The key to understanding the path of capitalist development in colonial Zimbabwe lies in analysis of the relations of conflict between capital and labour, and in the transformation of the long association of international capital with settler colonialism in the course of struggle to secure the conditions for the accumulation and reproduction of capital in general.

1

'The relationship between a good or bad sharemarket on the one side and a British Colony in the stage of tender infancy on the other is to be studied, if anywhere, in this country of Rhodesia. Rhodesia is a country which, almost avowedly is intended to be built up, or at least forced upward, by aid of gold mining and land dealing on the $1 share limited liability principle.'(1)

The immediate genesis of colonial Zimbabwe grew out of the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. A mixture of poor luck and faulty judgement left Cecil Rhodes' Gold Fields of South Africa Company on the fringes of the first Rand boom, and the consequences of this, together with the threat seemingly posed to British supremacy by the magnitude of the gold discoveries, combined to drive Rhodes' 'pioneer column' northwards in 1890 in search of a 'Second Rand'.(2) Thus rooted in the complex and shifting strategies of British imperial hegemony and of mining capital, the Chartered adventure from its inception rested on an alliance between international capital and settler colonialism. Then, as later, the latter was the junior but indispensable partner.

At first, it was confidently assumed that the settlers would be very junior partners indeed. The legendary riches of Ophir had long been rumoured to lie between the Limpopo and the Zambezi, and it was thought that as soon as 'several new Johannesburgs'(4) had been discovered, their development would necessarily be in the hands of large capital. For its part, the Chartered Company did not seek direct involvement in production. As the primary representative of financial and speculative capital, the B.S.A. Company set the terms of entry and sought to hold the ring for the operations of industrial and merchant capital; it aimed to provide an administrative and transport infrastructure, but would otherwise take its profits in the market through shareholding in other companies.(5) Under the newly-framed mining law, both prior right to company flotation and 50 percent of such vendors scrip were claimed for the Charter, leaving Rhodes to exult to his London Board that the system was 'an enormous thing', as it 'practically means...we...shall get half the minerals of the country'.(6)

Initial exploration in Mashonaland, however, produced little to cheer about. Although systematic mining work was severely handicapped by lack of equipment and by intermittent and expensive communication with the south, prospectors quickly established the poverty of local goldfields, and when this impression was confirmed by visiting experts,(7) the territory slid swiftly into an economic depression.(8) With little fresh capital entering the territory – only two mining companies were floated in 1892 – the Chartered Company found its original capitalisation of one million pounds ludicrously inadequate for the task before it, and was saved from collapse only by a
'monthly subsidy from De Beers and other friends'. (9) Cash expenditure was slashed, leaving what was left of the civil administration heavily dependent on settler magistrates, field cornets and burgher forces, (10) and in its place a system of extravagant land concessions was used both to reward companies and individuals for past services and to encourage speculative interest in Mashonaland. (11)

The resultant highly combustible brew of settler and speculative interests was soon ignited by a clash with the Ndebele near Fort Victoria in July, 1893. Even as news of the incident caused Chartered shares to fall rapidly, its resolution in favour of the Company suggested the possibility of a cheap confrontation with Lobengula. After momentary hesitation, Rhodes and Jameson raised settler columns on the promise of land and mining claims yet to be won, and set out to manufacture a war for the seizure of Matabeleland. (12) As Jameson well knew, 'the getting Matabeleland open would give us a tremendous lift in shares and everything else. The fact of its being shut up gives it an immense value here and outside'. (13)

For roughly two years after the end of the war, the B.S.A. Company basked in unaccustomed favour and prosperity. Within months of the conquest it was reported that 'a sum of over half a million has...been subscribed in cash by independent Companies', (14) and as this trend accelerated in 1895, the number of development companies in the country rose to about 200, while on the Bulawayo stock exchange, Chartered shares changed hands at £8.17.6. (15) Much of the boom, though, was speculative, not industrial, in character, and although partly based on over-estimation of the region's mineral resources, was intimately dependent on the Rand boom of 1894-5. The close association of the two share-markets - 'Kaffirs' described both Rand and Rhodesian mining shares - allowed the local boom to continue undisturbed even after the failure of Matabeleland to disgorge a major goldfield. (16) It was a market where insiders made money, where visitors were cynically informed that 'when output begins speculation ceases', (17) and where for 'nine months of each year the development of auriferous Mashonaland is gravely performed by cable and telegraph'. (18)

But while Rhodes and his associates did all in their power to encourage and sustain the boil and froth of speculative capital, they had in the meantime come to a more sober appraisal of the country's gold prospects. A visit in August-September 1894 by Consolidated Gold Fields' famous mining expert, John Hays Hammond, had emphasised that the real whereabouts of the 'second Rand' lay in the deep levels of the Rand itself and not in the very different quartzite reefs of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, where extensive development work was necessary to establish their values. (19) To meet this consideration, the B.S.A. Company passed fresh legislation in 1895 which aimed to encourage industrial as opposed to purely speculative capital in the mining industry by nudging the companies into continuous development of their properties. (20)

Tied to this tentative encouragement of industrial capital were further salvos in the process of primitive accumulation. Because the essential purpose of the Company state was to provide the minimum conditions for the more or less orderly accumulation of capital, the Charter had lost little time in the struggle to assert its authority over those Shona polities it could reach, most infamously through the para-military police patrols of 1892. (21) Much less haste was evidenced in the narrowly economic sphere, where the search for gold and the speculative obsessions of the colonists and companies generated only small and sporadic labour needs. Indeed, the primary tendency at that time was one of accelerated commoditisation amongst those communities able to meet the fluctuating market demands of the settlers.

Then as hopes of rich gold discoveries in Matabeleland flared and flickered, both the B.S.A. Company and the settlers turned to a more thorough-going looting of the 'natural economy' of the Shona and Ndebele. Between October 1893 and March 1896 anything from 100 000 to 200 000 cattle were...
seized from the Mdebele; forced labour became widespread; and the collection of hut tax, first imposed 'illegally' in May 1893, was stepped up after imperial sanction was received in 1894. Its collection was 'arbitrary and irregular, appearing more like the levy of a tribute than the collection of a civil tax', as mauding bands of native Department levies despoiled villages and districts of their crops and livestock. The struggle to separate the direct producers from the means of production was very largely left to the future, as neither the interests of speculative capital nor the extremely limited resources of the Company state required or permitted the profound transformation of the indigenous social formations.

A crucial consequence of this was that African polities, although becoming less autonomous, could still readily muster the political and social cohesion necessary to resist the colonial net settling unevenly over them. The manner of capital's penetration thus provided some Shona, and Mdebele with ample cause to resist, without significantly subtracting from their capacity to fight. Opportunity was presented by the Jameson Raid - itself informed by the poverty of local gold deposits - which denuded Chartered territory of police and troops, and in April and June 1896 the Risings began. They persisted in various areas until near the end of 1897 and were crushed only with the assistance of a British Army and at the cost of thousands of lives and hundreds of thousands of pounds.

The combined effect of the Raid and the Risings on the infant mining industry was disastrous, as the flow of investment capital evaporated along with the value of Rhodesian mining and development company shares. This collapse of the speculative bubble forced the B.S.A. Company to try, much more seriously this time, to foster genuine development. In short, the new situation was to be one in which the large capitalist 'should be encouraged, but only as a mining and industrial factor, not as a speculator pure and simple'. For this, railway transport was essential and, where it had previously resisted settler clamour for years, the Chartered establishment now authorised the speedy completion of rail communication with the coast and later the construction of branch lines to the major mining districts. Encouragement of a different sort came from a belated attempt to enforce the provisions of the 1895 Mines and Minerals Act ending the speculative 'locking-up' of thousands of claims, and in September 1898 the mining industry entered a new phase when the Geelong, soon to be joined by other mines, began a regular output of gold. Until that point, Southern Rhodesia's capitalist mining industry had produced less than seven thousand ozs. of gold, but in 1899 alone over 65 thousand ozs. were won, and by 1902 annual production had climbed to 194 268 ozs.

No sooner had the mining industry clambered precariously to its knees, however, than it was once more threatened, this time by the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in October 1899. Railway communication with the south was disrupted, and as transport and mining costs went up and the financial resources of nearly all companies were stretched to breaking-point by the war's continuation, it became increasingly difficult for the industry to sustain its existing top-heavy structure. Large sections of it were moribund, paralysed by the conflicting need to confiscate claims and curb speculation without frightening off fresh capital. Such working capital as there was tended to be completely inadequate, incompetent and expensive management was rife, and most companies were overcapitalised through speculation, through reservation of a substantial portion of the vendors' scrip for the Chartered Company and through the practice of floating subsidiary companies to raise extra cash. But above all, the war precipitated a major crisis between mining capital and black labour.

Once the mines had begun the slow process of subordinating speculative to productive capital, profitability came to depend crucially on abundant supplies of cheap labour. As early as 1895, provincial labour bureaux were formed, along with a central compound in Bulawayo to direct the flow of labour to the mines. The first initiative failed because of heavy financial
losses and the impact of the Risings. A second attempt was made in 1899 when the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia was established, again in two provincial sections. It supplied over 6,000 workers to Matabeleland mines in the last six months of 1899 and together with the huge contingents of forced labour provided by the Native Department undoubtedly was instrumental in the fall in average mine wages from almost 40/- per month in 1897 to 22/6 by early 1900. And during the same period the size of the produce market open to black agriculturalists was restricted by companies railing some food supplies up from the south.

What the war did was to stop this practice, and make forced labour itself somewhat more problematic, by leaving the mining industry dependent on peasant grain production. Africans who could 'trade their grain at a considerable profit' were unwilling to work on terms compatible with the mining industry's own profitability imperatives, and obliged capital to look elsewhere for its needs. As the Chartered Administration then lacked the means to squeeze its northern labour reservoirs and contain the high desertion rate, it instituted a desperate and exotic search for indentured labour in the Red Sea area, and rather more predictably, for Indian and Chinese workers. None of the schemes were successful, and the industry's problems ballooned when in swift succession the Labour Board collapsed under the weight of excessive administrative charges and provincial rivalry, and the British Secretary of State for the Colonies barred Native Commissioners from involvement in labour recruitment.

Lack of labour affected the mines in two main ways; if they weren't forced to close down completely, plants were run well below capacity which pushed up working expenses and eroded profitability, while cash wages rose in order to attract and retain what labour was available. Wages increased to roughly 30/- per month in March 1901 and to just over 40/- a year later. Attempts by the industry to reverse the process were met with strike action, and in fact most mines 'could not afford to run the risk of adopting a reduced scale of wage, as the margin of profit was so small that it did not allow of their running the risk of stopping the battery'. As mines closed and profits fell, sentiment in the London money market hardened: 'The argument of the thinking man in the City is this: "You have in Rhodesia say ten mines trying to produce gold and pay dividends... (but)... not one of these ten milling companies has been able to run for twelve months without having to hang up the whole or some part of their (crushing) stamps for want of labour to keep the mill going, and development ahead of the mill... Show me that the labour can be obtained and then we will see about the capital."' The London Wall headquarters of the B.S.A. Company concurred, and later stressed that 'want of money for the mines has been induced by want of labour'.

Mining capital's crisis magnified its other problems, particularly the exactions made by the B.S.A. Company, and found expression in discontent with Chartered rule. The old equation of Company and pioneers had become more complex as the Chartered state tried to secure the interests of capital in general through intervention against speculative capital, and as the political process was opened up to settler participation, or more precisely, as often happened, to the resident functionaries of international capital. It was this forum which mining capital occupied at the start of 1902 when all of the candidates returned from the mining province of Matabeleland in the Legislative Council elections opposed continued Company rule. The B.S.A. Company was also attacked in the widely-read Mining Journal which argued that 'mining adventurers have certainly been deterred by the extortionate system of royalties', and offered the shrill prediction that 'if any gold discoveries were made which precipitated a rush into Rhodesia no free mining community would submit without bloodshed to the exactions of their present landlord'.

The opposition baton now passed to a different segment of the tiny settler society. Quite apart from variously felt economic grievances, an emotional link tying many settlers to the Charter had snapped with Rhodes' death in March 1902, and in the context of the Peace of Vereeniging both
accentuated speculation about Southern Rhodesia's political future. In August, a mass public meeting of the prestigious Bulawayo Debating Society had as its motion the abrogation of the B.S.A. Company's Charter. Prominent 'independent' locals castigated the Company's economic policy favouring large and often unproductive capital, and the motion was carried with acclamation.\(^{(45)}\)

These were certainly not the same objectives as those of large mining capital, and the companies hastily proclaimed that while the community's grievances were serious, they were 'capable of remedy' under the existing system. Fearful of unrestricted competition from the Rand for labour supplies, the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines warned that 'annexation to either the Transvaal or the Cape would have a disastrous effect on the progress and prosperity of Rhodesia', and concluded that the mining industry would be 'best maintained and fostered under the Charter until the white community has increased to such an extent as to enable it to demand self-government'.\(^{(46)}\)

Nonetheless, when the directors of the B.S.A. Company arrived on a tour of inspection in September 1902, they found an 'embittered country'.\(^{(47)}\) Even if large mining capital shied away from ending Chartered rule, it was still anxious for concessions; such economies as it had implemented, along with the post-war depression generally, had created a new constituency of unemployed prospectors and miners discharged by contractors, and they too turned to the Charter for redress;\(^{(48)}\) commerce was also depressed; and even the minuscule white agricultural interest which had benefitted from the war-time exclusion of southern foodstuffs, now complained angrily about high railway rates. Major grievances and demands put to the directors thus focussed on the mining law's restrictions, on the old and vexatious question of the 50 percent clause, and on railway rates and the high cost of living, as well as on the small number of elected Legislative Council members.\(^{(49)}\)

Most of them in fact were conceded. The conjuncture of mining capital's labour crisis, its unwieldy structure and manifest unprofitability,\(^{(50)}\) and the growth of wider settler opposition to Company government left the directors with little choice. Legislation was revised to allow small mines to work for a profit without being floated as companies, the Company's share of vendor's scrip was formally reduced to 30 percent, and railway rates were adjusted and reduced in some instances. The directors also agreed to raise the number of elected Legislative Council representatives to equal the number of nominated members. It was a move deliberately designed to defuse the more extravagant settler political movements\(^{(51)}\) and to associate influential white residents in the economic and legislative policies of reconstruction.\(^{(52)}\)

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I see no objection (to making it a Native Reserve) as the area in question, which is practically a conglomeration of kopjes with very small cultivable valleys in between, is infested with baboons and is only traversable by pack animals.'\(^{(53)}\)

The concessions made by the B.S.A. Company at the end of 1902 were welcomed by the settlers and even by Rand mining houses. Sir A. Woolls-Sampson confided in a Bulawayo interview that 'the views of the Rand people have changed about Rhodesia...we are opening up offices here on a bigger scale...and other houses are sending men up. I think you will see things move'.\(^{(54)}\) Confidence began to return and it was thought that the mining industry 'had begun to turn the corner'.\(^{(55)}\) Instead, it turned out to be whistling in the dark. In January 1903 the Chartered Company's London secretary warned that 'the only talk on the market at the present moment is the question of Native Labour. Everyone has got the blues...'. By May, markets were 'as dull as ditchwater' and in June there was 'a very severe slump in the markets, determined partly by the American position and partly by the labour position in South Africa. If only the second could be settled there would be a speedy revival'.\(^{(56)}\) Rhodesian mining shares, already vulnerable because of their past record, lost their uncertain support and the
territory plunged back into depression.

Without support from London, it became obvious that more far-reaching changes and concessions than those granted only a few months previously would be necessary to see the industry through the depression. Through a mixture of its own initiative and responses to pressure from the mines, the Charter began pruning and shaping the industry's structure both to the contours of Southern Rhodesia's particular geological constraints, and to the reality of competition from the Rand. At the same time, the share market slump confirmed the urgent need for state intervention to secure conditions for the accumulation and reproduction of capital in general. The largely episodic looting of the 1890s was thus superseded by the initiation of a two-pronged assault on the black inhabitants of Central Africa, through intensified labour recruitment and through renewed attacks on their land holdings and participation in produce markets.

The earlier concession made to small mines was broadened in 1904 and again in 1914 and was rewarded with a rapid increase in the number of small workers. By 1905 there were already 76 small mines each producing under 1000 ozs of gold annually, and by 1907 their number had more than trebled. In many respects, the extremely low capitalisation of this mining petty-bourgeoisie was ideally suited to working the smaller quartz reefs, as these 'great hustlers' could readily 'flit from one property to another'. Their extremely low working costs were firmly grounded on minimal direct and indirect expenditure on African wages and working conditions, and this factor, together with maximum use of legally-entrenched rights to wood and water for mining purposes, enabled smallholders to win gold more cheaply than almost all larger mines.

At first, the pattern was for small workers to follow large capital - as tributors of properties leased from financially exhausted companies - but this stage soon gave way to one in which they owned the mines they worked, where small-workers could prove the size and payability of their properties to depth, these were sold to large companies. Capital was now following small-workers. An essential function of small-workers had become that of proving the way for capital to come in on a surer basis than it did in the earlier stages of the country's history. This was an important structural relationship between domestic and international mining capital and did much to mitigate the speculative and uncertain character of quartz reef gold mining.

Alongside the merger of hundreds of small mines occurred a marked strengthening in the position of many of the large company mines. Management and machinery costs were reduced, capitals were reconstituted on more modest lines, and in 1907 the B.C.N. Company agreed to substitute a sliding scale of royalties for the 30 percent clause. Much less success attended efforts to cut railway rates and the price of coal, but in any case the vital consideration for all mines was the supply and cost of black labour. On the Rand, labour accounted for 50 to 70 percent of total working costs and the proportion was greater still in Southern Rhodesia where the small scale of most mining operations mitigated against widespread mechanisation. Cost minimisation in this crucial sphere was multi-faceted; not only had black labour to be cheap, but also adequate and regular supplies had to be ensured and, further, this labour had to be utilised as profitably as possible.

The urgency of the situation was not lost on mining capital and the state, and within months of the sharemarket fall the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau was formed. Its recruiting net was quickly cast and, at various times, fell over much of Northern Rhodesia, and parts of Nyasaland and Mozambique. By supplying the minimum labour needs of the mines - an annual average of over 11,000 workers between 1906 and 1911 - the Bureau significantly contributed to the regular and increasingly profitable mining of gold ore, especially as lowly paid 'chibaro boys' undercut other workers. It
excluded the Rand from certain recruiting areas, directed labour to local
away from Rand mines, and by also servicing capitalist agriculture, greatly
tightened the squeeze on peasant producers and accelerated the process of
proletarianisation.\(^{(65)}\) As all of these measures began to improve the
supply of labour, 'so at last the mines were able to reduce wages, most drastric-
ally in 1906 and 1907.\(^{(66)}\)

Expenditure on African housing, diet and medical attention was, if
anything, even more ruthlessly minimised. For many years black workers built
their own accommodation on almost all mines, the only exceptions being the
chibare barracks erected on large mines, and the housing provided by some of
the biggest companies from the 1920s onwards. The 'frequently squalid'
dwelling conditions endured by the majority of black workers were neither
temporary nor accidental; on the contrary they constituted an integral aspect
of mining capital's cost-minimisation strategies to secure the profitability
of otherwise doubtful enterprises. Food, too, was an obvious target for
cost-conscious employers. The modest diet scale introduced by the state in
1908 and fractionally revised upwards in a series of stages \(^{66}\) its 1935
sticking-point, never made much demand on the industry's generosity; at 4d
per day it cost slightly less in 1944 to feed a single black worker than it
did in 1908. Nor was the diet scale ever nutritious enough on its own to
maintain workers' health. Instead, miners supplemented their rations where
they could with purchases from the local store, from neighbouring villages,
and by hunting and fishing expeditions. Poor diet and squalid accommodation
in turn led directly to a high death and sickness rate, particularly during
the reconstruction era, but also extending well beyond that date. At a
conservative estimate, pneumonia and scurvy, and to a lesser extent
tuberculosis, 'miners' pthisis, dysentery, influenza and syphilis, altogether
claimed the lives of an estimated 33,000 black miners between 1900 and 1948.\(^{(67)}\)

For mining capital, driving to profitability along a road littered with
the broken and diseased bodies of black workers, the results of reconstruction
were certainly gratifying. Overall profitability was achieved and the rising
volume of dividends declared attracted substantial investment from Rand min-
ing houses.\(^{(68)}\) After 1903 the number of mines leapt upwards and the value
of gold produced almost trebled to over £2.5 million in 1910. By then the
industry was producing virtually as much in a single year as it had done in
the entire pre-reconstruction period, and both output and dividends continued
to rise for the next six years, until overtaken by wartime inflation.\(^{(69)}\)

While the economic predominance of gold mining was not to be challenged
for another 30 years or so, in the very year that reconstruction drew to a
close a footnote of considerable future significance was entered when tobacco
accounted for one percent of Southern Rhodesia's exports. Indeed, in its
own way, the growth of capitalist agriculture at this time was as remarkable
as developments on the mines, not least because the Chartered Company had
begun with the same policy in agriculture as in mining: 'the principle in
both cases being to encourage flotations of companies, and the consequent
introduction of large capital into Southern Rhodesia, which the British South
Africa Company considered would more rapidly develop the resources of the
territory than the smaller capitals of individual settlers'.\(^{(70)}\) Huge
areas were alienated to the ubiquitous 'development' companies, but without
effective occupation clauses, land was simply held as a speculative asset.
In 1899 there were less than 250 white 'farmers' actually on the land, most
of whom devoted their energies to trading and transport riding.\(^{(71)}\)

From that point, however, small settler capital began rapidly expand-
ing agricultural production. The reasons for this transformation lay in
the combined impact of three events between 1897 and 1902; rinderpest and
other cattle diseases, the arrival and extension of railway communication,
and the Boer War. The devastation wrought by successive cattle diseases,
and the strict quarantine measures imposed to contain them, made transport
riding generally impossible where it had not already been made less attrac-
tive by the advent of the railway, which for the first time put major domes-
tic markets on the farmers' doorsteps at the very moment that the war excluded
competition from South African agriculture and pushed up prices for maize and other foodstuffs. The number of occupied farms rocketed from c 300-400 in 1903 to well over 900 in 1904,\(^{(72)}\) and went on rising as ‘a steady influx of men with small capital and a large capacity for work... (occupied) farms all over the country’.\(^{(73)}\)

Many of the newcomers planted maize, with the result that production rose dramatically from c 45 000 bags in 1903/4 to c 180 000 bags in 1906/7.\(^{(74)}\) Tobacco, too, experienced an impressive beginning with production surging upwards, but for both crops the result of this expansion on prices and markets was wholly predictable. The maize output, together with peasant production, soon filled the country’s tiny internal market, with the result that its price fell by 30-50 percent between 1903 and 1912,\(^{(75)}\) and when it spilled over into export markets, it found prices even less to its liking.\(^{(76)}\) Tobacco’s advance went a little further, but retreated more precipitously when prices collapsed following saturation of the available markets for turkish and virginian leaf in 1911 and 1914 respectively.\(^{(77)}\)

But while settler agriculture was to wrestle inconclusively with the problem of external markets for another generation, and had also to limit peasant competition and to procure labour on agricultural capital’s terms, its first priority was to win recognition for itself as a legitimate sphere of accumulation. The Rhodesia Agricultural Union objected to existing legislation which expressly subordinated agricultural to mining interests; pressed for reduced railway rates; argued that state assistance for agricultural research and to the industry generally was too small, grudging and sporadic; and fought for improved titles to land at lower prices. These grievances coincided with the campaign mounted by mining capital against the continued existence of the 30 percent clause, and in 1907 the Company once more bowed before settler pressure, and for the very pragmatic reason as well that as none of the big companies engaged in farming had made a profit in 1906,\(^{(78)}\) small capital comprised the cutting edge of productive agricultural enterprise. It reorganised its governmental form and policies along lines more acceptable to the interests of productive capital in both mining and agriculture by conceding a majority to elected members in the Legislative Council and by separating its administrative and commercial revenues. The 30 percent clause, as noted earlier, was removed, and the Charter committed itself to improved land titles and their promotion through a newly-established Estates Department.

The B.S.A. Company’s recognition that its economic interests, as well as those of capital in general, lay in encouraging the expansion of domestic agricultural capital, made inevitable further attacks on African production structures to curb peasant competition and increase the flow of labour. After a half-hearted attempt to press the land companies into releasing some of their possessions, the state concentrated on African holdings. Provision for African reserves had first been made with the infamous Gwaii and Shangani reserves, and much more importantly after the risings when, at the insistence of the Imperial Government, an estimated 24.8 million acres were hastily put aside for black occupation. From 1908 onwards, the Charter steadily chipped away 500 000 acres of the best of this land, and after the report of the Native Reserves Commission of 1914-15, excised a further million acres from the reserves. As far as possible, the boundaries of the reserves were re-drawn to exclude richer soils, higher rainfall and easy access to markets.\(^{(79)}\)

What the state may have missed with one hand, it tried to take with the other. The doubling of hut tax in 1904, which lifted the African contribution to state revenues to 41 percent, was followed by a spate of fresh levies and taxes between 1908 and 1914. In 1909, Africans living on so-called unalienated land had to pay rent to the Chartered Company; even higher fees were exacted from the tenants of white farmers; dog tax was introduced in 1912; and in 1914 an Ordinance made cattle dipping, at 1 - 2s. per head, compulsory ‘in any area where this was the wish of the majority of (white)
These actions to secure the structural conditions for accumulation and to strengthen the position of capital were not, however, just handed down by the state, but were shaped and infused by a shifting balance of forces and interests, and by a process of struggle. Although some Chartered Company officials looked forward to the day when the reserves would disappear, the actual extent of the state offensive against their size and location was defined by two major considerations. One, of course, was the economic interest of productive capital. Where elements in the mining industry had once favoured a proletarianised and stabilised black workforce, the lesson of reconstruction had been firmly in favour of migrant labour. With its labour force rooted in the rural areas, mining capital could purchase labour power below the cost of its reproduction, and thereby effect such stabilisation as it required largely on its own terms, as aggregate conditions deteriorated in the reserves. Because settler agriculture frequently competed with African producers for markets, it certainly wanted the reserves to be small and distant, but it too did not want them eliminated because its pronounced vulnerability to fluctuating prices and its seasonal demands for workers strongly favoured migrant labour. The second, and for a lengthy period, the dominant consideration, was, quite simply, that fear of provoking armed resistance precluded the complete confiscation of African-held land. It was certainly this need to guard against a repetition of the Risings which induced the Imperial authorities to hover more or less watchfully in the background.

Nor did the state offensive succeed in transforming all rural producers into labour migrants when they were not subsistence cultivators and into subsistence cultivators when they were not migrants. Although its measures oppressed all blacks, its impact was mediated through the process of differentiation already well underway in African rural areas. Capitalism's uneven development since 1890 had encouraged peasant production to the point where in 1903 Africans received £350,000 from the sale of grain, livestock and other produce, and as the reconstruction of the mining industry proceeded, they were able to supply the hundreds of markets which sprouted across the countryside. It was a process which sometimes accentuated and sometimes initiated differentiation between strata and between areas; while thousands bought ploughs, only a few could afford to invest in carts and wagons for the transport of produce; where, for example, proletarianisation was advanced in the Victoria region by 1914, it had scarcely started in Belingwe district 20 years later; and almost certainly it was the poorer peasants who were least able to absorb the state's demands and who were further marginalised in this period.

Inside the mining industry itself, where the state and mining capital co-operated closely in maximising accumulation through the operation of 'a web of coercive labour legislation, designed to regulate the mobility of black labour and stabilise employment under contract', and a compound system remarkable for its pervasiveness and brutality, class struggle assumed distinctive features. Black workers characteristically confronted exploitation in the shadows, 'in the nooks and crannies of the day-to-day work situation', where their techniques of resistance were similar to those once developed by slaves in the southern states of North America: 'Side by side with ordinary loafing and mindless labour went deliberate wastefulness, slowdowns, feigned illness, self-inflicted injuries, and the well-known abuse of livestock and equipment'. Every one of these devices found early expression on Southern Rhodesian mines - on the Red and White Rose Mine, for instance, where conditions were appalling, black miners in 1899 staged an effective 'go slow' which drove the management to frustration - and nor were they ever relinquished as weapons in the years up to 1948.

The highly unequal terms of struggle were rendered more uneven still, as chibaro and 'voluntary' foreign workers undercut local miners and
"denationalised" the labour force, and as more and more Ndebele and Shona workers were squeezed onto the labour market. Whereas striking workers on the Camperdown mine in 1901 could successfully block an attempt to reduce their wages, the expanding labour supply subsequently allowed capital to enforce wage cuts despite strikes on the Bonsor and Ayrshire mines in 1905 and 1909. Wages were again reduced during the First World War, only to be followed shortly thereafter by conflicts when the soaring inflation rate coincided with a temporary labour shortage brought about by wartime demands for peasant produce and by the devastating impact of the Spanish "flu pandemic. There were strikes and unrest at Wankie colliery between 1918 and 1921; a strike at the Globe and Phoenix in 1918; unrest at the Buhtick mine in 1920; and a boycott of mine stores at Shamva also in 1920, but as the slack in the labour market was rapidly taken up by foreign workers, the mines were able to hold wage increases far below the rise in the cost of living. (89)

In the immediate post-war period, mining capital, or more precisely, the large companies, was also locked in conflict with its white miners who had parlayed the war-time shortage of their skills into improved conditions and trade union organisation. At the end of 1919, white workers successfully struck for a 25 percent wage increase and a 48 hour working week, but overreached themselves the following November when they demanded a further 20 percent rise in wages. Mining capital proceeded to organise itself in the Rhodesia Mine Owners Association, and took advantage of division in union ranks and the ebbing of the skilled labour shortage not only to reject union demands, but to follow up a strike at Shamva with a general lock-out during February-March 1921. It ended with union capitulation and eventual collapse, but even as the companies celebrated their victory over white labour with wage reductions in 1922 and again in 1923, (90) it seemed that they had lost the war over Responsible Government.

Settler political quiescence at the beginning of the war had first been disturbed by a substantial increase in railway rates in 1916 - which had particularly upset farmers by doubling the rate on grain - and later aroused by Company proposals to amalgamate Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which settlers feared would foreclose political options when the Charter expired. In 1917 a Responsible Government association, enjoying close if informal links with organised agriculture, grew swiftly from the moment of its foundation, but much more damaging, indeed terminal, to the Chartered Administration was the 1918 Privy Council decision in favour of Crown ownership of the land. At a stroke, the Company lost its most valuable commercial asset which it had been carefully nurturing through its frequently tempestuous association with domestic capital, and as a result saw no further point in subsidising administrative deficits. (91)

This decision had 'a tremendous impact' (92) on settler politics and politicians who argued that if 'the country is to be administered on its own resources and credit...it might as well have the management of its own affairs'. (93) In the 1920 elections, the RGA, representing a loose and heterogeneous coalition of 'farmers, trade unionists, small traders, women, Dutch nationalists and perhaps junior civil servants', swept to victory over the representatives of large capital who, with the B.S.A. Company, looked to union with South Africa to safeguard their interests. (94) The newly-elected Legislative Council members promptly petitioned the Imperial authorities to grant Responsible Government, but were obliged to 'jump through another hoop before their request was met. In the Referendum of November 1922 domestic capital again emerged victorious after a bitter contest in which the 'reptile press, the influence of the Chartered Coy, the machinations of the non-rhodesian capitalists and politicians, with their local satellites have all been against us. we have had no friends, but the "man in the street"'. (95)
'I cannot quite get over the fact of the huge profits the Trusts make out of the tobacco which we are trying to grow out here by the sweat of our brows, or perhaps I should say the natives'...The fact of Directors of the Trusts dying multimillionaires...makes one wonder if they ever think of where all their money came from and how it is that a few crumbs from their groaning tables are not let fall to enable the growers in Rhodesia, or in other parts of the world for that matter, to make a bare living...' (96)

Although international capital initially viewed the Referendum result and Southern Rhodesia's assumption of Responsible Government with considerable apprehension, its fears soon evaporated. It became clear that the alignment of domestic interests in 1920 against large capital had been a vote against the Chartered administration and not one unreservedly in favour of Responsible Government. Agriculture, for example, although strongly against the B.S.A. Company in 1920, had split by 1922. The majority, comprising ranchers and tobacco planters for whom the South African market was essential, voted for Union; others, primarily maize farmers, wanted Responsible Government. And not only was the domestic bourgeoisie itself fragmented, but its electoral ties with organised white labour were tenuous and easily disturbed, making it extremely vulnerable to the deliberate process of penetration instituted by large capital from 1923 onwards. (97)

The constitution, moreover, was hedged about with safeguards designed to 'protect the rights of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation against Africans without Imperial sanction, and stop Southern Rhodesia from passing laws incompatible with the more general interests of the Imperial connexion'. (98) In short, the settler state form was a carefully crafted compromise between local and metropolitan accumulation, and as the dependent partner the settler state was obliged to accept constitutional provisions seeking to guard against initiatives which might disturb the orderly accumulation of capital in general. Together, these factors produced a thoroughly conservative successor to the Chartered state, so much so that 'the average (Legislative Council) session of the 'twenties resembled more a well-conducted shareholders' meeting than a national convention'. (99)

Typically, though, most of the shares were held outside of the colony. The social formation inherited by the domestic bourgeoisie in 1923 was remarkable for the degree of dominance exerted by monopoly capital. Southern Rhodesia's railway system was owned by the B.S.A. Company; its only colliery was a Chartered subsidiary; its chrome industry was effectively in the grip of one company, as were its asbestos mines; gold mining became increasingly dominated by a handful of large company-owned mines; and while investment by large capital was much less prominent in agriculture, exceptions being the citrus industry and to some extent in beef cattle, its predominant position in world markets gave it the whip hand over small capital.

On the various occasions that the settler state was prevailed upon to stand with domestic interests against monopoly capital, it invariably emerged from such confrontation rumpled, perhaps clutching a tatty agreement which on close inspection revealed yet another compromise in big capital's favour. For example, protests by farmers and miners over high railway rates encouraged the Government to institute a commission of enquiry in 1924, but the ensuing Railway Act of 1926 left B.S.A. Company ownership and profits essentially intact; the newly-established Railway Commission or control board notwithstanding. (100) There was a further clash in 1928 when the railways refused to construct a branch line in the Umvukwes region which would have benefitted small independent producers to the detriment of the Chrome Trust, with whom the railways were linked through the B.S.A. Company.
For once, the state was able to play off the Trust against another large group, and Rhodesia Railways were forced to give way. But the victory was nullified when the newcomer was soon afterwards swallowed by the Trust, and with monopolistic conditions restored, rates on the branch line were manipulated to the disadvantage of the remaining small mines. (101)

Apart from this brief interlude, monopoly capital was left in unchallenged possession of base mineral mining. Southern Rhodesia's chrome and asbestos output was dominated by multinationals whose control on a world scale of production and marketing allowed them to influence prices and make production decisions without reference to their host countries. For much of the 1920s, for instance, it suited the Chrome Trust to expand its Rhodesian activities to the point where the colony accounted for over half of the world's production in 1929. Three years later production slumped to 8 percent of the world total because of the Depression and because the Trust's production strategies changed in order to eliminate a regional competitor. For some time past, a rival grouping had been expanding production in southern Africa, and it seems that the Trust utilized the contraction in the world market caused by the Depression, along with its access to chrome production and supplies outside of Africa, to 'shut out' its rival's chrome. By early 1932 enough pressure had been exerted, and the Trust bought up the opposition. During this entire exercise, the settler state sat powerless to intervene, beyond denunciations in the Legislative Assembly of those 'who control in Rhodesia every other form of life, who control the chrome, the copper and the asbestos, and will subject those people engaged in those industries to desolation because it suits their market manipulations'. (102)

Experiences in agriculture were equally unhappy. Although the structure of capitalist agriculture has not yet been analysed or periodised, in broadest outline it comprised a mass of small, undercapitalised farmers around a core of big concerns, either individually or company owned. Throughout the '20s and early '30s this mass of small farmers tended to 'rush' from crop to different crop in search of elusive riches, a phenomenon which both imparted an extraordinarily volatile element to the volume of production, and aggravated the highly uneven productivity of the sector as a whole. Indeed white farmers seemed destined to share the fate of the biblical swine of Gadarene, until the state was eventually persuaded to provide safety nets for those who successively hurled themselves over the 'cliffs' of cattle, cotton, tobacco and maize.

In the early 1920s the need to find cattle export markets had become urgent. A large and fairly indiscriminate wartime demand which had helped cattle owners build up an export trade, gave way in 1921-2 to depression and falling prices which hit Southern Rhodesian ranches particularly heavily because most of their animals were low-grade. The colony's small domestic market was quite unable to absorb significant numbers, and as the surplus grew, so prices were further depressed. Ranchers initially tried to market surplus cattle by mobilising local capital in co-operative ventures. A canning factory was set up in 1919 near Umtali, but went out of business within three years because of the familiar problem of undercapitalisation and because of inability to compete on external markets dominated by monopoly capital. A second attempt made in 1921 when a co-operative Meat Producers' Exchange aimed to secure 'fair' prices by limiting supplies and by-passing the middlemen who infested the important Johannesburg market was aborted through the shadowy actions of the Imperial Cold Storage Company. (103)

As a result, ranchers turned to the state for help, and ironically the state extended an invitation to the I.C.S. Company to come in by the front door. Sensitive to charges that its policy was 'equivalent to handing over Rhodesia, bound hand and foot, to the mercies of interests that...in other countries are regarded as the enemies of cattle producers', (104) the settler government tried hard to interest other large companies in a proposal to establish a meat freezing industry in the colony, but with no success. Southern Rhodesia's remoteness from the major world meat markets and the
limited and generally poor quality of its cattle held little attraction for established American and British multinationals. Instead, the colony had to settle for the I.C.S. Company which, although of overwhelming regional importance, was insignificant outside southern Africa. Even then, it was only coaxed into Southern Rhodesia by an agreement, confirmed in 1924, which among other benefits gave it a ten-year monopoly over the export of frozen and chilled meat, and a guarantee that if in any year its profits fell below ten percent of its capital, the state would make up the difference to a maximum of £15,000. After a short honeymoon, however, the agreement began to break down over the provision calling for the development of exports to higher-priced but more discerning overseas markets. The settlers could not maintain regular supplies of quality cattle, and as the I.C.S. Company could not compensate with international muscle, losses began to mount. In 1929, despite a state-funded export bounty in support of bids for overseas contracts, the company still lost money, and the cattle industry was as far, perhaps further, from lucrative export markets as it had been at the start of the decade. (105)

By this time, the plight of tobacco planters was desperate. Their traumatic experience really began in 1924 when Rhodesian tobacco, painfully recovered from its fall ten years previously, was favourably received at the Wembley Empire Exhibition in London. Prices and prospects went higher still when in July 1925 Britain increased imperial preference on tobacco by 50 percent, causing Southern Rhodesian growers to turn their backs on the South African market and concentrate on meeting what they thought was Britain's huge demand. With prices in 1925 and 1926 far in excess of the lowly costs of production, white farmers abandoned cotton and maize growing for the 'leaf of gold': (106) '...all eyes turned on tobacco. Every farmer one meets talks about it and very handsome profits have been made or are anticipated being made as a result of this year's crop'. (107) The industry's expansion was startling. Acreage planted with virginian leaf rose from 7,000 in 1924 to 13,000 in 1926 to an estimated 50-60,000 in 1928, when there were 3,000 curing barns, 500 grading sheds and 700 bulking sheds to accommodate the 24.4 million lbs produced by 987 planters. (108)

The bubble was not long in bursting. 'In retrospect', admitted the industry's official history, 'there is something almost pathetic about a group of ingenuous and isolated farmers sitting in their rustic high-ceilinged boardroom in the village which was Salisbury, blundering confidently into the vortex of international financial and political interest. Visitors told them their tobacco was good; they were learning the art of growing it; there seemed no logical reason why they should not be able to sell it'. (109) The gigantic crops of 1927 and especially 1928, most of which was very poor quality, in fact proved virtually unsaleable on the British tobacco market, where the dominant companies, interlinked with American interests, found it neither feasible nor desirable to use Empire leaf on so large a scale. As the industry teetered on the brink of total collapse, the Southern Rhodesian state was forced to come to the rescue of the Tobacco Warehouse - the planters' export company - with over £500,000 to pay off merchant bank loans and to put at least some cash in growers' pockets. Many planters nonetheless faced ruin and by 1930 700 of them had abandoned the industry. Production fell back to 5.5 million lbs as once more domestic interests lay prostrate before monopoly capital. (110)

The helping hand extended to the tobacco growers was economically and politically unavoidable, but it was also exceptional. Other supplicants were grudgingly met and cautiously assisted, or, where possible, ignored, as when the state refused to act on the annual resolutions passed by the Rhodesia Agricultural Union calling for a system of controlled production and compulsory marketing of maize. (111) Although responsible to a settler electorate, the Southern Rhodesian state held within it the economic, political and ideological interests of capital in general, and did not simply direct or preside over an unrestricted process of domestic accumulation. On the contrary, the state sought to contain and channel the
antagonistic relations and contradictions engendered by the unceasing struggle to secure the many different conditions necessary for the creation and appropriation of surplus value. (112) Through the ideological practice of segregation, the colonial state encapsulated the contradiction between the economic interests of mining and agriculture capitals and the need to secure the social and political conditions for the undisturbed reproduction of capital. It thus continued to discriminate against African rural areas, most notoriously with the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which froze the reserves in a structurally subordinate position, while simultaneously setting in motion policies intended to blunt the most immediate contradictions which had sharpened in the meantime.

The general deterioration of the reserves in the early '20s, accelerated by the postwar slump in grain and livestock prices and by severe drought in 1922, sufficiently alarmed the state for 'developmental' policies to be introduced. From 1924 black agricultural demonstrators were trained at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo schools; in the same year a Native Trust Fund, supported mainly from dipping fees, was established for the improvement of cattle and agriculture generally; and in 1926 the post of 'Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives' was created. (113) These initiatives coincided with rising commodity prices after 1924 and the next five years saw a modest recovery in the reserves. Over 700 000 bags of maize were harvested in 1929, and the fact that almost 200 000 bags were marketed 'threatened to become a serious problem' for settler farmers. (114)

The fruits of recovery, though, were unevenly distributed. Signs accumulated in the mid and late '20s of overcrowding, overstocking and soil erosion in the reserves, and increasing numbers of local people, particularly Shona, became labourers, many taking jobs in poorly-paid white agriculture. (115) At the other end of the scale, cattle ownership was becoming concentrated in fewer hands, and those who could turn the vagaries of reserve geography to good account became market gardeners supplying the towns. (116) It was here that the impact of the state's agricultural advice was clustered. Instead of 'raising the level of agriculture throughout the Reserve', demonstrators tended to form class alliances with the rural elite, thereby imbuing 'a few natives with the idea of money-making', and effectively becoming 'the farm managers of a few enterprising and money-seeking plot owners'. (117)

Along with the 'developmental' policies went moves by the state to contain the revolution being wrought by capitalism on the fabric of African society. Emerging class antagonisms and aspirations were delayed and blunted by the gradual formulation and implementation of policies to prop up the disintegrating social cohesion of the reserves: 'encouraging Africans to move into the reserves thus became for many Native Commissioners a means by which to slow down the break-up of the tribal system and to hinder the growth of potentially hostile political movements'. (118) By defining and supporting 'traditional' rulers, as for example in the Native Affairs Ordinance of 1927, and by modifying and codifying African customary law, the settler state aimed at disorganising the dominated classes through confining their sphere of incorporation to a reconstituted 'tribal system'. (119)

Political legitimacy so narrowly defined could accommodate neither the independent initiative of the Matabele National Home Movement (later the Matabele Home Society) for a restored kingship in a consolidated 'national home', nor meet the modestly incorporationist requests of the tiny black petty-bourgeoisie voiced through the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association and the Rhodesian Native Association, (120) and was unrelentingly hostile to other more dramatic challenges which the state and capital faced from millenarianism and trade unionism in the late 1920s. In rural Mashonaland, specifically in areas shaken by the boom and collapse of the tobacco industry, and traversed by preachers from north of the Zambezi, the Church of watchtower gained an enthusiastic following from its efforts to 'restructure demoralised rural society' and for its predictions of the
imminent overthrow of white oppression, but was speedily intimidated by police and military patrols and its foreign preachers deported. (121) The Industrial and Commercial workers Union established in Southern Rhodesia in late 1927, proved rather more resilient and survived the early deportation of its leader, Robert Sambo, to root itself successfully in the Bulawayo Location where it began articulating grievances as diverse as those of the urban working class, the rural areas, and its petty-bourgeois leadership.

In fact, the most serious challenge to capital accumulation in this period was spearheaded not by Watch Tower or the ICU, but grew directly out of changed conditions in the gold mining industry. In 1925 the postwar premium on the price of gold was removed, and from that point Southern Rhodesia’s gold output fell steadily. The most important reason for this was that as mines were worked deeper in the 1920s, the cost per ounce tended to rise, either through a falling-off in the value of the deposit with depth (a common characteristic of local gold mines), or because it became more expensive to mine the deeper levels. When the mines applied their time-honoured solution to rising costs by maximising output and cutting expenditure on labour, they stirred up widespread strike action by black workers. For once, black miners enjoyed a relatively strong bargaining position because the assistance given to African cash-cropping in Nyasaland at this time and the expansion of other sectors in the Southern Rhodesian economy had made the supply of labour tight and occasionally scarce. Between December 1925 and October 1928, there were at least ten strikes on various mines, including one on the large Shamva mine which did much to rattle settler complacency, as workers resisted cuts and/or fought for increases. Beyond victimising identifiable leaders and trying to ensure that wages generally did not rise, there was little that mining capital and the state could do. Cost minimisation was arrested and production declined accordingly, until by 1929 the amount of gold produced was smaller than in 1907. (122)

IV

'It is difficult to conceive of a principle more inequitable or dangerous than that of deliberately paying to the better-off producers of a State more for a product than is paid to less well-off people in the same State for the identical product. It is the antithesis of assistance according to need and of the universally acclaimed principle of raising rather than depressing the lower classes.' (123)

Southern Rhodesia’s economy was thus already low in the water when the Great Depression broke across the world economy at the start of the 1930s. The national income, never very large, fell from £13.9 million in 1929 to £8.7 million in 1931 as commodity prices plummeted and markets shrivelled. (124) Thousands of black miners lost their jobs when chrome and asbestos mines cut back on production, while in capitalist agriculture 'a chain of circumstances... (had) placed the industry in a very precarious position, and unless a certain measure of relief is applied immediately a collapse on a large scale must be faced...The cotton failure, followed by the tobacco debacle, has forced a large number of farmers to produce Maize, and is the principal reason why there has been an increase in the acreage under that crop'. (125) At the time this warning was sounded, maize had fallen from 10s. to 6s. a bag on external markets and over the next twelve months the price virtually halved again. (126) In the same period, cattle exports 'met a disastrously low market', and the gloom was completed when an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease brought all meat exports to a halt. During 1931-2 the fortunes of the cattle industry were at their lowest ebb; all live exports were banned and South Africa even refused to allow the transit through her territory of chilled or frozen beef both of which led to a growing surplus and further
depressed prices.\(^{(127)}\) Farms went out of production and farmers constituted the largest single group of white employed.\(^{(126)}\)

This desperate situation evoked a prevaricating response from the Government, then under the tepid leadership of H.U. Moffat. Only after the Government began shedding seats in by-elections did a somewhat half-hearted Maize Control Act, confined to specified regions in Mashonaland, and a Cattle Levy Act find their way onto the statute books. Developments in South Africa drew the Southern Rhodesian state a little further down the path of intervention and control, when it was obliged to follow the South African example and pass a Dairy Industry Control Act - the two industries were closely tied together - and respond to South Africa's imposition of a quota on duty-free Rhodesian tobacco by establishing a Tobacco Control Board to distribute the quota amongst planters.\(^{(129)}\) None of these measures did much to lift the Depression or to reverse the Government's waning political fortunes, while its purchase of the mineral rights from the B.S.A. Company for £2 million in 1933, positively inflamed a growing opposition which, loudly proclaiming its hostility to monopoly interests, went on to win the election of September 1933. To the outgoing administration it seemed as if victory had gone to 'the underdogs, the down and outs and all those with little stake in the country'.\(^{(130)}\)

Although the victorious Reform Party programme called for a state Reserve Bank, the development of secondary industries and opposition towards foreign monopolies, the party umbrella sheltered interests of very different persuasions, numbering among them commerce wedded to free enterprise and agricultural interests opposed to state control of marketing. The moment of national capital's ideological ascendancy was consequently exceptionally brief. By October 1934, majority elements in the Reform and recently defeated Rhodesian parties had come together in a United Party under the avowedly pragmatic leadership of Godfrey Huggins, and in November elections routed the radical rump of the Reform Party. Although the Reform Party claimed with pardonable exaggeration, that the 'Rhodesian Establishment', consisting of the senior ranks of the civil service, the chambers of commerce and of mines, the agricultural and show societies, the Salisbury Club, backed by the Argus Press and the Anglican hierarchy, was back in power',\(^{(131)}\) this did not mean unconditional capitulation to metropolitan imperialism. What it did mean was that the rhetoric and programme for the creation and consolidation of a national bourgeoisie were quickly jettisoned in a return to the ambiguous class interests of domestic capital.\(^{(132)}\) Ambiguity, moreover, was manifest in the peculiar system of autonomy enjoyed between ministries under Huggins; the net result was that while his administration had no coherent strategy supporting domestic capital, still less national capital, tactical measures were taken in its favour.\(^{(133)}\)

The first of these were in agriculture where an Amended Maize Control Act, favouring small white farmers against both large-scale growers and peasant producers, was passed in 1934. Control over tobacco production was extended through the Reserve Pool act of 1934 and particularly by the Market Stabilisation Act of 1936 which established a Marketing Board 'to organise the compulsory sale of all tobacco through licensed auction floors and buyers, and to advise the government on quotas for the protected markets'.\(^{(134)}\) The beef cattle, dairy, pig and cotton industries were also drawn within the ambit of the state, until by 1937 'of the principal agricultural products from European farms only poultry and eggs remained outside the system of control'.\(^{(135)}\)

The network of control boards and subsidies enjoyed mixed results. Settler maize production was stabilised and undoubtedly saved from catastrophe. Tobacco production, stimulated by a ten-year guarantee of 25 percent Imperial preference dating from the 1932 Ottawa Conference, but protected from over-production by the Control Board, expanded steadily from 5.5 million lbs in 1930 to hover around the 20 million lb mark for most of the decade. The cattle industry though, despite regular infusions of subsidy support,
continued to decline. Exports remained consistently uncompetitive on the world market and usually failed to recover their costs of production. Many ranchers drew the appropriate conclusion and abandoned the struggle entirely. Between 1925 and 1938 'anything from one million to two million pounds sterling' was 'lost or withdrawn' from the industry, and the number of white owned cattle fell from c 992 000 in 1932 to c 735 000 in 1937. As it was mainly the larger producers who left the industry and further blunted its competitive marketing edge, the remaining small ranchers were heavily dependent on continued subsidies. This development, concern over the financial losses of the past, and mounting dissatisfaction with the practices of the I.C.S. Company induced the state to cut its losses and expropriate the freezing works. In 1938, after bitter arbitration proceedings, the freezing works were taken over by the newly established Cold Storage Commission at a cost of £286,930. Monopoly control of the meat industry now rested with the state.

By contrast to the mixed success obtained in capitalist agriculture, it seemed as if domestic capital was carrying the day in the gold mining industry. The Depression's uneven impact on the colony meant that even as the prospects and profitability of most primary products contracted, so those of gold mining boomed. Millions of tons of previously unpayable ore were made profitable by two developments; in the first place, workers formerly employed in agriculture and on base mineral mines, together with people forced from the reserves, had to take the only work going, which was on the gold mines; and secondly the price of gold rose when Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931. With abundant labour and a higher gold price, the obstacles which had blocked cost minimisation and output maximisation in the previous decade disappeared. Gold output jumped from 532,111 ozs in 1931 to 814,078 ozs in 1938, while the number of mines quadrupled within three years to over 1,600 in 1934. Virtually all the new producers were small workers, 90 percent of whom mined less than 500 ozs p.a. Nonetheless, the contribution of small mines to the total gold output went up to about 30 percent in 1936, not much below that of the large mines whose relative importance had declined significantly since the late '20s.

The structural shift in favour of small workers was both cause and consequence of changed state policy towards the mining industry after 1933. Small workers irritated by the Moffat administration's negative attitude, had swung behind the Reform and later the United Party in 1933-4. Thereafter, their inflated numbers and economic importance ensured that political power was deployed in attempts to consolidate and perpetuate the particular interests of domestic capital within the mining industry. A wide range of state services were instituted, most notably the construction of a state-financed Roasting Plant at Que Que for the treatment of refractory sulphide ores, and the provision of regular cheap power through the Electricity Supply Commission. A Government Loan Fund gave still more help to small workers, most of whom were anyway exempted from special taxation imposed on the gold mining industry as a whole. In short, the policy 'amounted to a concerted effort to rebuild the gold mining industry on the basis of a partnership between government and small workers'.

It was also a policy which ran out of momentum by 1937, by which time it was apparent that the tactics pursued by the state in the mining industry and in agriculture defined the precise limits of its assistance to domestic capital. International capital was sometimes verbally assailed and pressed on to a defensive posture, but nothing else was done. Although at the time of his brief flirtation with the Reform Party, Huggins had asserted that 'whilst the Rhodesian Party looks at the people through the eyes of the big financial organisations, the Reform Party looks at the big financial organisations through the eyes of the people', in later years he steadfastly averted his gaze from the most prominent monopolies entrenched inside the colony. Chrome and asbestos mining remained in the firm grasp of monopoly capital, as did coal and the railways. No positive action was taken to foster secondary industrialisation, and nor did Southern Rhodesia push
very hard or for very long to improve its constitutional position in the imperialist chain. (140) Domestic capital, located in mining and agriculture, sought to improve its bargaining position, not to transform the nature of the transaction by questioning dependency as such. Consequently, 'in the late '30s, after nearly two decades of self-government, the country still had a typically colonial economy with no industrial sector apart from the railway workshop and small firms engaged in wholly subsidiary activities'. (141)

But all of the various measures affecting the balance and relationship between domestic and international capital would have come to little more than shuffling the seating arrangements on a sinking ship, if capital in general had not been able to re-establish its overall buoyancy. As settler ideological discourse took on the shrill tones of the 'two pyramid' policy, this was done by adding yet again to the burdens of the black peasantry and working class. Under the various control and levy acts of the 1930s, African cattle owners and maize growers were manipulated and taxed to subsidise the earnings of white ranchers and farmers. The Cattle Levy Acts of 1931 and 1934 imposed a 2s. 6d. levy on the slaughter of all cattle for domestic consumption in order to pay a bounty subsidising exports almost exclusively owned by whites. (142) Because the levy proved difficult to collect, an additional 3d. tax per head on all cattle was introduced in 1934. This fell most heavily on African cattle owners because while some white ranchers found ways of evading it, 'those living in reserves will hardly know that there has been such a tax, by reason of the fact that they have built up a reserve dipping fund from which the tax will be paid'. Although one or two eyebrows 'came to be raised at the ethics of collecting the African contribution from what amounted, in effect, to "trust funds", Huggins protested that Africans 'would prefer an indirect to a direct form of stock tax "unless ill-intentioned people or agitators stir them up"'. The tax, however, proved unpopular with white ranchers and was dropped after one year in favour of a 10s. slaughter levy. While this change 'lessened the capital burden on the African peasantry, it simply increased the cattle burden - as measured by adverse marketing conditions'. Both prices and the size of the market fell as butchers 'passed on their levy deductions to the Africans by offering lower prices', and tried to minimise the impact of the levy by only buying heavier and higher quality stock. (143)

Similarly, the general impact of the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934 depressed prices paid to Africans in order to subsidise the return received by white farmers. Whereas the average price per bag paid to African producers between 1934 and 1939 fluctuated from 1s. 6d. to 6s. 6d., white growers over the same period received an average price of over 8s. per bag. (144) One immediate effect of control was to weaken 'the African's ability to meet rent, tax, dipping fees and other monetary obligations and charges'. (145) From Matabeleland it was observed that people in the Insiza district 'have been accustomed for years to obtain revenue for taxes by sale of mealies, and this undoubtedly (is) going to hit them hard', an opinion which was echoed at the other end of the country by the Native Commissioner for Umtali who blamed the 'delayed collection of tax' on 'the extension of the Maize Control Act to this district'. (146)

No less immediate, however, was the stimulus which the successive acts imparted to peasant production and 'competition'. Output rose unsteadily from approximately 750,000 bags in 1930 to touch the million bag mark by 1936. The percentage of African sales both to total African production and to total sales increased significantly; in the first instance from 23.5 percent in 1930 to 43 percent in 1936; and in the second from 14.8 percent in 1930 to 23.9 percent in 1936. (147) Partly, these trends reflected the longer process of the expansion of commodity relations in the rural areas, but more pertinently they expressed the general compulsion exerted by falling prices to produce more to maintain existing incomes. (148) Here too, not everyone could respond equally because transport costs were deducted from the fixed price obtainable at Control Board depots, and no control gave an added twist to existing patterns of rural differentiation. In 1936 the
Chief Native Commissioner thought that 'the present system of Maize Control was a contributory factor to the tendency to abandon settlement in the remoter Districts and crowd in to the towns and mine markets'. It was, he observed, 'especially noticeable with advanced Natives'.(149) By 1937 the Native Commissioner for Ianze was reporting an 'almost 100% increase in the area under maize', and in 1938 the Chief Native Commissioner confirmed that the 'production of maize in central districts appears to be increasing'.(150) The contrast with outlying regions was striking; districts such as Beilingwe, Sinoa and Muanetsi saw previously important markets disappear, and where they could not diversify their crops, their inhabitants were forced into the labour market.(151)

For much of the 1930s this was a market where the balance of class forces moved firmly to the side of capital. White workers, already vulnerable to the overtures of capital because of their structural position and ideological practice, were ensnared and disarmed through the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, while for the black population in general and labour in particular, the climate of repression worsened even further. Through the Sedition Act of 1936, the state tried to halt the 'spread of subversive and seditious propaganda and literature in the Colony',(152) and in their place offered more wholesome fare concocted by the Native Department in association with the Bantu Mirror and other publications.(153) The ICU was infiltrated by 'spies, its meetings monitored and its organisers harassed; it was quickly defeated and expelled from the tightly controlled mine compounds, and when it developed a rural constituency, its leaders were barred from the reserves.(154) In the same year that the ICU expired, the Native Registration Act of 1936 compelled every male African in the towns to have 'in addition to his situpa, one of the following: a pass to seek work in the town; a certificate to show that he was employed within the town; a certificate signed by a Native Commissioner to the effect that he was earning a living in the town by lawful means; if employed outside the town, a written permit from his employer; a visiting pass'.(155) By these means, the 'distribution of the total African labour supply between the different capitalist sectors...was not mainly left to the law of supply and demand...as the Act tightened up the Pass Law and effectively contributed to the maintenance of a wage structure whereby the white farmers constantly paid unskilled labour lower wage rates than other employers'.(156)

In all of this, the hand of the state and capital was immensely strengthened by the flood of workseekers released by the impact of the Depression on the rural areas of Central Africa and by the contraction of capitalist agriculture and base mineral mining. Surviving farmers, for example, were able to pay labourers only 14s. per month in 1932 and in some areas squeezed payment down to 8s. per month by 1934.(157) And on the gold mines, whose expansion secured the economic salvation of the settler state, profitability was realised through unremitting assault on the cash wages of black workers. In the early '30s, average monthly wages fell by almost 30 percent, from 28s. 2d. in 1930 to 20s. in 1935, and were lower still on the expanding face of the industry where smallworkers paid 17s. 10d.(158) For capital, enjoying 'the cheapest black labour probably in the British Empire',(159) the reward was a 'very remarkable and indeed unprecedented growth in the National Income from 1932-39',(160) up from £9.6 million to £21.5 million.(161)

V

'STRIKE! Meeting on Tuesday of the African workers Voice Association...Come and join for your benefit your children and grandchildren. Forward we go and Backwards never. FIRE!!' (162)
Gold mining's successful expansion during the '30s was penalised at the outbreak of the Second World War when the state imposed a 'premium tax' to 'soak up' an increase in the price of gold and so contribute largely towards the colony's war effort. The tax also soaked up the industry's profitability and together with the inflation unleashed by the war, was an important cause of the huge drop in gold production between 1940 and 1945. Over the same period, the number of mines decreased from 1,477 to 732, and as the largest number of casualties were smallworkers, the large mines began to recover their previously predominant position, even though their production too was falling in absolute terms. In 1945 large mines produced over 46 percent of the total gold output and ten years later over 60 percent. Gold was becoming more like chrome and asbestos as preserves of international capital, but whereas the war and its aftermath precipitated an absolute decline in gold production, strategic base minerals, particularly chrome, experienced both rising prices and demand. (163)

International capital's growing importance in the mining industry reinforced the tentative 1939 rapprochement between the United Party and the Chamber of Mines, and found concrete expression in postwar state policy. After a commission of enquiry, the Gold Premium Tax, which had most affected the biggest mines, was removed, and other measures favouring large capital were introduced. They in turn reflected and accelerated the decline of domestic capital; smallworkers were powerless to prevent a series of state actions all of which adversely affected them: 'in 1947 prospecting grants were discontinued; in 1948 the miners training school was closed; in 1949 the electrically utilisation was reorganised, the hidden subsidies to smallworkers removed, and charges fixed on an economic basis'. (164) The new climate was one in which 'where there was conflict between the interests of smallworkers and those of mining companies, the latter tended to be favoured'. (165)

These developments were in complete contrast to those in agriculture where the fortunes of domestic capital, specifically tobacco planters, were soaring. During the war, the rising price of tobacco leaf was followed by a somewhat shaky rise in the volume of production, due to still rude growing techniques and to limited fertilizer supplies, from 22.8 million lbs in 1938/9 to 47.5 million lbs in 1944/5. But irrespective of its quality, the tobacco could be sold and for 'the first time since tobacco had been commercially planted in Rhodesia, every grower was making money'. (166) From 1946, however some of the planters began making fortunes as the pattern of demand, determined by Britain's own dollar shortage and fuelled by the huge sterling balances accumulated by various countries during the war, swung towards Southern Rhodesia. The price of tobacco leapt upwards from 20d per lb to an average of over 32d. per lb, at which level it 'brought a profit of over 100 percent to the efficient grower'. (167) Tobacco exports totalled £6.5 million in 1946, when for the first time gold exports were beaten into second place, and in subsequent years tobacco increased its lead as the acreage planted, the number of growers, and production all boomed.

The extraordinary demand for Southern Rhodesian tobacco placed the large British manufacturers in an increasingly uncomfortable position. Starved of dollars, they were unable to lift their customary requirements from American markets, and turned reluctantly towards Southern Rhodesia and its over-heated tobacco prices. Negotiations were opened in which British capital, through its Tobacco Advisory Committee, admitted that it was 'desperate' for Rhodesian leaf, but argued that 'it was insupportable to pay the average price of 59d. a pound, which had been reached at the opening of the Rhodesian auctions. Such a price paid on the floors meant that Rhodesian tobacco landed in Great Britain at 75d., compared with 45d for American and 33d. for Canadian leaf, both of which were then generally superior in quality to the Rhodesian product'. (168) A compromise was suggested to the planters in which the manufacturers agreed to purchase a significant proportion of the annual crop in return for lower prices. The effective choice was 'of exploiting Britain's difficulties by demanding
grossly inflated prices which would bring rich rewards in the short run, or of securing...a permanent and substantial share of the British market'. (169)

After some hesitation and with much suspicion, the planters committed themselves to the latter course. In the London Agreement of December 1947, the big tobacco companies undertook to buy 46 million lbs at an average price of 29-30c. per lb, 'reviewable and renewable' every year for the fifth year ahead, thereby creating the stable market conditions for future spectacular increases in production. (170) War and the decisive weakening of British imperialism thus secured in a decade the market which had eluded the best efforts of domestic capital in the previous 40 years.

So pronounced was the movement towards tobacco cultivation during the war that, conjoined with a rapidly expanding domestic market, Southern Rhodesia lost its previous self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. The state, faced with its commitment to feed Empire forces and Italian prisoners of war, as well as with the difficulties of trading in wartime, hastily converted the existing control boards into marketing boards to oversee the supply and distribution of agricultural produce. (171) Most important of all, it began re-thinking its position vis-à-vis black cultivators as a source of surplus production. These deliberations increasingly came to be made in the context of two developments; the war-induced growth of secondary industry which generated not just an expanding demand for labour, but in addition, to stabilise sections of the workforce, and eventually to widen and deepen the colony's internal market; and the continued deterioration of the reserves where overcrowding, declining yields and soil erosion daily augmented an impoverished and marginalised population and completely overshadowed the state's conservation and extension advice programme which was slowly consolidating a small but distinct class of middle and upper peasants.

Comprehensive recommendations by the 1944 Native Production and Trade Commission of Enquiry that 'the maximum benefit both for the state, and for the natives, from Native Agriculture and animal husbandry can only be obtained by compulsory planned production whereby a statutory body should be empowered to direct what crops, acreages and areas should be planted and what livestock should be kept to enforce good husbandry conditions, and to control the distribution and marketing of the consequent products', (172) were largely accepted and implemented. Compulsory marketing at fixed prices was extended to cover all important African-grown crops; the production of cotton, and later Turkish tobacco for export, was encouraged; and by activating those sections of the Natural Resources Act of 1941 which empowered Native Commissioners to 'depasture stock, give orders on methods of cultivation, prohibit the cultivation of land, and control water', (173) the state fought to control the peasant production process. Money to pay for these ambitious schemes was raised by the Native Production and Marketing Development Act of 1948 which imposed a 10 percent levy on all African-marketed crops and cattle, and the entire drive to intensify commodity production in the reserves culminated in the 1948 Native Reserves Land Utilisation and Good Husbandry Bill, which proposed to replace the existing system of land tenure with a 'hybrid tribal-capitalistic system of individual holdings and communal grazing' in which good husbandry practices would be enforced under threat of dispossession. (174)

The attempt to transform the African rural areas was, as already mentioned, fundamentally rooted in the structural shift of the colony's economy towards secondary industry. Although the roots of this sector stretched back in some instances to the 1890s and to the First World War, it expanded substantially only when imperialism was convulsed by crisis during the Depression and especially during the Second World War when imports from the advanced capitalist countries were slashed. Commerce, cut loose from the metropole, added its voice to the industrialists' clamour for sympathetic state treatment, and in 1940 an Industrial Development Advisory Committee was formed. Two years later the state nationalised and expanded Southern Rhodesia's tiny iron and steel works, and passed a Cotton Research...
and Industry act to establish a cotton spinning industry, Huggins explain­
ing that 'if private capital is prepared to function, we want to preserve
the freedom and initiative of private enterprise, but if that enterprise, fails in any way, or if the industry is not established, then the State must step in if we are to progress'.(175) But the speech effectively marked the end of a phase not a beginning. The colony's industrialists strongly opposed nationalisation, and the state subsequently retreated from an inter­ventionist stance. Even the purchase of the railway system in 1947 was part of an infrastructural policy to establish 'a basis on which private enter­prise can then build its own industry',(176) and certainly not part of a coherent attack on external monopoly control.(177)

with or without state intervention, industrial expansion in the '40s was impressive. The wartime interruption of competition from overseas was complemented by a massive expansion of the domestic market brought about by the siting of the Imperial Air Training Scheme in Southern Rhodesia(178) and after 1945 demand was sustained by the doubling of the black urban popula­tion to about 200 000 by 1956, and by influx of white immigrants which drove the settler population up from c 80 000 in 1945 to c 125 000 in 1950.(179) Factories increased in number from 299 in 1938 to 473 in 1948, and over the same period their gross output grew from £5.1 million to £25.8 million.(180) By 1950, manufacturing was second only to capitalist agriculture as a source of the colony's income.(181)

Aggregate figures, though, conceal the stages through which this process passed, as well as the nature of the industrialisation. During the war itself, the pace of industrialisation was relatively modest and was confined to concerns using local raw materials, particularly food processing. From 1946 industrial expansion quickened, only to falter almost immediately in 1947 and 1948 as the return of foreign competition cut into internal and export markets.(182) Many settler 'factories' were little more than glorified workshops, characterised by small outputs, an extremely low capital to labour ratio, and by low productivity,(183) and were vulnerable to competi­tion and takeover by international capital in the postwar phase of imperialism. In fact, foreign capital, drawn primarily from Britain and South Africa, did not so much penetrate as overwhelm local industries and the economy generally. Annual foreign investment which totalled £13.5 million in 1947, doubled itself in 1948, and was almost as much again in 1950 when it peaked at over £50 million.(184) Foreign capital was distributed more or less evenly between state borrowings and stocks and direct productive investment,(185) and both contributed mightily to the shouldering of domestic capital well into the wings of the industrial stage in the late '40s and early '50s.

Domestic capital's general failure to resist takeover by international interests was determined not by size and market competitiveness alone, but crucially at the point of production where intensifying struggle by the black working class began to exert upward pressure on wages and conditions of em­ployment. Those smaller capitals who opposed measures aimed at selectively stabilising the workforce and improving housing conditions, found the state relatively unsympathetic and were brusquely told by Huggins that if they could not afford the expenditure, they ought to go out of business.(186) It was, however, advice which rang hollow for black workers ensnared in the urban squalor of Bulawayo and Salisbury, for whom capital's internal differences were marginal if not irrelevant, and for whom it was brutally clear that the primary contradiction was between capital and labour.

The wages of the vast majority of urban Africans remained well below the poverty datum lines calculated in the '40s and lagged far behind the 140 percent rise in the cost of living between 1939 and 1947.(187) As a result, strikes occurred intermittently during the war, but the first major explosion was the railway workers' strike in October 1945. Although the actual concessions eventually won by the strike were limited, its broader implications and consequences were enormous. 'The railway strike', exulted Jasper Savanhu, 'has proved that Africans have been born...Africans realise
as never before that united they stand and divided they fall... We have found ourselves faced by a ruthless foe - exploitation and legalised oppression by the white man for his and his children's luxury... The days when a white man could exploit us at will are gone and gone for ever'. (188)

Within one week of the railway strike ending, a Bulawayo African Workers Trade Union, later renamed the Federation with Savanhu as President, was established, and in quick succession Bulawayo's building trade, bakeries, garages, general stores, chemist shops, milling factories, breweries, and its drivers, messengers, and engineering and foundry workers were all unionised, and affiliated to the Federation. (189) Independent unions also sprang up, and the process was repeated in Salisbury where, among others, the Reformed ICU was resuscitated by Charles Mzingele in June 1946. Frequent mass meetings and demonstrations were held in the main urban 'locations', as strikes and unrest flared up all over the colony, at various times involving Bulawayo municipal workers, Wankie miners, engineering workers, senior school pupils, and labourers in brickworks, construction firms and textile companies, but this militant phase ended with a major organisational split when early in 1947 the African workers Voice Association was founded in Bulawayo by Benjamin Burombo 'for the benefit of the workers'. The Federation, said Burombo, 'concerned itself only with rich men and big business propositions. It is not interested in the common working class'.

For the remainder of 1947, although strikes still erupted especially after meal and meat rations were cut because of drought, organised labour devoted its attention to unsuccessful attempts to heal the breach in its ranks and most of all to waiting on the deliberations of the Labour Board set up to arbitrate between management and labour on the railways. The award, published at the beginning of 1948 and recommending wage minima based on various grades, overtime payment, recognised holidays and better housing, (190) was swiftly rejected by capital elsewhere, and just as quickly seized on by unions as a reference point for their own demands. In February, the Federation and the workers Voice both called for a national Labour Board to consider black wages generally, while in Salisbury, Mzingele, speaking for the RICU, condemned the prevalent attitude of capital 'that the development of this Colony has to be carried out at the expense of the African with no regard to his right as a consumer of any produce he is sweating to produce'.

Unrest and strike action once more intensified, and by early April 1948, in the absence of any significant concessions by capital, Bulawayo workers decided to take matters into their own hands. At gatherings called by unions to counsel delay and caution, crowds 'yelled that they had waited too long and now was the time for action', and shouted down official speakers. On 13 April at a meeting called by the Workers Voice Association, and attended by 'practically every native in Bulawayo', the result was the same: 'native leaders got up in succession and tried to calm the mob. The mob would not listen, but started shouting "Sit down, we are going on strike tomorrow"... the meeting broke up in complete confusion and disorder and the town natives went streaming to their places of residence shouting "Chia, Chia"'.

The next morning, Bulawayo's white residents awoke to the sounds of pickets enforcing the strike throughout the city, from where it spread unevenly to other centres in the colony during the last weeks of April, drawing in most urban workers, even domestic servants, and many miners. Although the state lost little time in mobilising army and police forces, in general it reacted cautiously and no lives were lost. A number of economic concessions were made by the state and capital as a result of the strike, but its real and lasting significance lay in its impact on the consciousness of black and settler alike in symbolising a new era in which the arena and form of working class struggle had been transformed by industrial capitalism.
For much of the first 60 years of colonial Zimbabwe's history, international capital and settler colonialism shared an essential community of interests in the manner in which the black majority was oppressed and exploited. While domestic and international interests fought constantly over the size of their respective shares, invariably on terrain designed and dominated by imperialism, this was never confused with the primary need to co-operate in securing the conditions for the accumulation and reproduction of capital in general. As accumulation was very largely confined to mining and agricultural produce for export, capital's economic imperatives demanded and obtained cheap labour rooted in rural areas economically and politically shaped by the colonial state. The internal face of capital's external orientation was segregation, the exclusion of Africans from the centre of the state.

In the 1940s, the ties between domestic and international interests became more problematic as domestic capital increasingly came to be confined to those sectors in which accumulation was critically dependent on the maintenance of cheap labour structures, and as international capital largely absorbed and rapidly expanded secondary industry in which accumulation had an interest in encouraging the intensification of commodity relations in the African rural areas and in stabilising elements of the urban black working class in widening and deepening the colony's internal market. It was now more difficult to reconcile the needs of domestic capital with those of the increasingly powerful industrial sector, especially as the forms of class struggle associated with industrialisation necessitated changes in the manner of incorporation of the dominated classes. Compromise and conflict over the nature and pace of this incorporation were the very stuff of subsequent political and economic battles, as first different settler political parties and later black nationalists fought for control of the state. Only the struggle and war of the 1970s were to underline the fundamental need to change it.

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September 1980.
1 Rhodesia Herald, 14 Sep. 1898.


3 Rhodesia (British)-South Africa Company was granted a Royal Charter on 29 Oct. 1889 authorising it 'to make treaties and promulgate laws as well as to maintain a police force and undertake public works'; see P. Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London, 1958), p 128.

4 The phrase is Eric Walker's; A History of Southern Africa (London, 1964), p 429.


6 LO 8/3/1, C.J. Rhodes to Duke of Abercorn, 31 Mar. 1890. All file references are held in the National Archives, Zimbabwe.

7 See, for example, Lord Randolph Churchill, Men, Mines and Animals in South Africa (London, 1893), pp 234-6.

8 'At present everything is stagnation. Economy the order of the day in every household...The whole concern has the appearance of (an) enormous bladder unduly inflated and suddenly pricked. One might say that the experts were the people who have pricked it'; H. Miss. BO 11/1/1, Borrow to father, 26 Nov. 1891.

9 Walker, p 426.


11 Galbraith, pp 278-80.


13 Cited in Ranger, Revolt, p 94.

14 B.S.A. Company, Directors Reports and Accounts...31 March 1894.

15 Rhodesia Herald, 30 Mar. 1896.

16 There was considerable speculation in land; by 1899, 9.3 million acres were held by companies. See R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London, 1977), pp 34-8.


18 Rhodesia Herald, 16 Mar. 1894.


21 Ranger, Revolt, p 64.

22 Cobbing, pp 372-62; Galbraith, p 325.

23 Ranger, Revolt, p 77.

24 For discussion of the pattern and organisation of the Risings, see D.N. Beach, 'Chimurenga: the organisation of the Shona rising of 1896-71', unpub. 1978.

25 Rhodesia Herald, 30 Mar. 1898.
54 St James Gazette, 4 Mar. 1903.
55 Hone, p 261.
56 See A1/5/4, Wilson Fox to Milton, 23 Jan. 1903; 1 May 1903;
12 Jun. 1903.
57 A11/2/18/7, Mitchell to B.S.A. Company, 2 Nov. 1903.
59 For further discussion, see Phimister, 'The reconstruction of the
Southern Rhodesian gold mining industry, 1903-10', Economic History Review,
1976, 29, pp 469-474. See also the description in Hone, p 272.
60 Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year ended 31 December
1909, p 1.
62 W.J. Busschau, The Theory of Gold Supply with Special Reference
63 Rhodesia Herald, 2 Dec. 1910.
65 See especially van Onselen, Chibaro, p 103 onwards.
66 Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for the year ended
31 March 1906, p 4; N66/1/19, Compound Inspector, Division I, report for
year ending 31 March 1907. For the use made by the mines of skilled labour,
see Phimister, 'History of mining', pp 111-12, 135-6.
67 For fuller discussion and the evidence on which this paragraph is
based, see van Onselen, Chibaro, chapter 2; and Phimister, 'African Labour
conditions and health in the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry, 1898-1953',
in Phimister and van Onselen, Studies in the History of African Mine Labour
in Colonial Zimbabwe (Gwelo, 1978). The direct quotation comes from
Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines,
1937, p 8.
70 Hone, p 197.
71 Lee, p 25.
72 Ibid., p 82; Report of the Department of Agriculture for the year
ending 31 March 1905, p 1.
73 Rhodesia Herald, 26 Oct. 1906.
74 Palmer, p 91.
75 G. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study
of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', Journal
76 Report of the Secretary for Agriculture for the year ending
31 December 1907, p 1.
78 Lee, p 83.
79 For full discussion, see Palmer, Chapters 3-5.
26 Rhodesia Herald, 23 Feb. 1898.
28 The Financier and Bullionist, 19 Jan. 1903.
29 Lo 4/1/2, Report by the Commissioner of Mines for year ending 31 Mar. 1898.
33 A11/2/18/8, Memorandum on the Unskilled Labour Problem in Southern Rhodesia, 9 Dec. 1901. See also, Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, annual reports for 1896-1900.
35 Phimister, 'History of Mining', p 110.
36 Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, for the year ending 31 Mar. 1901, p 10
37 van Onselen, Chibaro, pp 61-4.
38 Phimister, 'History of Mining', p 90; van Onselen, Chibaro, pp 79-80.
39 B.S.A. Company, Information as to Mining in Rhodesia, 1902, p 172; Financial News, 1 May 1902.
40 Phimister, 'History of Mining', p 110
42 Rhodesian Times, 15 Mar. 1901; cited in van Onselen, Chibaro, p 78.
45 Ibid, pp 65-6. By 'independent' is meant those not directly employed by large companies.
49 Gann, p 208; Hone, p 151.
51 Lee, p 67.
St James Gazette, 4 Mar. 1903.

Hone, p 261.

See A1/5/4, Wilson Fox to Milton, 23 Jan. 1903; 1 May 1903;
12 Jun. 1903.

A11/2/18/7, Mitchell to B.S.A. Company, 2 Nov. 1903.


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1976, 22, pp 469-474. See also the description in Hone, p 272.

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to the Problems of the Witwatersrand (London, 1936), p 38.


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H. Mss 006/1/3, Coghlan to Mrs. E. Boller, 21 Jun, 1921.

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Ibid., p 68.

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See Phimister, 'The structure and development of the Southern Rhodesian base mineral industry, 1907 - Great Depression', Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 1975, 2, pp 82-4; Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 17 Apr, 1931, col 737.

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S1180/4(14), Imperial Economic Committee, Tobacco Enquiry, 9 May 1928, Summary of a Discussion on the Marketing of Southern Rhodesian Tobacco; Clements and Harben, pp98-9.

Clements and Harben, p102.

Ibid., pp 103-4, 114.

Murray, pp70-1.


Zachrisson, p 190; Palmer, p 202.


Palmer, p 145.

See also B.G. Clarke, 'The political economy of discrimination and under-development in Rhodesia with special reference to African workers, 1940-1973', University of St Andrews, unpub. PhD, 1975, p 25: "traditional" social forms are not simply unproductive relics of the past, but have been necessary and integral to the development, maintenance and reproduction of peripheral capitalism. Development has not required the total transformation of the peasantry and indigenous structures. Indeed the system, through the mediation of the state, continues to support such "traditional" structures after recreating them in the desired form.


Phimister, 'History of Mining', pp 125-9, 137-9.


S1193/060, General Manager, Farmers Coop Ltd. to Minister of Agriculture, 24 Feb. 1930.

Murray, p 73.
127 Fhimister, 'Meat and Monopolies', pp 410-11. The direct quotation comes from H. Mss. D01/1/1, Downie to Fletcher, 1 Apr. 1931.

128 Palmer, p 211.

129 Murray, pp 77, 81-2.

130 H. Mss. D01/1/4, Leggate to Downie, 13 Sep. 1933; cited in Gann, p 296.

131 Gann, p 311.

132 See below, p


134 Ibid., p 85.

135 Ibid., p 86.


137 This and the next paragraph are based on Murray, pp 131-6; Fhimister, 'History of Mining', pp 152-3, 157-8.

138 Murray, p 135.


140 On this latter issue, see Gann and Gelfand, p 101.


142 Africans theoretically gained from bounties, too, but in practice were excluded since throughout the '30s there was no system for weighing and grading their stock. See C. Keyter, 'Beef control in Southern Rhodesia, 1931-1938, and its significance to African rural underdevelopment', unpub. 1978, p 13.

143 This account of the Cattle Levy Acts, including the direct quotations, is based on Keyter, 'Beef control in Southern Rhodesia'.


145 Keyter, Maize Control, p 20.

146 S1542/42, Native Commissioner, Ft Nixon, to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 29 Jul. 1934; ibid, Report by the Native Commissioner, Umtali, in Chief Native Commissioner to Minister of Native Affairs, 7 Feb. 1935; both cited in Keyter, Maize Control, p 20.

147 Keyter, Maize Control, p 25.

148 Ibid., p 22.

149 S1215/1090/246, 'Maize Growers Conference', Salisbury, 8 Sep. 1936. See also S987/2, 'Memorandum on Maize Control', by E.R. Jacklin, Chairman, Maize Control Board, Oct. 1942.

150 Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner, 1937, 1938; cited in Keyter, Maize Control, p 22.
Barber, p 146.


Report...into Protection of Secondary Industries, pp 21, 23.


Gann and Gelfand, p 178.

For details, see Gray, pp 210-219; Clarke, 'The underdevelopment of African trade unions in Rhodesia: an assessment of working-class action in historical perspective', unpub. 1974, p 10.

Cited in Gray, p 319

Unless otherwise stated, this section on the General Strike is drawn from phimister, 'Class struggle and industrialisation in Zimbabwe: the 1948 General Strike' (in preparation).
