and infrastructure linking them to central markets was absent.⁴¹

3.2 Market actors and dynamics in Tsemay

Saturday is a special day for Woito Town. The town has more life. All the restaurants and bars – the bigger ones selling beer and soft drinks as well as the smaller makeshift ones made for the day to sell a traditional (and cheaper) alcoholic drink called *borde* – will overflow with customers. Livestock owners explain that they make most of their weekly revenue on Saturdays. A lot of Tsemay from the surrounding areas come to sell mainly goats, and in return, buy smaller/female animals, manufactured goods (such as clothes), and also entertain themselves with food and drink. Similarly, traders come from near and far to buy animals, with 10,000 Birr bundles (a 100 Birr-note bundles) stacked in small bags, and wait for sellers while hanging

their weighing scales (for goats) in the market centre. The town will also be graced by traffic policemen on Saturdays, as the number of motor bikes and minibuses on the town’s only asphalted road increases. Only on Saturdays do minibuses and ISUZU pick-up trucks travel to deeper parts of Tsemay, to bring in traders.

Highlander traders with long experience in the Tsemay area reminisce about the good old days from decades back. They state that the Tsemay used to beg them to buy, mainly to exchange with heifers that the traders used to bring from the Gamo-Goffa highlands, which are in high demand in the Tsemay areas. These Highlander traders admit that they used to trick and make exorbitant profits over the Tsemay.⁴² The traders, for example, used to exchange a goat for a two-metre *abujedi* (a thin, cheap cotton fabric used to make clothes) and an ox for a *buluko* (heavy wraps made from cotton, holding a special place in the highland culture), in the mid-1970s. They used to bring animals from Borana (and also those bought from the Tsemay themselves) to have them fed and recuperated in the Tsemay rangelands. A Tsemay *jaala* (bond friend) will do that for them, mainly based on trust and the occasional payment of a small sum of money. This period definitely worked to the benefit of the Highlander traders, although trade volume was miniscule compared to now.

To their dismay and loss, this position the Highlander traders used to enjoy is no more. Now, they are equals to many other Tsemay traders. The young men who about a decade ago used to source goats from deeper parts of the Tsemay (and Arbore and Hamer) territories and buy for them are now independent traders.⁴³ These Tsemay men are even competing with and

taking over the position of the Highlander traders. One man has even managed to break the chain and has managed to establish a direct link with an exporter in Modjo in 2015.⁴⁴ He supplies at least one truck-load of goats (180 in number, total worth of 150,000 Birr, about US\$5,175) per week. Other traders in Hamer also use his connection, meaning they will send through his name and licence to Modjo. This trader adopted the same system Highlander traders used in the past, and they now have six agents. These agents are also starting to assert some independence, as they are now buying with their own money (not the money of their boss) and their bargaining power with him is increasing too. In addition to buying throughout the Tsemay territory (thanks to the added advantage of owning motorbikes), they also buy from Arbore and Hamer villages and markets (on Mondays, weekly markets).⁴⁵

The volume of animals brought to the market and prices started showing impressive gains after 2008. One of the traders, with more than 20 years of livestock trade experience, asserted that it was him who sold the very first batch of animals from Tsemay to Arba Minch, a major city in SNNPRS, in 2008. At the time, he remembers, prices were about 2,000 Birr for cattle and less than 200 Birr for goats, but now range from between 15,000 and 20,000 Birr (US\$517.50 to US\$690) for an ox and at least 2,000 Birr (about US\$69) for a goat.⁴⁶ On average, prices have seen a more than tenfold increase over the past decade. This is also more or less reflected in the national-level inflation of prices after the Ethiopian millennium (in September 2008).

As expected, the municipality is represented by tax men at the gates of the market. They collect 15 Birr and 10 Birr (US\$0.518 and US\$0.345) per head for every cattle and goat/sheep sold, respectively. If the livestock are being sold to the 'central market', the buyer will pay Turnover Tax (TOT), amounting to 2 per cent of the price, which gets passed to the *woreda* government. These tax collectors estimate that on a typical market day, three receipt books, each with 150 leaves, will be finished for the sale of about 400 goats and 150 cattle. The supply of goats to the market is more regular throughout the year, while the number of cattle sold reduces in drier parts of the year. The annual revenue the town's municipality collects from the market amounts to more than a quarter of a million Birr, making it a major source of revenue.⁴⁷

What is more interesting is the presence of local development agents (DAs)⁴⁸ and their views on their assignment on Saturdays. Saturday, officially, is not a working day, but for the local DAs it is 'the most

important of all working days'.⁴⁹ This is not because they do demonstrations or instructions about new agricultural technologies to the Tsemay; rather, the task on Saturdays is collecting the money the Tsemay owe after they sell an animal/animals (see also Asebe, Yetebarek and Korf 2018). In this effort, all the available DAs will be present, and if needed will also be assisted by health extension agents. While the Tsemay pay on the spot for veterinary services and improved seeds are given for free, they have to pay for fertilisers: this amounts to 939 Birr (US\$32.34) for sesame and 1,240 Birr (US\$42.78) for maize for a half hectare of land based on 2013/14 fiscal-year prices. At the time of fieldwork, the DAs were actively collecting arrears they could not collect in 2016 and 2017 due to the drought and livestock loss at that time.⁵⁰

The Tsemay are also made to pay the land fee, a fixed amount of 35 Birr per year,⁵¹ and *yederejet* (the SEPDM membership annual fee)⁵² fee of 24 Birr.⁵³ The task of collecting the land fee and *yederejet* fee is also the responsibility of DAs, and agro-pastoralists pay these two fees at the same time. In Enchete, the DAs have also succeeded in convincing most of the 386 households to become members of the new national-level social security scheme paying an annual fee of 205 Birr.⁵⁴ Thus, the crucial task for the DAs on Saturdays is chasing the individuals they convinced to repay loans, land, and *yederejet* fees in their villages on earlier weekdays. If it is not a peak agricultural season, then this will be their week's highest priority. On a single market day, they will collect a total of as much as 15,000 Birr (US\$517.5), but the lowest being 3,000 Birr (US\$103.5).⁵⁵

Although no detailed information on the extent of sales in bush markets to avoid such exactions was garnered, many insisted that tax officials and the police cooperate in clamping down on such tendencies by confiscating animals. This reportedly led to the lower importance of bush markets (and if they happen, it is highly likely that these will be on other days and to Tsemay buyers/traders in nearby villages). Moreover, the fact that the DA will only convince the individual on a weekday before collecting on the market day reduces the chances of intentions to sell outside the market centres just to avoid repaying.

3.3 Market actors and dynamics in Bodi

The market day in Hana is also Saturday, but the peculiar feature of it is the haste and the tense atmosphere. While the police and tax collectors in Woito try to stay near the market as late as 6.30pm to get the last

'drops' the town municipality could get from the trade, in Hana, the market will close before 2.00pm.⁵⁶ The buyers want to buy as many cattle as they can, and go to their respective business areas as early as possible. Moreover, town residents aim to finish all chores and be locked in their respective compounds for the afternoon. The *woreda* police will be on the streets with long sticks: not to facilitate traffic and mobility, but to keep the Bodi out of the bounds of the town. The commonly held view is that the Bodi sell animals, start drinking, and in the afternoon turn violent. They quarrel with each other, and any Highlander coming within their reach is seen as inviting violence onto himself. The bars and restaurants will also be cautiously serving the Bodi on Saturday afternoons, while it will be a bonanza for the specific bars (also owned by Highlanders) which sell *tej* (a local wine, made of honey) and *Areke* (a local hard liquor) to the Bodi.

The market experience of the Bodi is very different. There is no comparable historical experience of Highlander traders buying animals from them, and bringing in manufactured goods from outside. One reason is the absence of a good enough road to facilitate sizeable traffic before the mid-2000s. A second hindering factor is the perception that Salamago is conflict-prone and insecure. This risk made livestock trade unattractive: one Highlander trader equated engaging in livestock trade in Salamago to 'selling one's life'.⁵⁷ Thus, the Bodi were minimally exposed to the outside world, compared to the Tsemay and other agro-pastoralist communities of the zone. This has led to according the Bodi different names. They are taken as 'unchangeable'⁵⁸ and as 'stagnant',⁵⁹ especially compared to the Tsemay 'who have improved themselves so much and are now mainly living on agriculture'.⁶⁰ The Bodi are criticised for keeping animals for 'pride only'.⁶¹

The Dime are more active in the local civil service as well as in trade, than the Bodi in Salamago Woreda's town, Hana. As such, the Dime, compared to the Bodi, are judged to be 'more educated' and 'more civilised' (in Amharic, *neka yalu nachew*).⁶² Moreover, in comparison to the Bodi, the Konso are viewed as 'not troubling' and as 'hard-working'.⁶³ This should be understood within the context of the geographic position and state experience of the Bodi (see Section 3.2).

In Salamago, livestock trade, in the view of Head of the Woreda's Trade Bureau,⁶⁴ showed a qualitative change after the sugar activities commenced in 2011. In this period, the PCDP (Pastoralist Community Development Programme) financed the construction of a market centre at the edge of the town, which experts and officials⁶⁵ argue helped the Bodi fetch

better prices for their animals. However, what is more important is the creation of a huge demand at the doorstep of the Bodi due to the influx of labourers, most of whom are bachelors and inclined to eat out in local restaurants. The list of companies working in the area is long (see Kamski 2016), but the major ones with a Mensa⁶⁶ include the ESC itself, the Chinese company engaged in road and factory (Omo III) construction, Akir (a domestic construction company), the Southern region's Water Works Enterprise, and the federal and regional police protecting these workers and facilities. As such, the main buyers at Hana market are those running the respective Mensas and restaurants in Hana Town, which works to the advantage of the few buyers over price negotiations.⁶⁷ The demand is sometimes higher than what the Bodi could supply, thus enticing importing of cattle from the Benna-Tsemay markets.⁶⁸

Other than the few Dime restaurant owners, the Bodi (and Mursi) of Salamago Woreda are represented as sellers only. Most Bodi agro-pastoralists also use the services of young Bodi men studying in Hana (residing at the hostel) or those living in town, to work as their agents and negotiate better prices. The asset here is knowing better Amharic, and in return these young men get a 50–100 Birr (US\$1.725 to US\$3.45) commission.⁶⁹ The Dime have an advantage here too, as they know the Bodi language well.

The municipality is represented by a tax collector, but the volume of trade and amount of taxes collected is much smaller than in Woito. The taxes are 5 Birr (US\$0.1725) for a small goat, 10 Birr (US\$0.345) for a big goat, 15 Birr (US\$0.5175) for a calf, and 20 Birr (US\$0.69) for an ox. The taxes are comparable to Woito, although prices are comparably lower (for example 5,000–8,000 Birr (US\$172.5 to US\$276) for an ox). The tax collectors will finish, on a very good day, one receipt book and collect revenue of between 1,500–2,000 Birr (US\$51.75 to US\$69).⁷⁰ Furthermore, there are no DAs roaming in the market for the repayment of loans, as the Bodi in the Hana area do not in the first place as of yet use agricultural inputs. However, the Bodi pay for land and *yederejet* fees (at the same rate as the Tsemay), which is done by the strong engagement of the local leadership (of the same ethnicity, not the DAs who are from the highlands).

Bush markets are more common in Bodi (than Tsemay). The *woreda* government anyways cannot enforce livestock-marketing regulations for security reasons (mainly). The very recent establishment of the market centre and its closing of the market in the early afternoon opens up the possibility for selling outside the scope of the market centre. It is also common to

hear references of the Bodi selling animals on their way to the market, or by taking them to the Mensas, than coming to the town.

4 SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADE

This part of the working paper focuses on the main reasons agro-pastoralists sell animals and the implications of this market engagement on community wealth dynamics in the two communities studied, the Tsemay and the Bodi.

4.1 Terms of market integration

Although not true, pastoralists everywhere in the region are blamed for being subsistence-orientated and for being market averse (Schareika 2018). While the sale of livestock is becoming part of the production system itself in Tsemay areas, the Bodi are viewed as still 'unwilling to modernise' and take part 'in the market'.⁷¹ When they do sell animals, government officials and Hana Town residents strongly argue that the Bodi use the money for drinking alcohol to only cause trouble later. Government actors further stress that the establishment of a market centre is helping the Bodi fetch better prices, combined with the increased demand to feed the labour force residing there. Despite this, there is also recognition that the number of buyers is very few (see Section 3.3), contributing to making the trade more beneficial to the buyers than the Bodi agro-pastoralist sellers. The view among government officials and experts is that the Bodi should be thankful for the coming of the sugar development and related government attention, which created the effective demand for their cattle.

To the Bodi, however, it is the concerted pressure coming from different angles which coerced them in to selling. When asked to prioritise the most important reasons for selling, 'hunger' always came first. Although government officials stress that 'even in 2016 [when there was a critical drought and shortage of fodder in other pastoral *woreda* of the zone] there was sufficient moisture and water in Salamago',⁷² the Bodi faced critical food insecurity. This is due to the combined pressure of inability to practise flood-retreat agriculture, including in the previous year, due to the filling of the Gibe III Dam upstream and due to fear to farm closer to the Konso (mid-altitude areas where rain-fed agriculture is possible). Households from which the husband has been imprisoned face additional pressure from lack of labour for land clearing too. Highlander traders are also blamed for worsening the situation by pushing

maize prices up and for selling low-quality maize (and sometimes with soil at the base of the sack).⁷³ As such, in all interviews and FGDs with Bodi informants, meeting this crucial demand became the first priority/ an absolute necessity. This sad state of food insecurity continued at the time of fieldwork in 2018, and is unlikely to change without betterment of the security situation (to allow rain-fed agriculture in mid-altitude areas) and the meeting of promises to deliver irrigation water to Bodi farms.

The second priority, at the time of fieldwork, was disease. The prevalence of animal diseases increased in the *woreda*, which the Bodi attribute to reduced range access inhibiting their old practice of quarantine. However, as the civil servants in the *woreda* feel insecure to go to any extent beyond the confines of the town,⁷⁴ veterinary or other services are inaccessible outside the bounds of Hana Town. This led to the question of 'we pay our taxes, we pay *yederejet* fees. Why are we not provided with veterinary care?' from one FGD participant.⁷⁵ As such, this meant that when there is the slightest sign of disease, the Bodi tend to immediately sell the animal, before it gets weak or dies. Moreover, some attempted to sell one animal and buy private veterinary services.⁷⁶

A third reason at the time of fieldwork (but which was second before 2016) is related to the imprisonment of many men from their community. In addition to its negative implications on production labour dynamics, these men need some money in the prison and need to be visited. This is a new additional burden on the Bodi's production system. The prisoner's wife (or wives) and relatives sell animals to meet this need. This becomes even more pressing when viewed in combination with the Bodi 'reproductive culture', which requires women to abstain from sex after giving birth until the child is roughly between a year and half and two years. As such, there is a birth cycle of about two and half to three years for every wife, which every woman should strictly follow. For the men, children are a sign of wealth (especially girls), and having many children per wife is a way of getting back the 38 cattle he paid as bridewealth. The Bodi (especially women whose husbands are in prison) are under immense pressure due to the discontinuation

of this cycle. A solution came at a huge bill, travelling to Jinka (the zonal capital, where the prisoners are held) and bribing police officers (to 'smuggle' the prisoner out, under the pretext of medical treatment). This mode of 'conjugal visit' was discontinued in 2016, when Aari prisoners wanted the same, but could not afford it, and thus complained of biases. Some animals were sold to meet these needs for every imprisoned man. A rough average from estimates on how many close relatives sold per prisoner gives about 1.5 to 2 cattle sold per year of imprisonment.⁷⁷

Drinking is the fourth (and last) reason in the eyes of the Bodi. Officials repeatedly stated that the Bodi simply sell animals and spend the money on buying drinks for the whole village for three/four days. Many Hana residents also raise that selling *tej* and *areke* is the most lucrative business in town.⁷⁸ However, to the Bodi, selling an animal just for the sake of drinking is a luxury very few rich people afford. Rather, whatever is left from the above priorities will be spent on drinks. As one woman stressed, the Bodi 'do not simply sell animals to drink'.⁷⁹ It should also be added that one of the major attractions of the urban sector in rural Africa is getting such services, restaurants, and bars. And it is not uncommon for peak trade seasons/days to match with high alcohol consumption.

The experience of the Tsemay cannot be far from this. The local economy is now increasingly being monetised.⁸⁰ This is interpreted by government and traders as the Tsemay being 'modern' and showing readiness to uptake 'modernisation'. Some Highlander traders add that the Tsemay 'know the value of money', making them 'better' than the other pastoral groups in the zone. Buying food was the most important priority in 2016, as in any drought year. A major expression of Tsemay's 'modernity' and proof of their 'knowing the value of money' is the relatively 'high consumption' of basic commodities, mainly clothes and shoes.⁸¹ Now, women wear traditional clothes made of animal skins only on special days (except the very poor).⁸² Paying government loans (agricultural inputs), *yederejet* fees, and the like is another reason to sell animals.

Other interesting targets with the money include getting a mobile phone/buying air-time, and having iron roofing on one's house. Having corrugated iron roofing has been a sign of wealth and status in rural highland Ethiopia for a long time, and it appears that the same is being replicated in Tsemay now. The number of animals sold to finance a non-livestock-based service economy, specifically transportation using motor bikes, is also on the increase. This phenomenon is seen everywhere in Benna-Tsemay Woreda, most importantly in Alduba,

Kako, Key Afer, and Woito, the biggest trade centres of the *woreda*. The motor bikes cost about 50,000 Birr (about US\$1,725) at the time of fieldwork, and fathers exchange three to four cattle for a motor bike with no expectations for repayment. The son is only expected to reciprocate by giving free services to his father, family, and relatives (especially those needing medical attention). The young men use the bike to provide transportation services. Most of these men are *lqub* (informal credit association) members, contributing between 300 and 1,000 Birr (between US\$10.35 and US\$34.5) per week. When their turn comes, they will re-invest in livestock (extra earnings above the weekly *lqub* fees as well) or in buying a grinding mill (which is very expensive, about a 100,000 Birr, about US\$3,450).⁸³

Perhaps the clearest indicator of the monetisation of the Tsemay economy is the inclusion of money in bridewealth negotiations over the last decade or so. The culture requires the man to send elders some three months after 'abducting'/'taking' the woman to get the blessing of the father and to negotiate on how many cattle, of which species, sex, and age to be given. Negotiations happen while everyone is sitting on an animal skin. Now money is inserted as a condition before the elders are allowed to sit on the animal skin. The term used to describe this fee also refers to 'sitting on the skin',⁸⁴ which serves as a metonym for the whole process. The money demanded is negotiated, with elders insisting that an in-law is like a Moringa tree which one should not cut, but continuously harvest. The money will not be put to productive use; rather, those representing the woman's side will use it (mainly for drinking).⁸⁵

4.2 Wealth categories and dynamics⁸⁶

The differing terms of market integration of the two communities imply differing implications of livestock trade on wealth categories in Tsemay and Bodi. These dynamics are greatly impacted by the herd composition in the particular areas: goats dominate in Tsemay and cattle dominate in Bodi (as shown in Table 3.2). This obviously has implications for the price of animals and the frequency of sale. Cattle fetch higher prices, which, given the absence of a saving culture and financial institutions, means that large sums of money will have to be spent in the days immediately following (which partly explains the 'drinking problem' in Bodi). The shorter gestation period, and higher number of births per gestation of goats also means that starting off with the same base number of animals, it is possible to have more goats than cattle. Thus, taking out a few every year for sale will have lower implications on a herd dominated by goats than a herd dominated by cattle.

Thus, goats will be closer to the ‘bank-on-the-hoof’ description, where one can draw smaller sums when needed, than cattle.

The indicators of wealth in Bodi are number of cattle (which can be approximated by the *Ke’el* ceremony celebrated at full moon in June),⁸⁷ number of wives and children, and the extent to which one can engage in revenge killings (and then settle them by paying compensation fees of 38 cattle, one goat and a girl).⁸⁸ The centre of wealth as such is cattle ownership, which is crucial for the number of wives, ‘reproductive success’, and payment of various social dues. In the past, raiding neighbouring groups was an option to having enough cattle for bridewealth payments; now, however, with the presence of the police and the state apparatus, this possibility is declining and the youth are complaining that ‘they cannot marry’.⁸⁹ However, compared to the 1970s and 1980s, when the Bodi lost many cattle to the severe drought of the time, the Bodi now are better endowed with livestock.⁹⁰

Discussions regarding wealth groups (WGs) in Bodi show that the very wealthy will have ‘countless’ cattle (about 100), split between different *jalaria* (bond friends), and five to seven wives at a younger age. At the other extreme, there are the very few destitute households. The destitute only manage to survive by eating at neighbours’/friends’ places and can borrow an animal to use the milk, but will not be able to marry. These are deemed to be just lazy, as not wanting to herd cattle (or farm).⁹¹ A poor person will have at least one, and at most, two wives and a few cattle. The medium-ranked households will have more wives and animals. As summarised in Table 4.1, the proportion of the destitute is negligible. This is also supported by the *woreda* officials, who argue that there are very few

destitute individuals. The destitute have no cattle, and sell none. The poor make up about 18 per cent of the households, and own about 12 per cent of cattle in the community. The wealthy and medium-ranked together make up some 80 per cent (55.33 and 24.67 per cent) of households, and close to 90 per cent of the herd and of the cattle sold by them.

There are few indications of the Bodi taking advantage of the emerging market and trade boom over the past decade. Some Dime take advantage of their knowledge of the Bodi language to negotiate better prices. The Dime are deemed to be ‘better educated’ and ‘more modern’,⁹² while the Bodi see education and working for government as becoming a ‘slave to government’, indicating unwillingness to lose one’s autonomy and subservience.⁹³ The few Bodi working for the sugar development and roads (almost exclusively as security guards) spend their earnings on food and other immediate necessities, as well as on stocking their herd.⁹⁴ This emerging trend of increasing cattle trade has not yet significantly affected wealth distribution and (in) equality patterns in Bodi. When the poor sell, they buy a calf and start working towards restocking immediately. And there are only a few cases of Bodi men selling their entire herd into destitution.⁹⁵ However, the coercive integration of the Bodi in the livestock trade is leading to their impoverishment. The Bodi are not choosing to sell cattle for economic reasons. Rather, the conflict-related food insecurity, high incidence of veterinary diseases, and imprisonments (as indicated above in Section 4.1) are leading to increasing levels of selling.

The proportion of sales does not vary across wealth groups, as the Bodi are mainly selling to meet pressing needs. Without a recourse to mitigate the insecurity-related pressures to sell, there appears to be a

Table 4.1 Wealth groups (WGs) and livestock trade dynamics per WG in Bodi

	Household distribution across WGs (percentages)				Cattle distribution across WGs (percentages)				Proportion of cattle sold per market day per WG (percentages)			
	W	M	P	D	W	M	P	D	W	M	P	D
FGD with elders	58	24	17	1	54	28	18	0	54	28	18	0
FGD with youth, men	56	25	17	2	62	30	8	0	60	30	10	0
FGD with women	52	25	20	3	60	30	10	0	57	32	11	0
Average	55.33	24.67	18	2	58.67	29.33	12	0	57	30	13	0

Note: W = wealthy; M = medium; P = poor; D = destitute. As the Bodi herd composition, as well as the animals sold on the Hana market, are dominated by cattle, the questions centred on cattle ownership and distribution per WG and proportion of cattle sold per WG on an average market day. Source: FGDs with elders, young men, and women in Salamago.

Table 4.2 Wealth groups (WGs) and livestock trade dynamics per WG in Tsemay

	Household distribution across WGs				Distribution of goats across WGs				Proportion of goats sold per market day per WG			
	W	M	P	D	W	M	P	D	W	M	P	D
FGD with elders	30	36	22	12	25	53	17	5	50	38	9	3
FGD with youth traders	23	42	25	10	23	53	20	4	43	45	10	2
FGD with youth, men	37	32	17	14	29	50	15	6	48	41	8	3
FGD with women	27	35	25	13	25	52	17	6	45	40	12	3
Average	29.25	36.25	22.25	12.25	25.5	52	17.25	5.25	46.5	41	9.75	2.75

Note: W = wealthy; M = medium; P = poor; D = destitute. As the Tsemay herd composition, as well as the animals sold on the Woito market, are dominated by goats, the questions centred on goat ownership and distribution across WG and proportion of goats sold per WG on an average market day. Source: FGDs with elders, young traders, young men, and women in Tsemay.

collective impoverishment. More and more cattle are sold out of the herd of individuals coming from different WGs in a manner proportional to the distribution of the herd across WGs. One key informant explained this trend by stating: 'I am worried, the local economy is deteriorating'.⁹⁶ This loss and collective impoverishment of the Bodi is being further cemented through their exclusion in the development of Hana Town. The town now has a Municipality Office, and as such, urban land is put on a lease system. This benefits those with capital, and excludes the poor, the Bodi. Such exclusion through market forces (see Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011) is being challenged through discourses of autochthony.⁹⁷

The reverse dynamics are at play in Tsemay. While livestock still continue to play a key role in local wealth group categorisation, the ability to convert livestock into other material productive possessions is seeping into local wealth group categorisation attempts. The wealthiest group, for example, will have two sets of herds, one for 'breeding and herding' (like other Tsemay agro-pastoralists, not for sale unless forced into it) and another for market, and material possessions bought after selling animals such as a grain-mill house, a motor bike, a house with corrugated iron roofing, and a donkey-pulled cart. Such households will have more cattle in their herd, although goats will dominate. Households in the medium wealth group only have livestock as productive property, mainly goats and sheep with a maximum of eight to twelve cattle. Such households could more easily go down the wealth ladder, due to drought/disease caused by de-stocking. The poor will have fewer livestock, mainly goats (about 15 to 20 goats), and three to five cattle. The destitute

have 'nothing',⁹⁸ 'beg for Moringa leaves [food]',⁹⁹ prepare and sell *borde* (the local alcoholic drink), or engage in labour works at the farms.¹⁰⁰

Unlike the case of the Bodi,¹⁰¹ the proportion of the destitute is very high in Tsemay (12.25 per cent, compared to only 2 per cent in Bodi), and the proportion of the households in the wealthiest quadrant is much smaller (29.25 per cent, compared to 55.3 per cent). Similarly, the percentage of households in the upper two quadrants is much smaller in Tsemay (65.5 per cent), compared to about 80 per cent in Bodi. While the destitute own some 5.25 per cent of the herd in Tsemay, the proportion owned by the upper two quadrants is much higher in Bodi than in Tsemay (88 per cent and 77.5 per cent, respectively). This might be a bit misleading, as the other non-livestock productive property of Tsemay's wealthiest group are not considered in the classification (see Table 4.2). If these are accounted for, Tsemay's wealthiest group will have more wealth and more certainty of sustaining that status, compared to its Bodi counterpart.

When it comes to the proportion of goats put for sale, a similar proportion is sold by the highest two wealth groups, about 87 per cent. The wealthiest sell 57 per cent in Bodi, but a significantly lower amount is put for the market in Tsemay by the same group, i.e. 46.5 per cent. The second wealthiest category sold 30 per cent in Bodi, compared to 41 per cent in Tsemay. Tsemay's wealthiest sell almost exclusively from their 'market herd', and their herd for the pastoral production system is not significantly affected. The higher proportion of sales from the second wealthiest group in Tsemay,

however, continuously eats into the sustainability of their survival as agro-pastoralists. Thus, the already high inequality appears to be on the increase in Tsemay. This is occurring despite repeated assertions that the 2016 drought 'equalised' the community by impoverishing the rich.¹⁰² In Bodi, the proportion of cattle sold per group more or less matches the proportion of animals owned per wealth group. As such, in Bodi, the extent of inequality does not appear to be on the increase; rather, everyone appears to be becoming poorer. This might be an indication of the fact that the cattle sales are not happening for market-related reasons, but for other extra-economic pressures all households have to respond to in comparable levels.

Agricultural land is more or less equally distributed in Tsemay, mainly because of past government sedentarisation schemes. However, members of the wealthiest group have taken the upper hand in a 2018 lease auction for urban land in Woito Town. Investment in real estate is only a recent investment of this group of wealthy young men. They have been investing the proceeds from the bustling livestock trade over the past decade in grinding-mill houses, changing housing structures to housing designs/structures more common in the highlands (consuming more wood, and using corrugated iron sheets), and donkey-propelled carts.

4.3 Socioeconomic implications of emergent livestock trade dynamics

Despite the differences in extent and terms of integration into the livestock trade, there is a lot of socioeconomic similarity between the Bodi and Tsemay communities. One such similarity is the extent of sharing, and circulation of livestock through culturally sanctioned processes. The sense in both communities is that poor/destitute people are in that position because of their own lack of initiative or vigour. A destitute household could sell *borde*, maize, or labour and start going up the wealth ladder. The agro-pastoral moral economy means that the poor and destitute will always be supported with something to eat by the community. This is the dominant view in both communities, and traders and civil servants from other *woreda* admire this egalitarianism and support schemes.

Another similarity is in labour contribution to farming. In both cases, men do the crucial land clearing and protecting crops from birds and wild animals, and women do the planting, weeding, harvesting, and other agronomic tasks. This labour distribution does not differ across wealth groups: even the wealthiest man in Tsemay (i.e. the one who sells directly to exporters in Modjo) does not shy from this laborious task. Neither is

there, at least until now, an intention to fully rely on the market for food, irrespective of wealth status.¹⁰³

A third similarity is the extent to which women are excluded from the potential benefits of the livestock trade. In both cultures, the decision to sell animals is the exclusive domain of men, the husband, or an old enough son.¹⁰⁴ After selling an animal, women will only get enough money to obtain the necessities required at the time: food, clothing, and the like. As such, women are described as 'not having enough money'.¹⁰⁵ Women have full ownership over the proceeds of cheaper and less prized commodities, such as chicken, eggs, *borde*, and Moringa in Tsemay, and milk in Bodi.¹⁰⁶ These are not taken as a sign of wealth; rather, the money is used for small expenses, such as buying salt and *shuffero* (coffee leaves). These are '*kedada meshefegna*' (to cover very basic necessities) market engagements.¹⁰⁷ As such, to women, household wealth makes little difference to their daily lives: 'the wife of a wealthy man will not worry about what to eat, that is the only difference'.¹⁰⁸ In the early 1990s, Melese (1995: 75) noted a similar uniformity for the Tsemay, as he reported that 'It is quite difficult to see the difference in status between a wife of a rich household and a wife whose husband has virtually no livestock.'

Furthermore, there is little difference in the material cultures of the respective households (ignoring roofing, motor bike and cart ownership in Tsemay, and ownership of mobile phones in both). Irrespective of the ease of slaughtering an animal (thus, the likelihood of eating meat) and ease of eating/drinking in Woito/Hana towns by wealthier households, the commonly consumed food does not differ across the different wealth groups. Additional furniture or utensils are yet to be introduced to the households.¹⁰⁹ The youth in Gisma take this as the 'pastoral culture holding them back', despite the money they have.¹¹⁰

The role of women is improving in Tsemay, as the physical burden they have to bear is showing some decline, although coming at an expense and thus for the rich only.¹¹¹ The first to 'arrive' was a donkey-pulled cart in 2010/11,¹¹² costing about 3,000 Birr at the time, but in July/August 2018 costing between 5,000 and 6,000 Birr (about US\$175 to US\$210). Such carts are used by women to fetch water and also to carry grain to and from the grinding-mill houses.¹¹³ In the early 1990s, according to Melese (1995: 93), use of animals of burden to transport harvest was there, but was not a widespread practice. The grinding-mill houses, owned by the wealthiest group in Tsemay, are also saving the physical labour of women at close to a Birr per kilogramme of grain processed. The first was opened

in 2012 in Duma, while in Bodi, it was the government which first introduced such mills, at more or less the same time, as part of the sedentarisation scheme. Now these mills, which were running at cheaper fees, are not functional, and Bodi women have to carry the grain to mill houses owned and operated by Highlanders in Hana Town, close to 15km to sedentarisation sites.¹¹⁴

Although the importance of money is increasing in both study sites, it is becoming more important in Tsemay. Retail shops and bars are opened in deeper parts of Tsemay territory to mainly sell some essentials such as fuel for motor bikes, charging services to mobile phones, and beer/soft drinks and *borde* as well.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, as indicated above, cash payments are now inserted in bridewealth negotiations in Tsemay only. This is an indication of the increasing monetisation of the local economy in Tsemay.¹¹⁶

5 MARKETISATION VS DISTRESS SALE: THE STORY OF LIVESTOCK TRADE IN SOUTH OMO

As the previous sections have illustrated, the story of livestock trade is not homogenous for areas at early stages of market integration, such as South Omo. The differing 'state experiences' of Benna-Tsemay and Salamago Woreda (see summary in Table 5.1) has led to divergent modes of market integration. In the case of the Tsemay, intensification of the trade over the past decade is leading to (and further augmented by) the monetisation of the local economy. This process is accompanied by an increase in inequality. Wealth is now circulating out of, and back to, the livestock sector, by the wealthier groups 'withdrawing' from the livestock sector and investing in the service sectors, and also re-investing back in livestock, mainly goats. Some young men are benefiting from this trade, while the privileged position of non-Tsemay traders is now significantly eroded. Tsemay livestock traders are now taking advantage of their poor ethnic folks by strategising on when and where to buy and sell.

Moreover, the division of their herd – between 'breeding and herding' and 'market' herds – implies that such Tsemay traders might be strategically dividing their herd between core/financial capital/saving and a section to meet domestic needs and make opportunistic sales.¹¹⁷ Investment in the service sector (i.e. transportation (motor bikes) and grain-mill houses) and in real estate illustrates that the socioeconomic position of the

wealthiest group is being solidified, and is becoming more resilient to drought and associated livestock losses. As such, livestock marketisation is at full swing in Tsemay areas, with the attendant transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich and increases in inequality. This dynamic indicates that the Tsemay are proceeding towards commercialisation, with the possibility of following the trend in the Somali and Borana areas (see Aklilu and Catley 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).

We have a different story in Bodi. The story is far from the 'normal sales' all pastoralist communities engage in. It is primarily undergirded by insecurity caused by the combined pressure of hunger, high disease incidence (lack of veterinary care), and imprisonments. All these are related to the nature of state intervention in Salamago, which has led to increasing insecurity, alienation of key land resources, poor government provision of veterinary services, and the hindering of recession and rain-fed farming. The severe reduction/stopping of the possibility of doing recession crop production (due to storage of water in Gibe III Dam) and rain-fed agriculture (insecurity of farming near the Konso settlements) has meant that the Bodi had to rely excessively on livestock to meet their consumption requirements. Moreover, the Bodi responded to a high incidence of diseases combined with absent veterinary care by making quick decisions to sell animals when

Table 5.1 Summary of state and market integration for Benna-Tsemay and Salamago Woreda

No.	Variable	Tsemay	Salamago
1	Period of significant (economic) integration – using road and civil service as proxies	1960s–	Since the late 2000s
2	Extent of integration to broader markets	High	Low
3	Level of conflict	Low	High
4	Type of conflict	–	Pastoral, with labour force, against state interests
5	State's economic interests	Low	High (sugar industries)
6	Nature and pace of state/power extension	Slower, intensification	Quick, rupture
7	Livestock trade trend	Marketisation	Distress selling

Source: Author's own.

symptoms are seen: the justification being either to make some money before the animal dies or to buy drugs afterwards. Another line of stress to the Bodi socioeconomic life is the withdrawal of the labour of the imprisoned men, and also the added burden of their visitation (conjugal or otherwise). These pressures put the Bodi in a quagmire by which they could only survive by selling cattle from their herd.

On top of this, the government and the incoming labour force is benefiting from the availability of cheap meat (prices of animals, meat, and food are lower in Hana than in Woito) from close-by sources. This is ignored by the *woreda* and zone governments (see also Schlee (2010) on a similar trend in the Horn of Africa in general), as well as those working for the different projects in the *woreda* and residing in Hana Town, who blame the Bodi for drinking with the money and causing trouble. As such, what we see is the Bodi themselves inadvertently (through distress selling) subsidising sugar development on the land taken away from them. Beyond meeting immediate consumption and cash needs, no Bodi individual/group accumulates from such trade dynamics. Rather, the Bodi are being pushed into collective impoverishment. What this means for the Bodi is yet to be seen, but this adds to the alarm bell many have been ringing (regarding the negative implications of sugar development and Gibe III) for a long time now, on other grounds.

6 CONCLUSION

The findings reported in this paper highlight divergent processes of the livestock trade in South Omo Zone. In Tsemay, the marketisation of the past decade is experienced as a continuation and intensification of an old process of state and market integration. The socioeconomic impact of livestock marketisation in Tsemay appears to follow the footsteps of the now more established commercialised dynamics in Somali and Borana. In Bodi areas, however, the increased interaction of the community with the market is a consequence of the rupture of experience of aggressive state investment in sugar cane plantation and related physical infrastructures. This was accompanied by security measures, which put many young Bodi men in prison, but failed to create stability and peace in the area. As such, the Bodi are forced to sell their animals to meet their immediate needs.

At the root of this distress selling of cattle is insecurity, which hinders the Bodi from rain-fed farming (on top of the slashing of the possibility of doing recession farming due to the Gibe III Dam) and also receiving state veterinary services. The Bodi are in a process of collective impoverishment, while a section of the Tsemay young men seem to be benefiting from the livestock trade. These findings strongly indicate that the extent to which agro-pastoralists engage in livestock trade and the terms of their integration are contingent on the nature of the state's interest and relation with them.

REFERENCES

- Yacob Aklilu and Catley, A. (2014) 'Pastoral Livestock Trade and Growth in Ethiopia', *Future Agricultures Policy Brief 72*, Brighton: Future Agricultures¹¹⁸
- Yacob Aklilu and Catley, A. (2010a) *Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of Benefits by Pastoralist Wealth Group and Policy Implications*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University¹¹⁹
- Yacob Aklilu and Catley, A. (2010b) *Mind the Gap: Commercialization, Livelihoods and Wealth Disparity in Pastoralist Areas of Ethiopia*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University¹²⁰
- Yacob Aklilu and Catley, A. (2010c) *Livestock Exports from Pastoralist Areas: An Analysis of Benefits by Wealth Group and Policy Implications*, IGAD LPI Working Paper 01-10, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University¹²¹
- Ayke Asfaw (2005) *Challenges and Opportunities of 'Salamago Resettlement': The Resettlement of Konso Farmers in the Ethnic Land of the Bodi Agro-Pastoralists, South-West Ethiopia*, paper submitted to the Forum for Social Studies¹²²
- Barrett, C.B.; Bellemare, M.F. and Osterloh, S.M. (2004) *Household-Level Livestock Marketing Behavior Among Northern Kenyan and Southern Ethiopian Pastoralists*, Working Paper 11, Ithaca NY: Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, www.researchgate.net/publication/23508484_Household-Level_Livestock_Marketing_Behavior_Among_Northern_Kenyan_and_Southern_Ethiopian_Pastoralists (accessed 20 April 2017)
- Kassahun Berhanu and Poulton, C. (2014) 'The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension Policy in Ethiopia: Economic Growth and Political Control', *Development Policy Review* 32.S2: s197–s213¹²³
- Buffavand, L. (2017) 'Vanishing Stones and the Hovering Giraffe: Identity, Land and the Divine in Mela, South-West Ethiopia', unpublished PhD dissertation, Martin-Luther University
- Buffavand, L. (2016) '“The Land Does Not Like Them”: Contesting Dispossession in Cosmological Terms in Mela, South-West Ethiopia', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10.3: 476–93
- Catley, A. and Alula Iyasu (2010) *Moving Up or Moving Out? A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Mercy Corps, <https://dl.tufts.edu/concern/pdfs/jd4738059> (accessed 18 February 2020)¹²⁴
- CSA (2008) *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*, Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia
- Eid, A. (2014) *Jostling for Trade: The Politics of Livestock Marketing on the Ethiopia-Somaliland Border*, Future Agricultures Working Paper 75, Brighton: Future Agricultures
- Garretson, P. (2002) 'Vicious Cycles: Ivory, Slaves, and Arms on the New Maji Frontier', in D. Donham and W. James (eds), *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Anthropology*, Oxford: James Currey

Fana Gebresenbet (2018) 'Transforming the Bodi from Pastoralists to Outgrowers: Land and State Capitalism in South Omo, Southwest Ethiopia', in Adeoye O. Akinola and Henry Wissink (eds), *Trajectory of Land Reform in Post-Colonial African States: The Quest for Sustainable Development and Utilization*, Cham: Springer International Publishing

Fana Gebresenbet and Kamski, B. (2020) 'The Paradox of the Ethiopian Developmental State: Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Sugar Industry', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 1–16, doi:10.1080/02589001.2020.1716963 (accessed 18 February 2020)¹²⁵

Melese Getu (2009) 'The Effects of Investment on the Livelihoods of the Tsamako in the Wayto Valley', in Alula Pankhurst and Francois Piguet (eds), *Moving People in Ethiopia: Development, Displacement and the State*, Oxford: James Currey¹²⁶

Melese Getu (2007) 'Are Tree Tenure and Land Tenure Issues the Same? A Case Study of Rights to Trees Among the Tsamako of Southwest Ethiopia', *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* 5.1: 43–61¹²⁷

Melese Getu (1995) *Tsemako Women's Roles and Status in Agro-Pastoral Production*, MA Dissertation Series 3, Addis Ababa: Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Administration, Addis Ababa University¹²⁸

Getnet Haile and Dawit Mengistu (2011) *Livestock Market Enhancement Study, Hamer Woreda, South Omo Zone*, Addis Ababa: Pact Ethiopia¹²⁹

Hall, D.; Hirsch, P. and Li, T.M. (2011) *Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press

Hodbod, J. et al. (2019) 'Social-Ecological Change in the Omo-Turkana Basin: A Synthesis of Current Developments', *Ambio* 48.10: 1099–1115, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-018-1139-3> (accessed 7 February 2020)

Kamski, B. (2016) 'The Kuraz Sugar Development Project (KSDP) in Ethiopia: Between "Sweet Visions" and Mounting Challenges', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 10.3: 568–80

Asnake Kefale and Fana Gebresenbet (2014) 'The Expansion of the Sugar Industry in the Southern Pastoral Lowlands', in D. Rahmato, M. Ayenew, A. Kefale and B. Habermann (eds), *Reflections on Development in Ethiopia: New Trends, Sustainability and Challenges*, Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung¹³⁰

Asnake Kefale and Fana Gebresenbet (2012) 'Discrepancies Between Traditional Coping Mechanisms to Climate Change and Government Intervention in South Omo, Ethiopia', in M.G. Berhe and J.-B. Butera (eds), *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and University for Peace (UPEACE)¹³¹

Lind, J.; Okenwa, D. and Scoones, I. (forthcoming, 2020) 'Land, Investment & Politics: Reconfiguring East Africa's Pastoral Drylands', Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer

Markakis, J. (2011) *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers*, Oxford: James Currey

Meles Z. (2011) 'Speech by Meles Zenawi during the 13th Annual Pastoralists' Day Celebrations, Jinka, South Omo', 25 January, www.mursi.org/pdf/Meles%20Jinka%20speech.pdf (accessed 22 January 2019)

Napier, A. and Solomon Desta (2011) *Review of Pastoral Rangeland Enclosures in Ethiopia*, PLI Policy Project, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Tufts-Range-Enclosure-Review-PLI.pdf> (8 May 2017)¹³²

PRIME (2014) *Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) Baseline Report*, 24 June 2014

- Asebe Regassa and Korf, B. (2018) 'Post-Imperial Statecraft: High Modernism and the Politics of Land Dispossession in Ethiopia's Pastoral Frontier', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12.4: 613–31¹³³
- Asebe Regassa; Yetebarek Hizekiel and Korf, B. (2019) ' "Civilizing" the Pastoral Frontier: Land Grabbing, Dispossession and Coercive Agrarian Development in Ethiopia', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 56.5: 935–55, doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1420060 (accessed 6 February 2020)¹³⁴
- Sadler, K. and Catley, A. (2009) *Milk Matters: The Role and Value of Milk in the Diets of Somali Pastoralist Children in Liben and Shinile, Ethiopia*, Medford MA and Addis Ababa: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Save the Children
- Sadler, K.; Kerven, C.; Calo, M.; Manske, M. and Catley, A. (2010) 'The Fat and the Lean: Review of Production and Use of Milk by Pastoralists', *Pastoralism* 1.2: 291–324
- Sadler, K.; Kerven, C.; Calo, M.; Manske, M. and Catley, A. (2009) *Milk Matters: A Literature Review of Pastoralist Nutrition and Programming Responses*, Addis Ababa: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Save the Children
- Schareika, N. (2018) 'Nomads/Pastoralists and Development', in H. Callan (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, Hoboken NJ and Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118924396.wbiea1611 (accessed 18 February 2020)
- Schlee, G. (2010) 'A Comment on the "Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa" Adopted by the African Union in January 2011', *Nomadic Peoples* 14.2: 158–63
- Stevenson, E.G.J. and Buffavand, L. (2018) ' "Do Our Bodies Know Their Ways?" Villagization, Food Insecurity, and Ill-Being in Ethiopia's Lower Omo Valley', *African Studies Review* 61.1: 109–33
- Tewolde Woldemariam and Fana Gebresenbet (2014) 'Socio-Political and Conflict Implications of Sugar Development in Salamago Wereda, Ethiopia', in M.G. Berhe (ed.), *A Delicate Balance: Land Use, Minority Rights and Social Stability in the Horn of Africa*, Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University¹³⁵
- Yacob Arsano and Baechler, G. (2002) 'Transformation of Resource Conflicts and the Case of Woito River Valley in Southern Ethiopia', in M. Flury and U. Geiser (eds), *Local Environmental Management in a North-South Perspective: Issues of Participation and Knowledge Management*, Amsterdam: IOS Press¹³⁶
- Yonad Business Promotion and Consultancy PLC (n.d.) *Value Chain Analysis of Milk and Milk Products in Borana Pastoralist Area: Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought Project*, commissioned by CARE-Ethiopia, www.prime-ethiopia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/VALUE%20CHAIN%20ANALYSIS%20OF%20MILK%20AND%20MILK%20PRODUCTS%20.pdf (accessed 7 February 2020)

ENDNOTES

- 1 Woreda ≈ district, the second lowest administrative level in Ethiopia.
- 2 This is especially true for small ruminants, and as such, goats and sheep are sold mainly to meet immediate cash needs, not for profit.
- 3 Increase in the (ab)use of *khat* and alcohol itself is an indicator of the extent of commercialisation and settlement formation, and could generate addiction-induced poverty (Akliilu and Catley 2010a).
- 4 ≈ districts, the second lowest administrative level.
- 5 Andy Catley introduced me to this methodology, for which I thank him profusely.
- 6 In the literature, variations of Tsemay are used, including Tsemako (see Melese 1995).
- 7 As can be seen in Table 3.1, the livestock population of the *woreda* is dominated by cattle. The government attempted to introduce goats in the early 2010s, but they died due to disease, according to informants from the *woreda*'s Livestock and Fisheries Development Bureau.
- 8 As indicated in Table 3.2, there is a significant number of cattle population (comparable to goats) in Benna-Tsemay Woreda. This, however, is the sum of livestock owned by both the Benna and the Tsemay. There is no disaggregated data for the Tsemay, but informants stressed that the Tsemay mainly own goats.
- 9 Melese (2007: 50) emphasises that honey makes up 'the major constituent' of bridewealth payments and could contribute to stocking/wealth accumulation by direct exchange for small stock and (sometimes) cattle.
- 10 Save for predatory and short-termish government activities, such as the ivory trade and slave raiding (see Garretson 2002).
- 11 FGD, young men, Salamago, 6 August 2018. The Derg is a military-socialist government which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie's government in 1974 and stayed in power until it was overthrown by a coalition of rebel groups, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991. The EPRDF restructured the state along ethno-linguistic lines, and in the early 2000s, advocated for the building of a developmental state. The Gibe III Dam and sugar estates are examples of this developmental state-building project.
- 12 Various interviews in Salamago: July 2016 and August 2018.
- 13 Interview, zone senior security official, 9 July 2018.
- 14 Interview, Salamago *woreda* expert, with long experience, 5 August 2018.
- 15 Interview, Salamago *woreda* expert, with long experience, 5 August 2018.
- 16 Interview, Salamago *woreda* expert, with long experience, 5 August 2018.
- 17 The resistance was both in the cosmological world and discourses drawn from there (Buffavand, 2016) and also by employing various 'weapons of the weak'.
- 18 Interview, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018.
- 19 See endnote 18. Melese (2009: 82) argues that 'Until the late 1970s, which saw the construction of the only all-weather road linking the Tsamako country to the south and the west, the area was virtually isolated from administrative centres. Two elementary schools and a health post were set up in the 1980s and an additional school was established in 1995. A clinic has been run by the Norwegian Missionary Church since the mid-1980s. Otherwise, the Tsamako and their neighbours have been left to their own devices' (see also Melese 2007: 51).
- 20 FGD participant, elder, Duma, 29 July 2018. This informant also added that the Derg tricked them into congregating and leaving the mountains by giving clothing and flour (in response to the famine of the 1980s).
- 21 Melese (2009: 88) adds that the farm was owned by a 'couple of private investors' and paid some 130,000 Birr annually as land rate, and that cotton and some tropical fruits were produced for the international and domestic markets, respectively. He further adds that in 1995/96 and 1996/97, 26,000 and 40,000 quintals of cotton was produced.

- 22 Over alienation of land resources, discontinuation of recession agriculture, deforestation (by the incoming labour force) for charcoal making, and the negative impact of pesticide use on honey production (see Melese 2009).
- 23 Interview, Highlander trader 2, 28 July 2018.
- 24 Among others, Melese (2009: 89–91) lists differences in language, religion and culture, permanent settlement, and the cutting of trees for various purposes (housing, charcoal), as well as the indiscriminate aerial spraying of pesticides negatively affecting honey production as leading to conflict.
- 25 FGD participant, elder, Duma Village, 29 July 2018. A context worth considering here is that cattle blood and milk are mixed and consumed together in the community.
- 26 This used to be an issue even in the early 1990s (Yacob and Baechler 2002).
- 27 Interview, senior official, Zonal Water Bureau, July 2016.
- 28 In comparative terms, the Tsemay are the weakest in their neighbourhood of the Borana, Konso, and Hamar, while the Bodi are more armed and scored major victories against the Mursi in the past. The Dime, until the Konso came, were at the mercy of the Bodi. Moreover, the Bodi could also have a helping hand from their ethnic kins across the border, only different in name: the Mee'enit, if need be (see Buffavand 2017).
- 29 Various elders, FGD in Duma village, 29 July 2018. Roads are mainly liked for the ease of connection to urban centres, where markets and other critical centres (health and veterinary), are located.
- 30 Various elders, FGD in Duma Village, 29 July 2018; interview, Highlander trader 2, 28 July 2018.
- 31 Also called Habesha/Amhara, a generic term for Ethiopians from the highlands, in contrast to lowlands.
- 32 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018. As Buffavand (2017) states, Bodi is really an outsiders' term for a collection of peoples who share a language but see themselves as distinct from each other.
- 33 Interview, expert, Zone Pastoral Affairs Bureau, 25 July 2018.
- 34 Interview, zone security official, 9 July 2018.
- 35 Interview, expert, Zone Trade Bureau, 11 July 2018.
- 36 Interview, expert, Zone Trade Bureau, 11 July 2018; also experts in Benna-Tsemay and Salamago Trade Bureaus, 26 July 2018 and 3 August 2018, respectively.
- 37 Data for the 2015/2016 Ethiopian Fiscal Year only covers the eight months between July 2015 and February 2016.
- 38 'Central market' here refers to animals sold to destinations outside the zone boundaries. The consumption centres could be nearby towns, the most important being Arba Minch, or could be fattened and exported from Modjo.
- 39 These figures are based on the Livestock Master Plan and Livestock Roadmap, and with the assumption that the cattle, sheep, goat, camel, and poultry populations will homogeneously increase annually at a rate of 2 per cent, 8 per cent, 6 per cent, 0.32 per cent, and 9 per cent, respectively. This by itself makes the figures a bit unrealistic. The livestock ownership figures will at least have indicative value.
- 40 The relatively higher potential of the Salamago to sell cattle could be judged from Table 3.2, which indicates that in 2019, the *woreda* had a total cattle population of 308,355, which by itself is almost half of what the other pastoral *woreda*, Benna-Tsemay, Dassanech, Hamar, and Nyangatom, have. However, if we consider the much smaller number of the pastoral inhabitants of Salamago (Bodi 6,994 and Mursi 7,500, according to CSA 2008), compared to the population of the other pastoral groups – Dassanech 48,067; Hamar 46,532; Benna 27,022; Nyangatom 25,252; Tsemay 20,046, according to CSA (2008) – it becomes obvious that per capita ownership is much higher in Salamago than the others.
- 41 This comparison would make a lot better sense if the livestock numbers were converted into Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs). However, as this is the only section where absolute numbers are used, and considering that the focus shifts to livestock ownership and selling proportions across wealth groups in later sections, I did not venture into conversions here.
- 42 Melese (2007: 51) mentions the 'growing number of itinerant traders' in Tsemay already in the early to mid-1990s.
- 43 Interview, Highlander trader 1, Highlander trader 2, 28 July 2018; the 'Exporter', 29 July 2018.
- 44 Modjo is an export hub, with dry port facilities, and many export abattoirs, located in the central highlands.
- 45 FGD with agents in Gisma, 29 July 2018.
- 46 Interview, Highlander trader 1, 28 July 2018.
- 47 Interviews, Municipality Officers, 28 July 2018.

- 48 Development Agents are responsible for the transfer and facilitation of adoption of agricultural technologies by farming communities. They also get involved in the sale (be it cash- or loan-based) of technologies, i.e. fertilisers and improved seeds mainly, but also veterinary drugs in some pastoral areas. DAs are also engaged in political mobilisation for the ruling party (see Kassahun and Poulton 2014; for the case of the Tsema, see Asebe, Yetebarek and Korf 2018).
- 49 Interview, DA 1, Enchete Village, 29 July 2018.
- 50 Interview, DA 1, DA 2, and DA 3, Enchete Village, 29 July 2018.
- 51 Land ownership is inclusive in Tsema. All who need land get access to land, thanks to shifting cultivation and, as it is not inherited across generations, gets redistributed to all community members regularly, and lending land free of charge to bond friends is common (Melese 1995: 79).
- 52 *Derejet* means organisation, and in this case refers to the ruling party of the Southern region, the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM). References such as ‘we paid *yederejit* fees, thus we deserve...’ are made regularly in reference to lack of social services. This indicates that these fees are not seen as party membership fees; rather, as some kind of payment all citizens should make.
- 53 Interview, DA 1, DA 2, and DA 3, Enchete Village, 29 July 2018; elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018.
- 54 One of the DAs was quick to add that as the public clinics are under-staffed and poorly equipped, ‘the Tsema prefer to get treated at private establishments. There is also the dominant view that the private centres cure better than the government clinics.’ As such, payments indicate the capacity of the state to extract from these agro-pastoralists.
- 55 Interview, DA 1 and DA 3, Enchete Village, 29 July 2018.
- 56 I was amazed to see the tax collector heading back from the market at about 1.30pm, compared to my experience in Woito of the officers staying until 6.00pm.
- 57 Interview, Highlander trader 1 and Highlander trader 2, 28 July 2018.
- 58 Interview, Zone Security Official, 9 July 2018.
- 59 Interview, Zone Pastoralist Affairs Office, 25 July 2018.
- 60 Interview, DA 1, Enchete Village, 29 July 2018.
- 61 Interviews, expert, Zone Trade Bureau, 11 July 2018.
- 62 Interview, Salamago Woreda PCDP expert, 3 August 2018.
- 63 Interview, expert, Salamago Woreda, Revenue Office, 4 August 2018.
- 64 Interview, 3 August 2018.
- 65 Interviews, Salamago Woreda PCDP expert, 3 August 2018; official, Woreda Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018; expert, Pastoralist Affairs Bureau, 3 August 2018. A second project, the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme in the Horn of Africa (DRSLP), funded by the African Development Bank also contributes to this increasing trend of building market centres in the zone’s agro-pastoral areas.
- 66 *Mensa* is a common name for eateries established to cater food and drinks to companies, usually in remote areas and often with some subsidisation by the company.
- 67 Various interviews, and observation at Hana Market, 4 August 2018.
- 68 Interviews, expert, Zone Trade Bureau, 11 July 2018; expert, Benna-Tsema Woreda Trade Bureau, 26 July 2018.
- 69 Informal discussion with such an agent, 4 August 2018. Amharic is spoken by the greatest majority of Ethiopia’s population, be it as the mother tongue or as a second language.
- 70 Interview, expert, Salamago Woreda, Revenue Office, 4 August 2018.
- 71 Interviews, Pastoral Affairs Bureau, South Omo Zone, 25 July 2018; Trade Bureau, Salamago Woreda, 3 August 2018; zone senior security official, 9 July 2018.
- 72 Interview, expert, Salamago Woreda Livestock Bureau, 3 August 2018.
- 73 In 2016, prices increased from 400 to 1000 Birr for one quintal of maize. There is the dominant view that the traders (from other parts of the country) exploited the opportunity (FGD elder interview, 5 August 2018).
- 74 Other reasons being lack of budget and medicines (interview, Salamago Woreda expert, with long experience, 3 August 2018).
- 75 FGD with young men, Salamago, 6 August 2018.
- 76 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018; FGD with young men, Salamago, 6 August 2018; interview, Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018.
- 77 Different FGDs in Salamago.
- 78 Informal discussions in Hana Town.

- 79 FGD with women, Salamago, 6 August 2018.
- 80 The use of money in their area started during the Derg's time, when they were forced to sell animals and pay taxes (FGD with elders, men, Duma Village, 29 July 2018).
- 81 Interview, Highlander trader 2, 28 July 2018.
- 82 Interview, young Tsemay man, civil servant, 30 July 2018. Melese (1995: 75) reported that in the early 1990s, wearing animal-skin clothes was a sign of wealth as it needs to be rubbed with butter to soften it and milk was scarce.
- 83 Various interviews in Woito and Duma.
- 84 *Koda lay mekemecha*, literally translated as fee to be paid to sit on animal skin (and start formal bridewealth negotiations). Abduction is a common form of marriage in Tsemay (Melese 1995: 51). While this is new to the Tsemay, their neighbours, the Ale, introduced cash in their bridewealth negotiations early on (at least in the 1990s): 150 Birr on top of the 100 Birr given to the mother in secret (*ibid.*: 121).
- 85 Interviews, young Tsemay man, civil servant 1, 30 July 2018; young Tsemay man, civil servant 2, 30 July 2018; FGD with elders in Duma Village, 29 July 2018.
- 86 The interest in this section is not in the exact number of livestock a household in a certain wealth group owns and sells. Rather, the interest is in the proportion of animals owned and sold by different wealth groups. As such, TLU values are not useful here, and a strict comparison in ownership and real values of animals sold is not possible between the Tsemay and the Bodi. It would be more important to look into (in) equality in herd distribution across wealth groups and the proportion of animals sold by households from different wealth groups on a single average market day.
- 87 For details on this, see Buffavand (2017).
- 88 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018; Interview, Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018; expert Salamago Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018.
- 89 Interview, expert, Salamago Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018.
- 90 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018; interview, Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018.
- 91 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018.
- 92 Interview, expert, Salamago Woreda, Revenue Office, 4 August 2018.
- 93 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018; FGD young men, Salamago, 6 August 2018; interview, expert, Salamago Woreda, Revenue Office, 4 August 2018; Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018.
- 94 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018.
- 95 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018; interview, Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018; expert, Salamago Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018.
- 96 Interview, official, Woreda Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018.
- 97 Interview, expert, Salamago Woreda, Revenue Office, 4 August 2018; official, Woreda Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018. See also Buffavand (2016).
- 98 Interview, elder with over two decades of experience in Kebele administration, 31 July 2018.
- 99 FGD with elders in Duma Village, 29 July 2018; interview, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018.
- 100 FGD with elders in Duma Village, 29 July 2018; interview, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018.
- 101 The comparison here is not in absolute ownership of TLU; rather, the interest is simply on the distribution of wealth in the two communities.
- 102 Informants in the FGD held with elders (Duma Village, 29 July 2018) further added that 'we are yet to recover and be differentiated'. They further added that the rich suffered more as they could not bring fodder and medicine enough to all their herd. In comparison, the poor will manage to somehow sustain the few they have.
- 103 FGD with elders in Duma Village, 29 July 2018; interview, Young Tsemay man, civil servant 2, 30 July 2018.
- 104 Wives whose husbands have been imprisoned particularly suffer in Bodi, and will have to pay some 200–300 Birr for the family member/relative who will be helping with selling the animal. Similarly, imprisonment also forces women to prepare food and drinks to get the labour of men from neighbouring areas and relatives. Despite the expenses, land clearing by such processes is not as good (FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018).
- 105 Interview, Highlander trader 1, 28 July 2018.

- 106 In Bodi, such small sums are also used to buy tobacco, cabbage, and Moringa (the last two being recent additions). The Konso have better Moringa than the Bodi; as such, there is dependence on this cheap source of quality protein for the poor especially. Milk was very cheap and not demanded before the sugar development-related influx of people and consumers; now a litre costs about 15 Birr. Chickens supplied during the villagisation scheme were eaten by cats, and as such, this alternative is not available to the Bodi (interview, expert, Salamago Trade Bureau, 3 August 2018; Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018; FGD with women, Salamago, 6 August 2018). Informants argue that their territory does not have enough water for there to be enough milk to be sold. Therefore, it is the herders only who sell milk (or by-products) when they need cash and are near market centres (FGD with elders, Duma Village, 29 July 2018; interview, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018). Melese (1995: 76) reported that for the Tsemay, milk could be sold by both men and women, while the revenue is spent on basic necessities in both cases.
- 107 FGD with elders, Hana villagisation site, 5 August 2018.
- 108 FGD with women, Duma Village, 31 July 2018.
- 109 FGD with elders, Duma Village, 29 July 2018.
- 110 FGD with agents in Gisma, 29 July 2018; FGD with women, Duma Village, 31 July 2018.
- 111 Women informants stressed that poor women are the only ones working for commercial farms in Tsemay areas (FGD with women, Duma Village, 31 July 2018).
- 112 Most households in Tsemay have donkeys, but these are not accounted for in wealth calculations. When sold, the money is simply consumed as food and/or drinks, not turned into a productive asset. In Bodi, donkeys are not valued. Only the urban residents and restaurant owners use donkeys.
- 113 FGD with women, Duma Village, 31 July 2018; interview, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018; interview with a young motorist man, Woito, 30 July 2018.
- 114 FGD with women, Salamago, 6 August 2018; interview, Salamago Woreda expert with long experience, 3 August 2018.
- 115 In the Luqa area of Tsemay, earlier trade activities led to the establishment of such bars and restaurants, much earlier than Weyto (see Melese 1995: 62).
- 116 Interviews, elder with over two decades of experience in *Kebele* administration, 31 July 2018; young Tsemay man, civil servant 1, 30 July 2018; young Tsemay man, civil servant 2, 30 July 2018.
- 117 A similar pattern is emerging in Karamoja, Uganda too, and as such, merits further research (personal communication, Andy Catley).
- 118 The English version of this reference is Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2014) 'Pastoral Livestock Trade and Growth in Ethiopia', *Future Agricultures Policy Brief 72*, Brighton: Future Agricultures.
- 119 The English version of this reference is Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2010a) *Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of Benefits by Pastoralist Wealth Group and Policy Implications*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
- 120 The English version of this reference is Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2010b) *Mind the Gap: Commercialization, Livelihoods and Wealth Disparity in Pastoralist Areas of Ethiopia*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
- 121 The English version of this reference is Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2010c) *Livestock Exports from Pastoralist Areas: An Analysis of Benefits by Wealth Group and Policy Implications*, IGAD LPI Working Paper 01-10, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
- 122 The English version of this reference is Asfaw, A. (2005) *Challenges and Opportunities of 'Salamago Resettlement': The Resettlement of Konso Farmers in the Ethnic Land of the Bodi Agro-Pastoralists, South-West Ethiopia*, paper submitted to the Forum for Social Studies.
- 123 The English version of this reference is Berhanu, K. and Poulton, C. (2014) 'The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension Policy in Ethiopia: Economic Growth and Political Control', *Development Policy Review* 32.S2: s197-s213.
- 124 The English version of this reference is Catley, A. and Iyasu, A. (2010) *Moving Up or Moving Out? A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia*, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Mercy Corps.
- 125 The English version of this reference is Gebresenbet, F. and Kamski, B. (2020) 'The Paradox of the Ethiopian Developmental State: Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Sugar Industry', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 1-16, doi:10.1080/02589001.2020.1716963.
- 126 The English version of this reference is Getu, M. (2009) 'The Effects of Investment on the Livelihoods of

- the Tsamako in the Wayto Valley', in Alula Pankhurst and Francois Piguet (eds), *Moving People in Ethiopia: Development, Displacement and the State*, Oxford: James Currey.
- 127 The English version of this reference is Getu, M. (2007) 'Are Tree Tenure and Land Tenure Issues the Same? A Case Study of Rights to Trees Among the Tsamako of Southwest Ethiopia', *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* 5.1: 43–61.
- 128 The English version of this reference is Getu, M. (1995) *Tsemako Women's Roles and Status in Agro-Pastoral Production*, MA Dissertation Series 3, Addis Ababa: Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Administration, Addis Ababa University.
- 129 The English version of this reference is Haile, G. and Mengistu, D. (2011) *Livestock Market Enhancement Study, Hamer Woreda, South Omo Zone*, Addis Ababa: Pact Ethiopia.
- 130 The English version of this reference is Kefale, A. and Gebresenbet, F. (2014) 'The Expansion of the Sugar Industry in the Southern Pastoral Lowlands', in D. Rahmato, M. Ayenew, A. Kefale and B. Habermann (eds), *Reflections on Development in Ethiopia: New Trends, Sustainability and Challenges*, Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- 131 The English version of this reference is Kefale, A. and Gebresenbet, F. (2012) 'Discrepancies Between Traditional Coping Mechanisms to Climate Change and Government Intervention in South Omo, Ethiopia', in M.G. Berhe and J.-B. Butera (eds), *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and University for Peace (UPEACE).
- 132 The English version of this reference is Napier, A. and Desta, S. (2011) *Review of Pastoral Rangeland Enclosures in Ethiopia*, PLI Policy Project, Medford MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Tufts-Range-Enclosure-Review-PLI.pdf>.
- 133 The English version of this reference is Regassa, A. and Korf, B. (2018) 'Post-Imperial Statecraft: High Modernism and the Politics of Land Dispossession in Ethiopia's Pastoral Frontier', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12.4: 613–31.
- 134 The English version of this reference is Regassa, A.; Hizekiel, Y. and Korf, B. (2019) '“Civilizing” the Pastoral Frontier: Land Grabbing, Dispossession and Coercive Agrarian Development in Ethiopia', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 56.5: 935–55, doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1420060.
- 135 The English version of this reference is Woldemariam, T. and Gebresenbet, F. (2014) 'Socio-Political and Conflict Implications of Sugar Development in Salamago Wereda, Ethiopia', in M.G. Berhe (ed.), *A Delicate Balance: Land Use, Minority Rights and Social Stability in the Horn of Africa*, Addis Ababa: Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University.
- 136 The English version of this reference is Arsano, Y. and Baechler, G. (2002) 'Transformation of Resource Conflicts and the Case of Woito River Valley in Southern Ethiopia', in M. Flury and U. Geiser (eds), *Local Environmental Management in a North-South Perspective: Issues of Participation and Knowledge Management*, Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Gebresenbet, F. (2020) *Divergent Terms of Market Integration of Agro-Pastoralists: Marketisation and Distress Selling of Livestock in South Omo, Ethiopia* APRA working paper 27, Future Agricultures Consortium.

© APRA 2020

ISBN: 978-1-78118-617-6



This is an Open Access report distributed under the terms of the Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivs 4.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. NoDerivatives — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. You are free to: Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode>

If you use the work, we ask that you reference the APRA website (www.future-agricultures.org/apra/) and send a copy of the work or a link to its use online to the following address for our archive: APRA, Rural Futures, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK (apra@ids.ac.uk)



DO YOU HAVE COMMENTS ON THIS PAPER?

We would welcome your feedback on this working paper!

To provide brief comments, please follow this link to our short APRA Working Paper Feedback form: <https://goo.gl/forms/1iVnXhhrlGesfR9>

**The Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme is a five-year research consortium.
APRA is funded with UK aid from the UK government and will run from 2016-2021.**

The programme is based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), UK (www.ids.ac.uk), with regional hubs at the Centre for African Bio-Entrepreneurship (CABE), Kenya, the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), South Africa, and the University of Ghana, Legon. It builds on more than a decade of research and policy engagement work by the Future Agricultures Consortium (www.future-agricultures.org) and involves new partners at Lund University, Sweden, and Michigan State University and Tufts University, USA.

Funded by



The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.