International Actors' Support on Inclusive Peace Processes

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Question

What are common findings from evaluations of how international actors have supported inclusive peace processes?

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1. Summary

This rapid literature review collates evidence from academic and grey literature on support on inclusive peace processes. The review identified limited evidence based on robust evaluations, there is, however, a wide range of reviews (principally case studies) of peace processes and national dialogues that have been collected and collated to distil lessons on what works and why. These have predominantly been collated by organisations such as the Inclusive Peace and Transitions Initiative, Conciliation Resources and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Lesson learning has played an important role in advancing the way peace processes are designed, negotiated and implemented. Although no two conflicts are alike, there are a number of lessons and practices that authors suggest can be transferred from one context to another. Commentators highlight that when doing so it is important to understand the differences and similarities between conflicts and peace processes in order to draw pertinent lessons from those with similar dynamics.

A recurring theme in the literature is the belief that after periods of conflict, the design, negotiation and implementation of inclusive peace processes is a means of strengthening a society's ability to avoid a relapse into armed violence. Central to this is the need for peace processes to be inclusive, this refers to both the inclusion of the main parties to the conflict, but also the inclusion of groups that have historically been excluded from peace processes e.g. civil society or women, etc. Key messages identified include:

1. **Quality not just quantity is important**: When included actors were able to influence the quality of agreements, and/or the implementation of these issues, the rate of peace agreements being reached and implemented was higher.

2. **Broader inclusion is important**: Contrary to assumptions made by many mediators, broader inclusion is not thought to reduce the likelihood of reaching agreements. This is often associated with conflict parties and mediators pushing for broader inclusion to gain legitimacy and public buy-in.

3. **It is important to consider the modalities of inclusion**: Inclusion takes place through different modalities at the table but also prior to and in parallel to official negotiations, and during implementation.

4. **Implementation is key**: Attention of the international community goes into the negotiation phase. However, many processes fail or gains of inclusive negotiations are lost during implementation. Inclusive post-agreement commissions such as monitoring bodies and constitution review commissions shape implementation of agreements, thus their inclusive composition and proper functioning needs preparation and monitoring.

5. **Process design is important**: How peace processes are designed is fundamental as it enables or constrains the ability of included actors to exercise influence. Whatever the inclusion modality, rules and procedures can negate the benefits of inclusion.

6. **Power matters**: Inclusive processes can challenge power structures, and resistance by powerful elites is to be expected. However, local civil society groups and the international community have been ill prepared to handle elite resistance. Public buy-in for an agreement or constitution is also important and is influenced by the country's political
climate and the attitude of powerful actors. However, public buy-in can also be encouraged.

2. Inclusive Peace Processes

The UN/World Bank (2018) report, Pathways for Peace, asserted that addressing ‘inequalities and exclusion’ and ‘making institutions more inclusive’ is key to preventing violent conflict. In turn, Conciliation Resources (2019) comment that inclusion matters as it is a mechanism to avoid the views and needs of elites drowning out those of the wider population. After periods of conflict, the design and implementation of peace processes is viewed as a means of strengthening a society's ability to avoid a relapse into armed violence. Indeed, a recurrent theme in the literature that discusses peace processes is the need for inclusion and engagement, this refers to both the inclusion of the main parties to the conflict, but also the inclusion of groups that have historically been excluded from peace processes e.g. civil society or women etc. (Dixon, 2015; Maney et al., 2006; Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014). In the context of this report, inclusivity refers to both the inclusion of a diverse range of combatants but also a range of stakeholders e.g. civil society groups in the negotiation, agreement and implementation of peace processes.

Ensuring the inclusivity of peace processes can be challenging. A central challenge is often related to the acceptance of various stakeholders’ e.g. militant nationalists, however, through empowering participants and increasing certainty, peace processes can be strengthened (Maney et al., 2006). Inclusionary processes will often involve exogenous actors offering guarantees to ensure all actors are accepted.

When designing and implementing inclusive peace processes, actors must also take into account an array of enabling factors that need to be in place to facilitate inclusion. The example of Colombia, demonstrates that including combatants is not always enough and in certain contexts protection may also need to be offered. Negotiations in Colombia in 1982 failed for a number of reasons, a significant one being that whilst the government provided amnesty to ex-combatants they could not offer security to demobilised Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) members who formed the political wing and around 3,000 were assassinated by paramilitaries (Theidon, 2009; UCL Institute of the Americas, 2012). Social and political factors can thus either facilitate or undermine inclusive peace processes.

Alongside political and social factors, the design of peace processes will shape the level of representativeness and the distribution of power. Design or process factors also influence the likelihood of reaching sustainable agreements (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Key process factors include: the degree of inclusion and participation; representation and selection criteria; objective and scope-setting; institutional framework and support structures; role of authority figures; decision-making procedures; confidence-building measures; and provision for implementation.

Finally it may also be important to consider who is included and why. Indeed, having negotiations with minor players can be counterproductive as they may lack the authority to negotiate. Commentators such as Fisas (2015) suggest that it is therefore necessary to start by using an inclusive approach that gives a voice to actors whom the other party may not want to talk to but who are key to resolving the conflict (Fisas, 2015).
Lesson Learning from past peace processes

Lesson learning has played an important role in advancing peace processes. Although no two conflicts are alike, there are a number of lessons and practices that authors suggest can be transferred from one context to another. Commentators highlight that when doing so it is important to understand the differences and similarities between conflicts and peace processes in order to draw pertinent lessons from those with similar dynamics (McGarry, 1998).

Lessons from both successes and failures have been collected in case study reports from a number of country peace processes (McGarry, 1998). In turn, these efforts have been summarised by commentators such O'Driscoll (2017) who collated findings from Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, and Iraq. These case studies were chosen for the range of lessons they offered on a number of processes. Specifically, O'Driscoll distils lessons associated with three key stages of peace processes (negotiations, agreements and implementation) with inclusion needed at each stage. Key findings from past reviews on lessons from peace processes can be summarised as follows (O'Driscoll, 2017):

- **Exogenous actors** are instrumental in peace processes and play a range of roles from facilitating negotiations, providing guarantees so that the process does not break down, as well as building trust between the actors.

- **Inclusive processes** are more likely to succeed and lead to lasting peace; however they can take longer as they often require extensive preparatory negotiations and involve external pressure to ensure the acceptance of all parties.

- A **timeline for negotiations** is important for the implementation of an agreement as this helps to keep all the parties on track and enables them to set a target to work towards.

- **Gender receives limited attention** in most peace processes and is often left out of the literature, however the literature that does take a gendered-approach points to the key role a gender inclusive peace process can have in transforming society and highlights the negative impact of omitting women from peace processes (O'Reilly et al., 2015).

- Dealing with **security issues**, such as police and security sector reform, is extremely important for power sharing arrangements, as failure to do so is likely to lead to tensions and the breakdown of the agreement.

- **Cabinet positions in a power sharing agreement** should not be left for negotiation, they should be chosen through sequential proportionality rules (a mathematic equation based on votes won), thus preventing political impasse or breakdown of the agreement.

- **Built-in safeguards**, such as transitional power sharing arrangements (involving negotiation parties, before elections can be held), dispute resolution mechanisms, and verification mechanisms help to stabilise the initial period following an agreement and prevent the agreement from breaking down.

- **Ex-combatants** can make or break a process, it is important that they are incorporated. Methods to engage them once fighting has ceased must be developed.

- **Elites** can be incentivised through placing cross pressures on them by making them more accountable to the population and the institutions within the government.

A cross cutting theme in the literature is the importance of effective monitoring and verification as a means of increasing the durability of peace agreements by addressing commitment problems inherent in peace processes. Monitoring refers to the technical process of collecting information
on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made. Verification is the process of using monitoring information to evaluate compliance with an agreement (Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, 2017).

Although political elites are the ones that negotiate and reach agreements, for these to work they need to ‘sell’ them to their constituents. It is therefore important that grassroots or civil society involvement in the process. Moreover, more localised issues of conflict also need to be addressed, as these can often act as flares for later conflict, again making the involvement of stakeholders at various levels significant (Maney et al., 2006).

More broadly, it is noted that civil society organisations must be strengthened in order to sustain peace processes. Grassroots peace campaigns can provide policy recommendations for elites to draw upon. They can also lead to elites being pressurised by the population to make concessions in order to achieve peace (Guelke, 2003). Additionally, civil society organisations give voice to groups that are often excluded from the process. When women’s rights organisations get involved, this may ensure a more gender sensitive process. This is important as women’s rights organisations often highlight human rights, interdependence, and the insecurity that comes with the denial of basic needs. However, it is not enough for women’s rights groups to merely be involved, they also need to have a say in the outcome of the negotiations (Maney et al., 2006; O’Reily et al., 2015).

Finally, in order to ensure the inclusivity of peace processes, it is important to consider the modalities of inclusion. Paffenholz (2016: 14) identifies seven modalities for inclusion developed from research undertaken by the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative¹, these include:

1. Direct representation at the negotiation table
   a. Inclusion within delegations
   b. Included actors’ own delegations

2. Observer status for selected groups

3. Consultations:
   a. Official / unofficial
   b. Elite / broader / public

4. Inclusive commissions
   a. Post-agreement commissions
   b. Commissions conducting peace process
   c. Permanent bodies

5. High-level problem-solving workshops

6. Public decision-making (i.e. referendum)

7. Mass action

¹ https://www.inclusivepeace.org/
3. Annotated Bibliography

Inclusive peace processes have received growing attention in the academic and policy focused literature and are viewed as better placed to ensure lasting stability than traditional exclusive peace deals negotiated solely between two or more armed groups. In a number of conflicts e.g. Colombia, Libya, Myanmar etc. peace processes have sought to broaden participation (Paffenholz, 2015). Civil society groups, political parties and women’s groups have been included in these negotiations and their implementation in formal roles and structures. However, authors such as Paffenholz (2015: 1) suggest that policy makers and international donors struggle to respond adequately to calls for greater inclusion. This is often associated with a lack of knowledge as to how inclusion can practically work in order to have a positive impact on the quality and sustainability of peace deals without reducing the likelihood that agreements are being reached. In what follows I provide an overview of literature that explores this issue, it draws particularly on the work of the work of centres of learning such as the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative2, Conciliation Resources3 and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue4. This review is not exhaustive, but rather introduces a range of readings that may serve to inform how international actors conceptualise, design and implement inclusive peace processes.

The vast majority of literature emphasises that the transformative potential of inclusive processes can only be realised if they are genuinely inclusive of society as whole (Barnes, 2017; Blunck et al., 2017). Inclusivity relates to ‘process inclusivity’ (the level of societal and political representation) in the preparatory and actual dialogue phases; and to ‘outcome inclusivity’ (the level of inclusiveness created by process outputs) in the implementation phase (Planta et al., 2015). The degree of inclusiveness, and extent to which different political actors and segments of society are included, shapes significantly whether stakeholders view the process as a valid way in which to address their grievances and aspirations (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017).

There is a growing interest in and recognition of the importance of including women, young people and minorities in inclusive transition processes, which has resulted in more representatives of such groups appointed to delegations and the incorporation of their views and needs into the agenda (Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Strong ties to key political and religious groups, civil society actors and state institutions outside the formal processes must also be maintained (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Discussing national dialogues Blunck et al. (2017) comment that in Yemen, women and youth were effectively included in the process through a quota system; whereas Jordan did not establish a mechanism for including women or young people adequately, which discredited the overall process. It is important to note that young people and women may, however, feel firmly bound by party, tribal or ethnic lines etc. As such, it may be beneficial to include representatives of civil society organisations that work specifically on youth and women’s issues (Blunck et al., 2017).

Even if the difficult task of including a broad range of different constituencies is accomplished, those who finally participate may not necessarily be representative of the group they have been selected for, as there are vast differences among groups, labelled as “women” or “youth”. This

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2 https://www.inclusivepeace.org/

3 http://www.c-r.org/

4 https://www.hdcentre.org/
can, in turn, result in the exclusion of marginalised members of social groups (Planta et al., 2015). In order to counter this difficulty, some processes have tried to adopt participative methodologies of self-selection with clear-cut rules of eligibility for group members to ensure vertical inclusivity (Papagianni, 2014).

Inclusivity is important in all of the phases: preparatory, process/negotiation, and implementation (Barnes, 2017; Blunck et al., 2017). If an inclusive approach is not followed in the preparatory phase and in the composition of the preparatory body, the legitimacy of the process and a sense of ownership could be undermined from the outset (Blunck et al., 2017). The composition of delegates, their form of participation and the design of the decision-making process, decided in preparatory phases, are all essential to the level of inclusivity (Planta et al., 2015). The degree of inclusiveness affects whether stakeholders accept decisions that are made during the process (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017).

A number of cross-cutting challenges impact on inclusionary processes. These include:

- **Balance of power issues**: Efforts to include different groups will not necessarily create an environment conducive to successful process, as persistent imbalances of power in the community often persist, with certain actors having overarching control (Elayah et al., 2018). As such, the transformative potential of inclusionary processes may only be realised if they help to balance power asymmetries, enabling collective engagement and the generation of mutually agreed outcomes (Barnes, 2017).

- **Fair representation**: It is important to distinguish between diversity (the presence of a variety of parties) and actual inclusiveness, whereby parties are allocated actual weight in decision-making (Harlander, 2016). The inclusion of women, young people and marginalised communities, for example, needs to extend beyond mere presence to enabling them to voice their concerns, engage in decision making, and influence the process. The absence of such meaningful participation can lead to frustration and dissatisfaction (Blunck et al., 2017).

- **Boycotting**: Despite efforts to promote inclusion, if an important group decides to boycott the process, the process will lose its legitimacy (Harlander, 2016).

**Methodological approaches**


In this short article, the author discusses a methodological approach to the evaluation of peacebuilding effectiveness. This approach entails drawing upon evidence-based comparative research on what worked and what did not work in similar peacebuilding interventions in order to analyse outcome plausibility.

**Step 1 Reconstructing theories of change**: In many peacebuilding evaluations, baselines and theories of change that provide the rationale for how and why peacebuilding projects are assumed to have an impact, are implicit rather than explicit. It is common that the theories listed in project documents no longer reflect the intervention logic due to changes in project design or context. In such cases, the theory of change has to be reconstructed as part of an evaluation.
Step 2 Assessing theories of change: Evaluating the logical plausibility of a theory of change involves relating a project’s activities and outcomes to its desired impacts or goals in order to establish whether such impacts might reasonably be achieved. The evaluator can also assess whether a theory of change is relevant in a given context. Firstly, this can be done by analysing the causes and dynamics of conflicts over time, and secondly, by evaluating if the theory of change addresses these factors in a logical sequence in order to facilitate peacebuilding.

Step 3 Assessing outcome plausibility: In the absence of detailed baseline data, an innovative way of assessing peacebuilding outcomes is analysing outcome plausibility by comparing the theory of change and the main activities conducted with existing comparative data on what has worked and what has not worked in similar peacebuilding interventions. However, such assessments are only possible if sound evidence from research or other evaluations exists.

More specifically, the research results showed that the following reasons limited the effectiveness of most projects:

- Radicalisation within society hinders this type of peace work;
- The main focus of most initiatives is on the main conflict lines only;
- Most initiatives are of a scattered, short term and fragmented nature;
- Most participants are English-speaking, elite-based representatives who are often already “converted” to the idea of positive images of the other group;
- People-to-people programmes do not reach society at large as they only focus on the individual level;
- The apolitical nature of most initiatives frame a deeply political problem as a relationship problem, something that can often be misleading, and result in limited acceptance and ownership within society;
- Many initiatives aim at changing attitudes, yet, this seems ineffective. Existing evidence from Bosnia, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine demonstrate that attitude change might not be necessary for behavioural change. Instead, work-related activities, which brought people from different groups together, proved to be more successful than peace related work. Here people expressed positive experiences from working with the other group, often producing concrete outcomes or common work initiatives.

Reviews of peace processes


This policy brief is based on results from the multi-year research (2011-2015) on “Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” conducted at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies’ Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding. The results of this research form part of the knowledge base of the new Inclusive Peace and Transitions Initiative at the Graduate Institute, where they are used to inform policy and practice.

7. Quality counts, not just quantity: When included actors were able to influence the quality of agreements (defined as addressing the causes of conflict), and/or the
implementation of these issues, the rate of peace agreements being reached and implemented was higher. When women’s groups had an influential role in a process, the positive impact was stronger. This shows that what matters is not merely the quantity of actors included, but the quality and influence of their contributions. For example, the Constituent Assembly in Nepal was the most representative body of its kind in Asia in terms of gender, cast and minority representation. However, established parties dominated decision-making and hindered included actors asserting influence.

8. **Broader inclusion does not weaken peace negotiations:** Contrary to assumptions made by many mediators, broader inclusion does not reduce the likelihood of reaching agreements. Only in one case was an agreement not reached when a high number of included actors had significant influence on the process.

9. **The push for broader inclusion is mostly motivated by realpolitik, rather than by normative considerations:** Conflict parties and mediators push for broader inclusion to gain legitimacy, public buy-in, or include hardliner constituencies. However, this was different when it came to the inclusion of women. There, inclusion was only made possible due to concerted effort by women themselves and their international supporters.

10. **Inclusion occurs in different modalities, both at the table and beyond:** Inclusion takes place through different modalities at the table but also prior to and in parallel to official negotiations, and during implementation. While seven inclusion modalities have been identified, success cases featured a combination of different inclusion modalities.

11. **Implementation is key but neglected:** Most attention of the international community goes into the negotiation phase. However, many processes fail or substantial gains of inclusive negotiations are lost during implementation. Inclusive post-agreement commissions such as monitoring bodies and constitution review commissions shape implementation of agreements, thus their inclusive composition and proper functioning needs preparation and monitoring.

12. **Process design is crucial:** How inclusive peace processes are designed is fundamental as it enables or constrains the ability of included actors to exercise influence. Whatever the inclusion modality, rules and procedures can negate the benefits of inclusion. For example, in almost all national dialogues, despite apparent broad participation, ultimate decision making power rests with small groups of powerful actors.

- In the 2001 Somali peace process, women were allocated a quota in all six “reconciliation” committees, but decisions by the committees required the authorisation of a leadership committee of clan elders.
- The African Union-led 2008 negotiations in Kenya shows that consultations can be influential: three consultative civil society forums, one only for women, managed to get most of their demands into the peace agreements by applying a joint strategy of handing over short, concise recommendation papers, engaging with mediators and negotiators, but also issuing public statements and lobbying the international community.
- Furthermore, civil society groups can increase their influence if they manage to overcome their divisions through coalition building and joint positioning.
- In Yemen, although women benefitted from a 30% quota in the national dialogue, they did not form a unified group and rarely voted as a block, thus failing to pass many of the issues of concern to them. The role of the mediators has also been important. When mediators were inclusion-friendly and knew how to manage inclusion strategically, this has helped groups to assert influence.
Quotas and transparent selection criteria and procedures have proven useful. However, there has been a tendency to often invite only “like-minded” groups, often civil society groups close to the parties, or else, peace-oriented change actors. In both cases, important actors can be excluded with crucial consequences for the process. The National Assembly in Guatemala has been a highly representative body. However, one of the most influential civil society organisations, the landowners association, was excluded. Together with the political establishment they were able to lobby against the implementation of the peace agreement.

The individuals designated to represent included groups need to be perceived as representative and legitimate. In Burundi, the Hutu negotiators rejected the participation of women’s groups not because they were women, but because many of them were perceived as representing only the Tutsi community.

Preparedness and support structures prior to, during and after negotiations can enhance the influence of civil society and other groups. Support can take the form of meeting space, Internet access, preparatory workshops and training, or expert support to draft position papers and understand legal subtleties.

13. **Power matters:** Inclusive processes challenge established power structures, and resistance by powerful elites is to be expected. However, local civil society groups and the international community have been ill prepared to handle elite resistance. Public buy-in for an agreement or constitution is also important and is influenced by the country’s political climate and the attitude of powerful actors. However, public buy-in can also be created. In Northern Ireland, in the run up to the referendum over the Good Friday Peace Agreement, a civil society campaign managed to push for a positive outcome. Regional powers also matter. Developments in Yemen are an example of how the lack of buy-in by major elites and regional actors can undermine an inclusive process.

The findings presented above led to the development of the following recommendations for mediators, donors, civil society organisations and their partners:

1. Support and lobby for a good mix of inclusion modalities at the negotiation table and beyond in all phases of the process.
2. Ensure that included actors can exercise influence by providing support and expertise to societal and political actors beyond the main parties and helping design adequate processes.
3. Apply coherent strategies that combine support and empowerment measures with support to the peace process such as action to reduce violence and elite resistance, strengthen public buy-in and regional actors’ commitments.
4. Strengthen inclusion-awareness among mediators and teams as well as conflict parties.
5. Improve monitoring mechanisms during implementation of agreements.


This brief questions what constitutes inclusive participation, and how can peacemakers and peacebuilders achieve it in their own, very different societies? The authors conclude.
• Conflict in divided societies is complex and has no single solution. Peace processes are vital tools but cannot on their own achieve sustainable peace. The international community should not only help develop an agreement and shape a process but also grapple with longer-term challenges of building national identity, transforming entrenched systems, and improving poor governance.

• A variety of definitional and structural knowledge gaps remain around the process of inclusive participation. What do we mean, beyond formal negotiations, by the term peace processes? How do we weave together levels and strands of peacebuilding activity? How can we deal with dilemmas in the politics of inclusion (such as when the inclusion of one group creates a backlash or brings a process to a halt)? What mechanisms have been used, and how effective have they been?

• Addressing these knowledge gaps using a multidisciplinary approach will help develop innovative tools and good practices for practitioners and policymakers working on the design and implementation of inclusive peace processes.


This study analyses when, how, and under what conditions the inclusion of a broad range of actors in peace and political transition processes contributes to the prevention of violence and armed conflict.

Overall, the authors found that inclusion plays an important role in preventing violence. Importantly, how inclusion contributes to prevention depends on the kind of violence and relatedly, the nature of political processes. The authors also found that the causal processes that prevent or reduce violence differ at the early stages of the prevention attempt and during the transitional processes that follow, as well as according to conflict type. The findings suggest that a combination of different inclusion modalities is important for sustaining peace, thus indicating the merit of sequenced inclusion.

In cases characterised by popular protests and incipient violent conflict, inclusion contributes to prevention by creating political momentum through which violence can be averted or reduced. When governments responded to protest-related violence through inclusive negotiation formats to jointly discuss the country’s future, grievances voiced on the street were transferred into formal processes.

During armed conflicts, violence can initially be reduced through broadly inclusive negotiations, and in some instances relatively exclusive but representative elite deals. However, an early-stage reduction of violence did not guarantee sustainable peace in the longer term. For maintaining reduced levels of violence, the inclusion of actors beyond the principle conflict parties plays a critical supportive role.

Inclusion is viewed to contribute to peaceful transition processes in two main ways, depending on their design and mandate. Firstly, through Inclusive Commissions mandated to monitor or address violence. Secondly, through formalised bodies that address the causes of violence by implementing comprehensive political reform processes. Inclusion mattered most when the
implementing bodies addressed grievances (e.g. political or economic inequality), thus aiming to resolve violence by building inclusive institutions.

Importantly, the study found little evidence that inclusion in and of itself helps to tackle violence. Rather, the representativeness and independence of included actors influence the degree to which inclusive bodies can prevent and reduce violence. If all stakeholders in a conflict are represented, causes of conflict are more likely to be addressed and levels of violence reduced in a sustainable manner. The independence of included actors from the main conflict parties also affects whether the modalities function smoothly and contribute to successful prevention.


In addressing some of the practical challenges of navigating inclusion in peace processes, this publication is structured around three areas of enquiry:

1. Frameworks for understanding inclusion in peace processes
2. Inclusion in practice in national peace processes – with ‘deep dive’ case studies of Colombia and Nepal
3. Inclusion in practice in sub- and supra-national peace processes – with case studies on Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria and Afghanistan

The publication concludes with a summary of insights. It is structured in response to three dimensions of the enquiry into inclusion in peace processes: Who needs to be represented? How are meaningful mechanisms for inclusion best designed? What kind of more inclusive outcomes can result?

Who needs to be represented?

Addressing diversity: Identity groups affected by conflict are complex and diverse, and rarely have agreed national representation to speak for them with ‘one voice’. In practice, their ability to influence a national negotiation process is complicated by their own internal dynamics, which can include clashing interests and accounts of the conflict, and tactics of violence or nonviolence. The question of ‘whose voice counts?’ is related to perceptions of ‘whose voice is legitimate?’ For external actors, in making sense of whether a group has local legitimacy it is important to factor in their reliance on international support and whether this might substitute for a genuine domestic constituency.

The challenge of ‘whole-of-system’ peace processes: Today’s conflicts tend to spill across multiple levels with complex local, national and international disputes ‘nested’ within each other. Understanding how to contribute to multi-level, ‘whole-of-system’ peace processes while working to common objectives is a critical and elusive challenge for any peacebuilding intervention.

Undermining peacebuilding: External governmental involvement can underpin or undermine societal inclusion. Multiple and sustained peacebuilding efforts to respect the basic rule of law are often compromised by realpolitik international calculus, which results in varying degrees of state tolerance for corrupt practices and legitimisation of flawed electoral processes.
Women’s leadership: It is no accident that the wider ‘inclusion project’ rides on the leadership, struggle and gains of the global women’s movement for equal rights and participation. Examples cited in this publication and in research from the Political Settlements Research Programme show how women have created multiple spaces for promoting gender equality and meaningful forms of participation – from pre-talks, through negotiations, to implementation and beyond.

Extreme exclusion of indigenous and minority communities: Elite members of society, even in the most violent armed conflicts, still enjoy a high degree of personal security, largely cocooned from the traumas of war. Indigenous and minority communities often have the opposite experience. In the many contexts studied here, they are disproportionately affected by armed conflicts and disproportionately under-represented in peace processes.

Youth momentum: Factoring a deeper understanding of how young people can mobilise in peace processes includes paying attention to the particular needs for constantly refreshing youth leadership, who will have to deal with all the unfinished, difficult and deferred issues in the political settlement.

Diaspora justice: There are multiple innovative examples of how diaspora communities can be part of a peace process. They face the dual challenge of seeking inclusion in host societies as well as in countries of origin. Ending the cycles of violence and reprisals requires that the rights of diaspora and of all victims’ and survivors’ and are brought to the centre of the peace process.

How are meaningful mechanisms for inclusion best designed?

Moving beyond the policy soundbite: As long as inclusion policies remain ambiguous and without clear commitments to meaningful mechanisms for participation, they will be mantras that can ‘hurt more than help’. Different actors view inclusion differently. Aid actors see it as instrumental to achieving long-term development outcomes. Security actors see it as part of a strategy for countering armed violence. Diplomats and peacebuilders understand it as a requirement for a robust peace process to address root causes of violence. Human rights promoters understand it as a basic right. The tensions between these different ‘inclusion projects’ cannot be eliminated but must be better managed.

There are risks and consequences of ignoring the complex ways in which exclusion and violence affect different identity groups, preventing some from influencing political decision-making, while ensuring others continue to shape it. Approaches that fail to pay attention to these dynamics risk preserving hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian decision-making systems with obvious costs for peace, justice and development. It is important to look beyond simple conflict narratives about the stakeholders, to uncover the multi-faceted conflicts that hide behind them.

Preparing for participation: Political cultures of governance in contexts of protracted conflict tend to rely on top-down decision-making and ambivalent forms of consultation built around weak and often traumatised bureaucracies. So, while they may rhetorically encourage it, governance habits of participation in conflict contexts are poorly developed to deliver.

Moments of rapid change: Sustained efforts towards greater inclusion shift social norms over time – like those relating to gender inclusion. These processes of ‘normalisation’ will not necessarily show direct signs of steady progress. Preparing for future transitions enables groups to better take advantage of such opportunities to exert long-term influence.
Facing forwards: There tends to be a rush to resolve conflict. But the PA-X Peace Agreements Database has revealed tremendous innovation in ways of leaving a process open to options for dispute resolution and future inclusive change. It is important to understand better how to navigate the fluid ‘unsettlement’ after a peace accord has been reached. References to international legal frameworks in peace accords can provide ‘hooks’ to leverage change if applied in a smart way by local actors when new opportunities arise.

Effective peace processes do not run themselves but require professional management support – including impartial monitoring mechanisms and other necessary infrastructures to conduct the process. These infrastructures are one arena where inclusive practices can be both enabled and embedded.

Sequencing in the initial stages of peace making is a key consideration. Actors should not undervalue the multiplicity of preparatory efforts taking place in different domains. In all processes, talks on a cessation of violence are preceded by often unofficial initiatives. The case studies in this issue suggest that comprehensive inclusiveness of belligerents in the early stages of a process is difficult to get right but essential to address.

Risks in tackling the challenges of ‘belligerent inclusion’: Poorly managed power-sharing arrangements have incentivised coercion and unleashed violent cycles of competition for power, positions and resources between and within armed factions. Power-sharing arrangements need to pay attention to whether and how they can be implemented in ways that avoid further fragmentation and find tactics for supporting the political transformation of armed groups and their constituencies.

Not all good things go together: Many of the case studies confirm that more directly representative forms of public participation such as national dialogues or referenda do not necessarily translate into influence over the content of an agreement. Also, elections, while an obvious, if limited, form of public participation, challenge the creation of conditions that enable consensus, compromise and reconciliation. This is equally true of referenda. In contemporary electoral democracies, party competition for political power can get in the way of promoting national interests, inter-group accommodation and peace.

Selection procedures and criteria for participation as well as rules for decision-making can either support or limit meaningful inclusion: Structural approaches to inclusion have a fair chance to remain relevant if considered useful by the negotiating parties, for example youth or women’s advisory councils or parallel forms of informal governance such as councils of traditional leaders. Reservation systems in legislation and constitutions during or after peace processes can be effective in ensuring structural change but take time to make their impact felt. Quotas also tend to preferentially benefit elites among the marginalised.

As peace processes move into the formalisation and then implementation of accords they require even wider participation. It is important to publicise the contents of the peace agreements through public education, translation and dissemination. Yet, the terrain for participation rarely has sufficient preparation. There is also the need for capacity building because of the entry into formal politics of people with little experience in governance and administration. Post-accord implementation invariably introduces new negotiations, actors and constituencies as those previously excluded during elite negotiations now press for meaningful participation in the new governance arrangements.
There is a direct connection between civil society inclusion and human rights protections which safeguard physical wellbeing. They also secure the enabling environment for peacebuilding work – including through peaceful protest and dissent.

What kind of more inclusive outcomes can result?

The promise of change: Transition processes from violence to meaningful peace are long and complex. Unresolved and sometimes new conflicts emerge. Corruption cultures and practices and weak institutions tend to persevere, while divided communities, resistance to change and mistrust permeate the implementation environment.

Self-reinforcing peace outcomes: Peace dividends from one aspect of the inclusion project can lead to unexpected dividends in others. Research in Northern Ireland showed that when agreements were reached on progressive programmes of police reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, they also addressed some of the causes and enabling factors of violence against women.

Civil society inclusion is no substitute for a flawed process: Inclusion of civil society actors can bolster claims that a political process is legitimate. Their information and perspectives can be so valued that consulting with them in an official process may be deemed to be a political necessity. But their inclusion in a stalled process risks sending an impression of progress where there is none, and may mask fundamental challenges instead of addressing them.

The consequences of not implementing commitments: Certain peace agreement provisions are particularly resistant to implementation and will require new strategies and diligence. Commitments on accountability for harm or crimes committed related to the conflict are clearly the most fiercely resisted, as those responsible for implementing them also tend to be the most liable. Economic reforms and ethnic, gender and environmental commitments have lower implementation rates than those related to disarmament or power-sharing. Failed implementation in one area has knock-on effects that compound the complexities of implementation in others and risk enabling future conflict.

The need to find new ways to be more relevant and effective: Traditional modes of ‘settling’ conflicts are failing. Complex local, national and global political marketplaces that are siloed by sector mean that there is a pressing need to reach new ways of working that could unlock synergies across the development, humanitarian, security, justice, peacebuilding and diplomatic arenas. Future peace programming design needs to experiment with ways of moving more nimbly between multiple levels, and to develop better strategies for addressing parallel and competing processes and dynamics. A common commitment to inclusion is one area where we could see a strategic alignment of principles for separate but articulated interventions.

Inclusion of Civil society


The objective of this report is to summarise the available evidence about civil society’s role in monitoring and verification activities. Based on experiences from different peace processes, this
report’s aim is threefold; it provides an introduction to the purpose of monitoring and verification of peace agreements, it presents the different modalities of how civil society has participated in the monitoring and verification of peace agreements and it analyses opportunities and challenges, and presents seven lessons for civil society’s effective contribution to monitoring and verification of peace agreements. The report concludes that:

1. Civil society participation in monitoring and verification is more effective when provided with political, technical and financial support.
2. Partisan political influence undermines the legitimacy of civil society and increases the risks faced by civil society actors.
3. Non-specific provisions for civil society inclusion in monitoring are unlikely to be implemented.
4. The inclusion of civil society in monitoring and verification is most effective when it reflects the capacities and context of civil society organisations.
5. Integrated monitoring is more effective than monitoring which is fragmented across many organisations.
6. Civil society organisations are more effective when they combine monitoring and mediation activities.
7. Civil society organisations engaged in monitoring and verification struggle to influence compliance without international or national support.


This rapid literature review synthesises findings on support for civil society engagement in peace processes. The report states that there is widespread acknowledgement of the importance of civil society engagement in peace processes. This is reflected in the wide range of interventions implemented by various donors to support such engagement. This review looks at the effectiveness of interventions specifically aimed at supporting civil society groups to participate in peace processes. The author identifies, a number of challenges in identifying evidence. Donor support for civil society in peacebuilding situations can take many different forms (e.g. promoting social cohesion, reconciliation, community-level mediation, and so on); interventions targeting civil society are often a component of a broader project or programme; finally, there is a dearth of evaluations of such interventions. These constraints make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of these interventions and the factors driving success.

The review focused on three contexts: Nepal, Yemen and Libya. All have/are coming out of violent conflict; there is heavy international involvement and support for peace processes; and the challenge in all is to bring about sustained peace. Because no intervention was found explicitly referring to donor support for civil society participation in peace processes, the review takes a broader perspective and looks at donor interventions targeting civil society and aimed at peacebuilding in those contexts. Key findings of the review are as follows:

- **Nepal**: A number of donor countries have supported interventions targeting civil society in the context of the Nepal peace process. Interventions were largely found to have been effective in promoting an inclusive peace. A number of success factors could be identified
across the evaluations reviewed: ability to pick the right partners for on-the-ground implementation; a high degree of gender sensitivity; building relationships with local partners based on mutual trust and respect; allowing time for results to be seen; ensuring participatory, bottom-up planning; and taking a multi-pronged approach.

- **Yemen**: A number of the interventions identified in Yemen are still ongoing, and no evaluations were found. The Enhancing Women’s Roles in Peace and Security in Yemen project was carried out by Saferworld in partnership with Yemeni organisations. An evaluation report noted that women-led initiatives need institutional support and direct financial support.

- **Libya**: A Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) country programme includes the promotion of women’s economic empowerment through political participation and support for civil society. No evaluation report was found for the programme.

As noted above, given the constraints, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. This review perhaps most clearly points to the need for more evaluations of donor interventions to support civil society, and specifically to support civil society participation in peace processes.

**Gender**


This brief is part of a Gender Briefing Series to support women’s meaningful participation and the integration of gender perspectives in peace processes that aim to end violent intrastate conflict. This Brief is an output of the Political Settlements Research Programme. Using a comparative approach, the briefs:

- Establish the importance of the issue from a gender equality perspective and the importance of women’s meaningful engagement for effectively addressing it.
- Identify key issues with reference to the inclusion of women and their gender-related and gender-specific dimensions.
- Suggest ways of influencing change in peace processes, including identifying possible entry points and overcoming tensions with competing strategies.
- Highlight through examples how integrating gender perspectives in peace agreements not only benefits women, but also helps diversify perspectives and proposed solutions, thereby contributing more generally to progress in peace processes for all.
- Provide quantitative and qualitative data from peace agreements, using examples from across the world as evidence and inspiration for action.
- Offer analysis that provides for principled approaches to inclusion – grounded in international legal standards – with an indication of how these can be linked to pragmatic political arguments.

The brief identifies the following activities as useful in engaging with power-sharing proposals to make them more inclusive of women and agendas for equality.
1. **Producing strong gender-responsive conflict analysis of group power dynamics and incentives.** There will be a number of predictable ways in which the parties to conflict may achieve a compromise between what are often irreconcilable demands to ‘own’ the state. Any compromise will revolve around new permutations of political, territorial, military and economic power.

2. **Modelling power-sharing proposals for their possible gender impact.** Women can anticipate and scenario-plan for how the possible power-sharing models proposed may affect them, for example, by considering how the power-allocation formulae are likely to affect women’s participation in practice, given other group balances. They might also consider how to frame proposals in ways that make them more likely to be heard by mediators and others not disposed to gender equality.

3. **Building alliances between and across women’s groups.** Different groups of women may choose different means of influencing the process – for example, from inside particular political groupings, working across groupings, building very local constituencies, working with international actors. It is important to have frequent dialogue and consultation across diverse groups of women, including across what may be several women’s movements rather than a singular women’s movement, to try to build strong communication and transparency, tolerance and dialogue as part and parcel of creating different strategies in a multi-layered cross-constituency approach to peacebuilding.

4. **Building alliances with other groups.** Women will have alliances with political-military groupings, or alliances with other non-aligned minorities whose challenges of exclusion they may share. Often, broad ‘rainbow’ coalitions pushing for equality can be more successful in creating a broader form of political power-sharing with better protection for human rights. Moreover, tactical use of the diversity of women and others advocating for equality may resonate with different parties, helping to move fixed party positions.

5. **Formulating clear proposals for women’s inclusion, which have evidence of cross-sector support from other marginalised constituencies.** Women will need to determine whether and how they want to seek direct representation in political power-sharing governance arrangements. Lobbying will need to address how women are to be selected, who will select them, and what type of representative role they will be understood to play. Challenging questions will require significant discussion amongst women, and a level of compromise between different feminist and women’s positions.

6. **Pushing for representation in the structures set up to advance the transitional deliberation.** Women will often want to seek strong representation in national dialogues, constitution-making or reform processes, and peace agreement implementation mechanisms. Thinking about how women’s interests can be achieved is important.

7. **Asking for support and advice.** Challenging levels of detail can be approached with the help of technical advice on how such proposals are likely to affect women in any given context. Gender equality advocates and gender advisors, and indeed mediators and parties to conflict, should seek specific advice on how the detail of power-sharing arrangements is likely to affect the representation of women within the particular electoral and power-balances of a country.

The objective of this report is to present an analysis of women’s inclusion distilled from the larger “Broadening Participation” research project, in order to provide direct comparative evidence on women’s influence in previous cases of peace processes. The research found that the direct inclusion of women does not per se increase the likelihood that more peace agreements are signed and implemented. What makes a difference is the influence women have on a process. Key findings are highlighted below:

- Women have made substantial contributions to peace-making and constitution-making negotiations and to the implementation of final agreements even if their inclusion is still challenged or met with indifference by many negotiation parties and mediators.

- The strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with agreements being reached and implemented. In cases where women’s groups were able to exercise strong influence on a negotiation process, the chances of a final agreement being reached were much higher than in those cases where women’s influence was moderate, weak, or absent in practice. The chances of peace agreements being implemented were also much higher when women’s groups had a stronger influence on the process.

- The involvement of women does not weaken peace processes. On the contrary, the presence of women strengthened the influence other additionally included actors had on the peace processes studied. This is because organised women’s groups pressured for signing peace deals more often than any other group participating in a peace process.

- Women’s inclusion is not limited to direct participation at the negotiation table. Women’s inclusion has occurred in the past through multiple modalities and throughout the different peace process phases (i.e. pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-agreement implementation). In any peace process, several modalities of inclusion may be present either separately or, more often, in parallel to each other during all process phases.

- A specific set of process and context factors work hand in hand to either enable or constrain women’s ability to participate and exercise influence: Selection criteria and procedures; Decision-making procedures; Coalition-building; Transfer strategies; Inclusion-friendly mediators; Early inclusion in the peace process; Support structures; Monitoring; Funding.


Participants in this expert group meeting discussed the barriers to and enablers of women’s representation and meaningful participation at all stages of peace and security processes. The scope of the discussions reflected the reality of contemporary peace and security processes and included discussion of ceasefires, informal and local/community level peacebuilding processes, negotiations and formal peace agreements, implementation mechanisms, transitional or constitutional arrangements, disarmament and demobilization arrangements, humanitarian access agreements, the growing focus on counter-terrorism operations and more. The report highlighted the need to:
Harness political will and eliminate structural blockages;
Embed gender-sensitive conflict analysis as standard practice;
Strengthen long-term support, enabling measures, and transformative approaches;
Support national and local ownership;
Secure gender-sensitive agreements and implementation.

Mediation Guidelines


The Mediation Practice Series was initiated in 2008 as part of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s efforts to support the broader mediation community. This Mediation Practice Series paper seeks to provide concrete examples in order to identify key factors of success for a national dialogue and prepare third parties for the challenges that they might face in supporting such processes. Essential points for practitioners include:

- There is no blueprint for national dialogues. Based on lessons learned, third parties can, however, identify factors contributing to their success and failure, as well as recurrent challenges for such processes.
- National dialogues are designed to conduct inclusive consultations to forge consensus, negotiate reforms or determine the process through which reforms will take place, and/or start a reconciliation process.
- Factors for success include the quality of a national dialogue’s mandate, the political will of parties for change, and the inclusiveness of the process.
- National dialogues should avoid being perceived as ivory towers by constituencies and gain from links to parallel dialogue tracks and existing political processes and institutions.
- To preserve the legitimacy of the process, third parties’ support to national dialogues should not replace or overshadow national ownership.
- National dialogues do not guarantee that reforms or transitions will be successful, and they alone cannot resolve all the challenges a country and society face. In addition, third parties should remember that the participants’ willingness and the technical quality of a national dialogue do not guarantee a positive outcome.
- Third-party support is rarely disinterested and different parties might sometimes have opposing objectives in supporting a national dialogue.
- Clarity should be an essential principle for the mandate of a national dialogue. A mandate which is too broad risks triggering intractable debates during the process to redefine the exact terms of the mandate. A narrow mandate on the other hand might greatly limit the room for change and generate frustration among participants and constituencies.
- The selection of delegates is a highly political step in the organisation of a national dialogue and will influence the legitimacy and inclusivity of the process. Consultations are an appropriate tool to prevent tensions during the selection process.
- Decision-making rules are important and might result in locking a dialogue in lengthy debates, or in vetoes or boycotts due to the frustration of some participants.
The convening of a national dialogue is a major undertaking in terms of organisation. The venue, costs, security and administrative support play a key role in the smooth development of the process. Outputs of national dialogues are not always tangible. Such processes are also socialising mechanisms for parties whose interactions have otherwise been characterised by mutual animosity. For implementation, it is very important that follow-up mechanisms are designed and agreed upon by consensus.


This paper seeks to provide mediators and mediation teams with a better understanding of, and options for, broadening participation in peace negotiations without sacrificing the effectiveness of the mediation process. The author cautions that while in some cases all relevant groups can have a seat at the negotiation table, this might not be possible for all negotiations. Hence, the following nine participation options can suit different contexts. They can take place either in parallel or sequentially, as they are not mutually exclusive.

**Model One Direct representation at the negotiation table:** In this model, all relevant groups are party to negotiations. This is the most direct form of participation and gives all players the same status as the main conflict parties. Examples are the Inter-Yemeni Dialogue that started in 2013 or the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from 2002. In Yemen, the UN mediator pushed for an all-inclusive dialogue as a means to allow all parties jointly to shape the future of their country in the process of the double transition from war to peace and from authoritarian to more democratic forms of governance. This process also ensures broader public buy-in and an acceptance of the agreement by all constituencies.

**Model Two Observer status:** Instead of participating as an additional party at the negotiation table, groups could instead have observer status. This can be particularly effective if a group has a high moral standing in the country and is seen as a guarantor for the agreement. It might also be a means of pleasing certain constituencies.

**Model Three Official consultative forums:** This model consists of formal forums comprising societal or political groups that are an official part of the peace process design. Such a forum has to be officially endorsed by all parties and the mediators, as was the case in Guatemala or Afghanistan in 2001. The mandate of such a forum can be specified by the mediator, the conflict parties, or by the groups themselves. In most cases, the consultative forum would follow the same agenda as the official negotiations but it mostly also adds issues to the negotiation agenda. It is essential that transfer modalities are agreed, i.e. how recommendations of the forum will be brought to the negotiation table. It is also important to agree whether the forum’s recommendations are binding or not.

**Model Four Consultations:** Here, consultations are not an officially endorsed part of the peace process architecture but can also take place before, parallel to or after official negotiations. Nevertheless, these consultations can enable diverse voices from the population to be heard and can inform wider constituencies about the negotiation process. They not only allow the mediation
team to better understand the conflict dynamics and the critical negotiation issues, but also allow mediators to gain insights into people’s needs, ideas and visions and to determine which players should be involved in shaping the post-agreement agenda. The case of the Kenyan post-election violence negotiations in 2008 demonstrates that groups can have substantial impact on the agreement.

**Model Five Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms:** Most peace agreements contain provisions for including wider representation into implementation mechanisms. Some peace agreements also include provisions for groups to inform the population about the agreement. In Somalia, for example, the 1993 agreement included a provision stipulating that civil society delegations would travel to all parts of the country to educate people about the agreement. Some agreements even provided seats for civil society representatives in national legislatures, as was the case in the Philippines in 1996, Burundi in 2000 and Liberia in 2003.

Model Six High-level civil society initiatives: High-level initiatives can take place before or in parallel to the official negotiations. These may be outside supported problem-solving workshops or private facilitation initiatives undertaken either by well-respected civil society leaders from within the country (insider mediators) or by externals. Both seek to strengthen the effectiveness of the negotiations, provide facilitation and, depending on the case, advocate for specific issues.

**Model Seven Public participation:** Such activities could include public hearings, citizen panels and opinion polls. Public participation serves different objectives, including to: improve understanding of the public’s opinions and needs, which in turn informs the negotiation agenda; create public buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process; put pressure on the conflict parties and help sustain the peace process; gather evidence from people about human rights violations or other grievances.

**Model Eight Public decision-making:** Following an armed conflict, peace agreements and/or new constitutions can be ratified by the electorate. This is a powerful tool to get public buy-in into an elite pact. Peace agreements are frequently negotiated by the moderates within parties. A public decision can then help to protect the agreement from hard-liner constituencies. It also seeks to provide democratic legitimacy to the process, ensuring public support and the sustainability of the agreement. A vote in favour of the agreement gives decision-makers a mandate to continue the process and gives them leverage over hard-line constituencies. A vote against the agreement blocks its implementation and usually puts the process on hold. Hence, the decision to put a peace deal to public vote needs careful consideration.

**Model Nine Mass action:** Most mass action centres on a common goal of national interest such as the end of authoritarian rule or war. Mass action can also take the form of targeted campaigns advocating the inclusion of relevant issues in the peace agreement. It may create a general pro- or anti-peace-agreement atmosphere. In Nepal in 2006, for example, three months of mass demonstrations put pressure on the conflict parties to end the armed conflict and the authoritarian rule, paving the way for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. By way of contrast, during the 2002 peace process in Sri Lanka, demonstrations against peace negotiations and the Norwegian facilitation – often carried out by Buddhist monks – became more frequent and louder than were the demonstrations in support of the peace process. Popular support for the military victory over the LTTE in 2009 demonstrates the power of the pro-war movement, which the facilitators and the international community had underestimated.
4. References


Suggested citation


About this report

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