



Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2016/17

July 2018

Cover photographs IDS students and graduates

Photographers Gary Edwards/Robin Coleman/Institute of Development Studies

Citation: IDS (ed.) (2018) *Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2016/17*, Brighton: IDS

Published: July 2018

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ISBN: 978-1-78118-454-7



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IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England
Charity Registration Number 306371
Charitable Company Number 877338

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Notes on Contributors

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Abbreviations

ATI	Asociación de Trabajo Interdisciplinario [Colombia]
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CEP	critical enquiry into practice
CFPR-TUP	Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra-Poor
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
CLM	Chemen Lavi Miyò programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	disaster risk reduction
ENSO	El Niño-Southern Oscillation
EQF	European Qualification Framework
ETF	European Training Foundation
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GBV	gender-based violence
GCSE	General Certificate of Secondary Education [UK]
GDP	gross domestic product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIC	high income country
ICT	information and communication technology
IDS	Institute of Development Studies [UK]
IMAGES	International Men and Gender Equality Survey
IoS	Internet of Services
IoT	Internet of Things
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	least-developed countries
LGBT	lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
LIC	low income country
M2M	machine-to-machine communication
MA	master’s degree
MIC	middle income country
MSc	Master of Science degree
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC	One Man Can campaign [South Africa]
PAR	Pressure and Release model
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SP	social protection
TNMS	the new men’s studies
TSP	transformative social protection
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UID	Unique ID programme [India]
UIDAI	Chief Executive of the UID Authority [India]
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
US	United States
WEF	World Economic Forum

Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2016/17

It gives me great pleasure to present this first edition of published term papers authored by IDS graduates (2016/17) from across our suite of master's degrees. At IDS, our vision is of equal and sustainable societies, locally and globally, where everyone can live secure, fulfilling lives free from poverty and injustice. Cutting-edge research, knowledge, and evidence is critical to realising this vision and shaping, informing, and navigating change. These papers make an essential contribution to this body of knowledge and current development debates.

Each year, in September, IDS welcomes a new cohort of development scholars and practitioners who come to read and study for a master's degree. They bring their experience and enthusiasm, their commitment to international development, and their ideas. We expect a lot from these scholars and practitioners during their time at IDS. We expect them to demonstrate, in their thinking and in their assignments, considerations of how to make a difference in the world. We ask them to help us extend our commitment to engaged excellence, to go beyond academic knowledge for its own sake and to use knowledge to help reduce inequalities, accelerate sustainability, and build more inclusive and secure societies.

As illustrated in this issue, each year, our expectations are met and surpassed with papers which show creative reasoning and learning, and which in turn inform and shape our thinking at IDS, providing new perspectives, ideas, and applications. In the course of a year, over 1,200 pieces of work are written and marked at IDS, much of it of fantastic quality. Obviously we cannot publish all of it, yet in producing this edition, we celebrate both these specific papers and the buzz generated by shared intellectual endeavours and from both individual and collective desires to bring about positive change.

This issue makes an important contribution to major development challenges and deserves to be read. Some of the papers contribute to the theme of reducing inequalities. Lucy Heyderman (MA Gender and Development) has investigated the degree to which gender-based violence initiatives, designed to prevent or respond to gender-based violence, might instead maintain or challenge gender inequalities. Rhea John (MA Development Studies) uses a power analysis to understand India's initiative to capture citizens' demographic and biometric information in a Unique Identification Project. Finally, in this reducing inequalities theme, Liam Kennedy (MA Poverty and Development) examines graduation from social protection programmes in Haiti.

Two papers address the accelerating sustainability theme, yet they explore very different visions of sustainability, both of which are necessary for making a difference and bringing about positive change. Samuel Leistner (MA Globalisation, Business and Development) examines recent technological innovations in relation to developing countries' manufacturing competitiveness and asks about the implications for industrial policy, whereas Alexander Vougioukas (MSc Climate Change, Development and Policy) explores the relationship between climate change and disaster risk.

Most papers emphasise opportunities for building more inclusive and secure societies. Both C. Neu (MA Participation, Power and Social Change) and Aisha Modibo (MA Poverty and Development) focus on relationships, with Aisha examining the conceptualisation of citizen-state engagement and C. Neu emphasising collaborative relationships. Luke Stannard (MA Development Studies) and Elena Wason (MA Governance, Development and Public Policy) focus on unruly politics in the UK, Luke in relation to education and Elena in relation to populism.

Collectively, an incredible amount of learning went into the 2016/17 academic year, all of it collaborative, most of it now embedded in individuals, networks, and relationships. This issue captures a small proportion of our learning yet celebrates everyone's contributions and looks forward to seeing IDS graduates making their mark on the world.

How Do Initiatives Designed to Prevent or Respond to Gender-Based Violence Challenge and/or Maintain Gender Inequalities?

Lucy Heyderman

1 Introduction

When considering gender and development, gender-based violence (GBV) has been considered a key issue for development initiatives. Within this discourse, the word 'gender' has had a tendency to imply women (Chant and Gutmann 2002: 271). However, in the 1980s 'the new men's studies' (TNMS) emerged, which emphasised the male component of gender drawing upon the issues of masculinity, sexuality and power (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985; Brod 1987; Connell 1987; Kimmel 1987). These explored the construction of manhood by considering how and why men act in certain ways. At first, feminist reviews expressed fears that TNMS would distract funding and resources from feminist research within gender studies (Griffin 1989: 104). The irony being that male issues would come to dominate an area of study, which had previously sought to liberate women. Some tensions still remain concerning the allocation of funds in gender and development projects that focus on men (Pease 2008: 8). Thus, it is necessary to ask: 'what do men have to do with the empowerment of women?' (Cornwall, Edström and Greig 2011: 16).

In light of this question, I will be exploring how men and masculinities has become a useful tool for understanding and bettering gender relations in development. To do so, I will explore how the Sonke Gender Justice Network's 'One Man Can' (OMC) programme in South Africa, has incorporated a masculinities approach into its anti-GBV project. The analysis will be split into three sections. The first section will begin with a brief introduction into masculinities, development, and the OMC initiative. The second section will demonstrate how the OMC has applied masculinities theories to challenge some of the gender inequalities that underpin GBV. The last section will consider some of the ways that the OMC initiative has failed to challenge gender inequalities. Using the OMC campaign as an example, I will support recent work conducted by Jewkes, Flood and Lang (2015: 1580), which argues that engaging men and boys is essential to development projects dealing with GBV.

2 Masculinities, development and South Africa

Foremost, it is important to understand how the study of 'men and masculinities' has been adopted into development projects that deal with gender issues. In terms of GBV, many initiatives work within a framework that positions women as victims, engaging men and boys to prevent violence against women. This can be within a school setting (Achyut 2011), in the community (Das *et al.* 2012), or even within institutions (Greig and Edström 2012). There is considerable evidence that this kind of approach works effectively, especially against male-on-female sexual violence (see Barker, Ricardo and Nascimento 2007; Ricardo, Eads and Barker 2011). However, some studies have emphasised the need to look beyond the 'men as perpetrators' or 'men as allies of women' discourse in order to understand the social, political and economic issues that underpin gender inequalities (Jewkes *et al.* 2015). For instance, recent development work encompasses men as victims of GBV (see Lewis 2009; Lwambo 2011) and there is growing interest into how LGBT issues relate to masculinities (Edström 2011: 79). Given the vast range of issues concerning men and boys, it is necessary

to pinpoint where a project lies within the masculinities and development discourse. How has it engaged with broader, theoretical understandings of men and boys?

The initiative that will be analysed in this paper is One Man Can (OMC) campaign in South Africa. Central to the philosophy of OMC is its focus on transforming gender roles and relations through interventions on masculinities (Dworkin 2015: 121). South Africa has some of the highest levels of domestic and sexual violence against women in the world (Dunkle *et al.* 2006: 231; Jewkes *et al.* 2009: 3). This makes South Africa a key place of focus for gender and development initiatives concerned with the prevention of violence against women. It should also be noted that the OMC campaign largely targets poor black South African men and much of the research considered in this essay focuses on rural Limpopo, Kwazulu Natal and the Eastern Cape (Dworkin *et al.* 2012; Dworkin 2015; Barker *et al.* 2011). Therefore, when I talk about men, I must make it clear that I am referring to this demographic. The following section will analyse OMC's engagement of these men and how a focus on masculinities can challenge gender inequalities?

3 How OMC has challenged to gender inequalities

I will begin by building a theoretical understanding of the relationship between gender, power and violence. As will be shown, these lie at the core of many studies concerning masculinities, especially those concerning the term 'hegemonic masculinity'. Since the 1980s, scholars have used it to refer to the constructed ideal of what it means to be a man (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 838). This identity reflects the dominant (most powerful) masculinity in a given culture. Significantly, as an 'ideal', it may be an abstract identity. Therefore, constructions of hegemonic masculinity may form unrealistic definitions of manliness. Moreover, it may be inferred that many men would aspire to act like it. In their significant work, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) have provided key insights into the various meanings behind the term, asserting that multiple hegemonic masculinities exist across cultures and societies. The heterogeneous nature of this identity makes it context specific. Therefore, understanding this social construction enables development projects to explain why men behave a certain way in different societies.


Following this, it is necessary to note how hegemonic masculinity relates to violence. During the 1990s, the term was used in research and policies, which looked into how and why military men and schoolboys acted in aggressive ways (see Barrett 1996; Denborough 1996). Other studies also drew a clear line between hegemonic masculinities and forceful behaviour in sports (see Trujillo 1991: 292; Burgess, Edwards and Skinner 2003). In these highly masculinised environments, it would appear that dominant masculinities display aggressive behaviour. Interestingly, these acts of violence may be towards other men rather than women. Are these acts representative of hegemonic masculinities? Or do they reflect male attempts to achieve it? Montanya has posited that men display violence as a part of a 'power-over-others model' in order to perform their male identity (cited in Greig and Edström 2012). If this is true in a society (if masculinity is determined by power and violence) issues such as GBV and gender inequality will become norms. This negative depiction of masculinity closely relates power, violence and gender.

However, there has been a backlash by masculinities scholars against the assumptions this creates. Hong has argued that in the United States, violent masculinities have become dominant through socialisation (Hong 2000: 296). This suggests that violence has become an expectation of men and boys. When the male gender role is ascribed certain characteristics, men will perform them, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. These ideas about performance and gender roles have been explored at length in gender studies (see Butler 1988, 1990). Although, there is no room for further discussion here, it is important to recognise how expectations of gender roles produce behaviour. If the ideal of masculinity is constructed as aggressive, then men and boys may act up to it. Understanding this reveals why some hegemonic masculinities produce violent male behaviour. Therefore, Connell and

Messerschmidt argue that hegemonic masculinities must be reconstructed to achieve gender equality (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 853). Hegemonic masculinities do not have to cause violence. However, the relationship between power and violence must be severed if GBV is to be challenged.

Before taking a closer look at OMC’s campaign, it is necessary to briefly expand upon the idea of ‘troubled masculinities’ or ‘men in crisis’ (Chant and Gutmann 2002: 271). Indeed, not all violent behaviour can simply be understood in terms of hegemonic masculinities. Important insights into the root causes of violence can be found in Moser and Mcllwaine’s study of rural Colombian communities (Moser and Mcllwaine 2000). She has used local understandings of violence to create a useful diagram to demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of violence in a rural Colombian community (*ibid.*: 30):

Figure 3.1 Causal impact diagram of interrelationships among intra-family violence, violence between neighbours, and violence over land in Colombia Chiquita, Aguazul, prepared by a mixed group of nine adults



Source: Moser and Mcllwaine (2000: 30) ‘Urban Poor Perceptions of Violence and Exclusion in Colombia’. © World Bank. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO, <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/>

Moser and Mcllwaine’s work is not alone. In other settings, scholars have shown that violent masculinities emerge out of crises of disempowerment (see Silberschmidt 2005). These works emphasise a need to create more in depth discussions of the roots of GBV from the standpoint of men and boys.

Having provided some insight into the theories surrounding the relationship between violence and men and masculinities, I will now reflect on its relevance to the South African context. How is masculinity perceived in South Africa? Research has revealed that it is a strongly patriarchal society. Indeed, an IMAGES survey found that 85% of men believed being a man meant being ‘tough’ (Barker *et al.* 2011: 66). Additionally, 60% believed the man should hold the decision making power in the household and around 50% believed women deserved to be beaten at times (*ibid.*). Consequently, South Africa scored lowest out of any country on the IMAGES Gender Equitable Scale (*ibid.*). These figures reflect a society in which women are the subordinate group – they are the victims. As has been said, the OMC project is built upon this assumption. Evidently, power, gender and violence are key issues in this setting.

Given this, I will explore how OMC’s campaign attempts to tackle these by engaging men and boys to counter gender inequalities and GBV. Its core strategy is to deconstruct ideas about the prevailing hegemonic masculinity. The purpose of this is to create a more equal,

progressive set of gender norms. OMC does so through a series of workshops. These cover the topics of 'gender and power, critical reflections on the norms and practices associated with hegemonic masculinity, gender and violence, gender and HIV/AIDS, healthy relationships, and taking action for social change' (Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 186). It is clear that the running theme in these workshops is the relationship between gender, violence and power. Considerable advances have been made through these workshops in terms of readjusting male views of women. Indeed, men interviewed after the workshops noted that they had gained an awareness of woman's rights (*ibid.*). One man recognised that his 'childhood observations of man as boss were wrong' and 'then realized that it is wrong to treat women like they do not exist' (Lim quoted in Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 189). In connection to Hong's argument, Lim's words suggest a socialisation of gender inequalities. The 'boss' mentality reflects a hegemonic masculinity that is built upon the subordination of others. Thus, OMC's campaign is key in challenging male attitudes towards women and other men so that more equal relationships can be formed.

Workshops have also engaged with masculinities scholarship to demonstrate that certain masculine behaviours have a cost (see Courtenay 2000 cited in Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 186). This reflects an earlier study carried out by Messner (1992), which revealed the emotional and physical harm that hegemonic masculine behaviour inflicts on one's own health. In the context of South Africa, the link between HIV and violence has been considered key issues (Dunkle *et al.* 2006; Jewkes *et al.* 2009, 2011). Moreover, Rachel Jewkes and Robert Morell have argued that the prevailing hegemonic masculinity in South Africa has made women more vulnerable to violence and HIV risk – especially when they submit to it (Jewkes and Morell 2010: 7). This is a manifestation of male power and control in heterosexual performance (Jewkes *et al.* 2011: 2). Consequently, young women (between the ages of 15-24) are around four times more likely to be infected with HIV than men (Muula 2008: 423). This is clearly a concern of gender inequity as well as health.

However, by exposing the potential harm men can do to themselves by acting in certain ways, it may become possible to shift concepts of masculinity. For instance, one participant disclosed that OMC's workshops had shown him the risks of HIV and had begun wearing a condom (much to his girlfriend's relief) (Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 192). Others noted how they had changed their perceptions of manhood and no longer equated sexual promiscuity or aggression with manliness or power (*ibid.*). By challenging gender norms in this way, OMC participants have detached violent behaviour from the hegemonic masculinity. This has undermined the relationship between violence, gender and power, producing a safer environment for men and women, as well as more equal gender relations.

The OMC's campaign has also paid attention to why harmful behaviours arise in an attempt to challenge the cause of gender inequalities. Its work has addressed masculinities as a product of history, as well as structural and social issues. Indeed, studies have linked the prevalence of GBV to South Africa's troubled history: from struggles against colonialism to continued racial discrimination (Bennett 2010; Kraak and Simpson 1998; Mills and Ssewakaringa 2005). Building on this, in Morrell and Morrell's study of masculinities, they argued that the majority of the violence committed by men is a symptom of men feeling powerless (Morrell and Morrell 2011: 123). Taking these on board, OMC has attempted to locate its campaign within a discourse of social justice (Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 186). This recognition of the discrimination against poor black men in history opens up a discussion of racial inequality. It makes the programme more sensitive to the ways in which men have felt powerless. By doing so, it may be easier to challenge other forms of inequality – such as gender inequality. Importantly, this history unites men and women. By uncovering these roots of social discontent, it becomes possible to tackle gender inequalities.

The issue of male powerlessness has also been tackled in other ways. Research has shown how violent behaviour can be linked to 'rigid gender attitudes', alcoholism and witnessing or

experiencing violence in childhood (Peacock and Barker 2014: 579). The foremost of these has already been discussed in OMC's work on hegemonic masculinities. The latter two are problems that impact men and boys directly, producing unhealthy environments in which violence may occur.

Challenging alcoholism has been a key focus of OMC's programme. This harmful behaviour is associated with poverty and unemployment amongst men (Boonzaier and Rey 2003: 1022). In South Africa, it has also been linked to male violence against women (*ibid.*). One of OMC's participants disclosed 'I was...violent in my drunken states and would sometimes physically assault my girlfriend' (Dworkin 2015: 145). Thus, alcohol can be seen as a catalyst for GBV in situations of male disempowerment. Therefore, bringing down rates of alcoholism can be seen to reduce GBV. Remarkably, in a community involved with OMC, a third of men had reduced their alcohol intake (*ibid.*). Several men have described how drinking less has changed their relationships with their girlfriends and others (*ibid.*: 145–55). Reducing alcoholism is beneficial to the man himself as well as those around him. This refers back to Moser and McIlwaine's diagram. If projects are able to tackle the roots of causes of why men behave violently, then a more sustainable change will be made.

Lastly, reducing violence in the home has also had success. An evaluation of masculinity in South Africa found that men who had experienced childhood violence displayed less emotional responsiveness when committing violence themselves (Jewkes *et al.* 2015). This implies that violence creates violence as it becomes normalised in society. To tackle this, the OMC project has built a strategy focusing on the social constructions of fatherhood that use authoritarian discipline (Van den Berg *et al.* 2013). For example, one participant stopped being 'a very strict man and a disciplinarian...[in] rough in a way' (54-year-old, five children quoted in Van den Berg *et al.* 2013). Instead, he praised 'those young men at Sonke' who 'taught...different ways of disciplining children' (*ibid.*). The authoritarian father can be seen as a symbol of power within the home. A person to be both admired and feared. By providing an alternative to this masculine identity, households will no longer reproduce gender inequalities. This approach has a double-pronged affect. It tackles both violent actions in the present, and the self-perpetuating system of violence.

At the core of all these approaches is the reconstruction of masculinities. Drawing upon understandings of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, OMC has managed to challenge some of the causal factors of GBV and gender inequality in South African communities.

4 How OMC maintains gender inequalities

In this last section, I will assess how the OMC campaign has maintained an essentialist notion of men and women. To explore this, I will pinpoint two key issues in relation to the broader masculinities scholarship. Firstly, I will look at the projects treatment of men as perpetrators and women as victims. Then I will consider the lack of attention OMC has given to violence directed towards LGBT people. By doing so, this section will question whether OMC, as a GBV-prevention project, has maintained problematic binaries that perpetuate gender inequalities.

It has already been noted that the OMC's campaign focuses on men as the perpetrators of violence. In terms of general development projects, this discourse has been noted as a superficial model for understanding violence (Moser and Clark 2001: 4). Crucially, it feeds essentialisations of gender, which in turn perpetuates a gender binary that reduces men and women to universalistic stereotypes (*ibid.*). The concern with this is that it is assumed that violence is inherent in masculine identities. This stereotype stems from a broader tendency to create negative depictions of men and masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 840). Stereotyping either gender undermines understandings of gender relations. In terms of violence, it might obscure the true causes of GBV; it ignores the fact that men can be victims

too and it might be the cause of male hostility towards gender equality campaigns. Furthermore, engaging men and boys in development projects has often meant seeing men as either perpetrators or allies (Jewkes *et al.* 2015: 1583). However, a combination of these factors may marginalise male issues. If these go unaddressed, then gender inequalities will be maintained.

Given the criticisms of categorising 'men as perpetrators' or 'allies of women', I will consider how these relate to OMC's work. I will be asking if treating men as perpetrators should be considered a key issue. In an interview, one OMC participant said that 'the one thing men ask most is why OMC is focused on men only', whilst others felt like 'culprits' and 'perpetrators' (quoted in Dworkin 2015: 153). These defensive and hostile reactions suggest that some men felt OMC was all blaming men for GBV. This implies that essentialistic, negative ideas have been constructed of South African men in workshops. Although this is not the message OMC was trying to deliver, it provokes some concern about the effectiveness of its communication with participants. Furthermore, South Africa has a high prevalence of male-on-male violence (Peacock *et al.* 2006: 25). Therefore, a man might be a victim not a perpetrator, or even both. By maintaining the trope of 'men as perpetrators' some individuals may feel marginalised by the project.

However, it should be noted that this was not the general feeling amongst men interviewed (Dworkin *et al.* 2012: 191). Given the context, it might be argued that the 'men as perpetrators' is a necessary assumption to make. Moreover, OMC does not only treat men as perpetrators or allies of women. It looks beyond this to causal factors behind male violence – the societal and cultural norms that perpetuate it. Therefore, it is important to note is that the decision to engage with men and boys has some disadvantages. Peacock and Barker have warned that campaigns like OMC should not impose their programme on men, but look to work with men, women and the community (Peacock and Barker 2014: 593). Unfortunately, there is a lack of research on how men interacted with wives, girlfriends and the community after the programme (Dworkin 2015: 157). With more insight into this, it will be possible to see whether OMC's messages about harmful masculine behaviour have been communicated effectively to challenge GBV and inequalities.

The second key issue is the silence surrounding violence against homosexuality. It should be noted that other LGBT people have also been excluded. In fact, there has been a tendency in gender and development to exclude sexual violence against LGBT people and sex workers from GBV debates (Edström 2011: 79). Having said this, homosexuality is the only LGBT issue discussed by OMC workers. Therefore, I will be focusing on the relationship between homosexuality and masculinity. During the 1970s, Morin and Garfinkle identified homophobia as a part of mainstream masculine culture (Morin and Garfinkle 1978: 39–40). At this time, the separation of men and 'gays' was even reflected in sociological understandings of masculinity – homosexuality was considered an inferior form of masculinity (see Tolson 1977). This perception meant that gay men were ignored or excluded from academic conceptions of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan *et al.* 1985: 577). The subordination of homosexuality in masculinities studies and in real life is one of the issues that TNMS attempted to challenge (*ibid.*). The fact that LGBT people are still ignored in development conversations today reflects a gap in addressing gender issues.

Given that South Africa was the first country in the world to introduce LGBT rights into its constitution, it may be assumed that there would be a more open discourse concerning GBV targeted at LGBT communities. Yet, it is clear that this was not reflected in OMC's campaign (see Sonke). Indeed, Sonke staff report high levels of homophobia amongst men who engaged with the project (Viitanen and Colvin 2015). Accordingly, 'staff and support group leaders often reported being able to do little in terms of challenging these norms' (*ibid.*). Clearly, this is an area where gender inequalities are still being maintained. It may be a difficult area to traverse. Indeed, it would appear that the legal rights of homosexuals and

their cultural acceptance stand far apart. Problematically, OMC's reconstruction of the masculine identity excludes homosexual males. It also excludes transgender men or any other identity that does not fit the hetero-normative male model. This perpetuates certain assumptions about masculinity that may lead to marginalisation or even violence. In this way, the OMC campaign sustains problematic gender norms and relations.

5 Conclusion

Overall, the OMC's campaign provides a convincing example of how anti-GBV campaigns that engage men and boys can challenge gender inequalities. By highlighting harmful behaviour and reconstructing concepts of masculinities men and boys have been able to challenge their own ideas about power, gender and violence. Rather than using violence as a means for power, more equitable gender relationships have been formed. Moreover, OMC has proved effective in tackling some of the problems facing men such as HIV and alcoholism. These successes show that although OMC has used broader ideas about masculinities to inform the campaign, it is still context specific. Yet, this focus on men has caused some concerns. In particular, the rhetoric that places 'men as perpetrators' remains a key issue. Additionally, more needs to be done to move gender and development projects beyond hetero-normative assumptions. This is needed to create an inclusive framework that addresses the needs of all citizens. With this in mind, the OMC's project illustrates that men are key actors in the empowerment of women. By understanding how and why men behave in certain ways, gender and development projects move closer to gender equality and ending GBV.

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A Power Analysis of the Unique Identification Project in India

Rhea John

1 Introduction

The Unique ID programme or UID, initiated by the Government of India in 2007, is an attempt to create a complete database of all residents of India based on their demographic and biometric information, and to provide a unique identifying number to each of them. The vision of the first Chief Executive of the UID Authority (UIDAI), Nandan Nilekani, was of a single unified ID and database that, when integrated with government functions, would circumvent corruption in the welfare delivery process, enable financial inclusion, have a 'dramatic, cleansing effect on land productivity, equity and litigation' through transparent land records, and create a new 'governance model' based on more equitable access to information, among other benefits (Nilekani 2009). Each of these acts suggests a transformation in relations between the state and its citizens, in particular the marginalised, and denotes a shift in, and an act of, power.

This vision of the UID's role assumed that greater visibility of the citizen to the state would translate into greater transparency of state to citizen. Yet this overlooks the nature of the UID as an 'invited space': it invalidates the agency exercised to gain the right to visibility, and transforms the achievement into a benevolent but opaque gesture. This paper therefore seeks to highlight the processes and relations of power implicit in the design of the UID, and argues that this shift from claimed to invited space is a co-optation of 'empowerment' by governmentality.

In order to recognise the forms of power at work, this paper uses the 'power cube' framework and Foucault's concepts of 'biopower' and 'governmentality' to analyse the kind of power exerted by and through the UID (Foucault 1997; Gaventa 2006). These approaches focus on the relational and contextual nature of power, and help to uncover the mechanisms through which such power is exercised. From a Foucauldian perspective, the UID as a mechanism of power constructs a relationship between governor and governed based on the custody of knowledge, both specifically about the individual as well as about the 'population' as a whole. At the same time, it also limits the ambit of government to (the bodies of) 'citizens', enacting disciplinary power through its definition of who is a citizen. The UIDAI itself however disclaims responsibility for deciding or enacting these definitions, and restricts its role to verifying the identity of residents, downplaying its own power even as it claims centrality in state functioning in a technologised future (Sharma 2010).

2 Identification

Both the need and the authority to verify that 'X is X', or that a resident is in fact who he/she claims to be, are exercises of national sovereignty. James Scott has argued that the act of enumerating citizens is part of the strategy of 'simplification' used by the state to increase the 'legibility' of its citizenry (Scott 1998). Increasing legibility creates a 'metric' that helps to order information about the population, discover gaps, and create the illusion of omniscience necessary for interventions (*ibid.*) In the process, the role of the state as provider, regulator and final court of appeal is established, through an act of invisible power.

In the case of the UID, it is argued that definitive identification helps in easier planning and implementation of welfare delivery, in particular by enabling financial inclusion and direct cash transfers into bank accounts. The benefits of this change are that from the state's perspective, this would remove 'phantoms' or false claimants to welfare in the system and

reduce the potential for inclusion errors; from the citizens' side, it would reduce the time and cost of accessing entitlements, and the indignity of suspicion and denial based on 'subjective' judgements. Within this framework, it is notable that the exclusion of those not currently able to claim welfare is not a priority. The major process innovation in the identification process is rather making available the collected identities in a centralised format, verifiable through 'objective' technological processes. This could be seen as de-duplication across multiple existing forms of documentation, rather than as adding a new and more inclusive avenue to acquiring legal status. This fails to broaden, and might even narrow, the path to accessing legal rights and entitlements for the marginalised.

The claim of the UID to be 'objective' because it is impersonal, is in itself a claim to power. Such power invalidates 'politics' as negotiation and creates for itself a hidden power, that of exercising subjective judgement without appearing to do so. Biometric technology and its claim to treating all people the same, unlike demographic data that can be used to 'discriminate' between populations, are essential to this claim. This pits technology against the previous dominant avatar of the state, the 'subjective' and thus corrupt bureaucratic machinery. The use of multiple indicators, including fingerprints, iris scans and basic demographic information, increases the authority of the verification (while increasing the margin of error in enrolment) (Ramanathan 2013).

What strengthens this claim to objectivity is the apparent 'purposelessness' of the information collected. The UID, unlike other forms of identification such as the ration card, passport, driving licence or voter card, does not identify a population for a specific purpose. Therefore it does not have a motivation for misrecognition built into it, or might provide multiple conflicting motivations, given its multiple uses. This is fundamental in turn to the notion of 'interoperability'—between government departments, but also between state and other economic actors—that the UID database will enable.

At a deeper level, 'purposelessness' links up to Webster's argument that the concept of 'information' in theories about the information society is seen as absolutely powerful because its worth is no longer related to its 'semantic content' (Webster 1995: 27). Thus, Nilekani is able to assume that generating data that allows 'identification' will create free and transparent flows of information about identity (or about all the policy-relevant parts of this complex characteristic), and that this information will soon flow *in both directions*, promote transparency and accountability, and simplify acts of negotiation by levelling the 'information asymmetry'. Yet the fact of a database existing does none of these things, in particular given concerns about privacy of data collected. The equitable sharing of information—and the equitable privacy of parts of it—remains off the agenda, and thus part of the 'hidden power' exerted in convening this 'invited space'.

3 Functionality

What then is the positive value, or 'semantic content', of the information collected for the UID? Ramachandran argues that the purpose of enumeration is the 'governmentality of unease' (Ramachandran 2015: 116). One of the methods used to achieve this, in her account, is by distinguishing residents of India (who are all entitled to a UID) from citizens. The question remains as to whose unease is being controlled—that of the government with an illegible population, of better-off populations concerned about their security, or of the unregistered poor concerned about the rejection of their identities. While in reality, as with the situation of Bangladeshi migrants, the meaning of citizenship involves a complex negotiation between documentary status and 'belonging' to the mythical 'unified national identity' (*ibid.*: 116), the UID's objectives elide the identification of residents with the recognition of citizens, evading the question altogether. When asked directly, Nilekani asserted that the question of which residents were citizens is not within the UID's mandate (cited in Sarkar 2014: 517). It becomes questionable whether it can then solve the bottlenecks of entitlements delivery. More significantly, the UID then becomes a necessary,

but not sufficient condition for proving identity. The claim of jettisoning uncertainty and inconsistency is undermined. Ramachandran also argues that this new mode of asserting the power to identify is an attempt to recoup on the Indian state's past failures to securely identify its citizens—as evidenced in the plethora of 'fake IDs' existing in the country (Ramachandran 2015). Control over the database of the 'Aadhaar' (meaning 'basis', in Hindi) of all identity then represents a reassertion of sovereignty by the state, which is perhaps the relatively abstract semantic content of the UID.

The sovereign right to identify is asserted by the right to exclude. This represents another act of governmentality, that of according legitimacy to its citizens and their citizenship. It is an act of bureaucracy, which is to be counterbalanced by the according of legitimacy by citizens to the state through democratic process. The UID critiques past forms of identification on the basis that they require non-universal and exclusionary criteria for identification, such as a residential address, birth registration or certification by officials, which exclude extremely marginalised populations, such as the homeless or those living in remote rural areas (remote to centres of government). While it technically excludes no resident of India, the UID establishes nothing on its own—and in order to make someone eligible for any right or entitlement, must so far take recourse to the previous methods of identification—for instance to establish Below Poverty Line Status for food subsidies. Furthermore, in practice even biometric data is not as 'inclusive' as it claims—for instance, it can be very difficult to obtain usable fingerprints from those who perform hard manual labour (Ramanathan 2013) and it is obviously difficult to use it as a verification mechanism in places where there is unstable access to the necessary technological infrastructure.

The focus on inclusion errors and identity verification expressed in the sovereign right of identification are also not without their purpose. This relates to the distribution of welfare provisioning, and the shift in focus converts what is a hard-won 'claimed space'—of public provisioning of food, employment, education, subsidised agricultural inputs, and so on—into an 'invited space' where the 'legitimate' and 'deserving' are granted access. To enact this, the UID, like the 'poverty line', appropriates to a technical realm the onus to decide whether a person is poor or a citizen, even in the absence of social-cultural context, history and self-identification. For instance, while the UID originally allowed 'introducers', or others from the community, to establish the claims of a particular applicant, the uptake and perhaps relevance of this measure for inclusion appears poor—perhaps those who have others to speak for them have routes to other existing forms of identification (Khera 2015). Foucault's notion of biopower offers one explanation for this indifference towards the exclusion of individuals. Biopower assumes that the body is a transparent, measurable truth to the statistician, and that the truth of the individual—in this case, whether he/she is included in the 'universal' database—is off-point. To the database, the 'statistical significance', rather than the demographic characteristics of the excluded population are relevant measures of the success of the enumeration strategy.

4 Incorporation

The third task of the UID, in addition to identification and according entitlements, is 'incorporation', or the integration of enumerated individuals into a population or a citizenry. Foucault argues that the vision of biopower—of a mass of bodies or population as a statistic—has the ultimate objective of ensuring 'a sort of homeostasis' (Foucault 1997: 246), as the 'body is replaced by general biological processes', the average of which is sought to be maintained by the state (*ibid.*: 249). In this situation, the transition from disciplinary to biopower is seen by different observers to mark different regimes of governance. Some suggest that the attempt to exhaustively record residents is a drive, renewed by technological innovation, to achieve the bureaucratic 'fantasy of panopticism' (Breckenridge quoted in Sarkar 2014: 518). Others suggest that bringing residents into the information network forcibly incorporates them in the (financialised) market economy—and that big data itself is a highly valuable commodity (Shukla 2010). A more positive explanation is that the UID

identifies bodies so as not to restrict them to the static correlates of their identity, and enable free movement within the country, which would for instance unprecedentedly include nomadic and pastoralist populations (suggested in Ramachandran 2015). Each of these represents the collection of information as a purposeful unification of the body politic, economic or geographic by bureaucratic means, and thus a corresponding loss (as well as a historical failure) of the democratic means and potential to achieve the same.

The UID also suggests a picture of a particular 'bureaucratic' way of knowing: decoupling positionality from circumstance as elements of identity. Normalising this way of seeing institutionalises the exclusion of 'practical knowledge' (Scott 1998), and replaces other governmental ways of knowing—the elite/colonial deposition before a magistrate, for instance, or the ration card certified by the village. It individualises and depersonalises the recognition of the citizen by the state, and weakens the capacity for direct contact and collective action vis-à-vis the state, which is often driven by solidarities of social identity rather than shared individual self-interest.

The Unique ID project has now enrolled over a billion Indian residents, as of April 2016. In itself, this is a mammoth achievement of technology and organisation. Yet, as the above analysis has established, the project is implicated in complex configurations of power, in proportion to its scale of success. Visible power is enacted to demand that all residents of India make themselves visible to the state, for their own good. Hidden power is used to ensure that the uses to which this visibility can be put are restricted to the rules established by the government for its invited spaces of public provisioning and administration. Simultaneously, invisible power is at work, structuring state-citizen relations and embedding in social and political consciousness a particular role for the state. The result of the operation of these forms of power is the capture of achievements and spaces that were claimed by democratic participation, by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. All these will come into play, arguably, on the day that the government considers its database to be 'complete' and sufficient for its purposes. The Indian government has, for instance, a troubled history of setting 'cut-off dates' for legitimate citizenship, for instance with the 1983 Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act in Assam (Kashyap 2016). While the situations are not analogous, they share a sense that lines can be drawn around people as around territory at a particular point in time, and the population determined as a finite entity. This marks off the future from an India of the past wherein distress migrants from surrounding countries were made welcome and settled by the government, particularly after 1971. Through this, not only the power of India, but the status of India as a 'power' in geopolitical terms will be signalled.

In conclusion, the paper tries to draw out the ways in which the UID as a method for bringing the marginalised closer to the state itself becomes tangled in the politics it seeks to evade. Its design, relying heavily on technical solutions and abbreviated ideas of the process of empowerment, vests power with technocratic authorities at the cost of the democratic processes through which the demand for inclusion was felt.

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Graduation as Transformation? A Case Study of Fonkoze's CLM Programme in Haiti

Liam Kennedy

1 Introduction

The world is not on track to achieve the first Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating extreme poverty by 2030 (ODI 2015). Despite recent progress, with some estimating the number of people in extreme poverty to be falling by as much as 130,000 a day (Roser 2016), millions will still live below the US\$1.90 a day threshold in over a decade's time.

Graduation programmes have emerged as a means of improving the standard of living of this demographic who typically lie beyond the reach of traditional social protection (SP) measures. With a holistic package of support that has been proven to increase income and wellbeing for the ultra-poor (Banerjee *et al.* 2015), these programmes may chime well with the transformative social protection (TSP) agenda. The ethos of which is to 'integrate individuals equally into society, allow everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth and enable excluded or marginalised groups to claim their rights' (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 70).

Influenced by the extended livelihoods approach, this essay will examine the potential for transformation 'across scales, from the micro to the macro, and across analytical frames, from the detailed and empirical to the conceptual and theorised' (Scoones 2015: 155). This approach permits an assessment of the transformative impact of graduation programmes across distinct actors and power relations whilst highlighting the importance of the connections and feedbacks between structural features and the lived realities of the poor.

In the following, I will first outline the conceptual underpinnings of the TSP framework and relate its advent to both previous thinking around social protection and wider bodies of literature on inclusive citizenship and empowerment. Thereafter, graduation and the politics of such programmes are introduced before analysing evidence across a range of countries at both the micro and macro level. Haiti and the Chemin Lavi Mayò programme are then explored in greater detail. The subsequent discussion calls for more expansive evaluation methodologies that match the scope of the transformative agenda before concluding.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Why micro and macro?

Above all, it is important to begin with a justification for using the extended livelihoods¹ framework. The distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies to social injustice long pre-dated the emergence of the transformative social protection framework. Whilst the former 'aimed at correcting outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them [inequitable outcomes]... [the latter] aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework' (Fraser 1997: 23). Scoones (2015: 79) highlights this 'underlying framework' as a crucial component of any analysis; 'livelihoods are not isolated and independent but tied to what is happening elsewhere, both locally and more broadly.'

¹ See Chambers and Conway (1992) for a fuller explanation of earlier livelihoods thinking.

If TSP aims to genuinely 'integrate individuals equally into society, allow everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth and enable excluded or marginalised groups to claim their rights' (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 70), then an analysis of the local is clearly insufficient. Analyses have 'to be complemented with an understanding of the wider, structural and relational dynamics that shape localities and livelihoods' (Scoones 2015: 115). These realities inform both the structure and the conceptual underpinnings of this paper.

2.2 From protection to transformation

Over the past few decades, there has been an ever-increasing interest in SP² as a means of reducing poverty and promoting development (Barrientos and Hulme 2008; ILO 2014). Combined with a slowly emerging consensus regarding the limits of trickle-down economics (Jolly 1991), the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s reinforced the need for social safety nets and solidified SP 'as an important component in policies to manage risks and shocks' (Gentilini and Omamo 2011: 330).

As development thinking evolved throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 'the broader potential of social protection began to be recognised, [with] bigger claims... being made for what social protection can and should strive to achieve' (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 64). The TSP agenda was an attempt to move beyond narrower and more residual conceptions of social protection as safety nets and social transfers to 'empower the poor and transform the conditions in which they struggle to construct viable livelihoods' (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 81).


The concept of transformation goes beyond the protective, preventive and promotive measures found in conventional social protection frameworks (see Figure 2.1). Embedded into this framework is a broader conceptualisation of vulnerability and poverty that incorporates structural inequalities and concerns for social justice. Carroll (2011: 90) neatly pens the ethos of TSP as aiming 'not only to transfer resources but... to transfer power.'

However, the overly-ambitious scope of the framework has invited some critiques. 'The breadth of transformative social protection, which covers everything from crisis-induced relief to political action, seems to address almost all aspects of the development agenda' (Aoo *et al.* 2007: 30). Although not necessarily a condemnation *per se*, it is true that TSP requires a multitude of inputs to enact change. For example, prerequisites for sustainable and realisable transformation include: processes of collaborative governance and decision-making (Chopra and te Lintel 2011); the presence of empowered users and 'catalytic social movements' (Tessitore 2011) and political buy-in (Hickey 2009, 2011).

Consequently, there is a sizeable overlap between TSP and wider bodies of literature on inclusive citizenship and empowerment. As Kabeer (2005: 22–23) argues 'it is the collective struggles of excluded groups which have historically driven processes of social transformation... [yet] the conundrum, of course, is how such collective action for inclusion or transformation can be organised by those whose exclusion is premised precisely on their lack of organisational power.' Reviewing the huge literature on power is beyond this scope of this essay but there are a few pioneering contributions that are related to Carroll's (2011) earlier assertion. Arendt (1970: 44) posited that 'power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together' whilst Giddens (1984: 14) wrote that 'an agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a difference", that is, to exercise some sort of power'.

² See Conway, De Haan, and Norton (2000) for a full explanation of the various social protection definitions and concepts.

Figure 2.1 A Conceptual Framework for Social Protection



Source: Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007: 26). © Institute of Development Studies, reproduced with permission.

Given the *raison d'être* of the TSP agenda, these conceptualisations of power are extremely relevant. Giddens' (1984) nod to gendered differences is also important given that many graduation programmes have predominantly female beneficiaries. As such, these programmes often imbue attempts at female empowerment with the literature highlighting the overwhelming need for recognition, reduction and redistribution of unpaid care work (Elson 2010) to alleviate time stress/poverty (Antonopoulus and Hirway 2010).

At a global level, the UN (2016) have reported four systemic constraints to female empowerment – adverse social norms, discriminatory laws and lack of legal protection, unpaid care work and lack of access to assets – although the experience of these constraints is multifarious and specific to individuals in certain contexts. Kabeer's (1999) framework for assessing empowerment across the immediate, intermediate and deeper levels of marginalisation is exemplar of the kind of approach needed when assessing transformation. One final work of relevance here is that of Buvinic and Furst-Nichols (2014: 70), whose systematic review found that 'very poor women need a more intensive package of services than do less poor women (and poor men) to break out of subsistence production.'

2.3 The emergence of graduation

Graduation programmes stemmed from this realisation that many SP instruments were neither accessible nor suitably designed for the ultra-poor (see Halder and Mosley 2004; Barrientos and Hulme 2008). For example, evidence from Bangladesh consistently found that the ultra-poor were excluded from microfinance initiatives (Rahman and Razzaque 2000) which echoed earlier calls for more multifaceted approaches to reaching the most deprived. Thus, the graduation model was born in the shape of BRAC's 'Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra-Poor' (CFPR-TUP) programme. For which, 'the theory of change starts from the recognition that a single intervention such as a cash transfer is unlikely to achieve a transformative impact on poor people's livelihoods, but a holistic package of support has the potential to construct a pathway out of poverty towards sustainable self-reliance' (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2015: 2). Graduation programmes are, thus, a holistic package of support that often includes cash and/or asset transfers, some form of income-generation training and access to credit and/or health services for a finite period (see Hashemi and Umaira 2011).

Whilst there is growing evidence of the success of these programmes (see Banerjee *et al.* 2015), rigorous debate remains. Important distinctions need to be made between threshold and sustainable graduation where the former arises when beneficiaries reach a certain benchmark, be it demographic, socioeconomic or time spent within the programme, with the latter incorporating notions of resilience, implying that ‘graduates should not fall back into poverty soon after they exit’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2015: 3).

More theoretical critiques have labelled graduation ‘a neoliberal vision of social policy’ which reflects deeply embedded prejudices about welfare revision (Kidd 2013). Others have questioned the potential for transformation with a focus on ‘technofixes’ (Reddy 2013) that operate in isolation of their macro-context. Empirical constraints have been highlighted by Roelen (2015) who argues that there is still much unknown about the impacts of graduation on children and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Referring to development programmes more widely, Copestake (2008: 548) claimed that ‘analysing programmes solely with respect to material wellbeing, while important can be misleading because it fails to capture their full meaning to intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders [as] any social assistance programme is embedded in a web of social relationships that is moulded in turn by strong beliefs and values’.

2.4 The politics of graduation

There are bigger questions involving the implementation of graduation programmes. Recent findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium Panel (cited by Lind 2017) have shown little evidence of a relationship between access to basic services, such as health and education, and perceptions of local or national government. Whether services were provided by state or non-state actors also did not affect perceptions. However, if services were inadequate, this led to a deterioration in the perception of government. These findings have clear implications for attempts at TSP and are further complicated in contexts with numerous international actors (see Hart 2001).

Additionally, targeting issues centred around the logistics and choice of targeting means, the often-costly repercussions to do so and associated philosophical underpinnings have important repercussions. The problem of social policy analysis excluding the broader political economy has been highlighted by Mkandawire (2005: 16) who rightly warns of wider implications beyond those targeted: ‘social policies not only define the boundaries of social communities and the position of individuals in the social order of things, but also affect people’s access to material well-being and social status.’ Roelen, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2016: 235) take these sentiments a step further by proposing that ‘a more radical question worth exploring is whether, and to what extent, social protection programmes primarily serve a political function to placate the poor and their demands for justice, rather than being a genuinely effective mechanism for redistribution’ which somewhat echoes Sen’s (1995: 14) famous argument that ‘benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being poor benefits.’

It is therefore crucial to factor in the political drivers of SP schemes, and in this specific case graduation, to assess their true potential for transformation. As Hickey (2009: 481) has consistently shown, ‘if reaching the poorest in a sustained way requires a re-drawing of the social contract between states and citizens in developing countries, this task is seriously complicated by the influential role that international development agencies play in many such contexts’. These agencies have famously been depicted as the anti-politics machine detached from the subjectivities, identities and positionalities of different actors. In *The Anti-Politics Machine*, Ferguson noted that empowerment was the answer to the many deprivations suffered across the globe. Yet heeded, however, that calls of ‘“what is to be done?” demand first of all an answer to the question, “by whom?”’ (Ferguson 1990: 280).

2.5 Transformation – micro... detail and empirical

If a graduation programme's success rests on its ability to improve outcomes for beneficiaries then there is widespread evidence of this. Banerjee *et al.* (2015) have shown statistically significant gains across a variety of indicators for six countries that have adopted the graduation model. Meanwhile, the number of Bangladeshi graduates now exceeds half a million with numerous evaluations showing positive results, including diversified income sources, reduced casual labour and increased consumption (Bandiera *et al.* 2013; Ahmed *et al.* 2009). Perhaps most importantly, studies have shown that the 'difference in per-capita income between the programme participants and comparison groups... increased[d] at an accelerating pace' over time (Raza, Das and Misha 2012: 265) with the insinuation that beneficiaries have effectively used their training and assets to continue an upwards trajectory and sustainably graduate.

Often the benefits of graduation spill beyond the realm of the economic. Evidence from Rwanda has shown increased confidence amongst female beneficiaries who attribute their success 'to their acquisition of voice and agency... [and] point out that barriers to leaping above the poverty line are not only economic, but rather that social challenges often prevent them from maintaining a livelihood' (McIlvaine *et al.* 2015: 91). . These findings are seconded by Sabates and Abbott (2013) who found significant increases in social inclusion gauged by cooperative membership and attendance at church. Further evidence from fieldwork across Kenya, Ghana and Lesotho suggests that graduation 'increased social capital and allowed beneficiaries to re-engage with existing social networks and/or to strengthen informal social protection systems and risk-sharing arrangements' (Daidone *et al.* 2015: 96).

However, there is also evidence of negative impacts at both the intra-community and intra-household level. For example, Concern (2015) found incidents of heightened tension between those households included and those excluded from their programme in Burundi. Whilst targeting techniques in Rwanda have led to the corroding of social relations: 'before people used to support mutually in solidarity; it was solidarity in farming or building households; now [new] categories do not at all refer to this solidarity; it is individual work in loneliness' (citizen of Rwezamenyo sector, cited in Sentama 2014: 36; see also Gahamanyi and Kettlewell 2015).

Finally, Sengupta (2012: 38) has highlighted, with reference to Ethiopia, the need for 'a more nuanced understanding of each participant household's pre-existing resources and constraints [to] potentially minimise any incongruity between programme inputs and household needs.' Roelen (2015: 31) proposes integrating childcare solutions into graduation programmes as a solution to 'having to juggle engagement in programme and non-programme related productive activities and domestic and care work'.

3 Transformation – macro... conceptual and theorised

Information on the wider impacts of graduation programmes is a lot less frequent in the literature. There are, however, some highly relevant findings from Bangladesh. Hossain (2005: 971) has shown that when the power of local elites is dependent 'not on inherited status or massive wealth but on demonstrating the intention and ability to help', then the provision of SP to the ultra-poor may be in the interests of these groups. She goes on to argue that for said elites 'the most dependent poor are a weak but symbolically powerful constituency, whose interests to some degree coincide with their own' (*ibid.*: 971).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, high-level political support from the governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda is touted as a positive influence on graduation programmes located in these countries. Yet, and as Devereux and Ulrichs (2015: 151) have shown 'with political support also comes political pressure to demonstrate success'. Unfortunately, said pressure is cited as creating perverse incentives that favour 'rapid' or 'premature' graduation which,

consequently, allows these governments to be seen as implementing a robust and successful poverty eradication strategy.

4 Haiti

Despite significant reductions in monetary and multidimensional poverty, Haiti remains one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. With a HDI value of 0.493, the country ranks 163rd worldwide with a GDP per capita – which stood at US\$1,658 (2011 PPP) – significantly lower than the average for countries in the region (UNDP 2016).

The majority of the population who live in rural areas (UN 2016), where extreme poverty is almost five times as prevalent as metropolitan Haiti (World Bank 2014), are further disadvantaged by the scant provision of public services (*ibid.*). Access to drinking water and ‘the presence of pregnant and/or lactating women in the household... [as well as] the presence of a woman as a head of the household’ (World Bank 2016: 14) are all important factors of vulnerability and deprivation. Taken together, the above has resulted in a deeply stratified society (Moncrieffe 2007: 81).

Large numbers of international donors and NGOs operate in present day Haiti as a consequence of the country’s protracted history of colonial rule and imposed structural adjustment policies (Schuller 1997), which has been further aggravated by frequent environmental and economic shocks. Relatedly, the popular and residual image is one of an absent or predatory state (see Dash 2016). Despite this, and as the country continues to undergo processes of state-building after recent elections, there are SP schemes emerging (see Lamaute-Brisson 2013) which may help to rebalance the overwhelming burden of public service provision away from private hands (Zanotti 2010).


Fonkoze is the largest microfinance institution in the country with its recent Chemen Lavi Miyò (CLM) programme, modelled on BRAC’s CFPR-TUP programme, aspiring to reach the most deprived female beneficiaries living in rural areas. There are five core elements to the programme: (i) targeting the poorest women in certain communities (ii) cash transfer to support basic needs, food security and health care for a six-month period (iii) a formal savings programme (iv) skills training and (v) transfer of two productive assets to ‘kickstart’ sustainable economic activity (Pain, Vautravers and Descieux 2015). Importantly, ‘individuals graduate into microfinance, which provides ongoing support, rather than out of a social protection programme’ (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 87), as depicted by Fonkoze’s programme chart below (see Figure 4.1).

It is important to note that case managers continually visit CLM beneficiaries to monitor their progress throughout the year and a half graduation programme with Fonkoze ‘attempt[ing] to create horizontal social capital... through weekly group meetings’ with local beneficiaries and leaders (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 101). Of note, this first step on the ‘staircase out of poverty’ is more costly than other Fonkoze programmes (Werlin 2016: 37) and ‘by far the most expensive out of all the ultra-poor graduation models’ (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 106).

As with many of the programmes outlined above, the success of the CLM programme has been noted by a number of evaluations with ‘an analysis of poverty scores show[ing] that every single CLM member improved their score over’ the 18-month period (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 90), 97 per cent of families graduated from the programme of which three quarters moved into the Ti Kredi programme³ (Huda and Simanowitz 2010).

³ Ti Kredi is the microfinance programme into which CLM beneficiaries can opt to graduate into.

Figure 4.1 Fonkoze's 'Staircase Out of Poverty'



Source: © Fonkoze, reproduced with kind permission.

However, there are important distinctions to be made. Evaluations have found that 'members are not all progressing at the same speed' (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 104). Pain *et al.* (2015) find mixed results after following up with CLM graduates three years after their cycle had ended - roughly 30 per cent had continued an upward trajectory, almost 40 per cent stagnated or registered a slight decline and the final 30 per cent recorded significant declines. It has been posited that beneficiaries suffer as they transition into Ti Kredi which has noticeably less case manager support (Huda and Simanowitz 2010) raising important questions about paternalistic practices and the agency of CLM beneficiaries.

Finally, whilst there is plenty of anecdotal evidence implying increased social cohesion and solidarity in programme areas (see Section 4 of Huda and Simanowitz 2010), with powerful examples also found in Werlin (2016), there is a greater need for more robust evaluation of these dynamics across binaries such as beneficiary/non-beneficiary and targeted/non-targeted community.

As iterated earlier, there can be no transformation without affecting the 'underlying generative framework' (Fraser 1997: 23), in other words without addressing the causes of inequality. Despite a long history of structural problems, recent developments in Haiti may lead to such changes. Firstly, a recently elected government 'with a new and urgent opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to the social contract. Secondly, a national disillusion, and anger, with external interference that creates an element of commonality between citizen and state' (IDS 2015: 28).

As such, advocacy work for the CLM programme is emerging and recent progress has been made in engaging with the variety of institutions that provide forms of SP in Haiti. This is further complicated by a long history of limited state capacity with the first National Social Protection Strategy only due to be published later this year (Simanowitz 2017). However, some authors have noted that Fonkoze is one of few institutions with such an expansive geographical reach in Haiti (Tucker and Will 2005; Zanotti 2010) which presents a unique opportunity to push for TSP.

5 Discussion

By definition, transformative social protection aspires to achieve more than the traditional provision, protection and promotion frameworks. As such, the success of graduation programmes in alleviating chronic poverty as outlined above, whilst commendable, and indicative of hugely promotive schemes, is not enough for transformation. This is even more pertinent given the huge costs of providing such holistic packages to the ultra-poor.

As much of the literature has shown, transformation is about affecting the ‘underlying generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23) to ‘integrate individuals equally into society’ (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008: 70). Essentially, TSP sets the bar high. Whilst there is evidence of sustained graduation across many of the countries and programmes mentioned in this paper, the findings from Haiti drive home the need for nuanced approaches to analyses of graduation programmes. Sen (2017: 362) has argued that a variety of attributes ‘can make two different people have quite divergent substantive opportunities even when they have the same commodity bundle’. If these pathways to graduation remain unexplored or unexplained, the accusation of the anti-politics machine reincarnate (Hickey 2009) will linger.

There remain further tensions at the micro-level relating back to the debate surrounding targeting and universalism outlined by Mkandawire (2005). When reviewing the evidence detailed above, it seems that there is often an inherent contradiction between graduation as a tool for reaching the ultra-poor and transformation that requires ‘collective action of marginalised groups’. This contradiction is that often the tools for targeting the ultra-poor are either unclear (as in the case of Rwanda), distinguish between those who perceive themselves to be of equal socioeconomic status (as in the case of Burundi) or incited jealousy (as in the case of Haiti – see Werlin 2016: 65–68). All of which are ill-conducive to the types of social capital formulation that the literature deems necessary for transformation.

It is therefore pertinent to ask, similarly to that posed by Ferguson (1990: 229), transformation for who and transformation by whom? If Carroll (2011) has proposed a framing of social transfers as a transfer of power, then the findings presented above present a complicated picture. Whilst there seems to be elite support for the ultra-poor in Bangladesh, there appears to be little agency for the ultra-poor in and of themselves. Their ability to ‘make a difference’ (Giddens 1964) is clearly constrained and if we think back to the question posed by Roelen *et al.* (2016) then the answer, at least in this instance, does not bode well for graduation as transformation.

There are further problems for transformation across the macro scale of analysis. Key stakeholder perceptions of graduation in Ethiopia and Rwanda have been shown to promote the political over the empirical (Devereux and Ulrichs 2015). When this prioritisation does occur, it can be detrimental to the ability of beneficiaries to graduate as those who benefit from the ‘underlying generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23) can continue to exert their power over others (Arendt 1970) and reinforce the status quo. The case of Haiti does however offer some promise in this regard. As the country continues along a path of state-building, Fonkoze and the CLM programme have an opportunity to engage with and formulate a framework that can offer transformation.

Finally, when looking across the numerous graduation programmes presented above, it is perhaps premature to conclude that the multiple conditions for transformation have not been met yet. What is above all needed are more ambitious evaluation methodologies that can match the ambition of the TSP agenda. The alternative evaluation framework proposed by Devereux *et al.* (2013: 7) , which incorporates ‘programme policies, social dynamics and feedback loops... [and] acknowledges the importance of politics’, may be an important step in the right direction. Combined with the multi-level approach advocated by Kabeer (1999) in

reference to female empowerment, these knowledge gaps regarding the potential *transformative-ness* of graduation programmes may be closed and more definitive answers be given.

6 Conclusion

The evidence compiled in the above has shown undoubtedly that graduation programmes are consistently improving the lives of the ultra-poor across various settings. Yet, whilst this is indicative of a social protection that is largely promotive, it is not evidence of transformation as outlined by the Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) framework.

The main takeaway from this paper is that evaluations are conducted in a way that rarely enables a distinctive qualification of the *transformative-ness* of a specific programme. This is evident in the relative dearth of evidence available that assesses the ‘macro’ impacts of graduation programmes. The evidence that is available, from Ethiopia, Rwanda and Bangladesh, whilst far from conclusive, hints at social protection agendas that are reminiscent of Ferguson’s (1990) binary of transformation by somebody for somebody else. Which, as we have seen, goes against many of the conceptual underpinnings of power, empowerment and, consequently, transformation.

Whilst the example of Haiti, which is still in the nascent stages of developing an ‘underlying generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23), does offer more hope of promoting and engraining TSP on the national stage, the message remains the same. Without evaluation strategies that can simultaneously look beyond the micro impacts of graduation programmes, be this intra-community negating the dynamic between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, inter-community ignoring wider networks of social capital or more broader patterns of socio-political inequality, then TSP will remain an abstract concept.

Fortunately, there are frameworks, either that proposed by Devereux *et al.* (2013) or Kabeer (1999), that can enable TSP not only to be operationalised more fluidly, but to also be properly evaluated. I believe that is only through these approaches can we fully understand the transformative nature of graduation programmes, and development programmes more widely, which in turn is key if we are to achieve SDG 1 and the targets set beyond that.

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The Implications of Industry 4.0 on the Competitiveness of Developing Countries

Samuel Leistner

1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of recent technological innovations on the competitiveness of developing countries, mainly in the manufacturing sector. The last years are characterised by rapid and disruptive technological innovations in several fields, which together amount to what is being termed as the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution'. Even if these developments are only an acceleration of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) developments that happened in the previous decades, the increasing connection of the physical and digital layers of our world, advanced robotics and automation, artificial intelligence or 3D printing could change the future trajectories of many countries' economies.

Innovation always poses substantial challenges for both developing and developed countries and these new technologies might lead to exactly that kind of creative destruction which Schumpeter described for periods of technological and societal change. This change does not only affect developed countries but could be highly devastating for developing countries which often have their comparative advantages linked with cheap low-skilled labour.

This paper first provides a general framework of technological change. Thereafter it analyses the impact, potential, and the necessary interventions coming with 'Industry 4.0'. This happens by analysing selected Industry 4.0 elements regarding their implications, in particular for developing countries. To assess possible policy approaches to deal with Industry 4.0 the BRICS common strategy and the manufacturing policies of China and India will be analysed. This helps to identify the gaps between existing policies and the interventions required for a technological convergence. The focus is hereby more on emerging rather than least-developed countries (LDCs), because Industry 4.0 is based on digital infrastructure which is much more available in emerging countries than in LDCs. Chapter 2 will introduce the general implications of technological change, chapter 3 and 4 will describe Industry 4.0 and the barriers to a successful technology diffusion of it. Finally, Chapter 5 will look at the implications of skill development in the context of Industry 4.0.

2 Coping with technological change: policy implications?

For many developing countries, which have their comparative advantages based on cheap low-skilled labour, the priority is to adopt and adapt already existing technology to narrow the technological gap to developed countries. Nevertheless, for many developed countries the creation and improvement of technology is important to stay competitive in markets. This follows the assumption that technology and innovation has an endogenous growth potential and that there is technological competition within and between countries with technological advancement driven by research and development or by the continuous improvement of technology while using it, the so called learning by doing effect (Arrow 1971; Romer 1990). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between technological policies which focus on the promotion of vertical integration by promoting incentives that foster innovation, and policies which focus on the acquisition of technology.

2.1 The innovation based approach

Policies which aim to create a national system of innovation have proven themselves as potential drivers of growth. A prominent example is the experience of Japan (Freeman 1989).

The main risk of technological change however is its skill-bias and the implications for global and national inequality (Acemoglu 1998). The comparative advantage which high-skilled workers have declines with the age of the technology and therefore peaks at the implementation and adjustment of new technologies. This implies that policies which focus on increasing the skill level of the workforce potentially increase the speed of technological diffusion (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987).

However, the implications of innovation for low-skilled labour can be devastating without government interventions. Thus, an industrial policy aimed to smooth out the transition from obsolete to innovative technology, needs to address two aspects. First it needs to gradually upgrade the skill set of the workforce to favour the transition towards advanced technology. But at the same time it cannot simply abandon the support of the old industry to avoid that the old industry comes down with a crash (Schumpeter 1994).

2.2 Absorbing innovation: the management of technology diffusion

One measurement of the future significance of a technology is the pace in which it can diffuse through markets and becomes omnipresent. Main constraints of technological diffusion are for developed countries mainly on the demand side. Sectors such as government services, health and education are only slowly increasing their demand for new technologies (Rodrik 2016a).

Many developing and emerging countries mainly rely on technology diffusion. However, the process of transferring technologies depends a lot on the absorptive capacities of the receiving country (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Developing countries face here a lot of problems on the supply side. The main slowdown is the lack of high-skilled workers. The transition from agriculture to manufacturing can easily transform agricultural workers to low-skilled manufacturing workers. However, the current technological changes lead to widespread automation in all sectors. This makes a transition of unskilled workers impossible since there will be a lack of occupations with an adequate skill level. This human capital deficiency threatens to erase the comparative advantage of many developing countries (Rodrik 2016a). A main factor in improving absorptive capacities, dealing with automation and the supply side in general is therefore the upgrading of human capital.

3 What is industry 4.0?

3.1 Emergence and evolution of the term 4.0

The term Industry 4.0 came firstly up at the Hannover Trade Fair in 2011 as the name of a future initiative for the German government. The original concept aimed at the development of intelligent surveillance and decision-making processes to control value chain networks in real time. The way to achieve this is embedded systems. These are products with intelligent sensors which act as observers and actors in their own production process. This concept is also known as the Internet of Things (IoT). Furthermore, Industry 4.0 introduces the notion of an Internet of Services, where new smart products can exchange their services with other products by machine-to-machine communication (M2M) (Kopetz 2011; Kagermann, Lukas and Wahlster 2011). It is important to highlight that the use of the term Industry 4.0 became much broader, from an initial focus on embedded systems to a synonym of a fourth industrial revolution (Schwab 2016).

While the term Industry 4.0 was not common outside the German speaking area in the years after it was established (Lasi *et al.* 2014) this has recently changed. Globally, industry consulting companies started adapting the term to describe global value chain changes. The BRICS Business Council released the whitepaper *Skill Development for Industry 4.0* in 2017 (BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017). This shows the emergence of the term as a framework for developing countries. Moreover, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) addressed the opportunities and challenges of Industry 4.0 for

emerging and developing countries, highlighting the possible impact for developing countries and identified Industry 4.0 as one of the major drivers of a fourth industrial revolution (UNIDO 2016). The unsophisticated-ness of Industry 4.0 and the fact that it is not accompanied by unwanted political connotations seems to recommend it as a framework for countries all over the world. Therefore, this paper will use this framework for analysis.

Table 3.1 Industry 4.0 characteristics and technologies

Company	Key aspects	Key technologies
Price Waterhouse Coopers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Digitisation and integration of vertical and horizontal value chains 2. Digitisation of product and service offerings 3. Digital business models and customer access 	Cloud computing, mobile devices, IoT platforms, location detection technologies, advanced human-machine interfaces, authentication and fraud detection, 3D printing, smart sensors, big data analytics and advanced algorithms, multilevel customer interaction and customer profiling, augmented reality/wearables
Deloitte	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vertical networking 2. Horizontal integration 3. Through-engineering 4. Acceleration through exponential technologies 5. Environment of the IoT: Internet of data, internet of services (IoS), and internet of people 	Exponential technologies such as IoT, artificial intelligence, intelligent robots, autonomous drones, 3D printing, and sensors
McKinsey	Digitisation of the manufacturing sector, with embedded sensors, ubiquitous cyber physical systems, and analysis of all relevant data. Driven by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. data, computational power, and connectivity 2. analytics and intelligence 3. human-machine interaction 4. digital-to-physical conversion (e.g. advanced robotics/3D printing) 	Big data/open data, IoT, cloud technology, digitisation and automation of knowledge work, advanced analytics, touch interfaces and next level GUIs, virtual and augmented reality, 3D printing, advanced robotics, energy storage and harvesting
BRICS Business Council	Seamless connection of the real and virtual world - reduces labour cost advantages of traditional low-cost locations	Automation/robotics, IoT, artificial intelligence, 3D printing

Source: Deloitte 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016; UNIDO 2016; BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017; McKinsey & Company 2015.

3.2 Scope and technologies

A pivotal aggregation of all innovations is the so-called 'smart factory', which can assist both people and machines in their task execution by having the ability of context-awareness (Mitsubishi, Ueda and Kimura 2008). The European Union defines the main features of Industry 4.0 as interoperability, virtualisation, decentralisation, real time capability, service orientation, and modularity (Smit *et al.* 2016). Considering the lack of academic literature on this topic, it is helpful to assess the actual scope of Industry 4.0 by looking at the understanding of the concept by different actors in the industry. Table 3.1 gives a comprehensive overview of the used technologies.

3.3 General implications

The complexity and scale of the technological and societal changes triggered by Industry 4.0 makes quantified forecasting difficult. Existing forecasts usually differ in their scope. General Electric forecasted in 2012 that about 46 per cent of the global economy can profit from an Industrial Internet, a term which has a similar scope as Industry 4.0, which quantifies to US\$ 32.3 trillion (Annunziata and Evans 2012). There are detailed forecasts for the impact of Industry 4.0 by the Boston Consulting Group on Germany with an estimated annual revenue growth of around EUR€ 30 billion (around one percent of the German GDP). In terms of employment, a growth of 6 per cent is predicted for the next ten years. This positive outlook is related to the composition of the German labour force with its large share of high-skilled workers (Rüßmann *et al.* 2015). Accenture estimated the value of an Industrial Internet for several countries until 2030 in terms of cumulative GDP added value. The estimations are up to US\$7,146 billion for the US, US\$531 billion for the UK, US\$700 for Germany, and US\$ 1,824 billion for China (Purdy and Davarzani 2015).

4 The challenges of a global implementation of industry 4.0

4.1 Leapfrogging

Innovation sometimes allows a country to go beyond mere technology diffusion and skip a technological stage, the so called leapfrogging process. An example is moving from no landline telecommunication directly to mobile phones: strategies based on wireless communication technology, which skip the use of expensive network grid infrastructure, can have a strong impact on economic development and could increase the participation of the poor parts of the population in ICT (Alzouma 2005; Fong 2009). However, leapfrogging requires that the technology's maturity has reached a level where not only the technology itself but also the skills to use it are acquirable in the new context (Perez and Soete 1988). Developing countries frequently lack the absorptive capacity which is needed to utilise leapfrogging opportunities. Companies and governments need to be able to spot these opportunities, but too much focus might be risky due to the uncertainty associated with potential leapfrogging processes (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Steinmueller 2001). Furthermore, the digital divide within developing countries could be intensified by leapfrogging without access to it for all parts of the population. UNIDO puts a special emphasis on innovation management standards and general Industry 4.0 standards which would ease technology diffusion (UNIDO 2016).


The World Economic Forum (WEF) sees the leapfrogging potential into Industry 4.0 mainly for developed and emerging rather than for developing economies since leapfrogging needs vast investments in digital infrastructure. The large investments into infrastructure of many emerging countries allow them to add the newest technology in constructions. Developing countries which face a lack of finance will have to rely on retrofitting in the future (World Economic Forum 2015).

4.2 Premature deindustrialisation

A problem regarding the development of a manufacturing sector which can adapt Industry 4.0 technologies is that open economies which are not already at their peak of industrialisation are importing the deindustrialisation of highly industrialised countries due to the fall in global price levels in manufacturing, caused by higher productivities. This premature deindustrialisation further weakens the manufacturing sector, which was one of the main drivers for development in the past, of developing countries (Rodrik 2016b). A possible solution could be to combine cheap acquisition of knowledge with cheap labour and to specialise in things such as cultural production, educational production and computer programming for export-orientated growth. An example is India which also grew strongly due to the export of non-physical goods such as information technology and services (Cowen 2016).


4.3 Limited internet access

Figure 4.1 Internet participation



Source: Author's creation based on data from International Telecommunication Union (2016).

Figure 4.2 4Mbps broad speed globally



Source: Akamai (2016). (c) 1999-2013 Akamai Technologies Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission.


As Figure 4.1 plots, both developed countries and developing countries could increase internet participation by more than 30 per cent but the gap between them remained at around 40 per cent. While developing countries quintuplicated internet participation since 2005 the main constraint for any activities related to Industry 4.0 remains their lack of fast broadband. In many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, under 10 per cent of connections reach speeds over 4MBps. This limits activities which rely on big data, compromising competitiveness in global digitalised value chains. While the impact of slow connectivity on technologies like 3D printing might be not as high as for others, it prevents live-monitoring activities related to the IoT or IoS.

The general impact of broadband and ICT for economic growth is inconclusive (Minges 2015; Hernandez *et al.* 2016) but there is a huge negative impact on the Industry 4.0 diffusion to developing countries. When one looks at the other end of the spectrum, General Electric is working on 100 Gbps fibre-optic network lines for a seamless connection of smart factories (GE Global Research 2015). The US already updated their broadband definition to a minimum of a 25MBps download and a 3MBps upload speed in 2015 (Federal Communications Commission 2015) and it seems to remain utopian for developing countries, with average download speeds in many developing countries below 2MBps, to catch up to developed countries without huge investments into their digital infrastructure.

4.4 Lack of human capital

A main problem for LDCs in benefitting from an Industry 4.0 technology diffusion is their lack of human capital. A low level of human capital does not only hinder technology diffusion (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) but is also connected to low inflows of foreign direct investment (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 2001). Figure 4.3 shows the labour share for 2000, 2016, and the projection for 2021 by formal occupation and country group. The intermediate skill level represents jobs which are on a similar level as machine operators and assemblers in the manufacturing sector. Managers, professionals, technicians and associated professionals are in the high-skilled group. The low-skilled group only represents elementary occupations.

Figure 4.3 Employment composition by country group



Source: Author's creation based on data from International Labour Organization (2016).

Figure 4.3 clearly plots the huge difference between the skill composition of low income (LIC) and high income countries (HIC). The share of high-skill labour in high income countries was in 2016 nearly 35 per cent higher than in low income countries. Moreover, all country groups beside LIC experienced a shift away from intermediate-skilled occupations towards high-skilled occupations, while LICs increased the proportion of elementary occupations.

Division by occupation helps to estimate the preparedness of LICs for Industry 4.0 technology diffusion. Immature technology requires skills which are mainly developed in a learning by doing framework. The potential for an increase in productivity by the mere knowledge of a technology is limited when there is no playing field where it can be adapted. This requires a high labour share in high-skilled occupations which improves the absorptive capacity of the sector (Arrow 1971; Perez and Soete 1988; Lucas 1988). Nevertheless, much of the lack of increase in the high-skill occupations in LICs can be related to stagnating education levels and the outlook for developing countries does not seem too positive. Estimations of the McKinsey Institute predict a lack of jobs for 15 per cent of people with secondary education and that a creation of 380 million additional non-farm jobs would be needed until 2020 to match the growing labour demand in developing countries (Dobbs *et al.* 2012).

4.5 Automation

Frey and Osborne (2017) ranked over 700 occupations according to their risk of getting replaced by a computer. Not only sectors such as logistics and manufacturing are at risk but also a substantial share of the service sector. A strong negative relationship exists between skill levels and the probability of computerisation. Jobs with a low-risk of computerisation usually require higher skill levels and share the common attributes of creative and social intelligence. Governments face the challenge to support their citizens in acquiring these skills or providing them with another way of securing their subsistence. Moreover, since work is widely regarded as a driver of meaningfulness, governments and societies will need to come up with solutions to fill this gap. Filling the new leisure time might be a huge driver of job creation itself.

Robotisation impacts employment in manufacturing mostly in the automotive, electronics, metal, and chemical product sectors. The global industrial robot stock had an average annual growth rate of 19 per cent between 2010 and 2015 and the main future growth is expected to happen in Asia (International Federation of Robotics 2016) but robotisation does not create enough fiscal resources to make the social transition of workers which lose their jobs. Robots are also likely to make premature deindustrialisation more severe, by weakening the comparative advantage of cheap labour in developing countries. It is unlikely that developing countries can attract the investments needed for competitive industries. Even in countries with strong vertical integration additional provision of robots is likely to benefit only high skilled activities (Rodrik 2016b; UNCTAD 2016).

LDCs could benefit from transportation robots, mainly from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) commonly known as drones. While the likelihood for a shift towards drone transportation to consumers is generally limited by many constraints, causing a limited profitability compared to traditional logistics (Mckinnon 2016), the bad infrastructure of many LDCs would give air-transport higher revenues due to the high costs for land transport. This can already be seen by the advantages of drones in the delivery of vaccines over traditional methods (Haidari *et al.* 2016). Similar to the use of drones are airships which not only could help to reach more consumers due to their high transportation capacity, but could also work as relays for mobile broadband (Ramalingam *et al.* 2016).

4.6 3D printing

3D printing can, similar to automation, increase the proximity of the producer to the market by lowering transport costs. However, the impact on employment is likely to be negative due

to less demand for low-skilled labour. Global direct economic impact by 3D printing is estimated to be US\$230 billion to US\$550 billion per year in 2025 (Manyika *et al.* 2013). 3D printing could also damage emerging countries such as Mexico, which made the shift from the sole production of parts to the creation of a finished product in the automotive sector. The advantages of vertical integration in manufacturing with complete production in all stages would be mitigated by local production in developed countries and the countries with the biggest consumer markets. It is therefore likely that countries which gain a regional comparative advantage in 3D printing will strongly benefit from it, as they can supply regional markets. On the other hand, countries relying on far distance exports would suffer from it. Thus countries with a high population and large consumer markets such as China, India, and the US could benefit the most from local production since they reach a huge market without crossing borders.

5 How can emerging countries adjust to Industry 4.0: the BRICS skill development strategy

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the common BRICS skill development Industry 4.0 policy to show ways for emerging countries to adapt to the challenges of Industry 4.0. Furthermore, the manufacturing strategies of China and India are introduced to show what and how much emerging countries can do to increase readiness for Industry 4.0.

5.1 Upgrading human capital: skill development for Industry 4.0

New technologies rely on high-skilled labour. As shown before, human capital is one of the main constraints of developing countries to further advance in technology-intense sectors. However, the upgrading of human capital matters also for developed countries. Table 5.1 gives here some contrast showing the policy focus of some developed countries. Nevertheless, as seen before, the low share of workers in lower and middle-income countries makes adapting to Industry 4.0 much more complicated since they cannot draw on the transition of existing high skilled labour to new technologies.

Table 5.1 Industry 4.0 policy frameworks of developed countries

Country	Strategy	Key focus
USA	Advanced manufacturing partnership 2.0/industrial internet consortium	Bringing industry, academia and government together to promote an industrial internet
Germany	High Tech Strategy 2020	Becoming world leader in embedded (cyber-physical) systems, ICT-research
France	Industrie du Futur	Develop new technological solutions, support companies in the transformation, train employees, strengthen cooperation for international standards
Japan	Industrial Value Chain Initiative	To build a mutually connected system architecture with collaboration areas between companies

Source: White House (2013); Germany Trade and Invest (2014); The Industrial Value Chain Initiative (n.d.).

A possible approach to tackle the challenges of Industry 4.0 is the skill development path, the common BRICS strategy for Industry 4.0. The following paragraphs draw mainly on the findings of the BRICS whitepaper on skill development (BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017).

5.1.1 Initial conditions of the manufacturing sector

Major parts of the BRICS rely on manufacturing, and especially for China and India, high tech exports gain significance. The BRICS Council sees therefore the need to adopt Industry

4.0 to maintain competitiveness. All BRICS states beside China have a low Industry 4.0 readiness measured by the levels of industrial automation, Industry 4.0-related patent applications, numbers of machine-to-machine connections, and the activities in robotics and 3D printing. The whitepaper suggests that most of the BRICS countries will need leapfrogging to a higher level of industrial automation to adapt Industry 4.0.

5.1.2 Problems regarding human capital

The need for skill development is based on the weakness in skilled labour in the BRICS. A strong negative effect of a future adoption of Industry 4.0 on lower-skilled jobs is anticipated. This comes in addition to the high unemployment following population growth. The BRICS generally have a weak skill composition. This relates to the weakness of tertiary education and vocational training. The council identifies skill development as a main challenge of Industry 4.0 for the BRICS. However, there are some principal problems. First, there is a lack of training institutes and vocational schools. This hinders education outside of universities. Moreover, vocational training is classroom based and does not include practical experience. It also has a bad reputation. Dual systems such as the German one would be much more beneficial for combining on the job training with education. Furthermore, the general quality in education both of staff and infrastructure, and also of the curriculum, is poor. This is among other reasons caused by the lack of funding for education.

5.1.3 Measures for skill development

To reach competitive skill development for Industry 4.0, the most significant measures can be summarised by two main pillars. The first one deals with the assessment of future skill demand and opportunities of skill transfer. The second includes infrastructure, vocational training and curriculum related measures.

The strategy sees as the first step for a successful skill development the assessment of the future skill demand of an Industry 4.0 adoption. This is necessary to make the required changes to national curricula to meet future demands for Industry 4.0 by the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, joining international institutions such as the European Training Foundation (ETF) can help to draw on the best available expertise for skill development related to Industry 4.0. Moreover, an education framework following the idea of the European Qualification Framework (EQF) could help to increase labour mobility among the BRICS countries since every country would accept the degree qualifications of the others. Industry 4.0 skills could hereby be included in the framework.

To provide high quality training in Industry 4.0 related skills it is important to involve the private sector to guarantee that the taught skills match the industry demand. Furthermore, providers of Industry 4.0 technology should be involved in the curricula creation. As mentioned before there is a lack of exposure to practical work and the involvement of the industry can hereby help by offering dual training or apprenticeships. However, in general it is important that the education remains holistic since Industry 4.0 requires a broad skillset. A lot of the weakness of the BRICS in education and skills is related to the lack of funding for building skill development institutes which provide vocational training. Funding across countries in example by the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) could help to improve this (BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017).

5.2 Increasing industry 4.0 readiness: make in India and made in China 2025 policies

Both China and India have major industrial policies for improving their manufacturing sector. The first smart factory opened in 2016 in India (Kumar 2016) however smart factories or Industry 4.0 technologies are not specifically mentioned in India's 'Make in India' policy. It aims generally on improving their manufacturing sector by increasing FDI. India has already a good track record for the time after its liberalisation in benefitting from technology spillover through the FDI channel (Basant and Fikkert 1996; Kathuria 2000) and its vast experience in

the attraction of FDI together with investments in digital infrastructure could lead to trajectories similar to the evolution of India's IT based service sector. However, automation and increased productivity decreases the advantage of cheap labour and if the trend to outsourcing slows down with the trend of global deindustrialisation the FDI attracting path might not be sufficient. India however could also utilise their strong ICT sector to promote innovation in the manufacturing sector to stay competitive.

On the other hand, China's holistic industrial policy 'Made in China 2025' is directly inspired by the Industry 4.0 concept but also covers quality control, output consistency and environmental issues (China-Britain Business Council 2016). Together with the Belt and Road initiative it creates China's future plan for upgrading manufacturing and the export market. China also drafted a specific policy for the role of the internet in the manufacturing sector called 'Internet Plus'. Measures which can be directly linked to an improvement of China's Industry 4.0 readiness are hereby an active promotion of internet technology and infrastructure. Furthermore, China wants to set industrial standards for the integration of internet into industries. To gain a competitive advantage the plan includes innovation promotion connected with further protection of intellectual property. This would ideally happen in innovation zones such as *Zhongguancun*, a Chinese version of Silicon Valley. There are also plans for a big data strategy. The educational training for ICT, and the better use of local and foreign talent is seen as essential for China's future competitiveness. To achieve all of this the government wants to provide financial support and attract foreign and local investors (Xinhua 2015).

6 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to assess the implications of Industry 4.0 for developing countries. The analysis shows that while Industry 4.0 has a great potential for global economic growth, low-skilled manufacturing based countries are facing a huge risk since they lack the skills which are required for new technology. The situation for LDCs remains mostly unpredictable, mainly dependent on the compatibility of their comparative advantages with cutting-edge technology, and would require broad digital infrastructure investments. Moreover, many jobs are likely to be replaced through automation and the decrease in outsourcing. Therefore, a comparative advantage in labour intense manufacturing could be lost. The risk is hereby much higher for those countries in the catch-up process and they require fundamental decisions and pro-active industrial policies before they miss the opportunities which come with innovation.

Emerging countries, on the other hand, with their larger share of skilled labour and more infrastructure, need to specifically focus on improving their Industry 4.0 readiness. The cases of the BRICS, India and China have shown that there is an awareness of the possible consequences, if measures such as improvements in human capital and higher investments in digital infrastructure and innovation are not undertaken. Especially transnational cooperation and the involvement of institutions such as the New Development Bank, the World Bank, or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could help to make the necessary investments in developing countries to not fall behind further.

To conclude it can be said that Industry 4.0 first benefits developed countries, however emerging countries could, with the correct strategies, stay competitive. Especially China with its already strong manufacturing sector has a positive outlook. The only sector which might provide some benefits for LDCs could be 3D printing since it allows local production and a simplification of logistic chains. The huge population of many developing countries gives them quite a large consumer market which can be supplied without international competition, due to the low transportation costs of a local production with 3D printing. Another possible advantage outside of an industrial perspective, which was not mentioned earlier, is that Industry 4.0 technologies could have many applications in development assistance (Ramalingam *et al.* 2016).

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Using Relevant Concepts and Framework(s), Analyse a Case of Citizen–State Engagement and Assess its Strengths, Weaknesses and Degree of Success

Aisha Modibo

The Aba Women’s Riot against taxes was not a riot and it did not only involve women from Aba, but it was spread over most of south-eastern Nigeria (Falola and Aderinto 2010; Van Allen 1975). Traditional Igbo women called these demonstrations Ogu Umu Nwanyi which translates to ‘making war’ (*ibid.*). This essay will refer to Ogu Umu Nwanyi as the Women’s War of 1929 and the women’s other protests as ‘sitting on a man’. A power analysis will be done by reviewing the historical background while exploring the power dynamics between the key players and pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the movement. This essay argues that though ‘sitting on men’ had been effective in the past, ‘making war’ ultimately proved to be an inappropriate method for achieving long-term change with the British colonialists.

Power is widely understood as being a negative, overt and one-dimensional expression of dominance (IPAT 2015; McGee 2016). This is oftentimes accurate, but there several other natures, levels, forms and spaces in which power exists simultaneously. These levels (local, national and global); forms (visible, invisible and hidden); and spaces (closed, invited and created) are represented in the Power Cube and the natures (power over, power to, power with and power within) are implied (Gaventa 2006). A dominant person may have power ‘over’ a subordinate and any actor may have power ‘to’ take action ‘with’ or without a group and the awareness ‘within’ that they have the capacity to act (IPAT 2015). The Power Cube tells us that power is complex, fluid and can be observed in all relationships within a culture or a society.

In Eurocentric societies, visible power is observable in formal structures where decisions are made in closed spaces which are exclusive (IPAT 2015). This was not the case in pre-colonial Igboland. The Igbo political structures were democratic, meritocratic and power was distributed (Afigbo 1966). Despite the patrilineal nature of their traditions which made women second-class citizens, village meetings were invited spaces in which women could participate in matters that concerned them and decisions were consensus-driven (Van Allen 1975). Women were not equal to men, but the power distance was not so large that women were unable to confront unacceptable behaviour of men (Wipper 1985). It is perhaps for this reason that the women deemed it conceivable to challenge the British. The colonial masters exercised their power ‘over’ the indigenous people to undermine their traditional institutions and adapt their laws to British tastes, putting only the men in administrative and decision-making positions (*ibid.*). They selected one representative from each village to serve as warrant chiefs in the Native Administration (*ibid.*) in a manner that did not reflect the democratic and meritocratic nature of the former village meetings. This led to the introduction of gender hierarchies and the decline in women’s participation (Falola and Aderinto 2010). The British were in charge, the Igbo men became second-class and the Igbo women were neglected. Colonialists claimed to be civilising and democratising the ‘savages’ but instead they perpetuated hierarchies and the exclusion of women.

When people are alienated from participation, they tend to create their own spaces based on shared identities and/or issues (Gaventa 2006) that empower them ‘to’ engage politically (Cornwall 2004). For traditional Igbo women, this took the form of everyday *mitiri* (meetings

in markets) that pre-existed colonisation (Van Allen 1975) and consisted of their comprehensive social networks (*ibid.*) It was in these meetings that they discussed their problems and organised 'with' each other 'to' solve them (*ibid.*). Whenever they decided that a villager's behaviour was impermissible, they followed a protocol, which consisted of alerting him of his wrong behaviour and if he refused to stop, they would then 'sit on him' (Wipper 1985). To 'sit on' a man was to arrange a demonstration at his residence to embarrass him publicly with detailed songs until such a time when he agreed to discontinue his behaviour and repent (Van Allen 1975). Judging by their responses to them, the men seemed to think these 'sit ons' were a legitimate course of action. The women applied these 'sit ons' 'to' empower themselves collectively and impact their lives in ways that reflected decisions they made together.

The previous accomplishments of 'sitting on men' explains why Igbo women had power 'within' when resisting colonial power. In November 1929, thousands of Igbo and Ibibio women swiftly coordinated themselves and gathered in front of the Native Administration to protest a rumoured introduction of taxes on women (Afigbo 1966; Falola and Aderinto 2010). The women adapted the mechanism of collective action which was available to them to make clear demands. One officer of the Native Administration appeared to have begun the process of tax collection seemingly on his own initiative so they 'made war' on him (Van Allen 1975; Wipper 1985). The scope of this essay is the political, rather than the economic motives for the war. The women felt that their interests were jeopardised and so their economic predicament turned their political frustration into resistance against power. This protest was successful; the women were assured that they would not be taxed and the officer in question was sentenced to jail (*ibid.*). The demonstration was an exercise of their hidden power in confrontation of the administration's visible power. Hidden power comes into play when members of the civil society work to set an agenda (Gaventa 2006; IPAT 2015). One common way that activists use this power is by creating spaces such as social movements which serve as an expression of resistance and aim for transformation (*ibid.*). Subsequent events will demonstrate that the women's sole focus on visible power was a weakness in their war.

The Women's War was more like a social movement than a riot but definitions of social movements are ambiguous. Charles Tilly is a prominent scholar of social movements. Tilly has been criticised for not prioritising people's ideologies in his theories (Goldstone 2010). He himself recognised that problems may arise when trying to apply his definition to real-life contexts (Tilly 1979). In his work, he insists that for a collective action to be regarded as a social movement, it needs to be sustained over a long period (*ibid.*; Tilly 2005). The Women's War of 1929 only lasted for one month although there were a few sporadic demonstrations that occurred in 1930 (Wipper 1985). It is unclear whether this constitutes a long period, though in more recent history, the Colour Revolutions have been regarded as socio-political movements despite most of them only lasting a few months (Gerlach 2014; Thein 2009). Another possible issue is with the rationale behind the Women's War. Between 1682 and 1691, the women of Narbonne, France protested their tax system and managed to get the authorities to reconsider but Tilly argued that their claims were not broad enough for their resistance to constitute a social movement (Tilly 1979). However, this essay contends that taxes were not the sole reason the women protested in 1929. This essay considers the Women's War as a social movement.

Their initial victory made them ambitious; some women started regional protests demanding the colonialists consult women in political processes or leave (Van Allen 1975; Wipper 1985). After a British officer hit two women with his car and left them for dead, the war turned violent (Zukas 2008). The women vandalised public property and broke into prisons to release prisoners so in response, the British sent soldiers and police to shoot them, vandalise their homes and enforce fines (*ibid.*). Unruly politics exist in spaces of power and they expose power relations (Khanna 2012). This climate showed a terrorising abuse of power by the

British. It could be argued that it was unrealistic of the women to expect the British to leave but what happened was far from anything the women anticipated. The Igbos had naively assumed that the women would not be shot for protesting (Afigbo 1966). Not all the women were in support of the vandalism; the movement had become fragmented. This lack of unity was another weakness in the Women's War. Traditional 'sit ons' were marked by their strong consensus but this war was performed on an unprecedented scale and it proved difficult to control. Each village self-selected a representative but the representatives did not appear to have any clear authority outside of their villages (Wipper 1985). This follows, because actors who have power in one space, may not necessarily have power in another (Gaventa 2006). Nevertheless, scholars argue that social movements contain people with heterogeneous identities and strategies that make it difficult for the movement to remain 'solidaristic' and well-organised (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; Poletta and Jasper 2001; Tilly 1979). The fragmentation shows that their space was not neutral and even though it was created to give voices to the less powerful, some turned out to be more vocal than others.

The war was essentially a civil rights movement which had Igbo and Ibibio women fighting for their rights as citizens to participate in decision-making processes. When formal structures exclude women, they seek empowerment by engaging 'with' community groups (Lister 1997). Citizens should be allowed their power 'to' organise and be encouraged to participate but these women were not treated like citizens. They exercised the power they shared 'with' each other but this resulted in the deaths of some of their members. The Women's War was an audacious reaction but not unorthodox. Since they were not invited into the administration's closed spaces, they did not have many options to voice their concerns. The strength in their resistance lied in how quickly thousands of them mobilised and how they adapted their traditions to their situation. Overall, their men were in favour of the war (Van Allen 1972) and the space they created helped them determine their own scope for agency so that they became subjects rather than objects of their society.

The British implemented some reforms but they nonetheless maintained their Eurocentric views of women. The Native Courts were changed to conform to more traditional Igbo standards except women were still not included and their views were not represented in court (Afigbo 1966). The movement occurred during the Victorian period when British women were publicly invisible (Van Allen 1975). The normative British notions of a woman's place led them to view the Igbo women's desire to create space in the political sphere as irrational. The British made efforts to eliminate corruption and this benefitted the women but they also deemed illegitimate, any extra-government institutions or traditional rituals (*ibid.*). This outlawry of the *mitiri* meant the women could no longer organise legally even against their indigenous people. After things quieted down, women were neglected in representation again and they were subsequently taxed (Wipper 1985). Research does not show how the resistance affected the most marginalised members of their movement but it can be concluded that the war failed to achieve permanent solutions. This is to be expected since research shows that 'resistance [movements] often fail' (McGee 2016: 209). The Women's War was weakened because the British did not respect their traditions. 'Sit ons' were effective among the Igbo people however, when they 'made war' with the British, the women were essentially speaking another language.

Christian missionaries began to convert the Igbos to Christianity and hence urged them against attending *mitiri* (Van Allen 1975) by using invisible power. The women capitulated. This form of power is harder to notice and it reflects the norms of the society which have been imposed from the top-down so that people will accept their existing circumstances (Gaventa 2006; IPAT 2015). The British used visible power 'to' obstruct the women from their political authority and the parallel effort by the missionaries served to tame the women, using invisible power. They might have continued resisting using their created spaces for citizen-engagement but that is precisely what the British banned. The women may not have recognised the importance of invisible power. Because of the nature of institutions and

patriarchy, some argue that women can only be empowered if they reshape entire political structures (Sardenberg 2016). To have been successful, the women needed to concurrently employ different strategies that confronted power on multiple levels, forms and spaces (Gaventa 2006). The women had already created spaces to use their hidden power to resist visible power. Perhaps the women could have also confronted invisible power by creating invited spaces and challenging the ideologies the Church was teaching them.

In conclusion, the major strength of the Women's War was in how they managed to efficiently distribute their power 'with' and unite to make a stand. The two main weaknesses were: 1) their focus on visible power, and 2) the eventual fragmentation of the movement. They had some success when their initial demands were met and the officer was convicted. The movement failed largely due to elements such as patriarchy which were beyond their control and because some of their members turned violent. The outcome when citizens challenge authority, is not necessarily due to which party has more power. It is about how strategies are employed productively to address the scope of power.

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In Search of Collaborative Relationships

C. Neu

1 Introduction

We want to create together situations that lead to a rebuilding of positive and joyful modes of interdependence, and the creation of new forms of attachment in which the humanity of each individual is acknowledged. Here is a program for an ongoing revolution, where the central goal is not a fixed and future utopia known in advance, for which we have to sacrifice in the present, but rather a continuing practice of dialogue and restoration with the goal of building more humane communities.

(Mary Watkins and Helene Shulman 2008: 28)

What do they want?

Robert Chambers

This paper is a compilation of thoughts that have been requiring in my mind for the last four years, they are weaved together with a specific aim: exploring how collaborative relationships can be achieved and maintained.

To start I want to bring back a memory. A casual meeting, with an unknown farmer in a maize grainer, of a small town called Ramiriquí in Colombia, keeps lingering in my mind. This man, a typical *boyacense* cultivator with his hat and *ruana* (poncho) compared himself to me by stating 'anything you would do would be better than what I do, because you have a university degree'. I felt ashamed instead of flattered, answering back: 'Look at my hand; they are like baby hands. Look at yours... your hands are the ones who feed me. My hands can't do that. My diploma can't take care of a plot of agriculture.'

I've had to use this story more than once. It still hurts because I see injustice and I see degradation, for example, of farmers' knowledge and any person that doesn't have a formal education. However, as I told the farmer, he has a certain type of knowledge that is as important or even more valuable than the one that I have constructed. There is a dichotomies embedded were one type of knowledge if more valued than the other. And this has change.

From the standpoint of relationships, it becomes critical to understand what power is and how knowledge is created to comprehend what type of relationships we have in our societies and (if necessary) how these can be improved. How are the interactions between people in a relationship? How is power distributed? What type of knowledge is taken into account? Whose reality counts? (Chambers 2003).

The current western relationships among people are surrounded by inequality and injustice. Power relationships create the knowledge of the reality we have, which is of oppression of some people and institutions over others. In other words, a hierarchical society. Evidently, the encounter with the farmer demonstrates in a way a suffering, in which we all live in, where not everyone is conscious of it, and as a result, it is reproduced and tolerated by most.

How can a collaborative relationship be created and maintained, in a society that values certain types of knowledge's over other, and were hierarchical forms of relationships prevail? This is the question to be explored in the following text. By using *liberation psychology* (Watkins and Shulman 2008) as an approach, structures of power embedded in our discourses and social interactions are untangled. To break open power relationships requires a cognitive justice (de Sousa Santos *et al.* 2008) and collaborative rebuilding of positive and joyful modes of interdependence among people and groups to transform the status quo.

I understand a collaborative relationship to be the balance of power between people, where there is capacity for dialogue (Watkins and Shulman 2008; Freire 2005), hence there is respect for different types of knowledge and mind-sets. Solidarity and mutual help is also implied and, lastly, collective actions are to be carried out.

The Critical Enquiry into practice (CEP) I plan to set up is based on a 4 months project back in my home country, Colombia. With the current political and social conditions after the Peace Treaty signature and the forthcoming process of implementing the agreements, the task of civil societies' organisation is to strengthen themselves and their relationships with the communities they are working with. The coming process of rebuilding the society will allow different approaches to flourish. There are organisations with similar understandings of what a collaborative relationships is, and it is of great interest to see and experience how they can be achieved during the context like Colombia's current social transition. For these purposes I have so far contacted Corporación Otra Escuela (Otra Escuela) and Asociación de Trabajo Interdisciplinario (ATI), which I will further explain who they are and why they can be the means to develop my work.

In the following pages I will present where all of this thoughts are coming from laying out experiences I have had. Then I will explore the conceptual framework necessary to answer my main question focusing on the links between relationships, power and knowledge. These concepts and their interrelationships will allow me to understand hierarchical relationships in contrast to collaborative relationships. By doing that, new fields of exploration will appear and it will allow me to deepen in the search for a collaborative relationship by explaining certain characteristics, and then how this can be achieved. Having said all of this, the possibilities that I have for my CEP in Colombia will be portrait.

2 Where am I coming from?

Since I graduated as an anthropologist at the University of los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia in 2014, I've worked as a research anthropologist in three developmental projects in the country. Even though each one had a specific aim, they were all related to understand the food systems in different regions, with the objective of looking for alternative systems that would benefit small-scale farmers and vendors. These experiences allowed me to admire the complexity of social and cultural values and ideas behind the people working as craftsmen and craftswomen. Hence richness of popular knowledge could be found; network of families and friends supporting each other was evident, but at the same time we were confronted by their day to day struggle¹ to survive in an economical structure privileging large scale farming, industrial production and supermarkets, while small scale production or vendors were neglected by society and forgotten by the politics.

I always believed in the projects I was part of. Words of *hope* were in my conversations. *Hope* that the projects were going to provide them direct and diverse answers. This hope was weaved with care and respect towards them, in respect to their lives, their knowledge and their everyday efforts. With all of the three projects, I always felt that a relationship of trust was being created.

Yet, I sense a one-way relationship was always lingering in the air. Were we really creating a relationship of trust? And what does that (i.e. Trust) mean? Dissimilarities were always there. I always felt to be seen as the girl (not woman) with European traits coming from the 'capital' (meaning Bogotá), and with privileges (i.e. Travel expenses). These dichotomies resided,

¹ Thinking back also, their prevalent worries were economical (ie. Competitions from other type of businesses) and/or environmental issues (ie. water draughts were occurring more than normally.) Both threated their already struggled life and affected their only incomes. Basically, making them concern in how they were going to support their families.

even though I tried to break them, to make them understand that I could learn from them more than they could learn from me. The encounter with the *boyacense* farmer is just of example.

I am not sure if I was able to transmit this message, and I even doubt what I was able to achieve in these experiences, because even though all of the projects had an aim to be applied research, it ended up being just a diagnosis or a research. So again I ask the questions: what kind of relationship did I really have with the communities? What kind of relationships can be really created in these types of projects? And even deeper and personal, why I am doing all of this, and why do I want to have a relationship with small poor farmers, small poor venders or any marginalised group or person?²

In writing this paper, I have realised that I am in search of deconstructing my thoughts and my life. To critically disentangle assumptions, confront and understand where I come from and how I can move ahead with my CEP. My search for collaborative relationships can be explained as a way of being part of a society with a lot of injustice, where some are privileged and others are not; where some peoples' knowledge is valued and others isn't. My personal prospects have allowed me to see that this is not true, and even though I am still in an awaking process, this process helps me understand personal growth and needs. It is vital to look for ways to make this other knowledge's be valued. Before looking for these approaches, basic concepts and their interrelationships have to be described.

3 Power, knowledge, and relationships

All relationships are surrounded by power and knowledge dynamics. Knowledge is exchanged in conversations and practices between people and/or institutions; and power dynamics surround this exchange. The knowledge generated by power, and the power generated by knowledge makes some things visible and invisible, valuable and invaluable; as for example expert's knowledge over farmer's knowledge.

Foucault argues that power is everywhere. 'It is diffused and embodied in discourses, knowledge and "regimes of truth" ' (Powercube 2009). The latter, include and exclude certain types of knowledge's, making some visible and dominant over other types of knowledge. In other words, power can be negative, oppressive, silencing and authoritarian. Nevertheless, Foucault (Powercube 2009) also says it can also be positive, innovative and resistant. Depending on the type of power exercised a type of knowledge is created and a 'truth' is constructed.

The current dominant power/knowledge (Foucault and Gordon 1990) relationship is an oppressive type, where exclusion and marginalisation occurs, and relationships are ordered in a hierarchical manner. In the aid industry, this mind-set has been described as top-down approach (Chambers 2003). 'Experts' decide over marginalised communities, because the knowledge that the former has is considered to be objective, factual, reliable and, thus, legitimate. In a hierarchical relationship the 'regime of truth' of how knowledge and reality is created is one-way.

This mind-set is embedded in all of us. It's an 'invisible power' that's normalised and naturalises this way of interactions (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). Foucault relevance is seen for making visible exclusions that lead to an understanding of the existence different regimes of truths (de Sousa Santos 2003: 27).

² The answers I come up with in current times, has different layers. First, because cultural and social history has interested me since I was a child (i.e. I was highly interested of the WW2). This then transitioned into my interest of traveling and to my first understandings of anthropology. I could work with people and I could be volunteering and/or helping them to have a better life.

To see that there are alternative regimes of truth, or that there can be counter-hegemonies to use Gramsci's terms (Powercube 2009), ideas such as epistemologies (plural) of the south can be developed as de Sousa Santos *et al.* (2008) proposes. Here a decolonisation proposal is set out, where power relationships of the oppressive are challenged by the oppressed with the aim to be completely transformed, and to have another epistemological understanding where diversity is privileged, and where former excluded knowledge's are valued. All of this is very relevant in the current context of Colombia, where a society with a past of normalised violence is in search of peace.

To achieve this it is necessary first to have 'cognitive justice' (de Sousa Santos *et al.* 2008), or 'conscientisation' from Freire (2005). Both have the aim of being aware of the dynamics of the hierarchical relationships so that they can be transformed.

A useful framework to deconstruct the dynamics and see how power is distributed is the Power Cube. The latter is a compilation of different theories (Powercube 2009). It grasps power to be multidimensional and have interrelationships between the forms of power. All of this with the aim to assess the possibilities of transformative action in various spaces (Gaventa 2006: 25). In other words, see possible entry points so that strategies for change can happen, and in the case of trying to construct collaborative relationships,

Colombia has a socio-cultural richness because of the diversity of its society, yet it is a country with a colonial past, and surrounded by a western mind-set. Foucault, de Sousa Santos, and the powercube provide lenses that could grasp the silences generated by the western mind-set, but also they provide the possibility to think of alternatives.

4 Towards a collaborative relationship

In a collaborative relationship there should be a fluid two-way or multiple-way dialogue, where everyone compromising and negotiating, hence change has to happen. Especially the more powerful have to change. Thus, there is not one type of knowledge of understanding the world and reality we live in. There are many perspectives and cosmologies which try to make sense in their own way of the possible realities, with their own values and explanations (de Sousa Santos *et al.* 2008).

A call to unite and act, within different types of knowledge systems is viewed in different places as for example VeneKlasen and Miller (2002: 12) who argue:

by challenging dominant ideologies and worldviews, people not only deepen their understanding of power dynamics and themselves, they can begin the potential of solidarity and the common good. Organizing around worldview involves the creation of new spaces for inclusive, empowering community reflection and dialogue about what's going on and why [...] These processes also help to answer the question 'what do we stand for?' by supporting the articulation of alternative worldviews and agendas that incorporate rights, justices, equality and democracy.

By seeing the entry points of possible change and being aware that oppressive power can be transformed, the aim is that the oppressed be liberated by themselves and not by development works or volunteers – because of the risk of reproducing hierarchies (Agrawal cited in Ashwood *et al.* 2014). Yet, because I am part of this society, and I myself have reproduced and may be reproducing oppressive structures, I want to and *have to be* part of this liberation. The liberation is happening also in my life. The figure of an 'Ally' gives the possibility to stand by the side of the most vulnerable and marginalised people. The person that chooses to be an ally (it is not an identity) understands that he/she hasn't experienced

those injustices (Anti-Oppression Network n.d.), but that doesn't make it acceptable that he/she stand by doing nothing.³ Solidarity, as VeneKlasen and Millers quote states above, has to occur, and it goes beyond development or aid discourses.

Exploring psychologies of liberation from Watkins' and Shulman's (2008) teachings open a door to create a more humane society by looking and feeling directly injustice, so that the structures embedded in these oppressions be directly challenged and transformed. This can be achieved via critical understanding and with the help of creative dialogues and arts come up to equivalent solutions by means of a collaborative relationship to construct and/or maintain cultural and social environments.

This awakening process and the search for solutions is a difficult task. It's easy to fall back again in the dominant structure, were dichotomies exist, were hierarchies thought to have disappeared, still exist. This calls for a continually critical reflection to make horizontal relationships (Chambers 2003) happen.

Hence, when this falling back starts to emerge in me, a reflection phase starts. I try to ask myself why I am doing all of this. I transport my thoughts into Colombia (very far from Brighton, and much further from IDS and the development discourses). My personal and professional life are the same. They are not separated, as many people want them to be. I choose to study and work on something because my life (with my family, in my school, with my friends, with my maid, etc.) have guided me to have encounters were I've experienced injustices, as for example with the *boyacense* farmer. As I can recall, the injustice were not done on me. Yet, I don't feel that that is right. I do not understand how we can stand and do nothing.

Hence, solidarity is needed and that is why I am pursuing collaborative relationships. The question of 'how are collaborative relationships created and maintained' have different scales, one is the awaking process, another one is the search of solutions and strategies to change and, in the long run, how to sustain it but at the same time be conscious of the constant change.

All of these phases can help to be achieved through methodologies. The usage of methodologies such as theatre, games, storytelling, video and photography, just to name a few, could allow the emergence of alternative situations, actions and ideas out of the dominant mind-set. An exploration of these methodologies is what I would like to do in my CEP. How do organisations work towards collaborative and solidarity relationships? What is necessary in an organisation to build this type of interactions? How do organisations work towards a resistance hierarchical relations? Do they resist or do they reproduce them? These are some guiding questions for the selection of the organisations I am interested, and that I want to further explore in the coming months.⁴

5 Colombia and two possibilities

2016 was an important year in the history of Colombia because of the signed Peace Treaty between the government and the guerrilla group FARC. It has been a path with hopes and fears. In the discourses of hope and the beginning of peace, the result of the Plebiscite permitted to not overlook the divided society that we have: ones based in criteria around prejudices, lies and anger; and another, where people were ready to work within diversity to

³ I would like to explore this deeper during my CEP, and specially see if there are Latin American ideas of allies, having seen that the ally politic is more from North America.

⁴ In Colombia, there is a talked about territorial peace, instead of projects being created in cities, they are conceived by the same people of the territories in their territories with their knowledge. Hence, the idea of 'territory', 'territorial peace' are concepts and a space that I want to explore more during my CEPT.

create a more united country without war or fear. I belong to the latter, and this is one of the reasons I want to return to Colombia as to experience and be part of this transformative change about to start.

There are many civil society organisations building and strengthening the society in order to advance in a more equal societal environment. I have found two entities through which I could enrol for the CEP. One is called Asociación de Trabajo Interdisciplinario (ATI) and the other Corporación Otra Escuela (Otra Escuela). Both have shown within the diverse type of NGO, commitment towards people and conflict resolution into something positive and transformative.

ATI (2014) is an interdisciplinary organisation that works with rural and urban communities around food sovereignty and food autonomy in Bogotá and the region of the state of Cundinamarca.⁵ With over thirty years' experience, a group of around ten people who divide projects, ATI works in strengthening grassroots organisations applying participatory methodologies with a focus on popular education. The values and principles are guided by social and solidary economy, which are: trust, complementarity, responsibility, respect and justice (ATI 2014). The broader aim they have is to achieve a solidarity network were the gap between rural and urban decreases, and, hence to transform a structure by build territorial peace.

Otra Escuela (2016) aims at building peace culture through innovative pedagogies and methodologies channelled by games and arts. Their approach is dialogical in all senses; first it is an on-going reflection process as individuals and as a collective matter; it binds constantly together reasoning and feelings with the hope to bring actions to success stories. Humanise social relationships, and create positive effects within groups from conflict on are some of their objectives. Their service repertoire is diverse ranging from working with communities to facilitating specialisations for professional interests. They work in different parts of the country, but mostly they try to reach vulnerable regions, which have suffered from the internal conflict.

Despite I have addressed them in certain opportunities; so far I have not received any feedback in order to join them once I return to Colombia. However also, this type of answer requires a long-term conversation process and the common interest to fulfil needs and requirements.

If there is no possibility to do my CEP with either of the previous organisation, I have backup plans. The closes would be to work with a friend in a social entrepreneurship (named Mawa) of handcrafts from indigenous communities from the Caribbean Coast of Colombia. The collaborative and solidarity approach would also apply for Mawa as for the relationship my friend is trying to build with the handcrafts communities.

6 Conclusions

In a context where certain types of knowledge's prevail over others and were hierarchical relationships surround us, has taken me to a process of understanding some basic things of knowledge, power and relationships. This has allowed me to see the complexity of structures that are embedded in us as individual and as a society. These structures generate injustices and inequalities. Yet, my search is aligned with others people's enquiry of social justice, collaboration and solidarity (de Sousa Santos 2003; ATI 2014; Otra Escuela 2016).

⁵ Cundinamarca is the state where Bogotá is located.

In Colombia this is the route that we should be looking for after fifty-two years of internal conflict. ATI's and Otra Escuelas' work is surrounded by the constant search of these three spaces. Both show that it is a political arena, where conflicts and contentious encounters will emerge. Yet, both have the aim of turning that conflict into something positive, and in awakening the most embedded oppressions in our daily life. Their work goes into transforming embedded invisible structures of power that we all have. An awakening process is necessary to take action and make the change happen. This exactly has to be done farmers such as the one from Ramiriquí.

For the next term and for my Critical Enquiry into Practice I would like to deepen my understanding in solidarity theory and collaborative relationships, to see deeper the scope and limitations that they have. I would also want to confront (if it's possible to confront) my doubt (enforced by external actors) about how viable and effective is my search and way of thinking about liberation and solidarity on an individual and collective level. How useful are techniques such as storytelling and theatre in valuing different types of knowledge's, and hence crating a collaborative relationship.

To sum up, an understanding of relationships, power and knowledge permits us to see oppression and collaboration; hierarchies and solidarity; division and unity. It is not a search to create division, or to reinforce dichotomies. It is a search to look for unity in diversity, and diversity in unity.

Thus, it is an opportunity for unity among diversity, and diversity within unity. Unity to equilibrate trends, requirements and needs among a given community. Diversity required handling traditions, opinions, and settlements seeking for new ways to maintain craftsmanship among them.

It is to co-create realities, projects and environments capable of understanding the need for change, for improvements and to sustain the interdependences of different stakeholders.

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How does Rancière's Distribution of the Sensible Speak to the Changes in the UK English Curriculum and How does His Notion of the Aesthetic Regime of the Arts Help Frame Unruly Acts?

Luke Stannard

1 Introduction

The classroom is bustling. Conversations gurgle from every table, muffled laughter swirls as they read the swear words and ruin it for their friend, who hasn't got there yet.

'Sir, you've forgotten to put capitals on this person's name!' smirks Pradeep.

'It's meant to be like that'

'Why would someone want to get rid of the capitals in their name?'

A shadow appears in the corner of my eye. It swallows the light coming through the frosted pane of the door. I haven't taken the register yet either (you may laugh, but people get official warnings for less). The mass draws close. *'Everyone, quick, look like you're responding to my marking'* I exclaim in a shrill whisper.

A couple of them look up, recognise the situation and calm their tables, the bustle goes flat. We draw breath. The door flies open.

'Mr Stannard. How are 10X performing this morning?'

I don't respond. It's a member of SLT. You've met the type: considers the arts soft and proclaims at every staff meeting that recent education reform is both strong and stable. A character from one of Dahl's books. The students shuffle anxiously, quietly getting on with what they think they're meant to write under the comments. She circles. Silently. The class mimic her silence.

'What a wonderfully quiet class you have produced here Mr Stannard'

She circles once again, it's clear there is no purpose for this visit, just a quick haunt. Check that the class is 'on task'. Learning is being done, knowledge copied down into books. As she leaves, she motions that I follow her.

'There's no learning aim on the board, nor date. Completely unacceptable' she declares without eye contact. She's missed the poem, we're in luck. She turns on her heels and silently glides off to her next line-up.

* * *

This paper is concerned with unruly acts, in ruly places. Spaces where the margins are being squeezed. Molotovs, masks and milk littered the connotations I held with such a word. However, I admit, a school is not the first place that comes to mind. The acts this paper

addresses are about the provision of art, creative spaces, so called *dangerous* texts, power, and play. It is concerned with attempts to give space for chaos in an environment burdened with the anxiety of league tables and funding cuts.

I am writing about acts of unruly behaviour I took part in, with a number of the friends and young people I worked with at a school in the shadow of Terminal 3, in Southall, London. This paper will address these acts of unruliness through the lens of Jacques Rancière's work: *The Distribution of the Sensible*. It will focus initially on his discussion of the distribution of the sensible, then onto his regimes of the arts, which I believe talk to the changes we have seen recently in the British education system. I will work from the ethical, through the representational and onto the aesthetic regime, which he maintains holds such potential for reimagining of our shared map of the sensible (Rancière 2006). To supplement my reading of these acts I will discuss Clarissa Hayward's work *De-Facing Power* the insights for which were drawn from her experience in two schools in New York (Hayward 2000).

Unruly politics is defined by Alex Shankland and colleagues as 'political action by people who have been denied voice by the rules of the political game, and by the social rules that underpin this game' (Shankland *et al.* 2011). It is not a common to consider teachers to be those who have been denied voice by the rules of the political game. Education is an institution. It is awash with 'rules and procedures that are created and communicated... through channels widely accepted as official' (Helme and Levitsky 2014: 727). The teachers working with the young people in the UK, work within the frameworks assigned to them by the Department of Education and enforced through organisations such as OFSTED the schooling inspectorate. It was the change to a number of these frameworks that led to these unruly acts.

These unruly acts, took place in a space where the teachers have very little room for expression. Teachers and young people are being systematically denied the opportunity to engage in activities and spaces that allow for free thought and play. These acts addressed this poverty. They were subversive and we all ran the risk of disciplinary action or worse having classes we'd worked with for years taken off us.

2 Power

This paper considers power to be diffused across networks, boundaries and discourses (Gaventa 2006). It is not in the hands of a few, to be used over others, or *Power-over* as VeneKlassen *et al.* (2006) referred to it. Clarissa Hayward described it as a process that 'defines the fields of possibility' (Hayward 2000: 11). In this context, it defines how a teacher acts, how students react to what they are presented, it moulds and shapes what we interpret education to be, what forms of activities deserve merit and are valid. This paper maintains that teachers are as much subjects of these power relations as anyone else is, 'all social actors, then are situated within power relations' (*ibid.*).

Teachers' in this country are greatly maligned and very often voiceless. Except, that is, until they take matters into their own hands, as they have, and continue to do, every day, in schools all over this country.

3 The modern British academy

The introduction to this paper is not embellished. The Education Secretary at the time of the curriculum reforms famously described teachers as 'enemies of promise' (McQuilan 2013). It was a hostile environment. There is a fear in teaching now. I was a secondary school teacher for five years in London, it was an 'outstanding' school according to the six foot high banner attached to the front gates. The staff, for the most part, were intelligent, passionate and dedicated people, and the young people were superlative.

In that time a lot has changed. To provide context in that time frame: curriculums changed completely; coursework was scrapped; entire subjects removed; performance related pay enforced; teaching assistant posts reduced; new grading mechanisms introduced with no grade boundaries provided; days extended and climate change removed from the Geography curriculum (for example). These are but a few changes that we experienced as a collective. This list is intended to provide a flavour of the environment, not a comprehensive assessment.

This paper focuses on the changes to the English literature curriculum. The first year-group of young people pushed through this assessment mangle will be sitting their second literature exam at about the time this paper lands on your desk.

4 The unruly act

Over the course of three terms we stopped teaching the exam, for at least a lesson a week. We were not allowed to do this and it was explicitly forbidden. This sounds small, but I do not think that takes away from the action. The young people we worked with had very little space to enjoy the subject matter, these acts gave them that space. The work completed in these sessions was never assessed formally. Discussions were had and that's what we valued as important. Some of these texts reflected the backgrounds they were from, some didn't. Each teacher chose his or her own texts to work with, then as the space developed students brought their own texts.

On reflection, I don't think the most unruly aspect was the texts. I think the unruly act was in fact, the space. For forty-five minutes (most) weeks, the students produced work they knew wouldn't be assessed, they wrote: poems, lyrics, short stories, tweets and descriptions. They also argued and fought, but this should not detract from it. They chatted, laughed and engaged in serious play. It may not seem much, but it brought us all closer, it showed some that they are creative people with a voice worth listening to.

The introductory passage of this paper took place during one of these 'free spaces' and the students covered for me, all of us really. They protected the space. I believe, in an institution as authoritarian as the school we found ourselves in, was something to be proud of.

5 The distribution of the sensible

How does this relate to Rancière's thoughts on the distribution of the sensible? Well it requires us to consider all of the regimes of the arts, not just the aesthetic, so that this act can be properly situated as means of engaging in the distribution of the sensible.

Rancière defined the distribution of the sensible as a 'system of self-evident facts about sense perception' (Rancière 2006: 1). He was clear that this is with regards to the 'western tradition' (*ibid.*: 20) of art. It is easy in a consumer driven society such as ours to narrow this to objects of art, but Rancière claimed it was greater than this.

'Sense perception' implies that this as a system that is pre-speech. It is then an aspect of cognition or framing of those who are within a particular order of culture. It is about our ideas of art, our patterns of speech and hierarchies of knowledge or genre. My interpretation is that it is the process in which types of art the *nouns*, so to speak, are constituted. Also, the acts of artistic interpretation, 'ways of doing and marking' (*ibid.*: 13) are constructed, the *verbs* of art. They are both subject to appropriation, cooption and integration into the fabric of what is legitimate and sensible.

The French word *partage* has been translated into English as distribution. *Partage* has a duplicity of meanings. It can mean partition or division, here it is most closely associated with its British cousin. Its other meaning is the sharing of something (Rockhill 2006). This is

where some of the unruliness lives in my opinion. To share something requires exchange and in an exchange you are fragile.

If you share a language of identification of the arts, if you share the recognition of art and its purpose, and you share the reproduction of its conventions, then this is not simply a top down process. It is not *Power over* in the traditional sense, it is more complicated than that. If the aesthetic regime affords you the chance to engage with a text in the 'singular' and redefine your distribution of the sensible and that is shared, then the system is fluid.

6 Ethical regime

The first regime of art that Rancière draws attention to is the 'Ethical regime' (Rancière 2006). This is the regime that questions the 'origin (and consequently their truth content) and the question of their end or purpose' (*ibid.*: 20) of a text. It is, in part, a question of where texts have come from. It is the realm in which the 'status and signification of the image' (*ibid.*: 21) is anointed and its position within a taxonomy of images is ascertained. In the case of this change to curriculum, the dismissal of the majority of the world's literary texts, renders those that are canonised and taught, as being within the ethical regime. Those considered appropriate for these young people to learn, hold a privileged position in the distribution of the sensible.

It is within the ethical regime that we see the most overt reference to power structures which predominate our experience of art. It is for those with a certain education or occupation (*ibid.*), trophies of identity that are not often extended to the students in these economically deprived schools. These schools are spaces that sit outside of the white, broad leafed Britain so aggressively invoked in the modern English literature curriculum, through its veneration of the likes of Keats, Byron and Austen.

In this regime Rancière concerns himself with those who have the power not only to produce such images, and define their destination but also place a 'ban' (*ibid.*: 20) on them. My interpretation is that this does not ban their circulation, it is more insidious than that, it is a prohibition of their right to worth. This I feel is where the violence of the changes to our curriculum becomes so apparent. The young people we work with, in these ruly spaces, do not often see people of similar ethnicities, religions, or their families' economic positions being included in this list of worthy texts. The arrogant assumption that students do not care about these changes is farcical and indicative of the ethical regimes preoccupation with those of certain educations having a right to speak.

7 The representative regime

The second regime of the arts Rancière refers to is the 'poetic- or representative' (*ibid.*: 21). This focuses on the 'substance of the arts'. It is, in some respects, to do with art as a *verb*.

This regime is not solely concerned with the reproduction of art or *mimesis* which I interpret as Rancière referring to the imitation of behaviour of one group of people, as opposed the presenting the real world in art. It is about how it is seen, or read after it has been produced as much as reproduction. This regime frames the means and language of interpretation. Whereas the ethical regime is concerned more overtly with where, for whom and by whom art is produced, this regime is concerned with how it is read, viewed and reproduced. It is 'a regime of visibility' (*ibid.*: 22) not so much where but how a text is read. It is in this respect that I refer to it as the *verb* in art. He talks of the distribution of the sensible being a means of differentiating between 'speech and noise' (*ibid.*: 13) and this is the regime I feel this is most apparent. It gives order to artists' actions. For a text to become legible it requires more than the foundations of its purpose and the lineage of its author. To read art from lexis you need to be able to break down the text into a collation of signifiers, to understand how to 'read' the text, and this I believe is the regime most closely associated with this.

The new English Language curriculum as an approach champions a framing of the language of interpretation (all curriculums do). This language, to achieve a level 4, which (we're told) is the equivalent of a C at GCSE, the students' response must show 'clear explanation of writer's methods with appropriate use of relevant subject terminology' (AQA 2017: 6). This can be read as evidence of 'proper ways of doing and making as well as assessing imitations' (Rancière 2006: 22). Students are required to learn what is good poetry, prose or verse, and how to reproduce the deconstructed elements identified. It does not propose, at this level, that they are critical of what they have been presented with. The origins (ethical regime) are not to be questioned, but they are taught to recognise its worth, accept it and then work to replicate it. Their responses must 'unpick how the text works and what the writer is doing' (AQA 2017: 6), there is no mention of why. It is prescriptive. The 'learner' is therefore not excluded from this regime of seeing; they are systematically inducted into how to see it. The learners are required to be able to recognise elements of artistic *excellence* that 'exclusively belonging to an art and assessed, within this framework, as good or bad' (Rancière 2006: 21–22). It can be read as building an ability to recognise pre-existing taxonomy's of artistic worth, much as this regime is concerned with the 'hierarchy of genres according to the dignity of their subject matter' (*ibid.*: 22). It is here that the restrictive and narrow pallet of literature on the curriculum can be considered something worthy of subversion.

If we take these two regimes of the arts into consideration, they compound and influence one another. The ethical regime concerns itself with a texts origins and genealogy, from a menu we have seen refocused along narrow nationalist lines. When we consider the representative regime, explained as the tools for deciphering or reading of a text that inform the reproduction of art. We see a cross pollination of these regimes means of control. This is where we see the violence in this curricular change. The students 'means of analysis' (representative) is limited to the 'texts' (ethical) they're being asked to decipher. This process 'defines the fields of possibility' (Hayward 2000: 11) of what a text can look like, how a text can be read, and who is in a position to produce it.

8 Aesthetic regime

The aesthetic regime is the final of Rancière's regimes of the arts, and where the opportunity for a reorganisation of the 'sensible' is possible. This regime 'strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from specific rule' (Rancière 2006: 23). It is a 'pure instance of suspension, a moment when form is experienced for itself' (*ibid.*: 23). Our unruly space allowed us to engage in texts for no other reason than intrigue, not outside but slightly removed from the overt pressures of the exam. The aesthetic regime stands in opposition to the representative regimes (*ibid.*) control over how a text is read. It claims to allow the individual to read the text in a moment without from the weight of history or in this case the weight of summative assessment. It brings the emotion back into the reading of art and unruliness.

This moment, or regime 'is a system of possibilities' (*ibid.*: 50) to read a text in a manner that is not dominated by the representative regime. It provides an opportunity to change the individuals understanding of a piece of art, or art itself. Our unruly space was a suspension of the normal rules, in a way it was a space where collectively we engaged with texts and activities that reshaped how we looked at English literature, and for me personally, how I viewed education.

The aesthetic regime is a 'new regime for relating to the past' (*ibid.*: 24). Whereas the ethical and representative regimes present a curated form of the past that is structured through those in positions of power, this regime allows the individual to redraw their own map of history. In the case of our unruly action we engaged with bell hooks' anger, with Fanon's view of colonial history, and Kate Tempest's London. These texts are a world away from the empirical literature of the curriculum. This space gave all of us an opportunity to reflect on

this multiplicity of histories, and that is something Rancière argues the aesthetic provides. It was a process that broadened our views of literature and teaching, it expanded our horizons and caused me to evaluate the structures of power within education.

I am not convinced that an act can be in complete suspension of our history and past as Rancière claims the aesthetic to be. A text's connotations are in dialogue with the culture it inhabits. Our language and culture is a palimpsest for our readings of any text, and I do not believe we can ever be in complete suspension from this. However, I read the aesthetic regime as something that can be kept present in mind, to allow for such spaces to develop outside of a summative framework then we can develop a more nuanced interpretation of history. It is important that in schools young people have space to play. To engage on their own terms so as to build a sense of what they regard as important, not what they are told is important.

It was a season of unruly acts that worked to redefine for all of us involved what English literature can or could be. The texts led to conversations surrounding the formulation of British history that many of the students stated they felt excluded from. The hope is that, in the provision of these spaces, individually and collectively we can build our own understandings of history. Understandings that challenge the narrative so readily evoked in the modern English curriculum and question the construction, and means of assessing, what is deemed 'proper literature'.

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Using Examples, Analyse how Climate Change will Increase Disaster Risk

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1 Introduction

Disaster risk is a function of two variables: hazards and vulnerability (Blaikie *et al.* 2004). Though hazards are natural, disasters are socially constructed and only occur when a hazard hits vulnerable people. Climate change will affect both variables; it will increase the frequency and magnitude of hazards, and will increase vulnerability to disasters by affecting natural variability, changing climatic trends and through slow onset changes. The main consequences of this will be undermining livelihoods, increasing risks for people who live in dangerous locations and unprotected buildings, and contributing to rapid urbanisation.

Answering this question requires a method of understanding the causes of current disaster risk, before assessing how climate change will affect those drivers. The Pressure and Release (PAR) model will be used for this purpose, and applied on to the drivers of disaster risk this model identifies will be the four different ways climate change will take effect. Examples from disasters that were caused by various kinds of natural hazards will be used in this assessment. Critically, the non-hazard impacts of climate change affect vulnerability and therefore increase disaster risk for all hazards, including those which will be unaffected by climate change. Having established the mechanisms by which climate change will increase disaster risk, this paper will query the assumption in the question: whether climate change will always increase disaster risk.

The question is about the processes by which climate change will increase disaster risk. This paper is not about climate projections or the level of uncertainty in climate models, nor is it a detailed analysis of the drivers of current vulnerability or disaster risk. Furthermore, this paper will tackle the question on a macro-level. Assessing how climate change will increase disaster risk for any one specific location on a micro-scale is outside the scope of this paper, requiring both significant qualitative data to understand the current drivers of vulnerability in that locale, and small-scale projections to determine the likely impacts of climate change there.

2 Frameworks

2.1 The PAR model

This paper will use the PAR model to assess current disaster risk (*ibid.*). As shown above, the model visualises a disaster as occurring in the middle of two pressures: the causes of vulnerability on the left hand side and the hazard event on the right. The model divides the processes that create vulnerability into a causal hierarchy comprised of three parts: unsafe conditions, the immediate situation people live in, dynamic pressures, the medium term processes that facilitate the creation of unsafe conditions, and root causes, the long term underlying factors. This model is useful in answering how climate change will increase disaster risk because it is specifically intended to examine vulnerability to disasters, and it delineates everything from historic causes to the immediate day-to-day reasons people are vulnerable to hazards. This separation of factors means the different impacts of climate change can be applied on top, to assess how it will affect each factor.

Increased variability manifests over the medium-term, and includes changing or increasing the frequency or probability of climate variables, the seasons, and ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation). Trends occur over the longer-term, and include changes in mean temperatures, precipitation and climate patterns. Slow onset changes occur over very long periods, and include sea level rise and melting glaciers (IPCC 2014b; Kehinde 2014); they are outcomes that are new and unique to climate change whereas the others alter the frequency or probability distributions of natural climate variability (Smit *et al.* 2000). Though these effects are not discrete, with, for example, hazards resulting from increased variability, it is useful as a framework to delineate the impacts to enable an assessment of the mechanisms by which climate change will increase disaster risk.

How climate change affects each of the drivers of vulnerability will be assessed, with examples highlighting some of the consequences for people on the ground. Though for the purposes of this analysis the different drivers of vulnerability are being taken individually, it is important to remember that they act together. For example, a decline in soil productivity and other natural resource degradation undermines the livelihoods that are dependent on them. Also, factors described in the PAR model that will be unaffected by climate change, like a lack of press freedom, will not be discussed below.

3 Applying the frameworks: how climate change will increase disaster risk

After analysing how climate change will affect the hazard side of the PAR model, for the left hand side of the model this chapter will analyse unsafe conditions first, then dynamic pressures and root causes, as the impacts of climate change on the causes of vulnerability move from being more direct to more diffuse in this order. For clarity, within these subsections, the drivers of vulnerability will be discussed in the order the PAR model uses.

3.1 Hazards

This section will assess how climate change will affect hazards, the right hand side of the PAR model. Increasing the magnitude and frequency of hazards is one of the four impacts of climate change. However, more frequent tropical cyclones in the middle of the ocean do not cause disasters; what is important is how people's disaster risk will be increased by the impacts of climate change on hazards. This will occur in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the intensity of hazards, climate change will magnify existing situations where the risks are already apparent (IPCC 2014a). For example, the 2010 flash floods in Pakistan resulted from heavy monsoon rain, caused by record high sea surface temperatures due to climate change and ENSO, resulting in unusually abundant atmospheric moisture (Trenberth and Fasullo 2012), and causing huge damage, even though floods are common there (Mahmood, Khan and Ullah 2016). Secondly, due to the spatial extension of hazards, climate change will increase physical exposure, with hazards hitting new places and people. In particular floods and droughts will affect greater areas, and salinisation will affect delta regions (IPCC 2012). An example is the 2003 heatwave in Europe, where such hazards are historically rare, and which resulted in over 70,000 additional deaths (Robine *et al.* 2008). Climate change increased the risk of the occurrence of such an event (Stott, Stone and Allen 2004), and similar heatwaves are predicted to become more common (Beniston 2004). However, vulnerability is a subset of exposure, and not everyone who is newly exposed to a hazard will suffer harm if they have access to resources that decrease their risk.

The other impacts of climate change, increased variability, trends and slow onset changes, will also affect the hazard side of the PAR model. Meteorological hazards are a natural phenomenon and result from natural variability; climate change will exacerbate this variability, increasing the likelihood of a threshold being surpassed and a hazard situation occurring. For example, unusually high precipitation can result in a flood. Trends affect the mean, increasing, for example, the likelihood of a heatwave or a drought, or worsening their effects (Smit *et al.* 2000). Slow onset changes will exacerbate some kinds of hazards. For

example, sea level rise will affect hazards in coastal areas through increasing the physical risk of flooding and increasing storm surge damage from cyclones (Van Aalst 2006).

Climate change will not affect all kinds of hazards; there is no evidence climate change or sea level rise will influence volcanic eruptions or earthquakes (McGuire, Mason and Kilburn 2002). However, climate change will alter the left hand side of the PAR model for both climatic and non-climatic hazards, and this chapter will now assess how climate change will affect the economic, social, cultural and political factors that determine vulnerability.

3.2 Unsafe conditions

The key purpose of this analysis is to determine how climate change will affect the drivers that already cause vulnerability. Living in a dangerous location already contributes to disaster risk; the question is how climate change will make such factors even more dangerous.

People's physical environment is a key driver of their vulnerability to disasters, and acting upon this is one of the most significant ways climate change will increase disaster risk. People who live in dangerous locations are at increased risk from disasters because they are more exposed to hazard events. However, this is an example of how risks are perceived differently; in locations where some people see livelihood opportunities, DRR organisations only see the dangers from potential hazards. Climate change will have a huge impact on increasing disaster risk for people who are already vulnerable because they live in dangerous locations. Such people are put at further risk from the increased intensity and frequency of hazards due to climate change, because to their high level of exposure. For example, living on hillsides make people vulnerable to landslides, coastal areas vulnerable to storms, and low lying areas, floodplains or near to rivers makes them vulnerable to floods (IPCC 2014a). Furthermore, sea level rise will affect those living in coastal areas, through salination of water resources and increased risk from storms.

The impacts of climate change will also exacerbate the dangers from living in unprotected buildings. People who are unable to afford to live in buildings that are well constructed and maintained are more vulnerable to hazards, and are risking injury or death should the building collapse as a result of the stress from a hazard. Climate change will exacerbate this risk in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the strength and frequency of hazards, with for example the winds from tropical cyclones causing structural damage to buildings and property, and secondly through increased variability. For example, increased summer drying can cause ground shrinkage, which can damage building foundations (Van Aalst 2006). The consequences of living in an unsafe building in a dangerous location can be severe when a hazard hits: 30,000 people were killed and 100,000 were displaced by flash flooding and mudslides in the coastal, hillside slums of Caracas, Venezuela in 1999 (Blaikie *et al.* 2004).

Climate change will put livelihoods increasingly at risk. Examples of currently dangerous livelihoods suggested by Blaikie *et al.* (2004) include ocean fishing in small boats and wildlife poaching. Climate change will expand this to almost any livelihood that is dependent on natural resources (IPCC 2014a). Indeed, all four impacts of climate change will affect livelihoods. Through its effects on hazards, climate change will increase the disruption of livelihoods. Increased variability and trends will work together to undermine agricultural livelihoods through increasing stresses, whilst sea level rise will destroy the livelihoods of people living in low-lying coastal areas. As an example, fishery-based livelihoods will be affected by all four effects of climate change; hazards will disrupt operations, whilst increased variability, trends and sea level rise will result in critical ecological and biological changes to marine and freshwater ecosystems and their resident fish populations (Badjeck *et al.* 2010). Therefore, by placing more livelihoods at risk, climate change will increase disaster risk, as it will reduce people's capacity to adapt and cope with hazards.

Low income levels are another issue climate change will exacerbate. Poverty and disaster risk are not identical but are often closely linked (Blaikie *et al.* 2004). A lot of disaster risk can be mitigated through having access to financial resources, whether that is through insurance, having savings, or simply being able to afford to live in less hazardous conditions in the first place. People who are already vulnerable because of their low incomes will have their disaster risk increased by climate change's impacts on hazards and variability. Hazards will wipe out their current assets, and they will not have access to the resources necessary to rebuild and restore what was lost. Increased variability will put pressure on their livelihoods, and because of their low incomes, coping with even a short disruption will be challenging, with being able to purchase enough food quickly becoming an issue.

Disaster preparedness is key in both helping people to avoid the approaching threats from hazards and in providing assistance to those affected after the event, though many communities lack disaster preparedness even for the magnitudes of hazards that currently occur. The hazard impact of climate change, making hazards more frequent and intense, will only serve to exacerbate this; as climatic extremes are covariant risks, which affect a wide range of people in an area simultaneously, current safety nets will become overwhelmed (UNDP 2008).

The prevalence of endemic diseases will also be increased by climate change, through the impacts of increasing variability and changing trends. For example, cholera is sensitive to climate variability (Rodo *et al.* 2002), which will be exacerbated by climate change. The 2008 cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe affected around 92,000 people and killed over 4,000 (Mason 2009), with the outbreak amplified by the onset of the rainy season (Luque Fernández *et al.* 2009). Such epidemics can be expected to become more frequent with climate change. Trends will affect other diseases as well. For example, warmer global average temperatures will likely see mosquitos spreading malaria over greater areas (Patz *et al.* 2002), with up to 300 million additional people at risk of malaria globally in 2080 due to climate change (Martens *et al.* 1999). By increasing the prevalence of endemic diseases, thereby affecting people's health and capacity to earn an income, climate change will increase disaster risk.

3.3 Dynamic pressures

Increased variability and trends will increase vulnerability by exacerbating a lack of appropriate skills and local investments. As climate change disrupts the conditions under which livelihoods had been carried out, previously held knowledge, techniques and investments will become insufficient to deal with the new status quo (IPCC 2014a).

Rapid urbanisation will be affected by climate change through all four of its impacts. Migration to cities is often a common response after a disaster has occurred, making rural families destitute, and the impact of climate change on hazards would exacerbate this driver of urban migration (Black *et al.* 2011a). However, the stresses climate change puts on rural livelihoods through increased variability and changing trends also contribute to rural to urban migration, whilst slow onset changes like sea level rise will displace entire communities, who will likely be forced to move to urban areas to find new livelihoods.

Climate change will contribute to a decline in soil productivity through increased variability, trends and slow onset changes. Areas where increased variability results in more frequent and intense precipitation events will increase wind and water erosion rates. The increases in average temperatures will result in salinisation of the soil, as evapotranspiration will be greater than precipitation and irrigation, whilst rising sea levels will increase flood incidence and salinity along coastal regions (Brevik 2013; IPCC 2014a).

Therefore the four impacts of climate change will worsen many of the unsafe conditions and dynamic pressures the PAR model identifies as increasing people's disaster risk.

3.4 Root causes

Root causes are the political and economic systems that determine the distribution of power and access to assets in a society, and people who lack access are more vulnerable to disasters. Though dealing with the root causes is essential to reducing vulnerability, it is not clear how climate change will affect these factors, and any impact is likely to be diffuse, with causation likely impossible to prove.

Klein (2007) argues natural disasters have been used as a pretext to further neoliberal ideology and institute economic reforms; for example, she contends corporate taxes were cut, regulations were eliminated and the public school system was replaced by charter schools after Hurricane Katrina. By increasing the likelihood of disasters through its impacts on both hazards and the drivers of vulnerability discussed above, it is possible climate change could make such societal reforms more likely. Giroux (2004) argues neoliberalism erodes public participation in democratic life and is behind the failure to tackle the problems of poverty and health in the USA, saying its proponents view people as expendable in the pursuit of profit. Therefore it could be argued climate change could contribute to creating situations where, as corporate vested interests become more dominant, people could have even less access to power, resources and the political system, and are therefore at greater risk from disasters. Whilst this is the most speculative assessment in this paper, it serves to illustrate the complexities in assigning causality and how climate change could affect the root causes of vulnerability under certain circumstances.

3.5 The example of Bangladesh

Having established which impacts of climate change will affect the drivers of vulnerability identified in the PAR model, this subsection will attempt to illustrate how this could work in practice, and show the nuances and complexities of the interactions between the impacts of climate change and the factors that cause vulnerability. The example used is a hypothetical hazard affecting Dhaka, though it will be based on the current context and drivers of vulnerability, along with the addition of the likely consequences of climate change.

In Bangladesh moving to cities is a common coping strategy after floods, with 22 per cent of the households affected by tidal-surge floods and 16 per cent affected by riverbank erosion migrating to urban areas (Black *et al.* 2011a). This will be fuelled by the impact of climate change on hazards, increasing their frequency and intensity. However, urban migration will also be driven by the other effects of climate change; through increased variability and trends affecting rural agricultural livelihoods, which combined with the growing population of Bangladesh, will reduce both the productivity of and access to the natural resources that are essential for rural livelihoods like fisheries and forests (Black *et al.* 2011b). Rice, Bangladesh's main crop, is especially sensitive to increasing temperatures and a decline in the length of the monsoon, both of which have already been observed (Rahman *et al.* 2007). It is also likely climate change will contribute to a decline in soil productivity due to increased salinity in coastal areas. Therefore climate change will also result in urban migration by affecting rural livelihoods and incomes.

However, climate change is rarely the only factor, and in this case there are also pull factors behind the migration to cities; urban incomes are more secure as they are usually wage-based, and this applies even in slums, with employment usually successfully found in Dhaka almost immediately after arriving (Black *et al.* 2011b). Most migrants to Dhaka do live in the slums, which are growing around 4 per cent per year and account for 86 per cent of the total urban population (*ibid.*). Slums are usually located in dangerous areas such as flood plains or the low-lying islands (known locally as char) that emerged from silt deposition in the river estuaries of the delta regions, and they are particularly liable to be hit by cyclones and river flooding (Blaikie *et al.* 2004). Therefore these migrants will have moved from one place of

environmental danger to a new one in Dhaka, and they will have been forced to live in unprotected buildings and in dangerous locations.

At this point the hypothetical hazard hits. For argument's sake, this hazard is an earthquake; this is plausible, as the Earthquake Disaster Risk Index ranks Dhaka among the 20 cities most at risk of earthquakes in the world (World Bank 2013). Even though climate change will not influence the likelihood or magnitude of the earthquake, all the other non-hazard impacts of climate change on the drivers of vulnerability from the left hand side of the PAR model have increased the disaster risk for the people of Dhaka.

However, if this hypothetical hazard was meteorological, like a flood resulting from heavy precipitation, climate change could have also had an effect on the right hand side of the PAR model, by increasing the intensity or likelihood of the hazard occurring. Whether or not Dhaka's disaster preparations would be able to cope would depend on the magnitude of the hazard event, though again one of the impacts of climate change is to make such phenomena more severe. The combination of the hazard event and the underlying causes of vulnerability would then create a disaster.

This in turn could result in an outbreak of disease; for example as surface water gets contaminated outbreaks of intestinal diseases like diarrhoea and cholera have occurred in Bangladesh during and after floods (Toufique and Islam 2014; Brouwer *et al.* 2007). Therefore, this hypothetical disaster shows how the different drivers of vulnerability in the PAR model are interrelated, and how the four impacts of climate change can combine with the other contextual factors that cause disaster risk, and further increase the risk.

4 Will climate change always increase disaster risk?

As illustrated above, climate change will increase disaster risk, primarily through increasing the impact of and exposure to hazards and by affecting livelihoods. However, the assumption that climate change will always increase disaster risk should be questioned. For instance, it is likely the disaster risk of some people, particularly the wealthy in developed countries, will be unaffected by climate change as they have such high adaptive capacity and access to resources and coping strategies (CAFOD 2014).

It is also possible climate change could decrease disaster risk for some people. The IPCC definition of adaptation to climate change includes the aim to 'exploit beneficial opportunities' (IPCC 2012: 5), implying climate change could have positive effects, resulting in a reduction in vulnerability for some people. In some areas livelihoods could become more secure, or new livelihoods will become viable. For example, some species of fish might become more abundant (Badjeck *et al.* 2010), decreasing vulnerability for some fishing livelihoods, and grapevine cultivation will become possible for new areas in northern Europe (Moriondo *et al.* 2013), allowing for diversification of agricultural livelihoods. However, the processes of climate change, in particular the trend of increasing average temperatures that could facilitate improved agricultural livelihoods in some northern countries, will increase the vulnerability of people elsewhere by harming their agricultural opportunities (IPCC 2014a).

Furthermore, whilst it was suggested above climate change could result in political and economic reforms that increase disaster risk, the opposite could also be true in some cases. Blaikie *et al.* (2004) argue the mass trauma of disasters could result in transformative political changes that reduce disaster risk, citing how the 1970 East Pakistan cyclone storm surge contributed to the growth of the Bangladesh independence movement, and how the governments of Niger and Ethiopia were unseated after their incompetence in handling the Sahel famine of the 1970s. The impact of climate change on hazards could have such a result. Therefore, though this analysis is conjectural, because some people will have such access to resources they will be largely unaffected by climatic changes, through creating

opportunities for new livelihoods, and via transformative changes in the aftermath of disasters, climate change will not necessarily increase disaster risk for everyone.

5 Conclusion

Climate change will increase disaster risk by affecting both the hazard and vulnerability sides of the PAR model. Climate change will exacerbate conditions for those who are already most vulnerable to disasters, whether through increasing the likelihood of the destruction of their physical environment, undermining people's livelihoods and incomes, and contributing to rapid urbanisation.

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How Can Unruly Politics Explain the Rise of Populism in the UK?

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1 Introduction

The recent rise of populism in many Western countries has disrupted mainstream politics (Inglehart and Norris 2016). It has raised important questions, including what is causing this change in the political landscape, and how political actors can interpret and act on the demands being made by citizens supporting populism. In this essay I aim to investigate this field by analysing the rise of populism in the UK, interpreting what is being expressed through this phenomenon and why it has come about. I will argue that populism in the UK can be explained through an unruly politics lens: that populism is an unruly act to reject the left-right spectrum, and people are being unruly due to insecurity. This is argued from the standpoint of populism itself, regarding its aim to be unruly, as I acknowledge it could be analysed differently from other perspectives. I will specifically look at the cases of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and Brexit (the British exit from the European Union) to provide evidence for my argument. I will start by outlining the context, including defining populism and relating it to ideology, the left-right spectrum, and the case in the UK, and the four characteristics of unruly politics as my theoretical framework. I will then take each of these characteristics in turn, and show how it explains populism as relating to insecurity and rejecting left-right ideology. Finally, I will conclude that looking at populism through an unruly lens is vital to understand and address its root causes.

2 Populism

Whilst a broad and changing concept, Pollock *et al.* summarise populism as ‘forms of anti-elitism and a cynicism towards those who are responsible for government’ (Pollock, Brock and Ellison 2015: 142). Mudde (2007) focuses on ‘radical right’ populism, which he operationalises into three main features: *anti-establishment* - resentment of authorities and belief in the wisdom of ordinary people over the ‘corrupt’ establishment, *authoritarianism* - favouring power of a strong, charismatic leader and majoritarian over representative democracy, reflecting the will of the people, and *nativism* – preferring monoculturalism, national self-interest and closed borders, and assuming ‘the people’ are uniform. This definition is useful for this analysis, however as will be explored below, does not represent the broader definition of populism. Inglehart and Norris (2017) equate populism to a fundamental change in society in recent decades. They cite the ‘silent revolution’ theory, stating that citizens in developed countries, due to high levels of economic security, have been changing their values to progressive movements, supporting minority rights and redistribution of wealth. However, this security has been compromised by a shrinking welfare state and neoliberal austerity (Inglehart and Norris 2016), and the rise in insecurity encourages a xenophobic, authoritarian reaction; this is because with more competition for scarce resources, people strive to fulfil their basic needs, and ‘struggle for survival against dangerous outsiders’ (Inglehart and Norris 2017: 1). I will apply this theory of insecurity as a catalyst for populism throughout my arguments.

I argue in this essay that populism is a rejection of the left-right ideology. I define ideology simply as ‘a set of political beliefs about how society ought to be and how to improve it’ (Adams 2001: 2), and I refer to the left-right spectrum as programmatic ideologies on the distribution of wealth and economic inequality, with the left supporting greater redistribution (Lee 2013). Populism is often assumed to represent an ideology, and as demonstrated above, is especially associated with far-right politics. For instance, Mudde (2004) calls populism a ‘thin-centred ideology’, as it is not fully formed, but can still be placed on the

ideological spectrum. Others, however, argue that populism is not ideological in itself. Pollock *et al.* (2015: 145) argue that populist views have a lack of 'ideological coherence' that do not reflect a system of beliefs, rather the local and regional conditions, and therefore does not map onto the left-right spectrum. Similarly, Aslanidis (2016) calls populism a 'discourse' which rejects the dominant discourse, rather than an ideology, and Freedden (2017) says populism is not ideological because populist groups are not concerned with which topics form their rhetoric, they instead emphasise items which mobilise public opinion. This is important because I will argue that instead of being an ideology, populism is a manifestation of the disillusion with the traditional left-right ideology in the UK, which has disorientated and frustrated voters from across the spectrum; populism has risen to reject dominant ideologies, not to replace them.

3 Populism in the UK

The rise in popularity of the political party UKIP, and Brexit, referring to the referendum to British voters regarding membership of the EU (European Union), represent the recent growth of populism in the UK. UKIP rose to prominence in the 2015 general election, winning only one seat in parliament, but gaining 12.6% of the national vote (3.9 million votes): an increase of 9.5% since 2010 (*BBC News* 2015). UKIP is a populist party (Freedden 2017): it scores 91.8 / 100 on the CHES Populism Party Scale, with its main values described as pro-market, socially conservative and deeply Eurosceptic (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This demonstrates its close connection with Brexit, where in 2016, 51.9% of the electorate voted to leave the EU, and UKIP played a significant role in this campaign (Swales 2016). The current 'implosion' of UKIP since Brexit proves its status as a populist party; its one-issue politics has led to it losing popularity since achieving its central aim of leaving the EU (Freedden 2017). Brexit was considered a populist vote; using the characteristics above, it was anti-establishment as the official government stance was to remain (Deloy 2016), so 'leave' voters rebelled against the establishment, authoritarian as a direct democracy exercise of the will of the people, and nativist as the vote was swayed by matters of global integration: the three main issues concerning Brexit voters were immigration, sovereignty, and the economy (Swales 2012). It should be noted that not all UKIP and Brexit supporters have the intentions laid out in this analysis; I refer to generalised trends and hypotheses. I will investigate what explains this rise of UK populism, and explore it as a British form of unruly politics which aims to reject the left-right ideology.

4 Unruly politics

In the unruly politics manifesto, Shankland *et al.* define unruly politics as: 'political action by people who have been denied voice by the rules of the political game, and by the social rules that underpin this game' (Shankland *et al.* cited in Khanna 2012: 166), highlighting the demographic of those excluded from other forms of political and social participation. The manifesto outlines four main features of unruly politics. The first is it represents resource claims made by less powerful on more powerful actors, in situations of acute need and scarcity. The second is it lies outside of or jars with civil forms of democratic engagement: taking forms that are illegal, violent, disruptive of the social order, strident or rude. The third is that the actions illicit a response, or force official attention to the concerns being voiced. Finally, it represents a moral economy of entitlement and obligation, that encapsulates, constructs, and defends a powerful popular sense of fairness (Shankland *et al.* cited in Khanna 2012). An important unruly feature is that once an act has happened, it becomes incorporated as 'politics', and is no longer unruly (Khanna 2012). However, I interpret unruly politics slightly differently, incorporating acts as unruly which are performed within normal institutional parameters, however have the same intention and impact as unruly acts as defined above. I will now show how populism, although manifested through conventional political channels, can be explained through this unruly politics framework. I will address each feature of unruly politics in turn.

5 Resource claims

The first feature of unruly politics I will analyse is resource claims made on powerful actors, in situations of scarcity. The populist votes of UKIP and Brexit can be argued to be a reaction to economic scarcity amongst certain groups, and a way of voicing concerns about the distribution of resources in the UK. Inglehart and Norris (2016) outline the 'economic inequality thesis', suggesting that populism is a consequence of globalisation, neoliberal austerity measures and a shrinking welfare state, causing rising economic inequality and social deprivation in developed countries. There are strong arguments that neoliberal policies implemented in the last 30 years have had such detrimental effects in the UK. Since the implementation of neoliberal politics – the free market, low taxes, and cutting welfare spending – there has been a steep rise in poverty, income inequality, and inequality of access to basic services (Fuchs 2016). Sivanandan (2013: 3) argues that the creation of a 'market society' – emphasising individualism over social welfare – has structured inequality and poverty into the foundations of society, resulting in working class citizens 'who have fallen off the edge'.

Looking at the demographics of UKIP and Brexit supporters, populism could be a way of voicing discontent for this economic trend. In the Brexit vote, 66% of low-income voters, 70% of those in social housing, 59% of the working class, and 70% of those finding it difficult to manage financially, voted 'leave' (Swales 2016). These are all much higher than the average Brexit vote of 51.9%, and are all groups with fewer financial resources. Similarly, support for UKIP is more than twice as high among the working class than other social classes, and twice as high among those who say they are 'really struggling' on their current income, than those who say they are 'really comfortable' (Curtice and Ormston 2015). These suggest that economic resources are a factor in choosing to support populism, and insecurity, as hypothesised by Inglehart and Norris (2017), could have caused people to turn to xenophobia as a form of blame for increasingly uneven distribution of economic resources. Therefore, populism, as UKIP and Brexit support, could be explained by the unruly politics characteristic of excluded citizens making resource claims on the powerful actors they deem responsible for their economic insecurity.

This unruly act of resource claims made on elites could be a rejection of traditional left-right politics, due to voter disillusion about which parties are supporting the working class and poorest citizens. Traditionally, the Labour party's supporters are working class, less well-off citizens, attracted to the party through its socialist, left-wing leaning policies, which redistribute wealth to the poorest in society (Heath 2000). However, since it reinvented itself as 'New Labour' in 1997, the party has moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum; Lee (2013) argues that the two main parties (Labour and Conservatives) have converged in the centre, occupying a smaller area of political debate. Heath (2000) suggests that this move of mainstream politics away from the socialist left has disillusioned traditional Labour supporters with less economic resources, who now lack a party representing their interests. This is supported by UKIP attracting disaffected former Labour voters: many voters alienated by New Labour's move to centre ground voted for Conservatives in 2010, and then moved to UKIP in 2015 (Evans and Mellon 2016). This trend dispels the idea of voting according to the left-right spectrum, as a party that is considered 'radical right' is gaining votes from a former left-wing socialist party; whilst UKIP may be considered right-wing, this suggests that its supporters are making a desperate plea for resources, by skipping over the ideological spectrum. These disillusioned voters turned to populism to reject the left-right spectrum that has not worked for them, through an unruly act to highlight their economic insecurity.

6 Outside of civil forms of democratic engagement

The second feature of unruly politics is that it lies outside of civil forms of democratic engagement, and acts are illegal, violent, disruptive of the social order, strident or rude.

Voting in a referendum or supporting a political party are definitely not actions that lie outside of civil forms of democratic engagement; in fact, they are the most traditional and formal methods. However, to look at this differently, it can be argued that the intended outcome of the rise of populism, not the form of participation, jars with the norms and expectations of democratic engagement, and has disrupted the expected social order through 'shaking up' traditional electoral outcomes. It is also a reaction to democratic participation: Cumbers argues that the rise of UK populism is down to some citizens being marginalised from democratic engagement. He found that in OECD countries with higher poverty and inequality, citizens were more likely to be excluded from decision-making processes (Cumbers 2017).

This disengagement from decision-making is evident amongst UKIP and Brexit supporters. Of those who agreed with the statement 'politicians do not listen to people like me', 58% voted for Brexit (Swales 2016). UKIP supporters have significantly higher levels of distrust of and disengagement with the government than supporters of other parties, and 70% of UKIP supporters agreed with the statement 'people like me don't have any say about what the government does', compared with an average of 44% from all respondents (Curtice and Ormston 2015). This demonstrates the higher-than-average feeling among these groups that they are disconnected from the democratic decision-making process and feel they have been denied voice in democratic participation. This links into this group's sense of insecurity, because if they do not trust the government to listen to their needs and guarantee their basic economic security, then they could turn to populism as a form of protesting. This unruly framework therefore helps explain populism, as some Brexit and UKIP supporters could aim to disrupt the social order of excluding certain citizens from standard democratic voice.

Furthermore, populism is disruptive of the social order as it unsettles the standard ideological spectrum. Political rhetoric has long been dominated by positionality on this intangible scale of left and right, and many voters align themselves on the scale with political parties when casting votes (Pattie and Johnston 2009). However, as argued, populism does not map systematically onto this left-right political spectrum. Brexit has very little correlation with such ideological preferences of voters: 53% of people who identified themselves as 'right leaning' voted for Brexit, compared with 50% of those 'left leaning' (Swales 2016). Interestingly, UKIP supporters associate more with left values than Conservative supporters, aligning with Labour supporters. For example, 76% of UKIP supporters and 71% of Labour supporters feel that 'ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth', whilst only 41% of Conservative supporters agree; the report describes UKIP supporters as 'far from on the right' (Curtice and Ormston 2015). Whilst such statements are provocative in that they stir up a sense of injustice, which is associated with the anti-elite rhetoric of populism, these statistics nevertheless provide a picture of populism as not following the ingrained assumption in the UK that supporters can be placed on a scale from left to right, and necessarily follow the values of this position. This form of populism as questioning the left-right assumption can therefore be explained by the unruly characteristic of disrupting expectations of the social order.

7 Elicits a response

The third feature of unruly politics is that actions elicit a response, or force official attention to specific concerns being voiced. In the UK, the government cannot ignore demands emerging from the rise of populism; as outlined above, it became a significant proportion of the population, which shifts crucial votes away from mainstream parties and politics. Prime Minister Theresa May gave a speech in January 2017 addressing economic concerns raised by populism, and matching populist rhetoric by blaming the establishment for neglecting the majority: she accused mainstream politicians of 'ignoring the legitimate concerns of ordinary people for too long' (Parker 2017). Similarly, the 2017 general election campaigning targeted people whose voices are not being heard: the three main parties all addressed the issue of voters feeling disconnected from power in their manifestos (Easton 2017). Inglehart and

Norris (2016: 2) outline how populism can exert huge 'blackmail pressure' on mainstream parties, public discourse, and the policy agenda: they give the example of how rising support for UKIP catalysed the government to hold a referendum on leaving the EU, and then were forced to follow up by implementing Brexit. This demonstrates populism driving a change in the national conversation about key issues being expressed, and the government feeling the need to respond to them, due to the strength of the threat populism poses to mainstream politics.

Much of the government's response to populism altering politics has been to address, rhetorically, concerns of economic insecurity (Parker 2017). However, this may be difficult in reality. If rising economic inequality and insecurity are caused by neoliberal structures, these are deeply entrenched in society, so a government on a short-term, five-year mandate may be unable, or unwilling, to take meaningful action. Either way, unruly politics provides an explanation of populist acts as a means to provoke a response from authorities.

This manifestation of populism eliciting an official response can help make the case for a rejection of left-right politics. The rise of populism could represent people trying to provoke action from the government regarding their confusion over mainstream politics: particularly what parties represent and who to vote for. Dommert (2012) describes how even though the main UK parties do have ideological underpinnings, on the surface it appears to voters as a 'consensual, non-ideological agenda', where parties are converging and it is difficult to distinguish them. Therefore, populism rejecting the left-right spectrum, as unruly politics suggests, could be a call for political actors to make parties more relatable and differentiated.

8 Defends a powerful popular sense of fairness

The final characteristic of unruly politics is that it represents a moral economy of entitlement and obligation, which builds a powerful, popular sense of fairness; in other words, it is generally accepted as an injustice worth fighting for. Populism embodies this feature from its own standpoint; it is based on expressing the needs of 'the silent majority', and emphasises the wisdom of 'ordinary people' (Inglehart and Norris 2016). It therefore uses the rallying cry of a sense of fairness of what is happening to people 'like me and you', through claims like 'we are the forgotten majority', or even the Occupy movement's slogan of 'we are the 99%' (Stelter 2011). This mobilises people by including them in suffering this great injustice, which creates a popular sense of fairness; it draws on people's individual economic situations to create a collective moral sense of entitlement, by uniting those in the same situation, and othering and blaming people who are not.

Building this popular sense of fairness has been done through playing on what Inglehart and Norris (2016) call the 'cultural backlash thesis'. This is the idea that populism can be a reaction to progressive cultural change, which makes people feel threatened; this can cause them to react against multiculturalism, a key cultural change in recent decades, by blaming it for the inequality and economic insecurity faced by many. For instance, a recent UKIP slogan was 'we want our country back' (Nickerson 2016), and a frequently used phrase in the Brexit leave campaign was 'take back control' (Haughton 2016). These phrases play on people's insecurities of being threatened by cultural change, and exacerbate the sense of entitlement and control over resources that were once in people's hands and are no longer as easily available. Unruly politics explains populism in this sense of using rhetoric to defend and proliferate a depicted sense of injustice, creating a wave of support for the cause.

Populism harbouring anger towards an unjust society could also be demonstrated by the rejection of left-right politics. Swales (2016: 15) contends that the Brexit debate was swayed not just by economic factors, but also by 'views on acceptable social behaviour and moral fairness', which cut across the ideological spectrum, incorporating left-leaning and right-leaning voters. As outlined above, the left-right spectrum is often a deciding factor in voters' preferences for parties and policies, however this result shows that a sense of moral fairness

has overridden traditional ideological preferences. Populism, therefore, has manipulated economic and social injustice, to cut through both left and right ideologies and deem them as irrelevant. By viewing this act through an unruly lens, it demonstrates how populism mobilises support by creating a collective and popular sense of moral entitlement for the 'forgotten many', beyond the ideological spectrum.

9 Conclusion

Overall, this essay has used an unruly lens to explain the rise and aims of populism, to argue how it was caused by growing insecurity in the UK, and an important element to its expansion was a rejection of traditional left-right politics due to disillusion with the system. I have done this by systematically analysing populism through the main features of unruly politics; although populism is not a standard unruly act, I have argued that through using an unruly politics framework it is possible to understand both its underlying motivations and forms of functioning. This is important because populism is changing the face of politics in the UK; politicians need to understand what the electorate is expressing through support for UKIP and Brexit, and it may be that populism is a very British form of being unruly. Unruly politics is, by definition, a cry to be heard by people who do not feel that conventional decision-making processes allow them to communicate their needs. Therefore, by viewing populism as a form of unruly politics, it allows the recognition of underlying demands made in an unconventional manner to be heard, to bring the growing minority of populism supporters into a space where they can express their voices.

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