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Concepts of citizenship: a review

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Preface

Very little is known about the realities of how different people understand themselves as citizens, and the ways in which this impacts on the different dimensions of their lives. Similarly, little is known about how rights languages are actually used in situated struggles, by different individuals and groups, and to what effect. The 'Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability' aims to bring the voices of citizens in different contexts to the often abstract debates around citizenship. It hopes to contribute to the understanding of citizenship: the realities, challenges and opportunities it poses for different people, and to utilise citizens' knowledges to point to strategies for change. The review essay in this Development Bibliography provides a broad map to contemporary thinking around citizenship, in order to provide a theoretical frame of reference for empirical work on the contextual relations between citizenship, participation and accountability. The attached section of annotated references provides brief summaries of recent texts that we have found to be particularly helpful. Other papers in this series explore participation, accountability and inclusion as they relate to citizenship, and thus both complement and give greater depth to the summaries provided in this Development Bibliography.

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1 Introduction: citizenship and development

Since the late 1990s, several parallel shifts in development thought have contributed to the rise of citizenship as an emerging area of debate in development studies. The focus of participatory development, long rooted in the domain of ‘community projects’, began to turn towards political participation and increasing poor and marginalised people’s influence over the wider decision-making processes, which affect their lives (Holland and Blackburn 1998; Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Cornwall 2000). Alongside this shift was the rise of the ‘good governance’ agenda and its concerns with decentralised governance and increasing responsiveness of governments to the needs and priorities of citizens (Minogue 1997; Rhodes 1996; Schneider 1999; Edralin 1997). Representing a level of convergence, these shifts have opened spaces for the participation and good governance agendas to meet in the concept of ‘citizenship participation’.

The late 1990s also saw the unfolding of a new relationship between the domains of human rights and development, crystallised in the ‘rights-based approach to development’. Embraced in various forms by international development institutions, such as the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), parts of the international human rights movement, many civil society groups and some governments, ‘the rights-based approach to development politicises needs’ (Ferguson 1999). The entrance of rights opens further spaces for the issue of citizenship within development. Moreover, shaped by parallel moves within both human rights and development thought, participation itself has been re-framed as a fundamental human and citizenship right, and a prerequisite for making other rights claims (Hausermann 1998; Ferguson 1999).

The emerging focus on citizenship within development, mirrors the increasingly global interest in citizenship (Heater 1999). Heater (1999: 2–3) argues that the contemporary interest in citizenship can be explained by six interlocking factors. Among these factors are the contemporary processes of globalisation-localisation, and the associated dynamics of increased international migrations, heightened political awareness of ethnic and cultural difference within nation-states, and a fragmentation of nation-states on the basis of this politicised difference. In response, some governments have drawn on the notion of citizenship as a civic identity in an attempt to draw citizens together under a new form of commonality (see Meekosha and Dowse 1997; Seidman 1999). In contrast, alongside these nationalist moves, contemporary questioning of the validity of the nation-state has prompted calls for recognition of the multi-layered nature of citizenship (local to global), and the need to address the exclusions created by the linkage of citizenship to nation-states (Ellison 1997; Falk 1998; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997; Newell 2000; Turner 1999).

Moreover, there is increasing consciousness that for many people citizenship is, in practice, a hollow and meaningless idea (Heater 1999: 3). Around the world, relationships between citizens and the institutions which affect their lives are being shrouded in a crisis of legitimacy, with citizens expressing disillusionment with governments and concern over their lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor (Commonwealth Foundation 1999; Narayan *et al.* 2000). Impelled by this context, and by the growing recognition of the various benefits of citizen participation, direct democratic mechanisms are increasingly

being used as vehicles through which citizens can take active roles in the decisions that affect their lives, and states can increase their responsiveness to citizens (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001).

As the discourses of citizenship have increasingly been used in relation to participation, rights and obligations, the terms have often come to offer to everybody what they would like to understand them to mean. Much literature around citizen participation, for example, uses ‘citizenship’ to mean the act of any person taking part in public affairs. Increasingly, this ‘participation’ is promoted as a right, yet there is little conceptualisation of what this implies: individual rights, some level of group rights, rights to participate on the basis of particular identities or interests, rights to difference or dissent? Similarly, with regard to accountability, there is little conceptualisation of who is accountable to whom in what domains of life, or how a person might deal with their multiple and often conflicting individual and group obligations and rights.

Many of these questions have been theoretically explored within academic literature on citizenship. The overarching aim of this review essay and annotated bibliography is to present a broad map of this literature, in order to provide a theoretical frame of reference for empirical work on the contextual relations between citizenship, participation and accountability. Constraints (particularly in terms of language) on the availability and accessibility of literature have meant that this review focuses largely on Northern texts written in English. This unfortunately stands as a significant limitation, since it means that the review does not adequately reflect the increasingly large body of writing on citizenship from other perspectives and regions of the world – an issue which future papers in this series will seek to address.

Section 2 provides a brief overview of three of the main theoretical approaches to understanding citizenship which developed in early political thought, and introduces some of the themes emerging in contemporary writing which aim to synthesise these earlier approaches. *Section 3* focuses on the rights and obligations of citizenship. Again grounded in a summary of earlier political thought, it moves on to discuss some of the debates found in contemporary citizenship writing: rights to participate, universalism and particularism, redistribution and recognition, and individual and group rights. The second half of this literature review sets out three of the emerging themes found in contemporary literature: citizenship and identity (*section 4*), the spaces and places of citizenship (*section 5*), and citizenship accountabilities and responsibilities (*section 6*). The concluding section puts forward some implications of this theoretical discussion for further research around citizenship participation and accountability (*section 7*). This literature review is followed by an annotated bibliography covering some key books and articles.

2 What is citizenship?

2.1 Different traditions in citizenship thought

Discussions of citizenship often start by outlining the liberal, communitarian and civic republican approaches. As with most categorisations, these perspectives are groups of ideas with common structuring dimensions, rather than categories into which particular ideas around citizenship can be slotted neatly. It

is, however, useful to give brief summaries of the dominant elements of these perspectives as a route to understanding some of the divergent thinking around citizenship. The summaries of schools of thought in this section are drawn on throughout the literature review, with critical responses to aspects of earlier thinking leading on to contemporary theories, which creatively synthesise them.

Citizenship in liberal thought

Liberal theories promote the idea that citizenship is a status, which entitles individuals to a specific set of universal rights granted by the state. Central to liberal thought is the notion that individual citizens act 'rationally' to advance their own interests, and that the role of the state is to protect citizens in the exercise of their rights (Oldfield 1990a: 2). In this 'protection' role of rights, liberty is understood in negative terms (freedom *from*) (Lister 1997 a,b; Isin and Wood 1999; Smith 1998). Granting each individual the same formal rights is understood to promote equality through making a person's political and economic power 'irrelevant' to rights claims. As this implies, exercising rights is seen as the choice of citizens, on the assumption that they have the necessary resources and opportunities (Isin and Wood 1999: 7). While rights to participate have long been central to liberal thought, these are largely rights to political participation. Above all, the right to vote within a representative democratic system.

Marshall (1950) might be considered a *civic liberal*. His conceptualisation of citizenship, particularly his insertion of social rights to the previous dyad of political and civil rights (see *sections 3.1–3.3*), is often considered a good starting point for contemporary thinking. 'The understanding of citizenship underlying Marshall's work, which should be situated in its post-war British context of economic expansion, is marked by a faith in the capacities of the state to protect individuals from social and economic uncertainties through welfare provision (Ellison 1997: 699). Marshall argued that citizens have a right to their minimal social and economic needs, and that this security should be provided by the state. As with most liberal thinkers, he argued not for an elimination of inequalities, but a reduction in the risks associated with capitalism for the poorest citizens. This, in Marshall's view, would lead to an overarching sense of community and social cohesion.

Rawls might be considered a *utilitarian liberal* (Smith 1998: 117). Going beyond Marshall's conception of welfare as a minimal safety net, Rawls (1971) introduced the more dynamic notion that, through state redistribution mechanisms, an increase in the share of the better off should increase the share for the worse off. Like Marshall, however, he did not propose equality *per se* through such redistribution. Rather, he argued that liberty entails individuals being able to make choices through the courses of their lives, which are not constrained by their initial (at birth) socio-economic endowments (see Smith 1998 and Isin and Wood 1999).

For Rawls, the goal of the 'good society' is the greatest achievement of individual interests for the greatest number of citizens, and the role of the political realm is to protect individuals by leaving them unhindered in pursuit of their interests (Smith 1998: 126). He portrayed 'participation' as a political process in the public sphere, in which all citizens have an equal right (but not obligation) to take part in, and determine, 'the constitutional process, which establishes the laws to which they are to comply'

(Rawls 1971: 227). He also argued that in order to achieve rational consensus in the political arena, religious and philosophical matters on which agreement cannot be reached should not be included in public debate, and that no definition of the 'good life' should be imposed on people in their private lives (Voet 1998: 36). He thus drew a sharp distinction between citizenship as political identity and other identities, attachments and loyalties (Isin and Wood 1999: 13).

Citizenship in communitarian thought

The notion of the 'self-interested', 'independent' individual which Rawls and other liberal thinkers construct has been critiqued by communitarians, such as Sandal (1998), who argue that an individual's sense of identity is produced only *through* relations with others in the community of which she or he is a part. As this implies, communitarian thought centres on the notion of the socially-embedded citizen and community belonging (Smith 1998: 117). The individual, it is argued, can only realise her or his interests and identity through deliberation over the 'common good', and 'individual liberty is maximised through public service and the prioritisation of the 'common good' over the pursuit of individual interests' (Skinner 1992, cited in Smith 1998: 118).

For communitarians, citizenship is defined through, and is seen to develop, particular 'civic virtues', such as respect for others and recognition of the importance of public service (Smith 1998: 118). With reference to post-modern societies, Sandal (1998, cited in Isin and Wood 1999: 7) argues that the 'civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tensions to which our multiple loyalties give rise'. Thus, in contrast to much liberal thought, which 'dismiss[es] the possibility of assigning any political or legal meaning to group rights, communitarians assert the group as the defining centre of identity and that all individuals imagine themselves only in relation to the larger community as the basis of common ground' (Isin and Wood 1999: 2).

Citizenship in civic republican thought

Civic republican thought attempts to incorporate the liberal notion of the self-interested individual within the communitarian framework of egalitarianism and community belonging (Isin and Wood 1999: 8). Like communitarian thought, it emphasises what binds citizens together into a community. For civic republican writers, however, this is underpinned by a concern with individual obligations to participate in communal affairs (Oldfield 1990a: 145). In contrast to civic liberal thought, civic republicans, such as Oldfield, argue that basic resources are necessary to enable participation in community life, rather than conceiving them as basic rights *per se*. As this suggests, much civic republican writing promotes deliberative forms of democracy, in contrast to the liberal emphasis on representative political systems (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Heater 1999).

Central to much civic republican writing, such as that of Habermas (1998); Miller (1988, 1989, 1995) and Beiner (1995), is the idea that citizenship should be understood as a common civic identity, shaped by a common public culture. Miller, for example, argues for a conceptualisation of citizenship, which blends

the classical communitarian emphasis on belonging with recognition that ‘modern societies are likely to contain a far greater diversity of interests than their classical forbears’ (Miller 1988, cited in Ellison 1997: 701). He thus proposes that citizenship, as a civic identity, can work to unite citizens so long as this identity is stronger than their separate identities as members of different groups (ethnic, religious, etc.).

Assuming that citizens will form factional groups based on their interests in order to press for them in the political realm, he argues that representatives of these groups must be able to put sufficient distance between their particularist demands and those of others to be able to deal with the later objectively – thus producing ‘an effective balance between toleration and obligation’ (Miller 1988). For Miller, a context of toleration involves citizens participating politically as advocates of particular interests, with their concern focussed on ‘fairness between different sections of the community and the pursuit of common ends’. Miller thus conceives citizenship as ‘common identification at the level at which most major decisions affecting the shape of society are made’ (Miller 1988).

2.2 Linking different approaches to citizenship

A large concern of contemporary citizenship theory is to link the liberal, communitarian and civic republican traditions. Many theorists (see Mouffe 1992; Lister 1997a,b; Isin and Wood 1999; Oldfield 1990 a,b; Heater 1999; Kymlicka 1995, 1996) attempt to find ways of uniting the liberal emphasis on individual rights, equality and due process of law, with the communitarian focus on belonging and the civic republican focus on processes of deliberation, collective action and responsibility.

At the centre of much contemporary writing is the need to conceptualise citizenship as both a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations *and* an active practice (Lister 1997; Oldfield 1990a; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Mouffe 1992). As Oldfield (1990a) argues, there is a difference between citizenship as status and citizenship as practice. ‘To be a citizen in the legal and sociological sense means to enjoy the rights of citizenship necessary for agency and social and political participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the potential of that status’ (Lister 1997a: 41). Making a similar distinction, Barnes (1999: 82) proposes three ways in which collective action provides a means through which citizenship can be addressed in social policy: as a social right, as a form of agency and practice, and as a relationship of accountability between public service providers and their users.

Citizenship participation as a right

Many writers (Gould 1988; Lister 1997a, b; Hausermann 1998; Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Ferguson 1999) argue for the re-casting of participation in social, political and economic life as a question of fundamental citizenship rights (see *sections 3.2–3.4* for a more detailed discussion). While many versions of classical citizenship thought portray political participation as a right, extending this to encompass participation in social and economic life *politicises* social rights, through re-casting citizens as their active creators (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). As Ferguson (1999: 7) asserts, people cannot realise their rights to health, for example, if they cannot exercise their democratic rights to participation in decision-making around health service provision. Thus, whilst social rights can be seen as positive freedoms in terms of

enabling citizens to realise their political and civil rights, participation as a right can be seen as a positive freedom which enables citizens to realise their social rights (see Ferguson 1999; DfID 2000; Voet 1998; Lister 1997a).

Citizenship as agency

Lister argues that ‘citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents’ (Lister 1998: 228). Human agency is central to the liberal conceptualisation of individuals as ‘autonomous, purposive actors, capable of choice’, in which individuals’ actions and choices constitute a process of self-development orientated towards their personal plans and needs (Lister 1997a: 36–7). In linking participation and rights in this way, Lister asserts a notion of human agency as both located in dialectical relationships with social structures (simple agency) and embedded in social relations (citizenship agency).

Lister asserts that ‘human agency embedded in social relations’ is integrally related to consciousness: ‘to act as a citizen requires first a sense of agency, the belief that one *can* act; acting as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of agency. Thus agency is not simply about the capacity to choose and act but also about a *conscious* capacity which is important to the individual’s self-identity’ (Lister 1997a: 38).

The notion of agency is used by some writers, particularly feminists (for example Gould 1988), to argue that if all humans are regarded as agents, there can be no grounds for some groups to have a greater right to exercise this capacity as citizens than others. Marquand (1991, cited in Lister 1997a: 40) warns, however, that to frame citizenship as agency in this way, places undue obligation on people to exercise that agency in order to gain the status of citizenship. And, as Lister argues, it carries the danger of excluding those who do not participate on the basis either of choice or of ability. Drawing on Held (1989), she therefore argues that what is important is to create an enabling environment so that all citizens can participate, acting as citizens, if they so wish.

Recognition of ‘citizenship as agency’

Conceptualising citizenship as agency gives a central role to the individual’s self-identity as a citizen, and emphasises the thought and action, which this enables. Barnes, working with groups of people with disabilities in the UK, highlights this point (Barnes 1999: 84). In this context, the direct involvement of service users in the decision-making processes of public services engendered a sense that, rather than being passive beneficiaries or consumers of these services, they were ‘active agents making and creating the services they receive’. Through being offered opportunities to participate, this group of service-users developed identities as ‘active agents in their own affairs’, and were able to use these identities, which they themselves played a part in defining, to act strategically to improve the services they used (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000: 54).

As Barnes *et al.* (1999) note, however, while officials showed commitment to the idea of user involvement, few associated this activity with citizenship and there was resistance to the idea that

organised user groups are stakeholders in an increasingly complex system of local governance. This latter analysis highlights the point that while state service providers offered opportunities for user group participation, they bracketed off this activity as merely representing ‘user involvement’ and a route to enabling people to become more effective users of services, rather than perceiving it as active citizenship (Barnes 1999: 101).

While this demonstrates the relational nature of agency, as emphasised by Lister, it more explicitly illustrates the need for processes of recognition and conscientisation to involve state service providers *as well as* citizens, since the power to define citizen status and activity lies not only in citizens themselves, but in the institutions and actors with which they work. If citizens themselves interpret their activity as citizenship practice and an expression of their agency and rights to participate, this may create a force for change. But if people’s participation is understood to be ‘user involvement’, rather than the practice of citizenship rights and obligations, this participation is effectively depoliticised.

Citizenship as participation and democratic governance

With the rise of the ‘good governance’ agenda, the recasting of citizenship participation as an expression of citizenship rights and human agency has met with the growing concern not only for citizen ‘voice’, but also for influence and accountability. Gaventa and Valderrama (1999: 5), for example, define citizenship participation as involving the ‘direct ways in which citizens influence and exercise control in governance’. As this suggests, recent thinking around citizenship participation emphasises the direct intervention of citizens in public activities, and the accountability of the state and other responsible institutions to citizens (Goetz and Gaventa 2001; DfID 2000; Prior *et al.* 1995; Barnes 1999; Cornwall 2000; Blair 2000; Newell 1999).

In contrast to civic republican thought, this inserts a relational dynamic into citizenship, placing obligations on both citizens *and* the state through participatory democratic systems. As a study by the Commonwealth Foundation (1999: 82) argues: ‘In the past the relationship between the state and citizens has tended to be mediated and achieved (or thought to be) through the intermediaries, elected representatives and political party structures. But this aspect of participation in governance for a good society requires direct connection between citizens and the state... The connection between the citizen and the state must be based on participation and inclusion’. In turn, this entails institutional reforms that enable democratic participation through the production of new forms of relationship between civil society and the state (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999). Blair (2000) asserts that a decentralised system of governance enables citizens to engage in the decision-making processes which affect their lives, and encourages governments to increase their accountability through direct mechanisms of citizen oversight. Indeed, as Cornwall and Gaventa (2000: 54) propose, when citizens perceive themselves as actors in governance, rather than passive beneficiaries of services and policy, they may be more able to assert their citizenship through actively seeking greater accountability, as well as through participation in the shaping of policies that affect their lives.

3 Citizenship rights and obligations

Rights and obligations lie at the heart of the language of citizenship. At the centre of much contemporary debate is the balance and nature of each (Lister 1997a: 13). As noted above, the rights approach stems from liberal thought, in which citizenship is understood as a formal status which entitles individuals to specific universalised rights enshrined in law (Heater 1999: 6; Isin and Wood 1999: 7). ‘Citizenship as obligations’ has its roots in civic republican thought, in which political participation is understood as the civic duty of all citizens and the expression of their citizenship and social membership (Lister 1997: 14; Heater 1999: 54; Ellison 1997: 701).

3.1 Rights in classical liberal thought

In classical liberalism, rights are conceived as political and civil (rights to vote, protection of private property, freedom of speech, liberty of the person, etc). Rights are formalised in law, and claiming and exercising rights is understood as a matter of choice for the individual. As Oldfield (1990a: 2) states, in liberal thought ‘the function of the political realm is to render service to individual interests and purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of their rights, and to leave them unhindered in the pursuit of whatever collective and individual interests they may have’.

As Oldfield’s words suggest, liberalism promotes a rather *negative* notion of freedom: ‘freedom *from*’ (Isin and Wood 1999: 7). The renaissance of classical liberalism in the form of the New Right in many countries of the West has re-affirmed this negative definition of freedom: the absence of coercion and interference, so that the role of the state is limited to the protection of the freedom of individual citizens (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 354; Lister 1997a: 16).

As examples from around the world demonstrate, however, such negative freedoms do not *enable* citizens to claim rights, since claiming rights requires the resources, power and knowledge to do so (Lister 1997: 16; Isin and Wood 1999: 8; Phillips 1993: 40). A woman’s right not to be raped, for example, means little if her understanding of gendered relations means that she does not conceive of forced sex as a contravention of her rights and is unable in any case to demand control over her body (McEwan 2000: 630; Ferguson 1999; Voet 1998). Similarly, rights to the protection of property and livelihood mean little if claiming such rights requires sufficient resources, power and knowledge to fight against corporate interests in formal political arenas. This is particularly so when corporate interests are portrayed as ‘common interests’ against the ‘individual interests’ of landowners and community members, a tension which introduces the notion of ‘competing rights’ (Human Rights Watch 1999, see also Ferguson 1999: 10 on individual reproductive rights and the ‘common interest’).

As such examples suggest, the experience and outcomes of claiming rights are shaped partly by the person or institution claims are made against (Engle Merry 1990; Cowan *et al.* 2001; Wilson 1997). Thus, the other side of the rights coin is an obligation to respond and be held to account. Furthermore, processes of claiming rights are inherently political and are played out as struggles between the interests, power and knowledges of differently positioned actors (Cowan *et al.* 2001: 12; Ferguson 1999: 11).

Those most disadvantaged in relations of power and resources are those least likely to be conscious of, and able to assert, their claims to rights (Lister 1997: 17; Young 1989: 48; Doyal and Gough 1991: 54). As Plant (1992) argues, negative freedoms are intended to protect individual autonomy, to enable individuals to pursue their own ends, which cannot be separated from the *ability* to do so (cited in Lister 1997: 16).

3.2 Social rights: incorporating 'positive freedoms' into citizenship

Marshall (1950) introduced a positive notion of liberty into citizenship through the concept of social rights: rights to welfare and resources, such as rights to health, education and a dignified level of socio-economic wellbeing, regardless of a person's standing in the market (Plant 1992: 16). For Marshall, access to such basic social welfare and resources was a right *per se*. He also argued however, that social rights are essential to enable all people to participate in social and political life, that is, to exercise their civil and political rights (Ellison 1997; Turner 1999).

Central to Marshall's argument was the notion that social citizenship promotes the 'de-commodification of labour by de-coupling the living standards of individual citizens from their 'market value', so that they are not totally dependent on selling their labour power in the market' (Lister 1997: 17). In this argument, he links social citizenship rights to human need through the notion of individual autonomy, a linkage which recurs in contemporary theories of social citizenship rights. Gould (1988: 12), for example, argues that the positive freedoms of social rights enable self-development through entitling all citizens to the social and economic conditions necessary for the achievement of their personal goals, as with the enabling dimensions of universal entitlements to education and health.

Entitling all citizens to a bundle of social rights, Lister argues, helps to address social and economic inequalities and to 'promote the effective exercise of civil and political rights by groups disadvantaged in terms of power and resources' (Lister 1997: 16–17). As noted in *section 2.2.1*, these arguments go beyond the formal rights of classical liberalism to conceptualise social rights as substantive rights: rights to the conditions, which enable the claiming of other rights.

3.3 The indivisibility of social, political and civil citizenship rights

Recognition that people's ability to claim one right often depends on the realisation of other rights, has led to assertions of the indivisibility of political, social and civil rights and the need to pursue and enable each simultaneously (DfID 2000; UNDP 2000). As Ferguson (1999: 7) argues, recognition of the indivisibility of these rights confers equal weight to each and provides 'a means of strengthening the ability of vulnerable groups to claim social, political and economic resources to meet their needs'.

However some writers, such as Foweraker and Landers (1999), maintain that social rights are inherently different from political and civil rights, because they assume a claim on resources, that is, they refer to claims to benefits guaranteed *by* the state, rather than claims made *against* the state. The debate over the legitimacy of social rights is underpinned by opposing 'negative' and 'positive' visions of freedom (Lister 1997: 17). Moreover, as Plant (1991) points out, the exercise of political and civil rights in any case *also* implies a claim on resources. Lister (1997: 13) thus argues that the focus should be on the interaction

between different forms of rights and obligations, and how that balance affects social relations of power and capabilities to take action as a citizen.

3.4 Rights and needs

Thinking in terms of an indivisible set of citizenship rights re-casts traditional approaches to social and economic welfare (Ferguson 1999: 5–6; Cornwall and Gaventa 1999: 54). As Fraser (1989) argues, social-welfare issues are typically posed as questions of whether the state should undertake to satisfy the social needs of a given group, and if so to what degree. This, as she asserts, not only permits a relatively limited number of answers and casts the debate in quantitative terms, but ‘takes for granted the definition of the needs in question ... [and] occludes the fact that the interpretation of people’s needs is itself a political stake, indeed sometimes *the* political stake’ (Fraser 1989: 145)

Dasgupta (1990) distinguishes between two opposing understandings of individuals in social policy, as the site of wants, such as hunger, which leads to consideration of needs, and as active choice making agents, which leads to consideration of rights (cited in Ferguson 1999: 5). She argues that the focus on needs has led to characterisation of the beneficiaries of social policy as ‘passive targets’, without their own objectives and interests. Much contemporary social policy has moved beyond such top-down models, towards an emphasis on participation and partnership. Embracing the concept of rights, it promotes the idea that individuals are active agents rather than simply having needs that require satisfaction (Ferguson 1999: 6).

As Ferguson argues, however, rights and needs-based approaches are complementary, with needs-based approaches helping to identify the resource requirements of particular groups, and rights-based approaches ‘provid[ing] a means of strengthening people’s claims to those resources’ (Ferguson 1999: 6–7). Rights can therefore be understood as legitimised claims, while needs are people’s own perceptions of their entitlement, which have yet to be legitimised (*ibid.*). The rights perspective thus politicises needs, and as Cornwall argues, ‘implies taking a stand on issues of social justice’ (2000: 67).

3.5 Challenges to universal definitions of citizenship rights

In the liberal view, entitling all citizens to a universal set of individual rights treats each person as formally equal and thus provides a platform of power and legitimacy on which disadvantaged individuals and groups can challenge inequalities and injustices (Lister 1997b: 30; Phillips 1993: 95). However, entitling all citizens to the same rights does not necessarily promote equitable outcomes (Cornwall 2000; Ferguson 1999). Indeed, it tends to abstract inequalities from the political and historical contexts in which they were produced and maintained (Lister 1997a: 17), and to ignore their fundamental influence over people’s consciousness of, and capabilities to advocate for, their rights and needs (Isin and Wood 1999: 3). Different citizens in fact have vastly different needs, interests and priorities, and each starts from a different position of power and resources (*ibid.*; Cowan *et al.* 2001: 6).

As Ellison argues, imposing a universal set of values under the guise of concern for all produces a ‘false uniformity’ (1999: 59), which hides the realities of power and difference that ‘make some more equal

citizens than others' (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000: 53; Taylor 1996; Carataga 1999). And, paradoxically, rather than addressing inequalities, universalism can work to marginalise the already marginal and exacerbate social exclusion (Ellison 1999: 58–9) while simultaneously disguising this under a veneer of formal equality (Lister 1997a: 18). Those with the resources, power and knowledge to shape definitions of rights and how they are put into practice are able to turn rights discourses and entitlements to their advantage. On the other hand, the very structure of exclusions means that the most marginalised are often unable to do so (Young 1989: 258; Phillips 1993: 94–5).

As this point suggests, despite their often universalist definition in theory, *in practice*, rights are interpreted and mediated through situated struggles and claims-making processes (Cowan *et al.* 2001). A body of writing on rights explores the ways in which rights claims are mediated through dominant discourses around those rights (see Wilson 1997) and the institutions and places in which rights struggles are played out (see Engle Merry 1990). As situated actors deliberate over rights, they draw on their different power, knowledges, interests and needs to define and shape the process and outcomes of rights claims. And, since different rights often compete with and contradict one another (as with rights to information and rights to corporate secrecy), rights claims are often played out as struggles of power and resources (Cowan *et al.* 2001).

3.6 Citizenship as the 'right to have rights'

A focus on equitable outcomes requires a differentiated approach to rights that actively addresses the realities of power and inequalities institutionalised in societies (Isin and Wood 1999; Mouffe 1992; Smith 1998; Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). This point has led to conceptions of citizenship that start with the needs of the disadvantaged and seek to invest them with the power and resources required to challenge inequities actively and create their own strategies and entry points for change (Cornwall 2000: 68). Rather than conceiving citizenship as defined by a bundle of particular rights and obligations, such an approach focuses on the 'right to have rights' (Isin and Wood 1999: 4) and to advocate for one's own perception of rights. Thus, the emphasis shifts to the processes of rights claims, rather than the substance of those rights *per se*. In raising the notion of rights as created through citizens' collective struggles, this dynamic understanding promotes the idea of group rights.

3.7 Incorporating rights within civic republicanism: group rights

Stemming from an integration of liberal rights languages into civic republican thought, the notion of group rights stands in stark contrast to the liberal understanding of the individual as the sole bearer of rights (Isin and Wood 1999: 2). The idea of group rights refers to rights specific to particular groups of people, such as women, ethnic minorities, or religious groupings, which protect and *enable* the realisation of the particular needs, interests and priorities of these groups. Accepting group rights implies recognition of, and respect for, difference. It also promotes the notion of differentiated rights; that different groups may legitimately require different sets of rights, a point central to the arguments around cultural relativism and rights (see Wilson 1997; Cowan *et al.* 2001).

For civic republican thinkers, the group is the defining centre of identity, and the integration of rights into this framework centres on the idea that the group is the logical focus of rights definitions and claims-making processes. To recall Miller's (1989) theoretical framework (detailed in *section 2.1.3*), the process of citizenship participation is identified as groups with the same needs and interests working together to articulate their priorities in public spheres, ultimately to define the 'common good'. Rights are thus understood as not only claimed, but *created*, through group struggles (Stammers 1999), and formal recognition of group rights is seen to give power and legitimacy to group struggles for rights (Isin and Wood 1999: 2).

However, the politics of power, representation and mediation shape which issues are raised, and the processes and outcomes of rights struggles and claims-making processes (see *section 5*). Moreover, as many writers state, there is a fundamental problem in the notion that there can be a 'common good' (Mouffe 1992; Lister 1997a,b; Smith 1998; Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). Since different people have very different capabilities and opportunities to participate, and the most marginalised are those likely to have the least power and resources, requiring citizens to participate politically in order to define and claim their rights, is perhaps most likely to promote a version of the 'common good' which in fact favours those who are already better-off (Phillips 1993: 96).

3.8 Incorporating group rights within a liberal citizenship framework

Such critiques have promoted arguments for integrating the notion of group rights within a liberal citizenship framework, which emphasises justice, equity and due process of law (Isin and Wood 1999: 58). Kymlicka (1989, 1995, 1996) attempts to incorporate group rights within a liberal framework of individual rights. Centring his argument around ethnic minorities within majority cultures, he asserts that ethnic groups have legitimate rights to sustain their own value systems in so far as these protections are orientated towards a negation of external threats, rather than internal protections (1995). Rights to express particular cultural beliefs and ways of being, for example, should not be threatened by the prejudices and discriminations experienced by minorities when faced with a dominant majority's attempts to produce what they see as the 'ideal society' (cited in Cowan *et al.* 2001: 22). However, cultural practices, which result in the oppression of individual members of that group (as with oppressions of women institutionalised within cultural practices and discourses) are considered illegitimate. Kymlicka thus asserts the rights of individuals to cultural membership and practices, while at the same time asserting the rights of those individuals not to be oppressed by these cultural memberships (Smith 1998: 132).

As Isin and Wood (1999: 61) state, however, it is difficult to apply Kymlicka's argument to the multiple, interlocking and often contradictory realities of group identities and interests. The fragmentations and conflicts, which such multiple and contradictory struggles produce fuel both liberal and civic republican fears that formal recognition of differentiated rights might encourage individuals to focus on their 'narrow group interests and identities'; placing them in competition with those of other groups, overriding and degrading common understandings of citizenship and democracy (Littleton 1996; Morley and Robins 1995, cited in Isin and Wood 1999: 2). This, however, highlights the inherent tensions

between the desire to formulate generalising principles and the need to apply these principles within particular contexts (Cowan *et al.* 2001: 6).

3.9 Group rights: social membership and recognition

As Isin and Wood (1999: 32) argue, understanding group claims to rights requires recognition not only of the legitimacy of group rights, but also of the extent to which group identity itself (as a form of solidarity) is central to people's sense of self, agency and value. They draw on Berlin's (1969, quoted in Isin and Wood 1999) notion of a 'third form of liberty' to theorise this in terms of claims to group recognition.

Like Marshall, Berlin asserted that freedom to pursue self-determination (positive liberty) is crucially different to freedom from constraint (negative liberty). He also pointed to a third form of liberty: freedoms to the assertion of self and agency. He explained this through arguing that group recognition 'is an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own ... to act in accordance with it (whether it is good, legitimate or not) and not to be ruled, educated, guided ... as not being quite fully human, and therefore not quite free' (quoted in Isin and Wood 1999: 32).

This third form of liberty, although it entails negative freedoms for the entire group, is closely related to 'solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding and the need for association on equal terms' (Isin and Wood 1999: 33). This might be understood as 'group liberty', and, as Isin and Wood argue, explains why members of certain groups actively choose to curtail their individual liberties but still feel enjoyment of their group liberty. This points to the importance of freedoms of association and belonging *per se* to people's sense of self and value. It is also arguable that giving status to group rights might give greater legitimacy to group identities and strength to their common claims. Moreover, the belonging and selfhood such common identification produces is both a valued dimension of life in itself and a basis for establishing a common ground on which group and individual conscientisation, autonomy and agency can be engendered (Young 1990; Leca 1992; Smith 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999).

4 Images and meanings of citizenship

Debates on the images and meanings of citizenship are often framed by discussions of identity: how people see themselves as citizens and act upon this, and how this relates to their understanding of themselves in other aspects of life (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999; Morley and Robins 1995; Littleton 1996; Isin and Wood 1999; Voet 1998). As noted above, the issue of identity is central to the contemporary discussion around group belonging and struggles for rights. With the increasing recognition that for many citizenship is, in practice, hollow and meaningless, concern with citizenship as itself a form of identity has gained new prominence. Underpinning much contemporary writing is the assertion that the way in which people understand themselves as citizens is likely to have a significant impact on their perception of their rights and obligations and on whether they participate, in what form and why.

4.1 Citizenship as universal, identity as particular

Different perspectives on citizenship define different relationships between citizenship and identity. For civic republican thinkers, citizenship is an overarching civic identity produced by, and productive of, a sense of belonging to a particular nation-state (Habermas 1998; Miller 1989, 1995). Miller, for example, states that ‘without a common national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together, no reason for extending the role just to these people ... [conversely] without citizenship, nationality cannot fulfil the activist idea of a community of people determining its own future ...’ (1989, quoted in Ellison 1997: 702). For liberal thinkers, in contrast, citizenship denotes formal membership of a nation-state, an identity, which is universally defined in order to promote formal equality in rights and obligations for all.

Despite their fundamentally different foundations, both schools of thought promote citizenship as *universal*, and individual/group identity as *particular* (Isin and Wood 1999: 14), and both conceptualise citizenship at the level of the nation-state. The difficulty in both conceptualisations, as Isin and Wood argue, arises from a problematic conception of identity.

4.2 Citizenship and identity as entangled sets of subject positions

Defining citizenship as universal and identity as particular not only creates an artificial separation between citizenship and identity, but assumes that each individual and group understands, experiences and practices citizenship in the same way (Isin and Wood 1999). This ignores the point that an individual’s sense of identity and sense of citizenship mutually shape each other (Mouffe 1992, 1995, 1996; Isin and Wood 1999). For example, a different sense of citizenship may be produced by ‘Hindu-female’ and ‘Hindu-male’ identities. While dominant discourses around maleness emphasise political capabilities and obligations, dominant discourses around femaleness promote the idea that political engagement is neither socially acceptable nor within female capabilities (Jones and SPEECH 2001).

Mouffe’s (1992, 1995) conceptualisation of identity has become a common starting point for thinking about the interactions of citizenship and identity. She argues that identity should be understood as an ensemble of ‘subject positions’ (such as ‘female’, ‘southern Ethiopian’, ‘pastoralist’, ‘Muslim’, etc.), each of which represent the individual’s identification with a particular group. Together, these subject positions form an individual’s identity, with each dimension shaping the others (implying that a Hindu woman and a Christian woman might understand the idea of being ‘female’ differently). Each subject position is understood by the individual through dominant ideas around them (for example that ‘a proper woman should honour her husband’), which for many people, shape aspects of their everyday practice.

A sense of group political identity, Mouffe argues, is produced through identification with others who hold particular subject positions in common. During moments when a particular political identity is drawn upon in citizenship action (for example through the women’s movement, gay rights campaigns, or the struggle of people displaced by a dam), that dimension of identity on which people are drawing becomes ‘dominant’. This implies that the other aspects of a person’s identity are defined through that politicised subject-position: in a struggle for the rights of people displaced by a dam, for example, it is this identity which draws people together, and other dimensions of identity (such as femaleness) are defined

through their relationship to the main object of the struggle, emphasising women's particular experiences and needs *as displaced persons*.

People's sense of citizenship can also work to shape their understanding and practice of their identity (Voet 1998; Lister 1997a; McEwan 2000; Seidman 1999; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999). For example, a woman who understands citizenship as an active form of practice and a status which entitles her to advocate for her understanding of her rights might work to assert her needs and priorities *as a woman* in the political sphere (Voet 1998; Lister 1997a,b). And through advocating women's particular rights, she might position herself as a 'feminist'. Positionalities such as 'feminist' and 'farmers' union activist' perhaps make the entangled nature of citizenship and identity most clear. They are by definition political identities, which signify consciousness and action for change around particular conditions, discourses and practices. Thus, while subject positions such as 'female' may shape a woman's sense and experience of citizenship, in some contexts this may promote a sense or reality of non-citizenship. 'Feminist', on the other hand, implies that an active sense of citizenship is working to shape understandings of 'female' and promoting group and individual action for change (Voet 1998; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999; Seidman 1999; Mouffe 1995).

How people understand themselves as citizens, and how they interpret this dimension of their identity to take forms of citizenship action, is likely to have a complex relationship with their sense of belonging to particular groups and their sense that their relationship with particular institutions should be shaped by accountability (Isin and Wood 1999; Voet 1998). Some may understand themselves as citizens of a state by virtue of holding sets of subject positions which, in particular contexts, produce a sense of citizenship identity and enable forms of citizenship practice (Voet 1998). Some such people may understand themselves as citizens but choose not to be active (Lister 1997a). Others may hold sets of subject positions, which inhibit an active sense of citizenship (Meekosha and Dowse 1997). Yet, for some people, consciousness of the exclusions produced by the social construction of their identity may promote citizenship action for change (Jackson 1999; Seidman 1999; McEwan 2000).

4.3 Inclusions and exclusions of 'citizenship'

As noted in *section 3.5*, many writers assert that universalisations of the concept of the 'citizen' serve to hide the realities of citizenship exclusions under a veil of formal equality (Mamdani 1996; Ellison 1999: 58; Lister 1997b: 38; Meekosha and Dowse 1997; Young 1989). Not only do different people have vastly different capabilities and opportunities to engage in political, social and civic activities (Voet 1998; Barnes 1999; Cohen 1999), but the formulations of state policy often exclude the needs and experiences of particular groups (Ellison 1999; Donnelly 1989; Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Seidman 1999).

Feminist, race and disability writers and movements have been at the forefront of this debate (Meekosha and Dowse 1997; Young 1997; Benhabib 1996; Seidman 1999; Lister 1997a; McEwan 2000; Jackson 1999; Mamdani 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997; Phillips 1993). At the centre of their arguments is the need to uncover the reality of the citizen often

conceived as ‘male-white-able-bodied’, and to take action to enable minority groups to participate in social, political and civic life, defining and claiming their rights to become equal, active citizens.

4.4 Multiple and interlocking exclusions

A body of contemporary writing around the inclusions and exclusions of citizenship emphasises the multiple and interlocking oppressions and disadvantages that marginalised groups often face (Kabeer 2000; Mamdani 1996; Fraser 1997a). Fraser (1997a) sets out a conceptual spectrum of disadvantage and injustice ranging from primarily economic forms to primary cultural forms (formulated around identities, which construct relations of power). She argues that economic and cultural forms of injustice and disadvantage often interlock, producing, legitimising and maintaining each other, and thus give rise to what she terms ‘bivalent collectivities’. Caste, for example, is often experienced as a bivalent collectivity, since it embodies both economic disadvantage through ‘religiously sanctioned segregation and ordering of occupations with the lowest castes associated with the most stigmatised occupations’, and symbolic devaluations, which define the lowest castes as despised and legitimate various forms of injustice (Kabeer 2000: 86).

Mamdani’s (1996) analysis of post-colonial states in Africa also illustrates this point. He argues that the history of colonialism institutionalised white elites as economically and culturally privileged ‘citizens’ (whose lives were shaped by ‘modern law’, ‘culture’ and ‘religion’) and the colonised black majority as devalued ‘subjects’ (whose lives were shaped by ‘customary law’, ‘paganism’ and ‘ritual’). As Kabeer (2000: 86) argues, while race may no longer be the principal line of exclusion defining relations between individuals and the state, the value systems on which societies were structured during colonial periods remain institutionalised (see also Halisi *et al.* 1998).

Kabeer argues that, while often interrelated, ‘different forms of disadvantage have their own distinct logics and strategic responses’ (Kabeer 2000: 86). Drawing on Fraser (1997a), she argues that where disadvantage is largely economic, people are likely to mobilise around their interests and formulate demands in terms of redistribution. Where disadvantage is largely based on value systems, mobilisation is more likely to be around questions of identity, and demands formulated in terms of recognition. This produces a potential tension: the logic of addressing resource-based disadvantage and of calls for redistribution is egalitarian, while the logic of addressing identity-based disadvantage and of demands for recognition is diversity. This tension is particularly problematic for those bivalent collectivities disadvantaged by the interlocking dynamics of both resources and valuation.

4.5 Struggles for recognition and redistribution

Kabeer’s point highlights a paradox over the calls for rights to inclusion and redistribution seen in many citizenship struggles. As Ellison (1999: 70–71) argues, the struggles of marginalised groups often express a demand for inclusion while ‘simultaneously challenging the nature of what it means to be included’: that is, ‘the basis of social membership, the principles informing resource allocations and the means of access to resources themselves’.

Given these conflicting logics, some contemporary writing has raised the question of whether citizenship struggles for recognition can form an effective resistance to injustice, inequality, domination and oppression (Fraser 1997a,b; Young 1997; Philips 1997; Benhabib 1996). To some, such ‘recognition politics’ is too fragmented and removed from the economic realm to mount resistance; arguments which have led to a call for emphasis on redistribution rather than ‘divisive identity politics’ (Brooks 1996, also cited in Isin and Wood 1999: 3). Others, such as Young (1990, 1997), highlight, however, that such arguments reduce social justice to redistribution alone. This, she argues, ‘ignores the social and institutional relations which determine patterns of inequality’, and ‘even when the focus shifts to non-material goods such as health and education, the concept of redistribution treats them as if they were static objects as opposed to social relations’ (cited in Isin and Wood 1999: 41).

Young argues that attention should be shifted to social justice as understood in terms of oppression (institutional constraint on self-development) and domination (institutional constraint on self-determination), since this enables a conceptualisation of ‘justice which refers not only to redistribution but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and group rights’. Social justice, she argues, requires ‘not the melting away of differences which construct relations of power, but institutions which promote and respect group differences without oppression’ (cited in Isin and Wood 1999).

4.6 Citizenship as a master political identity

For Mouffe (1992), democracy depends on citizens identifying with different groups and working together to make demands. She conceptualises citizenship as an ‘articulating principle that affects different subject positions of the social agent ... while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect for individual liberty’ (Mouffe 1992: 235). She asserts that citizenship should be seen as a chain of ‘equivalence’, a concept which, as Cornwall and Gaventa (2000: 59) note, implies being given ‘equal value’ through respect for diversity, in contrast to ‘equality’, which implies to ‘be like’. This chain is dynamically formed through different social struggles working to shape a democratic ‘we’ in opposition to the ‘them’ of inequality and domination, without eliminating difference (Mouffe 1993: 84–5). Thus, for Mouffe, rather than citizenship rights being constructed and mediated through formal political mechanisms, they are constructed and mediated *within* the multi-sited arenas of citizenship struggles. As each citizen group collectively identifies with the democratic demands of the others, perceiving them as equivalent in terms of working to overcome the forces of domination and inequality, each might take on board the others’ democratic demands while pursuing their own projects (Mouffe 1992: 236).

Mouffe thus perceives group differences as constitutive of democratic processes, in the sense that, as different social groups identify their claims as equivalent to each other, their understandings of the forces of domination and inequality are broadened beyond the particularism of their specific struggles. However, Mouffe argues that group identities should not be translated into group rights or inserted into the definition of citizenship, since this, in her view, would be to essentialise that identity. She argues that ‘it is true that the pretence of universality ... relegated all particularity and difference to the private, [which] has

contributed to the exclusion of women. But that does not mean that the answer is to introduce women's so-called specific tasks into the very definition of citizenship' (Mouffe 1992: 9).

As Isin and Wood (1999) argue, however, to make identities irrelevant to citizenship is to ignore their relatively durable institutionalizations in discourse and practice. In overlooking this, Mouffe ultimately conflates citizenship and identity and promotes citizenship as a 'master political identity' (Mouffe 1992: 12). That is, to argue that citizenship as an articulating subject position could efface the ethnic and religious identities which fuel the complexities of citizenship struggles in many areas of the world is to underplay the durability of these identities and their centrality to citizenship itself. Many writers thus argue that the problem lies in the need to affirm identities, which construct relations of power in order then to transcend them, without freezing these identities as essential differences and thus producing further forms of oppression (Lister 1997a: 197; Voet 1998; Isin and Wood 1999).

4.7 Multiple citizenship

Isin and Wood (1999); Fraser (1997a,b); Lister (1997a) and Taylor (1994) argue that different claims to group identity can be conceptualised as forms of citizenship rights, such as gendered citizenship, ethnic citizenship, ecological citizenship, or indeed *national citizenship*, which is itself a form of group identity. In this formulation, citizenship is an 'ensemble of different forms of belonging' (Isin and Wood 1999: 21; Voet 1998). Drawing on Mouffe's (1992) conceptualisation of identity, it can be seen that not only is citizenship differentiated across individuals, but that each individual person may experience and express different forms of citizenship (Isin and Wood 1999). A person might, for example, express a form of 'social-gendered citizenship' through demanding changes in health service provision to enable women to achieve better access to the health services they need, and a form of 'global economic citizenship' through demanding changes in WTO policies to enable better terms of trade (Heater 1999; Held 1995, 1997; Urry 1998).

Thinking about citizenship as a differentiated form also points to the reality that people can experience citizenship inclusion on the basis of particular subject positions whilst simultaneously experiencing exclusion on the basis of others (Jackson 1999). A person might, for example, be conscious of their particular needs and experiences as a pastoralist and advocate for these politically, thus expressing a form of 'pastoralist citizenship', while remaining unconscious of their particular needs and experiences as a female.

Many writers note, however, that the concept of multiple citizenship holds dangers in deconstructing identity-interests to a level where no common identification for collective action remains (Lister 1997a; Leca 1992). Emphasising the need to affirm identities, which construct relations of power in order then to transcend them, however, both Lister and Leca argue that acknowledging the multiple differences within groups does not preclude solidarity and collective action. As Lister asserts, this is not to promote an elimination of difference in citizenship, rather 'a universalism which stands in creative tension to diversity and difference and which challenges the divisions and exclusionary inequalities which stem from diversity, (Lister 1997b: 39).

Lister terms this conception of citizenship a call for ‘differentiated universalism’ in which ‘universalism is understood ... not as false impartiality but as a universality of moral commitment to the equal worth and participation of all’ (Lister 1997b). As Mouffe argues, acknowledging the plurality of citizenship does not mean abandonment of the ‘core principles of liberty and equality’ (Mouffe 1992: 236). Treating the principle of equivalence as a central element of democratic pluralism, thus offers a way out of this perceived impasse between universalism and difference (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000: 54), enabling people to draw on the emancipatory potential of universal principles while demanding equity in their diversities (Lister 1997b: 39; Mouffe 1995, 1996).

5 Spaces and places of citizenship

The rather abstract nature of much citizenship literature leads many writers to avoid analysis of the actual spaces in which citizenship is expressed. As Brown (1995) states ‘citizens are always engaging in politics in actual locations’ (cited in Isin and Wood 1999: 88): deliberating in public meetings, claiming rights in the courts or in the home, forming groups and networks or using public spaces to articulate demands. Citizenship is also an identity and practice that is likely to differ across the spaces in which people’s lives are played out: the home and personal relations, local and national politics, to the global arena. In recognition of this spatial dimension, a body of writing is now emerging around the ‘spaces and places’ of citizenship. There are two distinct dimensions to this literature: analysis of the scales of citizenship, from local spaces to global arenas, and analysis of how the complexities of representation, power and claims to know are played out in the physical and social arenas opened up for citizenship participation.

5.1 The scales of citizenship

Beyond the nation-state

In both liberal and civic republican thought, the nation-state is the spatial frame of reference for citizenship (Ellison 1997; Heater 1999; Falk 1998). In the contemporary context of globalisation-localisation and heightened consciousness of citizens’ belonging to different groups within and beyond states, however, there is increasing recognition of the need to conceptualise citizenship at the many different scales in which people’s lives are played out (Heater 1999; Ellison 1999; McEwan 2000). To this end, Isin and Wood (1999) and Voet (1998) argue that citizenship should be understood as an ensemble of different forms of belonging to different groups, of which ‘national identity’ is but one.

Within this formulation, ‘national citizenship’ is a form of group identity and practice at the level of the nation-state. Placing citizen action at the centre of the definition of citizenship, Cornwall and Gaventa (2000: 54) state that going beyond nationalist conceptions to understand citizenship as ‘a responsibility attained through collective action and democratic governance, with rights accruing from this engagement’, enables citizens to define the spaces and scales of their citizenship as it makes sense to them (see also DfID 2000; Commonwealth Foundation 1999). The de-linkage of citizenship from the nation-state which this implies, has been of particular concern to those engaged in advocacy for the citizenship rights of the

increasing number of people who live in areas which are not those of their cultural origin (migrants, refugees, etc), for whom the formal status of 'national citizenship' remains a critical question (Alubo 2000; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997).

Thinking about national citizenship in this way, makes it possible to extend application of the concept of citizenship to all levels between the global and the personal, and across all the spaces and places in which such relationships are produced and practised (McEwan 2000). Citizenship thus becomes a differentiated relationship of belonging, action and accountability between citizens and the many different institutions that have influence over their lives (Isin and Wood 1999).

Global citizenship

In line with the questioning of the nation-state as the sole organising entity for citizenship, many writers argue for a concept of 'global citizenship' (Ellison 1997; Heater 1999; Falk 1998; Held 1995, 1997). The point at issue, Ellison states, is the 'extent to which the nation-state continues to provide a social, economic and political framework capable of delivering resources in the form of enforceable rights to good and services, as well as political participation, sufficient to foster a meaningful quality of inclusion and belonging' (Ellison 1997: 703). Moreover, the influence of multinational and intergovernmental institutions over people's lives urges recognition of the need for accountabilities and rights to be enforceable across national boundaries (Newell 2000; Cohen 1999; Urry 1998; Beck 1995).

Many writers argue that globalisation is both weakening and strengthening territorial ties between people and the state (Falk 1998; Beck 1995; Held 1995). For some, particularly those who are members of elite groups, the locus of their political identity is shifting away from the nation-state towards notions of 'global citizenship', 'regional citizenships' or 'citizen pilgrims', while at the same time many people adversely affected by globalisation have developed stronger senses of territorial citizenship and defensive patriotism (Falk 1998: 2). Shaped partly by this context, but also existing as a force and symbol of globalisation itself, an increasing number of transnational social movements (or networks) have started to emerge (Beck 1995; Newell 2000; Madon 2000; Bhandari 1999; Taylor 1996). Beck (1995) argues that such transnational networks highlight the emergence of a new form of politics in which citizens are working together across national boundaries to advocate for their common needs and concerns to both national and transnational institutions.

Citizenship and local governance

Historically, the 'local' has been considered a key site for democracy building and citizen participation. It has been at this level that 'people usually come into contact with politicians or public officials, receive services and benefits from the state, and organise together in communities' (Lowndes 1995: 161). Citizenship was thought to derive largely from community identification and membership; civic action and political participation were thought to be concentrated at the local level; and local governance provided a learning ground for broader understandings and forms of citizenship (Lowndes 1995).

At the same time, Lowndes (1995) raises questions over the assumption that decentralised governance enhances the relationship between individuals, community and government (which he terms the citizenship 'triangle'). He argues that the potential for decentralised governance to enhance citizen participation and capabilities depends on the design and culture of municipal institutions and the autonomy and authority of local government vis-à-vis the wider political system (Lowndes 1995: 171). Further, he suggests, the idea that citizenship derives from community identification and membership holds less significance in societies where community is no longer based solely on locality and communities of interest have become more significant (Lowndes 1995: 162–3).

Prior, Stewart and Walsh (1995) also raise this second point. They argue that most examples of the formation of communities of identity and interest are found among social groups traditionally excluded from social, economic and political power, whose collective actions often represent a challenge to the very nature of citizenship. This, they assert, is in itself a powerful reason for questioning the validity of territorial community as the sole basis for local citizenship, and points to the need for local governments to develop means to engage with and respond to collectively expressed needs, and the alternative structures of governance they might imply (Stewart and Walsh 1995: 155–7).

Mohan and Stokke (2000: 263–4) warn that as concepts of the 'local' are increasingly adopted and endorsed by extra-local institutions (e.g. the World Bank, as seen in the World Development Report 2000–1), we need to examine carefully how the concept is being used: 'the paradoxical consensus over the role of "local participation" in a globalising world, is fraught with dangers. Local participation can be used for different purposes by very different ideological stakeholders. It can underplay the role of the state and transnational power holders and can overtly or inadvertently cement Eurocentric solutions to Third World development' (see also Shaw and Martin 2000).

Citizenship in the 'private domain'

A central concern of feminist writing around citizenship is the issue of the exclusions produced through application of a restrictive notion of 'the political', built on a rigid separation of public and private spheres (Lister 1997a; Parry *et al.* 1992; Pateman 1989; Gould 1988; Phillips 1997). In much liberal thought the state's responsibilities are related only to the protection of non-domestic spaces (the 'public sphere'), while the very basis of civic republican thought is the obligation to engage in formal public deliberations (Isin and Wood 1999: 78). Yet, as Parry *et al.* (1992: 20) state, 'any definition of political participation is inevitably tenuous and contestable, given that drawing a line between the political and non-political is itself a political act'.

At the heart of such arguments is the long-debated problem that defining citizenship through political participation in formal public spaces serves to occlude other forms of participation (community work, participation in local decision making processes such as traditional meetings, etc.) as legitimate expressions of citizenship. It also in essence excludes people who cannot participate in public affairs from the accolade of citizenship (Lister 1997a: 41). Perhaps more fundamentally, drawing a boundary around the public sphere in defining citizenship raises the problem of how people can legitimately define and

demand rights related to issues and actions that take place within 'private' spaces, such as the home, where citizens may act upon personal ideas and notions of 'morality' (McEwan 2000).

Drawing on such arguments, Gould (1988: 255) asserts that 'democracy is necessary not only in the conventional political and economic spheres, but also in the organisation and relations of social and cultural life ... [including] the family and other child-raising and living arrangements'. In contrast to Gould, Lister distinguishes between what she sees as 'political citizenship' from what she terms 'personal politics'. She argues that although the two are dialectically interrelated, 'not all politics necessarily counts as citizenship' (1997a: 28). She appeals to Phillips's (1993) distinction between 'campaigning in public for men to do their share of housework and simply sorting out the division of labour in one's own home; in the case of the former we are acting as citizens, in the case of the latter, which is nevertheless significant for citizenship, we are not ...' (Phillips 1993).

In stating this, Lister draws a conceptual boundary around what constitutes 'citizenship participation', a boundary, which is perhaps important to maintaining the political resonance and power of the term. As Lister herself argues, however, this distinction requires a stronger understanding of the dynamics between the different spaces and places of 'public' to 'private' citizenships. The research which Jones and SPEECH (2001) carried out with communities in southern India points to some potential interactions between people's participation in 'public' arenas and change in other dimensions of their lives. In a process shaped by SPEECH's particular approach to facilitating participation, the community members who engaged in participatory work with the organisation sought to extend their empowered thought and action both into wider public spaces such as government offices and into the more 'private' spaces of their everyday lives.

5.2 Arenas of citizen participation

An emerging body of writing on citizenship focuses on the physical and social arenas in which citizens participate in decision-making processes (Barnes 1999; Smith and Wales 2000; Isin and Wood 1999). Particularly with the conceptualisation of participation as a fundamental citizenship right, questions of how to create new mechanisms and spaces to enable citizen engagement have become central. At the heart of these discussions is the need to go beyond the traditional places and mechanisms for citizen participation, such as the ballot box, and to move towards developing innovative processes, which enable more active and inclusive participation (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001: 5).

Some of the mechanisms which have been developed, such as the use of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) for poverty assessments, legislative theatre and citizen juries (Smith and Wales 2000; Wakefield 2000; Barnes 1999), aim to extend analysis and decision-making processes into the spaces in which citizens spend their everyday lives (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001: 4). Other mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting (De Sousa Santos 1998; Paixão Bretas 1996), aim to open up government spaces to citizens to enable them to take part in state decision-making processes. In some countries, mechanisms such as local radio (Ananthpur and Ganesh Prasad 2000), street theatre and citizen video (where citizens produce videos to articulate issues of importance to them and then replay them at public meetings) have

been developed by citizens themselves as a means to disseminate information and bring about change (PLA Notes 2000).

Each of these mechanisms works by creating and making use of new political spaces for citizen participation. As Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) state, ‘these new spaces and strategies offer enormous potential for constructing new forms of citizen participation – ones in which participation shifts from the “users and choosers” approach to one concerned with how citizens “make and shape” policies which affect their lives’. (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001: 8)

As a body of contemporary critical analysis asserts, however, there is a need to better understand the complexities of power, representation and claims, to know which are played out in participatory arenas (Holmes and Scoones 1999; Isin and Wood 1999; Smith and Wales 2000; Barnes 1999). Many writers highlight the point that participation in political processes first requires a sense of the right to do so (Seidman 1999; Lister 1997a), a sense of the capabilities to participate effectively (Gough 1992; Doyal and Gough 1991) and a sense that such participation will have an impact upon political processes (Orkin 1995; Abers 1998; Parry; Moser and Day 1992).

Drawing on examples from around the world, Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) argue that the control of the ‘participatory structure’ and associated processes, defining the spaces, actors, agendas and procedures, is usually in the hands of the government, and thus that inclusions and exclusions are often shaped from ‘above’. This point is also made by Higgins-Wharf, who asserts that the structure and process of democracy affects, and is affected by people’s sense and practice of citizenship (see also Stammers 1999; Mouffe 1992; Isin and Wood 1999). As this suggests, there is likely to be a dialectical relationship between the messages about citizenship emanating from democratic structures and opportunities for citizen engagement, people’s sense of citizenship, and the level, nature and inclusiveness of citizen participation.

Learning from experiences of community participation

Though not linked as directly to the questions of ‘rights’ implied by citizenship participation, much can be learnt also from the experiences of ‘community participation’. In stark contrast to the notion that ‘communities’ are united groups of people with common interests and needs, analysis of specific community participatory processes have shown that the ‘consensus’ reached in participatory analysis often centres on the priorities of particular people while excluding those of others (Crawley 1998: 28). Much gender analysis of community participation has uncovered evidence that ‘community’ consensus is often a ‘male’ consensus (Guijt and Kaul Shah 1998: 1), and even this ‘male consensus’ inevitably reflects the interests of particular people, since ‘men’ do not have one set of needs, interests and concerns solely through being male (Cornwall 1998). Moreover, simply opening opportunities to participate does not enable all community members actually to do so, not least because sociocultural discourses often reinforce the idea that some people are more capable of knowing and making decisions than others (Jones and SPEECH 2001).

These problems have been highlighted even when local communities engage in relatively long-term interactions with NGOs, who are both orientated towards including marginalised people and use particular methods (such as PRA, drama, video, etc.) to broaden the inclusiveness of participatory processes. Extrapolating these problems beyond local communities to national or regional level ‘communities of citizens’, and their interactions with a variety of institutions who may have vested interests in *not* including the interests and needs of marginalised people in their plans and policies, highlights the complex realities at stake.

Participatory arenas as ‘unusual’ social spaces

From his research in India, Mosse (1994) argues that, far from simply ‘uncovering hidden knowledges’, participatory arenas are specific social contexts, imbued with power and anticipation, in which knowledge is constructed for particular purposes. Similarly, drawing on Kesby (1999); Jones and SPEECH (2001) argue that the interactions between participants and practitioners in participatory arenas can be seen as producing a particular social space in which interactions are shaped by the practice of locally interpreted ‘participatory principles’ (such as the claim that ‘all knowledges are equal’). Further, as Jackson (1999) notes, far from being neutral, the attitudes, behaviour and interests of the development practitioners facilitating analysis, shapes the processes and outcomes of decision-making. Such analyses highlight the influence of the physical and social spaces in which participation takes place on the processes and outcomes of engagement between the different social actors involved.

5.3 Citizenship participation in spaces separate from the state

In contrast to much writing on citizenship participation, there is a radical body of thought, which shifts the terrain away from participation *with* the state to an understanding of citizen participation as collective action within arenas *separate from* the state (see Schönwälder 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 1985), or *against* the state (Dryzek 1996; Pahl 1990). Both Dryzek (1996) and Schönwälder (1997) argue that citizen participation is most effective when it is undertaken in spheres separate from the state, since participation within state structures most often involves a degree of assimilation or co-optation, and inevitably comes up against multiple bureaucratic obstacles and politically motivated resistances from within civil society.

Arguing for a level of state-interaction, but retaining the idea that citizenship action should be located in spaces separate from the state, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) assert the notion of ‘radical democratic pluralism’. ‘Radical democratic pluralism’ centres on the idea of a democratic unification of different citizenship struggles through the principles of liberty and equality. They argue that if these principles are understood as a ‘common good’, they act as a unifying force between individuals and groups without contradicting rights to individual liberty and pluralist self-determination. In practice, this would entail each group engaged in struggle feeling solidarity with other struggles through identifying with their common aims of equality and liberty, while each maintained a focus on its particularist aims.

6 Citizenship accountabilities and responsibilities

As Cornwall *et al.* (2000: 3) note, the concept of accountability is often used without clarity over who is accountable to whom, in what domains of life. Little is known about how different people and the different organisations which affect their lives understand accountability, or how these understandings affect the relations between them. In many definitions, ‘accountability’ implies the responsibilities of individuals or institutions delegated to carry out specific tasks on behalf of those they represent (Newell and Bellour 2001: 5). However, the rather passive role which this implies for citizens, has been problematised in some contemporary writing on citizenship. With the rise of the notion of citizenship as agency, a body of writing has emerged, which emphasises the development of methods and legal systems, which enable citizens to *demand* accountability from the many different institutions which have influence over their lives (Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Barnes 1999; Newell 2000, 1999; Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Central to these debates is the need for a governance environment that enables citizens to make such demands; that is, an environment shaped by transparency, trust, rights to information and spaces for citizen awareness of, and control over, the decision-making processes which influence their lives (Jenkins and Goetz 1999; DfID 2000).

Conceptualising citizenship accountabilities and responsibilities within the framework of active citizenship promotes a new dynamic relationship between the good governance and citizen participation agendas (DfID 2000; Cornwall and Gaventa 2001: 2). Increasingly, it is seen as important to focus simultaneously on the capacities of citizens to take action and the capacities of government and other responsible institutions for good governance and accountability (DfID 2000; Commonwealth Foundation 1999; UNDP 2000). As DfID (2000: 14) notes, ‘states have very different capacities to reform legislation and ensure that it is enforced’, thus ‘building government’s capacities to provide accessible justice and legal redress, based on a respect for human rights, is central to the realisation of human rights for poor people’.

6.1 Voice, influence and responsiveness

An emerging body of literature on active citizenship and accountability focuses on the dynamics of voice, influence and responsiveness in the relations between citizens and the institutions which affect their lives (Cornwall *et al.* 2000; Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Prior *et al.* 1995; Schneider 1999). Zillur Rahman (2001: 1) argues that while ‘voice’ occupies a central place in contemporary democracy discourse, there is ‘increasing unease at the ground level of the possible deformation of this focus in terms of it becoming a one-way consultation exercise’. That is, people being given the space to ‘speak’ without onus or inclination on the part of policy-makers or macro actors to do the corresponding ‘listening’. He identifies three stages in the effective development of participatory mechanisms, each of which must be developed if voice is to translate to influence: ‘visibilising voice’, strategic distillation of voices to produce agendas, and constituency-building behind agreed agendas. A common weakness in consultation processes, he argues, is

a tendency to focus too much on stages one and three, leaving the agenda crystallisation process open to elite manipulation.

Many writers also note that there is a tendency for consultations to be tokenistic gestures, or a means of informing people of decisions that have, in reality, already been taken. In many contexts, consultation over the quality and scope of services can generate a sense of threat amongst state actors and service providers, and these fears can act as a potent obstacle to responsiveness (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). Thus, bureaucrats' attitudes, behaviour and understanding of the potential gains and losses of consultative processes can have a significant influence on their effectiveness, in terms of their potential for working towards citizens' inclusion and engagement in governance (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Orkin 1995; Abers 1998; Parry *et al.* 1992).

Moreover, as Cornwall and Gaventa (2000: 54) argue, understandings of accountability should not be limited to invited consultative arenas, but extended into broader notions of governance and citizens' rights to hold the state (and institutions at other levels) accountable to their needs and concerns. This might encompass often highly politicised dimensions of governance such as budgeting, spending and broader policy issues (De Sousa Santos 1998; Abers 1998; Prior *et al.* 1995; Goetz and Gaventa 2001).

6.2 Horizontal accountabilities and responsibilities

Particularly within civic republican and communitarian thought, the notion of citizenship accountabilities and responsibilities refers not only to citizen-state relations, but also to relations between citizens (Miller 1989; Beiner 1995; Sandal 1998). Such 'horizontal' accountabilities and responsibilities are essential not only for effective representation and collective action, but also for generating a sense of community and thus citizenship *per se*. Furthermore, insofar as rights imply corresponding obligations of accountability, the upholding of citizenship rights within the often private spaces of people's everyday lives fundamentally requires a sense of mutual responsibility between citizens. Given the difficulties of taking 'private issues' into the public domain of the courts, fulfilment of (for example) the right of a woman not to have sex against her will depends to a large extent on other citizens' respecting this right (DfID 2000; Ferguson 1999).

6.3 The relationship between rights and accountabilities in development thought

As noted in the introduction, a body of contemporary development thought emphasises the need to place simultaneous and equal emphasis on the processes of accountability at multiple levels, from global to local, and on building the capabilities of socially and economically disadvantaged people to analyse, articulate and demand their needs. It is in maintaining equal emphasis on the need to build both citizens' capabilities to articulate rights *and* the capabilities of political-economic institutions to respond and be held to account that the challenge of the rights-based approach lies (DfID 2000).

The UNDP Human Development Report (2000: 73–85) argues that the mutually reinforcing nature of social, economic, political and civil rights 'creates synergies that contribute to poor people's securing

their rights, enhancing their capabilities and escaping poverty'. Drawing on Sen (1999), the Report states that a democratic polity, buttressed by a free press and an active civil society in which vulnerable groups have a voice, 'make it almost impossible for governments and others not to take quick action'. In this, and the framing message that 'rights empower people in the fight against poverty', the Report asserts the idea that given an enabling political environment, people can demand that their needs are met. The Report also makes the case for processes of international accountability (though falling short of calling for international redistribution), stating that 'global actors and states acting collectively in global institutions' have responsibilities to 'help realise the economic and social rights of poor people in both rich and poor countries' (Sen 1999: 79).

However, making demands for accountability first requires a sense of the right to do so, as well as access to appropriate mechanisms through which these demands can be made and responded to. Arguing that 'full realisation of social and economic rights is not a goal that can be attained here and now', the UNDP Report asserts that the 'accountability of duty-bearers is to be judged by whether effective policies have been implemented and whether progress is being made' (Sen 1999: 77). The Report also draws on Dworkin's distinction between abstract and concrete rights: 'a person has concrete rights to the appropriate policies – not to food, housing and the like, which are abstract rights' (Sen 1999). While such an emphasis on enabling policies and on building people's capabilities to claim political space is a crucial dimension of a rights-based approach to development, others would strongly argue that the political-economic challenges of re-distribution and social-economic justice should not be side-lined by a 'technical focus' on 'enhancing voice'.

The ways in which rights discourses have been incorporated within development thought hold dangers of privileging 'bottom-up empowerment' over 'top-down redistribution' and institutional change. As Cornwall (2000: 31) notes, the neo-liberal appropriation of grass-roots participation and empowerment languages has worked to re-cast empowerment as 'liberation from an interventionist state'. Legitimising inaction on the part of the state, such discourses avoid acknowledgement of the realities of institutionalised relations of power which prevent marginalised people from realising needs and making claims. Moreover, they carry the danger of avoiding the realities of socio-economic inequalities and legitimising them by implying that 'welfare-handouts' help to create passive and thus disempowered citizens. It is thus important that the rights of marginalised people to demand that their needs are addressed should not be emphasised at the expense of the rights of marginalised people to these needs in themselves.

These dangers are highlighted by Munro (1996) in his analysis of the realities of the South African rights-based approach to development for disadvantaged rural communities. He argues that the South African demand-driven model of development aligns with neo-liberal conceptualisations of 'participation' as communities initiating and working towards solving their own development problems, and that within this the 'rights of rural communities to demand public goods has been blended into their responsibility to do so' (Munro 1996: 19). In this case, conceptualising development in terms of citizens' rights has effectively placed the onus on citizens to demand, rather than the state to provide.

7 Conclusions: learning about citizenship from citizens themselves

Very little is known about the realities of how different people understand themselves as citizens, and the ways in which this impacts on the different dimensions of their lives. Equally, little is known about how rights languages are actually used in situated struggles, by different individuals and groups, and to what effect. This literature review has outlined a variety of perspectives on the relationship between citizenship, rights, participation and accountability. As the tensions between these different perspectives highlight, however, understanding how citizenship rights and accountabilities are played out in practice, for different people, in different contexts, in the different domains of their lives, requires learning from citizens themselves.

Developing understanding of citizenship by identifying the experiences and knowledges of citizens themselves as a central concern, points to the need to use methodologies which *enable* people to articulate their realities and propose strategies for change. Beyond working to open formal spaces for the inclusion of those whose voices are rarely heard, a variety of participatory methods for action research on citizenship are beginning to emerge. The use of such methods in analysis with different individuals and groups holds great potential for gaining a better understanding of the realities of citizenship for different people in different contexts. Moreover, through opening spaces for citizens to express the possibilities and challenges which citizenship presents to them, such analysis might catalyse processes of reflection and action for change on the part of both citizens and the organisations which affect their lives. It is hoped that the review of literature provided in this paper both points to directions for further research, and highlights the need to enrich and broaden the debate through the inclusion of citizens' own knowledges, experiences and strategies for change.

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Selected works on concepts of citizenship

This annotated bibliography is intended as a guide to further reading around concepts of citizenship. It includes some of the key texts used in the attached *Concepts of Citizenship* review. It also includes texts that discuss some of the more complex ideas within contemporary citizenship writing, which are touched on in the main text, but not discussed in detail. Further publications may be found at the website of the ‘Citizenship, Participation and Accountability Development Research Centre’ (www.ids.ac.uk/drc-citizen).

Barnes, M., 1999, ‘Users as citizens: collective action and the local governance of welfare’, *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol 33 No 1: 73–90

Drawing on theories of new social movements and of citizenship, this paper considers the developing place of user organisations within systems of local governance. Central to the discussion are the ways in which excluded groups have sought to assert the legitimacy of both their experiential knowledges and their position as citizens in the face of official responses, which have constructed them as self-interested pressure groups. Barnes thus asserts the significance of shared identity as a basis for collective action alongside more pragmatic motivations to influence the nature of health and social care services.

A distinction is made between ‘collective action based in common experiences of oppression, disadvantage or social exclusion’ from ‘an assertive consumerism, which seeks to maximise assertive self interest’. It is argued that there are three main ways in which collective action provides a means through which citizenship can be addressed in the social policy arena: as a social right, as a form of agency and practice, as a relationship of accountability between public service providers and their users.

Benhabib, S., 1996, ‘Towards a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy’, in S. Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: contesting the boundaries of the political*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Benhabib outlines a deliberative model of democracy that incorporates features of practical rationality, central to which is the possibility of free, public deliberation about matters of mutual concern to all. She argues that too great a focus on collective identity may come at the cost of minorities whose civil and political rights may be impinged, and thus that claims to legitimacy and collective identity, particularly a collective identity with a nationalist tone, may come into conflict. Conversely, too great an emphasis on economic welfare may undermine a sense of collective identity by creating competition between social groups and weakening the claims of political sovereignty, vis-à-vis other states. Yet, in a well-functioning democratic society, she argues, the demands of legitimacy, economic welfare and collective identity may ideally exist in some form of equilibrium.

First, her vision of deliberative democracy entails a system in which deliberation is a procedure for being informed. Second, this vision includes recognition that individuals enter deliberation with some level of conceptual clarity about their choices and preferences. However, such clarity cannot precede deliberation, since it is through deliberation that individuals inevitably come up against conflicts and reflect on their individual preferences and options. Third, this vision of deliberative processes derives from not only a conflict of values, but a conflict of interests in social life. Finally, she envisages not a singular deliberative system, but a multiplicity of arenas engaging groups from political parties, citizens' initiatives, voluntary associations to consciousness-raising groups, in an interlocking set of associations, networks and organisations that span social and political life.

Boyte, H., 1999, 'Building the Commonwealth: citizenship as public work', in L. Soltan and K. Elkin (eds), *Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University

Harry Boyte's 'Commonwealth democracy' is a vision of participatory democracy, in which citizenship is the practice of 'public work', by which he means the creation by citizens of public goods and services. He argues that 'voting, protesting, and complaining are not sufficient; neither are deliberating, being responsible, caring nor volunteering. Only through public work together will we be able to create a new democracy that regenerates the sense that "we the people" are authors of our common fate'. Thus, he argues that while communitarian democracy (perhaps equivalent to other notions of participatory democracy) introduces the pursuit of the common good and the creation of a 'civil society' to the minimalist bundle of rights and practices which defines liberal democracy, that 'the commonwealth is something richer': 'Public work shifts the focus to a much richer conception of civic agency, to a much broader understanding of citizen competence, and to a much more vibrant view of democracy itself. The government becomes a catalyser of civic energies rather than replacing them, and is truly popular. Public institutions are less professionalised service organisations for citizens and more 'institutions maintained by citizens'. The task, he argues, is to 'construct the forms of association, exchange of experience, communication, and action that can generate a broad and transformative movement for commonwealth democracy'.

Cohen, J.L., 1999, 'Changing paradigms of citizenship and the exclusiveness of the demos', *International Sociology*, Vol 14 No 3: 245–68

Cohen argues that there are three distinct components of citizenship: a political principle of democracy, a juridical status of legal personhood and a form of membership and political identity. The modern paradigm of citizenship was based on the assumption that these components would neatly map onto one another on the terrain of the democratic welfare state. Yet, he argues, globalisation, new forms of transnational migration, the partial disaggregation of state sovereignty and the development of human rights regimes have rendered this model anachronistic.

He argues that civil society, as distinct from political society, has taken the lead in reviving human rights discourses as the right to have rights and making claims for expanding rights (Falk 1992; Held 1995). A context is therefore being created in which people act in collaboration, exchange opinions and develop the civic competencies and trust required for exercising influence on political and public institutions, and it is the relations established by international civil society that carry and give political weight to the universalist dimension of human rights discourses. It is thus argued that it is only if the various elements of the citizenship principle are disaggregated and re-institutionalised at various levels of governance, (local, national and supranational), with different powers articulating and backing them up, that they will be able to counter the flaws in each and function productively as counter-powers. Cohen concludes by arguing that understanding citizenship as multiple levels of belonging enables citizenship to be tempered with the demands of justice.

Commonwealth Foundation and CIVICUS, 1999, *Citizens and Governance*, London: Commonwealth Foundation

This report summarises the findings of research, which explored how citizens in different Commonwealth countries perceive their citizenship. The framing questions of the research were: ‘What is a good society?’; ‘In such a society, what roles are best played by citizens and which are best played by state institutions and other sectors?’; ‘What would enable citizens to play their roles more effectively in the development of such a society in the future?’

Noting an inevitable degree of difference across people, the study found that the *expectations of citizens* are: (1) basic needs of citizens, (2) association with other people (respect for culture and heritage, cooperation, caring and sharing in the community/society), and (3) participation in the governance of society (equal rights and justice, responsive and inclusive governance).

Perceptions of the state role: democratic, strong, capable of standing up to global forces, and efficient in the use of public resources: (1) ‘provider’ of basic services and security in livelihoods, (2) facilitator of the actions of citizens in building and maintaining a good society; (3) promoter of rights and justice, and inclusion of citizens in the process of governance through transparency, voluntary disclosure of information, accountability to citizens, devolution of decision-making power and resources about localised issues to local bodies. ‘A sense of ownership of their democracies’.

Perceptions of citizen’s roles: (1) active citizenship (reflexivity, obligations to state/other citizens, motivation), (2) collective citizen action (unity, power in numbers, organisation, mutual capacity building, confidence), (3) engaged citizens (playing roles in wider public arenas, seeking information, demanding accountability, perseverance, grit and courage, inspiration, leadership, sharing, enable, animate and facilitate other citizens to participate and engage).

It concludes with a discussion of *desired visions*: (1) a strong state and strong civil society, (2) deepened democracy and democratic culture, (3) an enlarged role for citizens, (4) direct connection between citizens and state based on participation and inclusion, (5) co-construction of strong associational life in civil society (strengthened interface between citizens and intermediaries like NGOs, trade unions and informal institutions).

Cornwall, A., 2000, *Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: perspectives on participation for poverty reduction*, Stockholm: SIDA

Focusing on international development discourses, this paper sets the contemporary interest in ‘citizen participation’ in its historical context, of changing perspectives on participation and development over the last three decades of the twentieth century. Strategies to engage citizens directly in establishing and negotiating policy priorities and holding government accountable become especially significant in the context of the emerging ‘rights-based approach’ to development in which new forms of citizenship are beginning to be articulated. Re-conceptualising citizenship as the exercise of agency, rather than the liberal notion of a national identity, which entitles citizens to a bundle of rights, creates the basis for a more inclusionary approach, and with it a re-casting of rights; rights as created by citizens themselves. Casting participation in social, economic and political life as itself a right, becomes a starting point for making other claims. Emphasising obligation and responsibility, the rights-based approach opens up possibilities for a renewed focus on the root causes of poverty and exclusion, and on the relations of power that sustain inequity. Bringing governance squarely into the frame, exclusion itself becomes a denial of rights and a base on which citizens can make demands backed-up by legal instruments.

The rights-based approach to development offers the possibility of shifting the frame of participatory initiatives away from participation in pre-determined spaces, to enabling citizens to define for themselves their own entry points for change. It also shifts the focus from legislative apparatus towards those people on the receiving end of prejudice, discrimination and exclusion, providing a starting point for development processes that can actively challenge and redress inequity.

Cornwall, A. and Gaventa, J., 2000, ‘From users and choosers to makers and shapers: repositioning participation in social policy’, *IDS Bulletin*, Vol 31 No 4: 50–62

The paper explores approaches to participation in social policy, setting them within broader debates on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Using examples of participation in a range of social policy arenas, North and South, it explores the implications of a shift from a focus on clients or consumers of social policies as users and choosers to a more active engagement of citizens as agents in the making and shaping of the social policies that affect their lives. Drawing on Lister (1998) it is argued that casting participation as itself a citizenship right, enables people to act as agents. Through this, the social rights of

citizenship can go beyond Marshall's passive vision, towards the processes through which citizens can gain access to social rights and take part in defining their rights through actively engaging in the governance and decision-making which affect their lives.

Through creating and shaping their own models of social provisioning, the examples demonstrate that service users develop and make strategic use of their identities as actors on their own affairs rather than passive beneficiaries of abstract rights granted by broader society. By seeing themselves as actors rather than passive beneficiaries, user groups may be more able to assert their citizenship through seeking greater accountability from public service providers. This raises questions however, as to the extent to which marginalised groups are able to articulate their concerns and about the form that dialogue takes. Developing mechanisms that enable marginalised groups to engage in dialogue, identify indicators of success, monitor and assess performance, and demand greater transparency are thus of central importance. Social citizenship, it is argued, should thus be expanded to include not only concepts of social rights, but also social responsibilities exercised through self action, and social accountability achieved through direct forms of democratic governance.

Cowan, J., Dembour, M-B. and Wilson, R. (eds), 2001, 'Introduction', in *Culture and Rights*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Cowan *et al.* propose three major ways in which culture and rights have been linked in recent debates: rights *versus* culture, rights *to* culture, and rights *as* culture. Through analysis and critique of each approach, they propose a fourth conjunction; rights as *analytic to* culture. They argue that, rather than being solely an object of analysis, culture can be employed as a means of analysing and bringing understanding to the particular ways that rights processes operate as situated social action. They assert that it is only through analysis of the contextual realities of specific rights struggles that we can better understand how individuals, groups, communities and states actually use discourses of rights in the pursuit of particular ends, and how they become enmeshed in its logic. Such analysis thus offers a stronger grounding of the conversation between theory and practice.

Department for International Development, UK, 2000, *Realising Human Rights for Poor People*, London: DfID

Framed by the message that the elimination of poverty can only be achieved through the engagement of poor people in the development processes which affect their lives, this DfID Strategy Paper asserts that a rights-based approach to development 'means empowering people to make their own decisions, rather than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf'. Underpinning DfID's rights-based approach are the assertions that poverty is about more than a lack of income; equality matters, and governments have a duty to promote the rights of poor people. The DfID approach weaves together a three-pronged integrated approach. (1) **Participation**: 'enabling people to realise their rights to participate in, and access information relating to, the decision-making processes which affect their lives'.

(2) **Inclusion:** ‘building socially inclusive societies, based on values of equality and non-discrimination, through development which promotes all human rights for all people’. (3) **Fulfilling obligations:** ‘strengthening institutions and policies which ensure that obligations to protect and promote the realisation of all human rights are fulfilled by states and other duty bearers’.

Donnelly, J., 1999, ‘Human rights, democracy and development’, *Human Rights Quarterly* 21: 608–32

Donnelly argues that human rights are based on the notion of ‘natural rights’, a metaphysical abstraction and based on legal positivism. But, he asks, what does it mean to be involved in decision-making, to claim rights through legal mechanisms and to assert a right to accountability? Democratic theories, he asserts, are often distinguished by their reliance on procedural and substantive tests in making this determination. Donnelly draws on Rousseau to argue against procedural ‘will of all’, which often expresses the interests of only particular individuals and groups, and instead argues for a ‘general will’, the reflective, rational interest of the whole people, which is not the same as aggregated preferences. He asserts that democracy aims to empower people. Yet, human rights aim to empower individuals, thus limiting rather than empowering the people and their government. Beyond who ought to rule, human rights are concerned with *how* the people (or any other group) rule and *what* they do in so ruling. He thus argues that it is only if a sovereign people wills respect for human rights, and thus constrains its own interests and actions, will democracy contribute to realising human rights.

Dryzek, J.S., 1996, ‘Political inclusion and the dynamics of democratization’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol 90 No 3: 475–87

Dryzek argues that once universal citizenship rights have been secured in a society, democratisation is mostly a matter of the more authentic political inclusion of different groups and categories, for which formal political equality can hide continued exclusion or oppression. He argues, however, that it is important to distinguish between inclusion in the state and inclusion in the polity more generally. He defines entry into the state as comprising a diverse set of initiatives, including: lobbying as an interest group; participation in policy development and implementation through ongoing negotiation between group-leaders and public officials; participation in conventional party and electoral politics; acceptance of governmental appointments by group leaders; or enhancing the groups ability to participate in public policy-making through changes in public policy. He argues that democratic theorists who advocate the strategy of progressive inclusion of as many groups as possible in the state, fail to recognise that the conditions for authentic, as opposed to ‘symbolic’ inclusion, are actually quite demanding.

He argues that history shows that benign inclusion in the state is possible only when (a) a group’s defining concern can be assimilated to an established or emerging state imperative, and (b) civil society is not unduly depleted by the group’s entry into the state. The absence of such conditions possibly places oppositional civil society in a better focus for democratisation than the state.

Ellison, N., 1997, 'Towards a new social politics: citizenship and reflexivity in late modernity', *Sociology*, Vol 31 No 4: 697–711

Ellison starts by exploring three approaches to understanding citizenship: state-centred (civic liberal), pluralist (civic republican) and post-structuralist, and asserts that none of these are adequate for understanding contemporary social politics in late modern societies. He draws on post-structuralist notions of decentred identities, but argues that any notion of citizenship must continue to intimate an empirical sense of collective membership and social inclusion, shifting memberships and forms of belonging. He thus argues that in late modernity, citizenship is best understood as a condition of 'defensive engagement'. This is a variegated social form, which encompasses differential negotiations of social change as groups struggle to create a new range of solidarities in a context increasingly divorced from traditional institutional locations and modes of belonging.

Some groups, he argues, have adapted to their sense and reality of exclusion by ceasing to participate as citizens in any form of public space, limiting themselves to using those dimensions of formal institutional mechanisms which are advantageous, and finding ways around the rules and regulations that limit them. The limitation of effective citizenship to those with the personal or collective resources (material, cultural and intellectual) to construct solidarities and imagine new identities and modes of belonging, carries the danger that those excluded from the sphere of reflexive engagement could be forced into a 'non-reflexive' defence of interests. And some sections of society unable to cope with the fragmenting effects of social change may resort to 'fundamentalist solidarities' in an attempt to mitigate exclusion.

Ellison, N., 1999, 'Beyond universalism and particularism: rethinking contemporary welfare theory', *Critical Social Policy*, Vol 19 No 1: 57–83

Ellison argues that citizenship and welfare theory debates around universalism and particularism, have reached an impasse. On the one hand, stands the universalist plea for greater social justice and equality, a 'fair' allocation of social goods to mitigate the in-egalitarian effects of the market and to generate social cohesion. On the other, stand demands for recognition of diversity and difference, which sustain the view that universalism: 'paradoxically, can exacerbate social exclusion'. Imposing a universal set of values under the guise of concern for all, he asserts, produces a 'false uniformity'. And, paradoxically, far from addressing inequalities, universalism can work to marginalise the already marginal, and exacerbate social exclusion, while simultaneously masking this under a veneer of formal equality. Yet, a clear paradox in contemporary struggles of marginalised groups is that they often express a demand for inclusion, while 'simultaneously challenging the nature of what it means to be included': 'the basis of social membership, the principles informing resource allocations and the means of access to resources themselves'.

He argues that to push beyond the universalist-particularist divide, we should move towards acceptance of a deliberative politics, accompanied by a politics of presence. A deliberative approach to social policy, involving all social groups to participate in forming and pursuing policy proposals through access to deliberative institutions, is likely to hold out promise of a greater degree of social equality than traditional universalist welfare ideals have managed to achieve.

Engle Merry, S., 1990, *Getting Justice and Getting Even: legal consciousness among working class Americans*, London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Engle Merry researched with US citizens about their expectations and experiences of claiming formal citizenship rights. She found that people go to the courts because they think the law has something to offer them: the possibility of the power, rights and justice they see themselves as entitled to as citizens. This sense of legal entitlement is not based on particular legal doctrine, but on a broad sense of rights: rights are not conceptualised as being attached to persons as individuals, but as being embedded in relationships and constitutive of these relationships.

Law, she argues, consists of a complex repertoire of meanings and categories understood differently by people depending on their experience and understanding of law. Legal consciousness is expressed both by the act of going to court as well as by everyday talk about rights and entitlements. In general, people have the possibility of creativity and resistance; of changing their consciousness as they test it against the experience of everyday life. Indeed, legal consciousness can itself generate contradictions, such as promises of equal treatment in court. Law works not just by the imposition of rules and punishments, but also by its capacity to construct authoritative images of social relationships and actions; images which are symbolically powerful. Thus, she argues, the law's power to shape consciousness depends on both its capacity to generate symbols and categories, which persuasively constitute the social world, and on its capacity to exert force behind these symbols and categories to coerce obedience to its rendition of events and relationships.

Ferguson, C., 1999, *Global Social Policy Principles: human rights and social justice*, London: DfID

Ferguson argues that commitment to people's participation in policy-making within a rights-based approach can work as a vehicle for increasing the accountability of government organisations to their citizens and consequently increasing the likelihood that policy measures will be implemented in practice. Drawing on Goonesekere (1998), she argues that when concerns are conceived in terms of rights, they are elevated from the realm of good faith, to a level of legal entitlement, requiring national and international response, and become fundamental, immutable and priority claims. The concept of rights also prioritises the idea that individuals are active agents rather than simply people with needs, and the principle of the indivisibility of human rights provides a means of strengthening the ability of vulnerable groups to claim social, political and economic resources to meet their needs.

Yet, she cautions, people have to know what their rights are, to have the possibility of saying what they think particular rights mean, and reach understanding over what concrete entitlements define. Equally, people cannot participate in decision-making processes if they do not have general health or economic wellbeing. But a human rights framework is not simply about promoting individual agency, it is also concerned with particular outcomes, including equality and social justice. The human rights framework thus places individual agency and participation within a context of state responsibility for realising the rights of all citizens without discrimination.

Fox, J., 1994, 'The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship – lessons from Mexico', *World Politics*, Vol 46 No 2: 151–84

Fox asserts that the transition from clientelism to citizenship, within the consolidation of democratic regimes, requires the extension of political rights to the entire citizenry. He argues that the transition from authoritarian clientelism to respect for associational autonomy, is an important dimension of democratisation, yet tends to unfold unevenly through iterative cycles of conflict among authoritarian rulers, reformist elites, and autonomous social movements. Extending effective access to citizenship rights to an entire society requires a framework that differs from most approaches to national-regime-change. Through analysis of the Mexican case, he proposes that while state managers can promote semi-clientelism as an alternative to citizenship rights, social movements 'gnaw at the cracks in the system and try to open them further'. The result is a gradual and uneven transition towards citizenship that involves distinct patterns of state-society relations. Thus, he concludes, persistent authoritarianism can coexist with both new enclaves of pluralist tolerance and large grey areas of semi-clientelism.

Gaventa, J. and Valderrama, C., 1999, 'Participation, citizenship and local governance', background paper for workshop on 'Strengthening participation in local governance', mimeo, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 21–24 June 1998: www.ids.ac.uk/particip

Drawing on recent studies of citizen participation from different areas of the world, this paper explores some of the dynamics and methods for strengthening community-based participation in the context of programmes for democratic decentralisation. A number of barriers to citizen participation are identified: the complexities of power relations and the control of the government over the structure of participation; the level of citizen organisation and their capacities to participate; political will and insufficient financial resources. They argue that approaches to overcoming these barriers might include new forms and methods of participatory planning, citizen-education and awareness-building; training and sensitising local officials; advocacy, and building alliances and collaborations; and promoting the accountability of officials to citizens.

Goetz, A-M. and Gaventa, J., 2001, 'From consultation to influence: bringing citizen voice and client focus into service delivery', *IDS Working Paper 138*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

Based on a wide range of case-studies that demonstrate different mechanisms for citizen engagement, this paper identifies the conditions for enhancing the effectiveness of citizens' efforts to transform voice and consultation into real influence. Central to this is the identification of public sector reforms, which produce greater responsiveness and accountability to poor clients. The characteristics found to be most important were: (1) legal standing or formal recognition of non-governmental observers within policy-making arenas, (2) continuous presence for these observers throughout the process of the agency's work, (3) structured access for citizens to the flow of official documentary information, (4) either the right of observers to issue dissenting reports directly to legislative bodies, or the right of service users to demand a formal investigation and seek legal redress for poor or non-delivery of services.

The paper maintains that the extent to which citizens influence the design and delivery of public services, and the extent to which states are capable of responding, will depend upon the interaction of three factors. First, the sociocultural and economic power of the client group in question. Second, the nature of the political system and the organisation of political competition. Third, the nature and power of the state and its bureaucracies.

Halisi, G., Kaiser, P. and Ndegwam, S., 1998, 'Introduction: the multiple meanings of citizenship – rights, identity and social justice in Africa', *Africa Today*, Vol 45 No 3–4: 337–50

The paper critiques the dominance of 'eurocentric visions' of citizenship, and the use of these theories to explain African citizenship experiences. Colonial histories, it is argued, have significantly affected contemporary experiences of citizenship in Africa, and the contrasting experiences of British republicanism and French liberalism have had different effects. In Africa, they argue, inclusiveness is a value independent of both economic performance and the democratic process. The tendency to emphasise legal-rational factors while ignoring populist and communitarian conceptions of citizenship creates an arbitrary distinction between tradition and modernity. Crucial to understanding citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa is the recognition that both liberal and communitarian values are relevant, because they combine rights and identities respectively. Whilst citizenship is primarily thought of in terms of state-enforced rights and obligations, civil society creates the pressures for political choices and legislatures. Strong civil societies, they argue, produce institutions that enhance citizenship and require a constant state-civil society discourse; weaker civil societies are more readily dominated by the state and economic institutions.

Drawing on Mamdani (1996), they suggest a bifurcation of citizenship in post-colonial Africa, which has encouraged a dual-citizenship consciousness. Many African people's attachment to a primordial identity may produce a sense of ethnic republicanism deeper than the often hollow solidarity of the modern state. It is argued that a focus on citizenship can help to refocus African democratic thought on accountability, as a vital force between rulers and subjects in the evolution of democracy. This is particularly since conceptions of horizontal and vertical accountability respond to ideas on constitutionalism and democracy respectively, and thus to a realisation that citizenship, democracy, and accountability are inextricably linked.

Heater, D., 1999, *What is Citizenship?*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Heater starts with an exploration of the liberal and civic republican traditions. With reference to the liberal concern with rights, he argues that, within many states, there is a fundamental gap between enshrined rights and the rights citizens enjoy in practice. For many citizens, the problem ranges from rights effectively denied, rights not defined but largely available, rights defined in a distorted form, to rights that are defined but difficult to claim in practice. He argues that the civic republican focus on the ideals of community belonging and participation, must be adapted in recognition of the complexities of multiple forms of belonging which shape people's lives. Heater moves on to critically analyse what citizenship might mean for different people in the contemporary contexts of globalisation and localisation, through which he explores the notion of multiple citizenship, and critically examines the intersections of citizenship action, citizenship education and accountability.

Higgins-Wharf, J., 1999, 'Citizenship and empowerment: a remedy for citizen participation in health reform', *Community Development Journal*, Vol 34 No 4: 287–307

The article explores why some people actively participate when opportunities are provided for citizens to engage in decision-making while others do not, and the experiences of those who did participate in a particular decision-making arena. The analysis found that a sense of citizenship; a sense of enjoying the formal status *and* substantive effects of civil, political and social rights as an equal member of the community, distinguished between participants and non-participants. Higgins therefore argues that the structures of participation efforts do not in themselves determine who participates. Rather, the decision to participate should be seen in terms of both personal empowerment and a sense of community, and citizenship rights and responsibilities. Further, perceptions of holding social rights nurture one's sense of personal empowerment and respect, as well as one's responsibility to collectively engage in the life of the community. Participation in community life thus requires a sense of full citizenship, of being accorded the rights that define one's equal status in, and relationship to, the state.

The universal ideal of citizenship serves to exclude disadvantaged and diverse groups in society by assuming that, because differences are discounted in an attempt to provide equal status for all, differences no longer matter. Genuinely universal citizenship is differential; it embraces the diversity of perspectives that people derive from their distinct experiences and positionalities, and views these differences as a strength. Attending to difference is thus crucial to making participation and inclusion possible.

Isin, E. and Wood, P., 1999, *Citizenship and Identity*, London: Sage

Starting with the assertion that citizenship is a differentiated form of identity produced through identifications with different groups, Isin and Wood argue that each set of group claims to rights can be conceptualised as a form of citizenship. Through this, they move beyond the nationalist imaginary of citizenship to envision multi-layered citizenships, of which national citizenship, itself a level and form of group identity, is but one. Their discussion focuses on citizenship as a sense of the ‘right to have rights’ and advocating for one’s own perception of their rights, as opposed to the passive status of ‘rights bearer’. In doing so, they place emphasis on processes of rights claims rather than the content of those rights. They argue that citizenship writing has to a large extent ignored that citizenship rights are not only exercised from particular physical spaces, but that processes of claiming public spaces is central to the creation of rights and thus citizenship identities.

They assert that understanding the differentiated reality of people’s sense and practice of citizenship requires a robust conceptualisation of group identity formation, a formal recognition of group rights and an understanding of citizenship as an articulating principle for different levels and forms of group rights. Drawing on Berlin’s conceptualisation of a ‘third form of liberty’, they assert that theorisations of group rights (such as Mouffe 1992; Kymlicka 1995) have overlooked the centrality of ‘solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding and the need for association on equal terms’ to group rights claims. Recognising that different people have different capacities and resources to form identities and interests, however, they argue that citizenship should be seen as an institution for reducing these inequalities, and that acknowledging the multiple and differentiated reality of citizenship enables citizens to define and claim their own entry points for inclusion.

Jackson, C., 1999, 'Social exclusion and gender: does one size fit all?', *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol 11 No 1: 125–46

Jackson argues that the notion of the 'unitary individual' has obscured that a person might be simultaneously included and excluded at the same time. This, she argues, has led to the treatment of women as just one more excluded category. Drawing on Tsing, she asserts that marginality can offer both limitations and opportunities, such as women using the idioms of motherhood and the domestic as the basis for voice. Illustrating this point, Jackson cites several case studies which found that marginalised women effectively manipulate identities of vulnerability towards more successful rights claims, and thus argues that marginality can thus also offer positions from which to protest and form the ground of resistant discourses and resource claims.

As Tsing shows, there can be costs of inclusion; as one moves closer to powerful centres, one gains both luxury and servitude, yet as one moves away, one can gain autonomy with hardships. Tsing (1993) asks: 'can one be simultaneously inside and outside of the state? This is the dilemma of marginality ... Marginals stand outside the state by tying themselves to it; they constitute the state by fleeing from it. As culturally "different" subjects they can never be citizens; as culturally different "subjects" they can never escape citizenship'. Jackson argues that the excluded are brought in, included, and offered access to the resources and relations of power. The poor, by inclusion for example in employment, may become non-poor. Yet in gender terms, what does this mean? Gender identities may be positively valued, yet at the same time may be devalued in hegemonic understandings of identity. She thus raises the problem that inclusion might involve a loss or transformation of these identities.

Jenkins, R. and Goetz, A.-M., 1999, 'Accounts and accountability: theoretical implications for the right-to-information movement in India', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 20 No 3: 603–22

Based on empirical research, this article explores the interconnected issues of corruption, rights to information, transparency, citizenship and participation, through examination of the work of the MKSS movement in Rajasthan, India. The MKSS mobilised around the suspected corruption of local state officials over development project finances, and made citizens' rights to information central in their campaign. It is argued that, in the process of experimenting with methods of compiling, sharing and verifying expenditure data at very local levels, the MKSS has developed a radical interpretation of the notion that citizens have a right both to know how they are governed and to participate actively in the process of auditing their representatives. Yet, in this case, even after information was gained, state corruption identified, and moral pressure used to shame the corrupt officials, the local authorities intervened to discourage admission of guilt. This, it is argued, highlights the complexities of holding states to account for their actions, and the elusive nature of transparency.

Kymlicka, W., 1995, 'Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights', Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kymlicka develops a framework for protecting minorities against the discriminations they feel when faced with the homogeneity dominant groups try to create to produce what they see as an ideal society. He asserts that group rights to cultural difference are best protected within a liberal framework of rights, if a clear distinction is made between the group rights that lead to internal sanctions, and those that lead to external protections. He argues that the liberal approach can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. Kymlicka thus endorses the view of individual rights to cultural membership.

Laloo, K., 1998, 'Citizenship and place: spatial definitions of oppression and agency in South Africa', *Africa Today*, Vol 45 No 3–4: 423–38

Laloo explores the dynamic relationship between citizenship and place in apartheid South Africa, in an attempt to understand how place was instrumental in structuring the inequitable patterns of citizenship observed in South Africa today. He argues that citizenship has integrative as well as allocative functions. That is, citizenship can mitigate inequalities through allocations of socioeconomic resources, thereby securing social solidarity within communities that are divided by class, ethnicity, gender or age, etc. And expanding citizen participation (inclusion) allows groups access to scarce resources, while retaining their diversity within a common national culture, a common set of identities, and a common value system. Conversely, excluding groups from participation denies or restricts their access to resources, and hence can reduce the possibility of a common national culture, identity and value system, while increasing the likelihood of conflict and fragmentation.

Laloo highlights that the 'integrative' and 'allocative' functions of citizenship are inherently spatial. This is because access to places that are well located in relation to economic and social opportunities, as well as formal political arenas are spatially differentiated. Thus different groups (differentiated along race, ethnic, class or gender lines) can be denied important types of spatial access due to social custom, legislation or the costs incurred from travel. Hence citizen participation is determined not only by social, legal or political status, but also by one's physical location in relation to opportunities and resources.

Lister, R., 1997, *Citizenship: feminist perspectives*, Basingstoke: Macmillan

Starting with an analysis and critique of dimensions of liberal and civic republican approaches to citizenship, Lister uses the notion of human agency to synthesise the two approaches. Central to her argument are the assertions that ‘citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the political arena’ and ‘citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents’. Lister asserts a notion of human agency as both located in dialectical relationships with social structures (simple agency) and embedded in social relations (citizenship agency). She also asserts that citizenship agency is integrally related to consciousness: ‘to act as a citizen requires first a sense of agency, the belief that one *can* act; acting as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of agency. Thus agency is not simply about the capacity to choose and act but also about a *conscious* capacity which is important to the individual’s self-identity’.

Citizenship, for Lister, is a differentiated dimension of identity and practice, rather than a universal status as in the liberal view, or an overarching civic identity as in the Civic Republican view. Highlighting that different people have different capacities to act, however, she distinguishes between ‘being a citizen’ and ‘acting as a citizen’: ‘To *be* a citizen is to enjoy the status and rights of legal-political citizenship which are necessary for exercising human agency, whilst to *act* as a citizen involves exercising one’s agency to fulfil the potential of citizenship status’. In this, she retains dimensions of citizenship as a universalist project, and thus the emancipatory potential of universalist notions of rights. She calls, however, for a new articulation between universalism and particularism, in which universalism stands in creative tension to diversity and difference, and challenges the divisions and exclusionary inequalities which stem from diversity. She terms this conception of citizenship, ‘differentiated universalism’, in which universalism is understood, not as false impartiality but as a universality of moral commitment to the equal worth and participation of all.

Lister, R., 1998, ‘Citizen in action: citizenship and community development in Northern Ireland context’, *Community Development Journal*, Vol 33 No 3: 226–35

Developing the idea of citizenship as an expression of human agency in the political arena (Lister 1997), it is argued that community development can be understood as an expression of citizenship in action at the local level. Such processes of participatory citizenship are seen to develop the individual’s capacities to act as citizens, particularly through the social dimensions of this process; social relations, negotiating conflicts, mutual support, defining values, enforcements of control and regulation. It is argued that the inherent nature of power often marginalises the poorest and most vulnerable from political processes, and participation at the level of community development, as a form of collective action, is put forward as a possible route to increasing marginalised individuals’ self-confidence and capabilities, through which people come to see themselves as political actors and effective citizens.

Lowndes, V., 1995, 'Citizenship and Urban Politics', in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman (eds), *Theories of Urban Politics*, London: Sage

Lowndes argues that the revived interest in citizenship stems from the new triangle of relationships between individuals, communities and government. Specifically, it reflects a concern that such relationships are breaking down, and that government institutions are inaccessible and unresponsive. The key question for citizenship is thus: what is the nature of the bond which links individuals, community and government, and how can it be sustained?

According to Lowndes, the link between citizenship and urban politics has historically been rooted in three propositions: (1) citizenship derives from community identification and membership, (2) civic action and political participation are concentrated at the local level, (3) local governance and urban politics provide an 'education for citizenship'. Yet, in contemporary urban environments, the link between individual, community and government is threatened by the limited interest and involvement of individuals in local politics and civic life, the loss of relevance and coherence in local communities, and the inaccessibility and un-responsiveness of local political institutions.

Lowndes argues that individual rights and community membership are best seen as two faces of citizenship that are related in different ways in different historical periods and political systems. A stress on individual rights to information, redress, and service choice and quality is unsustainable in the absence of a collective framework for dispute arbitration, the establishment of priorities and the brokering of different groups' demands. Further, a stress on community participation and membership requires an understanding of the diversity of communities and of what motivates individuals to get involved in local politics and civic life.

Mamdani, M., 1996, 'Citizens and Subjects: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism', Princeton: Princeton University Press

In this article, Mamdani analyses the historical roots of the 'segmented nature' of post-colonial African citizenship. He argues that during colonial rule, the white colonial elite were treated as economically and culturally privileged 'citizens', while the colonised black majority were treated as devalued 'subjects'. This, he argues, has shaped a 'bifurcated society' in which 'citizens' are those whose lives are shaped by modern law, religion and culture, and who work in the formal segments of the labour market, while 'subjects' are those whose lives are shaped by devalued customary law, minority beliefs, and ritual, and who work in informal, marginalised sectors. He thus argues that the history of colonialism institutionalised white elites as economically and culturally privileged 'citizens' (whose lives are shaped by 'modern law', 'culture', 'religion') and the colonised black majority as devalued 'subjects' (whose lives are shaped by 'customary law', 'paganism' and 'ritual').

Mansbridge, J., 1999, 'On the Idea that Participation Makes Better Citizens', in S. Elkin and K. Soltan (eds), *Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press: 291–328

Focussing particularly on Western nineteenth century political philosophy, Mansbridge analyses the history and development of the idea that 'participation makes better citizens'. In the nineteenth century, Tocqueville and Mill proposed that participation created 'good citizen character'. Tocqueville argued that centralised power takes away citizens' own power, and thus creates apathy, yet that direct participation in democratic decision-making with others makes better citizens, because it has an impact on the self of enlarging one's interests; 'the educative function'. Tocqueville conceptualised that individual self-interest is the central motivation behind citizen's participation in public affairs; he argues that self-interest becomes common interest through citizens perceiving that 'the fortune of the public is his own', i.e. 'enlightened self interest'. In the second point, Mansbridge argues, he suggests that participation engenders a sense of ownership and its attendant responsibilities in citizens. Mill went further to argue for citizen participation over government-led practices, even where the quality of services suffers, because of the positive developmental impact of participation.

While such propositions of the linkage between participation and people's sense and practice of citizenship remained strong over the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, by the twenty-first century, Mansbridge argues, participation was increasingly seen as a means to the end of policy creation and self-protection. In the 1960s, criticisms of existing forms of democracy promoted a revitalisation of 'participation', particularly with Kaufmann coining the term 'participatory democracy' and feminist calls for recognition that 'the personal is the political'. Mansbridge argues, however, that the link between participation and people's sense and practice of citizenship is difficult to prove, certainly contextual and closely connected to the form and role of participation.

McEwan, C., 2000, 'Engendering citizenship: gendered spaces of democracy in South Africa', *Political Geography*, Vol 19 No 5: 627–51

Tracing shifts in experiences of citizenship for women through South Africa's transition period to the present day, McEwan explores the scales and spaces of citizenship. It is argued that, beyond the concern with formal political arenas seen in much citizenship writing, a more productive way to think about citizenship would be to explore the meanings, negotiations and contestations of citizenship in the daily lives of South African women in their diversity. This is particularly since 'private patriarchies' might prove a hindrance to women's public expression of citizenship, and thus the spaces and scales of public citizenship extend beyond the public sphere into neighbourhoods, communities and the home.

McEwan argues that there is a need to concentrate on people's access to voice in various institutions, at different scales and to consider and construct alternative forms of governance more appropriate to the scales of life than the nation-state. Moreover, that democratisation depends upon the creation of metaphorical and material spaces for women's effective participation, where the emphasis is on the abilities of people to participate and mould the policies that shape their everyday lives. This, she argues, requires a public policy that women's citizenship derives as much from the private spheres as the public spheres, which in turn requires making formal political systems accessible to informal political groupings. Thus, she argues, recognition of the different scales of citizenship must be incorporated into public policy-making.

Meekosha, H. and Dowse, L., 1997, 'Enabling citizenship: gender, disability and citizenship in Australia', *Feminist Review*, Vol 57: 49–72

Meekosha and Dowse's discussion centres around the citizenship of people with physical and mental disabilities in Australia. They argue that contemporary discourses around citizenship are more than a legal concept, they are a desirable activity within the context of generating nationalist identities. However, these discourses are troubling for many positioned on the margins who, because of their gender, race, ethnicity, class, or disability, do not feel attachment to the notion of an Australian identity. People with disabilities experience a sense of community most widely, when taking action against oppression, yet despite the attempts by some people with disabilities to articulate a culture of disability, shared stigmatisation can be a limited basis for the development of community.

They argue that active citizenship calls on members of a collectivity to take seriously their responsibilities in addition to making claims regarding their rights. These calls, they argue, raise difficult issues for those having competing or different communities or those having no obvious community of interests, as is often the case for people with disabilities living in relative isolation, including those who have been de-institutionalised.

A contemporary Australian poster to promote active citizenship, which displays lots of shoes from the many different cultures within Australia, works as a visibilisation of the exclusion of those whose bodies limit the possibility of 'activity'. It presents an inclusivity on the basis of culture, while exclusion on the basis of physicality; a problem of 'active citizenship' is thus an implication of 'active, mobile bodies'. Current critiques of such discourses examine the concept of a 'normal functioning' citizen and the institutions that assume such a citizen as the norm.

Merrifield, J., 2001, *Learning Citizenship*, London: Commonwealth Foundation. See also Citizens and Governance Programme: www.commonwealthfoundation.com

An analysis of how people learn to be citizens, the paper focuses on citizenship as active participation. It argues that people learn to be citizens, shaped by socialisation into a political culture, participation (or lack of) in political processes and formal and informal teaching. But what they learn does not always make them more active citizens. In terms of knowledge, people need a broad understanding about political choices (rather than specific facts), and in terms of capabilities, citizenship learning should involve practical activity. Some examples of adult education which focus on linking learning with experience, and emphasise group learning, cultural expression and reflection, however, seem to be getting things right. The link between experience and learning reinforces the value of education that accompanies efforts for change. It also highlights the importance of structural change in facilitating both action and learning. While educators often focus on changing the individual, democratic theory suggests that while individuals must learn to exercise their rights, governance structures, which provide opportunities for the exercise of these rights, are crucial.

Merrifield argues that the challenges for educational practice for citizen learning include: (1) starting where people are, with mental models of how people view the world, (2) creating communities of practice that provide social contexts to support learning, (3) providing opportunities to act, and embed learning in experiences, (4) providing opportunities to reflect, analyse and represent experiences in order to deepen understanding, (5) enabling people to create the knowledge frameworks that underpin judgments, and supporting knowledges and experiences (or knowledge-in-action), and (6) grounding experience and learning in an understanding of values.

Mouffe, C., 1992, 'Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community', in C. Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community*, London: Verso

Mouffe argues that understanding citizenship requires a non-essentialist understanding of identity – identity as an ensemble of subject positions, constructed within discourses, which are experienced and practised by individuals through their identification with different groups. A sense of group political identity is produced through identification with others who hold a particular subject position, and during moments when that political identity is drawn upon in citizenship action – other subject positions are defined through relation to that 'privileged' subject position.

For Mouffe, democracy depends on citizens identifying with different groups and working together to make demands. She conceptualises citizenship, as an 'articulating principle that affects different subject positions of the social agent while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect for individual liberty'. She asserts that citizenship should be seen as a 'chain of equivalence' dynamically formed through different social struggles, and working through a democratic 'we' in opposition to the 'them' of inequality and domination, without eliminating difference.

Through each citizen group collectively identifying with the democratic demands of each other, perceiving them as equivalent in terms of working towards the forces of domination and inequality, each takes on board each other's democratic demands whilst pursuing their own projects. Mouffe thus perceives group differences as constitutive of democratic processes, in the sense that through different social actors identifying their claims as equivalent to each other, understandings of the forces of domination and inequality are broadened beyond the particularism of specific struggles.

Munro, W., 1996, 'Re-forming the post-apartheid state? Citizenship and rural development in contemporary South Africa', *Transformation*, Vol 30: 1–29

This paper examines the implications of the post-apartheid South African state structure for rural citizens. It highlights both the opportunities and non-opportunities it offers for different rural people in terms of their participation in decision-making, the impact of state structure on relationships between citizens and the state, and how this engenders different expectations of citizenship. It is argued that while the RDP formally stressed 'people's participation', this was both in contradiction with parallel statements by the government insisting, 'under the philosophy of demand-driven development, that communities themselves should provide the initiative and impetus for these activities', and the market-driven approach to growth and development.

Munro also argues that the notion of a 'democratic South Africa' is spatially variant; since while South African urban residents elect political representatives directly and have access to formal political arenas, rural political representatives are drawn from party-list proportional representation and non-elected traditional authorities. Thus, in rural areas, local accountability is mediated by the principles of tradition and party competition and a demand-driven process with no systematic framework for the articulation of demands. It is argued that South Africa has a spatially differentiated definition of citizenship and the rights of rural communities to demand public goods has been blended into their responsibility to do so without providing the structures through which rural people can actually do so.

Newell, P., 2000, 'Environmental NGOs and Globalisation: the governance of TNCs', in R. Cohen and S. Rai (eds), *Global Social Movements*, London: Athone Press: 117–34

Newell's discussion is framed by the crisis of governance created by globalisation and the associated 'retreat' of the nation-state. In this context, the traditional mechanisms for regulating and oversight of corporate activities fall away. In the vacuum left by this retreat of government control over companies' environmental activities, environmental NGOs have, through a wide-spectrum of confrontational and co-operative strategies, been targeting companies directly. His discussion centres on the new forms of relationships being formed by this dynamic.

Amongst the mechanisms being used by NGOs are: *Green consumerism*, which uses the market to express political will and harnesses consumer power to corporate reform. *Project collaboration*, which harnesses and pools expertise and avoids confrontation in the belief of corporate reform. *Codes of conduct*, which provide criteria for auditing environmental performance. *Counter-information*, which aims to sever customer loyalties to companies through bad-publicity. *Share-holder activism*, in which environmental groups buy corporate shares in order to generate meetings and therefore influence decision-making. The use of such methods, he argues, represents the proactive use of direct mechanisms to check and restrain corporate power, and the new relationships they suggest illustrate the impact of economic change upon the goals and practices of social movements, which react to perceived power-shifts in the global economy.

Oldfield, A., 1990a, *Citizenship and Community: civic republicanism and the modern world*, London: Routledge

Oldfield starts by noting that the assumption that individuals *are* citizens is made in all the traditions of citizenship thought. In contrast, he asserts that there is a difference between 'being a citizen' and 'acting as a citizen'. He appeals to the civic republican focus on citizenship participation. The test of being a citizen, he argues, 'is performance of the duties of the practice of citizenship', and thus not participating is, in important senses, not to be a citizen. Civic republicanism places emphasis, however, on supporting people to become active citizens; both in terms of opportunities, motivation and commitment. He notes, however, that whilst the civic republican tradition centres on the notion of belonging, this is not a sense of belonging related to inner peace. Yet, the idea of community should have less to do with formal organisation than with a shared sense of belonging and commitment. The commitment is to others who share interests, positions or purposes, and to those who cannot look after their own interests, positions or purposes. It is this that creates citizenship, Oldfield argues, and it is also this that creates community. Citizenship, in civic republicanism, entails community. Thus if the conditions for the practice of citizenship are met, so too are those for the existence of community. Community is therefore found wherever people take the practice of citizenship seriously, and the problem is to generate the required commitment to bring this about.

Patterson, A.S., 1999, 'The dynamic nature of citizenship and participation: lessons from three rural Senegalese case studies', *Africa Today*, Vol 46 No 1: 3–27

The article uses three case studies from rural Senegalese community organisations to explore the dynamism of citizenship and participation. It is argued that how citizens see their rights and obligations, and how these can change, can transform people's perceptions of citizenship. When the rights, including rights to participate, of individuals are disregarded, those individuals may begin to question their responsibilities to the common society. Patterson argues that expectations can change when:

- (1) community structures that evolve do not incorporate inclusive decision-making institutions that value

the involvement of all participants, which may prompt individuals to question their citizenship rights and exit the community, (2) the community cannot live up to the material expectations that members have for it, which may prompt people to question why they should responsibly give time, energy or resources to the community.

Prior, D., Stewart, J. and Walsh, K., 1995, ‘*Citizenship, Rights and Community Participation*’, London: Pitman

Prior *et al.* argue that, as well as being a principle, which should underpin the organisation and management of public services, citizenship should be viewed as a desired outcome of quality services. Thus public services should be delivered in such a way that promotes citizenship by encouraging and enabling people to feel and act like full citizens. This means, as well as services responding to individuals in ways that enhance self-esteem, that services should be delivered in a way that treats individuals as responsible persons and encourages individuals to take control of their lives (with appropriate support where necessary). Developing ways of embedding the notion of mutual responsibility between provider and user for improving public services is thus an important part of strengthening citizenship.

They argue that one of the principle factors that undermines the experience of citizenship for many people is the apparent meaninglessness of the various formal rights and entitlements they possess, when they are unable to act on these rights in practice. Enabling people to translate their formal rights of citizenship into substantive rights must thus be a major theme for citizenship, central to which is the relationship between the citizen and the wider community and the polity of which they are members. Local government has both the responsibility and capacity to play a leading role in making citizenship a positive and meaningful experience for individuals who might otherwise be excluded from it, and therefore contributing to the encouragement of greater integration and cohesion in society.

Prior *et al.* argue that there are three forms of community which hold relevance for citizenship: ‘communities of place’, ‘communities of identity’ and ‘communities of interest’. In practice, these often overlap, with particular groups combining elements of place, identity and interest in their membership, their policy agenda and mode of action. A local government committed to strengthening citizenship will need to be sensitive to this complexity and to be constantly seeking to create and renew the interrelationships between itself and the community in all its manifestations. This suggests a need for continuous experimentation and innovation in the ways that local authorities seek to communicate and open up areas for discourse and deliberation with their many communities. Two issues of trust are paramount here. Firstly, the need to build trust between the authority and the groups whose experience is shaped by exclusion from society’s traditional power bases. Secondly, the need for local authorities to have trust in their staff, to support staff trying out new and unproven approaches. This requires a culture able to tolerate frustrations and failures, disagreement and conflict, and which is supportive of risk and innovation.

Schönwälder, G., 1997, 'New democratic spaces at the grassroots? Popular participation in Latin American local governments', *Development and Change*, Vol 28: 753–70

Schönwälder problematises the increasingly popular notion that political decentralisation and increased grassroots popular participation can help to consolidate fragile democratic regimes and render their institutions more efficient and responsive to citizens. In contrast, he argues that political decentralisation often runs into bureaucratic obstacles and politically motivated resistances from local, and other elites. Further, that locally based popular movements are frequently co-opted by other actors for their own ends. He identifies two forms of decentralisation: (1) *Pragmatic decentralisation*, which is concerned with the way decentralisation can contribute to regional development, with popular participation viewed as instrumental – facilitating decentralisation schemes, which are planned from above. (2) *Political decentralisation*, in which decentralisation is seen as a political reform through which state institutions are democratised and channels for popular participation in the political system are opened.

Participation, he argues, is a pathway to the empowerment of the otherwise excluded 'masses'. The problems with this approach include its lack of account of the inevitable and necessary conflict *between* popular movements, and thus the risks that state-civil society alliances pose for these movements. Four options are proposed for popular movements to participate in political systems: (1) Decide against a partnership with state institutions and instead put pressure on the state from the outside in the form of mass mobilisations or public relations campaigns. Although again, the problem of risking co-optation by other movements is posed against the need for inter-group collaborations if the campaign is to have influence. (2) Try to penetrate political parties/state institutions to gain influence from within, although problems of leader co-optation or obligatory ties are raised. (3) Form more broad based alliances with other actors, particularly the political left. Problems with this approach include co-optation by the left, leading to the creation of dependent support bases. (4) Form coalitions, not with one preferred ally, but with several actors simultaneously; making them less vulnerable to co-optation, and providing the opportunity for each to draw on the particular strengths of the others. This approach would require the development of negotiation skills to avoid the problem of stronger groups promoting their particularist agendas to the disadvantage of the others. Thus, it is argued that the democratic potential of locally based popular movements would not be realised through their withdrawal from institutional space altogether, rather by taking best advantage of existing possibilities to participate, while maximising their influence and minimising the risk of co-optation by forming alliances with a variety of other actors.

Shaw, M. and Martin, I., 2000, 'Community work, citizenship and democracy: re-making the connections', *Community Development Journal*, Vol 35 No 4: 401–13

Shaw and Martin argue that the devolution of decision-making, or community involvement, can be seen as 'deepening democracy' or 'democratising democracy' (in Anthony Giddens terms). They argue that in order to make this distinction, we have to distinguish between community development as the instrument of state policy, and community work as the active intervention of professional workers in communities (engaging with both the policy context, and popular issues and concerns). In this sense, they argue that 'community development' may be said to treat people as the objects of policy whereas 'community work' is concerned with developing people's roles as subjects in politics. Thus, the notion of 'community development' may sometimes hide that it is often a process which is as much concerned with controlling and determining the direction of change, as with enabling people to take greater control over their lives.

They argue that education for citizenship means, above all, the nurturing of a capacity and willingness to ask awkward questions and to cultivate an awareness that the quest for individual fulfilment needs to be combined with the larger demands of solidarity and concern for the public good. The politics of the state now needs to be reconstructed in ways that strengthen civil society and political life both outside and inside the state. It is in civil society that people learn to be active citizens, and consequently, it is in the relationship between civil society and the state that the process of reconstructing citizenship and democracy must begin: leading to a new cultural politics of communities and new political culture of the state.

Drawing on Williams (1998), however, they argue that we need to rethink the relationship between the individual and the structural so as to challenge the all-too-easy recourse to individualist explanations of citizenship which still dominate political discourses of poverty and social exclusion. Rather than simply reasserting the importance of the structural, we need to embrace the behaviour of the individual and reconnect it to the structural. We have, indeed, to argue that those experiencing social exclusion have a voice, but we need also to be able to re-conceptualise that voice. There is thus an urgent need to politicise politics.

This is in sharp contrast to Third Way politics, which appears to reduce the political question from what kind of society we want to live in, to a managerial one about how to run things (as they are) better. We now need, they argue, to re-politicise citizenship, as a process in which power is something that is claimed, or demanded, through social and political action from below, rather than above. The actions of people in communities in pursuit of their own interests (as distinct from the objectives of community workers) need to be seen not only as the legitimate expression of active citizenship, but also as the essence of democracy itself. This allows the community work role to be about expansion, rather than closure; activating 'voice' rather than managing diversity; exposing awkward problems rather than obscuring them. In view of this, they argue that 'if the space for progressive community work practice is to be re-gained, the role of community work itself must shift from that of turning citizens into consumers and customers, to that of defining – and defending – democratic citizenship itself'.

Smith, S. and Wales, C., 2000, 'Citizens' juries and deliberative democracy', *Political Studies*, Vol 48: 51–65

Smith and Wales argue that many theories of deliberative democracy fail to sufficiently address the question of institutional design. They assert that recent experiments with citizens' juries should be of interest to deliberative democrats, and analyse this mechanism through the lens of three democratic criteria: inclusivity, deliberation and citizenship. They argue that liberalist representative democracy tends to reproduce the inequalities inherent in society, and in aggregating individual 'pre-given' preferences, they fail to recognise that the interests and values on which these preferences are based are shaped and constrained by the socio-political and economic contexts of the individual, and their sense of what is possible.

In contrast, deliberative democracy is seen to start from the perspective that citizen participation is both desirable and feasible, and is based on critical engagement and collective deliberation, as part of an ongoing dialogue, on which more authoritarian forms of political authority can be grounded. They argue that this deliberation is based on the principles that all should be heard, and thus are potentially included, and that deliberative democratic arenas promote the resolution of conflicts rather than agreement. Further that deliberative democracy not only holds the potential for institutionalising more legitimate and trustworthy forms, but also promises more informed judgments through lessening 'bounded rationality'.

They highlight, however, that more empirical research is required to determine appropriate scales and institutional forms of deliberative processes. They argue that through the principle of proportional representation, citizens' juries offer a degree of inclusivity, but problematise the notion that all views can be incorporated, the creation of false essentialisms in this representation, and the effects of views being transformed during the process itself on the notion of representation. They raise the point, however, that it should not be assumed that people cannot empathise across difference.

In analysis of the process of 'deliberation' itself, they problematise the notion of free open dialogue and argue that the stage before jury deliberation – the identification and definition of the problem – is crucial to which issues get to the table, the process and outcomes. This is particularly since the 'identifiers' are likely to be self-selecting, the most organised and those with time and financial resources. With respect to citizenship, they argue that citizen juries may have a positive impact on the development of democratic practice. They thus argue that the changes in attitudes and views produced through the process have impact on the individual's sense of purposeful citizenship and political efficacy. They conclude by reiterating that such deliberative active citizenship processes should not be judged in isolation, but rather within the wider institutional and political context. As such, citizens' juries should be seen, at most, as a potential supplement to representative institutions; a way of bringing informed citizen perspectives into decision-making processes.

Stammers, N., 1999, 'Social movements and the social construction of human rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol 21: 980–1060

Stammers asserts the need to look at social movements in terms of both their 'instrumental' and 'expressive' dimensions. That is, not just their 'interests', but the articulation of demands, which are both altruistic and instrumental, and their 'expressive' dimensions, which go beyond identity into the broader realm of the cultural construction of values, norms, lifestyles, identities, symbols and discourses, which are typically articulated into wider society and cultural milieu. Thinking in terms of instrumental/expressive, in articulating between the interests–identity divide, enables a broader understanding of social movements and their use and creation of rights discourses.

The construction and use of rights discourses by social movements has played an important and positive role in changing structures of power, both in respect to concentrated 'sites' of power and the way that power is embedded in everyday social relations. He argues that many writers have considered rights discourses in purely instrumental terms. In contrast, he suggests that rights discourses also operate to legitimate alternative values, norms and lifestyles and validate the perspectives and lifestyles of those oppressed by particular relations and structures of power. This he asserts, drawing on Gramsci, can be seen as counter-hegemony at the level of public 'common sense'. Social movements have made use of rights discourses and proliferated whole new sets of rights claim to, as Melucci puts it, 'make power visible', utilising rights claims to challenge such relations and structures of power, both instrumentally and expressively.

He thus argues that human rights are necessarily enmeshed in relations and structures of power in particular socio-historical contexts and constructed in real social and political struggles. Further, rights are not the product of social relations, but embedded within them: 'positioned at the concrete conjecture of two fields of the social: agency and power ... human rights are above all the result of historical political struggles' (Wilson 1997). The expressive side of social movement action, he asserts, seeks to embed new values and norms into social cultural life. Indeed, it is only insofar as social movements succeed in shifting norms and values, as well as winning instrumental demands, that they are able to shift relations and structures of power and thus reconstruct historicity, to transform such values into 'common sense'. Stammers thus argues that rights are created through social movement struggles, and shifts in norms occurring through struggles, and are often normalised and de-politicised in their institutionalisation. Rights claims, he thus asserts, are the tool not the end of social-political struggles.

Stasiulis, D. and Bakan, A., 1997, 'Negotiating citizenship: the case of foreign domestic workers in Canada', *Feminist Review*, Vol 57: 112–39

The paper argues that most conceptualisations of citizenship limit the remit of the discourse to static categories. Citizenship is commonly seen as an ideal type, presuming a largely legal relationship between an individual and a single nation state. More precisely, only one type of nation-state – the advanced capitalist post-war model. This 'ideal relationship' is usually understood as individually obtained, passively granted and static. The assumption is that the state is, or should be, a neutral and fair arbiter of rights, based on objective criteria and that citizenship is fair and inclusive, and if not always fully universal at least constructed in a manner that can be reformed or adapted to incorporate differences in an egalitarian manner.

Stasiulis and Bakan argue that citizenship should rather be seen as a negotiated relationship, which is subject to change, and acted on collectively within social, political and economic relations of conflict which are shaped by gendered, racial class and internationally based hierarchies. Their arguments go beyond the discussion of whether citizens should be defined as individuals or groups. They argue that citizenship should be seen as a nodal point for the intersection of many other social relations, and changes continually as relationships are negotiated and re-negotiated in variable national and international contexts.

States, they argue, attempt to regulate the access of different individuals and groups to various forms of rights, and to impose various forms of obligations. Citizenship, non-citizenship and the various categories in-between (such as non-citizen residency and other forms of partial citizenship) emerge simultaneously, designed and created according to systemic processes of struggle and negotiation. Rather than assuming that there is an active state and a passive citizenry, or a set of active states and a passive number of citizen bodies, they argue that citizenship and non-citizenship should be seen as a variable spectrum of rights and mechanisms to deny such rights. It is a process, which renders legal and legitimate discriminations, based on whether individuals embody capital or poverty, as well as the dominant race/ethnicity and gender.

Thompson, S. and Hoggett, P., 1996, 'Universalism, selectivism and particularism: towards a postmodern social policy', *Critical Social Policy*, Vol 46: 21–43

Thompson and Hoggett argue that although postmodernists provide good reasons to reject crude forms of universalism, it remains possible to defend a sophisticated universalism. That is, to be committed to equality, while simultaneously being sensitive to diversity by incorporating significant elements of both selectivism and particularism, equality with diversity, and consistency of treatment with group empowerment.

A balance must be struck, they argue, between values such as universalism, equality and impartiality, and responsiveness, diversity and choice. They assert a difference between '*general universalism*' (impartiality) and '*specific universalism*' (which defends and seeks social rights as one way of achieving general aims of impartiality). Selectivism, they argue, is different to particularism – which aims to attend to particular

differences between particular individuals – differences which, it is claimed, make a moral difference. *Negative selectivism* favours the targeting of services on the basis of individual means, while *positive selectivism* aims to provide additional services and resources for certain disadvantaged groups, without reference to their means.

They argue for a social policy that: (1) embodies specific universalism (protects social rights against targeting (explicit and disguised), (2) when required, abandons general universalism for various forms of positive selectivism, (3) at various points goes beyond limitations of selectivism to incorporate elements of particularism, since there are occasions when it is legitimate to vary standards between individuals and groups, and (4) shifts the balance from institutional to non-institutional (decentralised delivery and empowering subjects) models of welfare delivery. While arguing that each element necessarily interpenetrates the others, Thompson and Hoggett assert that relativism becomes paradoxical in making two claims: (1) that there are no universal but only local values – values relative to a particular community or tradition etc., and (2) principles of justice should reflect local values. But, they ask, what is the status of a claim? It seems as if it must itself be a universal value, for at a theoretical level it would be incoherent to say that ‘for us’ relativism is valid but for other communities it may be otherwise. This is because relativism is intended appropriately to legislate for a different set of communities, and not just to describe our own local set of attitudes on these matters. To endorse the right of communities to do their own thing (i.e. to be intolerant of others) would be to give license to those who would destroy the state of mutual toleration that relativism intends to support.

Turner, B.S., 1999, ‘*The Sociology of Citizenship*’, London: Sage

Bryan Turner’s work focuses on how the terms on which citizenship have traditionally been based have fundamentally changed as a result of changes in economic, social and military realities. While in the past, access to the entitlements of citizenship were organised around ‘work, war and reproduction’, the ways in which each of these have changed have made them less relevant as routes to citizenship. Modern society is no longer constituted by a dense network of associations, chapels and communal associations, and these changes raise questions about the possibilities of participation in contemporary society, and specifically about the level of third-sector institutions such as voluntary associations in providing opportunities for social service and participation.

He argues that a vibrant democracy is unlikely to flourish without authentic community. But whether or not voluntary associations can provide an effective welfare service and accountability is possibly less important than whether they can provide an experience of community involvement that in turn can be a schooling in democracy. The ‘Marshallian framework’ of rights has been eroded, such that while they are still important, these are no longer sufficient to ensure social rights. And active citizenship has greatly declined. A new regime of rights is emerging, although one not so much connected to the nation state as global and universal human rights, reflecting problems of contemporary global order and technological

development. Different structures of working life, welfare and warfare, mean that essentially fewer social rights ensue from fulfilling these functions. At the same time, other rights are more valued and appropriate in the modern world, and these are less nation-based and more universal.

These changes, Turner argues, have wider ramifications. Perhaps the most basic and profound is that no longer is the negotiation of interfaces between citizens of a nation and its governmental machinery the sole or even primary arena in which participation and the determination of democracy is struggled over. We can even envisage a time when relations with particular states, as long as they stop short of violently repressive, are irrelevant to participation in the issues of concern to citizens and with wide social legitimacy: instead participation in the Third sector, in the workplace and in international fora will be more relevant.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2000, *Human Development Report: human rights and human development*, New York: UNPD

Chapter 4 of the Human Development Report is framed by the message that '*rights empower people in the fight against poverty*', and entails two main components. First, it is asserted that social, civil, economic and political rights are causally linked, can be mutually reinforcing, and thus should be pursued simultaneously. They can create synergies that contribute to claiming rights and enhance human capabilities to escape poverty. Second, that a decent standard of living, healthcare and other social and economic achievements are not just development goals, but human rights inherent in human freedom and dignity, and claims to a set of social arrangements. 'It is thus the obligation of governments and others to implement policies to put these arrangements in place', and in the contemporary context it is necessary to recognise the obligations of global actors who, in the pursuit of global justice, must promote the eradication of poverty.

Voet, R., 1998, *Feminism and Citizenship*, London: Sage

Voet argues that liberty and participation are related for two reasons: one inherent and one instrumental. First, participation in decision-making is in itself an important and highly regarded liberty. It is one of the most profound ways in which we realise ourselves as human and, therefore, acting beings. Second, participation forms part of a larger structure of liberties, because the extent to which this liberty is accorded and exercised will usually affect the extent to which liberty is available in other areas of social life. What is necessary for this 'positive liberty as participation' is a public space where citizens can act together visibly for an audience, where they can realise themselves as individuals or members of a group. It is exactly this kind of liberty that is essential for citizenship, and it is exactly this kind of liberty, she argues, that women lack. Thus, she asserts, it is at the level of participation that we see the major distinctions between male citizens and female citizens, not at the level of rights.

She thus states that participation, and the equality and form of participation, should be looked at as an indicator of full citizenship, which means that we need to reverse the social-liberal relationship between rights and citizenship. Instead of seeing citizenship as a means to realise rights, we should see rights as one of the means to realise equal citizenship. Citizenship, she asserts, does not consist only of participation in decision making, but also having political subjectivity, knowing how to play political roles, being capable of political judgment and showing in your actions that you are not a subject but a citizen. This requires certain preconditions, particularly freedom of rights and a certain level of material welfare. Although it neither requires participation of everyone, nor that all full citizens participate simultaneously, the idea does call upon people to participate as citizens.

Active citizenship implies that liberty in participation is the most important type of liberty; if people do not perceive themselves as political beings, they will not become politically active, nor feel the urge to participate in decision making. Drawing on other writers, Voet thus argues that social participation affects one's citizenship, and social and political participation affect one's understanding of rights, self-esteem, intellect, feelings, manners and democracy.

Yashar, D.J., 1998, 'Contesting citizenship – indigenous movements and democracy in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, Vol 31 No 1: 23–43

Yashar seeks to explain why calls for recognition of indigenous identity and rights have become a more salient basis of political organising and source of political claims since recent rounds of democratisation in Latin America. She focuses particularly on a comparison of Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala (and Peru, where indigenous identity has not become politicised). It is argued that political liberalisation unwittingly provided space for the re-negotiation of citizenship and the associated public expression of ethnic identities, demands and conflicts. It is also argued, however, that indigenous communities have experienced a new stage of political disenfranchisement as states disregard the individual rights associated with liberal democracy, and economic reforms dismantle state institutions that had previously extended *de facto* or *de jure* corporatist class rights and community autonomy.

Indigenous groups have thus drawn on and built social networks to organise across communities for rights and resources (particularly land rights/resources), which they feel are being denied to them as indigenous peoples. The case studies highlight that state structures are heterogeneous in scope, presence and capacity, and it is thus argued that national institutional changes (such as nation-building and democratisation) have differential impact in different local state institutions, practices and social relations. Indigenous organisations, she argues, demand autonomy and respect, they challenge liberal democratic assumptions and notions of a singular state-citizen relation: demanding multiple citizenship with boundaries that guarantee equal rights and representation at the national level and recognise community rights in the indigenous territories. The reality of multiple citizenship, she asserts, requires that the law of policy be configured to incorporate both universal and differentiated claims to citizenship.

Yuval-Davis, N., 1997, 'Women citizenship and difference', *Feminist Review*, Vol 57: 4–27

Yuval-Davis argues that in the liberal tradition, citizens are constructed, not as members of a community, but as strangers to each other. In liberal constructions of citizenship, the right is prioritised over the good. Republicanism, on the other hand, constructs citizenship not only as a status but also as a means of active involvement and participation in the determination, practice and promotion of the common good. As other authors argue, this raises the question of how the republican (moral) community is constituted and what qualities are required for active participation in it? Yuval Davis warns that there are people who cannot or will not become full members of that strong community, and there are many other members of civil society who, although they may share the myth of common origin of 'the community', do not share important hegemonic value systems with the majority of the population.

Yuval-Davis argues that there is a twilight zone between the liberal and republican constructions of citizenship, where religious, ethnic and sexual minorities are located outside of the national 'moral community' but within the 'civic nation'. To those who can afford it, this is not a completely closed off system. She cites other authors who describe how minority groups have developed socioeconomic 'community' infrastructures around their identities, organised to obtain further housing, insurance, medical, parenting, marital rights, etc., and spend a significant portion of their income on distinguishable lifestyles in segregated or specific social territories. Yet, Yuval-Davis argues, while recognising that notions of difference cannot just be ignored, she suggests that participation in the public arena of politics should be based on what she calls 'transformation', getting beyond one's immediate sphere, rather than transcendence. The first, she sees, as rightly stressing the limits of localised and specific identities, while the latter involves pursuing this to the point of jettisoning all group differences and concerns.