



A review of options that have been used to structure donor-funded technical assistance facilities to support investments and investment environment.

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Question

What options have been used to structure donor-funded technical assistance facilities to support investments and the investment environment in low and middle-income countries?

Provide examples and lessons from technical assistance facilities which support investment for growth, jobs and inclusion.

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The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.

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1. Overview

Donor funded technical assistance (TA) in support of investment climate and investments tend to be focused on two delivery mechanisms: through Trust Funds with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and through private consultancy firms. Additional approaches include applied research and think-tanks, networks, non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies.

Donor engagement in the private sector has grown in recent years for multiple reasons. In financial terms, the IFIs and multinational and bilateral Development Financing Institutions (DFIs) dominate flows. A significant proportion of technical assistance is directly linked to these flows, helping build markets but also to manage risks of their associated investments.

There are a range of sectors from which to draw examples. This note has been organised by technical assistance with a focus on technical assistance that is delivered by agencies that also are sources of investment; and technical assistance delivered by private or not-for-profit agencies without a direct financial investment role.

This rapid review was based on publicly available documents. Given the recent increased donor investment into supporting increased investment flows, many of the examples are recent and reflect donor and implementers reports, and in-house and third-party evaluations. Lessons and evaluations are emerging from the sector, albeit mostly focused on the investments themselves rather than the technical assistance. Clear attribution remains a challenge. Literature that looks more deeply at impact in terms of poverty and gender is limited. Although there was some effort to search in other (European) languages, the results reflect a likely English-language bias. There are also significant variations in term of what different donors and IFIs publish, especially where these include evaluations and post-implementation reports.

As an overview of technical assistance linked to investment:

- Most technical assistance is provided along-side financing by the same institution/financing mechanism.
- However, there are an increasing number of examples of technical assistance which are more open, supporting bankable projects, or seeking improved returns in both publicly and privately-owned enterprises.
- Donor funded technical assistance managed through IFIs or DFIs tends to be targeted at their comparative advantage of improving the investment climate and leveraging the financing these organisations bring (including enabling investments into higher risk context, more inclusive investments, increased resilience)
- Donor funded technical assistance through the private consultancy firms tends to be more open in term of the resources it seeks to leverage (from IFIs, bilateral investors including non-OECD sources, private sector).
- Other mechanisms such as supporting networks, policy research, information sharing, are used. These clearly can add value, although face challenges demonstrating attributable results.
- Many interventions are risky, with technical assistance seen as a way of helping reduce this risk although this is seldom measured in terms of actual risk reduction.
- It's not always clear that donor support is robustly tested against increasing socio-economic benefits and market failure, combined with financial viability.

As key lessons that emerge from the review:

- **Politics and people matter.** At a high level, political buy-in and seeking to build a constituency to support that political buy-in is often a key challenge. This is similar to buy-in at the top of companies and groups of companies. Similarly, the right people to deliver matter, often local and regional experts can be more effective, but being able to bring in international specialists is also highly relevant.
- **All models require a degree of donor engagement, often more than anticipated.** Used carefully, bilateral donors can have political comparative advantages over IFIs and especially with consultancy firms. With technical aspects being the main comfort zone, allocating time and stepping up political economy understanding is often needed. In some cases, this may mean stepping back and waiting for the right time, in other cases it means significant time investment.
- **Technical assistance can add value.** It can unblock processes, build trust, help decision makers priorities, build capacity and strategic focus. However, it will often depend on having the right people at the right time, which can be partly addressed through adaptable designs and rapid response capacity.
- **Measuring additionality is challenging;** this can be partially managed through ex ante efforts by implementing partners to identify probable specific outcomes and impact and then follow through as during and after implementation¹.
- **Doing no harm, or reducing harm perhaps needs increased understanding.** There are good examples of helping avoid poor investment decisions by governments where easy credit and ambitious promises are not supported by evidence in the ground. Donor support that leads to reduced corruption associated with support to investment does not appear much in the technical assistance literature outside direct anti-corruption programmes – the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is perhaps a good example in this area.
- **The tension between growth and inclusion remain a challenge.** A number of evaluations are positive about development impact (and presumably associated growth). As noted by ICAI (2014, 2017), evidence of inclusion is generally more challenging, and mostly limited to very targeted programmes that are explicitly about gender impact and/or poverty reduction and which tend to be on smaller scales.

2. Conceptual justification for donor support to the private sector

The economic rationale for donor support to the private sector lies with market failure. Due to multiple reasons (imperfect information, externalities leading to market preferences being different from social preferences, very limited capital resources), there is a case for public (donor) funds. As Carter (2015 pg iv), notes, the case for subsidising private sector investment in developing countries is based largely on the economic theory of positive externalities: the idea that the benefits from investment that accrue to society at large exceed the returns to private investors. In the case of technical assistance, it is also arguably about imperfect information, as

¹ A good description of challenges and lessons can be found in Heinrich M, 2013. Donor Partnerships with Business for Private Sector Development: What can we Learn from Experience? DCED. https://www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/uploads/DCEDWorkingPaper_PartnershipsforPSDLearningFromExperience_26Mar2013.pdf

risks can be hard to assess (leading to lower than ideal investments as investors are mostly risk-adverse) and knowledge transfer/reducing the costs of innovation.

3. Delivering through International Financial Institutions and Development Financial Institutions

Major multinational Banks

Most IFIs provide technical advice to governments with the aim of improving the investment environment. Some also provide support to the private sector.

The World Bank Group (**World Bank and International Finance Corporation - IFC**) focus on both investment climate and more concrete business delivery technical assistance. The World Bank's focus includes analytical and advisory services, often linked to lending and budget support with a focus on investment climate. Where not directly funded and linked to loans and credits, it is generally funded through trust funds or reimbursable advisory services. The IFC provides stand-alone advisory services, with defined products and tend to focus on concrete, short-term and rapid interventions. This is both investment climate related (often funded by donor trust funds) and investment specific technical assistance linked to IFC investments.

The **Inter-American Bank (IDB)** provides support to the investment climate as part of its credit provision. In private sector technical assistance more specifically, its main delivery is through IDBInvest², providing equity and loans to the private sector (which will have associated technical assistance as an investor) and also separate technical assistance funded through trust funds and internal resources. This additional technical assistance covers a range of areas, such as specific sectoral support, value-chain development, creating opportunities for increased access to finance.

An evaluation of the World Bank Groups interventions (with a focus on investment climate) drew the following lessons:

- Political will was strongly related to success. Often the investment climate challenges were identified as a challenge by the World Bank, while this was not clearly a view shared by partner governments.
- The World Bank carried out considerable diagnostics, however this was more often where World Bank activities take place (rather than all aspects of investment climate).
- It was important to draw on these diagnostic tools during the design of investment climate projects as this was not always found to be the case.

The World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) found that in a review of the World Bank/IFC private sector interventions IEG (2016, pg 6), while there is no single prescription for catalysing transformational change, there are some mechanisms that increase its likelihood:

- Identifying and addressing the binding constraints to progress toward a development objective
- Adopting systemic tactics that address multiple constraints in interrelated parts, including through cross-sectoral approaches

² <https://idbinvest.org/en/projects>

- Scaling up and replicating effective approaches and innovations and of novel financing instruments
- Changing behaviours by modifying incentives of beneficiaries, introducing market forces, or increasing the flow of information.

Trust Funds delivered through IFIs

A Trust Fund is the main mechanism through which bilateral donors “buy” IFI services to deliver specific agreed objectives. Two examples:

The **Asia Pacific Project Preparation Facility (AP3F)** is a multi-donor fund managed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which provides technical support to governments leading to Public-Private partnerships, this includes: Project preparation and structuring, capacity development and policy reform, and project monitoring and restructuring support. Less usual in other IFI models, it includes a fee payment for successful financing deals, providing internal incentives as well as alternative sources of funds from donor grants (ADB 2014). Set up in 2016, a total of 11 applications for technical assistance had been approved by end 2017 (ADB 2017).

Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a multi-donor funded managed by the World Bank. Its focus is on supporting private investment into key infrastructure, often under public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements. An evaluation of 15 years of investment in Nigeria (PPIAF 2016) concluded that:

- In the sector (eg: ports) where clear success, there had been strong stakeholder management and participation, clear communication, focussed government leadership
- In the sectors where delivery was much weaker (energy, water), these were not present leading to necessary but not sufficient reforms and regulation that would lead to effective impact.

Technical assistance programmes in place with Development Finance Institutions

Of **multilateral DFIs**, the IFC is the most active in terms of managing Trust Funds that include investment climate and sectoral approaches as well as more specific advisory services to structure investments and financing.

Bilateral DFIs are also a mechanism through which technical assistance is delivered. All four of the largest bilateral DFIs³ provide technical assistance that is additional to their main investment objectives, although in practise this technical assistance will mostly be with prospective clients.

Netherlands FMO – Entrepreneurial Development is by some measures the largest bilateral DFI with an investment portfolio of EUR €9.2 billion. It implements a Capacity Development Programme: technical assistance to build growth of businesses from financial, environmental and socially sustainable way. Fifty percent of the costs are covered by the specific business, and since 2015 the focus has been on “green and gender” (FMO 2017). Delivery models include external advisory services and partnerships with the business, as well as facilitating exchange experiences with similar businesses and specific courses, seminars and workshops. Over ten

³ As defined by OECD

https://public.tableau.com/views/NONODA_DFIs/DFIs_EN?:embed=y&:display_count=no&:showVizHome=no#1

years covering over 500 projects and at a cost of EUR €52 million (funding including the clients contribution), additionally catalysed funds are estimated to be EUR €100 million (FMO 2017a).

French Proparco is the DFI set up in 1977, and an agency of the French Cooperation Agency (AFD). Drawing on AFC resources, it implements two technical assistance funds:

- An investments and support fund. Focused on building capacity and improving performance of especially SMEs and financial institutions. This includes organisational diagnostics, targeted advisory support, as well as assistance to set up investment funds for companies within the portfolio.
- Governance capacity building: this second fund works with AFD partners (Proparco and other AFD cooperation), providing specific diagnostics, technical assistance, seeking financing options. For this support, 25% of the cost is normally expected from the client.

The **German government DFI (DEG)** provides tailored Business Support Services (BSS). This is non-repayable co-financing for eligible projects that help companies to improve their performance, growth and developmental impact. Both prospective and existing customers are eligible. Areas of support include⁴:

- Resource and energy efficiency advisory services
- Corporate governance advisory services
- People management
- Environmental and Social Management in the Financial Sector
- SME Advisory Programmes for Financial Institutions

The **UK CDC** has historically not drawn on ODA funds to provide technical assistance (Velde and Warner 2007). However, the DFID funded Impact Programme approved in 2012, with the capital fund element formally transferred to the CDC balance sheet in 2017. The CDC has an ODA (DFID) funded technical assistance (CDC Plus)⁵ supporting investee companies, suggesting this element of the Impact Programme technical assistance will continue to be implemented by CDC⁶. With these changes it is unclear what lessons can be drawn, however they may offer insights in the future.

Although these apply to a multilateral DFI (IFC), summary findings of an evaluation of IFC advisory services (IEG 2011) is likely to also broadly apply to bilateral DFIs. The evaluation of the IFC advisory services concludes that around 70% have achieved high development ratings⁷.

And lessons include:

- The capacity gap between provider and recipient impacts on absorptive capacity, where weaker, more challenging.
- Transfer of knowledge can be more effective when the overall development level of country of the source (provider) is closer to that of the recipient country.
- Strong commitment and presence on both sides leads to improved outcomes

⁴ <https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Unsere-Lösungen/Begleitmaßnahmen/>

⁵ <https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/how-we-invest/how-we-partner-with-businesses/adding-value/>

⁶ The Impact Programme <http://www.theimpactprogramme.org.uk>

⁷ This primarily means impacting positively on investment decisions, rather than eg: job creation.

- Broader relationships (eg: also provision of other services, financing) support knowledge and technical advice transfer
- Codified and explicit knowledge is easier to transfer.

As an evolution of DFIs, a number of investment funds have been set up.

Especially in Africa where job creation and food security are given high priority, these have focused on agri-businesses though they have expanded into other income generating opportunities such as renewable energy⁸.

The US\$246 million **African Agriculture Fund (AFF)** offers an example of a private, public and not-for-profit delivery. The fund itself blends private and development finance investors (DFIs), with a subsidiary SME fund for smaller agri-business investments. Each fund is managed by different private equity firms.

A separate, donor (primarily European Union - EU) funded, technical assistance fund (TAF) managed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and implemented by a not-for-profit firm (TechnoServe) services both funds, offering both development services, but also helps companies to develop more innovative and inclusive models that lead to commercial returns (TechnoServe 2017). It has a budget of around US\$10million over a seven-year period, and while it focussed on the companies that AFF invests in, it operates with these same companies to help them expand their markets, increase their profits.

An EU funded review (Smith and Schramm 2017) after five years concluded:

- Shifting to ensuring the AAF/SME funds did their due diligence first (without TAF support) was an important step. Potential was therefore verified and owned by the equity funds themselves. The TAF then engaged to enhance this potential, working with the companies with the knowledge they were already screened as viable. Technical assistance was then also timely given the firms were also benefiting from the equity and loan investments from the AAF.
- It was important to tailor support to difference context, especially the size of the business. Micro-firms (<10 employees) benefited most from training and know-how. Small firms (10-50 employees) primarily benefited from core TA such as ensuring solid accounting systems and potentially build capacity for innovative inclusive approaches. Medium and larger firms where best able to see innovative inclusive approaches, with some tailored capacity building technical assistance.
- Early investment in building high quality suppliers within the region was especially valuable, especially those who are able to engage at all levels including with busy CEOs and equity managers. They also had back-up of international expertise where required.
- Successful management including the ability to learn and adapt, understand local contexts vary, be ready to manage challenges of poor uptake, dealing with unrealistic expectations, and overcoming communication challenges.

⁸ Other example would be the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund <https://www.aecfafrica.org/about-us/who-we-are> and AgDevCo <https://www.agdevco.com>

4. Technical assistance that is not directly associated with financing mechanisms.

Delivery through Private Sector Providers

A significant proportion of technical advice is provided through consultancy firms, including not-for-profit firms.

Australian Aid (DFAT) has a long history of using private sector delivery of which a significant proportion is through private contractors and so provides a good overview. Benefiting from a systematic evaluation (DFAT 2018), key criteria for increased success included:

- Facilities allow flexible approaches, adapting to demand and contextual changes.
- Importance of providing opportunities for outcome-focused coherence across sectors, the whole to be bigger than the sum of the parts.

And other lessons included:

- Quality delivery depends on being very well managed by DFAT, and which could include significant and experienced 'hands on' approach.
- Engagement requires capacity within the facility, and by DFAT, staff to engage, manage, optimise results. A major risk is that effort ends up "Transactional rather than transformative".
- Unrealistic assumptions are common.
- Data challenges prevent firm conclusions about efficiencies in managing contractors' costs; although the evaluation concluded no obvious differences from alternative delivery options while recognising an area for deeper review.
- Trust and open communication between delivery agents and DFAT was related to significant benefits in terms of results
- Careful structuring of criteria for management fees is important, so both DFAT and contractor incentives are balanced appropriately.

Effectiveness: delivery was on average found to be effective once unrealistic design assumptions are factored in.

Efficiency: contracting out to consultancy firms can help reduce administrative savings, but rarely reduced demand in terms of more complex engagement by DFAT staff.

As more specific examples:

The Department for International Development (DFID) funded **Business Innovation Facility** (BIF) was a five-year facility, focused on Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, providing technical assistance⁹ and knowledge sharing to support companies to develop inclusive businesses. Both shorter specific technical assistance (eg: workshops, working with clusters of companies, average cost £10,000), and longer-term engagement (three to 24 months, average costs £45,000) were used as approaches across a range of sectors within the five countries. The lessons drawn from this phase (Ashley et al, 2014) concluded that:

- Putting together inclusive businesses require more innovation and perseverance that may be expected, with multiple pilots and reiterations, depended on well managed and strong partnerships.

⁹ Although BIF did not provide financing, it was able to help fund materials for pilots, testing.

- They take time to get right, generally assume a 10-year period from inception to scale.
- Inclusive businesses can reach underserved markets with low income populations but it's a longer term strategic commercial view rather than rapid commercial results.
- For larger companies, TA is often not needed. It's about getting the timing right, when the company is able and seeking to expand, innovate. Short specific and timely TA can at times offer better value for money (vfm) than more intensive support.
- For smaller companies, the benefits are more about stronger business plans, better financial management. Also in some cases this helped raise finance, others still struggled despite being stronger in terms of "bankability".

As a complementary lesson learning, the internal DFID Project Completion (DFID 2014a) report noted that while overall successful, it was also noted that further lesson learning would be relevant to understand why a subsection of firms still struggled to implement agreed processes despite significant BIF inputs. The BIF is now in its second phase, focused on Myanmar (Burma), Malawi and Nigeria¹⁰. Although the rationale for the shift in countries from the first phase is not covered explicitly (DFID 2014), this appears to be more driven by a commitment to increase focus on Fragile and Conflict-Affected countries (FCAS). BIF2 also increased its focus on specific markets and understanding the market prior to engagement.

Cities and Infrastructure for Growth (CIG) is a £165 million technical assistance investment implemented in a portfolio of sub-Saharan and South Asian countries¹¹ focused on infrastructure, energy, services that support business and households. It will target improvements in policies, regulation and procedures that can enable investment from the private sector and from multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, including DFID's own development capital platforms. Although working in a similar space to PPIAF (as mentioned above) it is designed to be able to work more politically to nurture opportunities on the ground, while PPIAF is considered more demand-led. (DFID 2016)

Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF) is now in a second phase. Through the provision of technical assistance, it focuses on creating conditions for investment for public goods (eg: roads and railway, effective cities, energy). The formative evaluation (ICF 2015) noted, inter alia, that key considerations for success included:

- As a strength it has the right combination of skills in place, including drawing on consultants in the diaspora as able to understand the context while bringing in specific skills
- Potential investor engagement helps lead to resources and higher standards.
- Political impetus is critical; greater chances of success where working in sectors in clear need and so where politicians are incentivised to respond.
- Institutional clarity, avoiding overlaps and potentially competing interests
- Whole system approach taken, addressing the entire market chain.

Ethiopia Investment Advisory Facility (EIAF) is also implemented through a consultancy firm, providing demand-driven advice and technical assessment to government-guaranteed or owned investments, with a focus on growth and export-related infrastructure (railways, industrial parks, state-owned enterprises). It seeks buy-in through jointly implemented assessments (with state-owned enterprises) which include counterpart senior buy-in and technical capacity building. This

¹⁰ <http://www.bifprogramme.org/where-we-work>

¹¹ Within these two regions, the priority would be countries considered to be fragile and conflict affected States (FCAS).

in turn aims to lead to better investment decisions and management of investments already being implemented.

The **Nepal Centre for Inclusive Growth** took a somewhat different evolution, moving from more of a policy hub into supporting bankable projects. This reflected the particular realities and needs on the ground, and its flexibility is considered one of the reasons for its success in contributing to major investments (hydro-electric, power trade with India). It shifted to providing rigorous models for structuring deals. Key lessons (ICED 2016) included:

- Flexible design and delivery model. This allowed space to lesson learn and adapt.
- A politically aware arm's length approach. Implementing partners were given space by DFID, however DFID engaged rapidly where political or additional resources were required.
- Laying the foundations to take advantage of windows of opportunity. It was through political shifts that opportunities emerge.

The role of networks (and Impact Investing)

There has been a significant increase in Impact Investing¹², commercial and private foundation funded investors who like DFIs seek commercially viable investments while impacting positively in socio-economic terms, and often seek to bring in innovations which allow both objectives to be met.

However, in terms of the role of donor funded technical assistance, the overlap is limited. One area is through national and international networks. Most have donor and private foundation support, though increasingly they seek to be self-financing. Networks aim to share information and lesson learning, improve capacity to measure impact, facilitate investment flows and opportunities. Although clearly valued, there was no readily available evaluation or review of the value-added that donor technical funds obtained.

The **Global Impact Investment Network (GIIN)**¹³, is financed by members and also donor contributions (DFID provides financial support via IMPACT¹⁴). GIIN is a not-for-profit market support network set up in 2009 dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of impact investing. It serves as a forum for identifying and addressing the systemic barriers that hinder the impact investing industry's efficiency and effectiveness.

Impact Investors Council – India¹⁵ offers an example of a national focus. It is made up of a collective of members and partners, primarily private foundations and impact investors but also donors. It seeks to improve regulations to encourage impact investing, as well as build alliances, create opportunities, enable investments within India. It also aims to be self-sustaining.

Other networks include:

¹² Impact investing can be defined as “investments made into companies, organizations, vehicles and funds with the intent to contribute to measurable positive social, economic and environmental impact alongside financial returns.” (IFC https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Impact-investing/Overview/)

¹³ <https://thegiin.org/imm/>

¹⁴ <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202939/documents>

¹⁵ <http://iiic.in/impact-investors/>

Business Call to Action (BCtA¹⁶): brings together over 230 private companies, supported by various donors and with managed by UNDP. Engaging in innovation, market building, supply chains, competitiveness, it seeks to create new opportunities with inclusive and environmentally sustainable benefits.

ANDE (Aspen Network for Development Entrepreneurs¹⁷): focus on capacity of small and growing businesses with regional and (large country) chapters

AVCA (African Venture Capital Association): Promotes and stimulates private equity and venture capital investment in Africa

IBAN (Inclusive Business Action Network¹⁸) – global network focussing on supporting businesses.

Political and high-level policy engagement

Political risks are often highlighted in design and evaluation documents.

Donor supported political engagement is rarely reported and evaluated on, perhaps as mostly carried out by donors. The examples below do not seek to offer different models through which bilateral funds have added-value at a political and high-policy level, especially in terms of investment climate improvements.

One example that benefits from third-party reflections in terms of its value-added is the **Viet Nam Business Forum**. Through the already established Government of Viet Nam – donor forum, the Viet Nam Business Forum was set up in 1997¹⁹, meeting bi-annually with secretarial and technical support from IFC/World Bank and financial support from donors at the start (it is now managed by the business themselves, with IFC/World Bank inputs). It represents the main domestic and international firms, with working groups covering specific issues with aim of improving business, investment, etc.

A recent review of investment policy in Viet Nam (OECD 2018) noted the value of the Viet Nam Business Forum, particularly in the context of period during and following the country's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007 where the Government drew on the engagement and advise of the Forum to increase the benefits of the WTO. Similarly, a US State Department (2014) review recognises the value as an important forum through which Government of Viet Nam engaged business.

In Ethiopia, a partnership of businesses supported by German and Dutch funds were successful of having laws changed that improved business environment. The evaluation of this support also

¹⁶ <https://www.businesscalltoaction.org/business-call-action#>

¹⁷ <https://www.andeglobal.org>

¹⁸ <https://www.inclusivebusiness.net>

¹⁹ <http://vbf.org.vn/about-us/introduction/>

noted the active role of the Dutch Embassy in bringing business climate issues to the table (Heinrich 2013 pg 39).

More common, or at least more frequently documented, are the roles of applied policy research, through specialised agencies²⁰, research networks, think-tanks. This mechanism contributes to building evidence and in-country capacity.

The DFID funded **International Growth Centre** (IGC) is a long-term funding commitment that builds up country-level capacity and know-how. It's country-based operations arguably function as a think-tank as well as part of the wider network, benefiting from direction and additional capacity centred at LSE and Oxford universities. The IGC covers a wide range of challenges that are growth-related within the themes of State, Firms, Cities and Energy²¹. In the 2017-18 period, the IGC was involved in 165 projects, of which 29%²² led to a specific policy change or decision based on the evidence and engagement with policy makers.

²⁰ An example here would be Canadian IDRC, who draw on their own funds as well as other sources to deliver research for development, with the aim of bring innovation, knowledge and policy influence. www.idrc.ca

²¹ <https://www.theigc.org/research-themes/>

²² <https://www.theigc.org/impact/>

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