

# The Implication of Government Change to Technical Assistance

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## Question

*Does a change in government affect (increase/reduce) the impact of technical assistance (TA)?*

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# 1. Overview

**The biggest risk to the effectiveness of ongoing Technical Assistance (TA) programmes (as a result of a change in government) is a change in priority or policy by the incoming administration.** Indeed, periods of transition usually see the passing of a diverse set of economic and social policies that may affect ongoing development programmes. The World Bank (2007), for instance, notes that about 85% of economic reforms take place within 15 months of a change of government. Donor flexibility is, therefore, of particular importance in circumstances of government change in programme countries.<sup>1</sup>

**The existing (limited) evidence shows that the change of government generally has a negative effect on the effectiveness of ongoing TA programmes** – especially when the new government has different priorities (which can often be the case for an incoming opposition party). However, in some cases, a new administration – despite some policy differences from its predecessor – may see an ongoing TA programme as helpful and may decide to continue supporting it in its existing form. In such cases, there may not be an adverse impact/shock on the effectiveness of TA programmes (see Sections 3 and 4).

**This rapid literature review has detected the severe lack of academic studies and dedicated synthesis on the topic.**<sup>2</sup> However, several project reviews (intermediate or final) by donors and independent programme reviewers give a passing mention (a paragraph or two) of the high risk to programme effectiveness from government change in partner countries. In this regard, the academic community (or research departments of major development institutions) may fill a valuable research gap if they systematically explore the issue.

Some evidence on how change of governments in programme countries affects the effectiveness of TA is summarised below:

- The TA component of the ‘Punjab Education Sector Programme’ has faced sustainability challenges from the new administration (that won the 2018 Pakistan general elections) since it showed low political will and ownership towards the programme.
- A USAID evaluation of TA for local M&E capacity building in Peru has shown that the national M&E networks and institutions are vulnerable to instability rendered by changes in government – as was evident from the 2016 Peruvian general election.
- Evidence from TA programmes in Guatemala have shown that TA effectiveness may be negatively affected by programme delays, changing/conflicting priorities of ministries and government departments, and a complicated political environment – in the event of change in government (e.g. 2011 Guatemalan general election).
- Following a change of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. general elections in October 2010), USAID’s Country Development Cooperation programme and its TA components faced considerable risk from constitutional and political instabilities.

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/\\_508\\_securing-the-future.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/_508_securing-the-future.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> This rapid literature review follows on from ‘The Effectiveness of Technical Assistance in Middle Income Countries’ by Megersa (2019).

- Evidence from TA components in DFID's regional business innovation programme (namely, 'Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development' in South Asia and East Africa) as well as German Bilateral Technical Cooperation in different Latin America and Caribbean countries shows that changes of governments (and the ensuing political instabilities and shifting government priorities) may impact TA effectiveness.
- Conversely, an evaluation of the 'Advancing National Integration' programme in Georgia by USAID claimed that the change of government in 2012 has had no observable effect on project effectiveness. Further, a change of government in Ghana in 2000 has had a positive effect on the effectiveness of 'Parliamentary Strengthening' capacity enhancement (TA) programme – even if the usual post-election political instabilities were observed (e.g. laying-off senior public servants by incoming administration).

The following sections of this brief report are structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise account of the scientific literature – especially as it relates to the link between government change, political instability and aid effectiveness. Section 3 provides specific examples where changes in governments affected national Technical Assistance programmes (or specific Technical Assistance components of broad country programmes by donors).<sup>3</sup> The section provides some eight examples of such instances from Middle Income Countries (MICs) in South Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Section 4 provides two more similar examples – focusing on regional TA programmes.

## 2. Change of government and TA: Evidence from the broad literature

**There is an established body of literature examining the link between change of governments and/or political instability, vis-à-vis policy uncertainty or reforms, and how this affects economic growth. However, the literature does not explicitly explore the effects on Technical Assistance (TA) programmes.** Nonetheless, it is correct to assume that changing government priorities and policies will affect programme effectiveness (see Section 3 and 4).

Research shows that lack of continuity in policies, changing government priorities, and political instabilities (e.g. linked to changes in governments and severe divisions among political groups) creates uncertainties that adversely affect programme effectiveness and economic development (Batten, 2011; Joseph, 2015).

**Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003) stress that aid effectiveness in general depends on political stability.** They hypothesise that the effectiveness of aid (in the form of TA or other modalities) may be affected by political instability in two opposite directions. Political instability could be seen as economic vulnerability (i.e. as an exogenous negative shock) that is likely to be compensated (or insured) by foreign aid. But because this instability is political rather than

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<sup>3</sup> Some of the programmes covered in this report are not solely TA – but also broader country and regional programmes that have a TA component to address specific objectives.

economic and internal rather than external, its effects are less likely to be rewarded by a resource inflow. It seems more likely that political instability works in the opposite direction and negatively impacts effectiveness. The authors note that in a troubled political environment, with violence, frequently changing governments, coups d'état, riots, etc. – aid (be it TA or other) may hardly contribute to growth.

**Changes in government may at times have positive effects on the effectiveness of TA programmes.** This is especially the case where the transition is part of a normal democratic process, and the programme is favourable to the new government too (e.g. see Section 3.6). Unsurprisingly, some of the positive cases associated to change in government are on TA and capacity building programmes focused on democratisation, parliamentary support, external advice on elections processes etc. (Simpson and Park, 2013; World Bank, 2004).

**It is worth mentioning that 'uncertainties' and 'risks' tied to change in government – in some rare occasions – may emanate not only on the side of TA recipient countries, but also from donors.** Seldomly, new administrations of donor nations may have different priorities and philosophies, and this may affect longer-term TA programmes. For instance, the change of government in 2013 brought considerable changes to Australian government aid policy. The aid budget was cut repeatedly. AusAID, the Australian Government's aid agency, was fully integrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Government policy statements also stated the arrival of a 'New Aid Paradigm', an augmented focus on economic diplomacy, and a new push for innovation in the Australian aid programme (Wood et al., 2017). Cliff (1993) also notes that a change of donor government or policy may sometimes cause cancellation of funds to specific aid (e.g. TA) programmes.<sup>4</sup>

**Lastly, the link between change of government, and political instability, reforms, and economic growth has been investigated by notable and seminal studies in the field of political economy** (e.g. Alesina et al. 1992; Barro 1991) and many other follow-up studies. For instance, regarding uncertainties in government policies following transitions of power, Bates and Krueger (1993)<sup>5</sup> note that a change of government may lead to reforms (i.e. changes in policy), which may not have happened if exiting governments were to continue in power. They note that this is because reforms carry uncertainty about the future size and distribution of the benefits of reform. Duncan (2011) and Bates and Krueger (1993) argue that the status quo (e.g. existing policies and administrative apparatus) are likely to be maintained if the costs of a reform are more immediate and concentrated.

**However, due to its lack of explicit focus on TA or donor programmes, the above line of academic literature will not be discussed further. The overall conclusion is, however, that**

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<sup>4</sup> In some cases, a change in government (when favourably viewed by the donor) may see additional commitment from the donor – thus, guiding the overall country programme and effectiveness of specific outcomes in a positive direction. For instance, after a change of government in Guatemala in 1954, the US government poured almost USD 20 million into aid programmes to that country. United States economic and TA programmes to Guatemala predate 1945, and these programmes deal with education, agricultural extension, and public health (Weaver, 1970).

<sup>5</sup> Bates and Krueger (1993), who investigated the history of economic reform, studied eight developing countries - some of which had been successful reformers (e.g. Chile and the Republic of Korea), some which had been reasonably successful (e.g. Ghana and Turkey), and others that had little success with reform despite several attempts (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, and Zambia).

**these (political and economic) factors are interlinked.** The following sections of this review will be dedicated to discussing specific examples of changes in government, and how they affected ongoing respective TA programmes.

### **3. Case Studies: National TA Programmes & change of government**

#### **3.1 Pakistan: Punjab Education Sector Programme II (PESP II)**

**Description of TA programme** (PESP, 2017; PESP, 2019):

PESP II provides TA to Pakistan's School Education Department (SED) and its affiliated agencies, to support capacity building and institutional strengthening. The current (second phase) of the TA programme will run until 31 March 2020 (being managed by Cambridge Education (CE)). In addition, PESP II provided TA to support the Chief Minister's Education Reform Roadmap through McKinsey and Company. Further, PESP II provided TA to SED through an Externally Financed Output (EFO) agreement with the World Bank (GBP808,092, Jan 2017 to Dec 2018). The EFO was designed to align TA, and to strengthen collaboration between PESP II and the World Bank's Education Sector Project across areas that are not covered by other DFID or World Bank TA programmes.

**Effect of Change in Government on TA** (PESP, 2017; PESP 2019):

According to DFID, the **results "substantially did not meet expectations"** regarding programme milestone on indicator '2.2' of the Business Case, i.e. "Improved reporting, analysis and dissemination of PEC exam results" (PESP, 2019).

**With the change of government (following the 2018 Pakistan general elections), the new Punjab Examination Commission (PEC) Board was being reconstituted and the staffing plan needs re-approval.** The Chief Minister directed that the staffing plan may be placed before the committee headed by Chief Secretary, Punjab. PEC is reviewing the staffing plan which will then be submitted to the Secretary SED for onward submission to the Chief Secretary for approval. As the plan is still being finalised and implementation has not begun, this milestone is off course.

**TA has supported PEC to develop an Assessment Policy Framework** which was shared with a variety of different stakeholders including District Education Authorities (DEAs) for feedback - in addition to the organisational development plan. **Certain key policy recommendations made therein have been adopted by the new government, and DFID TA continues to support the education department in the implementation of these recommendations.**

**There is a risk around top political will and ownership of education reforms, particularly following the change of government.** However, the education department led by the Minister and new Secretary are leading the reforms with considerable momentum. DFID also noted that it continuously engages with the Minister and Secretary Education to keep the reforms momentum going, besides advocating for a restart of stocktake process with the top political leadership.

## 3.2 Peru: Strengthening M&E capacity

### Description of TA programme (USAID, 2018a):

Capacity building intervention and evaluation activity is supplied by USAID/Peru with monitoring and evaluation services, and assistance to execute the USAID Evaluation Policy. Its goal was to encourage evidence-based programming by undertaking studies and evaluations and by contributing to the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacities of USAID and its local implementing partners (IPs).

The 'activity'/programme was organised into three areas of support:

1. Design and implement both impact and performance evaluation studies and conduct assessments supporting USAID programmes;
2. Provide performance M&E TA, and capacity building for USAID Peru, its implementing partners, and host country government counterparts, and
3. Strengthen the capacity of local evaluation institutions to design and implement evaluation studies and assessments according to international standards.

### Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2018a):

**Peruvian M&E networks are vulnerable to destabilisation (including from changes in government).** The Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP) has been acting as a sponsoring public institution by providing resources for the management of the Peruvian Network of Monitoring and Evaluation (PERUME).

**A change of government (after the 2016 Peruvian general election) upset plans to have the network transferred to Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion of Peru** (Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social de Perú - MIDIS). The resulting ambiguous status of PERUME (with MIMP) is wearing down its leadership, which has slowed down its development and activities. It is also suffering from the loss of its international affiliate, the M&E Network in Latin America & the Caribbean (REDLACME), a regional network that endorsed them and that has now become part of Community of Practice on Management for Development Results in the Latin America & the Caribbean region (COPLAC). Notwithstanding these obstacles, PERUME network members indicate that they consider the network as remaining relevant and intend to analyse their institutional situation when reviewing their strategic plan.

## 3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2012-2016

### Description of TA programme (USAID, 2012a):

Through its country development cooperation, the USAID is the main donor currently involved in energy policy reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in collaboration with TA from UNDP and GIZ, while other donors, notably the EU and World Bank, are concentrating on such areas as energy efficiency legislation (EU) and power distribution upgrades (WB).

Likewise, in the economic policy area, USAID has partnerships with key government institutions and the private sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Particular, USAID has been the lead donor in reforms in the financial sector. This resulted in Bosnia and Herzegovina having one of the steadiest banking systems in the region. USAID has also been the lead donor in important reforms in fiscal policy (e.g. direct tax reform), public finance management, and energy.

It is noted that bigger investment, particularly in the energy sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina (not least because of USAID's capacity building and Technical Assistance programmes) will lead to greater electricity trade and exports, which will directly contribute to a reduced trade deficit and improved macroeconomic stability for the country.

#### **Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2012a):**

**Bosnia and Herzegovina had general elections in October 2010.** Understanding the implications of the government change on its programmes, USAID (2012a) noted that it will continually examine political will and traction in economic policy reforms to decide whether certain sectors, such as banking and energy policy, continue to progress and merit ongoing TA.

The energy sector epitomises substantial economic opportunity for Bosnia and Herzegovina and builds on past USAID investments and accomplishments, but it requires strong host country commitment. Similarly, the financial sector is a priority area for USAID assistance due to the following:

- financial sector performance greatly affects productivity growth (the sector is critical to mobilise savings and channel domestic and international private capital to support productivity growth); and
- future investments in the financial sector will capitalise on previous USAID investments and achievements and ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina meets its IMF commitments.<sup>6</sup>

USAID's support in the financial sector is concentrated on the banking sector, given that this is an area where the greatest demand for assistance existed in the country – e.g. because of the risk that a bank-centric financial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina carries.

**While listing major risks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which are partly linked to change in government – as a cause or consequence), USAID notes** that the Constitutional Reform process is delayed or stalled; nationalistic propaganda further divides the reform agenda; growing youth dissatisfaction feeds into nationalistic rhetoric and deters the reconciliation process, and Bosnia and Herzegovina fails to implement prudent and responsible fiscal consolidation measures and policy.

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<sup>6</sup> The IMF (2010; p12) Article IV Reviews Report specifically stresses the role that USAID plays in fostering a single economic space in the financial sector, noting that “the banking agencies are receiving TA from USAID as part of a multistage programme to gradually adopt risk-based supervision and move to Basel II, which will help harmonise supervisory practices and regulations.”

### 3.4 Guatemala: Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems

**Description of TA programme** (USAID, 2012b):

**The goal of the Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) Technical Assistance programme in Guatemala was to raise awareness of infection prevention** and to reduce the rate of nosocomial infections in Ministry of Health (MoH) facilities, thereby contributing to an improved quality of care in these health facilities.

Drawing from experiences and lessons learned in African Countries, Rational Pharmaceutical Management (RPM) Plus programme cooperated with the Guatemala MoH Hospital Technical Assistance Unit to deliver TA (i.e. implement the approach) in five pilot hospitals in Guatemala: Amatitlan, Coatepeque, Escuintla, Quetzaltenango, and Quiche. The successful pilot was conducted in 2007 and 2008, supported by the RPM Plus programme, and financed by USAID. It used regional infectious disease funds through the South American Infectious Disease Initiative (SAIDI) and core Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) funds. As a result of the pilot, the Vice Ministry of Hospitals (VMH) of MoH decided to adopt the standardised approach to advance Infection control (IC) practices in its 43-hospital network by using a Guatemalan version of the tool, as well as to update the MoH IC protocols.

From the outset of the TA to the VMH, it was agreed that the follow-up and monitoring would be provided by the hospital coordinators from the VMH. They are responsible for supervision of the hospitals, with TA from Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) programme.

**Effect of Change in Government on TA** (USAID, 2012b):

MoH was key in moving TA activities forward and was the driving force behind the activities in both the VMH and in the Comprehensive Health Care System (*Sistema Integral de Atencion de Salud – SIAS*).

**However, there were many delays in activity progress, due primarily to conflicting priorities of MoH and the complicated political environment at the time of implementation: and change of government (following 2011 Guatemalan general election).**

However, despite these impediments, the VMH was able to mobilise the hospital IC committees to apply the modules of the Infection control assessment tool (ICAT) and maintain momentum for three annual evaluations. The delays introducing the monitoring indicators meant that SPS failed to support that process.

### 3.5 Honduras: National Vision (2010-38) & National Plan (2010-22)

**Description of TA programme** (USAID, 2018b):

**The Government of Honduras (GOH) National Vision and National Plan emphasises economic growth and job creation**, providing an overarching and consistent platform to support planning and coordination through 2038. The GOH, the private sector, and donor-funded

programmes are making inroads in terms of improving employment planning, expanding employment access, and guaranteeing relevant employability and skills training.

**Key donors – such as the EU, Canada, and USAID – are making significant investments in employment growth, including policy and technical support for improved systems and institutions at the national level as well as direct TA in Honduras (especially within western Honduras).** The Vision prioritises the western region in particular, because of its high level of poverty and the concentration of the Lenca and Maya Ch'ortí indigenous groups in the area.

Even if the National Plan currently has gaps in terms of transparency and clarity of implementation, it offers a basic vision; has identified priority sectors and enjoys legitimacy within the private sector space. The Honduran Secretariat of Labour is prioritising legal reforms to encourage entrepreneurship and access to credit; promoting Small and Medium Enterprise Business Development Centers (CDE-MIPYMEs) as local small business incubators; and is working to launch and institutionalise employment offices providing a range of services to job-seekers throughout the country, including in western Honduras.

**The CDE-MIPYMEs provide TA and training for MSMEs and offer significant potential to channel support to young entrepreneurs.** The private sector is working closely with the government through the Plan Honduras 20/20, which intends to create 600,000 jobs in priority sectors of the economy - an effort that would be dented only by public and private sector capacity to build the skills needed for these new jobs.

Honduran Coffee Institute (*Instituto Hondureño del Cafe* - IHCAFE) advocates for continued improvement and prosperity in the coffee sector in Honduras. **IHCAFE represents over 100,000 coffee-producing families, providing TA, training, and research and development services.** IHCAFE trains coffee producers through mass media and direct extension and training services such as meetings, workshops, field days and informal talks. IHCAFE also provides TA to producers in the establishment of nurseries, crop management, integrated pest management, crop nutrition and fertilisation, tissue management, wet and dry processing, storage, specialty coffee, marketing, and identification and development of markets.

#### **Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2018b):**

The Vision and National Plan are Honduras' key development plans, providing a clear framework for national development. The Vision comprises of a 28-year period. Thus, **to guarantee continuity across Presidential administrations, an innovative and progressive move is required. As USAID notes, this will be important in a country that has traditionally dismantled the entire public service system with each successive presidential election.**

The National Plan has been decentralised. Regional coordinators located throughout the country, who represent the central government, coordinate actions related to the plan's key pillars across local actors within the departments and municipalities under their view. Nevertheless, local stakeholders said that **during the change of government in 2013, the National Plan went from being a Secretariat-level coordinating body to a lesser dependency of the Office of the Presidency. This reduced its legitimacy and budget and has made it difficult to coordinate National Plan-related activities.**

Further, according to high-level stakeholders from the private sector, the National Plan was not developed in close coordination with the private sector or civil society, so buy-in is weak.

### 3.6 Ghana: Capacity Enhancement Program (Parliamentary Strengthening)

#### **Description of TA programme** (World Bank, 2004):

World Bank Institute (WBI) and the Parliamentary Centre of Canada (by collaborating with Ghana's Institute of Economic Affairs) ran a capacity enhancement programme, whose objective was to provide practical advice to MPs on the budget process and relate it to the wider economic reform programme, to update and streamline Ghana's public sector.

This multiyear capacity enhancement programme (running since 1990s) was complementary to other broader Technical Assistance programmes. It supplemented broader governance reforms, such as that of World Bank's Public Financial Management Reform and Financial Management Technical Assistance projects. These TA (or capacities building) programmes intended to promote, among others, greater government accountability.

#### **Effect of Change in Government on TA** (World Bank, 2004):

**The December 2000 elections in Ghana resulted in a change of government. As the new government settled in, familiar patterns become apparent. The new government fired hundreds of local government officials (appointed by the previous president) and laid off many senior public servants and army/security officers.** The former government, now in opposition, developed an aggressive parliamentary style. A drive for political reform consequently emerged. This gave energy and momentum to improvements for parliamentary involvement in policymaking process and oversight in Ghana.

World Bank's Social Development Department and WBI studied the impact and sustainability of learning from WBI's activities for parliamentarians around the world in 2003. More than half of the respondents for this study were from Ghana. In terms of the application and adaptation of learning, the Ghanaian MPs described that WBI capacity enhancement enabled them to participate in Parliamentary deliberations more effectively, and to play leadership roles in major development issues. Concerning development of communities of practitioners, the MPs also reported that the continuing contact they had with fellow alumni from the TA programme (e.g. workshops and seminars) was useful for them.

### 3.7 Colombia: National Food and Nutrition Plan (PAN)<sup>7</sup>

#### **Description of TA programme/component:** USAID (2019)

USAID established the central Technical Assistance Bureau, with Nutrition among its additional technical offices in 1969 (Nutrition is now its own sector). **USAID's technical assistance has guided national food fortification programs in partner countries toward sustainability and self-reliance.** USAID's efforts in Colombia (through Technical Assistance and other schemes), is one of the most documented cases of all USAID assisted nutrition programmes.

Colombia's National Food and Nutrition Plan (Plan de Alimentación y Nutrición or PAN) epitomised USAID's multi-sectoral nutrition planning philosophy. Developed in 1974 by Colombia's National Planning Department and implemented by the responsible ministries, with political support from the Office of the President, PAN was designed to provide a wide range of services. These included rural credit, agricultural cooperatives and agroindustry to generate employment and increase incomes of low-income households; community health promoters to provide greater access to services; a well-targeted food coupon program based on a detailed Colombia poverty map; and improved access to clean water.

#### **Effect of Change in Government on TA:** USAID (2019)

**A change of government in 1978 significantly weakened PAN, and the remaining, fragmented program closed four years later. Thus, PAN's was terminated due to the desire of the subsequent government to establish 'its own' development strategies.**

**Nevertheless, later analysis identified several explanations for the demise of PAN – beyond the change in government.** One was an infringement on the autonomy of sectoral ministries, which got little supplemental funding. Others were the lack of local structures and commitment, and the lack of civil society support, including the insufficient political organisation and power of the low-income groups benefiting most from the program.

**USAID (2019) noted that Similar problems affected multi-sectoral nutrition planning units in other countries;** the development sectors were not reorienting their activities and resources for nutrition. The units were accordingly deemed unsuccessful and began disappearing. Starting around 1985, USAID nutrition programming restricted its focus to the highly targeted, evidence-based interventions within the health sector that could save the most lives for the least cost – for instance vitamin A supplementation, consistent with USAID's Child Survival Initiative.

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<sup>7</sup> Plan de Alimentación y Nutrición

## 3.8 Georgia: Advancing National Integration

### Description of TA programme/component: USAID (2014)

The Advancing National Integration (ANI) programme was intended to address several development challenges that are pervasive in Georgian society and are principally problematic in areas of densely settled minority populations.

Many Georgian citizens are not active in civic life and are secluded in regions far from the political and economic centers of Georgia. These tendencies are worse for members of ethnic minority groups. Ethnic minorities and ethnic Georgians alike often point to Georgian language skills as the main impairment to integration but there remain deep-seated issues around religion, culture and stereotypes. These issues can be lessened through direct continued interactions; yet in most regions, there is little contact between those belonging to different ethnic groups.

Operations of institutions such as the Tolerance Center (TC) and two Council of Religions (CR) are almost entirely dependent on financial support from ANI. **Increased reliance on government funding could jeopardise the independence of the TC, therefore, international support continues to be essential to its efficacy as a watchdog body – especially considering recent transitions in government and uncertain levels of political will.** The TC has played an important role in enhancing the capacity of the CR and, to a lesser extent, the Council of National Minorities (CNM). Both Councils are still relatively young with weak coalitions, which need ongoing financial and technical assistance.

USAID's 2014 evaluation noted that mechanisms should be explored for more recurrent progress monitoring of the new National Concept and Action Plan for Tolerance and Civic Integration (NCAP) by both the government and civil society. The programme evaluation also advised that ANI and USAID should advocate for essential changes to be endorsed by government and deliver technical assistance to the government.

### Effect of Change in Government on TA: USAID (2014)

**USAID's 2014 evaluation found minimal effects of the 2012 change of government on the project.** Informants indicated that the United Nations Association in Georgia (UNAG) and ANI staff has had cordial and cooperative relations with the government – both before and after the elections.

**The change of government has had no observable effect on 'project effectiveness'.** This is credited to the diplomacy efforts of UNAG, although it is no doubt also influenced by the positive relations of the government with USAID. Support by projects such as ANI sends the message to the government that these mechanisms and processes, which are not yet firmly institutionalised, are important in the eyes of the international community.

**Project implementers have worked hard to sustain good relations with the government, both before and after the 2012 transition. Those efforts have been largely successful.** However, collaboration with Georgia Public Broadcasting has been impeded by a series of upheavals and changes of direction within the state media body.

**ANI staff report that they have worked steadily to establish links with new government officials since the elections. This, they note, has cost some time and effort, especially of**

**senior staff.** Informants from various sectors uniformly indicated that UNAG/ANI staff has had cordial and cooperative relations with the government, both before and after the elections.

**The positive relationship is also the result of the new government's acceptance of ANI technical assistance in monitoring NCAP and in preparing the new NCAP to take effect in 2014.** However, one informant mentioned that the **new government's commitment to NCAP was not guaranteed**, since there had been no public or formal statement made in support of the process. Another commented that some ministries had been "uncooperative" in developing the new NCAP.

**Further, the change of government did result in some discussion of eliminating the Tolerance Centres, according to informants, and relations are not yet as strong as they were with the previous government. Some informants assert that the Council of National Minorities and Council of Religions are considered threats by certain factions within the new government.**

## **4. Case Studies: Regional TA Programmes & Change of Government**

### **4.1 Latin America & the Caribbean: German Bilateral Technical Cooperation**

**Description of TA programme** (GIZ and ECLAC, 2016):

Since 2010, the main thematic focuses of German Bilateral Technical Cooperation in the Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC) region have been fiscal policy, structural policy, energy efficiency/renewable energy and climate change policy, and social protection. The three main programmes are:

- Sustainable development and social cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean (known as the 2010-2012 programme) with a budget of 3.5 million euros.
- Promotion of low carbon development and social cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean (known as the 2012-2014 programme) with a budget of 2.725 million euros.
- Structural change for sustainable and inclusive development in Latin America and the Caribbean (known as the 2014-2016 programme) with a budget of 4 million euros.

Some examples of TA within the German technical cooperation in the LAC region include the following:

- The Cooperation provided TA to the Office of the Superintendent of Tax Administration (SAT) of Guatemala, in setting up a new division devoted explicitly to transfer prices. This work was carried out in cooperation with Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) and staff training in the formulation of fiscal regulations relating to transfer prices was delivered in collaboration with the programme "Good Fiscal Governance" of GIZ-Guatemala.
- Policy advice was given to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay produced considerable results – specifically in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay.

- TA to the Ministry for Social Development was given in Uruguay for the creation of an Integrated National Care System (with the focus on childcare and care for older people). Comparable support was provided to the Ministry for Family Affairs in Costa Rica, with recommendations for the formulation of the law on early childhood development and care.
- Within a relatively short time, the TA resulted in the launch of specific public initiatives for strengthening and investing in value chains, specifically in Guatemala with the support of government officials at the highest level. In El Salvador, though, lack of training among technical staff limited the scope of TA. Mid- and high-level officials were not able to fully absorb and transfer the methodology. This resulted in reduced ownership. Furthermore, the Ministry of Economy lacks the resources and capacity to implement the Commission's recommendations and to develop and promote value chains.

Overall, German TA in LAC countries has gained importance, and governments in the region are showing growing interest and demand, far beyond the response capacities of the Cooperation. While TA is highly valued as a form of intervention, it is the combination of products and services that shows effectiveness and the most potential for achieving sustainable results and transformations.

#### **Effect of Change in Government on TA (GIZ and ECLAC, 2016):**

**External factors such as a change of government or a restructuring of government priorities have been a risk throughout the Cooperation and threatened programme outcomes.** However, the flexibility of the Cooperation and its programmes and recognition of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)'s role as a neutral think tank assisted to alleviate risks and negative effects, shifting activities to another country or re-establishing topics on the agenda with new authorities. In this context, GIZ country offices proved to be an essential ally for some divisions, providing first-hand knowledge of countries' priorities and real needs, and facilitating relationships with national stakeholders.

As GIZ and ECLAC (2016) note, **National ownership, sustained political will (e.g. across successive governments) and commitment to the activities were not always present in the Cooperation initiatives. Their deficiency/non-existence undermines the applicability, let alone the sustainability of the initiative. Gender activities, for instance, were not pursued after the change of government in Costa Rica due to a lack of political will and commitment.** In some cases, the countries have limited resources to dedicate to competing priorities and in others, such as regional integration in the energy sector and in social protection, the level of maturity needed to embark on certain activities was not yet in place.

**GIZ and ECLAC (2016) also note that the sustainability of interventions requires consolidated relationships with counterparts, based on trust, open communication and ongoing and long-term collaboration – across different governments.**

## 4.2 South Asia & East Africa: Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development (INVENT)

**Description of TA programme/component:** (INVENT Business Case, 2013 & INVENT Project completion Review, 2014)

The INVENT programme backed technological and business innovations for the benefit of the poor in the low-income states of India and countries in South Asia and East Africa. It was approved in August 2013 to invest up to £38m over 6 years.

Key Technical Assistance components of the programme include:

- £7.5m technical assistance to share and replicate successful innovations from India to low income countries (LICs).
- £3.5m technical assistance to support knowledge-sharing on inclusive innovations between India and low-income countries.

**Effect of Change in Government on TA:** (INVENT Business Case, 2013 & INVENT Project completion Review, 2014)

**With the change in the government of India in 2014, the programme component ‘India Inclusive Innovation Fund’ (IIIF) – which was seen as high priority and transformational by the previous government – has fallen low on priority and may not take off at all.** The fund was approved by the cabinet committee but has not been established due to political changes in the government of India.

Due to the delay in the launch of IIIF and the possibility that the fund may not be launched in the current form and structure (due to change in government), the programme team has worked on a back-up plan – including a ‘Fund of Fund’ option (as a mitigation strategy) as highlighted in the Business case. The team also met with the Secretary of Micro Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) as part of the review to explore alternative partners.

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## About this report

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