



**Drivers of intra-regional and  
inter-regional migration in Africa:  
A synthesis from the  
Migrating out of Poverty surveys**

**Julie Litchfield**

May 2018

Working Paper 53

## Acknowledgements

Data used in this paper are from the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys collected with funding from the UK Department for International Development by Migrating out of Poverty researchers at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana; the African Centre for Migration & Society, University of Witwatersrand; the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe and Asmelash Tsegay, an independent consultant based in Addis Ababa. This paper was prepared as a background paper for the Economic Development in Africa Report 2018 within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It has benefited from comments and suggestions from among others, Junior Davis, Millaso Chere-Robson, Jane Muthumbi, Claudia Roethlisberger and Stephanie Garry of the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes. Thanks are also owed to Eva-Maria Egger and Pierfrancesco Rolla for excellent research assistance.

University of Sussex, Arts B  
Brighton BN1 9QN, United Kingdom  
Email: [migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk)  
Web: <http://migratingoutofpoverty.org>  
Twitter: @MigrationRPC  
Facebook: /migratingoutofpoverty  
Blogger: [migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk](http://migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk)

This is an output from a project funded by UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

© 2018 University of Sussex, School of Global Studies. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

## **Abstract**

This paper explores the drivers of African migration drawing on micro data from comparable household surveys of rural households conducted in Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe between 2013 and 2015, including a short longitudinal data set for Ghana, which tracks households over time. We compare characteristics of migrants with non-migrants and identify the importance of youth, gender and education as drivers of migration. We reveal a complex and gendered pattern of migrant decision-making and an equally complex and gendered pattern of remittance sending of diverse items via varied channels.

## Executive Summary

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the nature of migration and remittances in three African countries, drawing on the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys of Ethiopia, Ghana and Zimbabwe. Particular emphasis is placed on the gendered nature of migration and remittance patterns. Comparisons are made between migrants and non-migrants and an econometric model of the household and individual drivers of migration is estimated. We also explore some of the associations between migration and poverty.

We find evidence of two overlapping groups of migrants: an older group of both men and women following long-established migration routes, sometimes international, into mining and seasonal agriculture, for example, and a younger, slightly better educated group of men and women, leaving paid employment in rural areas and responding to new opportunities in construction and domestic work. While youth is undoubtedly a prominent feature of contemporary and future migration in Africa, it is likely that migration of older generations from low-income countries will persist for some time to come. This in turn raises an additional dimension to migration policy debates on social protection and employment precarity.

Our data also challenges ideas that women are less likely to migrate than men. While this is the case in two of our countries, it is only partially true in Ethiopia. Our survey there reveals that women are more likely to migrate internationally than men. At the time of our survey (2015) demand was very high for domestic workers in the Gulf states, and our data suggests that women opted to migrate abroad while men moved to work on the numerous infrastructure construction projects underway in Ethiopia. Much of this migration of women is facilitated by recruitment agents – perhaps a necessary way to secure training, employment, visas etc. Remittances from women working in the Gulf states are substantial, and the prospect of such high remittances, is perhaps an inducement for even women with dependent children at home to migrate.

Finally, our data also reveals the importance of in-kind remittances and the gendered nature of choices relating to what migrants send home. Again, we challenge ideas that women are less likely to send remittances home, observing that the dollar value of in-kind remittances sent home by women in Zimbabwe all but removes the gap in cash remittances.

## Introduction

Migration occupies an uncomfortable position in policy debates. On the one hand, national governments often seek to control and restrict immigration, citing, at best, very weak evidence on the negative impacts of immigrant workers on wages, employment, access to services, security issues and integration concerns. While, on the other hand, most economists would argue that the free movement of labour within and across countries is an important factor in boosting economic productivity, lowering inequality and reducing poverty, and furthermore, that migration is a consequence of rising standards of living.<sup>1</sup>

What is often overlooked is that most migration is internal migration of individuals within the border of the country they were born in and that much of international migration is within the Global South. For example, the World Bank (2016) estimates that there are approx. 247 million people living outside of their country of birth, which is approximately 3% of the global population, and that South-North migration makes up only a third of this. The UN estimates that there are a further 763 million internal migrants living away from their place of birth, but within their country of birth. These figures suggests that internal migrants outnumber international migrants by over three to one, yet it is international migrants in the North that attract the most attention.

This paper explores the drivers of African migration drawing on micro data from comparable household surveys of rural households conducted in Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe between 2013 and 2015, including a short longitudinal data set for Ghana, which tracks households over time between 2013 and 2015. We also present comparative evidence on the nature of remittance flows and their use by recipient households and explore the role of the private sector in facilitating migration.

The Migrating out of Poverty surveys are described in detail in annex 1 but it is worth flagging two points about the surveys here.<sup>2</sup> Firstly, our definition of migration follows accepted practice<sup>3</sup> to identify both a spatial and a temporal dimension. We identify individuals as migrants if they have moved away from their community, usually defined as their village, for a period of at least three months, and for purposes that may include work, education, and family reasons. By using a relatively generous definition of what types of mobilities might be counted as migration – a short period, over a short distance and for multiple possible purposes - we offer researchers the chance of exploring a greater diversity of migration and mobility patterns, including short term seasonal migration to neighbouring districts as well as longer term migration to international destinations. We define a migrant as internal if they are still within the borders of their country where their origin household is located and interviewed and we define them as international if they are located in another country.

Second, our surveys are of rural households in migrant-sending regions of each country hence they cannot be considered nationally representative. However, the sample of migrants is randomly selected and relatively large and therefore can provide useful insights into migrant decision-making, comparisons between migrants and non-migrants, and a detailed exploration of gender differences.

---

<sup>1</sup> See for example Clemens (2014)

<sup>2</sup> All micro-data is available at <http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/research/migrationdata>

<sup>3</sup> See for example Bilborow (2016).

## Women and men on the move in Ethiopia, Ghana and Zimbabwe.

One of the insights from our research in these three countries is that migration is highly gender-nuanced and that generalisations about migration are difficult to make without unpacking data by gender. We show here some characteristics of migrants from each survey as a pre-cursor to discussing drivers of migration.

Table 1 below shows the size of the samples of migrants collected through the Migrating out of Poverty surveys and how these are distributed by gender and by broad destination. Note how the gender split varies across countries: in Ghana and Zimbabwe, men make up between two-thirds and three-quarters of migrants. Contrast this with Ethiopia where the share of women among migrants is almost a half. Part of this story is that women in Ethiopia are actively recruited as domestic workers in the Gulf States, and this is reflected in the relatively high proportions of women migrants from these countries who are international migrants compared to the case of Zimbabwe.

Table 1: Migrant Destinations by Gender						
	Men		Women		All	
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
<b>ETHIOPIA 2014</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>799</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>731</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1530</b>
Internal	81.60	652	59.40	434	71.00	1086
International	18.40	147	40.60	297	29.00	444
<b>ZIMBABWE 2015</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1095</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1517</b>
Internal	44.10	483	41.20	174	43.30	657
International	55.90	612	58.80	248	56.70	860
<b>GHANA 2013</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>812</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1262</b>
Internal	93.00	755	96.90	436	94.40	1191
<i>International<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>7.00</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>3.10</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>5.60</i>	<i>71</i>
<b>GHANA 2015</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>538</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>361</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>899</b>
Internal	91.3	426	96.6	288	93.2	714
<i>International<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>6.8</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>6.8</i>	<i>52</i>

<sup>1</sup> Note that the Ghana surveys were not designed to select households with international migrants due to the early focus of this survey on internal or domestic migration. Thus the figures on international migrants are highly underestimated and give a mis-leading picture about the proportions of migrants who are internal versus international.

Delving in to the detail on destination choices of migrants from each country, we see that Ethiopian migration is not only mostly internal but also very local. Around 60% of men internal migrants and 70% of women internal migrants remain within the same region of the country. The remainder are in another region or in the state capital Addis Ababa<sup>4</sup>. The Gulf States are

<sup>4</sup> Addis is not a common destination: less than 10% of all migrants are in Addis.

the overwhelming destination for international migrants, reflecting opportunities for domestic work for women and construction work for men. Within the regions, however, there are some interesting differences. Internal migrants from Tigray and Oromia predominantly stay within their own region, while those from Amhara and SNNP are more likely to be found elsewhere in Ethiopia. This is true for both men and women internal migrants. It is not obvious that distress push factors are behind this: both Tigray and SNNP are historically high poverty regions but have experienced rapid reductions in poverty since 1996 and there has been a convergence in regional poverty rates.<sup>5</sup> More plausible is that migration destination is driven by work opportunities. Oromia has benefitted in recent years from significant Chinese investment in transport infrastructure (including the Addis–Adama expressway) and during fieldwork a number of household respondents referred to employment opportunities on Chinese road and rail construction projects, including the Addis-Djibouti rail link, which crosses parts of Oromia and has a number of stations located in the region.

Zimbabwe presents a slightly different picture. Historically migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has mostly been confined to people living along the border with South Africa, such as Gwanda, with Zimbabweans from Chivi and Hurungwe much more likely to migrate internally, either to farms and mines, or urban centres.<sup>6</sup> Now, however, over half of all migrants are international, rising to 75% in Gwanda, and South Africa is the most significant international destination for both men and women from all districts of the country. Even as far from the border as Hurungwe, 75% of international migrants are in South Africa. Internal migration is however still very important in Zimbabwe, particularly in Hurungwe where 73% of male migrants and 60% of women migrants are within Zimbabwe. Internal male migrants from Hurungwe and Chivi move outside of their province, while those from Gwanda are just as likely to remain within the same province as move away. It is possible that we are observing men moving closer to the border in a form of step migration. Women internal migrants on the other hand are more likely to remain closer to home: 65% of them stay in the same province, although most of these women have moved to another district. It is possible that they too are following a step pattern to migration, but making smaller steps, before they reach the point for international migration. It is also possible that women are moving within their provinces replacing male labour.

Our data for Ghana can't be used to explore international migration patterns as the survey was designed to only capture internal migrants. However, it can provide insights into internal patterns of migration. The largest single destination for all internal migrants is Accra: over 25% of all internal migrants go to the metropolitan Accra areas as their first destination, with a third of all internal migrants going to the Greater Accra region. Migrants from Volta and the Northern region are more likely to choose Accra as their first destination (over a third of migrants from these regions go to Accra, compared to 7-12% from Upper West and East respectively) which may reflect proximity to Accra as opposed to other possible destinations. Kumasi is also a popular destination for migrants from the Upper East, Northern and Brong Ahafo regions, with other destinations in the Ashanti region also proving popular (for example, the Obuasi district in the mining area appears to attract migrants from Upper West).

---

<sup>5</sup> World Bank Group. 2015. Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014. Washington, DC. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21323>

<sup>6</sup> Dzingirai, Mutopo and Landau (2014)

Brong Ahafo is also an important destination for poor farmers from the Upper East and Upper West.<sup>7</sup>

It is possible that these destinations are chosen for the economic opportunities they offer potential migrants. Kumasi and Accra are both significant cities. However, we see across our surveys that migrants often migrate along routes laid down by earlier migrants from their villages and communities and that the first destination is not always the last but instead represents a pause along a longer route.

*Age of migrants and duration of migration episodes*

Generally, the stock of female migrants in our sample is slightly younger than male migrants. This does not necessarily mean they migrate at an earlier age than men do, so we also show our estimates of their age at the time of migration using information on migration duration. Women have generally shorter migration episodes than men, on average between 4 and 9 months less, hence on average they do migrate at slightly younger ages than men. This may reflect gendered opportunities at home and at other destinations: to the extent that women’s economic opportunities are constrained to unpaid family labour at home then the opportunity of paid employment as a migrant may exert a stronger pull than for men who are more likely to have paid employment opportunities at home. Women are also more likely to migrate for marriage and family reasons and are likely, on average, to be younger than their spouses. Further, there may be some occupations, domestic work, for example, where youth is an advantage as younger women may be seen as more docile and malleable (see for example, Awumbila et al, 2017 on Ghana).

**Table 2: Age of migrants (years) at time of survey and at time of departure and duration of migration episodes (months)**

	Men			Women		
	Age at survey	Age at departure	Duration of migration	Age at survey	Age at departure	Duration of migration
Ethiopia	26.6	23.3	40	23.7	20.7	36
Zimbabwe	36.6	33.1	42	33.6	30.9	39
Ghana 2013	32.0	28.3	56	28.7	25.9	55
Ghana 2015	28.6	27.2	36	26.4	24.5	32

In terms of duration of migration, we ask households to report how long each migrant has been away. We see, in Table 2, that durations are generally shorter for women than men, and that our migrants have been away from home for between three and four years. As this is of a current migration spell, and the migrant has not (yet) returned to the household, these should not be interpreted as necessarily meaning that women migrate for shorter periods of time. Rather the shorter duration may indicate that migration of women is a relatively recent phenomenon. This quite lengthy average duration of migration suggests a number of nuances. First is that our data does not pick up much short term seasonal migration, which is plausible given that because seasonal demand for labour may be for periods shorter than

<sup>7</sup> See Awumbila et al, 2015

three months Secondly, the table reports mean and there is some variation around this. Even so, median durations are still in excess of one and a half to two years in each country, and with the exception of Zimbabwe, less than 5% of our migrants had been away for 3-4 months at the time of the survey.<sup>8</sup>

In most countries, our sample migrants are married or cohabiting at the time of interview (although we do not know, nor can we estimate, if marriage occurred before or after migration). However, there are interesting variations. In Ethiopia, for example, the overwhelming majority of migrants are single (or too young to be married). Women migrants are relatively more likely than men to be divorced, separated or widowed and make up as much as 23% of women migrants in Zimbabwe. These figures are supported by the reasons migrants move, reported on further below.

<b>Table 3 Marital Status of migrants</b>						
	Men		Women		All	
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
<b>Ethiopia 2014</b>						
Single (incl too young to be married)	68.8	548	61.0	442	65.1	990
Married /Cohabiting	29.5	235	30.4	220	29.9	455
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	1.8	14	8.5	62	5.1	76
<b>Zimbabwe 2015</b>						
Single (incl too young to be married)	35.3	376	42.9	177	37.4	553
Married /Cohabiting	59	628	33.9	140	52	768
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	5.7	61	23.3	96	10.6	157
<b>Ghana 2013</b>						
Single (incl too young to be married)	43.2	401	41.8	240	42.7	641
Married /Cohabiting	55.5	515	52.6	302	54.4	817
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	1.2	12	5.6	32	3	44
<b>Ghana 2015</b>						
Single (incl too young to be married)	50.1	230	49.7	156	49.9	386
Married /Cohabiting	49.0	225	44.0	138	47.0	363
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.8	4	6.4	20	3.1	24

## Drivers of Migration

Our definition of migration is broad in that it includes the possibility of migrating for reasons other than work. Nevertheless, we see that in every country the main reason reported for migrating is work related. The most common reason given is to seek work, rather than moving once a job has been secured at the destination. This is particularly stark in Zimbabwe, where

<sup>88</sup> In our Zimbabwe survey, seasonal migration is more apparent as slightly less than 25% of migrants have been away for 3-4 months.

74% of men and 55% of women cite seeking work as the main reason for leaving. Notably, women in Ethiopia are more likely to report having secured a job prior to moving, and, in Zimbabwe, returning to a previous job is more prevalent among women migrants. These two observations suggest that women may be more risk averse than men in migration decisions, preferring to move once a job has been identified rather than take the risk of moving without having ensured some measure of economic security. We also see that women are more likely than men to report migrating for family reasons, such as marriage or joining a spouse at their destination, as their main reason for moving. Study or training features in some countries – Ghana and Ethiopia - all have a small proportion of migrants for whom continuing their investment in human capital is the main reason for migration.

<b>Table 4. Reasons for migrating (top responses)</b>						
	Men		Women		All	
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
<b>Ethiopia 2014</b>						
Job transfer	1.4	11	0.3	2	0.8	13
Work	43.9	351	39.3	287	41.7	638
Seek work/better work	44.9	359	36.3	265	40.8	624
Study/training	7.5	60	7.1	52	7.3	112
To get married and follow the spouse	1.4	11	13.5	99	7.2	110
<b>Zimbabwe 2015</b>						
Job transfer	4.5	49	2.1	9	3.8	58
New job	5.8	63	3.8	16	5.2	79
Seek work/better job	73.9	803	55.4	235	68.7	1038
Return to previous job	8.7	95	12.5	53	9.8	148
<b>Ghana 2013</b>						
Job transfer/opportunity	17.2	137	13.3	59	15.8	196
Seek work/better job	62.0	493	46.4	205	56.4	698
Study/ training	11.9	95	16.1	71	13.4	166
To get married /family reunification	2.8	22	20.1	89	9.0	111
<b>Ghana 2015</b>						
Job transfer/opportunity	11.16	52	9.8	29	10.6	81
Seek work/better job	62.9	293	28.0	83	49.0	376
Study/ training	9.0	42	22.6	67	14.3	109
To get married /family reunification	8.6	40	29.4	89	16.9	129
Notes: column % do not sum to 100 as only most commonly reported reasons are reported here						

Although our surveys do ask about whether factors related to climate change and conflict were important in the decision to migrate, very few respondents cite these as a reason. In

Zimbabwe for example, only one migrant cites declining agricultural yields as a factor, and only three refer to weather extremes. Five refer to family or other disputes and two to political reasons but these are tiny numbers and not up to any more than a comment. The numbers are similarly small for other countries.

### *Education and Skills*

Across our three countries, migrants tend to be slightly better educated than non-migrants. Restricting our sample to individuals aged 16-60 (so as to exclude children, who are less likely to be migrants, than are working age adults) we see that migrants generally have completed more stages of education than non-migrants. In Ethiopia, migrants are very unlikely to have no education and have a higher probability of having secondary and higher education compared to non-migrants. In Zimbabwe, the majority of migrants have completed secondary school, and in Ghana where the differences are more subtle we still observe a higher level of formal education among migrants.

<b>Table 5 Education of migrants compared to non-migrants (%)</b>							
	<b>None</b>	<b>Some Primary</b>	<b>Completed primary</b>	<b>Some secondary</b>	<b>completed secondary</b>	<b>higher education</b>	<b>other</b>
<b>Ethiopia 2014</b>							
Non migrants	36.25	16.36	24.85	14.06	2.59	1.67	4.23
Migrants	8.91	12.02	30.93	23.97	6.28	13.30	4.59
<b>Zimbabwe 2015</b>							
Non migrants	17.78	36.0		33.68	1.63	0.22	10.59
Migrants	0.69	4.08		19.93	64.36	2.77	8.16
<b>Ghana 2015</b>							
Non migrants	31.61	14.53	5.72	20.15	14.02	4.59	9.37
Migrants	24.29	12.29	3.81	23.16	18.22	7.49	10.73
Note: cells show percentage of migrants and non-migrants at each education attainment level. Rows sum to 100%. The Zimbabwe survey does not distinguish between partial and full completion of primary school.							

We would expect education to be a driver of migration for a number of reasons. Firstly, it suggests an investment in formal skills that are transferable across locations and activities, rather than specific to activities common at home, such as agriculture or fishing. Education also enables people to identify potential job opportunities, possible housing options, as well as the costs of migration and thus to reduce the risks of migration. Education may also be a passport into certain activities and anything less than secondary education may prevent migrants from employment in higher paid occupations.

### Modelling migration decisions

We turn now to modelling the drivers of migration in each country. Conceptually we have a choice between modelling outcomes at the household level or the individual level. Here we opt for modelling migration decisions at the individual level, i.e. the probability that an individual is a migrant or not. A household level model would imply dropping useful information on migrants themselves: their skills, gender etc, while an individual analysis allows us to incorporate both household and individual level characteristics. We cluster our models at the household level to capture the unobserved correlations across individuals who belong to the same household (such as risk taking attitudes). We restrict our sample to individuals aged 16-60. Even though there are migrants younger and older than these cut-offs, we would suggest that their migration decisions are likely to be quite different from those of conventional working age.

We model the likelihood of an individual being a migrant with a probit model as follows

$$\Pr(M = 1)_{ihd} = \alpha + \gamma_1 X_{ih} + \gamma_2 H_h + \gamma_3 D_d + \varepsilon_h \quad [3]$$

Where the outcome variable is binary, equal to 1 if the individual is a migrant and 0 otherwise.  $X_{ih}$  is the set of individual characteristics of person i in household h in district d, where H are the set of household characteristics and D a set of regional or district controls. Our model specifications include age, gender, education of the migration, a set of household characteristics.

We also model, as a follow up to this, the determinants of migration type, i.e. distinguishing between internal and international migrants, with a multinomial logit where we have three possible outcomes: not being a migrant, being an internal migrant, and for Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, being an international migrant.<sup>9</sup>

We show summary tables here for each country. The appendix has details of region specific regressions within each country.

<b>Table 6 Probit model of likelihood of being a migrant</b>			
<i>Dependent variable: migrant=1, non-migrant=0.</i>	<b>Full model - Zimbabwe 2015</b>	<b>Full model - Ethiopia 2014</b>	<b>Full model - Ghana 2015</b>
<b>Individual characteristics</b>			
Age of individuals	0.0196***	-0.0191***	-0.0146***
Female individual	-0.633***	-0.0341	-0.324***
Education individual (base group if no education)			
Education individual: Completed primary	1.670***	0.688***	-0.230**
Education individual: Completed secondary school onward	2.181***	1.266***	0.0453
Job typology individual: (base group=paid employee)			

<sup>9</sup> The lack of international migrants in the Ghana surveys rule this out.

Job typology individual: Self employed	-1.544***	-0.845***	0.152
Job typology individual: Unemployed or student	-0.112	-0.129	0.365***
<b>Household Characteristics</b>			
HH size	-0.0370***	-0.370***	-0.0842***
Age of the HH head	-0.0111***	0.0225***	0.000928
Female HH head	0.261***	0.0262	-0.00438
Education HH head (base=no education)			
Education HH head: Completed primary	-0.280**	-0.171***	-0.0518
Education HH head: Completed Secondary school onward	-0.488***	-0.349***	-0.0397
Job typology HH head (base is paid employee)			
Job typology HH head: Self-employed	0.692***	0.093	0.102
Job typology HH head: Unemployed or student	0.0842	0.0963	0.115
Main source HH income: (base group=agriculture and land rental)			
Main source HH income: Non-agricultural job	-0.052	-0.236**	0.014
Main source HH income: Government and NGO benefits	0.351***	-0.158*	-0.0645
Main source HH income: Remittances	0.290***	0.272***	0.486***
Main source HH income: Other or unknown	-0.0434	0.16	0.0852
Agricultural land ownership	-0.00496	--	-0.0922
Having a child in the HH who is less than 15 y.o.	-0.182***	0.264***	-0.741***
Regional Controls	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-1.961***	-0.953***	0.923***
Observations	3,383	4524	3,949
R squared	0.2327	0.2401	0.1067

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicate statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Base group: Not being a migrant	Zimbabwe		Ethiopia	
<b>Individual characteristics</b>	Internal migrant	International migrant	Internal migrant	International migrant
Age of individuals	0.0459***	0.0291***	-0.0286***	-0.0307***
Female individual	-0.987***	-1.135***	-0.472***	0.881***
Base group: male individual				
Education individual: Completed primary	14.83***	2.514***	1.106***	1.546***
Base group: No education				
Education individual: Completed secondary school onward	15.92***	3.310***	2.300***	2.048***
Job typology individual: Self employed	-2.589***	-2.711***	-1.180***	-1.937***
Base group: paid employee				
Job typology individual: Unemployed or student	0.497**	-0.492**	0.278	-0.853***
<b>Household characteristics</b>				
HH Size	-0.177***	-0.0273	-0.733***	-0.489***
Age of the HH head	-0.0212***	-0.0192***	0.0495***	0.0169***
Female HH head	0.422***	0.501***	0.15	-0.243*
Base group: Male HH head				
Education HH head: Completed primary	-0.136	-0.662***	-0.2	-0.522***
Base group: No education				
Education HH head: Completed Secondary school onward	-0.738**	-0.879***	-0.699***	-0.458**
Job typology HH head: Self- employed	1.230***	1.157***	-0.203	0.977**
Base group: paid employee				
Job typology HH head: Unemployed or student	0.00119	0.237	-0.295	1.016***
Main source HH income: Gold planning and trade	-0.248	-0.353**	-0.254*	-0.631**
Base group: Agriculture and land rental				
Main source HH income: Government and NGO benefits	0.592**	0.386*	-0.343	0.214
Main source HH income: Remittances	0.598***	0.277*	-0.341***	1.573***
Main source HH income: Other or unknown	0.193	-0.382	0.135	-12.35***
Agricultural land ownership	0.123	-0.0154	..	..
Having a child in the HH who is less than 15 y.o.	-0.0211**	0.00433	0.564***	0.191
Constant	-17.42***	-3.076***	-2.611***	-2.595***
Pseudo R2	0.2126	0.2126	0.2444	0.2444
Observations	3,431	3,431	4,531	4,531

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicate statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

## *Discussion of results*

We discuss the results from both exercises together and group the discussion around a small number of themes.

### *Youth*

One of the first observations to make from the results is that migration is not just about youth. While it is the case that in both Ethiopia and Ghana, younger people are more likely to migrate, we find the opposite for Zimbabwe (see row 1 of Tables 6 and 7). Recall that the stock of migrants from Zimbabwe are older on average than those from Ethiopia and Ghana (Table 2 above) and the prevalence of seasonal migration is much higher in Zimbabwe than in the other countries. We also know that Zimbabwean migrants are very likely to be married (table 3). Zimbabwe has a very long history of relatively tightly organised migration to South Africa to work in mines and/or agriculture. It is likely the social capital built up through this experience (knowledge of where opportunities exist, working conditions, pay), which is also evidenced in one of the main reasons for migration (returning to a previous job- Table 4), at least partly explains why migration probabilities increase with age in Zimbabwe. Ethiopia on the other hand is relatively recently witnessing a huge demand for both internal and international migrant labour which would seem to favour youth, namely, work in the rapidly growing construction sector and in domestic work. Below we show how recruitment agencies operate in these two sectors, which would suggest that these agents replace or reduce the need for experience in migration. Hence, whilst the picture of migrants being young, single and risk-taking with long time horizons certainly holds for Ethiopia, it is less accurate of contexts such as Zimbabwe where migration patterns are well established.

### *Gender*

Our data shows that men migrants outnumber women migrants in Zimbabwe and Ghana while being roughly equal in Ethiopia. Our modelling supports this broad picture, with women being less likely to be migrants than men (see row 2 of Tables 6 and 7). There may be lots of explanations of this lower propensity to migrate, from cultural norms about gender roles in family reproductive responsibilities, and lower levels of education, to higher levels of risk aversion. However, Ethiopia provides the exception and gives some insights into how barriers to migration for women might be reduced. Ethiopian women have the same probability of being a migrant as men (row 2 of table 2)<sup>10</sup> but a much higher probability of becoming international migrants than internal migrants. So we observe a skew towards international migration for Ethiopian women. Recall that Ethiopia has large numbers of women employed in domestic work in the Gulf States, often recruited through agencies that train and place young women. The recruitment agencies may serve the function of reducing the perceived risks of migration<sup>11</sup> particularly when demand for migrant labour is relatively recent and the migrant-sending population is therefore uninformed about the destination. Of course, there

---

<sup>10</sup> Women from Oromia actually have a higher propensity to migrate than men (see column 4 in table A4 in Annex 2).

<sup>11</sup> A job and accommodation is secured at destination, a salary is known in advance and a contract length is fixed.

is much written about the exploitative nature of recruitment agencies but the Ethiopian context, and elsewhere, suggests that there is a role for the private sector in supporting migration.<sup>12</sup>

### *Skills and employment*

Migrants in our samples are relatively better educated than non-migrants in both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia (rows 4 and 5 of Tables 6 and 7), and completing secondary education appears to be the trigger for migrating, providing the potential migrant with recognised formal qualifications and transferable skills. This time Ghana is the exception, but recall from Table 5 that the distribution of education does not differ much between migrants and non-migrants in our sample. This may reflect the different sampling approach (no international migrants) but we believe it is picking up the heterogeneity of migrant labour demand in Ghana. Individuals with no education are just as likely to migrate as those who have completed secondary and there are a wide range of jobs at destination. We show below and in the annexes some examples of occupational mobility of migrants, comparing the last held job at home with the job at destination. For Ghana, we can see a number of teachers in our sample who move into other teaching roles, as well as a large number of farmers who move into a range of relatively unskilled occupations at destination. Occupation is also correlated with the likelihood of being a migrant. We see for example in Ghana that the self-employed are less likely to be migrants compared to those who are paid employees. A large proportion of the latter are paid labourers, including casual workers, and hence more mobile than the self-employed, which include those who work on their own land as well as traders and craftsmen, and therefore probably have more human capital invested in their home location.

Our modelling also reveals some interesting results about the effects of the education of the household head on an individual's propensity to migrate. We see that the better educated the head is, the lower the probability the referenced individual has of being a migrant. The reference person in our models is always an individual with no education, so the results suggests that having a better educated head reduces the pressure on other members of the household to migrate, as the head is likely to be able to earn enough to support less skilled members of the family. Having a head with no education is associated with increased pressure on other members with no education to migrate.

### *Family Responsibilities*

Our results suggest that individuals who come from larger households are less likely to migrate (see row 7 of each table). This suggest that family responsibilities such as caring for the elderly and very young members deter migration. This challenges some of the ideas about surplus family labour being a driver of migration. One exception, provided by Ethiopia, is that having a dependent child in the household increases the likelihood of a household member being an international migrant (see row 19 of table 7). This last result may reflect the relatively high wage opportunities abroad and we see in the discussion of remittances that transfers from international migrants from Ethiopia are very high, possibly contributing to the costs of child and elder care. Hence, when the prospects of significant remittances are high,

---

<sup>12</sup> See the work of *Migrating out of Poverty* for analysis which highlights the facilitating role of recruitment agents e.g. Abrar et al (2017); Awumbila et al (2017).

for example for international migrants from Ethiopia, then migration incidence may be higher for those with dependent children. Aspirations for one's children may therefore be an important factor in determining who migrates but also to where they migrate.

#### *Poverty of the migrant-sending households*

We see evidence of remittance dependency in all three countries among households who have migrants. There is some evidence that, in Zimbabwe, migration is associated with poorer family backgrounds, as shown by the positive correlation between dependency on government transfers and aid and the likelihood of being a migrant. The finding discussed above, that individuals with no education who come from households whose head has no education, and therefore likely to be among the poorest, are more likely to migrate than those who come from households with a better educated head, is also relevant for understanding the role of poverty as a driver of poverty.

Asset ownership in the form of land does not seem to be associated with migration probabilities.

### **Migration and socio-economic development in sending countries**

Traditional models of migration such as the Harris-Todaro model of rural to urban migration suggest that migration is undertaken to benefit the migrant. The potential migrant compares their actual wage (or income) in the rural area with the wage they might expect to earn in the urban area. The decision to migrate is based on whether the latter is higher than the former. Developments to this model also factor in costs of migration, explore the importance of the urban informal sector and consider the time horizon over which this calculation might be made, but essentially the assumption remains that migrants must benefit from their migration. These models have been criticised extensively and there has been an emergence of models in the New Economics of Labour Migration school of thought whereby migration is not viewed as a decision purely for the migrants benefit but is part of a decision entered into by the broader household to spread risk spatially across sectors and spaces which face risks that are not covariant with the sending area.<sup>13</sup> The objective of migration is to smooth income rather than to maximise income, and remittances are one mechanism through which shocks to income at home can be offset. In this framework, it is possible that households do not experience an increase in income or expenditure but rather face a less volatile income stream. It is therefore an empirical question about whether migration raises the welfare of the family at home.

In this section, we explore self-reported poverty of households with and without migrants; report on modelling of the impact of migration on household consumption undertaken by Migrating out of Poverty and examine patterns of remittances.

---

<sup>13</sup> See for example Lucas and Stark 1985.

## *Poverty and wellbeing*

We explore in this section households' own self-reported wellbeing along with more objective indicators of living standards. Our surveys contain a number of wellbeing questions, mostly asking households to compare their current situation with that five years ago. Responses are broadly consistent within each survey so we present here the results on a single indicator, adequacy of the household's financial situation.

The striking feature of the data is that there is no common trend in whether migration *per se* is associated with improvements in household's own perception of poverty and much seems to depend on whether the migrant is international or internal and whether they send remittances. In Ethiopia, households with international migrants stand out as being more likely to have experienced improvements in their wellbeing, and we know that many of these international migrants are in the Gulf states and remitting large amounts of money to their families at home. Ethiopian households with internal migrants appear to be very similar to households with no migrants. In Ghana (2013 and 2015), there is little difference between any of the household groups, and in Zimbabwe it is households with internal migrants which if anything seem to have fared better. We think this last finding for Zimbabwe may reflect the devaluation of the South African Rand, which will have reduced the purchasing power of remittance income from migrants in South Africa, and an increase in xenophobia in the period leading up to our survey.

These results are supported by Migrating out of Poverty work modelling the impact of migration in Ghana and Ethiopia on household expenditure, which was only collected in our later round of surveys. This is difficult to do using a single cross section of data as we cannot observe changes over time so in comparative research we rely a methodology that essentially uses expenditure of households without migrants to predict what expenditure of households with migrants might have been *had the migrant remained at home*.<sup>14</sup> We estimate in Ghana for example that households with migrants are on average very slightly worse off than they would have been if they had not migrated, and that households which do benefit from migration are those whose migrants had a relatively better planned migration: close contacts at the destination, for example. In contrast, households in Ethiopia benefit on average, and that gains are associated with remittance receipt, which tend to be higher from international migrants. Our fieldwork in Zimbabwe revealed that households with migrants in South Africa were very pessimistic about the potential benefits of international migration, as a result of the strong devaluation of the Rand and a rise in xenophobic attitudes in South Africa.

Further work using the longitudinal data from our Ghana surveys, which permits us to build an index of housing quality, suggests that successive migration (migration of further household members from households already with some experience of migration) has no impact on household welfare, at least in the relatively short period of two years between our surveys (Egger and Litchfield, 2017). We find that lower costs of migrating for later migrants means households are less likely to finance migration through the sale of assets and more likely to finance it through savings and remittances from earlier migrants; and that remittances of successive migrants are less frequent and lower in value than those from earlier migrants.

---

<sup>14</sup> See Awumbila et al 2016, and Abdelmoneim and Litchfield 2016.

Our research thus suggests that it is not possible to draw blanket conclusions that migration is good for poverty reduction of the sending households and that there are nuances around what types of households have migrants and the type of migration they experience.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 8. Subjective well-being compared with five years previously**

	Households with No Migrants		Households with Internal Migrants		Households with International Migrants		Households with both Internal and International Migrants		Total	
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
<b>ETHIOPIA 2014</b>										
Much improved	9.9	40	10.1	46	15.4	35	16.4	20	11.7	141
Improved	53.7	217	50.2	228	58.6	133	63.9	78	54.3	656
Neither improved nor getting worse	19.3	78	17.8	81	11.0	25	9.8	12	16.2	196
Worse	16.6	67	20.3	92	14.5	33	9.8	12	16.9	204
Much worse	0.5	2	1.5	7	0.4	1	0.0	0	0.8	10
Total	100	404	100	454	100	227	100	122	100	1207
<b>ZIMBABWE 2015</b>										
Much improved	2.7	9	1.8	6	2.9	12	2.9	3	2.5	30
Improved	21.1	71	33.1	112	26.8	111	30.8	32	27.3	326
Neither improved nor getting worse	24.3	82	26.9	91	23.2	96	23.1	24	24.6	293
Worse	36.2	122	32.8	111	36.0	149	35.6	37	35.1	419
Much worse	15.7	53	5.3	18	11.1	46	7.7	8	10.5	125
Total	100	337	100	338	100	414	100	104	100	1193
<b>GHANA 2013<sup>1</sup></b>										
More than adequate	6.4	26	4.2	38	11.5	7	22.2	6	5.5	77
Adequate	35.6	145	37.8	338	27.9	17	29.6	8	36.5	508
Just adequate	26.3	107	28.9	259	32.8	20	25.9	7	28.3	393
Inadequate	31.7	129	29.1	260	27.9	17	22.2	6	29.6	412
Total	100	407	100	895	100	61	100	27	100	1390
<b>GHANA 2015<sup>1</sup></b>										
More than adequate	2.2	15	3.4	13	4.5	1	0.0	0	2.6	29
Adequate	25.3	173	27.2	105	40.9	9	50.0	9	26.7	296

<sup>15</sup> Note that this does not mean that migration does not improve welfare of those who migrate. It is highly likely that migration does benefit the individual who migrates. The World Bank 2014 poverty profile of Ethiopia for example shows that migrants enjoy a much higher consumption level than non-migrants.

Just adequate	33.1	226	34.7	134	18.2	4	33.3	6	33.4	370
Inadequate	39.4	269	34.7	134	36.4	8	16.7	3	37.3	414
Total	100	683	100	386	100	22	100	18	100	1109
Subjective well-being here refers to the adequacy of the household's financial situation compared to 5 years previously.										
1. Note for Ghana that sample of households with international migrants is strongly under-estimated.										

### *Migrant Remittances*

One of the main mechanisms that links migration to potential improvements in welfare of their families and communities at origin is remittances. Remittances can take many forms – cash, in-kind and social – but all potentially enable family members to improve their diets, access education and health care, make investments in family and farm businesses and improve the quality of their lives.

Cash remittances are commonly understood to be the flows of money (in physical cash or via the banking and finance system) between migrants and their families. In-kind remittances are the goods migrants send home, which might range from regular parcels of food and personal items to medicine, clothing, consumer durables, business equipment and other large items. Social remittances refer to the “ideas, know-how, practices, and skills” which migrants share with or impart to their families and communities at home” (Levitt, 2001).

Most discussion of remittances received by developing countries focuses on estimates of financial flows between countries that can be identified as transfers between migrants in a destination country and their families in the origin country. The most comprehensive estimates of international migrant remittance flows are compiled by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and typically comes from the IMF Balance of Payments database supplemented with information from country central banks and statistics agencies. These estimates show that remittances are larger than official development assistance and also more stable than FDI (World Bank, 2017).

### *Transaction costs and under-estimating migrant remittance flows*

Although the KNOMAD data is uniquely comprehensive, it does underestimate the volumes of remittance flows between migrants and their families. Part of this relates to problems of definition and how each country implements the definitions set out in IMF protocols (see World Bank (2016) for a full discussion). In addition, remittances are likely to be underestimated in official figures due to the diversity of what migrants send home and the method of sending they choose.

Cash remittances are often hidden from official estimates because migrants choose to send money home via informal means, probably to avoid paying punitive bank charges (see below on cost of sending remittances) – taking it home themselves, sending it via friends and family travelling between the migrant and their home, or via transportation drivers or using trust-based networks of brokers such as the *hawala* system common in Arab and South Asian countries. Goods sent home to families are similarly sent via informal means, avoiding formal trade channels and charges. These informal means of remitting are near impossible to

estimate without comprehensive, comparable and representative surveys of households and their migrants.

In the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys it is possible to identify a very wide range of methods of transfer, from formal banking services and mobile banking to using friends and family members to carry money home and even using bus and truck drivers to take money home. In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia between 55 and 60% of migrant cash transfers are made via a formal financial institution, including via banks, post offices, Western Union branches, whereas in Ghana less than 30% are via formal banking methods. This may be because the Ghana data is heavily weighted towards internal migrants who rely very heavily on friends and family to carry or even collect money for their family at home, or take it home themselves when they visit. Migrants from Zimbabwe and Ethiopia also use family and friends (and a number of international migrants from Zimbabwe will use bus and truck drivers to send cash home) but as more of them are international, and certainly in the case of Ethiopian migrants in the Gulf, unlikely to be travelling home very often.

This spread of ways remittances are sent home and an avoidance of formal banking mechanisms when feasible suggests that migrants are seeking to avoid the high transactions costs of money transfers. The World Bank<sup>16</sup> estimates that remittance-sending costs along many African corridors are above 10 percent, due to a combination of low volumes and slow uptake of technology in fairly under-developed financial markets. Mobile banking is not commonly used by the migrants sampled in the Migrating out of Poverty surveys: 4-5 percent in Zimbabwe and Ghana, and less than 1 percent in Ethiopia, despite initiatives such as EcoCash in Zimbabwe and recent commitments to increase mobile banking support in Ghana.

### *In-kind remittances*

There are several reasons why migrants might choose to send some of their remittances in the form of goods. In-kind remittances may help receiving households to satisfy their consumption of certain items that may be difficult to obtain, particularly in rural areas, enabling households to perhaps widen their diet, acquire medicine or educational supplies. Certain in-kind remittances such as branded goods or consumer durables may also confer an additional social value for both migrant and recipient family. These goods might also be traded locally. Furthermore, sending goods, rather than money, may help ensure that the migrant has control over what his or her funds are used for. There is a strong gender dimension to remittance sending, with gender norms often influencing who sends what type of items to whom within the household.<sup>17</sup>

The World Bank's African Migration Surveys<sup>18</sup> collect data on goods sent home by migrants but for fairly big-ticket items, including household appliances (refrigerators, deep freezers, TV, HiFi system, Washing Machine, Stove/cooker, Microwave, air-conditioners, furniture, DVD/Video players, Mobile phones); business equipment (computers and accessories, sewing machines, hair-dressing equipment); tractor and agricultural equipment and transport, such

---

<sup>16</sup> World Bank (2017)

<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> See for example Pickbourne (2016) and Teye et al (2017)

<sup>18</sup> The full set of the World Bank's African Migration and Remittance surveys are available from <http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/mrs>

as motorbikes, cars, buses, and trucks. In contrast, the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys collect data on remittances in the form of food, clothing, school supplies, and medicine as well as larger items of equipment and consumer durables.

The surveys suggest that in-kind remittances of these types are important, but particularly important for women migrants. Figure 1 below shows data for Kenya using the 2009 African Migration Survey for Kenya. It shows that a large proportion of both men and women send cash remittances, while fewer migrants send in-kind remittances. Women are less likely than men to send cash remittances and send less on average in cash, but the value of goods that women send home almost removes the gap. A similar picture exists for Burkina Faso and South Africa, and for Zimbabwe using the Migrating out of Poverty survey (Figure 2), although not for Nigeria nor Senegal. It seems that in some contexts, women prefer to send goods over cash, possibly because this way ensures the goods are used for their intended purpose. Focussing on cash remittances only raises the possibility of under-estimating the contribution that women migrants make to their household and community economy.

Figure 1: Remittances in cash and in kind by gender of sender (Kenya, 2009; monetary values in Kenyan Shillings)





Figure 2. Remittances in cash and in kind by gender of sender (Zimbabwe, 2015; monetary values in US dollars)



## Cash remittances

Our surveys collect data on cash and in-kind remittances received from each migrant, the method of transfer, and the main uses of remittances by the household. We report on cash remittances in the table below for comparability between the surveys, as the way we collected types of goods sent home varies between surveys.

We see significant variations across countries in terms of how many migrants send remittances: ranging from a low of 39% among men migrants in Ethiopia to a high of 66% of men migrants in Ghana. There is no obvious gender pattern: in Ethiopia, women have higher remittance rates than men, perhaps reflecting their international opportunities.

**Table 9. Percentage of migrants sending cash remittances home in 12 months prior to the survey**

	men		women		Total		Total Migrants
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	
Ethiopia	38.8	310	43.6	319	41.1	629	1530
Zimbabwe	51.8	557	44.2	182	49.7	739	1487
Ghana 2013	66.1	504	50.6	211	60.6	715	1180
Ghana 2015	37.3	202	20.8	75	30.7	277	902

Our surveys also ask respondents to state the main use of cash remittances received over the last year. It is plausible that income received from migrants might appear to be used for a particular purpose, such as food, but in practise, frees up the household budget to be used for other purposes such as investing in human or physical capital. However, it is also possible that households adopt a mental accounting approach to their household financial decisions, allocating virtual budgets to specific areas of expenditure.<sup>19</sup> While taking household responses at face value ignores the fungibility of income there is some evidence from our qualitative research (see Teye et al, 2017), that remittances are a distinct source of income with decisions over their use sometimes determined by the migrant and their relationship with the specific receiver of remittances within the household.

The existing evidence in the empirical literature which seeks to show at the margin the impact of remittances on expenditure across a range of budget items is mixed, although a systematic review of studies has suggested that the balance of the evidence is that migrant remittances are used for productive purposes (Housen et al, 2013). This is reflected in what can be gleaned from the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys. It would appear that in contexts where remittance are low in frequency or value, notably Zimbabwe and internal migrants in Ethiopia, the primary use of remittances is for everyday consumption – principally food and clothing – and particularly when the remittances are from an internal migrant. However, in Ethiopia, remittances from international migrants are more likely to be used for farm or family business investment and development, compared to households with internal migrants, with households reporting a range of uses from purchase of seeds and inputs, farm machinery and

---

<sup>19</sup> This argument draws on the mental accounting ideas, first developed by Richard Thaler (1999) which challenges the assumption that money is fungible and suggest that instead individuals divide their income “mentally” into specific pots for different purposes.

land, and other business equipment. We believe this may be due to a behavioural response of households to the value of remittances sent home. Ethiopia is a high remittance receiving country and in our data we can see that international migrants from Ethiopia send amounts that are much higher than what is sent home by internal migrants, and what is reported in Zimbabwe and Ghana. These larger amounts lend themselves to being saved or being invested: it is harder to make small deposits in contexts where financial infrastructure is weak so small amounts are more likely to be spent as part of regular expenditure without freeing up much income for investment. Other than food, education and health are also important categories of expenditure funded by remittances, and our surveys also suggest school supplies.

	internal		international		both		Total	
<b>Ethiopia</b>	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Everyday consumption	70.8	148	33	58	55	55	53.8	261
Education and Health	6.7	14	5.1	9	4	4	5.5	27
Paying off debt	2.9	6	8.5	15	5	5	5.4	26
Farm/business investment	16.8	35	35.3	62	24	24	24.8	121
Social and Religious occasions	1.9	4	5.1	9	2	2	3.1	15
Household goods	0.5	1	1.7	3	3	3	1.4	7
Savings	0	0	8	14	6	6	4.1	20
others	0.5	1	3.4	6	1	1	1.6	8
Total	100	209	100	176	100	100	100	485
<b>Zimbabwe</b>								
Everyday consumption	75.9	154	74.3	176	70.4	50	74.3	382
Education and Health	14.8	30	20.7	49	12.7	9	17.3	89
Pay off loans	0.5	1	0	0	0	0	0.2	1
Farm/Business investment	7.9	16	5	12	16.9	12	7.8	40
Others	1	2	0	0	0	0	0.4	2
Total	100	203	100	237	100	71	100	514
Note that our Ghana surveys do not ask respondents about the use of remittances								

### *Financing migration*

Migration is costly and costs include not just transport, but also visas, official documents, and possibly bribes to border agents and recruitment brokers. Our data reveals that migrants raise this through gifts from family and friends, savings, loans and selling off assets.

Debt-financed migration is not very common in our sample, with less than 10% of migrants in Ethiopia and Ghana and as few as 2.5% in Zimbabwe taking out a loan or accepting an advance from an employer or agent. The majority of migrants use savings to finance migration. A significant number of migrants finance migration through savings: almost 65% of Zimbabwean migrants used savings (41% in Ethiopia and 58% in Ghana). Family and friends also support migrants to meet the costs of migration with around 20% of migrants in each country relying

on kinship networks. Selling off assets, or mortgaging land in the case of Ethiopia, is adopted by between 8% of migrants in Ghana and Zimbabwe and 20% of migrants in Ethiopia.

One way of interpreting the ways migrants finance migration is to see it as a form of investment in a venture that has risks, but also potentially rewards in the form of higher earnings and remittance flows back to the family. The wider support from family and friends reflects their stakes in the migration being successful.

## **Dynamics of migration**

We explore in this section some of the dynamics of migration, specifically occupational mobility of migrants and changes in migration status over time.<sup>20</sup>

Our surveys collect data that allows us to explore occupational mobility of migrants, comparing the job they did before migration with the one they are doing at the time of the survey. There are some important caveats to place around this as we rely on the household to tell us about what the occupations of their migrant pre and post migration. Recall is an issue which affects our baseline here and we cannot be sure households have accurate information from their migrants. It is likely that households find it harder to recall the occupation of their migrants who departed longer ago but we see no correlation between absence of information on occupation prior to departure and how long the migrant has been away so we suggest this potential source of bias is small. The second caveat is that sample sizes are quite small, particularly at the level of some occupations.

We show an occupational mobility matrix for each of Zimbabwe 2015, Ethiopia 2014 and Ghana 2015 which show last occupation prior to departure and current occupation at destination. The tables are detailed so are presented in Annex 2 as tables A5, A6 and A7.

One observation we draw is that migrants in skilled occupations prior to migration typically find similarly skilled occupations at destinations. In Zimbabwe, most of the technical and professional staff remain in these occupations at the destination; and we observe similar patterns for Zimbabweans who were administrative staff, transport operators, skilled construction workers prior to migration remaining in these occupations. In Ghana, teachers from rural areas typically find work as teachers at destination. The less skilled are to be found in a wider range of occupations at destination. Among the less skilled, for example, paid labourers in agriculture are to be found across a range of similarly unskilled occupations, such as farm labouring, paid labouring in other sectors, services, and domestic work.

The tables also reveal some differences across the countries. In Ethiopia for example migrants are drawn from predominantly agriculture, either working on their own land or as paid labourers in agriculture, and move largely into paid labouring in farm or non-farm, likely as

---

<sup>20</sup> We explored whether there is any evidence of migration improving asset accumulation, or on perception of poverty status, but any differences between households with and without migrants are statistically insignificant. Given the heavy use of savings in financing migration we might have expected to see a lower rate of asset accumulation of households with migrants in 2015 but this is not the case. We suspect that the time period is too short to be able to identify any meaningful changes in welfare (Egger and Litchfield, 2017).

labourers on construction sites. Migrants from the rural areas of Zimbabwe and Ghana appear to be more heterogeneous in the occupations they held prior to migration.<sup>21</sup>

Finally we can observe that some occupations at destination attract migrants from very different backgrounds: domestic workers in Ethiopia and Ghana for example are drawn from across a wide range of prior occupations.

Our longitudinal data in the Ghana surveys allows us to explore some of the changes over time. Note that the data covers a short period of time, 2013 and 2015, thus we are likely to see only quite small changes. We have already seen above from the descriptive work that migrants in the 2015 survey are younger than the earlier stock of migrants and there is a slight shift away from being married to being single. We also see some changes in the reasons why migrants have left, with men showing a small shift away from work related reasons towards getting married, and women towards further study and getting married. In terms of destinations, there is very little difference between the two cohorts, suggesting that the drivers of migration are not changing over the period of our study.

What we do observe is substantial changes in migration itself. Around a quarter of the households in 2013 which did not have a migrant, have one by 2015, and we also observe substantial return, with half of the households which were previously labelled as having migrants no longer having any current migrants away. The pattern of new migration and of significant return is broadly similar across the regions of the country. Rising unemployment, particularly in Accra, may be driving people home.

	2015		
	Households without migrants	Households with migrants	Total
2013			
Households without migrants	343	106	449
Households with migrants	312	351	663
Total	655	457	1112

The reasons cited for return support the idea that return may be motivated by lack of opportunities in the larger towns and cities of the country but also highlight the complexity of any migration decision. A large proportion of return migrants refer to family issues, and also to illness of themselves or a family member, revealing the responsibilities migrants feel towards their families, or to the desire to get married. Not being able to find a job and the end of a contract are mentioned in about 15% of cases.

<sup>21</sup> This may also be linked to the finding that migrants are not necessarily better educated than non-migrants in Ghana, discussed above in the section on modelling drivers of migration.

**Table 12. Reasons for Return Ghana 2015**

	N	%
Family issues incl. marital problems and homesickness	82	32
Earned enough money	5	2
Sick family member	21	8
Contract ended	17	7
Could not find job	24	9
To get married	4	2
Migrant became ill	21	8
Others	83	32
Total	257	100

## The role of the private sector in migration

Migration is often viewed as a problem waiting to be addressed by government and all too often the role of the private sector in improving outcomes for migrants and their sending families is overlooked. We highlight briefly two aspects of the private sector which provide potential policy levers; first the recruitment industry, the network of formal and informal brokers and agents which assist potential migrants to secure work at destination; and remittance costs.

### *Migration industry*<sup>22</sup>

We saw in Table 4 that significant numbers of migrants, particularly women, migrate only after a job has been secured at the destination. More than half of the migrants in our Ethiopian and Zimbabwean sample drew on advice and information from friends and family at both home and destination, as well as formal recruitment agencies acting as brokers, and employment offices from specific firms before embarking on their migration. Around 13% of these contacts were agents or employment offices and of the migrants who report having found a job prior to migration, around 40% did so through a recruitment agent or firm. Some migrants even secure finance for their journeys through a loan from recruitment agents.<sup>23</sup> Again, we see some nuances around gender: among our Ethiopian sample of migrants, of those who had secured a job at their destination prior to migration, almost 50% of women had done so via a recruitment agent or broker, compared to around 6% of men migrants.

Our Migrating out of Poverty work on domestic workers<sup>24</sup> reveals that recruitment agents will often train young women in child care, care of elderly, food preparation and housework, before placing them with families, and a similar training role of agents emerges in other sectors. This suggests that both agents/brokers and firms employing migrants have a

---

<sup>22</sup> See the breadth of work on the migration industry in a number of countries carried out by Migrating out of Poverty <http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/themes/migration-industry>

<sup>23</sup> Our Asian partners in Migrating out of Poverty (2010 – 2017, Bangladesh and Singapore) have documented the phenomenon of debt-financed migration through brokers for Bangladeshi and Indonesian migrants.

<sup>24</sup> There has been a strong rise in demand for domestic workers in urban areas of Ghana, reflecting in part an increase in female labour force participation and intensification of work, and most of this demand is met by women from poorer rural areas. (Awumbila et al, 2017).

significant role to play in preparing migrants for their work ahead, reducing the uncertainties of migration and in improving outcomes for migrants by offering good employment matches. There is however also the risk of exploitation (debt-financed migration, deception about the nature of work at the destination for example) particularly when recruitment agents are only loosely regulated.

Researchers in *Migrating out of Poverty* have developed a typology of recruitment agents, drawing on work on the domestic worker sector in Ghana. They distinguish between formal fully registered recruitment agencies (registered and with a licence to operate); formal partially registered agencies (registered, but with no licence to operate); individual informal brokers and their sub-agents (neither registered nor have a licence to operate); and networks of friends and family (Awumbila et al, 2017: p10). They document the incentives and barriers to become more formal (often bureaucratic complexity and delays prevent an agent from completing the registration process). Fieldwork in Ghana revealed that while there were examples of brokers being exploitative, there were also examples of brokers working in the interests of migrants, who saw their role as facilitating people to escape unemployment, to negotiate better pay or working conditions: not just economic agents but making a social contribution too. This challenges conceptualisations of agents and brokers as exploitative, with migrants portrayed as their victims without any agency, as portrayed in the literature, and is problematic.

Where there is a role for policy is firstly in improving registration and regulation of recruitment agents and secondly in strengthening efforts to support worker's organisation, such as the Ghana Trades Union Council's support for Domestic Services Workers Union.

### *Reducing the costs of sending remittances*

We have already described the patterns of remittances sent home by our migrants. Now we describe how they send money home, the extent of their reliance on formal money transfer offices and the costs of sending remittances, and opportunities for reducing the costs of sending money home.

In our surveys we see a very wide range of methods of transfer, from formal banking services and mobile banking to using friends and family members to carry money home and even using bus and truck drivers to take money home. In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia between 55% and 60% of migrant cash transfers are made via a formal financial institution, including via banks, post offices, and Western Union branches, whereas in Ghana less than 30% are via formal banking methods. We argue that this reflects the fact that our Ghana sample are mostly internal migrants, and indeed we see that they rely very heavily on friends and family to carry or even collect money for their family at home, or take it home themselves when they visit.

This spread of uses and an avoidance of formal banking mechanisms, when feasible, suggests that migrants are seeking to avoid the high transactions costs of money transfers. The World Bank<sup>25</sup> estimates that remittance-sending costs along many African corridors are above 10 percent, due to a combination of low volumes and slow uptake of technology in fairly under-developed financial markets. Mobile banking is not commonly used by our sample: 4-5% in Zimbabwe and

---

<sup>25</sup> World Bank (2017)

<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf>

Ghana, and less than 1% in Ethiopia, despite initiatives such as EcoCash in Zimbabwe and recent commitments to increase mobile banking support in Ghana.

Increasing the volume of remittances that are sent home via formal banking transfers and mobile banking and reducing the costs of these transfers may enable recipients to make more measured decisions about how to use remittances. It can be no coincidence that Ethiopia, where use of formal banking transfers is highest and where transfer amounts are large, also sees remittances used for farm and business investments. Hence one area available for private sector innovations is in developing technology that facilitates the transfer of funds home and improves the ability of recipients to manage them. Essentially, extending coverage of networks of money transfer agents and reducing transaction costs would be a first port of call for a policy recommendation.

## **Conclusion**

While the analysis in this paper is confined to data from just three African countries, it does yield some insights into the nature and processes of migration on the continent.

First, we can discern the emergence of two broad groups of migrants, an older generation of migrants following traditional migration routes for work in agriculture and mining, and a younger, better-educated newer wave of migrants exploring new routes and responding to new opportunities in new destinations, such as construction and domestic service, some of which is international. As more low-income African countries work through the demographic transition and make investments, public and private, in education, we are likely to see both an increase in the share and the number of migrants who are young and who possess transferable skills, and an increasing gap in education levels between those who stay behind in rural areas and those who leave.

Second, we document the phenomenon of female migration and how women migrants may differ in their choices and responses to opportunities compared to those of men. Ethiopia is a useful case-study for this, where we see a roughly equal gender ratio among our sample of migrants, and a relatively higher proportion of women migrating to international destinations outside the continent, chiefly the Gulf States. This shows that there are contexts where migration is not necessarily a mainly male activity: in Ethiopia we see large numbers of women migrating to work in domestic service, facilitated by recruitment agents who help women navigate the complex bureaucratic processes of visas, secure employment and remove some of the risks associated with migration. To what extent this remains a sustainable strategy for women, i.e. to remain abroad earning relatively high wages, is difficult to say: the majority of these women are single, and it is possible that these opportunities close down to women as they get older and get married, either because of preferences for unmarried maids in the Gulf or from family pressure at home.

The ways in which Ethiopian women migrate to the Gulf raises questions about the role of recruitment agents in facilitating migration and to what extent they are reducing information asymmetries, reducing risks and enabling safe migration or contributing to unsafe migration, exploitation and even trafficking. Our research suggests that understanding these networks of intermediaries or brokers, which range from formal, registered agencies to private

individuals, might provide signals about likely sources of demand for migrant labour as well as flagging where private sector regulation might be needed.

Our research provides insights into the complex manner of sending remittances home and highlights the high costs of transferring money and the ways that migrants, even international migrants, will seek to avoid paying these transaction charges. We see that many of the migrants in our samples send money home in ways other than bank and mobile transfers, which we interpret as reflecting the high transactions costs in many African corridors. This is of concern because not only do transaction costs lower the value to the recipient family but the ways that migrants attempt to avoid transactions charges may expose them to greater risk of loss. Furthermore, we argue that there is a risk that when amounts received are small (perhaps because migrants avoid transaction costs by trickling small amounts home via travelling friends and family), it may be harder for recipient households to accumulate these small amounts to spend on productive assets. Our Ethiopian data provides support for this idea: households with international migrants, who are on average sending much larger amounts than internal migrants, are more likely to report using these remittances for making farm or business investments. If remittances are to be encouraged and if they are to have greater impact on investment, then reducing transaction costs is key.

## References

- Abdelmoneim, Yousra and Julie Litchfield (2016) "Does Migration Improve Living Standards of Migrant-Sending Households? Evidence from Rural Ethiopia" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 41*
- Abrar, C.R. Priya Deshingkar, Mirza Taslima Sultana, Kazi Nurmohammad Hossainul Haque, and Md Selim Reza (2017) "Emic perspectives on brokering international migration for construction from Bangladesh to Qatar" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 49*
- Awumbila, Mariama Joseph Kofi Teye, Julie Litchfield, Louis Boakye-Yiadom, Priya Deshingkar and Peter Quartey (2015) "Are Migrant Households better off than Non-Migrant Households? Evidence from Ghana" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 28*.
- Awumbila, Mariama Priya Deshingkar, Leander Kandilige, Joseph Kofi Teye, and Mary Setrana (2017) "Brokerage in migrant domestic work in Ghana: complex social relations and mixed outcomes" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 47*
- Bilsborrow R.E. (2016) Concepts, Definitions and Data Collection Approaches. In: White. (eds) *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution. International Handbooks of Population, vol 6*. Springer, Dordrecht
- Clemens, Michael (2014) "Does Development Reduce Migration?" *CGD Working Paper 359*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
- Dzingirai, Vupenyu, Mutopo, Patience and Loren B. Landau (2014) *Confirmations, Coffins and Corn: Kinship, Social Networks and Remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe*. *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 18*.
- Egger, Eva-Maria and Julie Litchfield (2017) "Following in their footsteps: An analysis of the impact of successive migration on rural household welfare in Ghana" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 51*.
- Housen, T., Hopkins, S. and Earnest, J. (2013), A Systematic Review on the Impact of Internal Remittances on Poverty and Consumption in Developing Countries: Implications for Policy. *Population, Space and Place, 19*: 610–632.
- Levitt, Peggy (2001) *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Lucas Robert E. B., & Stark, O. (1985). Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana. *Journal of Political Economy, 93*(5), 901-918.
- Mahé, Clotilde and Wim Naudé (2016) "Migration, Occupation and Education: Evidence from Ghana" *UNU-MERIT Working Paper 2016-18*.
- Pickbourn, L.J. (2016) 'Remittances and household expenditure on education in Ghana's northern region: why gender matters', *Feminist Economics, 22*(3): 74–100. Thaler, R. (1999) "Mental Accounting Matters" *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, vol 12*: pp 183-206.
- Teye, Joseph Kofi, Mariama Awumbila, and Akosua Darkwah (2017) "Gendered dynamics of remitting and remittance use in Northern Ghana" *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper 48*
- United Nations Population Division (2013) "Cross National comparisons of internal migrants: an update on global patterns and trends. *UN Technical Paper 2013/1*.
- World Bank Group (2015) *Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014*. Washington, DC. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21323>
- World Bank Group (2016) *Migration and Remittances Handbook 2016*

World Bank Group (2017) "Migration and Remittances." Migration and Development Brief 27.  
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf>

## **Annex 1. The Migrating out of Poverty survey approach**

The Migrating out of Poverty household surveys are purposefully designed for rural households in developing countries to provide researchers and policy makers with insights into a range of migration behaviour and patterns in developing countries. The surveys were designed to incorporate larger sub-samples of households with current migrants than are typically available in existing surveys, and use a comparable and rich questionnaire designed to capture the complexity of migration patterns and behaviour, and to adopt a common definition of migration that captures a wide range of migration patterns. This comparability in our approach gives us the opportunity to explore the diversity of migration patterns, both internal (within a person's home country) and international (beyond the borders of their home country, including to neighbouring countries, other African countries and other international destinations), the reliance of households on migration to generate incomes and support livelihoods, and the depth of relationships between migrants and their families at home.

Migrating out of Poverty began conducting household surveys in 2013 with surveys in Bangladesh, Ghana, and Indonesia, followed in 2014 with a survey in Ethiopia and one in 2015 in Zimbabwe. All five surveys are available on the Migrating out of Poverty website and can be downloaded for free.<sup>26</sup> Each dataset is accompanied with a user guide which explains the specific approach adopted in each country. In 2015 we revisited the households in the 2013 Ghana survey, re-interviewed them on their migration experience, added a consumption module to the questionnaire and tracked a small sample of migrants to Accra.

Each survey consists of a sample of approximately rural 1200-1400 households, with deliberate over-sampling of households with current migrants. For example, in Ghana, nationally representative random sampling of households would have yielded an expected sub-sample of just 100 households with current migrants (see Mahé and Naudé, 2016). Instead, our approach gave us a sub-sample of over 1000 households with migrants and a control group of 300 households with no current migrants. The sample coverage in each country was restricted to regions within each country that have a history of migration, as evidenced by previous sample or census data, and informed by the local knowledge of our partner institutions.<sup>27</sup> All the areas sampled are rural but contain a mix of areas in terms of proximity to significant towns and differences in agro-ecology.

Our strategy to over-sample households with migrants does create one drawback of our approach in that our surveys cannot be used to estimate nationally or regionally representative estimates of stocks or flows of migrants, the flow of remittances between migrants and their households or national or regional level impacts of migration. The advantages however are that we have sizeable sub-samples of households with migrants. These larger sub-samples of households with current migrants, as well as a group of households without migrants, can be used to provide more robust analyses of migration

---

<sup>26</sup> All of our data is publicly available in SPSS and STATA format and can be downloaded from the Migrating out of Poverty website, along with questionnaires and related working papers <http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/research/migrationdata>.

<sup>27</sup> The exception to this is our data for Indonesia, which for reasons of physical accessibility is restricted to just one region of the country.

processes and impacts at the household level, and a more nuanced understanding of migration patterns by gender, age and other important characteristics.

The core household questionnaire contains modules on household composition and demographics, migration experiences of current and return migrants, remittance behaviour, household assets, subjective well-being, and income sources. The core questionnaire was extended in 2014 to include a consumption module and incorporated into the Ethiopia and Zimbabwe surveys. Some of the modules are similar to those one might see in other surveys such as the Living Standards Measurement Surveys, but where we innovate is in capturing more depth on the migration decision-making process, on remittance behaviour and on perceptions of the effects of migration. For example, our surveys ask respondents about who was involved in the decision to migrate and the involvement of migration brokers, reasons for migration, prior contacts at the destination and financing of migration, methods of sending remittances, frequency and amounts of monetary transfers and types of non-cash remittances. We are also able to explore the ways migration is perceived by the sending households and its impact on men and women's work at home.

We adopt a broad approach to conceptualising poverty, drawing on both subjective and objective indicators of poverty, well-being and welfare. Households are asked to list their main sources of income and to indicate approximately how much they receive from each source. We also record a number of key indicators on their living conditions, such as access to safe water and electricity and the materials used to construct their home. Land ownership of different types is also captured. We ask household respondents to record their own perception of their poverty situation, asking them to make comparisons over time as well as relative to other people in their community. The surveys for Ethiopia and Zimbabwe also include more detailed questions on household expenditures, recording expenditure on food over a 7-day recall period and on larger items over a monthly or annual period. This breadth of indicators gives researchers the opportunity to use the data to explore different dimensions of poverty and well-being.

Table 1 below shows our sample size in each country, disaggregated by type of migrant and where relevant by region.

**Table 1 Sample size across regions and by type of household**

	Households with no migrants		Households with internal migrants		Households with International Migrants		Households with both Internal and International Migrants		Total	
	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
<b>ETHIOPIA 2014</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1207</b>
Region										
Tigray	24.8	100	17.2	78	37.4	85	30.3	37	24.9	300
Amhara	24.8	100	32.2	146	13.2	30	21.3	26	25	302
Oromia	25.7	104	26	118	22.5	51	25.4	31	25.2	304
SNNP	24.8	100	24.7	112	26.9	61	23	28	24.9	301
<b>ZIMBABWE 2015</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1195</b>
District										
Chivi	29.3	99	24.9	84	45.8	190	26	27	33.5	400
Hurungwe	29.3	99	59.8	202	17.8	74	23.1	24	33.4	399
Gwanda	41.4	140	15.4	52	36.4	151	51	53	33.1	396
<b>GHANA 2013<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1418</b>
Region										
Brong Ahafo	16.2	69	16.1	145	72.6	45	41.4	12	19.1	271
Northern	22	94	23.2	209	3.2	2	0	0	21.5	305
Upper East	16.4	70	15.9	143	1.6	1	10.3	3	15.3	217

Upper West	13.3	57	13.6	122	1.6	1	0	0	12.7	180
Volta	32.1	137	31.2	281	21	13	48.3	14	31.4	445
<b>GHANA 2015</b>	100	692	100	388	100	22	100	18	100	1120
Region										
Brong Ahafo	13.9	96	19.1	74	63.6	14	61.1	11	17.4	195
Northern	26.3	182	19.3	75	4.5	1	5.6	1	23.1	259
Upper East	14.7	102	22.2	86	4.5	1	22.2	4	17.2	193
Upper West	14.3	99	17.8	69	4.5	1	0.0	0	15.1	169
Volta	30.8	213	21.6	84	22.7	5	11.1	2	27.1	304

<sup>1</sup> In Ghana sampling was proportional to population in each region so sample sizes vary across the regions.

Note that the Ghana surveys capture very few international migrants. This is because at that stage of our research we were only focussing on internal migration and thus the surveys were designed to only capture households with internal migrants. By chance, some households reported that some of their members were international migrants. Our next survey planned for 2018 will add to the existing sample a group of households with international migrants. Also, the 2015 re-survey of households did not have a strategy to replace households which moved or dropped out of the sample for other reasons, which the 2018 survey has.

## Annex 2. Country specific and region specific regression results.

Tables in this section provide the regional level estimates of the whole country results presented in Table 6. They show the results of a probit model of the determinants of individual  $i$  being a migrant.

### Zimbabwe 2015

Table A2 Probit model, with clustered standard errors				
<i>Dependent variable: Probability of being a migrant</i>	Full model	Chivi	Hurungwe	Gwanda
HH size	-0.0370***	-0.0631***	-0.0748***	0.00258
Age of the HH head	-0.0111***	-0.00928*	-0.0113**	-0.0144***
Female HH head	0.261***	0.0701	0.262**	0.255***
Base group: Male HH head				
Education HH head: Completed primary	-0.280**	-0.0665	-0.285	-0.381**
Base group: No education				
Education HH head: Completed Secondary school onward	-0.488***	-0.263	-0.669***	-0.627***
Job typology HH head: Self- employed	0.692***	0.927***	0.865**	0.375**
Base group: paid employee				
Job typology HH head: Unemployed or student	0.0842	0.0753	-0.0156	0.0993
Age of individuals	0.0196***	0.0353***	0.0373***	-0.00173

Female individual	-0.633***	-0.871***	-0.655***	-0.323***
Base group: male individual				
Education individual: Completed primary	1.670***	1.053***	-0.889***	-0.357***
Base group: No education				
Education individual: Completed secondary school onward	2.181***	1.765***	-	-
Job typology individual: Self employed	-1.544***	-1.648***	-2.199***	-0.960***
Base group: paid employee				
Job typology individual: Unemployed or student	-0.112	0.0457	-0.169	-0.269*
Main source HH income: Gold planning and trade	-0.052	-0.129	0.0429	-0.0367
Base group: Agriculture and land rental				
Main source HH income: Government and NGO benefits	0.351***	0.0702	0.531**	0.321**
Main source HH income: Remittances	0.290***	0.275**	0.394***	0.210*
Main source HH income: Other or unknown	-0.0434	0.117	0.074	-0.241*
Agricultural land ownership	-0.00496	0.124	-0.144	-0.198
Having a child in the HH who is less than 15 y.o.	-0.182***	-0.175*	-0.0494	-0.319***
District control: Hurungwe	-0.0457	-	-	-
Base group: Chivi				
District control: Gwanda	0.273***	-	-	-
Constant	-1.961***	-2.201***	0.124	1.443***
Observations	3,383	1,116	1,081	1,140

## Ethiopia 2014

<b>Table A3 Probit: Individual probability of migrating</b>					
	<b>Full sample</b>	<b>Tigray</b>	<b>Amhara</b>	<b>Oromiya</b>	<b>SNNP</b>
HH SIZE	-0.370***	-0.449***	-0.376***	-0.274***	-0.465***
Age HH head	0.0225***	0.0179***	0.0223***	0.0103**	0.0373***
Gender HH head: Female	0.0262	-0.0505	-0.0865	0.0938	0.176*
Base group: Male					
Education HH head: Completed primary education	-0.171***	-0.197*	-0.215**	-0.0452	-0.143
Base group: None					
Education HH head: Completed Secondary and onward	-0.349***	-0.269**	-0.265**	-0.679***	-0.212
Job category HH head: Self-employed	0.093	0.0824	-0.0985	-0.0896	-0.076
Base group: Paid employee					
Job category HH head: Unemployed or student	0.0963		-0.035	0.0953	-0.197
Age of all individuals	-0.0191***	-0.0117**	-0.0284***	-0.0008	-0.0285***
Female individuals	-0.0341	-0.434***	0.0198	0.400***	-0.138
Education individuals: Completed primary education	0.688***	0.506***	0.492***	0.991***	0.863***
Base group: None					
Education HH individuals: Completed Secondary and onward	1.266***	1.004***	1.032***	2.107***	1.076***

Job category individuals: Self-employed	-0.845***	-1.793***	-0.601*	-0.336	-0.763
Base group: Paid employee					
Job category individuals: Unemployed or student	-0.129	-0.918***	0.0834	-0.151	0.112
Main source of HH income: Non-agricultural jobs	-0.236**	-0.176	0.0594	-0.643***	-0.512***
Base group: Agriculture and land rental					
Main source of HH income: Government and NGO benefits	-0.158*	-0.189*	-0.0991	0.0811	-0.202
Main source of HH income: Remittances	0.272***	0.369***	0.290***	0.370***	0.172**
Main source of HH income: Other or unknown	0.16	0.113	-0.061	0.701***	-0.121
Having a child of less than 15 y.o. In the HH	0.264***	0.234**	0.175*	0.292**	0.422***
Region control: Amhara	-0.0383				
Base group: Tigray					
Region control: Oromiya	-0.0176				
Region control: SNNP	0.163***				
Constant	-0.953***	0.557	-0.43	-2.123***	-1.330*
Observations	4,524	1,032	1,092	1,209	1,180

## Ghana 2015

Table A4 Probit: Individual probability of migrating						
	Full sample	Brong Ahafo	Northern	Upper east	Upper west	Volta

HH SIZE	- 0.0842***	-0.108***	-0.0700***	-0.0672***	-0.113***	- 0.0703***
Age HH head	0.000928	0.00654	-0.00269	-0.00029	0.000896	0.0044
Gender HH head: Female	-0.00438	-0.184	0.0573	0.0378	0.204	0.0952
Base group: Male						
Education HH head: Completed primary education	-0.0518	-0.346**	0.176	-0.248	0.117	0.0453
Base group: None						
Education HH head: Completed Secondary and onward	-0.0397	-0.403	0.228	-0.324	-0.0873	0.195
Job category HH head: Self-employed	0.102	-0.0524	-0.213	-0.0804	0.0891	0.251
Base group: Paid employee						
Job category HH head: Unemployed or student	0.115	0.18	0.0594	-0.112	0.384	-0.185
Age of individuals	- 0.0146***	-0.0298***	-0.0132**	-0.000834	-0.0169**	-0.0154*
Female individual	-0.324***	-0.274**	-0.289**	-0.566***	-0.646***	-0.0544
Base group: male						
Education individual: Completed primary education	-0.230**	0.056	-0.441**	-0.0848	-0.327	0.0523
Base group: None						
Education HH individuals: Completed Secondary and onward	0.0453	0.218	-0.129	-0.0298	0.228	0.31
Job category individuals: Self-employed	0.152	0.187	0.603	0.0132	0.257	0.257
Base group: Paid employee						

Job category individuals: Unemployed or student	0.365***	0.0668	1.100**	0.321	-0.116	0.747**
Main source of HH income: Non-agricultural jobs	0.014	-0.0865	0.0798	0.0108	0.345	-0.143
Base group: Agriculture and land rental						
Main source of HH income: Government and NGO benefits	-0.0645			0.28	0.389	
Main source of HH income: Remittances	0.486***	0.564***	0.494***	0.525***	0.456	0.807***
Main source of HH income: Other or unknown	0.0852	0.126		-0.208	0.368	0.404*
Land ownership	-0.0922	0.0341	-0.0832	-0.114	0.11	-0.427***
Having a child of less than 15 y.o. In the HH	-0.741***			-0.109	-0.744**	-0.406
Region control: Northern	-0.551***					
Base group: Brong Ahafo						
Region control: Upper East	-0.226**					
Region control: Upper west	-0.320***					
Region control: Volta	-0.157*					
Constant	0.923***	0.821	-1.016	-0.0367	0.287	-0.244
Observations	3,949	688	1,172	625	619	752

Table A5 Zimbabwe 2015: Occupation mobility

## Migrant occupation at destination

Migrant occupation before migrating	Technician and professionals	Manager	Administrative staff	Sales worker (	Service worker	Own farm	Paid Labourer (agriculture)	Transportation operators	Skilled construction worker	Paid labourer (non-farm)	Production staff	Own business (non-farm)	Domestic worker	Others	Total
Technician and professionals	29	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	34
Manager	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	4
Administrative staff	1	0	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Sales worker (e.g. sales/waitress)	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	1	3	1	0	1	3	0	14
Service worker (e.g. cleaner, security guard, hotel worker)	2	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	12
Own farm	3	0	0	4	1	0	1	2	7	2	3	2	2	0	27
Paid Labourer (agriculture)	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	3	6	1	2	2	0	20
Transportation operators (e.g. Drivers)	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	10
Skilled construction worker	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	9
Paid labourer (non-farm)	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	10	2	0	4	0	21
Production staff (textile/electronics/others)	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	5
Own business (non-farm)	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	2	3	0	3	0	0	14
Domestic worker	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	8
Other (specify)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	38	0	6	15	16	0	9	12	29	27	8	9	17	1	187

Table A6 Ethiopia 2014: Occupational Mobility

Migrant occupation before migration	Migrant occupation at destination														
	Technician and professionals	Manager	Administrative staff	Sales worker (e.g. sales/waitress)	Service worker (e.g. cleaner, security guard, hotel worker)	Own farm	Paid Labourer (agriculture)	Transportation operators (e.g. Drivers)	Skilled construction worker	Paid labourer (non-farm)	Production staff (textile/electronics/others)	Own business (non-farm)	Domestic worker	Others	Total
Technician and professionals	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Manager	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Administrative staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sales worker (e.g. sales/waitress)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Service worker (e.g. cleaner, security guard, hotel worker)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Own farm	0	0	1	1	0	1	8	1	1	8	0	3	0	1	25
Paid Labourer (agriculture)	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	3	5	0	16
Transportation operators (e.g. Drivers)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Skilled construction worker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Paid labourer (non-farm)	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	9	0	4	8	0	23
Production staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Own business (non-farm)	1	0	2	2	0	0	7	0	2	5	1	10	13	0	43
Domestic worker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
Other (specify)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
Total	11	0	3	3	0	2	21	3	4	24	1	21	36	2	131

Table A7 Ghana 2015: Occupation mobility

Migrant occupation before migrating	Migrant occupation at destination															Total
	Farming	Chainsaw	Fishing	Mining & quarrying	Masonry	Driving	Carpentry	Teaching	Manufacturing	Cleaning	Electrician	Plumbing	Trading	Self employed	Others	
Farming	53	0	1	3	7	8	1	1	0	1	0	1	9	5	20	110
Chainsaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Fishing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	8
Mining & quarrying	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4
Masonry	1	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	10
Driving	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	11
Carpentry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Teaching	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	17
Manufacturing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Cleaning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Electrician	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	1	6
Plumbing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Trading	3	1	0	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	16	3	7	36
Self employed	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	5	4	16
Others	0	0	0	2	4	3	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	3	39	58
Total	59	1	2	12	21	14	2	20	3	1	2	2	38	19	86	282

## About Migrating out of Poverty

*Migrating out of Poverty* research programme consortium is funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). It focuses on the relationship between migration and poverty – especially migration within countries and regions – across Asia and Africa. The main goal of *Migrating out of Poverty* is to provide robust evidence on the drivers and impacts of migration in order to contribute to improving policies affecting the lives and well-being of impoverished migrants, their communities and their countries, through a programme of innovative research, capacity building and policy engagement.

*Migrating out of Poverty* is coordinated by the University of Sussex and led by Research Director Dr Priya Deshingkar and Dr Robert Nurick as Executive Director. Core partners are the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana, and the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia and L'Université Assane Seck Ziguinchor (UASZ) in Senegal. Past partners included the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) in Bangladesh, the Asia Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore; and the African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC) in Kenya. Please visit the website for more information.

University of Sussex, Arts B  
Brighton BN1 9QN, United Kingdom  
Email: [migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:migrationrpc@sussex.ac.uk)  
Web: <http://migratingoutofpoverty.org>  
Twitter: @MigrationRPC  
Facebook: /migratingoutofpoverty  
Blogger: [migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk](http://migratingoutofpoverty.blogspot.co.uk)

