

# The political economy of the primary education system in Tanzania

---

*Evert-jan Quak*

*Institute of Development Studies (IDS)*

*17 January 2020*

## Question

*What available evidence is there on the political economy of the primary education system in Tanzania?*

## Contents

1. Summary
2. Framing the debate about quality education for all
3. Educational reforms and learning outcomes in Tanzania
4. Mapping the political economy issues to deliver quality education for all in Tanzania
5. Political economy of equality in primary education: the case of students with disabilities
6. References

---

*The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.*

*Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please contact [helpdesk@k4d.info](mailto:helpdesk@k4d.info).*

# 1. Summary

This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution sources on the available evidence on the political economy of the primary education system in Tanzania. The review has a specific focus on what political economy analysis tells us about achieving quality education in Tanzania. Different distributions of power shapes decisions and incentives both at the school level as in the overall education system. From the literature it can be concluded that building accountability mechanisms within a learning environment is one of the most effective ways to align goals, policy and practice and find a power balance in which reforms could result in quality learning outcomes for all. This could be even more important than financial resources. However, it is important to get the balance right between micro and macro level decision-making processes in quality education reforms, as research shows that they reinforce each other.

In Tanzania enrolment of pupils into primary and secondary school has improved significantly, mainly through free education and a policy focus on building facilities. However, improvements in quality learning outcomes are limited. There is recognition within the government to stimulate quality education. To understand what interventions work, scholars are increasingly looking the political economy to explain progress dynamics. From a stakeholder perspective, the literature shows that:

- **Parents and child carers** are not organised as a group at the national or local level in demanding high-quality education. Because parents are not well-organised to raise their voice and push for educational reforms by the government, in particular for quality education, it falls to influential **civil society organisations** to raise important issues to the government and citizens.
- **Teachers** are well organised with the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), however, the authorities have deployed some containment techniques to inhibit its potential destabilising power. Teachers are public workers which makes them difficult to fire based on poor performances. With the high enrolment in Tanzania in the last decade, the high demand for teachers makes it even harder to dismiss teachers on the basis of performance.
- Some parents and teachers work together within **school boards**, which are formally accountable to the district, but in practice there is no systematic exchange of information. School boards have limited but increasing say in how capitation grants are spent. However, fundraising (mostly from parents) is no longer permitted due to efforts to alleviate financial pressures of schooling on parents. The School Board Committee has no direct legal ability in terms of learning inputs but they have the obligation to raise concerns about learning inputs to the school authorities on behalf of stakeholders.
- **Local government authorities** prioritise where the money is going to and signal needs and demands for improvements. However, although the education system is decentralised, funding is still centralised and therefore the most important decision-making takes place at the central level. Several officials work within the districts and wards within the education system, mainly to manage information and budgets, going from micro to macro level and vice versa. The **central government authorities** responsible for learning outcomes are the Ministry of Education (MoEST) and Presidents Ministerial Office on the Regions (PMO-RALG) both responsible for planning, monitoring, recurrent expenditures and development funds.

- **Elected bodies** at village and ward level like committees and councils have limited budgetary discretion as capital development grants and capitation grants are directly transferred from districts to schools. At the national level the Parliament has to approve the education budget and allocation of funds to the different ministries.

To understand the relationships between the stakeholders and their accountability to each other within the education system in Tanzania this rapid review also looks at the four determinants of principal-agency relationship:

- **Voice (politics) relationships:** In Tanzania, the relationship between end-users of the services, such as parents and families, and policy makers and politicians, remains rather weak in Tanzania. The only involvement by voters (parents) is in the school committees. But even then the ultimate power for policymaking lies with government officials in the district education office and at the ministry of education. Although voters (parents) pay taxes, Tanzania's heavy reliance on donor funding means that the fiscal accountability chain linking voters and politicians is relatively weak. Furthermore, the lack of a formal role for local representatives means that the electoral connection linking learning outcomes to voting behaviour is relatively weak.
- **Compact relationships:** The education sector budget is not the result of a multi-year costed plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. They are the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each unit or department, which makes it more complicated for strategic interventions within the education system. The current decentralisation process in Tanzania is criticised for having limited attention to equalise differences in fiscal capacity between sub-national authorities generating more resources per capita to mostly richer areas. This could be linked with capacity constraints, especially in local government, with a need to improve absorption capacity of available resources. Furthermore, it is very difficult for education providers to provide information on the capabilities of sub-national and national education officers due to weak accountability mechanisms. Lack of political will, some vested interest, clientelism, patronage and corruption all hamper implementation of policy and effective decision-making processes.
- **Management relationships:** Research from Mbiti et al. (2019) shows that students in schools that received more inputs (school grants) combined with teacher incentives (bonus) had significantly higher test scores. Furthermore, the study shows that the combination of grants and a teacher bonus is more cost-effective than focussing on just one. However, the reality in Tanzania is still different with low motivation for teachers. The majority of Tanzania's teachers are intrinsically demotivated and less committed to teaching. A lack of teaching and learning facilities in Tanzania limits the extent to which schools can demand and actuate teachers' accountability. However, wages are a limiting factor in motivating teachers as these are fixed in Tanzania, based on seniority. Cilliers et al. (2019) show that in Tanzania improving accountability through school rankings on district levels results in higher overall learning outcomes for students. However, parental responses to information did not provide these incentives, since parents generally are unaware of their school's district rank.
- **Client power:** The school board committees are the main body in which parents and students can use their client power. However, they are relatively weak in holding schools accountable for the students' learning output. The empirical evidence suggests that there

is a gap between Tanzanian schools and families. The reasons for the schools' limited efforts in involving parents in academic-related matters is the unwarranted belief among educational authorities that parents and members of the community are ignorant. Research from Solomon and Zeitlin (2019) show that parents' choices in Tanzania are driven by proximity and learning quality, with less pressure on class sizes or infrastructure quality.

The final part of this rapid review shows that the government does not consider variations across areas for education outcomes, which is an issue for students with disabilities, for example, who do not get more resources if they are in rural areas. Miles et al. (2018) argued that the achievement of equality for learners with disabilities currently relies largely upon the ingenuity of ordinary classroom teachers. Importantly, teachers are under significant pressure from the Ministry of Education, school administrators, and education inspectors to complete the set syllabus on time, improve learning outcomes and overall rankings, which limits teachers' flexibility and ability to modify curricular content and pedagogy to meet the needs of children with disabilities. Overall, such pressures also occur for special needs for socio-economically disadvantaged children.

## 2. Framing the debate about quality education for all

### Expansion of education vs quality of education

Access to education was the main purpose of the Millennium Development Goal 2 for 2015, however, the Sustainable Development Goals emphasise quality and equality in education. The World Bank's World Development Report 2018 acknowledges that **there is a 'learning crisis' that is widely, yet unevenly spread, varying between countries, classes, genders, and social groups** (World Bank, 2017). The report (World Bank, 2017, p.10) explains the four determinants of the learning crisis as (1) "children do not arrive ready to learn", (2) "teachers often lack the needed skills and motivation", (3) "school management skills that do not affect teaching and learning", and (4) "school inputs that have failed to affect teaching and learning." It argues that these can only be solved with a systemic approach that tackles existing political challenges that allow poor-quality schooling to persist.

Pritchett (2015) and Watkins and Kaler (2016) show that **well-intended single-issue approaches that are implemented in ineffective education systems may not be successful in developing countries unless fundamental features are addressed**. For example, the introduction of free primary school in Kenya in 2003 did not increase the net enrolment in public primary schools while enrolment in private primary schools doubled (Bold et al., 2013, as cited by Pritchett, 2015, p.6). In Indonesia the government doubled the wages for teachers to generate better outcomes for students, however, with zero impact on student learning, but resulting in additional salary costs of billions of dollars per year (De Ree et al., 2015, as cited by Pritchett, 2015, 6-7). Glewwe and Muralidharan (2015, cited by Pritchett, 2015, p.7) also point out that textbook provision does not necessarily increase learning of the typical student. This means that well-intentioned narrow education reforms that are implemented in ineffective systems may not be successful unless fundamental features are addressed (Watkins & Kaler, 2016).

Although many challenges in the education system can be linked to under-investments, **failures seem to be more related to a 'misalignment' between learning goals, policies, and practices**, in which incentives need to be right and accountability mechanisms established

(Hossain & Hickey, 2019). As the World Bank (2017) shows, there are countries (e.g. Vietnam) that are ahead on learning outcomes in schooling compared to what to expect for their income level, which reinforces the importance of political factors to explain quality learning outcomes above economic or cultural factors (Hossain & Hickey, 2019). Bruns and Schneider (2016) also conclude that education reforms are very politicised processes. For primary schools in developing countries physical expansion of education (e.g. more teachers and schools) has been easily measurable and therefore comparatively popular amongst policymakers. In comparison, improving quality learning for all is seen as complex with successes being measured over the long-term, meaning governments embracing such policies do so far less enthusiastically.

## Political economy of education

Wales et al. (2016, p.12) mention two political incentives underlying educational reforms:<sup>1</sup>

- The use of education as a route to creating a skilled workforce, as one element of elite coordination around a broad national development project;
- The use of education provision as a mechanism to build and secure support from elite groups and their followers (through a mix of policy programmes and patron-client networks).

This is where the political economy steps in to explain differences in access to quality learning for all (e.g. Mbiti, 2016). Hossain and Hickey (2019, p.2) state that **“different distributions of power shaped incentives and ideas around education quality reforms and institutions and processes of implementation” on both the school level (e.g. quality teaching and school management) and system level that enables quality learning**. For example, teacher unions are important actors to promote but also block learning reforms (Moe & Wiborg, 2017; Béteille, Kingdon & Muzammil, 2016). Quality learning outcomes also depend heavily on the commitment and capacity of elites and from parents and other carers of learners to promote and implement necessary reforms (Bruns & Schneider, 2016). Hossain and Hickey (2019, citing World Bank, 2003) show that for strengthening accountability for quality learning outcomes, citizens’ voice (towards policymakers) and client power (towards school management) are important dimensions to generate improvement. In other words, a balance between a “long route” (via the process of political representation) and a “short route” (via relationships with frontline providers, teachers and schools) to accountability is required to generate real impact on quality learning.

**To get this balance right between micro, meso and macro levels in quality education reforms is important, as research shows that they reinforce each other.** Joshi and Houtzager (2012) for example conclude that interventions that focus on client power (short route) engaging citizens with local learning providers, but failing to engage with wider policy actors to improve the learning system (long route), were less affective to increase overall accountability for quality learning. However, other research shows that lack of capacity or incentives for citizens to

---

<sup>1</sup> Wales et al. (2016, p.7) also mention two implications of education progress and reform processes across different political settlement types: “Firstly, that the application of political settlements analysis can help to explain patterns of progress in education access and quality, and to identify the political incentives underlying them. Education systems therefore need to be understood and researched in the light of their political context, rather than in isolation from it. Secondly, it demonstrates that there are benefits from tailoring donor and international agency approaches to education programming to the context of the political settlement in question.”

engage directly with learning providers affect learning outcomes, even where other groups of citizens could press for reforms at government levels (Carr-Hill et al., 2015). To cite Hossain & Hickey (2019, p.10):

*“[B]ottom-up pressures also need to be backed up by top-down pressure from within the political and bureaucratic system (Booth 2012), often through combined forms of diagonal accountability that join up oversight mechanisms in pursuit of more responsive and effective performance (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Joshi and Houtzager 2012).”*

This does not mean that decentralisation of education policy is always the right solution. For example, Kingdon et al. (2014, p.2) note that the supposed benefits of decentralisation “do not accrue in practice because in poor rural areas the local elite closes up the spaces for wider community representation and participation in school affairs”. They suggest the effects of decentralisation are “especially problematic when accountability systems are weak, and there is little parental information or awareness of how to hold schools responsible” (Kingdon et al. 2014, p.28). From the literature it can be concluded that **building accountability mechanisms within a learning environment is one of the most effective ways to align goals, policy and practice and find a power balance in which reforms could result in quality learning outcomes for all**. This could be even more important than resources as more resources may even “exacerbate the problem, entrenching public sector interests in the existing system, making teacher unions stronger, expanding poorly managed services to an even wider population” (Hossain & Hickey, 2019, p.12).

Pritchett (2015) builds a framework that entails such an approach of improving accountability by focussing on the four stakeholder groups involved in the system.

- Citizens, parents and students who are the direct beneficiaries of learning services.
- The Executive Apparatus of the State are all actors that control via executive decisions (laws, regulations, policies, allocation of budget) the provision of learning services.
- Organisational providers of learning services, which are schools and organisations that control schools.
- Teachers are the individuals who are the “front-line service providers” who are the direct producers and providers of instructional services.

The interactions between the stakeholders within the learning system create different principal-agency relationships between them (e.g. politics, compact, management, voice/client power). According to Pritchett (2015), each of these relationships embeds within it the four “design elements” of a relationship of accountability, namely: delegation, finance, information, and motivation. Several recent studies explain the political economy of the education system following the principles of this framework, by combining the design elements with the principal-agency relationships. By doing so it is possible to identify “the degree to which actors in local hierarchies of power genuinely support the reform; their willingness to implement reform; their capability for complex coordination of bureaucracies both horizontally, across systems, and vertically, from the ministerial to the school level, and the ability of the state to exercise effective control over policy implementation throughout its territory” (Watkins & Kaler, 2016, p.2).

Kingdon et al. (2014) in their literature review on the political economy of the education system in developing countries find the following key issues:

- **Roles and responsibilities:** From teacher unions that exert great influence on the shaping of education policies, to parents who do not have a collective voice on educational matters since they are generally not organised. The literature also recognises the importance of civil society groups (especially in highly politicised countries) and government officers and international agencies as stakeholders in education whose actions impact largely on the functioning and outcomes of schools.
- **Rent-seeking and patronage politics:** The literature concludes that clientelism, patronage and corruption are the three most intense political forces that push states to expand access to, rather than improve quality of, education. The literature shows that rent-seeking and exertion of political influence is also prevalent among teachers in a patronage-based system, which can negatively impact on the efficiency and equity of teacher deployment.
- **Decision-making and the process of influence:** A variety of groups influence the educational decision-making process depending on the institutional structures, such as centralised examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and process decisions, individual teacher autonomy over teaching methods, scrutiny of students' achievement, teacher incentive structures and competition from private schools.
- **Implementation issues:** Much of the reviewed literature on education has analysed the causes behind policy implementation gaps and policy failures, however, underlying these is likely to be some political economy constraint, as some lack of political will or some vested interest, which hinders the reduction in corruption or hinders better administration, governance and community information.
- **Driving forces:** Analysis in a large number of studies indicates that at the national level there are potential 'drivers' or agents of change – some groups and organised interests in civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pockets in the mass media, religious groups, trades unions, and reform-minded elements among the political, bureaucratic and professional elites.

### 3. Educational reforms and learning outcomes in Tanzania

Like in many other low-income countries, **Tanzania's education system focused mainly on the enrolment of students in primary and secondary schools.** It succeeded with a sharp rise in enrolment in primary and secondary education from the year 2000 accompanied by a surge in physical infrastructure, such as school buildings in the public education sector, to house the rise of students. This increase in enrolment can be linked with the 2001 policy of free primary education with an expanded policy of free lower secondary and pre-primary education that came into force in 2016 and led to an immediate increase of 38% in pre-primary enrolment. Enrolment for Form 1 (first year of secondary education) increased by 44.6% after 2016 (UNICEF, 2018).

The education budget of Tanzania is almost entirely managed by two ministries: Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and the President's Ministerial Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). In FY 2017/2018, **70% of education funding was transferred to Local Government Authorities to cover recurrent costs, mostly wages of teachers, while the remaining covers development expenditure and recurrent costs of the MoEST** (UNICEF, 2018). The budget for education as a percentage of the total public spending remained stable around 18% between the early 2000s to 2015, but in recent years declined towards 15% (UNICEF, 2018). This falls short of the Global Partnership for

Education target, which encourages countries to commit at least 20% of the national budget to education. Donors focus merely on supporting development funds via programming and have reduced budget support significantly in the last decade. In the FY 2017/2018 budget, 29% of development funds came from foreign donors compared to 44% the year before (UNICEF, 2018). Around 6% of the overall budget for education comes from foreign donors (UNICEF, 2018).

**The development expenditure in education is increasing in recent years driven by the growing amount of development funds available to decentralised authorities.** It is now around 24% of the total education budget in FY 2017/2018. Construction of new schools and rehabilitation of building infrastructure consumed the bulk of the development budget in FY 2016/2017, however, from the bulk of the development funds go to student loans (around 47% of the total development expenditures, which are domestically resourced).<sup>2</sup>

**Overall, the quality of education (e.g. quality of teachers) in Tanzania remains lower than in its peer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.** The teacher-pupil ratio at primary schools in Tanzania remains high at 1:43, higher than the sub-Saharan average and the number commonly referred to as the international standard of 1:40 (UNICEF, 2018). The pass-rate for minimum learning capabilities went down significantly in the 2000s while enrolment increased, however, there is a trend of gradual improvement since 2012. UNICEF (2018, p.6) mention the Uwezo Annual Learning Assessment that show that by the end of the primary cycle, 28% of children do not have the basic ability to read and multiply, but with high regional differences (also between urban and rural areas). Outcome indicators are correlated with inputs, and regions with less human and infrastructural resources tend to underperform (UNICEF, 2018).

Yet, it needs to be noted that **the Government has made efforts to tackle the problem of quality education for all** and in 2016/2017 provided training to 17,650 teachers (UNICEF, 2018). In 2017/2018 the Government committed to the training of 45,000 teachers on early primary literacy and numeracy. There is also a focus on delivering more books to schools. Books are now centrally procured and distributed to schools, however, with rising enrolment and delays in procurement and delivery, it is expected that shortages of textbooks persist (UNICEF, 2018). In 2014, the government also launched the Programme for Results initiative that aims to shift the focus of government and donors from an input-based system to one that focuses on results. The aim is to increase learning outcomes through:

- adequate and timely resource flows to schools;
- an improved education management information system;
- more equitable teacher deployment; and
- implementation of key “quick win” initiatives.

These “quick win” initiatives include, public official ranking of schools as a means of disseminating information on school performance; school incentive grants (for improved schools); development of a School Improvement Toolkit for school management; conducting regular national reading, writing and mathematics assessments; training for primary school teachers; ensuring the timely delivery of instructional materials; and recognising teacher performance and resolve payment arrears. **Despite this programme, UNICEF (2018) have not seen an improvement in quality learning outcomes in recent years.**

---

<sup>2</sup> See also <https://allafrica.com/stories/201904300724.html>

## 4. Mapping the political economy issues to deliver quality education for all in Tanzania

**Efforts to improve the primary education system, in particular reforms to stimulate quality education in primary schools in Tanzania, need to be analysed through political economy to explain why progress is still constrained** (see Box 1 for some sources about other sub-Saharan African countries). This section of the rapid review starts with a brief stakeholder analysis and then will focus on the accountability relationships between the stakeholders, and will end with some key power issues in the context of Tanzania.

### Stakeholder analysis

*Who are driving forces, what role and responsibility they have and who are key decision-makers?*

**Parents:** Parents or citizens in general are not considered a driving force for change in Tanzania, although some participate in school boards (see below). Their role and responsibility are to prepare their children for school, motivate learning and school attention. **They are not organised as a group at the national or local level in demanding high-quality education.** Some research mentions that some parents raise their voice through different channels to elected local councils (large route) and school management (short route), however, most issues are related to facilities (e.g. buildings, books, teacher-student ) and far less on issues related to quality education service systems (Komba, 2017).

**Teachers:** Teachers are organised in the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), which is a powerful trade union in Tanzania. Since the birth of the TTU in the 1990s, **the authorities have deployed “traditional containment techniques to inhibit its potential destabilising power: undermining their leaders’ credibility, intimidating teachers or capturing their leaders within the system”** (Languille, 2019, p.102). Languille (2019) highlights a teachers’ strike in 2010 which was followed by President Kikwete delivering a menacing speech to teachers while high-ranking representatives of the army and the police stood behind him. In 2012, in the context of salary negotiations, the government responded to a teachers’ strike with intimidation and the strike was declared illegal by the Court (Languille, 2019).

The wages of teachers are fixed by their characteristics – seniority, education attainment – regardless of their observable effort and effectiveness. **Teachers are public workers which makes them difficult to fire based on poor performances.** With the high enrolment in Tanzania in the last decade, the high demand for teachers makes it even harder to dismiss teachers on the basis of performance (GUIDE, 2016). Evidence from studies in Tanzania consistently affirm declining teachers’ motivation, low commitment to teaching, and a poor working environment, causing the majority of teachers to dislike teaching (Komba, 2017). The situation is further compounded by poor salaries in the teaching profession, which discourages the interest of highly performing graduates to join the teaching profession. However, there is also evidence that suggests that some graduates join the teaching profession simply because it is a profession that guarantees graduates immediate postgraduation employment from the government (Komba, 2017).

**School boards:** an important bottom-up actor in education are the school boards which consist of parents and teachers. During board meetings information from the head teacher is discussed, on the basis of which decisions are made. **School boards are formally accountable to the district, but in practice there is no systematic exchange of information** (Holvoet et al.,

2015). In Tanzania, families are primarily connected to the schools through school boards. The evidence indicates that almost every school in the country has a school board. These school committees are responsible for the management and overall development of the school. Inter alia, their roles are to engage with pupils, parents, and school staff; to oversee the school's day-to-day affairs; to plan the budget and ensure the proper use of school funds; and to effectively communicate educational information to parents, pupils, and other stakeholders (Holvoet et al., 2015).

**School committees have a limited say in how capitation grants are spent** (GUIDE, 2016).

The government specifies whether the money should be used for teaching and learning materials, school repairs, administrative materials, or examination expenses. Within these categories, the school committee has the authority to allocate funds (i.e. they can choose what specifically to repair or which learning materials to buy). In the past schools could raise their own money, however, fundraising (mostly from parents) is no longer permitted due to efforts to alleviate financial pressures of schooling on parents.

**The School Board Committee has no direct legal ability in terms of learning inputs** but as the committee's primary stakeholders are pupils, parents, teachers, and the community, they have the obligation to raise concerns about learning inputs to the school authorities on behalf of stakeholders. Education officials do not take into consideration individual parents' opinions (GUIDE, 2016).

**Local Government Authorities:** The implementation of policies and programmes in education are mainly on decentralised levels. Local Government Authorities (LGA) prioritise where the money is going to and signal needs and demands for improvements. However, **although the education system is decentralised, funding is still centralised and therefore the most important decision-making takes place at the central level**, particularly education budget allocations and priorities in the development funds (Languille, 2019). There are several functions at the LGA level as mentioned by Holvoet et al. (2015):

- **Ward Education Coordinator** is responsible for supervising all education activities at ward level, which includes monitoring the delivery of education, the attendance of teachers and students and involvement of the community. The Ward Education Coordinator is the actor that exchanges education-related information with most of the other actors, and therefore is an important player.
- **Ward Executive Officer** is responsible for revenue collection, developmental issues and law-and-order functions at ward level. He/she receives information from the Ward Education Coordinator and the Village Executive Officer who has similar responsibilities at village level.
- **District Primary Education Officer** is head of a department that is responsible for ensuring and monitoring primary education in the district and is, like the Ward Education Coordinator, considered to be an influential actor. At district level, data from schools are compiled and entered in an electronic Education Management Information System. Each District Education Officer is responsible for approximately 100 primary schools.
- **District Primary Education Inspectorate** is a top-down actor who stimulates accountability and learning in the education sector in the District. He/she is responsible for the inspection of primary schools. Officially 80% of the schools have to be inspected each year (of which 50% are non-announced inspections, 25% entire school inspections,

20% follow-up inspections and 5% visit inspections), the reality is that far less schools are inspected to a large extent due to staff shortages.

- **District Executive Director** is formally the most powerful local civil servant in the education system, receives information from all district actors as well as the Ward Executive Officers.
- **District Commissioner**, who is the representative of the state and the ruling party, is in practice the most powerful actor in the district as he or she is well-connected and exchanges information with various actors at district, ward and village levels.

**Central government authorities:** At the central level two ministries are directly involved in the education sector: MoEST and PMO-RALG. The Ministry of Finance is indirectly important as it allocates the funds to the education sector.

- **The MoEST** is the most important policymaker. It is charged with the following functions: formulating, monitoring, and evaluating educational policies; overseeing teacher training; registering schools; providing quality assurance; ensuring quality education service delivery in the country by conducting research to assist in making informed decisions; formulating and implementing mechanisms to strengthen quality assurance mechanisms to ensure that education is provided in accordance with set standards; and monitoring and evaluating Tanzania's education policies, legislation, guidelines, and curricula (Holvoet et al., 2015).
- **The PMO-RALG** is responsible for supervising the day-to-day provision of educational services at the decentralised levels. With regard to education, the functions of this ministry include the following: monitoring the employment of teachers and nonteaching staff in regions and local governments, initiating and monitoring the transfers of teachers and nonteaching staff from one region to another, monitoring the appointment of school heads, monitoring the appointment of school board members and their training in school management, monitoring in-service training for teachers and capacity building for nonteaching staff, coordinating the provision of government scholarships for children from poor families, participating in the coordination of Form 1 and 5 selection in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, and implementing policies, coordinating, and monitoring (Holvoet et al., 2015)

**Elected bodies:** There are elected councillors on the district, ward and village levels. They are less involved in the implementation of quality education services but focus on social issues (e.g. school dropouts due to pregnancy) and issues related to school infrastructure such as water and sanitation facilities (Holvoet et al., 2015). Wards and villages can have special committees, like a Ward Development Committee or an Education Committee that potentially could monitor progress and investment gaps. **Village and ward level committees and councils have limited budgetary discretion as capital development grants and capitation grants are directly transferred from districts to schools** (Holvoet et al., 2015). At the national level the Parliament has to approve the education budget and allocation of funds to the different ministries.

**Non-governmental organisations (NGOs):** Because parents are not well-organised to raise their voice and push for educational reforms by the government, in particular for quality education, **it falls to influential NGOs such as Uwezo/Twaweza and HakiElimu in Tanzania to raise important issues to the government and citizens** (Komba, 2017). For example, HakiElimu works on three programmes to increase participation and engagement of parents in education, to improve transparency and accountability on learning outcomes at the school level,

and to influence policy making and effective implementation. Twaweza's flagship programme Uwezo monitors basic literacy and numeracy levels of children through a household-based survey with the aim to inform wider public policy debates and encourage governments to improve the quality of education.

## Accountability relationships' analysis

**Voice (politics) relationships:** In Tanzania, politicians like councillors and Members of Parliament (MPs) are expected to serve as a vehicle for conveying citizens' views to the government, including on education. The relationship between end-users of the services, such as parents and families, and policy makers and politicians, remains rather weak in Tanzania. It is more the availability of strong NGOs or grassroot civil society organisations that step in, to voice local concerns and problems to help enhance pupils' learning outcomes (Komba, 2017).

Georgetown University Initiative called *GUIDE* (2016) provides a diagnostic analysis of the education system in Tanzania. See below some citations on the political accountability relationship:

*"Voters have very little understanding of how the education sector works. They elect politicians and delegate the policymaking process to their representatives. There is some involvement by voters in the school committees. But even then the ultimate power for policymaking lies with government officials in the district education office and at the ministry of education." (p.4)*

*"Voters contribute to the fiscal needs of the education sector through taxation. However, Tanzania's heavy reliance on donor funding means that the fiscal accountability chain linking voters and politicians is relatively weak. Voters delegate the management of largely donor funds earmarked for the education sector to their elected representatives and public officials." (p.4)*

*"The motivation of public officials to perform mainly arises from the electoral incentives. If politicians do not perform, they can be voted out. However, the lack of a formal role for local representatives means that the electoral connection linking learning outcomes to voting behaviour is relatively weak." (p.5)*

**Compact relationships:** The existing accountability relationship in Tanzania between the government, policymakers, and service providers is complicated, according to Komba (2017). The study findings in this regard reveal a lack of appropriate reporting mechanisms to monitor and adequately evaluate school performance processes. Komba (2017) also mentions a tendency of violation of a management principle known as unity of command, which requires that each subordinate have only one superior, because of the two Ministries that are responsible for school performances. This situation also affects the organisation's overall efficiency.

The allocation of the budget has a "heuristic function" (Languille, 2019) and aims to illuminate domestic power dynamics that underlie the budget, a topic scarcely scholarly investigated. The allocation of resources to ministries is supposed to be closely tied to their three-year strategic plan and annual action plans. However, the education sector budget is not the result of a multi-year costed plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. Languille (2019, p.100): "The Ministry of Education and the PMO-RALG prepare, in isolation, their own budget estimates, which are simply the incremental projection of the current fiscal year ceiling over the

two outer years. They are the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each unit or department.”

According to UNICEF (2017) **the current decentralisation process in Tanzania is criticised for having limited attention to equalise differences in fiscal capacity between sub-national authorities.** Local governments in rich areas are able to generate considerably more revenue per capita than those in poor areas. An ODI study also concludes that decentralised authorities receive very uneven recurrent grant allocations, in particular salary-related transfers, including for basic education (Tidemand et al., 2014). Furthermore, the ODI study mentioned that also within local authorities there are similar inequities with facilities in the periphery receiving far fewer staff resources than facilities near the centre leading to substantive inefficiencies in service delivery.

UNICEF (2017) also highlights **capacity constraints, especially in local government, with a need to improve absorption capacity of available resources.** Salaries are usually paid on time, block grants, subventions and development grants, however, often face delays or are only partly released. Another significant problem is the underfunding of the development budget which might lead to projects being abandoned or postponed resulting in wasted resources and/ or increased costs when/ if they are reverted to at a later stage (UNICEF, 2017). This inefficiency and inequality in the education system could have impact on school management and teacher performance in the worst affected schools.

Interviews with District Education Officers by Cilliers et al. (2019) revealed that some education officers gathered head-teachers in a room and publicly berated bottom-ranked schools in an effort to encourage better performance. There is also some suggestive evidence that some District Education Officers organised additional training on how to conduct remedial and exam preparation classes (Integrity Research, 2016, as cited in Cilliers et al., 2019). Overall the District Education Officers use the National Examination Council of Tanzania’s (NECTA) results to discuss progress with head teachers on an annual basis. There is no evidence of guidance being given to head teachers or teachers as to how underperforming schools should improve (GUIDE, 2016).

Although there are mechanisms in place to monitor teacher performance (see also below for school management), **it is very difficult for education providers to provide information on the capabilities of sub-national and national education officers due to weak accountability mechanisms.** They can be removed from office in case of poor performance only by the president or the relevant cabinet minister (GUIDE, 2016). Furthermore, this is the area where implementation and rent-seeking issues occur. Lack of political will, some vested interest, clientelism, patronage and corruption all hamper implementation of policy and effective decision-making processes.

To cite some conclusions from GUIDE (2016) on the compact relationships:

*“The central government disburses funds directly to schools and entrusts school committees, together with the sub-national education officers, with the task of responsibly spending money to produce good learning outcomes. The government has sufficient budgetary discretion to be able to use the threat of financial cuts to influence the behaviour of both teachers and sub-national education officers.” (p.4)*

*“The accountability relationship between the central government and local public officials in the education sector is primarily informed by the fiscal relationship and the authority to transfer front line providers. The central government gets information on inputs as well as*

*outputs (in terms of performance ranking). However, this measure of output is noisy, as it does not make it easy for the central government to disaggregate the effort levels of the different chains involved in the production of performance at the school level.” (p.5)*

*“The motivation for sub-national public officials to do their work comes from the credible threat of being fired or getting transferred to an undesirable location. In the case of teachers, the motivation comes from the public school ranking (which publicly signals performance) as well as the threat of being transferred to an undesirable school location.” (p.5)*

**Management relationships:** This is the relationship between school managers and teachers. Based on the factors that encourage graduates to join the teaching profession and the poor working environment in public schools, it can be argued that **the majority of Tanzania’s teachers are intrinsically demotivated and less committed to teaching**, which in turn affects both their level of accountability and students’ learning outcomes (Komba, 2017). The findings of Komba (2017) further suggest that a lack of teaching and learning facilities in Tanzania limits the extent to which schools can demand and actuate teachers’ accountability. The factors that the literature cites as contributing to absenteeism include poor teacher management and accountability (UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Head teachers could have taken steps to improve exam performance in order to demonstrate their competence and work ethic to their peers or superiors. This could be due to career concerns, professional norms, or an intrinsic competitive drive to outperform other schools in the district (Cilliers et al., 2019). However, **wages are a limiting factor in motivating teachers as these are fixed in Tanzania, based on seniority.**

Recent research in Tanzania to explain teacher motivation for quality education outcomes had the following conclusions (Mbiti et al., 2019):

- There is mixed evidence on the impact of teacher performance pay on student learning. On the low-stakes tests conducted by the research team, student scores were modestly higher than those in the control group, but were not statistically significant. On the high-stakes tests administered by Twaweza (that were used to calculate teacher bonus payments), the researchers found significant positive learning effects in math, Kiswahili, and English.
- Students in schools that received more inputs (school grants) and teacher incentives (bonus) had significantly higher test scores in all subjects on the low-stakes and high-stakes tests. Thus, “school inputs may be effective when teachers have incentives to use them effectively, but not otherwise” (Mbiti et al., 2019, p.1630). Mbiti et al. (2019) furthermore show that the combination of grants and a teacher bonus is more cost-effective than focussing on one.

However, the reality in Tanzania is still different with low motivation for teachers. To cite some conclusions from GUIDE (2016) on the management relationships:

*“The stated objectives for teachers are both input and output based. [...] The teacher and head teacher promotion process based entirely on seniority and level of education. Under rare conditions teachers can be rewarded through transfers to relatively more desirable geographic locales. The hiring and firing of teachers governed by the general statutes that govern public workers. This, coupled with the high demand for teachers, makes it highly unlikely that teachers are fired for poor performance.” (p.5)*

Cilliers et al. (2019) show that in Tanzania **improving accountability through school rankings on district levels results in higher overall learning outcomes for students as there was an overall improvement in the exam performance for schools in the bottom deciles of their district**, who faced additional pressure to improve. The authors conclude that parental responses to information did not provide these incentives, since parents generally are unaware of their school's district rank (see also below client power). Therefore they conclude that the mechanism is most likely a "combination of pressure exerted by District Education Officers, who themselves had incentives to demonstrate in their district, and a mix of professional norms and competitive desires among head teachers, seeking to avoid poor performance in an environment in which results had become more salient" (Cilliers et al., 2019, p.29).

However, the study also shows the negative unintended consequences of policies. Although the reform (Big Results Now in Education) improved learning among students in bottom-ranked schools, **the reform also resulted in some students dropping out due to higher pressure to perform**. Cilliers et al. (2019, p.29) conclude that "the overall welfare effect of the programme is unclear and will depend on additional structure for policymaker preferences".

**Client power:** The school board committees are the main body in which parents and students can use their client power. According to Korma (2017) they are mainly concerned with issues related to school construction activities, school facilities, and the management of funds, but are relatively weak in holding schools accountable for the students' learning output. Families are also free to visit the school and enquire about their children's learning outcomes or other concerns they have about the school performance. However, the empirical evidence suggests that there is a gap between Tanzanian schools and families. There is not much formal recognition of the need for participation in the budget process. At the school level, school committees can decide on projects, but subject to review by the District Education Officer (GUIDE, 2016).

**The reasons for the schools' limited efforts in involving parents in academic-related matters is the unwarranted belief among educational authorities that parents and members of the community are ignorant**, for example, that they have never attended school themselves (Komba, 2013). Another reason given by GUIDE (2016) diagnostic analysis is that official ranking information and other performance information of schools are hampered by the fact that citizens can only access the information online or by going to the District Education office. "Essentially, the findings indicate that the client power accountability relationship is weak and cannot be expected to yield much in terms of holding the school accountable for poor school outcomes" (Komba, 2017, p.6).

However, **research from Solomon and Zeitlin (2019) show that parents' choices in Tanzania are driven by proximity and learning quality**, with less pressure on class sizes or infrastructure quality. They come to three conclusions (p.1):

- Parents' values for a one-standard-deviation improvement in distance and in learning outcomes dominate other attributes, such as class sizes and infrastructure quality, in shaping choices.
- The extent to which parents prefer one of these attributes over the other—which we characterise as parents' *willingness to walk* for learning outcomes—varies widely by region.
- There is little association between the strength of parents' preference for learning over proximity and the efficiency with which regions actually deliver learning outcomes, suggesting scope for improved alignment between government and citizen priorities.

To cite from the GUIDE (2016) conclusions on Tanzania's client power relationship between parents and schools:

*“The vast majority of parents have very few years of schooling. They therefore delegate a lot of the teaching process to teachers. Parents therefore have a strong preference for teachers that can improve their children's performance without requiring too much parental input at home or in the school management system.” (p.4)*

*“Parents and students have a wealth of information on teacher performance and the various challenges facing their respective schools. They can voice these concerns through school committees. They can also voice them through their elected representatives, at the ward and constituency levels. However, the fact that there is no direct link between parents and the administrative structures that run the education system means that parental voice can only reach the main policymakers indirectly through second or third parties.” (p.5)*

*“School fees were abolished. Parents are not required to provide any funding in the management of schools.” (p.4)*

*“Parents prefer good performance and would like to have motivated teachers. However, they are inhibited in their ability to influence this outcome on account of the structure of human resource management in the education sector.” (p.5)*

#### **Box 1. Some suggestions for further reading on political economy in education in Eastern African Countries:**

Kjær, A.M., Muwanga, N. (2016). Inclusion as political mobilisation: The political economy of quality education initiatives in Uganda. ESID Working Paper 65. [http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working\\_papers/final-pdfs/esid\\_wp\\_65\\_kjaer\\_muwanga.pdf](http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_65_kjaer_muwanga.pdf)

Kramon, E., Posner, D.N. (2016). Ethnic favoritism in education in Kenya. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11, p.1-58. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015005>

Watkins, S., Ashforth, A. (2019). An Analysis of the Political Economy of Schooling in Rural Malawi: Interactions among Parents, Teachers, Students, Chiefs and Primary Education Advisors. RISE Working Paper 31. [https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE\\_WP-031\\_Watkins\\_Ashforth\\_2.pdf](https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_WP-031_Watkins_Ashforth_2.pdf)

Williams, T.P. (2017). The Political Economy of Primary Education: Lessons from Rwanda. *World Development*, 96, p.550–561. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.037>

## **5. Political economy of equality in primary education: the case of students with disabilities**

**In Tanzania, the government does not consider variations across areas for education outcomes. This is particularly an issue for students with disabilities, for example, who do not get more resources if they are in rural areas** (GUIDE, 2016). In 2010, Tanzania issued the Persons with Disabilities Act which guarantees the right to education and training services to children with disabilities. The vast majority of students with disabilities do not attend any

specialised schools for the disabled, however, the 2014 Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) survey found that only 4% of classrooms in the surveyed schools can cater to children with special needs (GUIDE, 2016).

**Most of the students with disabilities do not have access to assistive devices like a wheelchair, cane or hearing aid.** In other cases, few teachers receive training to teach children with learning disabilities. Miles et al. (2018) argued that the achievement of equality for learners with disabilities currently relies largely upon the ingenuity of ordinary classroom teachers. Although teachers' inclusive practices can be seen as effective pedagogies which could inform teacher education colleges and policy makers on improving education for students with disabilities, the constraints on resources (see for example Opini & Onditi, 2016) and lack of urgency to improve the current situation amongst most stakeholders in the education system, restricts systemic change. Importantly, teachers are under significant pressure from the Ministry of Education, school administrators, and education inspectors to complete the set syllabus on time (Opini & Onditi, 2016), improve learning outcomes and overall rankings, which limits teachers' flexibility and ability to modify curricular content and pedagogy to meet the needs of children with disabilities (Tungaraza, 2015).

Overall, such pressures also occur for special needs for socio-economically disadvantaged children. **There is no clear policy to address the needs of the socio-economically disadvantaged children** (GUIDE, 2016). Cash disbursement by the central government occurs on a per capita basis at the district level. Presently there is no clear government policy to provide additional resources to disadvantaged students.

## 6. References

- Béteille, T., Kingdon, G.G., Muzammil, M. (2016). Teacher Unions in India: Diverse and Powerful. In *The Comparative Politics of Education* by T. Moe and S. Wiborg, Cambridge University Press.
- Bold, T., Kimenyi, M., Mwabu, G., Ng'ang'a, A., Sandefur, J. (2013). *Scaling up what works: Experimental evidence on external validity in Kenyan education*. Center for Global Development Working Paper 321. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/scaling-what-works-experimental-evidence-external-validity-kenyan-education-working>
- Bruns, B., Schneider, B.R. (2016). *Managing the Politics of Quality Reforms in Education. Policy Lessons from Global Experience*. The Learning Generation Background Paper. New York: The Education Commission. <http://report.educationcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Managing-the-Politics-of-Quality-Reforms.pdf>
- Carr-Hill, R., Rolleston, C., Pherali, T., Schendel, R. (2015). *The Effects of School-based Decision Making on Educational Outcomes in Low and Middle Income Contexts: A Systematic Review*. 3ie Grantee Final Review. London: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. <https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/the-effects-of-school-based-decision-making-on-educational-outcomes-in-low-and-middle-income-contexts-a-systematic-review>
- Cilliers, J., Mbiti, I., Zeitlin, A. (2019). *Can public rankings improve school performance? Evidence from a nationwide reform in Tanzania*. RISE Working Paper 27. [https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE\\_WP-027\\_TZ\\_BRN\\_.pdf](https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_WP-027_TZ_BRN_.pdf)
- De Ree, J., Muralidharan, K., Pradhan, M., Rogers, F. (2015). *Double for nothing? Experimental evidence on the impact of an unconditional teacher salary increase on student performance in Indonesia*. NBER Working Paper 21806. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w21806>
- Glewwe, P., Muralidharan, K. (2015). *Improving School Education Outcomes in Developing Countries: Evidence, Knowledge Gaps, and Policy Implications*. [https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~kamur/papers/Published\\_Book\\_Chapters/School\\_Education\\_Developing\\_Countries.pdf](https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~kamur/papers/Published_Book_Chapters/School_Education_Developing_Countries.pdf)
- GUIDE (2016). *RISE Tanzania System Diagnostics*. Georgetown University Initiative on Innovation, Development and Evaluation (GUIDE).
- Holvoet, N., Inberg, I., Lulu E., Matekere, Y. (2015). Local education sector governance in Tanzania. Mapping monitoring and evaluation actors, activities and use in two selected villages of Mzumbe ward (Mvomero District, Morogoro Region). Preliminary Findings'. Antwerp: Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp and Mzumbe: Institute of Development Studies, Mzumbe University. <https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/1400cb/07adac55.pdf>
- Hossain, N., Hickey, S. (2019). The Problem of Education Quality in Developing Countries. In *The Politics of Education in Developing Countries. From Schooling to Learning* by S. Hickey and N. Hossain (eds), Oxford University Press. <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-politics-of-education-in-developing-countries-9780198835684?cc=us&lang=en&>

- Joshi, A., Houtzager, P.P. (2012). Widgets or Watchdogs? Conceptual Explorations in Social Accountability. *Public Management Review*, 14(2), p.145-162.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2012.657837>
- Kingdon, G.G., Little, A., Aslam, M., Rawal, S., Moe, T., Patrinos, H., Bêteille, T., Banerji, R., Parton, B., Sharma, S.K. (2014). *A Rigorous Review of the Political Economy of Education Systems in Developing Countries. Final Report*. Education Rigorous Literature Review. London: Department for International Development.  
<https://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Portals/0/PDF%20reviews%20and%20summaries/Political%20economy%202014Kingdon.pdf?ver=2014-04-24-141259-443>
- Komba, A.A. (2017). Educational Accountability Relationships and Students' Learning Outcomes in Tanzania's Public Schools. *SAGE Open*, p.1–12.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244017725795>
- Languille, S. (2019). The politics of the education budget: Financing mass secondary education in Tanzania (2004–2012). *International Journal of Educational Development*, 66(1), p.96-104. <https://www.learntechlib.org/p/208098/>
- Mbiti, I., Muralidharan, K., Romero, M., Schipper, Y., Manda, C., Rajani, R. (2019). Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(3), p.1627–1673. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1093/qje/qjz010>
- Mbiti, I. (2016). The need for accountability in education in developing countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30(3), p.109-132.  
<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.3.109>
- Miles, S., Westbrook, J., Croft, A. (2018). Inclusions and exclusions in rural Tanzanian primary schools: material barriers, teacher agency and disability equality. *Social Inclusion*, 6(1), p. 73-81. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/si.v6i1.1203>
- Moe, T. M., Wiborg, S. (2017). Introduction. In *The Comparative Politics of Education* by T.M. Moe and S. Wiborg (eds). Cambridge University Press.
- Opini, B., Onditi, H. (2016). Education for All and students with disabilities in Tanzanian Primary schools: challenges and successes. *International Journal for Educational Studies*, 3(2), p.65-76. <https://escijournals.net/index.php/IJES/article/download/1504/926>
- Pritchett, L. (2015). *Creating Education Systems Coherent for Learning Outcomes: Making the Transition from Schooling to Learning*. RISE Working Paper 5.  
[https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE\\_WP-005\\_Pritchett\\_0.pdf](https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_WP-005_Pritchett_0.pdf)
- Solomon, S., Zeitlin, A. (2019). What Do Tanzanian Parents Want from Primary Schools—and What Can Be Done about It? RISE Insight.  
[https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE\\_Insight\\_TZ\\_School\\_Choice\\_1.pdf](https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_Insight_TZ_School_Choice_1.pdf)
- Tidemand, P., Sola, N., Maziku, A., Williamson, T., Tobias, J., Long, C., Tilley, H. (2014). *Local Government Authority (LGA) fiscal inequities and the challenges of 'disadvantaged' LGAs in*

- Tanzania. Overseas Development Institute (ODI): London.  
<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9144.pdf>
- Tungaraza, F. D. (2015). The arduous march toward inclusive education in Tanzania: Head teachers' and teachers' perspectives. *Africa Today*, 61(2), p.108-123.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283228697\\_The\\_Arduous\\_March\\_toward\\_Inclusive\\_Education\\_in\\_Tanzania\\_Head\\_Teachers'\\_and\\_Teachers'\\_Perspectives](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283228697_The_Arduous_March_toward_Inclusive_Education_in_Tanzania_Head_Teachers'_and_Teachers'_Perspectives)
- UNESCO & Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (2014). Enhancing teacher education for bridging the education quality gap in Africa: The case of Tanzania—Needs assessment report. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002330/233079e.pdf>
- UNICEF (2018). *Tanzania Education Budget Brief 2018*.  
<https://www.unicef.org/tanzania/media/1236/file/UNICEF-Tanzania-2018-Education-Budget-Brief.pdf>
- UNICEF (2017). Political Economy Analyses in Countries in Eastern and Southern Africa Case Study – Tanzania Mainland Political Economy Analysis.  
<https://www.unicef.org/esa/sites/unicef.org.esa/files/2018-09/UNICEF-Tanzania-2017-Political-Economy-Analysis.pdf>
- Wales, J., Magee, A., Nicolai, S. (2016). How does political context shape education reforms and their success? Lessons from the Development Progress project. Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Dimension Paper 6. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10808.pdf>
- Watkins, S., Kaler, A. (2016). *Pivoting to Learning: A Puzzle with Many Pieces*. RISE Working Paper 6.  
[https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE\\_WP-006-Watkins-Kaler\\_0.pdf](https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_WP-006-Watkins-Kaler_0.pdf)
- World Bank (2017). *World Development Report 2018*. Learning to Realize Education's Promise. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018>
- World Bank (2003). *World Development Report 2004*. Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/527371468166770790/World-Development-Report-2004-Making-services-work-for-poor-people-Overview>

## Suggested citation

Quak, E. (2020). The political economy of the primary education system in Tanzania. K4D Helpdesk Report No 710. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

## About this report

*This report is based on six days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact [helpdesk@k4d.info](mailto:helpdesk@k4d.info).*

*K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI).*

*This report was prepared for the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2020.*

