Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2017/18

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Cover photographs IDS students and graduates

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Notes on Contributors

**Nadjeli Babinet** holds a master’s degree in Governance, Development and Public Policy from IDS, University of Sussex and another master’s degree in Energy and Environmental Policy and Management from Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). She currently works as Director of Strategic Coordination for the Ministry of Mobility, Mexico City. Prior to this, Nadjeli worked in academy and civil society organisations as a specialist in participation, conflict resolution, and sustainable development agendas.

**Amy Baum** holds a master’s degree in Development Studies from IDS, University of Sussex and a BA in Anthropology from the University of Virginia. Prior to studying at IDS, she worked for several years in Vietnam as both an educator and non-profit volunteer and consultant working with local and international organisations. Areas of work have included gender-based violence, rural community development, disability, and programme review. Amy is also a CELTA (Certificate in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages)-qualified teacher and enjoys working with both large and small groups to facilitate meaningful discussion and personal growth. Her research and thematic interests include participatory action research, gender, disability, youth civic engagement, and alternative models of social change and civic action.

**Annette Fisher** is deputy team leader on a Department for International Development (DFID)-funded justice and gender-based violence project in Malawi. She is both a practitioner and researcher with an academic background in social change, governance, and conflict studies. Annette has over ten years’ experience in the fields of voice and accountability, participatory action research, and human rights, delivering projects in over 25 countries. She has experience working with and supporting national and sub-national governments in a range of countries to deliver more responsive services to citizens. She has also designed and implemented interventions to strengthen accountability systems and participatory community-based mechanisms for monitoring service delivery. Annette’s research interests include community monitoring of public services and social accountability related to maternal health care. She holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, Sweden and another master’s in Power, Participation and Social Change from IDS, University of Sussex, UK.

**Matthew Gregora** is Head of Compliance for Tearfund, a Christian relief and development agency working through local partners in over 50 countries. His role is to improve organisational systems, processes and culture, to protect all Tearfund’s stakeholders from harm. He holds a master’s degree in Globalisation, Business and Development from IDS, University of Sussex. Prior to studying at IDS and joining Tearfund, Matt worked for the oil multinational BP for 12 years in operational and commercial management roles.

**Harparmjot Hans (Remy)** holds a master’s degree in Poverty and Development from IDS, University of Sussex. Her thesis focused on understanding the relevance of youth’s aspirations (education and employment) in three different Indian national policies. Prior to studying at IDS, she worked at KPMG Advisory and Pratham doing monitoring and evaluation, programme assessments, due diligence and capacity-building work. Her research interests include education, employment, and technology.
Ian Lee is the coordinator of Dam Peoples Amazon. He is a socially engaged artist, graduate of Oxford Brookes University, trained in medical herbalism at the Instituto de Medicina Alternativa in Madrid 1996–99, the Centre for Transpersonal Psychology, London, social sciences, and eco-building, and recently completed a master’s degree in Power, Participation and Social Change at IDS, University of Sussex. He has led disaster relief in Peru for flooding and earthquake, and refugee work with the Karen hill tribe. He was formerly director of the One World Centre in Sheffield, conducting transpersonal workshops in England, Peru and Chile, and managing director of a City of London commodity brokerage. He feels most at home in South America, with his first trip to the Amazon in 1983, most recently with NAPRA.

Diego Orozco Fernández holds a master’s degree in Governance, Development and Public Policy from IDS, University of Sussex. Prior to this, he achieved a BS in International Business at ITESO – Universidad Jesuita de Guadalajara in Mexico, and worked for over ten years in the private sector. He has now embarked on a career in the field of international development, specialising in the role of business as a development actor. He currently works at a research centre for social and solidarity economy at Universidad Iberoamericana, focusing and driving new initiatives in the most marginalised areas of southern Mexico.

Benjamin Preclik holds a master’s degree in Globalisation, Business and Development from IDS, University of Sussex. Prior to studying at IDS, he completed his BA in International Relations and Development at the University of Sussex. Recently, his research interests have notably been focused on the emerging phenomenon of South-South Development Cooperation. His dissertation explored how the Brazilian agricultural development model influences the country’s cooperation projects in Africa.

Isabella Pyrgies holds a master’s degree in Development Studies from IDS, University of Sussex, where her thesis was on whether social transfer schemes can socially empower women in the context of Familias en Acción, Medellín, Colombia. Her research interests are in gender mainstreaming, conflict studies, and social protection.

Tracy Taylor-Beck has worked as an operational manager in the UK charity and public sector for 15 years, focusing on health and social care. She completed her master’s degree in Poverty and Development at IDS, University of Sussex over two years whilst working full time. Her research specialities during her degree were nutrition, food systems and culture, social protection, and the challenges of urban development.
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Andhra Pradesh, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHU</td>
<td>Basic Health Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSR</td>
<td>Business for Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>critical enquiry into practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFP</td>
<td>Corporate Financial Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEVAL</td>
<td>National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy [Mexico]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>District Advocacy Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAPL</td>
<td>Dakota Access Pipeline [USA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development [UK]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDT</td>
<td>elite development theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPB</td>
<td>Economic Planning Board [South Korea]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETP</td>
<td>Energy Transfer Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVA</td>
<td>Empowerment, Voice and Accountability project [Pakistan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKTU</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Trade Unions [South Korea]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPIC</td>
<td>free, prior, and informed consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG</td>
<td>greenhouse gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI</td>
<td>Global Reporting Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Independent Monitoring Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Indian rupee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>Ladder of Citizen Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGNREGA</td>
<td>Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry [Japan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>multinational corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service [UK]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NREGS</td>
<td>National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme [India]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGCI</td>
<td>Oil and Gas Climate Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Power Cube</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTB</td>
<td>Right-to-Buy scheme [UK]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme [India]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAAT</td>
<td>Society for Social Audit Accountability and Transparency</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGC</td>
<td>United Nations Global Compact</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBCSD</td>
<td>World Business Council for Sustainable Development</td>
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Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2017/18

This is the second edition of Ideas from IDS, our publication featuring top-class student papers from the 2017/18 academic year. Ideas form a fundamental component of development studies, and there are a great number of them in this collection of papers. Our students have done themselves and IDS proud, impressing our external examiners with their performance and with the stimulating content of their assignments and dissertations. The ideas presented here are important enough to deserve communication amongst wider student, researcher, and policy communities, hence this publication.

In this issue, we celebrate and share the critical thinking, innovation, and excellence demonstrated by our students. What stands out, is not the collective endeavour within these papers, excellent though it is. Rather, it is the ways in which our students are asking fundamental questions about who is responsible for development, about the sites of development, and about how development might be re-envisioned to better achieve its goals.

Relationships of social accountability between states and citizens

The first three papers examine relationships of social accountability between states and citizens. Nadjeli Babinet asks what can be learnt from India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) programme and, drawing lessons from India, what potential there is for successful social audits in Mexico. The next paper, by Amy Baum, focuses on the building of a 1,172-mile pipeline for transporting crude oil across sacred Native American sites. Baum argues that these processes of contestation transform Native Americans’ identity and, through this, wider processes of development. Annette Fisher explores community-generated data and monitoring in Pakistan and India. Fisher shows that, when the data and monitoring result in political action, community empowerment and positive accountability contributions are more likely.

The role of the private sector in development

The next three papers explore the potential of the private sector to address development issues. Matthew Gregora examines oil multinationals’ contributions to climate change, resource curse effects, and development. He argues that the corporate social responsibility activities of these mega-corporations offer only limited succour, providing uncritical social commentary and promoting profit-seeking activities. Harparmjot Hans (Remy) then examines women’s participation in India’s labour market. Hans juxtaposes social and cultural constraints and barriers against women’s educational skills and capital potential. She argues that women’s current labour roles represent a form of modern patriarchy and that their full participation is necessary for India to sustain its economic and social development. Ian Lee’s paper examines citizens’ resistance to corporate power in Brazil and the UK. In this original critique of development, he draws our attention to dimensions frequently overlooked in development – love, goodwill, emotion, inner power, and caring – and argues that sharing is a more promising approach than participatory development.

Politics, the state, and development

The following two papers examine political challenges to the state and how these may offer new ways of seeing states and their role in development. Diego Orozco Fernández deals with Mexican indigenous social movements’ autonomous municipalities and their role in fostering social development. This paper contrasts movement-inspired governance and autonomy and the corresponding relationships with the state, asking whether these offer new opportunities for addressing dependency and re-envisioning development. Benjamin Preclik’s
paper also explores for new conceptualisations of the state, focusing this time on the inclusion of labour in East Africa, and for a re-envisioning of relations between states and labour, in which developmental states promote and enhance the capacity of labour.

**Gender, participation, social change, and urban development**

The final two papers offer a completely different take on development. Isabella Pyrgies shares a reflective and personal exploration of gender, identity, and femininity. In this evocative charting of her learning to deal with PCOS (polycystic ovaries syndrome), Pyrgies explores the relationships between participation, power and photography, and how this offers new opportunities for social change. And finally, Tracy Taylor-Beck brings a political economy lens to urban gentrification, examining the degree to which this offers opportunities for economic prosperity and freedom as opposed to, or alongside, experiences of displacement. Taylor-Beck challenges the notion that the free market will ensure a positive experience for all and asks what kinds of approaches and policies are necessary to avoid the combination of gentrification and dispossession exemplified in the city of London. In their respective focuses on the personal, and on ‘universal’ ideas of development as happening in the UK, both these papers provide refreshing alternatives to established development thinking, offering important new perspectives for current times.

**Linda Waldman**

Director of Teaching and Learning, Research Fellow
Institute of Development Studies
Social Audits: Lessons from India to Mexico

Nadjeli Babinet

Similar to other development practitioners, I used to assume that participatory mechanisms of accountability, such as social audits, only prospered in contexts where citizen engagement was high (Gaventa 2004; Fox 2007, 2015). Nonetheless, in Rajasthan, a region with a strong civil society, social audits of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) failed, while in Andhra Pradesh, with feeble civil society, they appear to succeed (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014). What lessons can we learn from this variance?

I focus in social audits in India because I am concerned with the factors that drive and constraint accountability and I consider the apparently paradoxical experiences of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh a relevant comparison. Besides, sharing lessons between two comparable extensive pro-poor programmes, MGNREGA in India and Prospera (To Prosper) in Mexico, in countries with some comparable characteristics, is meaningful.¹

I start outlining the characteristics of MGNREGA, Prospera and social audits. Afterwards, I measure the level success in social audits implementation and conclude that Rajasthan is a partial failure and Andhra Pradesh is a partial success. I identify three main lessons: (a) political commitment from key political elites and senior officers in charge of the reform; (b) the existence and effective use of a policy window by these stakeholders; and (c) an institutional design reducing power struggles in the reform implementation. Finally, I explain why political commitment and a policy window are central conditions for social audits to work in Mexico.

1 Contextual and analytical framework

MGNREGA is a policy of employment relief providing a scheme to guarantee at least 100 days of work per year at minimum wages to rural families (Ministry of Rural Development 2013). It is a democratically decentralised policy, since the design and funding is provided by the national Ministry of Rural Development, but the power and responsibility is devolved to the states elected governments, which are in charge of local regulation, funds administration and policy implementation (Robinson 2007; Ministry of Rural Development 2013).

Prospera, formerly known as Oportunidades, is a conditional cash transfer for the heads of households (mostly women) in the poorest families. It is conditional because the families have to accomplish some co-responsibilities² to receive the transfer (Hevia de la Jara 2008). Prospera has a deconcentrated operation, since the decision power and funds are centralised in the National Coordination, in the Ministry of Social Development, in coordination with the Ministries of Education and Health, while its operation is geographically transferred to State Co-ordinations controlled by the central government (Robinson 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2008). This institutional design limits state and municipalities intervention in Prospera implementation.

¹ Mexico shares with India democratic institutions, a wide territory, a middle-income economy and a high amount of population living in poverty (CONEVAL 2016; World Bank Group 2017). Also, both countries developed extensive poverty alleviation programmes which suffer from the same drawback: corruption (Fox 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2008; Afridi and Iversen 2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Pande 2014).

² Such as the attendance to monthly workshops on health care for the heads of households and regular attendance to classes for children and adolescents (Hevia de la Jara 2008).
Social audits are a vertical or social accountability mechanism, mandatory for local states implementing MGNREGA (Schedler 1999; Ministry of Rural Development 2013). The logic of social audits is based in the short route of accountability: citizens (MGNREGA’s beneficiaries) oversee and hold accountable providers (MGNREGA implementers) to prevent power abuses (World Bank 2003). It can be considered as a soft accountability mechanism since it includes answerability procedures (monitoring and justification of public officials practices), but lacks enforcement (capacity to impose sanctions) measures (Schedler 1999; Fox 2007).

2 Social audits’ level of success in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh

While social audits are mandatory, its implementation has substantial variations among states (Chopra 2015; Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula 2015). I analyse two cases of implementation, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, because I consider it a robust comparison of similar cases with dissimilar results. To analyse the level of success of each case, I start by defining the factors for measuring success and then I apply them to the cases.

Since continuity is a challenge for policy reforms, a key factor for measuring success is the continued implementation of the reform (Schneider and Heredia 2013). Besides, following the logic of the mechanism, the use of social audits should drive a more effective (better attainment of employment goals) and efficient (decrease in corruption) implementation of MGNREGA (Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula 2015). So, I consider effectiveness and efficiency as additional factors for measuring success.

Despite having the largest budget for MGNREGA’s implementation and an active citizenship, Rajasthan’s experience is a partial failure. Social audits started with a high impetus but were not sustained over time (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014). As a result of a strong citizen demand, in 2009 the Congress Party started social audits’ implementation (Pande 2014). Nevertheless, after an ephemeral period of reformist fervour, a counter-campaign against social audits from local bureaucrats and politicians (judicial confrontations, intimidation to supporters, threats of strike) led to the reform stoppage (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014).

In contrast, the case of Andhra Pradesh can be considered a partial success. It is the only state with continuously implemented social audits and evidence of enhancement in MGNREGA’s efficiency, with the reduction of wage-related thefts and lost funds recovery (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Pande 2014). However, the impact in the aggregate number of wage-related thefts is modest, material corruption increased and there is no evidence of a substantial expansion in MGNREGA’s effectiveness (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014).

3 Lessons learned

Comparing the cases of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, I identify three lessons related with the issues of political commitment, policy windows and institutional design. In this section I explain each of these lessons.

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3 In social or vertical accountability mechanisms civil society hold agents in the government accountable (Schedler 1999).

4 I chose these cases because I can control other variables that do not affect the level of success in these experiences: the level of commitment of the central government (the federal government is the same and it is from the same party than the two local states: Congress Party); the size and population (that is similar); and the level of participation (that the existing literature coincides in the conclusion that it does not influence the success in these cases) (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014).

5 The Right to Information and Work Campaign (Suchna Evum Rozgar Adhikar Abhiyan) pushed for the implementation of social audits in Rajasthan. For more information about the history of this movement and its impact for social audits institutionalisation at a national level see Pande (2014).
First, a high level of political commitment from influential political elites is imperative for the reform success. I understand commitment as the ‘willingness and intent of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives, and to sustain these actions overtime’ (Chopra 2015: 7). As can be noticed in Table 3.1, in Andhra Pradesh the commitment for improving MGNREGA was high, as four of the five characteristics demonstrating commitment were accomplished. In Andhra Pradesh, an elevated degree of initiative, visible in the creation of the Society for Social Audit Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT), was undertaken during the reform implementation (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014). Also, constituencies were actively mobilised for support using the media coverage and a continuous effort for implementing social audits was maintained, allocating sufficient resources and capacities for the reform implementation and monitoring (ibid.). Finally, analytical rigour was applied using a pilot case in a smaller programme (Food for Work) before the reform implementation, preparing the state machinery for the reform implementation (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014; Chopra 2015). However, the lack of commitment for applying credible sanctions can explain that the success in Andhra Pradesh is only partial, since even if they are fairly ‘effective in detecting irregularities, their impact, if any, on deterring malpractice is modest’ (Afridi and Iversen 2014: 5). In contrast, in Rajasthan the senior political elite lacked all the characteristics of commitment (Table 3.1). This can explain why senior officials were unable, or unwilling, to counter-balance the opposition to the reform.

Table 3.1 Political commitment in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic of political commitment</th>
<th>Andhra Pradesh</th>
<th>Rajasthan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiative and innovation</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical rigour and learning processes</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation of support</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual implementation of sanctions</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity: capacities and efforts</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Some sanctions were applied, but they were scarce given the total number of cases.

The second lesson learned from these experiences is the need of a policy window: an opportunity for the persons advocating for social audits to push that reform (Kingdon 1995). A policy window appears when ‘a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe’ (ibid.: 165). Only in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the elected Chief Minister had an undisputed victory in the electoral process, opening the opportunity for him to position poverty as the key issue in the decision agenda (Pande 2014). Also, in the Andhra Pradesh’s case, the Chief Minister had a role of policy entrepreneur creating a solid coupling between the problem of poverty and the policy solution of social audits (ibid.). This coupling was supported and amplified by the new senior bureaucracy in charge of MGNREGA’s implementation, who worked as policy entrepreneurs framing the reform discourse and building viable proposals for its implementation (Kingdon 1995; Pande 2014). This facilitated the acceptance of social audits in the state government and in the society, allowing a smoother implementation of the mechanism. This was not present in the case of Rajasthan, where the party elected had a low-margin of victory. Because of that, the political leaders were hesitant to push forward social audits as a solution after encountering opposition (Pande 2014).

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I refer to the decision agenda as the items in the top of the governmental agenda, among which policy decisions are taken (Kingdon 1995: 166).
The third lesson learned from the cases of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan is the influence of the institutional design in the implementation of social audits, due to its impact on the perceptions of power redistribution. In Rajasthan, the local bureaucracy, closely influenced by local politicians, was in charge of MGNREGA and social audits’ implementation (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014). In contrast, Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister created three new institutions at the state level: an insulated autonomous bureaucracy for MGNREGA’s implementation; an independent and non-political organisation, SSAAT, for operating social audits; and a vigilance agency to supervise the SSAAT (Afridi and Iversen 2014). From a political economy perspective, social audit reform was easier to implement in Andhra Pradesh since the institutional design (centralised in the bureaucracy at the state level) generated fewer blockages in terms of power redistribution than the Rajasthan’s institutional scheme. In Rajasthan, since the state and municipal bureaucracy implemented the MGNREGA policy, social audits were perceived by the municipal bureaucracy and politicians as an effort to weaken their position, influence and monetary gains (Schneider and Heredia 2003). This perception led to power struggles between Rajasthan’s elected officers, municipal politicians and the bureaucracy. In the case of Andhra Pradesh, because the implementation of MGNREGA was exclusively in the hands of the state bureaucracy, and the SSAAT coordinated social audits, those power struggles were avoided.

4 Lessons learned: from India to Mexico

I consider the three lessons are relevant for a successful implementation of social audits. However, because of the extension of the essay I only focus on the lessons of commitment and policy windows as necessary conditions for social audits implementation in Mexico because of two reasons. First, due to the differences in the levels of decentralisation between MGNREGA (democratic decentralisation) and Prospera (deconcentration), lessons around institutional design are less appropriate to be applied in the Mexican context. Second, because political commitment and policy windows are indispensable conditions for social audits to work in Mexico. In the case of the implementation of social audits in Mexico, in order to know if that reform actually worked, the same indicators used for the Indian cases could be applied: continuity in the policy implementation and impact in the efficiency and effectiveness of Prospera.

A successful implementation of social audits in Prospera requires the political commitment of key stakeholders. Based on the lessons of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, the literature around political commitment and my own experience in Mexican policy reforms, the commitment of political elites in charge of Prospera (Ministries of Social Development, Health and Education) is unconditionally required for the reform to succeed (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Chopra 2015). If a strong political commitment is attained in political elites with high power or influence in at least some of these institutions, they could mobilise the support of different constituencies in the government and abroad (Chopra 2015). These political elites committed with the reform could also develop new sources of commitment (such as inspiration, support, political incentives, sanctions) to build commitment in the bureaucracy of the National Coordination, who is fundamental for the continuous implementation of the reform (ibid.). Complementary to this, the commitment of bureaucrats in at least one of the State Coordinations will be necessary to improve the locus of initiative, the analytical rigour and learning process for a successful reform implementation at the local level (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2013; Chopra 2015). I witnessed a similar effect in my own experience related with energy reform, where the political commitment of the Ministry of Energy generated incentives (such as increased budget) and sanctions for driving political commitment in local states and in other ministries. Lastly, according to the lessons learned and the particularities of the Mexican case, it is essential to strengthen political commitment so that credible sanctions are institutionalised and applied to all the Ministries related with Prospera implementation. In the particular case of Prospera, since it is a conditional cash transfer programme, the enforcement part of social audits is even more necessary to empower the beneficiaries, in order to ensure that the short route of accountability operates. In Prospera,
the state holds the beneficiaries accountable for receiving the cash transfer, what can be considered a reversed or upward vertical accountability mechanism, eroding the perceived power of the beneficiaries to hold the state accountable, because of the fear of sanctions (Fox 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2008). Therefore, political commitment for enforcement measures is fundamental. As the main beneficiaries in Prospera, in contrast with MGNREGA, are women, the gender barriers for raising their voice are even higher, so a political commitment for a gender perspective in social audits implementation will be also a necessary condition for its successful implementation (Hevia de la Jara 2008).

A policy window is also a relevant condition for social audits to work in Mexico. Since Prospera is a centralised policy, a political change than can open a window for policy reform is the national electoral process of 2018. For instance, in the case of the electoral victory of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador – a left wing candidate with a pro-poor discourse – a policy window could appear (MORENA 2017). Enhancing the efficiency of Prospera with social audits could be positioned as a necessary solution for poverty alleviation. Besides, an alliance of the elected president with a local social entrepreneur could help to raise the problem of poverty coupled with the solution of social audits in Prospera in one of the states. Another – more unexpected – opportunity for driving a policy window for social audits could be a pressing problem such as a scandal around corruption in the Prospera programme arising in the media, similar to other scandals opening the window for the anti-corruption system reform. Finally, the spillover effect of coalitions of entrepreneurs currently pushing for the enhancement in the implementation of the anti-corruption system could reinforce the policy window for other accountability reforms, such as social audits (Kingdon 1995).

5 Conclusion

Social audits are an accountability mechanism expected to reduce power abuses of the bureaucrats implementing MGNREGA. The implementation of this mechanism in Rajasthan shows that a strong civil society demand for social audits implementation is not enough for its success. Political commitment, a policy window and an effective institutional design are necessary for social audits to succeed. Based on these lessons, I argue that social audits could have higher probabilities to work in some Mexican states if broad political commitment, from senior politicians and bureaucrats in charge of Prospera, and a policy window, either related with the 2018 presidential elections or with a pressing problem rise, are achieved. In particular, I underline how commitment for enforcement measures and a gender approach towards social audits is indispensable for effectively deterring power abuses, learning from the deficiencies of the Andhra Pradesh experience and from the particularities of the Mexican scenario.

References


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7 This was the main obstacle in the implementation of the first ombudsman effort of the Prospera programme (at that time Oportunidades), the Citizen Attention programme (Fox 2007).

8 More information about the anti-corruption system reform and the corruption scandals in Mexico related with the policy window for the reform are available in the research of the Mexico Institute in the Wilson Center (Rios 2017).

9 ‘The appearance of a window for one subject often increases the probability that a window will open for another similar subject’ (Kingdon 1995: 190).


**Mni Wiconi (Water is Life): Knowledge, Power and Resistance at Standing Rock**

Amy Baum

1 **Introduction**

On 23 February 2017, the United States national guard, armed in riot gear, stormed into the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation in North Dakota and forcefully evicted all remaining water protectors from the Oceti Sakowin camp, which had served as the site of the largest mobilisation of Native Americans since 1876 (Wong 2017). Begun by a small group of native youth and elders in April 2016 to stop the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) from being built over a sacred river that was also the sole source of the drinking water for the tribe, the encampment of ‘water protectors’ attracted upwards of 10,000 participants and gained international attention. The movement claimed victory in December 2016 when pipeline construction was blocked under the Obama administration and it seemed Native American voices and knowledge were finally being validated by the US government. However, hopes were crushed less than two months later when Donald Trump became president and issued a presidential memorandum that would see the pipeline completed and pumping oil by June 2017 (Meyer 2017a).

In addressing the question of whose knowledge counts in defining and doing development, I define development as both an intentional practice and an immanent process (Cowen and Shenton 1996). This paper classes the former as the capitalist model of development-as-growth that guides US development, driven largely by the extraction and exploitation of natural resources (Saad 2017), and the latter as unfolding processes of social change that occur amongst the people affected by such planned development. In terms of what is valued, I define what counts as that which has the ability to create widely recognisable changes in social, political, and/or material processes, as indicated in this case by heightened media attention, the presence of thousands of citizens supporting a cause, and changes to the actual outcome of the planned project.

The case of Standing Rock is extremely complicated, involving multiple actors, across public–private and local–national realms, with varying degrees of power and authority. In teasing apart the complex interweaving of knowledge and power at the heart of the process, I propose two refined sub-questions to guide my analysis: Whose knowledge counts when? and How does knowledge get deployed by different actors with varying interests and degrees of power? Framing my analysis around a constructivist approach to knowledge and its inherent relationship to power, I will explore the ways in which this relationship results in back-and-forth processes of domination and resistance that leave no easy answer to the question. Given that development is a multifaceted process, I will ultimately argue that although the resurgence of indigenous knowledge has transformative value for many Native Americans, ultimately this knowledge counts in shifting wider processes of development to the extent that it aligns with the interests of those who hold greater power. To contextualise the forthcoming analysis, I will provide more detail to the background of the case.

2 **Case background**

In early 2014, Dakota Access, a subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners (ETP), began the process of getting approval for a US$3.8 billion, 1,172 mile underground pipeline to transport up to 570,000 barrels of crude oil per day from North Dakota to refineries in Illinois (Levin 2016). Though the planned route crossed mostly private lands, it would fall only .55 miles outside reservation borders and cross Lake Oahe, a sacred river that was the primary source of drinking water for the entire tribe (*ibid.*). Further, a substantial section of the pipeline was
to cross through territory that was granted to the Sioux in the 1851 Treaty of Ft Laramie but later taken by the government and sold without tribal permission (Clark 2002). In a meeting with Dakota Access representatives in September 2014, members of the Standing Rock Tribe expressed their clear objection to the project. Tribal Chairman David Archimbault II stated, ‘So just so you know coming in, this is something that the tribe is not supporting. Even though it’s outside of our 1889 federal boundaries, we still recognise our treaty boundaries.’ Phyllis Young, a tribal elder, emphasised that ‘our water is our single last property that we have for our people. And water is life: *Mni Wiconi*’ (Stand with Standing Rock 2014: 4.35). Despite these objections, plans moved forward, and the tribe was left with one recourse to stop the pipeline.

Though 97 per cent of the land needed for the pipeline was privately owned, a mere 3 per cent went through water crossings under federal jurisdiction, requiring approval by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE). One of these crossings was on the Missouri River at Lake Oahe. As Native American tribes are considered sovereign nations by the US government, ACE has a responsibility to fulfil several federal policies to consult with the tribe on potential impacts of the project to the environment and ‘historic properties of religious and cultural significance’ (ACHP 2008). The extent to which ACE fulfilled this duty is in dispute, but they began issuing permits for the federal water crossings in January 2016, and Dakota Access prepared for construction on the treaty lands.¹

In resistance to the impending project, on 2 April a group of youth and elders created the Sacred Stone Camp on the land of LaDonna Brave Bull Allard, a tribal historian and activist whose son and relatives were buried on land marked for construction (Allard 2016). Proclaiming *Mni Wiconi*, ‘Water is Life’ as their mantra, the self-labelled water protectors rested their actions on the knowledge that the pipeline’s path posed a serious environmental risk and ran through sacred water and territory that still belonged to them and held deep cultural significance. As Allard says in an interview,

> Our young people have a right to know who they are. They have a right to language, to culture, to tradition. The way they learn these things is through connection to our lands and our history. If we allow an oil company to dig through and destroy our histories, our ancestors, our hearts and souls as a people, is that not genocide? *(ibid.)*

In July, despite concerns raised by three federal agencies about the potential impacts of the project to the environment and heritage sites, ACE issued permits for Dakota Access to begin construction on Lake Oahe, citing that their environmental assessment showed no effects ‘injurious to the public interest’ (McKenna 2016). Immediately after, the environmental law firm Earthjustice filed a lawsuit on behalf of the tribe against ACE in US District court, seeking an injunction to construction on the grounds that ACE failed in its duties to consult with the tribe. Throughout the summer, water protectors spread awareness of the movement through social media, and more and more native supporters began to arrive in support. The camps became fully functional living spaces that were reminiscent of traditional native villages: protectors lived in tipis, chopped wood, lived without electricity, and performed daily prayers and ceremonies in Lakota (Sioux) language (Awake 2017).

Despite an initial lack of mainstream media attention, the movement sparked national interest after an incident between protectors and Dakota Access security guards went viral. From September through November, as thousands more native and non-native allies poured into the camps and media coverage swelled, law enforcement tactics became increasingly brutal. Armed police frequently used pepper spray and rubber bullets to stop the protectors, and in November even sprayed powerful waters cannons on hundreds of protectors in freezing

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¹ See Plumer (2016) for a graphic that is helpful in clarifying the route.
temperatures (Wong 2016b). Throughout these altercations, the protectors remained non-violent and reiterated their central mission as one of sacred ceremony and protecting Unce Maka, Mother Earth (Awake 2017). Before moving on to analyse the results of this resistance, I will first provide the theoretical framework that underpins my perspective on knowledge and power.

3 Conceptual framework

3.1 Knowledge

To begin broadly, I employ a constructivist approach knowledge that follows the Foucauldian notion that knowledge is accepted or rejected within socially created ‘regimes of truth’ constituted from ‘the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true’ (Foucault 1980: 131). Discourse can be clarified as ‘ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them’ (Foucault, cited in Weedon 1987: 108). In essence, knowledge and power are intimately bound and co-constitutive of what counts as truth in society and there is a constant negotiation of ‘reciprocal legitimation’ between knowledge and power (Weilier 2009: 2). As such, power can be shifted through changing the terms of discourse and the way that knowledge is framed and thus create pathways for resistance against domination.

In this analysis, I define power as ‘the degree of control over material, human, intellectual and financial resources exercised by different sections of society’ (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002: 41). Importantly, power is not absolute, but ‘dynamic and relational’ (ibid.), allowing for a constant interaction/process of domination and resistance. Following VeneKlasen and Miller’s definition, the ‘extent of power of an individual or group is correlated to how many different kinds of resources they can access and control’, which is predicated and maintained through social divisions such as gender, class, and race; and through institutions such as education, media and the law (ibid.: 41).

To analyse the specifics of knowledge for the Standing Rock movement, there are stark contrasts between Western hegemonic knowledge and indigenous knowledge. In referring to Western knowledge systems, I use the notion that Western knowledge historically rests upon rational logic, scientific truth, and observable phenomenon (Little Bear 2000: 82; Grenier 1998). This form of knowledge isolates individual problems and compartmentalisises knowledge such that individuals are ‘not inherently linked will all of creation’ (Duran and Duran 2000: 91). As it relates to resource management, hegemonic Western knowledge is most easily recognised through the capitalist discourse of economic growth by means of resource extraction and the productive, cost-effective use of land (Bell 2015). However, as Western knowledge is rooted in science, there is an increasing call to protect the environment due to the overwhelming evidence that business-as-usual development and reliance on fossil fuels are causing climate change (Saad 2017).

Native American indigenous knowledge constitutes an entirely different epistemological system in which land, humans and animals are inseparably bound in holistic, cumulative relationships of sacred knowledge that ‘rightly affects and is reflected in all that [they] do and discover’ (Garrouette 2003: 115). Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred sums up the implications of how Western and indigenous knowledge systems conceive of the environment differently by critiquing the current notion of economic development that is driven by industrial growth for revenue and gives ‘no care for the qualitative and spiritual connections that indigenous peoples have to what developers would call “resources” ’ (Alfred 2005: 46). Grenier, quoting Agrawal, notes that the crucial difference between Western scientific and indigenous knowledge ‘lies in their relationship to power’ and that ‘it is not the holders of indigenous knowledge who exercise the power to marginalize’ (Grenier 1998: 45). This relationship will
become elucidated by the following analysis of the defining and doing of development through the two sub-questions I initially posed.

4 Analysis

4.1 Defining development: Whose knowledge counts when?

Though the Standing Rock movement began in 2016, its roots date back 500 years to the birth of what would become America. Despite nationalist mythology praising the ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy, the history of US development must be defined as a process of settler colonialism, in which a state’s ‘sovereignty and political economy are premised on the dispossession of indigenous peoples and exploitation of their land base’ (Barker 2015: 44). Landing on the east coast in 1492 and successively encroaching west, European settlers invaded and claimed native lands in an intentional process of accumulation by dispossession in order to generate the capital needed for economic growth and development (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Kazanjian 2014). The primary way such actions were justified was through discursive practices very similar to those Arturo Escobar describes as the ‘making’ of the Third World in order to define the terms of US international development interventions (Escobar 1995). This entails a process in which identities, ways of knowing, and legal institutions are imposed on others by those in power to establish ‘rules of the game’ that dictate whose knowledge is valued and by what measure. As Escobar states, ‘since one of the major foundations of power is truth, the knowledge of that truth – its invention and confirmation – becomes a major mechanism for the legitimation of the hegemonic forms of power with a given system’ (Escobar 1984: 392).

Such ‘truths’ were created by racialising native Americans as ‘primitive’ and ‘inferior’, which served to ‘justify’ their domination by the superior British colonizer. Imposing such identities onto Native Americans vindicated interventions to eradicate indigenous knowledge, such as the forced removal of thousands of native children to be put into American boarding schools (Farrington 2016). This is one of several cases that exemplifies the overarching strategy of the time to ‘Kill the Indian and save the man’ (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014: 151). Inscribing native people into Eurocentric legal systems of knowledge based on science, rationality, and efficiency further allowed the European settlers to legitimise land grabbing by decrying the natives’ ‘inefficient use of the land’ and the need to make it productive for the ‘public good’ (Leeds 2005: 52).

The Sioux have a particularly painful history of dispossession by the US government. Although agreeing to treaties boundaries in 1868, the government significantly carved the boundaries in 1877 after gold was discovered, and in 1887 strategically fragmented tribal reserves to allow ‘surplus land’ to be sold privately to white settlers (ibid.). Those fragments represent the Sioux reservation today, although the territory from the 1868 treaty has never been officially ceded by the tribe (Simon 2016). Perhaps the worst connection to this case in particular happened during the 1940s when ACE claimed tribal land around Lake Oahe in order to create the Oahe Dam in the name of ‘public good’ as part of a regional hydropower development project (Lawson 1976). Flooding the land needed to create the dam displaced 1,000 Indian families, desecrated a number of sacred sites and burial grounds, and destroyed 90 per cent of the timber land on two reservations as well as the best rangeland and areas for cultivation (ibid.). Once again, as it had been for hundreds of years, the logic of development as economic growth for the wider population silenced native knowledge of the land’s value.

Given this history of material, cultural and spiritual dispossession, it is peculiar that suddenly a small group of indigenous people jumped to national attention and managed to gain a victory, albeit short-lived, over a giant oil company. Although native activists were present at the camps from April 2016, mainstream media coverage was scarce (WICB 2017). As noted above, the primary means of spreading awareness was through social media, especially the
use of Twitter hashtags like #noDAPL, #StandWithStandingRock, and #WaterIsLife that could be easily re-tweeted by one person and shared with a wider audience of followers. As more native supporters joined the cause, well-known celebrities and environmental activists like Leonardo DiCaprio, Robert Redford, and Jane Fonda showed their support through Twitter beginning in May (McQueen 2018: 64). With increasing buzz around the issue and campers utilising Facebook live to post daily videos (#NoDPL Archive n.d.), independent news outlets began coverage. Still, the movement was receiving scant mainstream media attention until 3 September, when a Dakota Access bulldozer began construction on an area of land that a tribal archaeologist, just one day earlier, had testified contained ancient burial grounds and sacred sites (Meyer 2016b). Water protectors trying to block the bulldozer were confronted by private security guards wielding pepper spray and attack dogs, some of whom bit protectors and drew blood (Levin 2016). Following this, video and pictures of the incident spread with lightning speed on Facebook and Twitter, causing the mainstream media and wider public to take notice.

Social media was a vital tool for those on the ground to show the world what was happening. As one protector put it, ‘They’ve been big issues. The only thing that’s new is the technology, is social media’ (Sottile 2016). In his study of social movements in the digital age, Castells notes that digital networks can be crucial in producing ‘counterpower’, which is the ‘capacity of social actors to challenge the power embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation for their own values and interests’ (Castells 2012: 5). Able to frame stories in their own words and perspectives, social media created a space for marginalised native voices to become influential in a way that had never been possible before. As another protector noted, ‘If it doesn’t come from us, then no one is ever going to know the story for what it really is’ (Sottile 2016). One set of videos that showed violence local police perpetrated on peaceful protectors garnered upwards of four million views on Facebook alone (ibid.). As viral videos spread throughout September and October, hundreds of native and non-native allies flocked to Oceti Sakowin to support Standing Rock, resulting in nearly 300 tribes represented and camp numbers estimated as high as 10,000 at one point (Northcott 2016). While it is impossible to detangle the precise mixture of support and influence that elevated Standing Rock to global prominence, it is clear that social media and the collective presence it helped foment formed a powerful counter-hegemonic voice with the capacity to disrupt the standard narrative of US development. However, though Native American voices were being valued on a national and global level as never before, the way in which native knowledge surrounding the nature of the fight was framed by different actors brings me to the second part of my analysis and the second sub-question.

4.2 Doing development: How does knowledge get deployed by different actors with varying interests and degrees of power?

4.2.1 Native water protectors

From the beginning, protectors on the ground expressed that the need to protect the water was rooted in spiritual significance and also the injustice of colonial dispossession of native lands and ways of life. In an effort to ground the camps in the traditions of their ancestors, prayer and ceremony infused the everyday actions of the camp, and many native participants expressed a deeper awareness and understanding of their connection to sacred knowledge (Gunderson 2017; Wong 2016a). Insisting that they were water protectors and not protestors, native people instructed non-native camp guests to remember that the camp was itself a ceremony (Simon 2017). As one protector stated, ‘We are peacefully defending our land and our ways of life. We are standing together in prayer, and fighting for what is right’ (Awake 2017). In this way, the protectors were able to reject hegemonic forms of civic action and frame the events around their own language and customs. Also emphasising that the sacred lands they protected belonged to the Sioux by right of treaty and were stolen by colonising settlers, this represents a powerful narrative of decolonisation that takes place through the
'resurgence of indigenous consciousness channelled into contention with colonialism' (Alfred, quoted in Sium et al. 2012: III).

This sentiment is echoed in the remark of youth activist Lauren Howland during direct action resistance on Thanksgiving:

[To] be in a protective stand to say Water Is Life and to show no fear, unarmed, it makes [our] ancestors proud, and it re-writes history. Today we re-write Thanksgiving, we take back Thanks-taking, Thanks-killing... We re-write it as peaceful, prayer action that shows life.
(Awake 2017)

With recurrent comments of an ‘awakening’ happening among the people gathered at the camp (Awake 2017; Wong 2016a), it is clear that the resurgence of indigenous knowledge has tremendous value for the broader Native American community and can be read as a part of the immanent processes that arise in tandem with intentional development actions.

4.2.2 Non-native allies

However, alongside this indigenous framing rooted in sacred knowledge, several water protectors noticed that the ‘dialogue around #noDAPL has become extremely climate oriented’ (Hayes 2016). The wider environmental movement, which has gained significant strength in the 2000s with mounting awareness of climate change, played a key role in helping to galvanise public support for Standing Rock (Bailey 2016). Indeed, media analysis of mainstream news coverage identified that one of the strong narratives to emerge centered around the environment, with some of the most frequently used words being ‘global, climate, pollution and environmental’ (Sehat 2017).

Indigenous activists emphasise that this environmental framing fails to recognise that the fight for water is centered around an indigenous system of knowledge and is essentially about ‘surviving colonization’ (Hayes 2016). The movement is undoubtedly linked to the fight against climate change, but as indigenous scholar Kyle Whyte argues, it goes much deeper: ‘Stopping DAPL is a matter of climate justice and decolonisation for indigenous peoples. It may not always be apparent to people outside these communities, but standing up for water quality and heritage are intrinsically tied to these larger issues’ (Whyte 2016). Although the movement garnered thousands of supporters, when reduced to an issue of climate change and environmental protection delinked from the violent history of colonial dispossession that tribes have been resisting for centuries, indigenous knowledge is once again subsumed under the more powerful discursive system of Western knowledge. As such, there is an inherent tension in this process of making knowledge count, whereby the very thing that helped the Standing Rock movement gain traction also compromised it in a critical way.

4.2.3 Federal actors – ACE and the presidents

As noted in the case background, after the Standing Rock Sioux’s strong opposition to DAPL in 2014 was ignored and ACE deemed the environmental impact of no consequence, the tribe’s only recourse to stopping the pipeline was by suing ACE. While the ensuing litigation resulted in ACE delaying the permit in mid-November, a clash between protectors and police on 20 November resulted in 26 injured and 141 arrests (Wong 2016b). Tensions were at an all-time high, and the tribe called on President Obama to deny the permit needed for continued construction. Obama, an advocate of climate change policies and avowed supporter of native causes, faced increasing public scrutiny for his lack of action up to that point. On 4 December, cheers of victory and tears of vindication flowed out from the crowds at Oceti Sakowin after ACE announced it would be denying the permit and that a full two-year environment assessment with extensive tribal input was required (Meyer 2016a).
While ACE denies that Obama had any effect on their decision, what happened less than two months later is indicative of the ‘reciprocal legitimation’ between knowledge and power (Weilier 2009: 2). Less than a week after taking the office of president in late January 2017, Donald Trump signed a memorandum asking ACE to ‘review and approve’ the pipeline as quickly as possible ‘to the extent permitted by law’ (Meyer 2017b). Within a few weeks, ACE granted the permit necessary for construction and declared ‘no cause for completing any additional environmental analysis’ (Lamont 2017). Though ACE had previously acknowledged the need to consider the ‘history of the Great Sioux Nation’s dispossession of lands’ and ‘the importance of Lake Oahe to the Tribe’ (USACE 2016), all this seemed to change with the stroke of a pen. This provides another example of how the capacity for certain knowledge to count depends on how it is utilised by those in positions of power.

5 Conclusion

The Standing Rock case is tremendously complex, involving a range of different actors that traverse various levels of power and have access to different tools with which to leverage that power. In this paper, I have traced the way in which US development has historically been defined by a process of settler colonialism that required dispossessing Native Americans from their land in order to amass the resources needed for capitalist growth. Fast forward to 2016, despite another business-as-usual infrastructure development on native lands, social media helped create a space for native voices to be heard on a global scale and assert pressure on the dominant forces of power. However, the ensuing events would see the indigenous knowledge at the heart of the movement valued and devalued in different ways by natives, non-native allies, and those in government positions. Ultimately, I have shown that the intimate relationship between knowledge and power means that knowledge can count for different actors in different ways, at different times. Although the space for native voice created through social media helped spark a movement that lead to an awakening of indigenous wisdom, ultimately the capacity for this knowledge to count in wider, intentional plans for development is determined by the extent that it aligns with those holding power.

Given the nature of this case, I would be remiss not to make brief mention of my positionality as the author. As a white American in the privilege position of higher education, I am acutely aware that I am the product of a colonial system that ‘implicates and unsettles everyone’ (Tuck and Yang 2012: 7). This necessitates the recognition that, in crafting an analytical argument around the events, I risk reifying the colonial exploitation of indigenous knowledge by speaking for those who are historically dispossessed of voice. While this acknowledgement does not entail a solution, I hope that it may be the starting ground for a deeper recognition by myself and other readers that supporters of native struggles must work broadly towards championing indigenous knowledge as a process of decolonisation, ‘instead of aligning with indigenous peoples only when a particular issue, such as opposition to one pipeline, seems to match their interests’ (Whyte 2016).

References


What Do We Do with the Data? How Do the Concepts of Empowerment and Vertical Linkages Help Us to Understand Questions about the Effectiveness of Community Monitoring for Improving Public Service Delivery?

Annette Fisher

1 Introduction

Community monitoring is used around the world in a wide variety of contexts. The literature has predominantly focused on community monitoring for environmental preservation purposes but more recently a number of studies have been conducted, examining what factors can influence the effectiveness of community monitoring for improved public service delivery in the global South. Community monitoring has been applied in many different ways to education, health, anti-corruption programmes etc.

This paper explores how the data generated by community monitoring can be used both by communities for their own ends and by communities for holding duty bearers to account. In particular this paper explores how data represent a movement of power and uses the concepts of empowerment and vertical linkages to explore how data from community monitoring can be used. This paper looks at two aspects of monitoring: (a) what communities do, and could do, with the data they collect by monitoring public services and how external actors can facilitate them, and (b) how the process of monitoring and the data generated can increase the communities' own empowerment. This paper uses two case studies, one in Pakistan which I worked on and one in India detailed by Farzana Afridi in her 2008 study.

Framing community monitoring through an empowerment lens and linking this to the concept of vertical linkages is the springboard for my critical enquiry into practice (CEP). I plan to embed myself in an organisation which is supporting communities to monitor public service delivery and explore with them what the role of the external actors is in facilitating community monitoring in ways which are empowering for the community and in ways which are impactful in terms of improving public services.

2 Conceptual framework

In this section I will briefly explain my use of the key concepts of empowerment and vertical linkages. I will start by explaining what I mean by data in the context of this paper. In this case data refers to the information (statistics or otherwise) generated by the community as part of their monitoring of public service delivery, this might be a facility checklist for a health-care centre or a tally of teacher absenteeism. This type of community monitoring can produce data in a quantitative (e.g. checklist) or qualitative format (e.g. perception of users exit survey) but the type of monitoring I am predominantly focused on is that conducted by volunteer community members and which generates quantitative data. Data of this kind are often dismissed for their validity by governments and donors as they are not collected by highly trained researchers, nor under controlled circumstances. However, as studies analysed by Jeremy Holland in his work Who Counts? show, 'participatory research can generate accurate and generalisable statistics in a timely, efficient (value for money), and
effective way and participatory statistics empower local people in a sphere of research that has traditionally been highly extractive and externally controlled’ (Holland 2013: 1). I have also seen first-hand the accuracy and power that data of this kind can hold both for communities and for social accountability processes; it is this concept of the power of the data and the movement of that power that this paper focuses on.

Empowerment is a concept which means different things to different people, as captured by Ann Ferguson when she said, ‘What exactly is understood by “empowerment” as a process and a goal, and how does this concept relate to the concepts of “needs”, “interests” and “rights”?’ (Ferguson 2004: 1).

For the purposes of this paper and because I connect most with empowerment defined in a liberalising way, I am taking Eyben, Cornwall and Kabeer’s characterisation; ‘Empowerment happens when individuals and organised groups are able to imagine their world differently and to realise that vision by changing the relations of power that have been keeping them in poverty’ (Eyben, Kabeer and Cornwall 2008: 6). This characterisation of liberalising empowerment sees power as a central issue, ‘The extent to which any individual or community can determine for themselves who they are and how they choose to relate with others is determined by structures and relations of power’ (ibid.: 8).

Linked to this concept of liberalising empowerment is VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002: 55) political empowerment process (Figure 2.1) which is helpful in situating the process of community monitoring within the empowerment literature, as I will show later in this paper.

**Figure 2.1 The political empowerment process**

![Diagram of the political empowerment process](source: VeneKlasen and Miller (2002: 55), reproduced with permission.)

‘Vertical linkages’ has emerged as a concept from the work of Jonathan Fox and Joy Aceron, who have identified it as a potentially impactful strategy for social accountability, it refers to the ‘vertical integration of civil society policy monitoring and advocacy… vertical integration
tries to address power imbalances by emphasising the coordinated independent oversight of public sector actors at local, subnational, national and transnational levels’ (Fox and Aceron 2016: 4). For the purposes of this paper, I am applying this concept very specifically to the use of data generated by community monitoring for social accountability goals.

The vertical linkages concept includes in its thinking, the concept of diagonal accountability, which like empowerment is used differently by different parts of the literature. For the purposes of this paper, I am using the definition outlined by World Bank authors Stapenhurst and O’Brien:

Community advocates participate in institutions of horizontal accountability, rather than creating distinct and separate institutions of diagonal accountability… community advocates bring firsthand experience about the performance of the government agency to the accountability process.

(Stapenhurst and O’Brien n.d.: 3)

3 Why community monitoring and empowerment?

For the purposes of this essay, I think it is important to explain why community monitoring for social accountability and empowerment have stood out as concepts I want to explore in my critical enquiry into practice as it is through personal experience that I have become aware of the potential critical importance of the ‘data’ aspect of community monitoring. Through a recent exercise designed to help myself and fellow practitioners identify our ontological positions, I have concluded that I am a constructivist who draws on critical theory approaches to power structures. I believe that strong power structures (visible, hidden and invisible) have created a narrative and an order which oppresses people. I believe that by identifying and understanding these power structures we can help to transform them positively. I believe that where possible, knowledge should be co-created and co-constructed and should have emancipation as its aim. I also believe that some knowledge is often considered more ‘valid’ than others because of the power structures surrounding the way development work is designed and implemented (Guba, Lincoln, and Synham 2017).¹ This position has not only guided me toward the literature I have used to frame my thinking on social accountability in general but has also guided me towards the use of liberalising empowerment as a lens through which to view community monitoring for improved service delivery.

I was profoundly moved by the power of the fairly simple process of community monitoring, which the EVA project in Pakistan has been facilitating over the past five years. The mechanics of the process are explained in the next section but the volume, accuracy and the actual use of the data surprised many of us involved in the design. The data generated from the process became not only a key aspect of the social accountability approach facilitated by the project but, most interestingly, the community developed ways of using the data which were unplanned and potentially transformative from an empowerment perspective. Initiatives which include empowerment and ‘voice’ as a goal for marginalised people have become of great interest to me; at a young age I heard a number of witness statements at the Yugoslav War Tribunal in the Hague. The stories of people who had been left powerless and whose communities had been devastated by the actions of a few powerful people affected me and this experience has driven much of my career path since.

As I witnessed the mechanics of these accountability initiatives through roles in international development organisations, I became increasingly disillusioned by the lip service often paid to empowerment and began to feel that programmes which actually had transformative effects in this regard were rare or non-existent. It was at this low point in my experience that I

¹ My thinking on this was guided by the framework laid out by Guba, Lincoln and Synham (2017).
became involved in the project in Pakistan and through that I have become excited about the potential power of community-generated data within social accountability. What I want to understand now is, does that approach translate into other contexts and what is the role of external actors in facilitating this?

4 Community monitoring approaches

There are many approaches which fall under the category of community monitoring; a recent World Bank review (Molina et al. 2017) of approaches categorised them into four main areas:

1. Information campaigns
2. Score/report cards
3. Social audit
4. Grievance redress mechanisms

Community monitoring initiatives ‘are approaches where the community is given the opportunity to participate in the process of monitoring service delivery, where monitoring means being able to observe and assess providers’ performance and provide feedback to providers and politicians’ (Molina et al. 2017: 463).

Pollock and Whitelaw’s study (2005) of 31 communities in Canada has, along with other studies on community monitoring for the environment, framed much of the work in other sectors. They identified key factors which can lead to promising results, firstly, the approach has to be context specific, secondly the establishment of an information delivery mechanism is necessary and thirdly the gained experience should be meaningful for participants (Shrivastava, Ramasamy and Shrivastava 2013: 175).

There have also been a range of studies conducted on international development initiatives, some specifically on community monitoring (such as the aforementioned World Bank study) and others on social accountability approaches in general which include community monitoring (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). The evidence of the impact of community monitoring on improved service delivery is mixed (Olken 2007; Björkman and Svensson 2009), however the studies are often using different measures of impact and are often valuing different types of evidence. For example, the 2017 World Bank macro study predominantly takes evidence from quantitative research, measuring projects which approach community monitoring in very different ways and for different purposes. There is little exploration by the authors on why certain community monitoring approaches have more impact than others? The study does however direct researchers to explore two important areas which this paper takes note of, ‘the potential benefits of [community monitoring initiatives] on access to and quality of services are likely to be higher when interventions are designed so that contact between both actors are promoted, and tools for citizens to monitor agents’ performance are provided’ (Molina et al. 2017: 1).

As aforementioned, for the purposes of this paper and my CEP, I am predominantly interested in community monitoring approaches which generate quantitative data and where the monitoring is conducted directly by community volunteers. My focus is therefore different from many of the score/report card programmes employed by INGOs and donor projects where highly trained NGO staff convene meetings of community members and illicit responses to scorecard questions through dialogue.

To illustrate my chosen approach, I have selected two case studies. The first is a project in Pakistan on which I had the role of Technical Manager and the other is outlined in a study by Farzana Afridi comparing two approaches in India. While both these case studies are in South Asia and at first glance might not provide the necessary context differences, the nature of civil society in the two countries is extremely different and warrants further investigation in terms of the effectiveness of community monitoring approaches.
The Empowerment, Voice and Accountability (EVA) Project in Pakistan aims to empower, organise and facilitate citizens to hold the governments of the two provinces, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), to account for the delivery of public maternal and child health services.

EVA is represented at the local level by [384] community groups. Spread across nine districts in the Punjab and KP, they have an average of 20–30 members each. Through community-based monitoring and regular consultations, members identify issues and demands related to service provision in their local [Basic Health Units – BHUs]. Those that cannot be addressed through direct interactions with service providers are escalated to [District Advocacy Forums – DAFs]. DAFs are small squads of influential and committed accountability champions from civil society. They support community groups to raise their voices by engaging district and, in some cases, provincial-level powerholders and duty-bearers to resolve their issue. (Palladium 2016).

The project,

uses community-based monitoring as a means through which to gather information on service provision and to bolster the project’s advocacy efforts at all governance levels… however, it takes steps to assure that the information that is generated is aligned with supply side developments and useful to those receiving it. (Kirk 2017: 18)

Important to note is that all community members conducting the monitoring are volunteers and do not receive any financial support related to the monitoring. Additionally, the monitoring is conducted monthly by small groups of these volunteers in the form of a facility checklist\(^2\) and exit interviews with women who have received services at the facility. The raw data are shared with project officers and entered into a database which can generate reports and analysis.

The second case study is that of the monitoring of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’s (NREGS) implementation in two provinces in India: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). 'The recent spate of social audits of public projects under the NREGS in India provides an opportunity to re-examine the question of the impact of community monitoring in the Indian context' (Afridi 2008). As Afridi outlines, the two states represent different models of community monitoring; the difference between the models is relevant for the analysis in this paper.

Enacted by the central government as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005, the NREGS came into effect, on a pilot basis, in February 2006 in 200 economically most disadvantaged districts of the country. The NREGS, unlike existing social welfare programmes, is a law whereby any adult willing to do unskilled manual labour at a statutory minimum wage is entitled to being employed on public works within 15 days of applying for work in rural areas. Each rural household is eligible for up to 100 days of employment in a financial year. (ibid.)

\(^2\) This checklist was developed based on each provinces’ own health-care standards packages and essential drugs lists. It is measuring implementation of the policies which cover public primary health care provision. As project staff themselves describe it ‘it is holding government to account against the promises which it has made to the people’.

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In Rajasthan, Afridi explains,

Activists, NGOs and members of civil society, are playing a principal role in creating awareness of the rights of villagers and in securing their entitlements. In AP the state government has taken the lead in initiating this process and co-opted individuals from non-governmental institutions into it. The Rajasthan model can be called a grass-roots or ‘bottom up’ approach while the latter has a more ‘top down’ aspect to it. (Afridi 2008: 37–38).

In AP, the monitors were paid by the government, while in Rajasthan they were volunteers.

In both Pakistan and India the initiatives make use of the Right to Information legislation both in terms of filing Right to Information requests and in terms of using the laws as justification and protection for monitoring activities.

5 How do the concepts of empowerment and vertical linkages help us to understand questions about the effectiveness of community monitoring for improving public service delivery?

Eyben, Cornwall and Kabeer’s concept of empowerment includes an understanding that a necessary condition of becoming empowered is individuals or groups becoming conscious of how their world currently is, this is part of them imagining their world differently. Community monitoring of service delivery enables groups to understand the status quo and to learn about what service standards and policy implementation they can expect from the state as this is what they are monitoring the providers against. Thus, this process of monitoring is empowering in and of itself (empowerment as an end in itself) as it helps communities to become conscious of how their world currently is (the status quo) and to understand what their world could be (if service delivery standards and policy implementation improved). This application of the concept is supported by Pollock and Whitelaw’s findings in their study on Canadian communities when they say, ‘the gained experience should be meaningful for participants’ (Pollock and Whitelaw 2005: 225).

This idea of participatory data being a powerful asset to a community before and outside of its use in accountability is explored by Parfitt (2004), Jupp and Ibn Ali (2010) and Holland (2013) ‘participation as an end has an emancipatory, politically radical component in that it seeks to address unequal power relations’ (Jupp and Ibn Ali 2010: 32). Jupp and Ibn Ali, in a study in Bangladesh, explored how progress towards empowerment could be measured by a community themselves, arguing ‘as far as they are concerned the process is one that they drive and own and is purely for their purposes. For them the analysis stops here’ (ibid.: 53). We can take the findings from this study and explore them in relation to our understanding of community monitoring through an empowerment lens, ‘because each group uses the information for its own purposes the incentives for providing distorted information are reduced to a minimum’ (ibid.: 80). The implication here is that since the very act of monitoring is empowering, if we applied Jupp and Ibn Ali’s approach to the community measuring its own empowerment, this might strengthen the quality of the data collected because communities would be recognising the inherent value to themselves of not only the data but also their progress towards a more empowered state. This is a question I plan to pursue further in my CEP and the question of quality of data and how it can be further strengthened is of course very relevant in its use in advocacy and diagonal accountability approaches as discussed below.

However, evidence from both the cases in Pakistan and India challenge the idea that the act of generating the monitoring data is sufficient alone to empower communities, as the EVA project notes:
The most important moment for challenging traditional citizen–state relationships is the first time a community group has one of its demands resolved… with members beginning to view local health facilities and their staff as one of the community’s assets… many are beginning to organise themselves to maintain their BHUs, undertake small renovation projects, and to monitor the facilities outside of the project’s routine checks. (Kirk 2017: 16)

In Pakistan, we found that communities were empowered to look for changes they could make themselves (they could imagine the status quo being different) at the facility as a result of the monitoring but only after action occurred due to the duty bearers taking account of their findings generated by the monitoring. The generation of the data alone did not empower the community but the way the community used the data to shift the power balance (facilitated by the project) did lead to the community becoming empowered.

After communities became aware that the EVA project was able to run analyses on the data, some of the communities began to ask the project to create certain data reports for them. For example, more than one community requested data over a period, for certain checklist indicators in order that they could see if the situation had improved or deteriorated for their facility. In the cases where the data showed improvement, the communities were empowered as they directly linked their monitoring and issue raising to the improvement. More complex analysis would be needed to determine if this was in fact the case, but another question is, does it matter? The act of knowing there was improvement in the facility and experiencing a connection with their monitoring actions was empowering in and of itself. But this empowerment came not only from conducting the monitoring but also from seeing improvement, the communities which saw deterioration in their facility were still empowered to keep monitoring but not to the same extent as those who saw improvement.

Similarly, Afridi’s findings in relation to the India case show that when there is little action as a result of monitoring, this can lead to ordinary villagers feeling powerless in spite of the conduct of the audits (Afridi 2008: 38).

Any action taken thereafter against erring officials may be costly but the resulting benefits of an empowered community may outweigh the costs… unless substantive action is taken against officials who are found and proven guilty of corrupt practices, the credibility and effectiveness of community monitoring in reducing corruption could be insignificant. (ibid.: 39)

In both the Pakistan and India cases, external actors played a role in facilitating the data to reach those who could take action as a result of the findings; this role will be explored later in the paper.

This leads us to conclude that while the act of monitoring and most importantly the generation of data about service provision, is potentially powerful and likely contributes to empowered communities (which Pollock and Whitelaw have shown us is important for the effectiveness of monitoring in terms of social accountability) it is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition. Evidence from both India and Pakistan indicates that action as a result of the monitoring (the use of the data to shift power balances and thus potentially improve services) is also a necessary condition for empowered communities and from Pakistan we see that it is likely to lead to a higher level of empowerment of the community.

The possible reason for this is suggested by VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002) framework for political empowerment (see Figure 2.1), in which they show empowerment increasing by moving from a state of individual consciousness to political power. By applying Eyben, Cornwall and Kabeer’s approach to empowerment and Jupp and Ibn Ali’s findings and
combining them with VeneKlasen and Miller’s framework, we can understand the above further by seeing that while the act of generating data through monitoring is empowering, it is only contributing to the individual and collective levels of empowerment. It is only through duty bearers responding to the data when they are used to advocate for change (challenging the power) that we see the empowerment of the community moving to the level of ‘political power’ and the use of the data to make a significant shift in the power (Arnstein 1969) and improve service delivery.

Therefore, if we understand this and accept this to be the case, the question we must now turn to is, under what circumstances can community monitoring and the data it generates be most effectively used to hold duty bearers to account and improve service delivery; what are most effective ways for the community generated data to shift power balances?

Data and monitoring are important to policymakers and policy implementers as demonstrated by Miller and Covey’s (1997) ‘Phases of Policymaking’ (Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1 Phases of Policymaking**

As shown here, monitoring is important both for assessing current policy implementation and for setting the agenda and design of future policies. Bureaucrats and politicians want to know what is working at all levels of policy implementation and therefore they frequently design monitoring and evaluation processes into their policies. However, they infrequently design bottom-up monitoring into the process and therefore the end-users of service provision rarely have their perspectives factored into policy design and implementation. This often leads to service provision which does not cater to access issues of women or marginalised communities or which leads to monitoring indicators which are set around priorities of what service providers think users care about and not what are actually priorities for communities.

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3 This use of VeneKlasen and Miller’s framework reminds us of Arnstein’s ladder of participation which is relevant because community monitoring which generates data is a form of participatory statistics as explored by Holland in his book *Who Counts*?
This was demonstrated in a very powerful way to me on the project in Pakistan; the government of KP had developed (with the support of donors) an Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) which,

Consists of 175 staff that monitor the provision of health (and other) services across the province, at all levels, and construct bi-monthly action plans to address deficiencies… whilst in and of themselves the IMU’s data collection efforts are impressive, they are being bolstered by the EVA-BHN project feeding its own citizen generated monitoring data into the IMU’s reports.

(Palladium 2016b)

The IMU had been monitoring medicine stockage at the district level and the findings were positive however the data generated by communities, supported by the EVA project through the facility checklist and the exit interviews, showed that medicine stocks were often low or ran out at the facility level. Analysis of the two sets of data by the IMU and the EVA team, alongside further investigation at the facility and district level by community volunteers, revealed that one of the aid disbursement led indicators of the donors had created a perverse incentive for stockpiling medicine at the district level instead of distributing it to health facilities. Without this key data from the facility level and from the user perspective, this gap in implementation would not have been identified. As a result, the IMU selected a number of indicators from the community monitoring checklist and the exit survey to add to their top-down monitoring indicators and together they are now used to hold service delivers to account through the government’s own horizontal accountability processes. This is significant as it not only shows why vertical linkages are critical to the effectiveness of community monitoring for improved service delivery; without the facilitation of ‘contact’ (Molina et al. 2017) between communities generating the data and the IMU, this gap would not have been identified, power would not have moved and action would not have been taken (further empowering the communities which generated it). But it also confirms Pollock and Whitelaw’s conclusion that ‘an information delivery mechanism is necessary’.

In the Pakistan case, the use of the data has helped communities to shift power to the benefit of poor and marginalised people. Other examples of this are the volunteers’ communication to the duty bearers of the importance of female washrooms and a separate female waiting area in facilities. The community was able to show the duty bearers, through analysing the monitoring data (facilitated by EVA project officers), that those facilities which had these amenities, had a higher utilisation rate. They were then able to explain to service providers and decision makers that this was because women from poor, rural communities did not feel comfortable using services without these amenities, due to cultural constraints.

To understand why this use of community-generated data specifically has helped to shift power balances in this case in Pakistan, and how the principles of the approach might translate to a different context, we can explore the concept of vertical linkages further. As Fox and Aceron argue,

The core rationale for monitoring each stage and level of public sector decision making, non-decision-making and performance is to reveal more precisely not only where the main causes of accountability failures are located, but also their interconnected nature… the coordination of independent monitoring and advocacy capacity across as much as possible of the governance process – from policy debate and agenda-setting to the formulation of policy and budget decisions.

(Fox and Aceron 2016: 4–5)

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4 Molina et al.’s World Bank systemic review identified ‘contact’ between communities and duty bearers as likely important to the effectiveness of community monitoring initiatives.
The EVA project’s experience and the example in India demonstrate a few examples of how the data generated by community monitoring have been used by a few of the state’s own arms-length oversight bodies (IMU, ombudsman, etc.) through diagonal accountability to hold service providers to account. However, Fox and Aceron’s concept of vertical linkages points to a need to go further and identify opportunities for community-generated data to be used ‘across as much as possible of the governance process’ and for them to be triangulated with other types of independent monitoring; with the potential for this to have a powerful impact on the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives.5

Present throughout the experiences I have had on the project in Pakistan, the case in India analysed by Afridi and in many of the studies on community monitoring initiatives, is the importance of ‘getting right’ the role of external actors to the effectiveness of community monitoring. The 2017 World Bank macro-study identifies facilitation by external actors of ‘contact’ between communities and duty bearers as key to the success of the initiative (Molina et al. 2017) (presumably because this contributes to vertical linkages between actors). This is echoed by Gaventa and Barrett in their macro-study of social accountability approaches when they say, ‘Donors and policymakers alike can play an important role in protecting and strengthening spaces for citizens to exercise their voice, and can support the enabling conditions for citizen engagement to occur’ (Gaventa and Barrett 2010: 2407) and by Fox when he invites external actors to ‘deploy multiple tactics’ (Fox 2015: 346). This role of the external actor in facilitating community monitoring in order that the data generated are both used across the whole governance process and are empowering to the community, is something I plan to explore further in my CEP.

6 Conclusion

This paper has shown that community monitoring can contribute to the communities’ own empowerment as an end in itself but it also shows that this empowerment is increased when action occurs as a result of the monitoring. The paper has also demonstrated that when the data generated by community monitoring are channelled in a strategic way through vertical linkages, contributing to diagonal accountability, it not only strengthens the empowerment of the community but it can also be a part of shifting power and more effectively holding duty bearers to account.

References


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5 The EVA project staff talk of working towards a goal of the oversight institutions valuing the community-generated data to such an extent, that they ‘pull’ the data from communities, relieving the burden on communities to ‘push’ the data to them.


Unprofitable Problems: The Limitations of Corporate Social Responsibility

Matthew Gregora

1 Introduction

In 1970, Milton Friedman famously argued that the only social responsibility of business was to increase its profit, within the rules of fair play (Friedman 1970). At that time, it could be persuasively asserted that ‘states’ were ultimately responsible for social problems. Their unique civil authority and autonomy implied responsibility and capacity to provide public goods, and to regulate business to optimise private goods. However, in recent decades, many social problems and corporations have outgrown the state. The advance of globalisation has caused global public goods to become critically important (Kaul et al. 1999). Multinational corporations (MNCs) now rival states in autonomy, elusive to regulation (Ruggie 2017). Governance gaps have thus emerged at multiple levels (Scherer et al. 2016). This has prompted hopes and concerns that corporations will voluntarily self-regulate and proactively contribute to development – activities often described as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). But can CSR support such pressure?

This paper begins to answer that question, by arguing that corporations mainly use CSR to pursue or protect profit, which substantially limits what CSR can achieve for society. This argument is made by analysing the academic literature on CSR, linking main themes of research to build a case for the primary nature and limitations of CSR. These characteristics of CSR are then illustrated by the recent CSR activity of ten large oil MNCs regarding climate change and the ‘resource curse’. The paper concludes that clear discourse and research about CSR limitations are important for enhancing the potential of CSR and for developing other solutions to societal problems.

2 Literature analysis

The following analysis draws together main themes from the academic literature on CSR to demonstrate how the profit imperative limits CSR. Each subheading below represents a main strand of the research literature, from which selected points are made.

2.1 Definitions and concepts

Definitions and concepts of CSR, and cognate terms such as Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Sustainability, are numerous and contested (Sheehy 2015). This paper does not rely on a specific definition, but focuses on an aspect that is central to most: the voluntary actions of corporations to enhance their social impacts, including economic and environmental impacts. The dimensions of voluntariness, and of economic, environmental and social impacts are common to most CSR definitions (Dahlsrud 2008), as is the concept

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1 In simple economic models of social welfare, the state is expected to provide public goods because such goods are neither excludable nor rivalrous, permitting ‘free-riders’ who would reduce potential economic returns to business. Businesses require regulation because markets are prone to various failures in providing private goods, e.g. they overproduce goods with ‘negative externalities’ that impose part of the costs on society (untaxed pollution is a classic example). Economists also recognize quasi-public goods, club goods, etc. See e.g. Pigou (1920), Samuelson (1954), Arrow (1969), Cornes and Sandler (1986), and Kaul et al. (1999).

2 Definitions of CSR are discussed further below.

3 Carroll (2015) and Montiel (2008) observe that these terms are often used interchangeably by corporations, though academic literature delineates subtle differences. This paper treats them as interchangeable because the differences are not significant to the argument.

4 This paper uses ‘corporation’, ‘firm’, ‘company’, and ‘business’ interchangeably to refer to publicly-owned profit-seeking corporations, as is typical in CSR literature.
of enhancing impacts through minimising harm and maximising positive contributions (ibid.; UNGC 2014; EU Commission 2011). As alluded to in the introduction, voluntarily minimising harm can be usefully described as 'self-regulation' (Sheehy 2015), and 'development' is useful shorthand for making positive social contributions (UNGC 2017).

2.2 Theories of CSR behaviour

Theories of why corporations would display CSR behaviour are diverse and evolving. Garriga and Mele (2004) map them into four categories: instrumental, political, integrative or ethical. Most observers agree that 'instrumental' theories of CSR have become dominant, and have contributed to the recent widespread embrace of CSR by corporations (ibid.; Lee 2008; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). Instrumental theories assert that corporations use CSR primarily to pursue or protect profit. The premise of these theories is that corporations are a vehicle for investing capital to earn profit, and that investors have enough control over corporate managers to ensure that they mostly act to this end (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Actions with moral or relational motives remain possible, if investors curb their profit motive, or if managers evade investor control (Lee 2008; Aguilera et al. 2007). Thus, multilevel theories of CSR behaviour are relevant, particularly to individual actions and companies. However, in aggregate, the primacy of profit-seeking is viewed as keeping CSR centred on activities with a favourable business case.

2.3 The business case for CSR

The abundance of literature on 'the business case' for CSR is often seen as prima facie evidence of CSR's profit orientation. A meta-analysis by Orlitzky et al. (2003) found 52 quantitative studies of links between CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). By 2012 there were another 42 such studies for Wang et al. (2016) to analyse. Further studies explore the theoretical links between CSR and CFP. The point here is not what these studies find, but simply that the focus on the business case for CSR indicates that profitability is perceived as critically important to CSR's legitimacy and uptake (Schreck 2011). This view seems to be held by the key development actors who promote CSR, such as the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and Business for Social Responsibility (BSR). Their publications and websites heavily promote the business case, while still reminding that CSR is 'the right thing to do' (UNGC 2014; WBCSD 2012; BSR 2017). For example, in 2013, BSR co-created the Business Case Builder website (Business Case Builder 2018). Governments also seem anxious to couch CSR as good for business, not just society (UK Government 2014; EU Commission 2011). It is worth noting that the business case for CSR is often conceived in broad terms, by considering how multiple stakeholders influence corporate financial success (Carroll and Shabana 2010). This allows costs of CSR to be recouped creatively through various channels. Nonetheless, the business case imposes strong limits, as shown next.

2.4 Determinants of CSR

Research on what determines the level of CSR activity undertaken by different firms provides further evidence of CSR’s profit focus and consequent limitations. Campbell (2007) uses a profit-oriented model to theorise how levels of CSR will be mediated by economic and institutional conditions. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) do likewise for market and firm conditions. These two papers alone propose 18 separate determinants for the level of CSR activity by any corporation. Empirical studies often detect such determinants operating (Gamerschlag et al. 2011; Chih et al. 2010). The implication is that each firm has a different optimum level of CSR at any time. Some firms will enjoy conditions that favour CSR, such as the frequently cited examples who have found successful niches in pursuing strategies of

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These organisations have each published hundreds of documents on their websites which invoke the ‘business case’ for various aspects of CSR (WBCSD 2018; BSR 2018; UNGC 2018).
‘inclusive business’, ‘shared value creation’, or ethical branding – e.g. Unilever, Vodafone M-Pesa, and Patagonia (Porter and Kramer 2011; Jenkins and Ishikawa 2010). But for other firms, the optimum level of CSR will be low (Campbell 2007). Moreover, corporations which compete for advantage through CSR will experience diminishing returns on CSR investment, reducing its incremental attractiveness (Lee 2008). These implications constitute strong limitations to CSR, and may explain the inconsistent evidence of a correlation between CSR and CFP found in the empirical business case research described above (McWilliams and Siegel 2001).

2.5 Contributions of CSR

Critiques of the contributions of CSR to society often link shortcomings of CSR back to its profit-seeking nature (Banerjee 2008; Frynas 2005). Vogel (2007) thoroughly analyses how the limited ‘market for virtue’ has constrained the types of issues addressed by CSR, in which countries, and to what extent. He shows that customers, employees and investors meagrely reward most CSR, and that this causes for example, environmental CSR to remain weak in many developing countries, among corporations with low brand visibility, and on issues neglected by rich-country non-governmental organisations. Jenkins (2005) similarly argues that CSR has been weak in addressing poverty in developing countries, because the poor are rarely strong stakeholders in the business case. The research on determinants and contributions of CSR does not require a deterministic view of CSR activity (Frynas 2009), but it suggests that most corporate managers have relatively small room for agency.

2.6 Conclusions of literature analysis

To summarise, prominent strands in the CSR literature show that: corporations are viewed as using CSR primarily for profit, though other motives have a role; this is evidenced by the emphasis on the business case among academics and CSR advocates, and; the business case approach substantially constrains the CSR activities that corporations will undertake, even if all stakeholders are considered. These findings can be combined to draw the conclusion that corporations will rarely enhance their social impacts voluntarily unless it is profitable, which strongly limits the issues that CSR can address. Rather than being a criticism of corporate behaviour, this conclusion is intended as a descriptive consequence of how society is currently constituted.

Perhaps this would appear trivial, if not for the growing pressure on corporations to self-regulate and proactively contribute to development, as noted in the introduction. Governance gaps arising from globalisation are apparent to the United Nations (Kaul et al. 1999), CSR business groups (BSR 2017), and academics (Ruggie 2017; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Vogel 2010). Some prominent development actors have responded by calling on corporations to voluntarily enhance their social impacts (UNGC 2017; Agarwal et al. 2017; BSR 2017; WBCSD 2012). Positive views of CSR’s potential have been expressed by official development agencies, including the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (Jenkins 2005), although this enthusiasm appears to have waned somewhat after the Global Financial Crisis. Harvard University’s Corporate Responsibility Initiative publishes frequent studies of good CSR practice, seeking to enhance the public contributions of private enterprise. In short, there seems to be a disconnect between the limitations of CSR and the hopes and concerns for CSR among some development actors. This disconnect will be revisited at the end of the paper. First, the limitations will be highlighted by a case study of the global oil industry.

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6 Jenkins’ examples are from the early 2000s. The World Bank has since closed its CSR Practice. Searches of the DFID, IDB and World Bank websites show that most publications and policy statements regarding CSR and cognates were in the early and mid-2000s. Recent annual proceedings from the Interagency Roundtable on CSR show mixed perspectives on CSR (CSR Round Table 2018).
3 Case study

The oil and natural gas industry is an ideal test of the limitations of CSR described thus far.\(^7\) The industry comprises many of the world’s largest MNCs, operating in dozens of developing countries. These MNCs are at the forefront of CSR activity and reporting, and they are subjected to special scrutiny on several important CSR issues. Table 3.1 indicates the size of the world’s five largest oil MNCs (henceforth referred to as the ‘Big-5’).\(^8\) In 2016, their combined revenue exceeded the collective GDP of Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Iraq and Nigeria – some of the largest developing economies in which the Big-5 operate (World Bank 2017). Annexe 1 shows the many non-OECD/EU countries where the ‘Big-10’ operate.\(^9\) The Big-10 all publish detailed annual CSR reports on their websites, consistent with the industry having one of the highest CSR reporting rates among all sectors (KPMG 2017). Additionally, the Big-10 are leading participants in many prominent CSR initiatives, e.g. the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), UNGC, and WBCSD. Shell alone collaborates with 22 such organisations (Shell 2017). Lastly, unique social impacts of the oil industry have prompted governments and development organisations to publish an array of special initiatives and guidelines to enhance its impacts (e.g. EITI 2016; OECD 2017; UNDP 2017; GRI 2013).\(^10\)

This case study considers just two social impacts of the oil industry – climate change and the ‘resource curse’. These have been chosen because the Big-10 identify them among their major impacts, yet they respond extensively on one and minimally on the other. Analysis will suggest that these different sets of voluntary actions share an important trait – they are what the business case allows, but little more. Each impact will be considered in turn. The discussion relies partly on the author’s knowledge of the industry, as highlighted at the end of the case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 The world’s five largest publicly-traded oil companies by revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fortune Global 500 Revenue World Rank (2016)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortune Global 500 Revenue World Rank (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PwC Top 100 Market Capitalisation Rank (March 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue (2016, US$b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Capitalisation (March 2017, US$b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit (2011–16 avg. US$m p.a.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes (2011–16 avg. US$m p.a.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sinopec is formally named China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation; profit and taxes stated in RMB in sources have been converted to US$ using 1 RMB = 0.15 US$. Source: Author’s own, based on data from Fortune (2017), PwC (2017), Sinopec (2018), CNPC (2018), Shell (2018), Exxon (2018) and BP (2018).

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\(^7\) This paper frequently uses ‘oil’ or ‘oil and gas’ as shorthand for ‘oil and natural gas’.

\(^8\) The largest five publicly-traded oil companies by revenue in 2016 (Fortune 2017). CNPC is not directly publicly traded, but it is the majority shareholder in publicly-traded PetroChina. Saudi Aramco and Kuwait Petroleum Company have similarly high revenues, but are nationally owned.

\(^9\) The ‘Big-10’ are the Big-5 plus Chevron, Total, Lukoil, Eni, and Statoil, which were the next five largest publicly-traded oil companies by revenue in 2016 (Fortune 2017), after excluding Valero and Petrobras which have relatively small international activities.

\(^10\) Many social impacts of the oil industry are shared with the mining industry. These industries are together often called the ‘extractives industries’.
3.1 Climate change

There is a clear consensus among scientists and governments that humans are causing climate change, and that this is an urgent global threat (UNFCCC 2015; Cook et al. 2013). The primary mechanism is greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which carbon dioxide is most important. The oil industry directly releases 6 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions, and end uses of its products contribute a further 40 per cent (Nyquist and Ruys 2010). The oil industry's association for environmental and social issues, IPIECA,11 acknowledges that ‘a particular challenge for the industry is its role in climate change… [the] industry must be a key part of the solution’ (UNDP 2017: v). Accordingly, the Big-5 devoted almost a quarter of their 2016 CSR reports to describing their actions on climate change (Table 3.2).12 Table 3.3 shows the specific actions they described.

### Table 3.2 Composition of CSR reports for ‘Big-5’ oil MNCs (2016 annual reports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic Area</th>
<th>Proportion of Report Allocated to Topic (% space)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local societal impacts</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local development</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe operations</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other topics</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Method – all substantive content of these CSR reports was reviewed and allocated to topic areas and subtopics; non-substantive content was excluded, e.g. title and contents pages, introduction, guides to the report, assurance statements, full-page pictures


While Table 3.3 shows an array of actions, the underlying commonality is what pays. By far the most attention is on ‘Operational emissions’, which mostly means reducing the intensity (and therefore costs) of energy used in production. Nyquist and Ruys (2010) show that there are many ways oil companies do this profitably. A notable unprofitable exception is ‘Carbon capture and storage’, which helps explain why the CSR reports mainly describe research on this rather than implementation. ‘Supply of natural gas’ and ‘Supply of renewable fuels’ are both prominently discussed in the reports, because both have lower carbon emissions than oil. However, nothing indicates these fuels are supplied for any reason except profit. BP clearly states that it chooses which fuels to supply based on patterns of customer demand (BP 2017). Its CSR report prominently declares that BP is among the top producers of wind energy in the US (ibid.), but does not mention that it recently tried to sell these assets, just as it previously divested its solar business due to low profitability (Macalister 2015). Another prominent topic is ‘Research and development’. It is unsurprising that oil companies would invest in developing low-carbon technology and fuels, given the prospect of rising tax on carbon. What may surprise is the minimal investments. For example, the six members of the Big-10 who contribute to the OGCI all advertise prominently that it will invest US$1 billion

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11 Originally the ‘International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association’, but now just ‘IPIECA’ because of its expanded scope of work. Shell, Exxon, BP, Total, Chevron, Eni and Statoil are members.

12 The proportion of space allocated to a topic in a company’s CSR report is a very simplistic indicator of how important the company perceives the issue to be. It is adequate in this case because of how clear the result is.
over ten years in low-carbon technologies, but their annual individual contribution of US$10 million looks small against billions in profit (Table 3.1).

**Table 3.3 Composition of climate change section in ‘Big-5’ CSR reports (2016 annual reports)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate change subtopic</th>
<th>Proportion of section allocated to subtopic (% space)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational emissions</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply of natural gas</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer emissions</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply of renewable fuels</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon capture and storage</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy mix forecasting</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon pricing</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon offset programmes</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: See source note for Table 3.2 regarding methodology.*  
*Source: Author’s own, based on data from Sinopec (2017), CNPC (2017), Shell (2017), Exxon (2017) and BP (2017).*

Perhaps what is most revealing about the Big-10’s approach to climate change is their stance on government carbon pricing policy. A majority discuss it in their CSR reports, describing it as critically necessary, e.g.

Government policy will be critical to creating the conditions for making the transition to cleaner energy… commercially possible. Shell continues to call for effective government-led carbon-pricing.  
*(Shell 2017: 4)*

BP believes that carbon pricing by governments is the best policy to limit GHG emissions. Putting a price on carbon – one that treats all carbon equally… incentivises both energy producers and consumers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions… We need governments across the world to provide us with clear, stable, long-term, ambitious policy frameworks.  
*(BP 2017: 14)*

Similarly, IPIECA has recently written on behalf of the industry that:

Success in moving towards a low-emissions future will depend on how effective governments are at creating a policy landscape that uses market forces to enable low-GHG innovation and deployment… the most effective will… apply to all GHG emissions.  
*(IPIECA 2016: 9)*

The oil industry calls for a universal carbon price because when all users pay, it becomes profitable to reduce carbon emissions and supply low-carbon products. The overall message of the oil companies is clear: our response to climate change will remain limited until governments make it more profitable.
3.2 Resource curse

The developmental effects of natural resource abundance have been researched extensively since the late 1980s. This paper will only briefly summarise that research, because the priority is instead to show: (1) whether oil MNCs identify such effects among their major social impacts, (2) what the MNCs do in response, and (3) why. Seminal research on the ‘resource curse’ by Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Karl (1997), and Ross (1999), built a case that countries which heavily export natural resources (particularly oil) tend to grow more slowly due to various economic and political effects, e.g. inflation of the national currency hurting other more dynamic export sectors (‘Dutch disease’); volatility in government revenues promoting economic mismanagement, and; easy resource rents tending to promote corruption, weaken democratic institutions, and even induce violent conflict. Collier (2007) thus argued that extracting natural resources, especially oil, is one of four traps keeping the world’s ‘bottom billion’ people in poverty. Hundreds of studies later, many of the same resource curse effects are still advanced, though with more nuance about which ones may apply under different circumstances (Havranek et al. 2016). Ross (2012) now argues, for example, that oil-rich countries have not grown more slowly overall, but have become less democratic, more secretive, and created less opportunities for women. But what do the oil MNCs think and do about resource curse effects?

In contrast to climate change, one needs to look harder to see that the Big-10 identify resource curse effects among their major social impacts. Their 2016 CSR reports do not discuss potential negative macroeconomic or macropolitical effects in developing countries, focussing instead on local impacts and local development initiatives (see Table 3.2 above). However, most of the reports do include a brief statement of support for the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), as a measure to improve governance and accountability (CNPC 2017; Shell 2017; Exxon 2017; BP 2017; Eni 2017; Statoil 2017). The EITI promotes public disclosure of the revenue that governments receive from extractive industries, and where that revenue is allocated by governments. It is based on a Statement of Principles that were agreed in 2003 when the UK government convened various countries, companies and civil society organisations, partly in response to the Angolan government threatening to expel BP from Angola after BP published its government payments there in 2001 (Frynas 2010). The Statement of Principles begins:

> We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.

(EITI 2016:10)

IPIECA has more explicitly identified resource curse effects in a recent joint publication with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Finance Corporation (IFC):

> the wealth that development of hydrocarbon reserves can bring links the oil and gas industry to the ‘resource curse’ theory. This is the hypothesis that countries rich in natural resources such as fossil fuels often suffer from weak institutions and high levels of corruption, which drive mismanagement of oil and mineral rents…

(UNDP 2017: 9)

The same publication discusses the problem of ‘Dutch disease’ (ibid.: 53). The Dutch disease concept is further described in the Oil and Gas Sector Disclosures of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, which BP, Shell, Statoil and Eni helped create, and which most of the Big-10 use to prepare their CSR reports. The Disclosures highlight the problem that ‘where there is a strengthening of the national...
currency, other economic sectors can become uncompetitive in the global market’ (GRI 2013:15).

Table 3.4 suggests that many countries in which the Big-10 operate may be at risk of resource curse effects from oil, per indicators of EITI status, budget openness, governance quality, and oil-dependency. So, how have the oil MNCs responded?

**Table 3.4 Selected countries at risk of oil-related resource curse effects, where Big-10 operate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP Per capita, 2016 US$</th>
<th>Big-10 extractives presence</th>
<th>Resource curse risk factors</th>
<th>2016 EITI Status</th>
<th>2015 Open Budget Index (0–100)</th>
<th>World Governance Indicators (Avg. % Rank)</th>
<th>Oil &amp; Gas rents (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>X X X X X X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3,877</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>Withdrawn</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yet to be assessed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>8,333</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Delisted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>7,179</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Delisted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
<td>Inadequate Progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5,603</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>6,389</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela, RB</td>
<td>12,237</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>Non-participant</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen, Rep.</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Delisted</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2007 and 2008 BP briefly took substantive action on the resource curse. It funded the Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies, and it led a Regional Development Initiative across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, intended to promote good governance, among other objectives (BP 2008, 2009; Frynas 2010). These actions may have been influenced by Graham Baxter, BP’s Vice President for Social Responsibility from 2003 to 2007, who was heavily involved with EITI (see EITI 2009) and publicly acknowledged that ‘the curse of oil is a problem that BP recognises, and we have a part to play in helping our hosts deal with this wall of dollar-denominated cash coming into their fragile economies’ (The Economist 2005). Baxter left BP in late 2007, and BP ceased reporting substantive action on the resource curse after 2008 (BP 2018).

Other oil companies have not shown even this much initiative, with BP’s actions in Azerbaijan described as exceptional (Frynas 2010). Apart from mentioning EITI, the Big-10’s most recent CSR reports only discuss actions to avoid direct involvement in corruption. Regarding EITI, it is worth noting that there are strong critiques of its effectiveness (ibid.; Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Mejía Acosta 2013), based on its narrow focus on revenue, and its few participants. In 2008 the World Bank briefly promoted an ‘EITI++’ initiative to broaden the scope of EITI to include government expenditure and extractives policies (Frynas 2010). However, that initiative has been discontinued, and the current version of EITI merely ‘encourages’ disclosure of information on revenue management and expenditures (EITI 2016). Perhaps of more relevance to this paper, EITI costs oil MNCs very little, applying only when the host government opts in and requires participation by all extractive companies – avoiding a repeat of BP’s Angola experience, mentioned above.
The overall lack of action by oil companies on the resource curse is consistent with a weak business case – the affected ‘bottom billion’ can’t reward them; many of their customers are likely unaware or unconcerned, and; some governments involved may even punish them. BP’s actions in 2007 and 2008 appear to be an exception that proves the rule, being so short-lived.

3.3 Author’s experience

To conclude this case study, the author offers two brief observations from an eleven-year international career with one of the Big-5 oil companies. Regarding climate change, the author helped lead a proposal to build a world-scale renewable fuels plant. The business case was evaluated against the company’s standard financial criteria for investment, and was eventually rejected due to uncertainty about government climate policy, on which the profits depended. Regarding the resource curse, the author never heard it discussed.

4 Conclusion and implications

This paper has argued from a cross-section of the academic literature on CSR that corporations primarily use CSR to pursue profit, which limits the social problems that CSR can solve. This conclusion applies only in aggregate to publicly owned for-profit corporations, and is intended as descriptive rather than critical. The recent CSR actions reported by major oil companies support the conclusion. These companies describe various actions to mitigate climate change, but all the actions appear economically justifiable, and the companies say that meaningful progress depends on government policy to make carbon reductions more profitable. The same oil companies report almost no action on resource curse effects, despite identifying them among their major potential impacts. This inaction is consistent with a weak business case. The author acknowledges that the case study evidence is superficial and circumstantial, relying on a subset of industry self-reporting by mostly developed-country MNCs, and inferring the rationale for corporate actions. More conclusive evidence would require thorough analyses of specific corporate activities (e.g. Woolfson and Beck 2016; Frynas 2009). Nonetheless, CSR’s profit-seeking limitations are apparent, and are important given the social problems and governance gaps wrought by globalisation.

If corporations will not reliably enhance their social impacts voluntarily, a few general implications follow for improving social welfare. First, hopes for CSR should not be overstated, as this may divert attention from broader and more effective measures, such as those which enhance governance capacities (Frynas 2010). Second, where governance is currently capable of regulating business to enhance its impacts, this should be strongly considered over self-regulation (Vogel 2010). Third, research should more deeply examine the limits of CSR and opportunities to extend CSR’s potential where governance remains weak (Ruggie 2017; Abbott and Snidal 2009). This should include methods to increase the influence of stakeholders that are currently underrepresented in the business case (Banerjee 2008). The complicated new problems of globalisation require clear discourse and thinking about the potential and limitations of solutions like CSR.
## Annexe 1 Non-OECD/EU countries of operation for selected oil MNCs, and selected EITI status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP Per capita, 2016 US$</th>
<th>Oil company extractives presence</th>
<th>EITI status</th>
<th>Resource curse risk factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exxon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lukoil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statoil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep.</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>3,514</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>8,333</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>7,179</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,832</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5,274</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3,877</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>7,510</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>IP</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
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### Annexe 1 Non-OECD/EU countries of operation for selected oil MNCs, and selected data (continued)

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP Per capita, 2016 US$</th>
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<th>Resource curse risk factors</th>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>X X X X X</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>18 41 1</td>
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#### Key to Annexe 1:

**2016 EITI status**
- NP: Non-participant
- YA: Yet to be assessed
- SP: Satisfactory Progress
- MP: Meaningful Progress
- IP: Inadequate Progress
- WD: Withdrawn
- DL: Delisted

**2015 Open Budget Index**
- Extensive (61–100)
- Substantial (61–80)
- Limited (41–60)
- Minimal (21–40)
- Scant or None (0–20)

**World Governance Indicators**
- 90–100
- 75–90
- 50–75
- 25–50
- 10–25
- 0–10

#### Sources for Annexe 1:
- Author’s own, based on data from:
  - GDP: Oil and Gas rents: World Bank (2017)
  - EITI Status: EITI (2018)
  - Open Budget Index: IBP (2016)

Colour coding is as per EITI designation (EITI 2018). Colour coding is as per World Bank designation (World Bank 2018).
References


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Despite Massive Economic and Education Gains in India, Why Are So Few Women Working?

Harparmjot Hans (Remy)

1 Introduction

Women in India have made significant progress on a few social indicators. In contrast to the progress made on few social measures, women’s participation in economic life has remained low. Participation in economic life is measured by labour force participation rate. As per the Fifth Annual Employment-Unemployment Survey (2015–16) conducted by the Labour Bureau, labour force includes those persons in the age group of 15 years and above engaged in employment (self-employed, unpaid family worker, regular salaried, wage employee, contract worker, casual wage labour) or who are seeking employment (Government of India 2016). Students, persons with disabilities, housewives, persons engaged in domestic duties, receivers of remittances, beggars, prostitutes, young children and elderly are not considered as part of the labour force (Government of India 2016).

It is evident from Figure 1.1 that women’s involvement in the labour force in India has been declining, almost in close comparison to Pakistan and Arab countries. After Pakistan, India has one of the lowest labour participation rates among women in South Asia. The participation difference between men and women is extremely wide wherein, women’s participation rate stands at only 27 per cent as compared to 83 per cent for males (Prillaman et al. 2017). While the proportion of men’s involvement in economic activities increased between the period of 2004–05 and 2009–10, millions of women withdrew from the workforce (Andres et al. 2017).

Figure 1.1 Female labour force participation rate, all ages, country comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017).

Between 2004–05 and 2009–10, 21.7 million women withdrew from work (Andres et al. 2017), a huge number considering an already small proportion of women engaged in the labour market. On the other extreme, women are increasingly becoming visible in
triedly male-dominated industries such as banking and aviation. At present, there are three women heading India’s leading banks namely, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and State Bank of India and, according to Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Jayant Sinha, India has the highest number of women pilots in the world. However, at a time when more women in India are seen flying aircrafts and leading banks, rapes, child marriages, domestic violence and honour killings, still continue. Outcomes for women will not improve through increase in social spending, women friendly laws or increase in number of women going to professional schools. To reduce gender-based inequalities, distributive justice is required (Jaquette 1990). Despite progress achieved at the macro-level, realities for women in major parts of the country is still grim.

At a macro-level, evidence reveals that increase in women’s labour force participation rate contributes to economic growth (World Bank 2012). India’s persistent low levels of women participation in the economy, indicates the level of autonomy women experience in the society. While some development economists argue that rising wages and education access, increase in incomes of households and men, stigma associated with engaging in menial work among women, lack of appropriate employment opportunities for educated women are factors that discourage women to enter or continue in the labour force, others have also argued that social and cultural factors play an important role in keeping women out of the workforce (Mehrotra et al. 2014; Chaudhary and Verick 2014; Klasen and Pieters 2013). It is argued in this paper that social, cultural and institutional norms promote gender bias, hampering women’s economic and social movement. These norms still continue to play an important role in keeping over 70 per cent of the women out of the workforce. While factors such as rising wages, increase in incomes of male household members and girls’ access to education may have been responsible for keeping women away from taking up employment, social and cultural behaviours inevitably interact with those positive economic and social developments, leading to almost no changes in women’s participation outcomes.

The implication of underutilising women’s education, skills and talents can have negative economic and social outcomes. But on the flip side, with a 90 per cent increase in female labour force participation rate, estimates suggest that India’s gross domestic product can increase up to 60 per cent by 2025 (McKinsey Global Institute 2015). How will India activate its women population is a fair question to ask Indian policymakers. Most importantly, it is the question of human dignity for all, across social and geographical dimensions: rich and poor, rural and urban, male and female (Nussbaum 1999). Despite numerous national and international efforts, women continue to face unequal treatment in employment, education and other areas because laws and social institutions work to maintain these gender inequalities (ibid.). India’s growth story without women is not only a missed opportunity, but also a fundamental right denied.

In terms of the structure, this paper is mainly divided in three parts. The first part explores social and cultural norms impacting women’s participation. The second part shows the relationship between education and social norms responsible for withdrawing women from work. The third part highlights gender inequalities with respect to employment.

2 Social and cultural norms exist, discouraging women to work

Gender norms in India discourage many women to interact with the external world. (Field et al. 2016). There is evidence that confirms this practice wherein, 52 per cent of adult women reported that the decision to be able to work lies with their husband (Field et al. 2016; Chaudhary and Verick 2014). In addition to women’s employment decisions managed by men, women’s mobility is also highly constrained. Eighty-five per cent of women need to take permission to travel alone for short distances by bus or train (Field et al. 2016). Furthermore, 47 per cent of women are not permitted to travel on their own (ibid.). Research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also highlights India’s low ranking on its Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), revealing the impact of social
institutions through laws, attitudes and practices on women’s rights (OECD n.d.). Apart from compelling statistics through surveys and academic research, daily Indian newspaper articles are filled with stories of rape and violence towards women in villages and its metropolitan cities. Therefore, it is not surprising that women are restricted in terms of their mobility because the most basic forms of gender inequality and bias are still prevalent in the Indian society.

Despite India’s economic growth, social norms around women’s role in the economy have not incentivised women to participate in the labour force (World Bank 2012). As per gender norms, men are the sole economic providers for the family, while women are responsible for care work. Women working outside the confines of their homes is believed to be a low-status activity especially among married women (Eswaran et al. 2013). This worldview stems from an age-old caste system that still exists in India wherein the upper classes maintain caste norms restricting activities of women (Eswaran et al. 2013). Evidence shows that only 17 per cent (in 2009) married women in the age group 25–54 in urban India worked as compared to 97 per cent married men (Klasen and Pieters 2013). Furthermore, 60 per cent of urban women with graduate degrees attended to domestic duties (Thomas 2012). Given that 80 per cent of urban women are not engaged in the workforce, reveals the social norms imposed on women.

Women’s participation in rural India is also changing and slowly converging with the urban trend. Over the years, participation rates among rural women dropped significantly (especially since 2004–05) and number of rural women attending to domestic duties rose with increase in incomes of male members (Thomas 2012). In contrast, the unchanging urban statistics related to women and work (as shown in Figure 2.1), seem puzzling, as one would expect women living in urban areas to face less social constraints to be able to participate in the labour force (Chaudhary and Verick 2014). Research, however, shows that one third of women attending to domestic duties want to work (Field et al. 2016). Women are constrained from working because it is considered respectable for women to not engage in labour work, to discourage engagement with other men other than their husbands and restrict mobility outside their homes (Eswaran et al. 2013). This kind of practice is known to ensure ‘purity’ of women (Eswaran et al. 2013; Field et al. 2016), which reflects the pervasiveness and disparity in the application of social norms, impacting only women.

Figure 2.1 Female labour force participation rates (ages 15 and above), rural and urban

![Graph showing female labour force participation rates](image-url)

Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017)
‘Purity’ is enforced not only on married women, but also on single women. With the rise in call centres and back-offices for servicing multinationals, many women in urban areas joined the workforce. Even though single women are economically more active than married women in urban areas, single women cannot make economic decisions on their own (Panda 1999). It remains as a household decision (Chaudhary and Verick 2014). Factors such as women’s workload in the house and safety of women, among other reasons, are responsible in influencing their participation in the labour market (Sudarshan and Bhattacharya 2009). The concern about safety of women points us to the role women’s bodies play in constraining their physical mobility. In the South Asian context, family honour is determined by a woman’s ‘purity’. With that context, employment in the case of India does not necessarily impact women’s wellbeing and position at home and society, as gender norms play an important role in determining power positions in and outside homes. Additionally, over time, marriage affects job prospects for most Indian women because the caregiver role takes up a lot of their time. While marriage ages have increased and fertility rates have declined, marriage still plays an important role and is one of the factors resulting in low number of women in the labour economy (World Bank 2012).

3  Education matters – for marriages, not for jobs

One of the goals of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was to ensure universal access to primary education. To act upon the global goals, the Government of India initiated an education programme called the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). The main aim of this programme was to increase primary school access mostly in rural areas. Major improvements in school infrastructure took place and almost every village in India now has a primary school within one kilometre. Furthermore, in 2010, the Right to Education (RTE) Act came into force making it mandatory for every child between 6 and 14 years of age to complete elementary school. Efforts were also made by central and state governments to bridge the gap between girls and boys through schemes such as national scheme for incentives to girls for secondary education (MHRD n.d.), provision of girls’ hostels for students of secondary and higher secondary schools, provision of bicycles-to-girls policy to improve attendance among girl children (in Bihar). As a result, enrolment ratios significantly improved (MHRD 2016) and as shown in Figure 3.1, literacy levels improved among working age females.

Figure 3.1 Level of education of working age females in India

Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017)
Owing to massive enrolments in education, women’s participation in the age group of 15–24 years dropped considerably (Mehrotra et al. 2014). According to the U-shape pattern of the effect of education on labour force participation rate, with increasing levels of education, labour force participation declines in the initial stages, then rises among university graduate students getting absorbed in high paying white-collar jobs (Das et al. 2015). So, in this case, the declining trends of female labour participation due to the ‘education effect’ may not appear to be a negative trend. However, it comes with a caveat that is if education results into improved labour market returns over the years after completion of education.

Despite increasing education attainment in rural areas, and educated urban women being in close proximity to job opportunities, the link between education and employment participation may be weak in the case of India. Interestingly, education among women in India is driven by expected marriage and children’s human capital returns than labour market returns (Klasen and Pieters 2013). There is supporting evidence, analysing data of marginal effects of education for years 1987 and 2009. According to the authors’ analysis, in 2009, secondary education was required at the minimum to be able to marry a well-educated and well-earning spouse. Conversely, in 1987, primary and middle school education was sufficient to be able to attract an educated and well-paid spouse (ibid.). Furthermore, educated women are seen to play an important role in building human capital of their children, therefore, raising demand for educated women (Behrman 1999). Women’s education is also seen as a contributing factor to the husband’s social status directly and through increased engagement of women in status production activities (Eswaran et al. 2013) such as ritual activities, assistance to children in schoolwork, family status politics in the community (Population Council 1988).

The U-shape pattern theory suggests that at some point, labour force participation rates among women will increase among highly-educated women. They typically pursue careers that are financially and intellectually fulfilling (Eswaran et al. 2013). However, as indicated in Figure 2.1, women in urban areas participate very less and of those who work in urban areas, only 9.3 per cent are engaged in regular salaried jobs (Chaudhary and Verick 2014). Increasingly, more women appear to be seen in the banking and aviation industries, but it is still miniscule given India’s women population (almost half of the population). In fact, evidence from India shows that even though female leadership influences young girls’ dreams to work and study, it does not impact labour market opportunities for women (Beaman et al. 2012). Not only do social and cultural norms constrain women, market and institutional norms also affect women’s labour participation outcomes. Markets and institutions are designed in a way that promote inequalities between men and women (World Bank 2012).

4 Less women work due to structural problems

The labour market in India reflects gender biases and offers limited employment opportunities for women. Unfortunately, high economic growth has not resulted in better types of work for women. Occupational segregation plays an important role in restricting women in certain types of occupations and roles (ILO 2016). Segregation blocks women’s development in the economic sphere (Rees 1992) given that there is heavy reliance on women in the informal, agriculture sector and as temporary workers in the manufacturing sector in the case of India (Thomas 2012). This type of engagement of women traps women in low paid occupations and roles, relative to men. Sectors with high employment opportunities such as telecommunications, banking, automotive, manufacturing and other sectors such as oil and gas, steel and minerals are dominated by men (CII 2017), while very few women are represented in high-quality jobs in India (Thomas 2012). Women were represented in only 20 per cent of the jobs in male dominated industries such as financing, real estate and business services (Thomas 2012).

Furthermore, in major parts of India, women participate less (as shown in Table 4.1) and hold more tentative jobs as compared to men. The eastern, northern and northeastern regions in
particularly have lesser women in the labour force as compared to western and southern regions (Neff et al. 2012). Northern states such as Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh with the exception of Himachal Pradesh, have the lowest labour force participation rates in the country. In comparison to some southern and western Indian states, Himachal Pradesh has in fact one of the highest work participation rates among women in the country (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 2014). But, the pace of growth in terms of women’s economic involvement is comparatively slower than men’s, as evidence suggests. Participation rates among women in the state increased by only one percentage point between 2001 and 2011, whereas it increased by four percentage points for men between the same period (Government of Himachal Pradesh 2014). Additionally, statistics reveal that more women tend to be engaged in marginal types of work. For instance, almost 60 per cent of women were employed as marginal workers, while the remaining worked as main workers (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, men in the state are mostly employed as main workers (ibid.).

Table 4.1 Female labour force participation rate by region, 2009–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>In the labour force</th>
<th>Not in the labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By taking a closer look at one of the better performing states, one would expect an encouraging trend, however, the story of women’s involvement is still discouraging. Similarly, even though southern and western regions are comparatively better off than other regions, it only has slightly over 50 per cent of its women in the labour force. Due to lack of homogeneity in the social, cultural and economic aspects of women’s lives in these states, it is hard to generalise. For instance, restricted freedom in the economic sphere can co-exist with upper caste and higher levels of education, while a free status can co-exist with no level of education and lower caste (Kasturi 1996). The fact remains – a vast majority of women in India are denied choice and independence (ibid.).

Differences in wages between men and women may be connected with low economic participation rates among women. While the wage gap in the informal sector may not appear to be wide, there is an almost 25 per cent difference in the formal sector wages between men and women. Women earn INR 481, while men earn INR 632 in the formal sector. In the informal sector, women earn INR 120, while men earn INR 194 (Das et al. 2015). However, wage gap is a global phenomenon, a phenomenon not only limited to India. Even though wage gaps exist globally; participation, however, is higher among women of neighbouring countries such as China and Bangladesh (as seen in Figure 1.1). Low participation of women is also reflected in formal organisations where a gender ratio of 71 males to 29 females is observed (CII 2017). Furthermore, some reasons associated with occupational gender gaps include differences in men and women’s preferences of organisations, education choices, salary negotiation abilities and breaks in employment (ibid.). Motherhood brings further disadvantage and discrimination towards women for reduced or flexible working hours for childbirth, childcare and family responsibilities. As a result, some women leave the workforce. There are not enough industries, initiatives or firms; except a few such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and firms such as Belcorp and Hindustan Unilever (World Bank 2012) making efforts to promote women’s employment. Such efforts are not enough to
combat social norms around gender in the economic sphere. Existing structures need to be re-examined to meaningfully work towards the process of women advancement, rather than trying to integrate women into existing structures (Kasturi 1996).

Women’s role and contributions may not be represented officially, but they do also work. On the other side of low economic participation rates among women, it is observed that the proportion of women engaged in household work is high across rural and urban areas as they continue to shoulder the burden of care work. The proportion of women attending to domestic duties increased over the years in both, rural and urban areas. It increased from 29 per cent to 38 per cent between 1993–94 and 2009–10 in rural areas (Thomas 2012). Similarly, it also increased in urban areas from 42 per cent to 47 per cent during the same period (ibid.). In absolute numbers, 216 million women in 2009–10 attended to domestic duties (Ramaswamy 2015). According to Beneria and Sen, women will not be able to advance if the responsibility for ‘reproduction of the family’ is not recognised or shared with men (Jaquette 1990). Much of the care work such as childcare, elderly care, cooking, cleaning is unpaid and unrecognised. Society and national statistics fail to recognise their contribution (Thomas 2012) as persons attending to domestic duties are not considered part of the labour force. According to a leading Indian economist, Jayati Ghosh, if unpaid care work were recognised officially, the picture of women participation may change. I say the picture may definitely emerge different, but it does not change women’s desire for increased economic and social autonomy as over a third of women in urban India and half in rural areas who are engaged in domestic duties want a paid job (Field et al. 2016).

5 Conclusion

Women comprise almost half of the population and not being able to link them with the larger economic and social development agenda is a huge waste of human capital potential. My emphasis throughout this paper has been on highlighting inequalities towards women in and outside their homes, resulting in low women work participation rates. It reflects the persistence of patriarchal attitudes towards women in rural and urban areas, restricting women’s economic and social mobility. The nature of patriarchy has evolved over the years, where women initially were excluded from public life to women being segregated (Rees 1992) in certain types of occupations and pay. While India’s economic journey has excluded women so far, women would need to play a vital part in facilitating wider economic and social growth, if India is to sustain its development. Nevertheless, the story of women’s engagement in India is not a simple story. There are many women who have worked and are working to change the status quo. It is important to note that some success stories of women have come to being as a result of globalisation and economic development. However, according to Boserup, modernisation does not simply improve women’s rights and status (Jaquette 1990). The matter of fact is patriarchy has modernised itself (ibid.).

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Challenging Conceptual Approaches to Power through Spirituality

Ian Lee

Power without love is reckless and abusive, and love without power is sentimental and anaemic. Power at its best is love implementing the demands of justice, and justice at its best is power correcting everything that stands against love.

(Martin Luther King Jr.)

Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.

(Gospel of Matthew 7:15, King James Version)

I will discuss the Ladder of Citizen Participation (LCP), Power Cube (PC) and Jo Rowland’s Questioning Empowerment with two case studies involving experiences of relations between the marginalised and the state where false ‘profits’ of state and business collude to use the law to exercise power over people and their environment, forcing consent. One is Nazaré in the Brazilian Amazon, on the Rio Madeira, where inner power escapes out of the flora of Amazonian backwaters into global fora, such as COP23. Another is about macabre tree chainsaw-massacre power in Sheffield, England.

I will examine aspects of feminist cosmology presented by Jo Rowlands, emphasising the ‘within’ end of the PC spectrum, as an antidote to ‘invisible power’, with attention to symbolic power. I will highlight psycho-spiritual blind areas around Power Cube and explore concepts from eastern metaphysics and feminism that might resolve philosophical dilemmas around ‘change’ and ‘participation’. Success, here, would mean illustrating strengths and weaknesses of each framework adequately in relation to the case studies, and acceptance by the reader of my proposals for filling gaps as interesting or plausible.

In 2014, floods upriver from the 2012 Santo Antonio dam impacted 75,000 people, approximately 500 ‘riverside’ people, killing 2,500 livestock, causing over US$180m damage. Most families lost their houses, 12 people committed suicide, many more suffering depression. According to the community, the Brazilian state had not ensured their right to proper free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) and committed overt ‘violations of human rights and commitments to sustainable development’ (McGee 2000). Energy companies make astronomical profits while Brazilians pay one of the highest electricity prices in the world.

No compensation came from the dam. MAB (a movement for dam victims) still seeks compensation. Teachers from the settlement who survived took their school folk classes to the city to become a commercial success and led a revival of the semi-religious ‘Boi Curumim’ festival in which the whole of Nazaré takes part, attracting crowds from the city, lifting self-esteem in their identity as ‘riberinhos’.

During my degree, I won an OBSEA social entrepreneurial award to research ethno-tourism for these dam victims. Santander bank was corporate sponsor, who I discovered was the leading financier of the dam project. I arrived in Nazaré with the Brazilian NGO NAPRA in September 2016 to work on various community income-generation projects.

Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969) explores participation and power. The Nazaré community experience ‘manipulation’ by ‘ravening wolves’. LCP is appropriate as they do aspire to participation (starting with FPIC) and multi-scalar power-sharing (‘citizen...
control’). The ladder diagram offers hope, hooking the interest of the less literate. It is less apt where citizens might only want to be consulted, not involved in power. Powerlessness situates them on the bottom rungs.

The consultation process did happen according to government and dam powerholders, in reality more like the ‘distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle by power holders’ (Arnstein 1969: 218). A ‘consultation campaign’, ‘Eu Quero’ (I want [it]), was followed by television dam-spin adverts. The Nazaré population needed the rung of ‘therapy’ to cure of their ‘uneducated’ belief that building a 50-foot high wall across their river could not be a good thing. Putting words into their mouths shows insidious ‘tokenism’. LCP seems to explain power thus far.

For city dwellers, aiding and abetting dam powerholders, riverside settlements are a place to move from not to, joining in ‘polite hand claps’ when participation is ‘advocated by have-nots’. In the climate of the present government of Brazil, exactly as LCP says, ‘redistribution of power… explodes into many shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological and political opposition’ (ibid.: 216).

It serves well in cases of the triple whammy of marginalisation, race and gender discrimination developed in the context of institutional marginalisation versus the ‘American consensus’ (ibid.: 216). Temer’s government is exerting more than downward pressure on the marginalised on the ladder – attempting to remove the higher rungs before the oppressed reach them.

Freirian NGO NAPRA build capacity in this community, giving a repertoire with which to negotiate with powerholders. The community, in this continuum, experienced ‘therapy’ and ‘placation’. Riverine Fishermen in 2016 were offered one year’s funding for a fish farm. They were too untrusting of the dam to accept, too used to the frames empty rituals and empty promises that LCP describes.

In Sheffield, ‘Europe’s greenest city’, where I also lived, 6,000 trees are threatened to prevent pavements cracking. George Monbiot (2017) writes of citizen non-participation in the decision by the Council in also in 2012, to lock the city into a 25-year contract of street maintenance with the multinational Ferrovial without public consultation because ‘the issue is too big and too contentious for a public consultation to handle’, ‘protected from challenge by commercial confidentiality, property rights and civil law’. Citizens protesting are now in contempt of court, facing imprisonment.

The LCP tool, despite inbuilt intersectionality seems not to suit non-minorities who are not easily deceived. The marginalised here are affluent educated citizens. The Power Cube conceptual framework accounts better for complexity and globalisation, beyond ‘zero-sum’ concepts of ‘nobody’ trying to become a ‘somebody’, more situating in the bigger picture: ‘The [neoliberal] system, protected from challenge by commercial confidentiality, property rights and civil law, places it beyond the reach of democracy’ (Monbiot 2017).

PC’s three-dimensional symbolic sophistication, in contrast to the fixed vertical framework of LCP, takes us on a journey through ‘levels, spaces, forms and evolutions of power’ to analyse power mechanisms (Gaventa 2011: 8). Unlike LCP it has the potential to map the progression across all the interrelated and interacting dimensions – analysis as the basis for social action.

According to PC, ‘any sustained and effective change strategy must build and sustain effective change across the full continuum… working across each of the dimensions simultaneously’. Hence one-dimensional concepts of power do not help where power is a contradictory slippery global fish (Gaventa n.d.). PC effectively tracks power across dimensions. It recommends starting with ‘forms of power’ to diagnose participation.
We check the box of ‘hidden power’ for Brazil to get going. Powercube.net gives definitions, examples and interaction of dimensions to apply. What are PC’s implications here? Trying macro analysis, we see ‘Brazil’s government was run like a cartel for years, with political parties selling favours, votes...’ (The Guardian 2017). From local to international levels, we understand how government colludes with big business in Sheffield and Nazaré acting across levels, an interplay of ‘hidden’ and ‘visible’ power. At the supra-national level, COP21 failed to file dams under ‘dirty energy’. Invisible power expresses in England with Santander selling itself as a champion of justice, as a visible sponsor; Sheffield Council visibly championing ‘progress’ with its ‘Streets Ahead’ tree clearance, while deciding agendas with corporations behind closed doors. Government and business in both examples, express power ‘within’ negatively as superiority and intransigence. Power ‘with’ as entrenched power and imposed policy. NAPRA is careful to include power gatekeepers in the local communities where it works, not bypassing them to other levels, to avoid power imbalance. Riverines’ new power ‘within’ shifted them from ‘invisible’ acquiescence in stigma. The PC lens highlights potential tensions easily – of political, gender, racial discourses and more. The ‘dynamic tool’ of PC offers strategies for change too: ‘organising around common concerns... clout through numbers... strengthening coalitions... use alternative media... exposing true agendas... dominating public debate’ (Gaventa 2018).

Nazaré considered travelling to ‘invited’ space at COP23, and are networking now, mobile across levels, with other traditional communities. Sheffield activists wearing fancy dress block a felling contractor, ‘claiming’ space at a council depot to get round a court injunction.

But PC doesn’t explain how, when the oppressed gain power, they sometimes become oppressors. ‘Change’, so cherished in development and politics, can mean constant swinging between binary opposites within the status quo (Labour–Conservative/PT–PMDB/democracy–dictatorship/happy–sad). Rowlands is also sceptical. Power to dominate ‘can be bestowed by one person on another... it can just as easily be withdrawn; empowerment as a gift does not involve a structural change in power relations’ (Rowlands and Oxfam 1997: 12).

Eastern mysticism resolves this gap by defining a point of balance in the ‘three gunas’. Swinging between ‘rajas’ (mobility, change) and ‘tamas’ (inertia/unwholesomeness) is a game of thrones that finds resolution by the achievement of ‘sattva’ (harmonious response/homeostasis). The Martin Luther King Jr. quote illustrates this trinity. ‘Good’ is not essentially good if it turns ‘bad’. Change, for Eastern philosophy, is an experience through which to find the ‘real’, stabilising it with the power of being. Strategies for change emphasising doing are therefore questionable. Playing the change game under the ‘invisible’ spell of growth fetishism is ‘tamas’ for the environment (Bailey 1960: 4).

International development at worst is a pro-growth binary swinger: ‘development-as-Westernisation’ (Rowlands 1997: 11). Both case studies show abuse by ‘developers’. ‘Sustainability’, with growth enshrined in the SDGs, promises more of the same.

John Gaventa pays attention to belief systems but does not attempt to intervene. Spirituality and religion is outside the discourse, not exemplified in PC analysis despite exerting power with more than half the world’s population. In Nazaré religion is a hot topic. Could a belief that religion is ‘opium’ by IDS founders exert hidden power over methodology, for example? I question PC’s claim to cognise the whole ‘continuum’ (Gaventa 2011: 54).

In Questioning Empowerment, Jo Rowland, a feminist at the spiritual end of PC, considers the ‘CariWheel’ (Rowlands 1997: 21) developed by women questioning empowerment with Jennifer Harold. ‘Being’ is at the centre with integrated spirituality/sexuality. It maps the potential to break ‘invisible’ power affecting identity and self-worth, promising release from the slavery of power structures (situated at the periphery). ‘Love’ power is present in the wheel too. Rowlands proposes research to clarify the empowering potential of spirituality,
adding a footnote to the World Bank Spiritual Unfoldment Society Conference of 1996 showing ‘Bank staff now has permission... to bring their hearts, as well as their minds, to work. The supremacy of the intellect is being challenged in the World Bank’ (Barrett 1998, cited in Rowland 1997: 21).

Rowlands questions power tied with heartless male economics (Rowlands 1997: 23). Challenging colonialism and patriarchy by awakening to deeper love, resonates with both case studies: having in common the expressed love for their natural world. CariWheel has ontological power, its authors may not be academics but that does not mean they are less right, expressing themselves symbolically. Nazaré’s teachers spent long years working from their spiritual centre, building power ‘with’ relations in their community. With love and tolerance they overcame the evangelist boycott of the ‘superstitious’ yearly festival to be inclusive of all (Kozan 2016). They became commercially successful regionally and nationally, making riverines proud of their identity, until then a derogatory term. Their songs celebrate identity and love of environment. During the floods, their culture and root spirituality held most of them together. Power ‘within’ translated into power ‘to’ and ‘with’ – opening up multi-scalar relations.

‘CariWheel’ is about Honduran women but explains Nazaré’s renaissance better than PC. Energies of spirituality and sexuality in dense colour are at the centre are suggestive of a radiating sun. The ‘context of Caribbean women’s oppression’ in faded grey at the periphery suggests clouds that the sun can dissipate. It inspires women to ‘control resources, determine agendas and make decisions’ (Rowlands 1997: 21). Spiritual power can disintegrate permanent, intractable power structures with collective focus in their essential nature. The sun (psycho-spiritual reality) was there all the time, behind the illusory cloud formations of distorted power systems and generational complexes. In Sheffield, collective spirituality like Occupy could mobilise sufficient support to stop the chop. Adam Bucko, an Occupy activist, says in his book *Occupy Spirituality*: ‘This marriage of contemplation and action, mysticism and prophecy, is greatly needed in our time’ (Bucko 2013: 11).

Power Cube, like psychoanalysis, can help one become acutely aware of one’s problems, unable to do anything about it. Sheffield’s aware tree champions are just as impotent as oppressed minorities. I argue that until we radically institutionalise ‘power-within’ in education, and politics, power can never be stabilised (‘sattva’) in the hands of the just. Social science overlooks simple transforming qualities such as love and goodwill, antidotes for the collective ‘unthinking emotional mess’ (Bailey 1950: 20). Psychology and depth psychology is a gap in development thinking. Even the World Bank is using the L word now.

I have challenged the use of ‘politically expedient’ ‘fuzz’ words (Cornwall et al. 2005: iii) of ‘change’ and ‘participation’, suffering from overuse and abuse. ‘Participation’ sits well within a framework of ‘sharing and caring’, safeguarding us from the ‘participation of wolves’, on feminist lines. Sharing, like caring, works with intangibles as well as tangibles and has inbuilt ethics: ‘care implies attention, concern, compassion, surrender...’ (Martin 2008: 31).

Sharing connotes redistribution of resources, not the drive for more. It has no history in development that I know of, and is simple enough for a two-year-old to understand. ‘Sharing is not an ideological construct or ‘ism’ that is accompanied by a specific set of policies or procedures’ (Share the World’s Resources 2013).

The North lives ‘far too high from the standpoint of possessions and far too low from the angle of the spiritual values’ (Bailey 1944: 18). More spiritual frameworks highlight the need to learn to live on less, redistribute wealth, and reduce economic ‘doing’. ‘Sharing’ is more challenging for the so-called ‘elite’ than ‘participation’ in its implications for justice, with its implications of power-sharing. Integrating the power of the East and South with the ethics of ‘sharing and caring’ could institutionalise ‘power motivated by love’ in place of the love of power to heal the marginalised.
I have shown some of the virtues of power analysis frameworks amid the complexities, contradictions and confusion prevalent in our case studies. Of the strategies presented, I have shown a strong bias toward inner power as a strategy forward in the face of intractable conflicts in the world, which no ethical system, religion or science has yet solved. My critique of participation’s tyrannical potential is not original. One psychological implication of a ‘within’ approach is to question ‘motivation’, ensuring right use of power and that the insights gained from power frameworks are used for the common good. Scientific thinking is gradually integrating with Eastern thought with spirituality arguably moving from East (and South) to West, while the personality of the West moves ever East and South. Religion is a taboo subject for mainstreaming, which is not surprising as religious conflict is arguably the world’s most difficult problem to solve, although not perhaps the world’s most serious problem.

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Two Forms of Indigenous Autonomy in Mexico

Diego Orozco Fernández

1 Introduction

The uprising of the Zapatista movement in 1994 was a breakpoint for the indigenous communities in Mexico. It attracted the state’s attention as no other indigenous movement has done it in the last decades. It represented a clear and strong claim for the collective and individual rights that had been neglected to the indigenous people and to their recognition of self-determination and autonomy. Almost one year after the rebellion, the Zapatistas launched their own autonomous municipalities. Nevertheless, over 20 years after, it is hard to see substantial improvement in social development of these communities (Estrada 2007, 2009; Merino et al. 2014; Rico 2013).

More recently, in 2011, the indigenous community of Cherán in western Mexico was recognised as autonomous by the federal government. Unlike the Zapatistas communities, Cherán indigenous authorities maintain channels of cooperation with the state. It is too soon to assess the outcomes of this cooperation, but there are signs of progress in some social and productive programmes that could improve social development within the community.

This paper goes beyond acknowledging the right of autonomy that the indigenous communities have. Instead, its purpose is to analyse and contrast two forms of indigenous autonomy. One in which there is a clear cleavage between the communities and the state, and the other in which they find ways of cooperation. It aims to answer if a form of autonomy that includes cooperation with the state could lead to social development and break the systematic development dependence that has been imposed until now to the indigenous people across Mexico.

It is pertinent to make this analysis now that we are learning from two ongoing cases of indigenous autonomy in Mexico. In addition, we see better organised efforts advocating for the indigenous rights (Sierra 2005), and the international picture has changed during the past decade in which some Latin American countries responded for indigenous justice from a new perspective of plurinationalism.

In the first section I will frame my analysis using the literature of plurinationalism, contextualising social development for indigenous peoples in Mexico and analysing the impact that local governance can have at the national level. In the second section I explain what the indigenous people are demanding in relation to their autonomy. Then, I examine the case of the Zapatistas self-declared autonomous communities and the case of the officially recognised autonomous community of Cherán. On the third section I make some final remarks related to the two different forms of autonomy and the implications that each one of them can have in the social development for the indigenous people in Mexico.

2 Plurinationalism, indigenous social development and the implication of local governance at the national level

2.1 How states are dealing with indigenous autonomy?

Countries like Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and New Zealand consider themselves as plurinational states. This mean that they recognise the coexistence of two or more groups within the same polity (Keating 2001). According to Santos and Exeni (2012), the recognition of the existence and justice of the indigenous peoples is acquiring a new political meaning.
from this perspective of plurinationalism. It is not only looking for the recognition of cultural diversity, but to conceiving indigenous justice as an important part of a political project from a decolonising and anti-capitalist vocation. A second independence that finally breaks the Eurocentric links that have determined the development of these people.

In Latin America this change of perspective is more recent. For instance, constitutional reforms in the early 1990s in Colombia, led to significant changes in the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state (Van Cott 2002). Other important transformations were carried through in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador during the last decade. The core of these reforms is based in the recognition of the rights and self-determination and autonomy of the indigenous people (Santos and Exeni 2012; Sierra 2005).

Pro-indigenous reforms are also part of the new legal system that is promoted within the international arena. Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank are promoting human rights and identity policies. However, some scholars have pointed out that the reforms recognising cultural diversity and multi-ethnicity are closely linked to globalisation and neoliberal economic policies (Sierra 2005) which paradoxically have an adverse effect to vulnerable groups like the indigenous peoples. Such is the case of Mexico, where the implementation of pro-indigenous reforms has been limited and highly questionable (Sierra 2005; Van der Haar 2004).

2.2 Social development of the indigenous peoples of Mexico

For the purpose of this paper I see social development as an ultimate objective for the indigenous communities. Certainly, autonomy could be a means to improve social development, but in the same way some forms of autonomy could create more obstacles. Thus, it is important to analyse the impact that some forms of autonomy have had in the social development of the indigenous communities and possibly readjust the advocacy strategy.

Social development of the indigenous in Mexico is discouraging. Being an indigenous represents a clear disadvantage to access social rights and economic wellbeing. A report of The National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL 2014) provides some clear evidence: at the end of 2014, 73.2 per cent of the indigenous population was living in poverty, and 38 per cent in extreme poverty. This latter percentage is four times higher compared to the non-indigenous population. CONEVAL reported that one fifth of the Mexican population is considered as non-poor or not vulnerable to become poor. For the indigenous this wellbeing indicator is only 3.5 per cent, which means that 96.5 per cent of them are either poor because their income is not enough to cover basic needs as food, or because they are vulnerable by the lack of any public services as water, education, electricity, health, or housing. Closing the poverty and vulnerability gaps between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Mexico will be a sign of social development improvement.

2.3 Local governance and its impact at the national level

More autonomy in local communities can lead to more isolation from the state and national government. It also gives incentives to stay home from state and national-level elections. This could create less incentives for state and national politicians who are providers of revenue, services, tools, experience (Fox and Aranda 1996). We can see this as a paradox in which the more autonomy, the less participation in the higher political sphere, the less influence and support from the state for rights recognition and public services, which can lead to perpetuation of the development dependence from the central government or other non-state actors as NGOs or international aid (Hiskey and Goodman 2011).

While in Mexico the central government and the legislative power play a strong role in policymaking, and the states are gaining more fiscal power, autonomous communities may
lose their power of voice if they are isolated from state institutions. A study of Hiskey and Bowler (2005) suggest that local context governance have far-reaching consequences at the national level. Put in a different way, an autonomous community that fits well at the national level could have higher benefits than one that is secluded from national level politics.

3 Two forms of indigenous autonomy

3.1 The demands of the indigenous people and the response from the government

To explain what the indigenous people’s claims are, I will use the demands made by the Zapatista movement as it has been the most powerful voice of the indigenous groups and they have been adopted by other groups. Although, this does not mean that there are no other indigenous groups across the territory that may have different demands.

The Zapatistas have two main demands. The first is the legal recognition of their rights and cultures. This demand has a connotation of inclusion through participatory democracy and accountable governance. It is based on their aim to be respected as full Mexican citizens; ‘to be included in a democratic state rather than to secede from it’ (Fox 2000: 201).

The second demand is the implementation of autonomy. That is, a degree of self-government within a national framework, that involves political, administrative and juridical decentralisation without secession (Esteva and Pérez 2001; Van der Haar 2004). It draws on the right to self-determination as defined in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples, ratified by Mexico.

Even that the Zapatista’s demands expressly looked for greater inclusion and participation, the Government of Mexico argued that the proposed agreements could lead to the ‘Balkanization’ of Mexico and to legal spheres of exception and refused to translate them into laws. Since the late 1990s the negotiations are suspended.

3.2 Self-declared Zapatistas autonomous municipalities

After the negotiations between the Zapatistas and the state failed in terms of legal recognition, the Zapatistas moved to the terrain of practice. In 1994 they created self-governance structures based on their traditional forms of organisation and launched 38 autonomous communities. These structures are ‘spaces in which the Zapatistas seek to construct more effective and legitimated government, as much as they are spaces of resistance’ (Van der Haar 2004: 103). As one autonomous community leader put it: ‘the main goal is to show the government that with or without resources [from the state] we can promote sustainable development’ (Rodriguez-Castillo, cited in Fox 2007: 552).

But, is it possible to improve sustainable development with a profound cleavage with the state? To answer this question, we must look closer to this form of autonomy and the progress they have had in more than two decades.

The autonomous communities comprise institutions for the administration of justice, maintenance of order, civil registry and services such as health, education, land tenure and local and economic development. Most of the people working in these institutions receive no compensation. The system is sustained on local resources from collective enterprises and outside help from national and international NGOs (Van der Haar 2004). Local resources are not enough to invest in large projects, such as infrastructure. International donations are also not enough and may not be sustainable as the government can impose restrictions and control to the flow of resources at any time. Moreover, the autonomous communities operate parallel to the government official municipalities, overlapping and competing between each

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1 In 2003, they added a higher layer of governance called Juntas de Buen Gobierno.
other. This has led to frictions and a continuous uncomfortable co-existence of governance (Van der Haar and Heijke 2013). For instance, there is often uncertainty of who is responsible for what in issues that transcend Zapatistas communities, like roads and water, or in villages formed also by non-Zapatistas communities.

This form of autonomy has been criticised for being isolated and secluded (Estrada and Viqueira 2010). The main argument is that the self-sufficiency of the Zapatista communities is not realistic and perpetuates poverty (Estrada 2007, 2014; Estrada and Viqueira 2010; Rico 2013). In this light, the critics agree that the opportunities to improve their precarious economic situation are limited by the few resources they have access to (Estrada 2007, 2009; Rico 2013; Van der Haar and Heijke 2013).

The Zapatistas declare that their governance system is highly inclusive, participative and democratic. There are surveillance institutions and any government worker can be dismissed in case of misconduct. One of their mottos is Mandar obedeciendo, which means ‘lead by obeying’. So, we can infer that they are accountable to all the community. However, this system of governance and its mechanisms have been out of sight from the non-Zapatistas and there are claims that it is authoritarian (Estrada 2009).

Villafuerte (2009) states that meagre economic development and marginalisation remain in the Zapatista region despite the mobilisation of resources originated by the uprising. Moreover, Rico (2013) says that poverty increased an average of 9.2 per cent in three of the municipalities where the Zapatista communities are. However, this cannot be simply attributable to the self-governance of the Zapatistas as the municipalities in which the Zapatistas communities are also comprised by non-Zapatistas population. So, these poverty indicators lack methodologic rigour. In response, a study made by Merino et al. (2014), compared Zapatistas autonomous communities with neighbour non-Zapatistas communities that in the 1990s had a similar set of sociodemographic indicators, including the proportion of Zapatistas and non-Zapatistas populations, to find out if 20 years after the uprising of the Zapatistas there has been any improvement in their social development.

In sum, they found that there is no substantial improvement in social development in the Zapatistas communities. Both types of communities still lag in social development compared to the national medium. However, there are some slight differences that provide interesting information that contributes to formulate some hypothesis.

The economic indicators show that, public investment has increased in both communities, although 11 per cent more in the Zapatistas communities. Net per capita income grew at the same pace in both communities, but it was already higher in the Zapatista communities in 1995, so the gap proportion has not changed.

Regarding social indicators, the Zapatistas communities are 2.5 per cent behind than the non-Zapatistas in literacy rates, and education level is practically the same. In infant mortality rates, the Zapatista communities are doing better, even though the rate increased 68 per cent from 1995 to 2010, while in the non-Zapatistas it was reduced 37 per cent.

The infrastructure indicators show that the Zapatistas communities are considerably behind. 60 per cent of the Zapatistas households do not have drainage systems compared to 25 per cent of non-Zapatistas households. And, the proportion of households with no electricity service is 3 per cent higher for the Zapatistas households.

We can conclude there is no substantial difference between the Zapatistas autonomous communities and the non-Zapatistas communities. Moreover, the slight differences suggest

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2 Geographic location, proportion of indigenous population, income, and level of education and marginalisation.
that the lack of infrastructure and the isolation from public policies may be holding back the social development of the Zapatistas.

Lastly, van der Haar (2004: 106) points that the whole strategy of autonomy is difficult and costly to the indigenous people. They 'not only carry a heavy burden in sustaining with their effort and resources, the autonomous structures, but also face a constant threat of harassment from opponents of Zapatismo'.

### 3.3 The case of Cherán

In April 2011, after years of being affected by the organised crime, the people of Cherán, a community in the state of Michoacán comprised mainly by Purépecha indigenous people, confronted the delinquents who were accomplices with the local authorities and took control of the village. They expelled the municipal authorities and eventually established an organisational structure composed by a Major Council and eight other councils such as civil affairs, social, economic and cultural programmes, justice procurement, and administration, among others (Gobierno Comunal de Cherán K’eri 2015–2018, 2017). As part of their new organisation, they decided to exercise their right of self-determination and self-governance.

The Government of Michoacán tried to stop the movement in Cherán, but the indigenous community started a legal battle at the national level which they progressively won. First, in November 2011 through a resolution of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the Federation which gave them the right to appoint their own authorities through their traditional system. Then, three years later through a resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation that recognised Cherán as an autonomous indigenous municipality and established that Cherán must be consulted by the Michoacán government on all legislative and administrative matters that interest or affect them as a community. Also, Cherán’s traditional electoral system was incorporated to the state’s electoral law (González-Hernández and Zertuche-Cobos 2016).

The Government of Michoacán and the political parties have been trying to restore the regular elections system, but the federal resolutions have held them back. Moreover, as part of their form of autonomy Cherán maintained channels of cooperation with the federal government and some state agencies. For instance, the National Forest Commission, the federal agency for the conservation and sustainable forestry is providing resources and assistance to reforest the forests affected by the illegal logging. Likewise, the National Indigenous Council is funding projects such as restaurants run by the wives of men assassinated by organised crime (Pérez 2018).

The annual governance report issued by the autonomous Government of Cherán (Gobierno Comunal de Cherán K’eri 2015–2018, 2017) shows more examples of this cooperation. Federal and state social assistance programmes, like the cash transfer programme Prospera, subsidies for housing improvements, and economic support for older people, are active in Cherán. In matter of financial resources, the autonomous government is allowed to collect local taxes and obtain revenue from the provision of public services, issuing commercial permits, fines and other activities. Cherán also receives transfers from the federal and state governments that correspond to the municipality by law.

National and state ministries such as the Secretary of Communications and Transport and the Secretary of Health are providing funds for public infrastructure like road pavement, sewage and hospitals. The Council of Civil Affairs organises health awareness and service campaigns in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. Also, there is collaboration with the national agency in charge of doing socioeconomic diagnosis. Furthermore, the Major Council publishes a three-year development plan for their term time that includes goals and strategies for social development.
Within the autonomous government there are well-defined accountability rules and spaces. The Major Council is accountable to the General Assembly which is composed of all the inhabitants of Cherán (González-Hernández and Zertuche-Cobos 2016). Still, it runs a website\(^3\) under the official domain of Mexico’s government containing information as details and responsibilities of the Major Council and the eight councils, the legal framework under which they operate and all the financial information, resources management, and accountability reports. All according to the national laws in transparency and access to information. Added to that, every year the Major Council issues a governance report which helps to build confidence and give legitimacy to their government.

It is too soon to assess the outcomes of this form of autonomy but there are signs that the cooperation between the autonomous Government of Cherán and the federal and state government agencies can lead to the improvement of social development in the community but from position that is respectful with the rights, culture and traditions of the Purépecha people. A form of autonomy in these terms is not only beneficial to Cherán, but also to the government. Mexico has been highly criticised over governmental commitment to the indigenous population, losing legitimacy and credibility. The case of Cherán could be a form of autonomy that respects the rights of the indigenous peoples and at the same time is in line with the state, with clear institutional relations and within a legal framework that guarantees certainty and eliminate any concerns of the government.

So far, the most visible benefit in Cherán has been the expulsion of organised crime and the colluded local authorities (*ibid.*). This resulted in the end of extortions, kidnaps, murders and illegal logging. It has provided peace and stability to the community to run social and economic programmes from below that can improve social development. If so, the state will be fulfilling its responsibility of maintaining order and providing welfare within its territory, which can mean more legitimacy.

The state can also win more legitimacy among the international community by complying with the international regulations of organisations like the United Nations and the ILO. Complying in the case of Cherán is not enough. However, the government can use this case to set a precedent and replicate similar forms of autonomy in other areas and finally break the systematic development dependence that was imposed to the indigenous peoples of Mexico. Only then we can acknowledge that the Mexican government is being respectful of the indigenous people’s rights.

4  **Concluding remarks**

It is too soon to answer if the cooperative form of autonomy of Cherán will lead to social development, but there are promising signs of progress as the state is filling in the spaces where small communities are weaker, such as financing social assistance programmes and infrastructure, and in exchange complying with its responsibilities to win legitimacy.

Analysing this form of autonomy is a good opportunity for activists, academics and the Zapatistas that are pursuing their autonomy, to re-think and re-organise their efforts in a more constructive alternative of cooperation with the government that could also lead to social development. This does not mean losing the essence of the social movement that seeks for the respect and dignity of the indigenous people, and to overcome their marginalisation and poverty.

We must not forget that the Zapatista’s self-declared autonomy is a last resort because of governmental closure to official recognition. While there is no the minimum condition of legal recognition, it may not be possible to achieve the kind of cooperative autonomy as in Cherán.

\(^3\) [www.concejomayor.gob.mx/Acceso-a-la-informacion.html](http://www.concejomayor.gob.mx/Acceso-a-la-informacion.html)

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However, it is important to understand the implications of the two different forms of autonomy in social development. This could help to adjust the positions of the Zapatistas and the state and to untangle the negotiations.

One thing is true, we have learned that weak groups that did not have power of voice in Mexican transitions are the most vulnerable. So, we must find new ways for their inclusion in political participation from a position that is respectful of their rights and ways of life.

References


Can Developmental States Include Labour as Stakeholders in State–Society Relations?

Benjamin Preclik

1 Introduction

The most remarkable economic transformation in the latter half of the twentieth century has been the incredible growth of East Asian countries. The commercial success of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the post-Second World War period has attracted a lot of attention and has triggered a renewed debate on the role of the state in the promotion of development. Extensive studies on the nature of the state during the East Asian miracle gave rise to the ‘developmental state theory’. Chalmers Johnston (1982) first coined the term ‘capitalist developmental state’ in his seminal work MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Johnston and other theorists argue that the state played a fundamental role in economic transformation and the construction of comparative advantages in East Asian economic development. Over the last few decades, the developmental state theory has been particularly attractive because it provides an alternative to the free market development orthodoxy. Going beyond active Keynesian demand management, the developmental state theory argues that there is ‘strong evidence that the state can be effective in pursuing targeted catch-up policies by focusing resources on being dominant in certain industrial sectors’ (Mazzucato 2015: 47).

The ability of these East Asian countries to implement such strategic industrial policies heavily relied on particularities in the political and institutional endowment of the state. An unusual combination of bureaucratic autonomy and private–public cooperation facilitated the creation of targeted policies for relevant business actors. This symbiosis between business and the state is argued to have been at the heart of this incredible success story (Evans 1995; Weiss and Hobson 1995). But while this coalition between the state and industry did foster economic growth, it coincided with the oppression and side-lining of other stakeholders in the development process. Accounts of the East Asian miracle, in fact, do not seem to dwell on the significance that the marginalisation and repression of labour interests played in these economic transformations. While the state as an agent of social change and economic development has been given a lot of attention, the often violent and unequal trajectories of developmental states have been less highlighted. The initial model advocates a narrow perception of development as economic growth, where human development is perceived as a secondary concern.

In the following paper, I want to ask whether the repression of labour is essential or if alternative conceptualisations of the developmental state can provide a break from the relatively repressive model that was evident in the East Asian examples? In other words, I will try to find out if contemporary developmental states can be more inclusive towards labour as stakeholders in state–society relations. Is it possible to avoid the marginalisation of workers in the context of developmental states?

In the first section, I will introduce the concept of the developmental state and the state–society relations that are argued to have been vital to its success. This will provide a basis for the second part, where I will investigate the role of labour in the East Asian developmental state literature and practice. I will show that structural features and strong states limited the agency of labour and contributed to its oppressed position. The working class was perceived as an economic input and depicted in relatively passive terms. The case study of South Korea, one of the more authoritarian developmental states, will provide an opportunity to illustrate this and highlight repression as a critical factor. I will also argue that the oppression and violence towards the working class ultimately resulted in the demise of the Korean
developmental state. The third part will first engage with critical approaches that claim that the developmental state model is inherently irreconcilable with the inclusion of labour. These radical critiques crucially point out one of the main shortcomings of the developmental state paradigm: namely that state–society relations are narrowly conceptualised as state-business relations. More recent neo-developmentalist approaches have recognised this shortcoming. I will argue that the developmental state and the inclusion of labour are not mutually exclusive. Contemporary developmental needs call for a developmental state in which state–society relations include both civil society and labour.

2 Late development, developmental states and the importance of state–business relations

As mentioned above, the developmental state concept emerged in the 1980s based on a series of case studies that gave an alternative explanation to the orthodox interpretation of rapid industrialisation in East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Oenis 1991). It was fundamentally conceived as a counter-critique to the prevailing neoclassical consensus of the time which advised countries to follow market-oriented policies and greater liberalisation as the right mechanism to catalyse late-industrialisation. Instead, the studies emphasised the critical role that the state and its institutions played in the promotion of the East Asian late-development. The concept is heavily inspired by early statist political economy thinkers such as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, who argued that the state had a crucial role to play in late development (Chang 2002). Indeed, developmental state theory ‘suggests that far more options exist for industrialising countries than is implied by the pessimistic predications of culturally based modernisation theory, dependency theory or world theory’ (Pempel 1999: 142). Instead, the rise of East Asian states has been heavily attributed to the importance of countries’ institutional endowment and their ability to lead the way in the process of development (Schmit 2007).

Chalmers Johnson (1982) was the first to acknowledge the importance of the state’s fundamental role in the post-war industrial transformation of Japan. He argued that four factors were crucial for this transformation: (i) the presence of a small, highly qualified Weberian style state bureaucracy, (ii) a political system that gave this able bureaucracy the room to take initiative and work effectively, (iii) the mastering of market conforming methods of state interventions in the economy, and (iv) the existence of a pilot agency such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan which ‘controls industrial policy through its influence over planning, the energy sector, domestic production, international trade, finance and government funds’ (Johnson 1982, cited in Stubbs 2009: 2). Following Johnson’s analysis, a wide array of studies emerged arguing that similar structures were crucial in the economic successes of South Korea and Taiwan (Amsden 1982; Wade 1990). Today, the concept has been extended beyond the limits of East Asia and has been claimed to have become a somewhat ‘generic term to describe governments which try to “intervene” actively in economic processes and direct the course of development, rather than relying on market forces’ (Beeson 2014: 120).

But the focus of an interventionist state alone cannot explain the East Asian success. Arguably one of the most relevant insights from the study of these developmental states is the importance that government–business networks played in the formulation of active industrial policy. While close state–capital ties are usually linked to corruption and rent-seeking activities, Evans (1995) explains that this was avoided in the context of developmental states and bureaucracies managed to remain independent. While the state administration displayed some Weberian traits regarding meritocratic recruitment and highly qualified employees, it broke with the idea of being isolated from society. Instead, East Asian developmental state bureaucratic apparatuses were ‘embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for continual negotiations and re-negotiations of goals and policies’ (ibid.: 12). Evans first described this seemingly paradoxical relationship, where the bureaucracy remains insulated but not isolated.
from private interests as ‘embedded autonomy’. Similar observations on the importance of such insulated relations between the bureaucracy and business to achieve industrial transformation and long-term growth were made by Weiss and Hobson (1995), who referred to this as controlled or governed inter-dependence.

The literature on the East Asian developmental state shows how designing effective industrial policy relies heavily on the ability of governments to extract information on the constraints and opportunities that the private sector faces (Rodrik 2007). Active state–business relation is one of the core components of the developmental state. Ayele et al. (2016: 15), summarising the literature on developmental states say that ‘to be truly developmental, a state must show good bureaucracy, good leadership, good relationships and good policy, and direct these in practice towards economic development’. This includes the existence of institutionalised state–society relations and a developmentalist outlook to promote better lives for citizens. But, as I will show in the following part, the developmental strategy also heavily relied on the super-exploitation and oppression labour.

3 The role of labour in the East Asian developmental state

As mentioned above, central to the developmentalist ideology is a particular focus on improving the welfare of its citizens through state fostered capitalist accumulation and industrialisation (Ayele et al. 2016). But while this might suggest a progressive and positive vision of development, it relied heavily on the control and exploitation of labour. The following will review the position of labour in the developmental state literature and illustrate this through the case study of South Korea.

3.1 The role of labour in the developmental state theory

Most writings on the developmental state only marginally address labour as a group. Weak civil society, including labour, is however mentioned as one of the preconditions that provided the emergence of the developmental state and facilitated unrestricted rapid accumulation (Stubbs 2009; Weiss and Hobson 1995; Leftwich 2008). The literature seems to perceive ‘cheap’ and ‘weak labour’ as a structural feature that helps to explain the economic success of the East Asian states (Amsden 1990). While business is acknowledged as having played a key role in economic success, the contribution of the working class and suppression of labour as a stakeholder is deemed a by-product of the development trajectory. Indeed, the oppression of labour seems to be described as a necessary condition in the late developmental project and furthering of economic growth. Amsden (ibid.: 18), for instance, claims that ‘labour repression is the basis of late-industrialisation everywhere’. Strict workplace discipline and the absence of unions were key features that contributed to the profitability and competitiveness of industries since ‘corporatized labour keeps gains in productivity ahead of gains in wages’ (Kohli 2004: 381). In other developmental states such as Singapore, labour control is asserted as having been essential to providing an attractive investment environment for foreign capital (Crone 1988: 260). The literature thus seemingly reduces labour’s position to an input factor and element that provided the right environment for rapid economic growth.

The state’s role is described as crucial in the subordination and incorporation of labour through the instilment of a ‘paternalistic, corporatist structure of collaborative but authoritarian management’ (ibid.: 259). The East Asian developmental state had the ability to discipline and repress labour consistently (Kohli 2004). There is an acknowledgement that the capacity of developmental states to foster unrivalled economic growth was not merely the result of well-functioning state–business ties, but also included limiting the ability of other interest groups to become significant enough to influence the policy process. In his review of early developmental state writings on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Ziya Oenis finds that:
The strategic power of the East Asian developmental state has depended on the formation of political coalitions with domestic industry and on the destruction of the left and curtailment of the power of organised labour plus other popular groups. (Oenis 1991: 114)

Actively obstructing the mobilisation of labour groups from the outset, by denying them entry into the political process, is argued to have removed the space for conflictual politics and the delegitimisation of East Asian developmental states’ vision (ibid.). The absence of established interest groups, such as dominant landed classes or a mobilised working class, facilitated the subduing of everything to the developmental project (Leftwich 2008). This depended on the nature of the elite political compromise and the fact that ‘radical opposition has often quickly and effectively been neutralised and coopted’ (ibid.:13).

The muting of labour voices and those of other social interest groups is asserted to have been a crucial element in facilitating the ability to implement long-term planning and keep alternative demands off the political agenda (Kohli 2004). The private sector was naturally supportive of this marginalisation since the inclusion of other interests would have threatened to infiltrate politics with the 'logic of distribution' rather than the 'logic of accumulation' (Bellin 2000: 181). Instead, the ability to promote sustained economic development and the subsequent improvement of living standards is highlighted to have appeased populations and secured legitimacy in the early developmental state examples (Leftwich 2008). The case of South Korea will serve as an example and highlight the coercive relationship of developmental states with labour.

3.2 Labour in the South Korean developmental state

South Korea is referred to as one of the ‘big three’ developmental state examples in which high growth was attributed to the interventions of the state through a professional and autonomous bureaucracy. Alice Amsden (1989) famously linked the country’s development to Johnston’s ‘capitalist developmental state’ model in her influential book Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Development. She described South Korea as a case that revealed the importance and effectiveness of state intervention. The Korean developmental model was characterised by a strong, repressive authoritarian bureaucracy that disciplined the private sector and labour, guided businesses and provided financing to strategic business interests (Oenis 1991). The Economic Planning Board (EPB), a capable expert bureaucracy, worked closely with the Korean business elites to catalyse growth in sectors it deemed essential for its economic advancement (Leftwich 2008). This contributed to the empowerment of the Chaebol, sizeable Korean business conglomerates, which became increasingly powerful actors over time (Kim 1993).

The state not only provided the Chaebol with favourable industrial policies but also administered the working class through restrictive policies. Furthermore, strict control of labour was an essential service provided the Chaebols by the state (Minns 2001: 181). This included the enforcement of low wages and exponentially increasing work hours. From 1975 to 1985, Korea consistently topped world rankings for both the longest working week and the highest rate of work-related accidents. Even in 1990, when the working week hours had reduced significantly, Koreans worked an average of 49.8 hours a week (Kim 1993: 234).

Labour organisation was eliminated as an active force by the authoritarian Park regime early on. While the introduction of basic labour laws was initially announced, they were soon revoked by the Park regime to widen the scope for state interventions (ibid.). The administration saw an advantage in the existence of weak unions and therefore selected labour representatives to organise a union that could be controlled by the state (Minns 2001). Labour representation thus became divided into 12 industrial unions under the leadership of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). Minns (2001: 180) argues that ‘the remarkable speed at which this all happened suggested that the FKTU was nothing more than a government body without real roots in the working class’. Furthermore, restrictive
laws, complicated strike procedures and the infiltration of unions by state police officers diminished labours agency considerably (ibid.). This allowed the state to keep wages artificially low to ensure the competitiveness of products on the world market and increased profits for the chaebol business conglomerates (Kim 1993). Buchanan and Nicholls (2003: 204) argue that a combination of super-exploitation of human labour and highly subversive work environment in South Korea created ‘despotic relations in production and in the political interaction between the state, business and the working classes’. They describe this combination in South Korea as ‘despotic labour politics’.

Increasing wages were claimed to have been an incentive to increase productivity and a remuneration for the harsh working conditions (Amsden 1990a). Leftwich (2008: 16) insists that despite civil, political and human rights being abused in developmental states ‘it remains one of the most remarkable features of these states that their incumbent regimes appear to have enjoyed remarkable legitimacy’. However, this ignores that repression and despotic labour politics did not provide room for contestation. In South Korea, this repression and poor working conditions eventually ended up in strikes and turmoil. Ultimately, ‘the labour movement exploded in full force, like a pressure cooker building up steam for two decades’ (Kim 1993: 236). Despite coercion and constraining labour policies, the movement grew to become the most militant of the East Asian developmental states (Shin 2010). The response to this growing labour movement was very violent, with brutal police repression against protesting workers. After an unusually conflictual year in 1987, in which there were over 3,700 labour conflicts, the labour movement was joined by other civil society forces (Kim 2010: 105). This resulted in massive protests which ultimately led to the breakdown of authoritarianism and the gradual move towards democracy. The violent transition eventually led to the demise of the developmental state in South Korea. It demonstrates that an authoritarian developmental state model that excludes labour and other stakeholders cannot be a sustainable form of governance. In 1997, Korea's economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis, which forced the country to accept structural adjustment packages to acquire emergency loans from international financial institutions. Kim (2010) argues that if societal actors had been more represented in the economy and politics, they could have warned the state of the imminent crisis. But can the developmental state model be reconciled with labour inclusion?

4 Towards the inclusion of labour into the developmental state model

4.1 Critical perspectives

As mentioned above the developmental state model in the post-Second World War period relied heavily on the suppression and exploitation of labour. Critical scholars argue that the marginalisation of labour lies at the intellectual origin of the developmental state as a theory that denies labour agency and voice. Fishwick and Selwyn (2016) argue that the developmental state model is a fundamentally elite-driven development project that sees development from the perspective of capital. Labours needs are considered secondary and only achievable by securing capital's needs first. They suggest that the developmental state is part of a host of elite development theories (EDT) that regard securing the needs of capital essential for achieving human development. EDT are argued to be built on an ‘elite subject-subordinate object’ premise that insists that the development of the poor calls for effective elite leadership (Selwyn 2016a). This ‘elite subject-subordinate object’ relationship is enforced through the identification of elites as drivers of the development project. Furthermore, EDT perpetuate elite visions of development by ignoring or dismissing emancipatory poor-led efforts and legitimising economic and political repression and abuse by elites. ‘Such conceptions… legitimate various forms of coercion and subjection of labouring classes to elite-led development processes’ (Selwyn 2016b: 794). Rather than considering contestation by the poor as an integral part of development, it is considered to hamper the elite development project (Selwyn 2016a). The idea of the developmental state as a progressive theory and antithesis to neo-classical and neo-liberal development then
seems flawed. Both the developmental state theory and neoliberal orthodoxy have a similar predisposition to the control and exploitation of labour. The developmental state paradigm ‘intellectually denies labouring classes the agency and justifies the latter’s political repression and economic exploitation for the “higher goal” of national development’ (Fishwick and Selwyn 2016: 235).

This elite focus becomes clear when analysing the narrow definition of state–society relations that are deemed essential to the workings of the developmental state. Because the theory solely preoccupies itself with the relationship between private business and government it ‘already indicates the conceptual and analytical exclusion of labour’ (Chang 2009: 61). By equating ‘business’ with ‘capital’, the developmental state ignores capital as a social relation in which labour is an important stakeholder. Dae-oup Chang (2013) argues that this explains why state–capital relations are considered complete by just looking at government–business relations. The state is regarded as an entity of ultimate power and legitimacy in the process of development, and labour is reduced to a productive factor, equal to technological and financial inputs. Labour’s ‘role as an active social force, other than as one that is potentially disruptive, is denied, and it is otherwise depoliticised and disempowered’ (Chang 2013: 94). The autonomy of the state from society is essentially argued to be a response to needs of capital for favourable industrial policies as well as disposable and docile labour.

These critical perspectives highlight the fact that the developmental state theory didn’t address the issues of labour because its analysis narrowly focuses on the collaboration with state elites. By concentrating on the primary goal of catch-up industrialisation, the developmental states seem to give little attention to the conflicts that this creates regarding political contestation and economic inequalities.

4.2 **Room for inclusion?**

The widespread labour marginalisation practised in the East Asian developmental state, especially in the case of South Korea, should however partly be understood as a product of the socioeconomic and international conditions of the time (Pempel 1999). The East Asian developmental state has increasingly been recognised as the sum of its unusual class structures, embeddedness, capable bureaucracies and the international context at the time (Evans 2010). A contemporary developmental state faces entirely different developmental challenges and opportunities. Neo-developmentalalist thinkers agree there is no right model for a developmental state and that merely replicating the approaches that were successful in East Asia is unlikely to result in success (Chang 2010). The building of a developmental state needs to take into account the specific setting regarding the political, economic, ideological and institutional environment (ibid.). Whittaker et al. (2010) argue that today’s late-developers face a path of ‘compressed development’ in which various stages of development happen simultaneously rather than sequentially. Deepening global integration creates global interdependency that requires contemporary developmental states to be more adaptive as they have to coordinate a wide range of foreign as well as domestic stakeholders. Furthermore, the ability of states to act independently is constrained by ‘a host of international treaties and initiatives that are now deemed essential for membership of the international community’ (ibid.: 459). This arguably restricts the room for the categorical exclusion of labour because of international pressures that insist on the respect of human rights, social liberties and political freedoms.

The different context today calls for an alternative approach to the developmental states including more encompassing state–society relations which include labour. There has been a realisation among scholars that recognises the need for the inclusion of labour and civil society into the framework of the developmental state beyond a simple factor of production (Koo 2001). In his seminal work *Embedded Autonomy*, Peter Evans (1995) predicted that the developmental state would be under increasing pressure from various groups in society and therefore argued for a reconceptualisation of state–society relations. He explained that
‘embeddedness does not necessarily take the form of exclusionary ties to entrepreneurial elites’ (ibid.: 235). Drawing from examples of broader-based forms of embeddedness in Kerala and Austria, he highlights the vital role that a coherent state apparatus can play in providing the setting for bargaining between capital and labour. In the Indian state of Kerala, institutionalised links were formed between the political leadership and industrial and agricultural workers. This contributed to more welfare-oriented policies as development became conceived as something more than just economic growth. Furthermore, it contributed to more sustained labour peace. The Austrian case shows how a competent state bureaucracy can facilitate a platform of exchange and bargaining between capitalists and organised labour. Just as in developmental states a relatively strong state fostered the creation of coordinated industrial class interest representation. But contrary to the developmental states this was complemented by a strong unionised labour representation. With both interest groups being represented the state bureaucracies’ role was to translate the interests of labour and capital into policies. In both the Keralan and Austrian case ‘embedded autonomy did not entail the marginalisation of subordinate groups’ (ibid.: 241). This highlights that embeddedness, one of the developmental states core characteristics, does not have to take the form of exclusionary and coercive means. For contemporary developmental states, this suggests a reinterpretation of embeddedness beyond the East Asian example. Such encompassing embeddedness could provide the base for a sturdier economic and societal transformation.

These broader forms of embeddedness might best be incorporated into democratic structures. Neo-developmentalist thinkers therefore argue that today’s developmental states should be democratic in nature. It is claimed that democratic developmentalism might also provide more relevant development outcomes (Edigheji 2010). Democracy has previously not been associated with the developmental state because electoral politics were considered to limit its ability to implement long-term visions. Instead, as the case of South Korea has shown, more authoritarian structures were supposed to provide the necessary bureaucratic autonomy. Through despotic rule developmental states were argued to be able to ‘suppress, or ignore interest groups, which enables their bureaucratic autonomy’ (Routley 2014: 165). The democratic developmental state perspective instead suggests that twenty-first century developmental needs have shifted fundamentally and provide a setting in which broader embeddedness is achievable as well as necessary (ibid.). It suggests that the contemporary developmental state needs to be a capability enhancing state (Evans 2010). Evans (2010, 2014) argues that a capability enhancing developmental state, which draws inspiration from Amartya Sen’s (1999) notion of the capability approach to human development, is more fitting today. Because the focus has moved away from the emphasis on capital accumulation and growth, the capitalist development state is argued to be outdated. Value creation is attributed to the production of knowledge and jobs are becoming increasingly concentrated in the service sector. The ‘new centrality of services forces any state that wants to be “developmental” to focus more intensely on people and their skills, instead of machines and their owners’ (Evans 2014: 86). This requires the distribution of basic rights that emancipates workers and incentivises them to invest in their own abilities (Evans 2010). The state should also provide social support for goods such as education and health care that contribute to facilitating such capabilities. To achieve this goal there is a need for effective ties to societal actors. Like state–business ties in the traditional developmental state model, state–societal ties suggested to be crucial to determine collective priorities, defining developmental goals and gathering information to create policies (ibid.). Engaging with labour and building up its capacity has thus become central in the twenty-first century. This means that the oppression and marginalisation of labour is not a desirable feature of the contemporary developmental state anymore. The repression of labour would instead limit the willingness of labourers to invest in their own capabilities. The democratic developmental state advocated by neo-developmentalist suggests that a more pluralist engagement with society and labourers is possible. Yet it requires considerable infrastructural ability that can construct and manage
such broad-based development alliances. This is a major challenge for developing countries that are looking to implement developmental regimes today (Routley 2014).

5 Conclusion

This essay has attempted to review the role of labour in the developmental state. Much of the literature has emphasised the centrality of institutional particularities in facilitating the implementation of a capitalist developmental vision and a close engagement with business as the cornerstone of the developmental states. As a consequence, less attention has been paid to the role and position of labour in this context. As this essay has shown, labour was neglected as a relevant stakeholder and effectively reduced to a factor of production, a human input necessary in the process of accumulation and growth. This essay has tried to determine to what extent the marginalisation of labour is decisive and whether there is an alternative to ignoring and repressing this relevant stakeholder. Research on developmental state describes the weak position of labour and the ability of the state to discipline the working class as a precondition for the emergence of the developmental states in East Asia. In South Korea, this resulted in ‘despotic labour politics’ in which the labour force was exploited and abused. This has impacted the longevity of the developmental state as repression contributed to discontent and the dismantling of the developmental state. Radical critics argue that the repression and marginalisation are entrenched in its theoretical core. While they do not see the developmental state paradigm as reconcilable with labour inclusion, they have helped to point out that the problem of exclusion comes from a narrow conceptualisation of state–society relation and the bargain between government and capitalist elites. This suggests that the developmental state model practised in East Asia cannot and should not be replicated. Instead, the contemporary setting necessitates a reinterpretation of the developmental state. Today’s developmental needs and the international agenda calls for a capacity enhancing state in which labour and civil society at large are empowered to succeed. In this new capacity-enhancing developmental state model democratic structures and broader-based state–society ties are crucial. As such it would provide a radical break from the capitalist developmental state of the twentieth century and provide room for the inclusion of labour. The question how these capacity enhancing developmental states would look is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

References


Taking Off the Mask: Using Participatory Photography as the Reflective Medium to Explore and Understand Myself in the Web of Power Structures and Psychosocial Relations Underlying Feminine Appearance Norms

Isabella Pyrgies

Women have been cast as an object, a phantasm. She is never her own mistress. Her being is constantly divided between what she really is, and what she imagines she is... as her femininity manifests itself in forms men have invented for her.

(Octavio Paz 1961: 197)

The function of art is to do more than tell it like it is- it is to imagine what is possible.

(Bell Hooks 1994: 281)

1 Introduction

In this essay I will reflect on my process of understanding myself within the nexus of power structures around feminine appearance norms. I will present the process of dealing with PCOS (polycystic ovaries syndrome) in relation to external and internal pressure to adhere to feminine norms. On my reflective journey to re-establish an inner dialogue with myself, I was surprised to find how deeply feminine norms were located in my very sense of lived and sexual identity. Centring my analysis around the feminist depiction of the body as a site of political contestation, I allowed myself creative space to question and explore myself in relation to what I had previously taken to be natural and unalterable. In the past few months, I have used various methods of reflective practice to attempt to become aware of the norms of appearance with which I identify, and to interrogate the problematic politics of aesthetic and semiotic objectification and representation that underpin norms of feminine appearances (Bordo 2003).

My reflective practice journey took many forms. I wrote a journal, practiced mindful walking and engaged with embodied writing. In conjunction with those processes, I took photos. Together they enabled me not only to ‘facilitate consciousness of consciousness which enable[d] critical self-enquiry’ (Moon 2013, quoting Holly 1991) but to disentangle critical self-enquiry from, the unfortunately more natural, negative practice of self-criticism.

What aided my reflection most was the process and the result of making images, as its ‘aesthetic’ form enabled me to obtain a ‘unique form of understanding’ (Moon 2013) through creative expression that helped me recognise, embody and better comprehend the role of power dynamics. This materialised into two photography projects which I will present as my primary means of reflection.

The first project took the form of a participatory photographic project on myself as both object and subject. The project attempts to create a channel linking Butler’s (2011) conceptualisation of resistance as a conscious disruption of repetitive gender norms to my own version of resistance as parody of feminine norms. I found the potential of images to empower, build and engage with not only ‘power within’ but also bridging over into ‘power
with’ (Gaventa 2008). After, I will reflect on my second project ‘one-tone/size-fits-all’ to show the necessity of decolonising the mind and deconstructing privilege to highlight the importance of understanding the power I hold over others and the importance of intersectionality. Ultimately, I will look at the reflective practice, and my reflections that emerge from it, in my work as a development actor/scholar, paying particular attention to issues of ethics of representation and cultural politics within development.

2 Motivation

The pressure of ‘becoming a woman’ (de Beauvoir 2014) in a society that involves living up to a cultural reality encumbered by prescriptions and rules has had strong impact on the development of my anxiety and self-consciousness. When diagnosed with PCOS I was forced to question two things about my identity that society deems to be attributable to women: feminine appearance and motherhood. The former, through suffering from severe acne, thick hair growth in all the ‘wrong places’, brittle dry head hair, and painful bloating. And the latter, as a result of cysts on my ovaries, my identity no longer fitted with society’s identification of ‘woman’ as one who is a ‘natural’ carer. Instead of coming to terms with the condition I spent time trying to conform to these often-unattainable feminine appearance norms, which has resulted in the psychic fragmentation and estrangement between my mind and body. In contrast to feminist literature that talks about objectification as taking place from the external viewer, I felt that I had internalised this gaze and started, to my detriment, to objectify myself (Bartky 1997). The consequence of PCOS made me check mirrors constantly for blemishes, averting my gaze when spoken to and becoming more introverted. Constant self-policing has made crucial and critical damage not only to my relationship with myself and others in the private sphere but has spilt over into other areas of my public life, such as my inability to engage in public speaking. It is for this reason I have chosen to reflect on the relations between feminine norms, objectification, representation and self-hood. The process of reflective practice has allowed me to keep track of my emotional and intellectual processes through journaling and photography. Although challenging, as it requires both time and self-honesty in order for the practice to work, I believe, that reflective practice can support self-discovery while also enhancing awareness. It does so by aiding the feminist practice of drawing connections between the personal and political (Bordo 2003).

3 Gender performativity

When researching for this paper, the theory I identified most with was Butler’s (2011) account of gender identity construction. For her, gender performativity is the theory that gender is a social performance, the result of repetition of ‘stylised acts’ prescribed by cultural norms (ibid.). Over time the repetition of particular body gestures, activities and movements become the mechanisms by which the ‘dualistic heteronormative structure of gender is perpetuated, and an individual gender identity created’ (Lloyd 2015: 7). Gender is not passively scripted on the body, but rather acts are described as corporeal and involves gestures that ‘style the flesh’ (Butler 2011). Sufficient repetition of stylised gender acts generates an illusion that a sexed body is natural and provides the grounds that builds culturally shared specific modes of difference. What interested me most about her theory was when she states; ‘the task is not whether to repeat’ the practices constitutive of gender; but ‘how to repeat’ so that ‘through a radical proliferation of gender’ it is possible to ‘displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition” (Butler, quoted in Lloyd 2015: 8) By taking Butler’s theory of gender identity construction as my framework, I fused the idea of how one impersonates and performs one’s identity with her example of drag as a form of resistance through exposing unnaturality of femininity. This inspired me to use images to present a playful stepping aside from fixed gender stereotypes by recreating this resistance in a meaningful way in the form of parody of female norms. In an attempt to break-away from my unconscious reproduction and enforcement of norms that govern sexual behaviour, speaking styles, diet, emotional range, mannerisms and dress, I used photography as a way to reflect on and
re-imagine myself in a way that could subvert the internalisation of stereotypes and transgress limiting normalised scripts.

4 Method: Participatory photography: ‘Parody of Feminine Norms’

One reason I chose participatory photography as method was to break out of the current fast-paced image-culture of the digital world. My intention was to slow the process down and work with imagery in a more mindful and considered way. I was drawn to it as it allows one to create a process of storytelling, connecting those at the margins of society, bringing in different realities and voices, fostering social change on both a personal and global level, creative advocacy and communication skills (Pink 2001). It is a powerful tool for providing us not only with access to different cultures and creativities but also a much more human way of looking at the world as it gives those being photographed, written and talked about, a voice. For this project, it allowed me to disrupt photography as a commercial product as used by advertising and media and turn it into a critical space where I entered into a process of openness in order to perform myself in new ways. As I was both subject and object, defined by my own female gaze, photography allowed me to express myself in a way not always possible for me with words alone. As a form of public speaking that allowed me to transcend the white-hot paralysing terror that usually accompanies my body when words are involved, I was able to delve deeper to rekindle an authentic dialogue between my psyche and body. The act of turning the lens onto myself at first made me feel uneasy, but the active participation of the body in the creation felt liberating and empowering. I felt myself enter into a process of re-embodiment through the dialogue of absurdity and play, which allowed me to ‘pass beyond my usual borders and exceed the given to move between perspectives and systems of knowing’ (Nolas 2009: 190). Using girlish/absurd props and body gestures to parody the conventions of femininity allowed me to upset old paradigms of male gaze and female as victim and break-out of processes that produce the passivity, docility and subordination in women. Underneath I present three photos that I took to resist external and internal objectification, framed in a ‘power over’ and ‘power within’ response to negative comments I had underlined in my journal that had been said to me over the past months.

a) ‘You know you would look so much prettier if you made more effort’

The idea for this photo came to me after seeing a sign in the bedroom of a friend before going on a night out. It read ‘Do women have to be naked to get into the Met. Museum?’ Getting ready with three other girls, we’d all chosen to wear tight jeans, heeled boots and
crop tops. Reflecting on the sign, I felt the urge to write in my journal and it seemed fitting to try embodied writing. Once actually reflecting on and listening to my body about how these clothes made me physically feel was shocking, as I had probably worn something similar a thousand times but had never questioned it. I realised the uncomfortable truth that the expectation of women in art to be naked does not stop at the boundaries of the art-world, as even on a cold night in Brighton, feminine norms dictate girls are to be half naked and/or uncomfortable in tight clothes. Often in art women are represented as muses or models, in Western art history, docile and passive in the shadows of ‘great’ male artists (Berger 1972). In this photo, my body provokes the stereotype of the nude woman as prominent object. The make-shift absurd high heels are a reference to the pain and suffering many go through to appear feminine. The response of my body is to get up off the chair where I should be posing and tear the frame apart as my female body loses balance. Self-expression allows experience to transmute into an art object or project and cathertically releases the experience from my body.

b) ‘What’s that hair on your face? You know you should really sort that out’

When returning from a mindful walk, I was thinking about the things I had to do to get ready for my date that evening: the list was extensive. Then I started to question why I was doing them, and certain thoughts such as, ‘to feel pretty’, ‘to feel confident’, to feel I could ‘be myself’ whisked around my head. The latter part particularly shocked me as I had subconsciously equated my appearance as a core part of lived and sexual identity. My mind wandered back to an article I’d read that day, where Bartky (1997) appropriates Foucault’s account of power in the context of self-surveillance to explain how and why women take up tiresome, time-consuming, and expensive feminine body practices in order to produce their sense of natural femininity. ‘Femininity’ is marketed at a price and presented to us neatly packaged in the form of lotions and potions that promise to fix flaws and enhance beauty. Internalised behaviour conformity and capitalism cannot be separated as it aids the dualistic commodification and objectification of women’s bodies to create self-policing subjects. Media often acts as the policer of norms by punishing those who do not comply by fat-shaming and beauty-shaming. To resist this, I parody the feminine norms by using a hula-hoop, a girlish object used as an extension of a paint-brush, to throw paint on lists I found in magazines that tell us how to be ‘our best selves’ (Cosmopolitan 2018). I followed my interest in creating situations where exaggerated movements or physical accidents of my body result in failure to remain upright or in control and my body is destined to fail at performing femininity.
c) ‘You should really smile more, you look far more attractive’

Since journaling, I have been more aware of the regularity of receiving sexist and objectifying comments. Re-reading through my journal, I realised that I often stated facts such as; my friend told me ‘I looked like I had lost some weight’, my boss said ‘I had let myself go’ and ‘this man told me ‘looking at you, you would never say you were clever’’. It made me realise that women’s bodies are constantly objectified and judged as there is a notion that it is acceptable to comment both positively and negatively. I turned into myself to listen to the psychological implications that I usually ignore. This picture aims to unpack the inner-conflict created by prescribed feminine norms- sexualisation and objectification as a result of ascribing to them- but also punishment for non-adherence. Here my aim is to reject, as L’Oréal so incessantly puts it, my ‘worth’ as measured by consuming and adhering to beauty standards. To do so, I decided to use make-up, the thing that I needed most to cover my acne scars and flaws to feel confident both as a form of parody and also to write a response. I used eye-liner to write the message across my chest, symbolically turning an object I have incorporated into my daily routine to look beautiful into an act of resistance. Taking this photo allowed me to reflect on and provide my own resistance to everyday sexism and wrestle power back for myself.

5 Image creation and the three Rs: reclamation, resilience and resistance for social justice

An important part of using a camera or a paint-brush is not only to equip women individually but also to enhance the collective organising power of women by providing a medium to share experiences. Community engaged image creation can build connectivity, understanding, mobilisation and above all pathways to self-determination. Images and art are powerful mediums with which to create platforms of learning through sustaining safe spaces in order to resist the patriarchy. Photography is thus a key tool for reflecting a world in crisis through the exploration of important themes often silenced or distorted in the mainstream, such as domestic violence, gender identity, safety, sex, bodies and race. It is important to create a dialogue around these topics to ‘transform the mindlessness and massification that accompany social oppression, replacing it with higher levels of cultural sensitivity, intelligence and humanity’ (Fredrickson 1997: 201). Spaces such as Devils Dykes, Girl Gaze and the Canadian Feminist Art Show, work wonders in breaking down subjectivity and creating inclusive solidarities based on difference in order to branch-out from neoliberalist.
individualism that is often characterised by personal well-being. The power of image creation thus ‘arise[s] from the deepening of capacities for dialogue, improvisations, and resistance, all of which contribute to resilience’ and empowerment (Nolas 2009: 174). Participatory photography as a subsection to image creation is a particularly important practice for social justice as it creates space for marginalised voices, empowering with connection and education on a personal and community-level. As race, age, class all intersect with gender, different bodies have different histories and contexts, it is crucial that they need to represent their own experiences. I highlight here that it is important to note that subjectivity comes not from exclusion but in relationship through difference; as acknowledging difference retrieves ‘multiple potential sides for solidarity, making binary opposition of self and other less likely’ (ibid.: 185). Two particularly important projects that touched me in their power was Ingrid Guyon’s project with Colombian women from the diaspora that were victims of violence, and the ‘save us from saviours’ project which brought a community of sex-workers together to deflect the moralising interventions of developers (Ingrid Guyon 2018, Cornwall 2016). Silenced voices were brought to the forefront to expose injustices and bust stereotypes. Both projects show the process of marginalised communities reclaiming their bodies/rights, resisting oppression and building resilience.

6 ‘One-tone/size-fits-all’

![Image of clothing]

Source: © The Author.

I will now use my project to reflect on wider issues around the need to deconstruct privilege, whiteness and representation in development. I had the idea for this project when wandering around town and saw that all the clothes that I was looking at described the colour ‘nude’ to be a light paleish pink when in fact by its very name ‘nude’ is supposed to represent ‘skin colour’. The aim of this project is to represent mainstream societies views as engraining ideal feminine appearance norms as whiteness/Western. As a person who identifies as being white, it acts as an example that only just noticing this link highlights my privilege.
Characteristic of privilege is that the group defines the societal norm which often benefits those in the group, they rely on their privilege and avoid objecting to oppression and also are usually blind to it (Wilderman and Davies 1996). There is thus an obvious need to acknowledge the different sources and relations of power and privilege that are at play that have served to increase my advantage over others (Mohanty 1988). In order to be a better development practitioner, it is important to deconstruct whiteness and also to decolonise my approaches, histories and realities to prevent further exacerbation of asymmetrical power relations. One way is to practice active listening, allowing others to speak and share their experiences. This allows for the role of ‘expert’ to be shifted more into one of ‘facilitator’ in order to prevent, as much as possible, my ‘power over’. The act of deconstruction helps to look for assumptions behind opinions and listen to the diversity that is present (Brydon-Miller 2004). ‘The-one-tone-fits-all’ project also alludes further to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ development projects which like this example shows, covers up differences, context and intersectionalities, and end up stereotyping and doing further harm by following the Western master-script. As a development practitioner and scholar, it is important to look at how the interplays of different aspects of identities across the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality and age interact with each other and ethics of representation when speaking about other’s experiences (Crenshaw 1997). I will implement these processes of interrogating power-relations, deconstructing privilege and looking at identities as intersectional when conducting qualitative interviews for my dissertation with female beneficiaries of a CCT in Colombia this summer to make sure those voices taking part in the research are represented in the most ‘genuine manner’ possible (Spivak 1988: 271).

7 Conclusion

Reflecting on feminine norms has allowed me to reconceptualise how power works through the interrogation of the processes of norm creation and enforcement that ‘helps’ us see, experience and reproduce ourselves according to dominant hierarchies. It allowed me to re-establish a connection between my psyche and body by providing a process of reflection which has aided the deconstruction of self and other. Image creation at the community-level has also been shown to be a powerful tool for reflection and creative advocacy by exploring conflicting realities inhabited by different actors. Importantly, participatory photography as a medium for reflective practice and development as a whole align over issues I have explored such as ethics, inclusions/exclusions, gender, empowerment and representation. My reflective practice journey is one that has not concluded now that this essay has finished. I have started the reflective process which I will carry-on in my personal and professional life, as it has been instrumental in teaching me theoretically and practically how to be more self-aware, challenge assumptions and established patterns of behaviour in order to develop new ways of knowing, connecting and understanding to bring about social change.

References


Using London as a Case Study to Examine the Positive and Negative Aspects of Urban Gentrification

Tracy Taylor-Beck

An Englishman’s home is his castle.
(William Pitt the Elder, 1763)

1 Introduction

Gentrification is complex. Its origins were straightforward enough; it was a term coined in the 1960s by sociologist Anna Glass to describe the middle classes ‘invading’ long-standing working-class areas of London (Glass 1963). The language was strong enough then, but it has since become a loaded term and shorthand for urban society’s ills and successes. It is used to describe urbanism, enrage class divisions, highlight political indifference, and transformed to represent the march of globalisation and the inexorable effects of capitalism.

In this paper, I will examine these different versions of ‘urban gentrification’ by looking at the term’s origins, how it has changed and in turn changed London. I will explore whether it reflects a drive for economic prosperity and freedom, or the displacement of those without a voice. I will also consider how societal changes and government policy has allowed and supported these changes and show how debates about gentrification cannot be separated from the wider political economy of the UK. I will finally look at what policies around taxation and rent could be used to mitigate negative impacts.

2 A brief history of housing and gentrification in London

Post-war London was battered, and Britain had a severe housing shortage. A new Labour government ushered in the ‘Welfare State’ and a new philosophy on housing introduced by Aneurin Bevan, Health Minister. The ‘New Towns Act’ of 1946 created new suburbs around London and in 1949, Bevan introduced the ‘Housing Act’ which ‘removed the restriction of public housing to the “working classes” so that council housing was available to all’ (Winckler 2012). These new towns and new railways moved the middle classes out of the city (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd and Macfarlane 2017). This left a run-down inner London to the working classes and commonwealth migrants who arrived to take up jobs and help rebuild the capital (Hamnett 2003).

In the 1960s, the rise of the post-war baby boomers saw the start of a shift in British society from an industrial economy towards a service economy. This facilitated a move from a large working class to a growing population of educated middle classes. Couples were getting married later than previous generations and London, in particular, offered a chance at a career.

These changes saw a move back to the city begin. The first wave of gentrifiers were known as the ‘pioneers’, people from marginal groups with a low income, such as artists and gays who ‘took a risk on areas’ (Hamnett 2003: 165). The second wave were more affluent. They ‘tended to be highly educated, highly skilled, and highly paid professional and managerial households, either childless or with young families’ (ibid.). It was this second wave of gentrifiers that Glass talks about as an emerging ‘urban gentry’ paralleling the rural gentry of Jane Austen (Hamnett 2003; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). Glass describes the middle classes moving into ‘shabby’ cottages and making them ‘elegant’ and explains that
gentrification continues 'until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed' (Glass 1963: xviii).

In the 1970s this process was given a boost by the deregulation and liberalisation of credit markets. Buying a home in Britain had long been held as aspirational, so when access to credit became easier, it led to a property boom (Ryan-Collins et al. 2017). At the same time there began a decline in building of public housing as there was a belief that supply was sufficient (ibid.) and due to recession and economic decline, there was pressure on government to cut building programmes.

In 1979, the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, actively encouraged a 'property owning democracy' (ibid.: 88). Their ‘Right-to-Buy’ (RTB) scheme in 1980 allowed council tenants to purchase their homes, and by 1987 a million homes had been bought under the scheme. This, and the removal of rent regulation and consequently the introduction of assured shorthold tenancies (ibid.) led to the revival of the private rented sector and the commodification of housing. Homes had become an investment, as the rate of return on property was greater than return from the economy and employment (Minton 2017). This shift in policy led to what urbanist Richard Florida called a ‘neo-colonist land grab’ (Florida 2017: 63).

It was this land grab that shifted gentrification from describing house by house purchases to whole sale regeneration of areas by property developers. This and the consequences of these changes have split commentators.

3  Positives of gentrification

The first wave of ‘pioneers’ were marginal groups finding security in new communities, for example, artists, gays, lesbians and single parents (Butler 1997; Lees et al. 2008). By creating networks across similarities – i.e. the ‘gay scene’ – early gentrifiers created security for themselves that they may not have found in smaller towns and villages, which provided them with a better quality of life (Butler 1997). This group of gentrifiers mixed well with working class and ethnic communities and ‘took a risk in an area by investing their own “sweat equity” in it’ (ibid.: 2). They improved the housing stock through the renovation and preservation of old buildings, increased property values and began the process of urban regeneration by making places ‘cool’.¹

On the back of this initial investment, came the second wave of gentrification, the ‘creative classes’ (Florida 2017) who moved into areas that were perceived as interesting and a good investment. These groups are good for the local economy. They pay taxes, introduce new shops, coffee bars and cafes which help to regenerate neighbourhoods in decline. Infrastructure is improved, services and public spaces are invested in, and crime is reduced. Crucially, jobs are created which helps grow the economy. Today, ‘London’s creative class totals 1.7 million workers, comprising 41.6 per cent of its workforce’ (Florida 2013). This clustering of people is a driver of innovation: ‘in the 24 months to March 2014, 32,000 businesses were created in one modish postcode, EC1V’ (Hawkes 2018). In another example, famously gentrified Shoreditch in North London is now the world’s most expensive tech district (Morris-Jones 2017).

London ‘generates 22 per cent of UK GDP [gross domestic product] despite accounting for only 12.5 per cent of the UK population’ (Hawkes 2018). It is this kind of urban growth and tax benefits that attracted the third wave of gentrifiers; the global elites and billionaires (Minton 2017) who buy London prime real estate. In 2015, Savills Estate Agents reported that London housing stock is worth as much as Brazil's annual GDP (Hawkes 2018).

A further example of the success of this urban renewal is Canary Wharf; ‘Canary Wharf Group is one of the largest regeneration projects in Europe, attracting global firms. With 120,000 jobs, Canary Wharf claims to be the biggest single centre of employment in the UK’ (Martinson 2018). This third wave of gentrification has completed London’s journey from bombed out city to global force.

However, despite the remarkable economic development that gentrification has helped to drive in London, each wave has seen the benefits concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of people, and the displacement of original communities.

4  Negatives of gentrification

_The London property market is fine if you are a property tycoon._
(Boris Johnson, Home Secretary; Minton 2017: 259)

The first wave of pioneers valued mixing with existing communities (Lees et al. 2008) and their investment brought economic improvement to the area. However, as the second wave of creative middle classes moved in, they reclaimed the inner city as their own, and created a new ‘culturally sophisticated, urban class fraction’ (ibid.: 210). This meant that small local businesses with low prices for the working classes were eventually pushed out by higher rents. These rents are then paid by new artisan food and coffee shops who charge higher prices than the locals can afford. This negative impact of gentrification is ‘the spatial manifestation of these new cultural values’ (ibid.: 210) that displaces existing communities. By the time the third wave move in, prices increased further, the creatives were pushed out and only large multinational chains could afford the rents. The high street became sanitised and communities lost their unique character. For example, Canary Wharf now hosts London’s fourth largest shopping mall ‘fully occupied with high fashion brands and convenience retail’ (Allen 2013).

5  Affordable housing

Without doubt the biggest criticisms of gentrification concern the impact it has had on affordable housing which has in turn led to displacement of communities. It is the lack of affordable (social) housing in the capital that has resulted in competition for space and homes which has driven up the price of rents; the income of working classes and lower and middle-income families can’t keep up.

Successive governments have not addressed the issue of lack of housing stock that was caused by the effects of the RTB scheme, and as such it has depleted significantly. Instead of funding housing, budgets have focused on housing benefit. Government now spends ‘£21 billion a year on housing benefit which goes to private landlords’ (Jones 2011: 207). In 1970, 42 per cent of people lived in social housing, now, it is 8 per cent. In London ‘more than 36 per cent of formerly publicly owned units are now rented out privately; in some areas this figure is more than 50 per cent’ (Madden and Marcuse 2016: 41) which means there has been a shift of tenants into the private rental sector, yet still funded by housing benefit.

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Figure 5.1 Average London rents

![Graph showing average London rents](image)

Source: Trust for London (2018), reproduced with permission.

Figure 5.1 shows this increase in rents to be much higher in the private market in London than elsewhere, and more than twice the average for England (Trust for London 2018). This has a huge impact on people’s livelihoods as today, more than 50 per cent of people in London are private renters who spend 40 per cent of their income on rent (Colson 2017). In one example, ‘a tenant told reporters she is charged £800 per month by a private landlord, while her council rent for the same unit would have been £360 per month – with the public making up the shortfall’ (Madden and Marcuse 2016: 42).

Throughout wave two and then three of gentrification, the increase in house prices has benefitted a few long-standing owner residents. For example, in recent years they have increased by 46 per cent in Shoreditch (Brooker 2015). However, it is the renters that suffer and are priced out of the market. Because of the high rent, it is difficult for people on lower incomes to get a job that can keep up, which can create dependency on welfare-funded housing.

6 Displacement

In addition to the lack of building, successive government policy has not maintained focus on existing social housing, which has meant that council tower blocks and estates have fallen into decay and are described by councils as ‘sink estates’.

At the same time, gentrification creates desirable places that appeal to developers who want to maximise profit from this housing boom. Where this occurs, local authorities are given an excuse to regenerate these estates by demolishing them and selling the land to private developers. Since 1997, 135,658 council tenants and leaseholders in London have been displaced through this process, and 54,623 units have been either demolished or slated for development (Lees 2018). This process is described by critics as ‘social cleansing’ (Lees et al. 2008).

It is social cleansing and resulting ‘redevelopment’ that made space for the third wave of gentrifiers. Anna Minton argues it is a wholesale take-over of areas by state led, privately-funded corporations – pushing out not only the poor but middle and upper classes to make room for the global rentiers as described by Piketty (Minton 2017).
An example of this is the Heygate Estate in Elephant and Castle. A deprived area, a ‘muggers paradise’ (Minton 2017: 53) built in 1974 and demolished between 2011 and 2014 to make way for the new development ‘Elephant Park’. As a result of this regeneration, 3,000 residents were displaced (Figure 6.1). Only 74 flats were available in Elephant Park at social housing rates with a further 500 available to rent at an ‘affordable market rate’, i.e. rented out at up to 80 per cent of London’s superheated market rate (Wainwright 2015). To buy would cost £569,000 for a studio, or £801,000 for a two-bed flat (ibid), clearly unaffordable for an average wage in Southwark (£30,881) (Adzuna 2018). Instead, they were bought by the third wave of super-rich gentrifiers who invest in property in London; in the end every flat in this development was sold to a foreign investor (White 2017).

Figure 6.1 Heygate tenant displacement

This displacement had a huge negative on effect on the original Heygate residents and destroyed long-standing communities. It meant splitting up families, friends and support networks and a loss of jobs as people were unable to afford to commute back into London.

7 Discussion: How has this happened?

Nowadays there really is no primary poverty left in this country... There may be poverty because they don’t know how to budget, don’t know how to spend their earnings, but now you are left with a really hard fundamental character-personality defect.
(Margaret Thatcher; Jones 2011: 64)

The majority of British people would balk against the loss of Bevan’s NHS (Evans and Wellings 2017), but the loss of social housing gets much less attention. Why? One possible reason that social housing does not get the attention and funding it needs is that it is seen as something that only the most desperate want. Council housing has become stigmatised as being there only for the very poor.

At the heart of the challenges of gentrification in the UK is the issue of class. The principal class divide used to be between working class and middle and upper but has now become between those with jobs and those without. Over the last 40 years this divide has grown. It was started by Thatcher’s government who believed in market-driven development and celebrated these neoliberal beliefs as the ideal. As a result, poverty and even the working classes were demonised; ‘those who were poor or unemployed had no one to blame but themselves’ (Jones 2011: 71).

This view was expressed again in 2013 by Cameron and Osbourne, who used ‘shirkers’ to describe those on benefits to justify welfare cuts. It has been reinforced through the media...
via countless headlines and more recently through ‘poverty porn’ documentaries, such as ‘How to Get a Council House’ and ‘Benefits Britain’ (Jensen 2014). The working class or those on benefits are seen as feckless, lazy and ‘scroungers’ from the state. This in turn influenced the view of social housing. It was the BBC that labelled the Heygate Estate a ‘muggers paradise’, but in fact it had no reality in actual crime figures (Minton 2017).

Gentrification has increasingly been blamed for the growing class divide, but it is in fact just a symptom of a deliberate set of policies designed to cast poverty as a personal choice rather than a public issue, and thus allow governments and councils to ignore social housing. The crime is lack of affordable housing supported by a narrative of these people as worthless – not communities and individuals adapting to and fighting cultural and economic changes.

8 Solutions?

The last time we had a housing crisis in Britain the answer was building more homes. This would still be the answer now, however, the shift in culture and politics to a neoliberal belief in the market has left no role for social housing. Since the economic crash in 2008, successive governments’ austerity policies have made the problem worse. Whilst many economists have argued they are damaging for the economy as a whole (Eaton 2018), social housing faces particular problems as it must involve public spending which is the antithesis of the austerity project. Any building is likely to be left to the private sector, who don’t have financial incentives to build affordable homes as it is more profitable to maintain the status quo. Government also has a vested interest in maintaining this status quo. Across the UK there are many voting home owners and any changes which would affect those who have invested in property for stability or a pension (Ryan-Collins et al. 2017) may well cause an outcry. Currently, any drop in house prices are seen by the mainstream media as a bad thing (Prynn 2018).

However, the balance of home owners and renters is tipping. A third of millennials are likely to be renters for their whole lives as they can’t afford to get on the property ladder (Ahmed 2018), moreover the children of baby boomers, the generation-Xer’s in their forties are now ‘more than twice as likely to be renting than they were ten years ago’ (Peachey 2018). This suggests a shift in the priorities of the electorate, which could mean a shift in the political landscape.

The mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, has promised a more democratic approach to council redevelopment in London, stating that any new regeneration of social housing will be voted on by tenants to give them a voice (Mayor of London Office 2018), and the percentage of genuinely affordable homes in any new builds will be increased.

In addition, recently both the main political parties have recognised housing as a problem. Jeremy Corbyn has promised to tackle gentrification and Theresa May admits there is a ‘housing crisis’. Yet, however positive these comments are, at the heart of the matter their different political ideologies mean they propose different solutions to the crisis. For example, the Conservatives have cut Stamp Duty (Pickard and Williams 2017) whereas Labour want to redefine what ‘affordable’ means (Brady 2018).

Ultimately it is a shift in policy that places people at the centre that needs to happen in order to recognise that housing is a basic human right, and not just an investment commodity (Florida and Schneider 2018).

9 Conclusion

Gentrification is very complex. It was around long before Anna Glass gave it a name. It describes the very nature of cities as ‘perpetual works in progress. As they grow and change, their demography and class structures shift’ (Florida 2017: 67). Gentrification in itself not a bad thing, it can improve conditions, create jobs and grow the economy.
However, if uncontrolled, it will inevitably lead to the kind of displacement we have seen in London. The neoliberal ideal that the free market will solve all is proved wrong. The negative effects visible in London are the result of a clear set of policy decisions that are based on notions of the undeserving poor. Gentrification thus becomes a moral as well as an economic or political process – the displacement occurs because those people deserve to be displaced.

Sensible changes to policy with people and their right to a home at the centre of the philosophy can ensure that this no longer happens – even if there seems to be precious little political will for that currently.

References


