THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND BRITISH EXPANSION TO THE ZAMBEZI,
1835-95

by: P. R. Warhurst

ROBINSON AND GALLAGHER, in their seminal work Africa and the Victorians, detect a
certain ambivalence in British policy towards the interior of southern Africa.
Describing the 'ambivalent attitude to the Transvaal' shown by Colonial Secretary
Knutsford as 'typical of British policy from 1880 to 1895', they write:

He feared, on the one hand, to strain relations with
the republic too far, lest he provoke Boer anti-
imperialism and Anglo-Dutch strife throughout South
Africa. On the other hand, he felt bound to limit
the republic's occupation of the interior, in order
to protect colonial interests and uphold imperial
influence.

Though stressing the reluctant imperialism of the British Government, they never­
theless accept that containment of the Transvaal became the goal of the Colonial
Office once the Boer republic was perceived as a threat to British hegemony. The
purpose of this article is to examine attitudes and policies within the Colonial
Office, relations between the Colonial and Foreign Offices, and the part played
by the High Commissioners for South Africa in British expansion into the area
between the Limpopo and the Zambezi. This throws some new light on Colonial
Office policy and helps to elucidate the question, 'How reluctant was Britain's
"reluctant imperialism"?'

The Colonial Office had first considered expansion into the interior in
1878 when the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, proposed the creation of a
protectorate as far as Lake Ngami in the north, and from the Transvaal to the
Atlantic. However, when the Gladstone Ministry came to power they renounced
expansionist ambitions and in 1881 retroceded the Transvaal to the Boers. In
the following year the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, described Bechuanaland
as 'of no value to us'. Yet in 1885 a British protectorate was proclaimed
over the territory as far as 22° (thus dividing Kgama's Ngwato state). This
step was only taken by HMS, with Cape support, in order to preempt Boer and
German action. As Bramston minuted in the Colonial Office:

the 22nd parallel was chosen with a view to preventing
the extension of German influence from Angra Pequena to
the Transvaal, which by the junction of these two
peoples North of Bechuanaland might have shut in British
trade by a strip of foreign territory coming in between
the Portuguese and Kgama's country.
In defence of British interests the Imperial Government was prepared to take territory in southern Africa, but only as a last resort. 'We have done a stupendous thing in going as far as latitude 22', Fairfield minuted to Bramston, 'and had better stop there unless we retire altogether...'

After the acquisition of Bechuanaland the Colonial Office set its face against further adventures and the Foreign Office concurred. In 1885, in answer to an enquiry, the Portuguese Government was officially informed that HMG did not contemplate any extension of the Protectorate into Matabeleland. And when General Warren, who had expelled the Boers from Bechuanaland, pressed for the extension of the Protectorate from 22° to the Zambezi, his plea was rejected, both on general grounds and because it would involve Britain with the Ndebele state to the north-east. Warren had also proposed that the high commissionership be separated from the governorship of the Cape but Fairfield opposed the idea in a tirade which excoriated imperial policy in South Africa:

All the mischief and misery nearly that has been inflicted on the Natives in South Africa has been inflicted by Imperial Officers. It was Sir B. Frere who made the Zulu War contrary to the opinion of Sir H. Bulwer and the Natal officials.

As Fairfield waxed more eloquent, his history became more tendentious. He claimed that Frere had forced the 'Basuto quarrel' on the Cape, that British officers had renewed the war against Sekhukhune and that Lanyon and Warren had always been at war in Griqualand. Fairfield drew a general conclusion:

Once we get Natives under the management of the much abused Cape Colonists, and leave the Cape Colonists alone, everything goes right. They understand Native management much better than we do.

His seniors in the Colonial Office did not challenge the argument and Sir Robert Herbert, the Paymaster Under Secretary, observed: 'Admitting the force of much in Mr. Fairfield's preceding minute...'

There is no indication here of pride in any imperial mission and it is against this background that the policy pursued by the Colonial Office for more than two years is to be understood. For not only was the Colonial Office resolutely opposed to expansion, it went even further: Matabeleland and Mashonaland were seen as Lebog mara for the Transvaal. Even Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner who, after initial reluctance, had become an advocate of imperial expansion into northern Bechuanaland, was well disposed to a parallel Boer expansion into Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The idea was to kill Boer hostility with kindness. This was the attitude of Sir Theophilus Shepstone in Natal. When rumours of a northward Boer trek reached him in 1885, he cautioned against interference, 'as it furnishes a safety-valve to the hatred of everything English that is so strong in the mind of the Boer'. Fairfield made a similar observation on another report of a possible Boer trek:

If the Pears continue to breed at the prodigious rate they do, and as long as they incline to their present secluded and pastoral life, we must expect them to spread, and we should only be incurring needless trouble in trying to prevent them.

No thought was given to the interests of the indigenous people of the areas into which such treks would be made.
The policy of leaving the far interior to the Transvaal was endorsed at the highest level. On 14 May 1885 Derby minuted: 'I do not see why the Boers should not extend themselves to the north if they can. They will not interfere with us there.' In the following month the first Salisbury ministry took office and continued the policy. Fairfield's minute on the impossibility of curbing Boer trekking proclivities, quoted above, went on to suggest: '...we had better let them have an outlet in Matabele land and Mashuna Land - although ... I do not think that their incursion into the two territories named is at all probable.' He was writing in February 1886, the month in which Salisbury's Cabinet was ousted and Granville, the new Secretary of State, added: 'Mr. Fairfield's view is generally that of the late Government.'

Britain did not positively encourage the Boers to expand northwards but the Colonial Office removed two obstacles to any such move. The first was a technicality. The northern boundary of the Protectorate was 22° S. which, it was later realized, ran north of the Limpopo thus inadvertently cutting off the Transvaal from the interior. The error was corrected in 1887 on the orders of Colonial Secretary Holland who minuted that he was anxious to keep on good terms with the South African Republic. Another apparent barrier to Boer expansion was removed only to be raised against them later. The London Convention had said nothing about the right of the Transvaal to go north but as expansion to the east and west was explicitly forbidden, the clear implication was that the north lay open. Moreover there was a vague recollection at the Colonial Office that the Boer delegates had received assurances to that effect. Subsequently Robinson was able to add his personal testimony: 'I was myself present when Lord Derby informed Messieurs Kruger, Du Toit, and Smit that the door to the north would not be closed to them by the Convention.' When Holland ordered the amendment of the boundary line of 22° S, he stated that Kruger should be informed in substance 'that there is no desire on the part of HM Government to hem in the South African Republic in the North...', and this was made clear to Kruger by the High Commissioner. In the correspondence, however, no reference was made to the London Convention which was to remain a King Charles' Head.

If the Colonial Office was prepared to let the Boers have Matabeleland/Mashonaland, opposition was hardening towards the Portuguese who claimed the whole of south central Africa. In 1885, while noting the vagueness of these claims, the Colonial Office had agreed to a Foreign Office intimation to Portugal that Britain did not envisage a protectorate over Matabeleland, but by the following year attitudes had changed. In April 1886 the Portuguese Minister in London, Antas, disclosed his country's intention of conquering the Ndebele, adding that the assent of Britain was considered necessary for the successful issue of the enterprise. This assent was not forthcoming. The Colonial Office was strongly opposed and the imperialistic Hemming minuted: 'Portugal would be worse than Germany to have between us and the Zambesi... The arguments in favour of the extension of the British Protectorate to the Zambesi are accumulating rapidly.' Herbert referred to 'the numerous suggestions which have been made to them [RWC] in favour of a protectorate of Matabeleland'.

Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office did not take a strong line against Portugal but his successor as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, was to develop a strong dislike of the Portuguese. He was concerned to maintain British supremacy in southern Africa and reacted sharply to treaties which Portugal had made secretly with France and Germany in 1886. The treaties endorsed Portugal's claims to a huge belt of territory between Mozambique and Angola, and when they became known Britain protested against 'this gigantic act of landgrabbing'. Public opinion was also a factor. Lister of the Foreign
Officet referred to 'the strong feeling in this country against Portuguese extension in Africa'.
The agitation of the Scots Kirk over Nyasaland is well-known but the Archbishop of Canterbury also expressed concern and had to be reassured.

The desire to keep Portugal at bay was one issue over which both Colonial Office and Foreign Office could agree. Matabeleland and Mashonaland were to be reserved for South African enterprise and not, despite the pressures, for any imperial presence. The British Government was so little interested in moving into the area that even though a Boer trek was reported imminent, Lobengula, King of the Ndebele, was refused the modest gift of a Bengal Tiger skin, which he had requested.

Pressures for imperial expansion began to mount. The Cape Colony was enthusiastic - provided she did not have to share the cost and increasingly Britain was to look to the Cape as a counterpoise to the growing power of the Transvaal. Another enthusiast for imperial expansion was the Revd John Mackenzie whose aim was to preempt any Cape enterprise and safeguard African interests through direct imperial rule. But the most sustained pressure came from the High Commissioner. At this stage Robinson's interest was not in Matabeleland/Mashonaland but rather in pushing Britain rapidly to the Zambezi, which could be achieved by adding to the Bechuanaland Protectorate the balance of the territory claimed by Kgama. As has been seen, such a forward policy was not welcome to the Colonial Office. Although Robinson's 1885 proposal was submitted to cabinet, no decision eventuated. Kgama's territorial claims were disputed by Lobengula, whose counterclaim covered the whole of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Britain had no desire to become embroiled in this local dispute. Moreover Salisbury was concerned lest a takeover of northern Bechuanaland lead to a clash with the Germans who were expanding in the direction of Lake Ngami.

Robinson appeared to have reached a dead end, but his campaign was given fresh impetus by the Portuguese initiative of April 1886. Their proposal for a protectorate over Matabeleland was referred to the High Commissioner while he was in London, and he suggested that a British mission should go to Lobengula as a counter to possible Portuguese intrigue with the Ndebele king who had been alienated by the British takeover of Bechuanaland. Granville, the Colonial Secretary, asked Robinson for an exposition of his views on expansion to the Zambezi. The result was a detailed memorandum in which Robinson pointed out that Kgama had offered to place northern Bechuanaland under Britain. He adduced the need to protect Cape/British trade in the interior, the strength of Cape feeling, and alleged German designs on the area as sufficient warranty for Britain to take up Kgama's offer. Robinson discussed his memorandum with Granville and Herbert and they agreed to submit the matter to cabinet once again. Granville was in favour of the scheme but cabinet had taken no decision by the time the Gladstone Government fell in July 1886. Robinson tried again in the October only to meet with the same old objections: '...it would be a terribly heavy burden for this country to manage a protectorate far inland' (Herbert); 'An extension of protectorate [sic] to the Zambesi would be a formidable undertaking' (Derby).

If there was still a marked reluctance to acquire northern Bechuanaland, Boer activity in 1887 further east, in Matabeleland/Mashonaland, was to produce
a concatenation of events which eventually took Britain to the Zambezi in fulfilment of Robinson's dreams. A Boer trek into Mashonaland had been forecast for mid-1887. (trek rumours were becoming a hardy annual) and Herbert minuted: 'It is perhaps the richest part of South Africa.' In view of a report that Lobengula was planning to move north of the Zambezi, Herbert did not anticipate opposition, '...and the Boers will get a country which ought on every ground to be British.' One week later the Foreign Office forwarded to the Colonial Office a letter from Sir Donald Currie urging British expansion in Tongaland, on the east coast, and retailing information that the Portuguese were about to use a German company to exploit their claims in Matabeleland/Mashonaland. Salisbury had endorsed it as deserving 'careful consideration' but the Colonial Office was interested only in the Tongaland aspect and ignored the reference to Matabeleland/Mashonaland. The Colonial Office made one concession: it finally approved the appointment of an assistant commissioner to liaise with Lobengula and accepted Robinson's choice, John Smith Moffat. This was a limited step but one that was to have important consequences, particularly as Moffat had been a missionary in Ndebele country and knew Lobengula well. Further than this the Colonial Office was not prepared to go: 'The question of Tongaland, for one, takes precedence,' wrote Herbert and Colonial Secretary Holland supported his permanent under-secretary.

Robinson himself was still concerned only with northern Bechuanaland. Herbert reported that the High Commissioner: concurs in what has been the opinion of this Department, that it is not expedient to carry our Protectorate along the whole of the North of the Transvaal so as to impede the Boers from passing into and (if they like and can) acquiring the Matabele country...

Holland added:

I am decidedly against extending Protectorate further in any direction than is absolutely necessary and certainly not to the Northward of the South African Republic.

When Portugal's treaties with France and Germany were forwarded by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office was not unduly alarmed. Even the imperialist Hemming wrote: 'As we are not likely to desire to extend our Protectorate there [Matabeleland] it is hardly worthwhile to say anything about it. If the Boers find themselves in a position to overrun Matabeleland they are not likely to pay much attention to the shadowy claims of Portugal.' Robinson did not give up. On 13 July 1887, possibly angered at not receiving any response to his memorandum of May 1886, he wrote to the Secretary of State rehearsing his arguments for an extension of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 'Shade of Sir Bartle Frere!' burst out Meade. On 10 August the Colonial Secretary made it clear to Robinson that Britain was not going to extend the Protectorate. The Colonial Office was annoyed that the High Commissioner had approved a message from Sidney Shippard, the Deputy High Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, to Lobengula informing him of a projected Boer trek. When Shippard wrote an even more undiplomatic letter to Lobengula warning him against the Boers and the Germans ('the most dangerous of all'), the Colonial Office took immediate action and fortunately for its peace of mind the countermanding order caught up with Moffat before he could convey Shippard's warning to Lobengula. The Colonial Office refused to be drawn by scare rumours: 'They are all rubbish,' minuted the cynical Fairfield
on one such report of a threatened rush of gold-seekers. Robinson's persistent agitation had failed utterly. Even when the Transvaal representative, Piet Grobler, made a treaty of friendship with Lobengula in July 1887, Herbert minuted, quite categorically: 'Having decided not to protect Lobengula ourselves, we cannot effectively protest against the Transvaal doing so. "The expansion of the Transvaal" is the feature of the South Africa of today."

Thus by late 1887 Britain's intentions seemed clear: opposition to Portuguese claims without any design of going in herself. Yet in the same month as Herbert's strong minute the first touch of doubt appeared. The Portuguese Government had proposed the creation of British and Portuguese spheres of influence, and once again Hemming wrote: 'We have, I believe, no intention of extending our Protectorate over Matabeleland, and we have recently heard that the Transvaal Government intend to occupy it.' But this time Bramston replied: 'We must try and give some reply which will not shut us out of Matabeleland for ever.' Holland therefore replied to the Foreign Office advising against a settlement with Portugal and it was Salisbury who kept the door ajar for further negotiation. The Foreign Office, however, reacted more strongly to news of the Grobler Treaty than did the Colonial Office which was inclined to accept: (Hemming wrote resignedly: 'There can be little doubt that annexation to the Transvaal is the ultimate fate of Matabeleland, whether it has been already accomplished or not.') At the Foreign Office Sir Percy Anderson, head of the Africa Department, minuted: 'It is very serious if it is true that the South African Republic has obtained a protectorate over the whole of Matabeleland, including the gold fields.' Salisbury added that the treaty was invalid in terms of the London Convention which forbade the Transvaal from making treaties with other nations without British permission. The Boers could make treaties with "chiefs" of "tribes" but, argued Salisbury, Lobengula was a king and "the king of a "land" is clearly not the chief of a tribe."

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The legal assistant at the Foreign Office, W.E. Davidson, concurred in this sophistry but there was no essential difference in respect of national status between Lobengula's polity and, for instance, Kgama's, as Herbert at the Colonial Office was well aware: 'We could not deny that in negotiating that convention we meant by "nation" civilised white nations, as Portugal or Germany, and by "tribes" the coloured African inhabitants of the territories adjacent to the Transvaal.' Holland, now Lord Knutsford, endorsed Herbert's view and tried unavailingly to influence Salisbury in the same direction.

Although Salisbury wished to exclude the Transvaal, he proposed no positive British initiative. Neither did the Colonial Office which was disinclined to any forward move and held the High Commissioner's enthusiasm in check. It was from Rhodes that the action came. Rhodes' motivation, long accepted as idealistic dedication to the British Empire, has recently been called in question. It is now suggested that Rhodes used imperialism in the interests of his private fortune and specifically that the venture into Rhodesia was a by-product of his financial involvement in the Rand. Rhodes' motives are not central to this discussion, but the following should be noted: in 1878, eight years before the Rand, Rhodes had discussed his plans for Central Africa with Sidney Shippard at Oxford; in 1885 he wrote: 'My main object in the whole question of Bechuanaland has been to retain the interior and shut the Transvaal in'; and Shippard was being admonished to work towards the annexation of Matabeleland as early as January 1886 before the Rand was discovered.
Whatever his reasons, Rhodes was not only to provide the financial backing for penetration into the interior but was himself the prime mover. As soon as he heard of the Grobler Treaty Rhodes wangled the High Commissioner out of a Christmas party and persuaded him to take countermeasures. Robinson needed little persuasion, especially as he had been converted to a colonial brand of imperialism. He did, however, express doubts about the possibility of imperial support. The sole fruit of Robinson's previous efforts had been the appointment of Moffat as Assistant Commissioner and his despair at not being able to achieve more emerges from advice that he had conveyed to Moffat via Shippard when Moffat was sent to Lobengula in September 1887. Shippard wrote:

My principal object in writing to you is to inform you that owing to recent despatches from the Colonial Office and the present attitude of HMG with regard to South Africa His Excellency the High Commissioner is extremely anxious that you should not force the pace with Lo Bengula... discourage any appeal for Protection as much as possible... Sir H.R. plainly that in the present temper of the Cabinet a request from Lo Bengula for a Protectorate would be completely thrown away - positively and finally declined.

The Grobler Treaty and Rhodes' intervention strengthened Robinson's resolve and he now enjoined Moffat to take appropriate action. The result was the Moffat Treaty of February 1888 which gave Britain virtual control over Lobengula's foreign affairs. The Colonial Office was taken by surprise. Although faced with a fait accompli, it could nevertheless have disallowed the treaty. Indeed Fairfield recommended disallowance in order to avoid what he called the humiliations and rebuffs ending in final retreat that Britain had experienced in West Africa. A final decision was postponed until the matter had been referred back to Robinson and only when he confirmed his authorization was the treaty ratified.

The Moffat Treaty was an important step forward for Britain. Though acknowledged with reluctance it did commit Britain to some kind of presence in the area, however vague. Claire Palley argues that in strict law the treaty ipso facto made Lobengula's domains a British protectorate, but the British Government was not aware of such an interpretation at the time. Lobengula himself must have imagined that he had done no more than allow Britain a monopoly in his relations with Whites. Lobengula's domains were held to include Mashonaland though his claim to a large part of that area was tenuous as HMG well knew. Both the Transvaal and Portugal were alarmed by the Moffat Treaty. Kruger protested but the treaty had obliged the Colonial Office to go over completely to the Foreign Office line, and Knutsford informed the Cabinet: 'I propose... to treat this question/Transvaal rights in the north as no longer open to discussion.' Portugal's reaction was to suspend diplomacy in favour of treaty-making expeditions which led to a worsening in Anglo-Portuguese relations and a hardening of Salisbury's attitude. This in turn made for a more forward British policy. The Moffat Treaty had given Britain a special position in Lobengula's kingdom and the Colonial Office desired nothing more, yet by the following year it had allowed Rhodes to charter his company and in 1890 he was to occupy Mashonaland under imperial auspices. Within less than two years the Colonial Office executed a complete volte-face.

Mashonaland had been kept open for British enterprise through the efforts of Lord Salisbury and he now began to put pressure on the Colonial Office to consolidate the British position. On 20 June and 13 July 1888 Robinson advocated
the proclamation of Matabeleland/Mashonaland as a British sphere of influence—a logical follow-up to the Moffat Treaty. On both occasions the Colonial Office refused and only agreed to the announcement of the sphere because the Foreign Office saw it as a useful device to head off the Portuguese explorers in Mashonaland. 'Is not this precisely such an opportunity as we wish for?' minuted Anderson at the Foreign Office. The sphere of influence was duly notified to the South African Republic. The area was now clearly, if not uncontestedly, British but the imperial government had no intention of occupying southern Zambesia. Once again it was Rhodes who provided the muscle, through his British South Africa Company, and he was favoured by HMG as the key man in the most immediate problem in South Africa, English-Afrikaner relations. A recent study by Stevenson stresses the symbiotic nature of the Rhodes-Whitehall partnership and from an unknown Cape M.P., Rhodes progressed rapidly to the recipient of a royal charter for his company. Not that the Colonial Office lacked alternatives to Rhodes: apart from rival financial interests like Gifford's, the Revd John Mackenzie was back in action pleading for a direct imperial administration, but his schemes would have cost money and Rhodes was therefore preferred on grounds of economy. The British South Africa Company was granted a charter on 29 October 1889 in order to save HMG from being dragged into troubles that might otherwise develop in the sphere of influence; to provide Salisbury with effective occupation as a counter to the Portuguese claims; and to strengthen the overall British position in South Africa. The attraction for the British Government was that a charter would ensure the realization of these aims without recourse to the taxpayer.

With the sphere proclaimed, the B.S.A.C. chartered, and Salisbury sustaining his belief that the Transvaal was forbidden by the London Convention to expand northwards, it seemed as if the area was now definitely British. But the Portuguese still refused to accept British claims in Mashonaland. Angered by Portugal's attitude over the Slave War in Nyasaland, Salisbury was determined not to give way and his contempt for the Portuguese grew. Sidney Webb at the Colonial Office had minuted: 'Lord Salisbury has been, for some time, cross with our ancient ally.' By December 1889 Salisbury was so 'cross' that he was all for turning the Ndebele imps onto the Portuguese. This emerges from an exchange of minutes between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office that has hitherto escaped notice coming at the time of Salisbury's Ultimatum against Portugal in January 1890. Lobengula had reported a Portuguese inroad into his territory and requested advice. The Colonial Secretary did not want Lobengula to attack the Portuguese but Salisbury considered this approach 'hardly forcible enough'. Instead Salisbury proposed: "Tell Lobengula that HMG would be glad to see him assert his rights...". Knutsford stood his ground. Salisbury's phrasing, he complained, would be taken as a direct instigation to Lo Bengula to attack the Portuguese. As a compromise Lobengula was to be told, 'he may properly assert his right to his own territory', and even that was unusual advice to an African ruler on the part of one European power against another. Shortly afterwards the Ultimatum, largely precipitated by events in Nyasaland, drove the Portuguese out of Mashonaland and they were never allowed to return. In July 1890 Germany endorsed Britain's claims in the interior.

There remained the thorny question of Transvaal claims to its hinterland. On 31 January 1889, at the behest of the belligerent Salisbury, Knutsford instructed the High Commissioner to inform Kruger that the Transvaal had been enclosed, not by the Moffat Treaty, but by the London Convention of 1884. As the Colonial Office had previously been prepared to admit, this was quite untrue. The Boers had now not only lost the north but were left with the bitter impression that Einkreisung had been Britain's aim all along. The Transvaal turned her exclusion from the interior to advantage by using it as a bargaining counter in discussions with the British Government. On 4 May 1889 the Acting High
Commissioner cabled that Kruger had proposed a Transvaal withdrawal from any
commitment in the north in exchange for Swaziland and Kosi Bay in Tongaland. At the
Colonial Office Graham considered that Kruger was bluffing and to call his bluff he was informed that 'until there is full assurance that the movement
/the Bowler Trek/ will be prevented by the South African Republic, it is utterly
useless to propose to Parliament any concessions in Swaziland or Amatongaland'.
In March 1890 Kruger met Sir Henry Loch, the new High Commissioner, and Rhodes
at Blignaut's Pont. The President threatened to revive his treaty with the
Ndebele and claimed that Lobengula was playing off the British and the Boers
one against the other. But just as Lobengula had switched to the British through
the Moffat Treaty, Kruger was prepared to abandon Lobengula adding, 'in case it
should be necessary to resort to arms in Matabeleland I could offer inducements
to any burghers to go in and help Mr. Rhodes if he wants them'. Agreement
was reached (First Swaziland Convention) in terms of which Kruger restrained
the projected trek and the way was clear for Rhodes to occupy Mashonaland.

Colonial Office reluctance to expand had been finally defeated by Rhodes,
Robinson and Salisbury, and in 1890 the Chartered Company occupied Mashonaland
with the enthusiastic support of Kgama. But there is an epilogue of no small
significance. The Whites in Mashonaland existed in what was in effect a legal
vacuum. This had emerged when Sir Arthur Havelock, British commissioner on
the Brussels Commission, called at the Colonial Office: 'He says that he was
told most distinctly that he was not authorized to make any engagement on behalf
of the Company or of Lobengula,' reported Anderson, 'that the Co. had no
territory, and that Lobengula is an independent chief.' Havelock was
under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office was
politely told to mind its own business but there remained the legal problem.

Under section 10 of the Charter, the British South Africa Company enjoyed
only such rights as were granted by the indigenous authority, which was taken to
be Lobengula. The High Commissioner, in referring a draft ordinance for the
Company administration prepared by Shippard, to Schreiner, the Cape Attorney-
General, commented: '...the Chartered Company will have no power of legislation
until they obtain some cession or authority from Lobengula.' Schreiner
concurred. Loch told Shippard:

I gather that the present is not a favourable time for
making such a proposal to the King... I can communi-
cate with Mr. Rhodes as to the form of request to be
made to Lobengula should a favourable opportunity occur.

Since Lobengula had no intention of delegating his authority, the legal vacuum
remained and could only be remedied by an official protectorate. The pro-
tectorate issue has been examined in its legal aspect by Johnston and Claire Palley,
and comparatively, by Johnston and Newbury. The intention here is to set the protectorate in the context of British policy as we have
seen it develop.

At this stage nobody was clear about the legal position. In December
1889 the Foreign Office had actually used the term 'British protectorate' in a
draft despatch, instead of 'sphere of influence'. The Colonial Office pointed out that 'strictly speaking', there was no protectorate over Matabeleland/Mashonaland, but two months later the Colonial Office itself referred to 'the Queen's Protectorate'. In South Africa Robinson's policy of expansion was continued by his successor though Loch was an advocate of direct imperial rule, as against colonial. In March Loch proposed that the existing protectorate - the Bechuanaland Protectorate - be annexed outright. Although this was rejected by Knutsford, on the grounds that it was reserved for the British South Africa Company and that such action would be a provocation to Lobengula, Loch tried again in May. He succeeded in getting the Protectorate extended to the Zambezi ('west ... of Matabeleland; east of the German Protectorate'), thus consummating the idea Robinson had fought so hard to achieve. The Colonial Office was also beginning to realize the inadequacy of the sphere of influence over Matabeleland/Mashonaland. Worms admitted in Parliament that the term was vague and he was unable to define it. Within the Colonial Office he minuted: 'The rights we claim under it are wilfully ignored by the other Powers notably by Portugal'. But when, after the Occupation, Loch proposed the annexation of Mashonaland - lest it should 'become an Alsatia' - he was turned down. He tried again in December 1890 but once more annexation was ruled out. Fairfield minuted that it would be difficult to 'dis-annex' and cited the Gambia in 1870 and Heligoland. The British South Africa Company might go bankrupt and, he added prophetically, 'Mashonaland is not likely to prove an eldorado'. As Loch was due in London, the matter was held over. On his arrival in February, he suggested a grand scheme for imperial annexation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and was duly shown Fairfield's minute. Unabashed, Loch set out his scheme in a letter to Knutsford, only to be crossed again by Fairfield who raised the spectre of the Company provoking a war with Lobengula which would cost the British taxpayer more than the Gordon relief expedition. It was Knutsford and Bramston who solved the impasse. They discussed whether 'protection', involving 'a limited quasi sovereignty' to control foreign nationals, would suffice and the upshot was Bramston's famous memorandum on protectorates. This led to the formulation of an Order in Council which was still under discussion in April when an impending Boer trek precipitated action. Knutsford advocated the declaration of a protectorate without which the British could not take action against the trekkers. On the other hand the permanent officials were still reluctant and Loch was instructed to tell Kruger that the 'territory of Lobengula our ally is under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen'. This was the form of words used in the Order in Council of 9 May 1891 and Knutsford squared the circle by explaining: 'We can afterwards contend that "under the protectorate" = /sic/ Protectorate, or, if a difficulty is actually likely to arise, declare a Protectorate'. The protectorate was never actually declared.

This coyness on the part of the Colonial Office arose out of the opposition to any accretion of British power on the part of the people onto whom protection was thrust. Speaking in Parliament in 1889 Worms had implied that any protectorate must depend on a request from Lobengula for British protection. Such scruples, however, faded when wider British interests were involved. In 1890, for instance, Herbert wrote that H.M.G. did not intend to allow Boers, Germans or Portuguese into the Bechuanaland Protectorate: 'whether Khama agrees with us or not; he must acquiesce in our protection.' If this was the attitude towards a cooperative ally like Kgama, how much less was the Colonial Office likely to respect the Ndebele monarch of whom the High Commissioner wrote: 'There is no probability of Lobengula granting any cession of jurisdiction.' The Secretary of State stressed to the High Commissioner: 'It is of great importance that Lo Bengula's consent should, if possible, be obtained.' The operative phrase was 'if possible' and as he knew that Lobengula had no intention
of conceding further sovereignty, Loch counselled against informing him of the assumption of jurisdiction. The Director of Military Intelligence had no illusions. Referring to the threatened Boer/British clash he opined that the Matabele would join in but, he candidly admitted: 'It appears to be a toss-up which side they would take.' Faced with this clearcut opposition the Colonial Office was forced back onto a legalistic argument: Lobengula was said to have agreed 'on sufferance' to 'our governing and punishing' Whites in Mashonaland and on this flimsy basis he was brought under British protection.

Southern Rhodesia was now fully a British territory, thanks to Rhodes, the High Commissioners and Salisbury, and despite Colonial Office reluctance. Local initiatives - by Lobengula, the Boers, Kgama and Rhodes and his associates - had created the situation, aided by diplomatic activity involving Portugal's interests in south east Africa. Far from wishing to hem in the Boers the Colonial Office had been prepared to let them have Southern Rhodesia, but once Rhodes had propelled Britain in, the Colonial Office changed its attitude. Nevertheless it remained cautious and as late as December 1891 tentatively suggested that the British South Africa Company might offer southern Mashonaland to the Transvaal in order to mollify the Boers. (If this idea reached Rhodes, his comments are not recorded.) Yet on the surface it seemed to the Boers not only that they had lost the north but that Einkreisung had been the British intention all along, and their consequent bitterness contributed to the decline in Anglo-Boer relations. A close examination of the Colonial Office files endorses the view of Robinson and Gallagher that 'the danger of provoking Afrikaner nationalism ... inhibited the Colonial Office from interfering directly'. Indeed it reveals a significantly more conciliatory approach on the part of the Colonial Office than has previously been suspected, an approach that was enforced on the High Commissioners. Salisbury at the Foreign Office, however, was uncompromising over the issue of Boer expansion northwards. The clash between the Colonial and Foreign Offices was an unequal struggle with Salisbury both Prime Minister and a more powerful adversary than successive Colonial Secretaries. Once Rhodes entered the lists the more aggressive Foreign Office line came to prevail and the Colonial Office, not without misgiving, turned to support for Rhodes and the Cape interest.

Footnotes

3 Robinson & Gallagher, 203.
5 /Public Record Office/, Colonial Office 417/5/10789, minute by Bramston, 20 June 1885.
6 Ibid., 19 June 1885. On Fairfield as a 'Little Englander', see A. Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate* (Hague, 1975), 46.
8 C.O.417/6/13253, Fairfield to Bramston, 28 July 1885. See also Sillery, 81.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 29 July 1885. (In 1888 when the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society attacked the Cape, the Colonial Office sprang to the defence of the Cape's 'remarkable success in promoting the welfare and prosperity of the Natives within the Colony'. C.O.417/26/20176.)
12 C.O.417/10/7295, H.C. to Sec.State, 6 April 1886.
14 C.O.417/12/2999, Fairfield to Bramston, 23 Feb. 1886.
15 C.O.417/8/8597.
16 C.O.417/12/2999, Fairfield to Bramston, 23 Feb. 1886.
17 Ibid., minute by Granville, 3 March 1886.
18 C.O.417/12/2999, Fairfield to Bramston, 23 Feb. 1886 and 9/18849.
19 C.O.417/16/23252. See also C.O.417/10/7295.
20 C.O.417/15/14957, minute by Holland, 1 Aug. 1887.
21 C.O.417/5/9382, minutes by Hemming, Bramston and Herbert.
23 C.O.417/15/14957.
24 C.O.417/16/23252, H.C. to Sec. State, 26 Oct. 1887.
26 /Public Record Office/, Foreign Office 84/1765/Afr.32, Sec. State to Petre, 22 April 1886. The Portuguese plan is referred to in A.J. Hanna, *The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia* (Oxford, 1956), 127. Hanna adds: 'We hear no more of it, so probably it was quietly killed and buried by the Colonial Office.' In fact a copy of the
despatch was sent to the Colonial Office where it was filed under Natal (C.O.179/166/7162) and shown to Robinson when he called at the Colonial Office in May 1886.

27 C.O.179/166/7162, minute of 22 April 1886. (Sillery drew attention (p.95) to Hemming as the one consistent imperialist at the Colonial Office.)

28 Ibid., minute of 23 April 1886.

29 F.O.84/1844/Afr.88, minute by Lister, 7 July 1887. See also F.O.84/1842/Afr.89.

30 F.O.84/1844/Afr.88, minute of 7 July 1887.

31 F.O.84/1864, Archbishop to Sec. State, 13 June 1887 and F.O.84/1865, Sec. State to Archbishop, 27 June 1887.

32 C.O.417/15/12018, H.C. to Sec. State, 1 June 1887.

33 C.O.417/7/1084; 10/3646; 11/19302; 12/6171, minute by Herbert, 11 April 1886; 25/9325.

34 Robinson & Gallagher, 212 f.

35 Letter to the Times, 20 Dec. 1885. For Mackenzie, see A.J. Dachs (ed.), The Papers of John Mackenzie (Johannesburg, 1975). His ideas were given short shrift by the C.O. Fairfield was later to minute: 'It is important to keep reminding him ... that his local "facts" are all wrong - wilfully wrong I have no doubt.' C.O.417/32/18024, minute of 10 Sep. 1889.

36 C.O.417/5/10789.

37 C.O.417/11/19302, minute by Herbert, 2 Dec. 1886.


39 C.O.417/12/6171.

40 C.O.179/166/7162, minute of 6 May 1886.

41 C.O.417/15/15389, H.C. to Sec. State, 13 July 1887.

42 C.O.417/12/9474, Memo. of 23 May 1886. (This was printed as African South 320.)

43 Ibid., Bramston to Herbert, 1 June 1886.

44 C.O.417/11/19302, minute by Herbert, 2 Dec. 1886; and enclosed within, Memo. by Granville, 24 June 1886.


46 C.O.417/13/2357, minute by Herbert, 12 Jan. 1887.

47 F.O.84/1858, Currie to Salisbury, 5 Feb. 1887.


49 C.O.417/11/19302, minute by Hemming, 13 May 1887. See also C.O.179/166/7162, minute by Robinson, 6 May 1886.

50 C.O.417/11/19302, minutes by Herbert, 20 May 1887, and Holland, 23 May 1887.

51 C.O.417/10/7295, H.C. to Sec. State, 6 April 1886, minutes of 18 May and 19 May 1887.

52 C.O.417/18/13854.

53 Ibid., minute of 18 July 1887.
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54 C.O.417/15/15389. See also 15/19045.
55 Ibid., minute of 6 Aug. 1887.
56 C.O.417/11/19302 (draft) Sec. State to H.C., 10 Aug. 1887.
58 C.O.417/19/4081, H.C. to Sec. State, 8 Feb. 1888.
59 C.O.417/16/22188, minute of 8 Nov. 1887. (It was hardly a question of either Britain or the Transvaal 'protecting' Lobengula; he had sought a Transvaal alliance as a counterweight to the Kgama-Whitehall axis. On Lobengula's diplomacy, see R. Brown, 'Aspects of the Scramble for Matabeleland', in E.T. Stokes & R. Brown (eds), The Zambesian Past (Manchester, 1966).
60 C.O.417/18/23521, Hemmings to Bramston, 22 Nov. 1887.
61 Ibid., minute of 23 Nov. 1887.
62 F.O.84/1875, C.O. to F.O., 2 Dec. 1887.
64 C.O.417/19/4080.
66 Ibid., minute of 10 March and undated minute.
67 Ibid., 19 March.
68 C.O.417/25/6050, minute of 3 April 1888.
69 Ibid., minute of 5 April; enclosed within, Herbert to Fergusson, 12 April, and Fergusson to Herbert, 13 April.
71 Quoted in J.I. Rademeyer, Die Land Noord van die Limpopo in die Ekspansie-Beleid van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek (Cape Town, 1949), 124.
72 National Archives of Rhodesia, Rhodes Papers, RH1/1, f.666, 3 Jan. 1886.
73 Galbraith, 43.
74 National Archives of Rhodesia, Moffat Papers, M01/1/4, f.175.
75 C.O.417/19/5633, H.C. to Sec. State, 29 Feb. 1888.
76 C.O.417/19/6019, minute of 28 March 1888.
77 C.O.417/19/6283.
80 Great Britain, House of Commons, Accounts & Papers, LI, 389 (1890), C.5918/24. See also C.O.417/25/16353 and 29/7743.
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82 C.O.417/21/13999, 14100.


84 F.O.84/1924, C.O. to F.O., 19 July, minute of 20 July.


87 For the winning of the Charter, see Galbraith, chap.4, and Stevenson, chap.1. There was some unavailing pressure by London firms against the Cape interest e.g. C.O.417/26/25051.

88 C.5918/78, 97, 113, 118.

89 C.O.417/37/8773, Exploring Coy to C.O., 30 April 1889, minute by Herbert, 2 May.

90 F.O.84/1924.

91 Robinson & Gallagher, 234-44.

92 On the significance of the Charter, see Galbraith, chap.4.


94 C.O.417/35/24938. See also F.O.84/2072, Fairfield to Currie, 3 Jan. 1890.

95 Robinson & Gallagher, 248-9, 294.


97 C.O.417/31/9092.

98 Rademeyer, 94. (Perhaps it was the threat of this trek that diminished Lobengula's hostility to the British South Africa Company and led the H.C. and HMG to assure his acquiescence in the proposed occupation of Mashonaland.) On the connection between the Swaziland question and the North, see N.G. Garson, 'The Swaziland Question and the Road to the Sea 1889-1895', Archives Year Book for South African History (1957), Part II. According to Stevenson (97-8), HMG offered Swaziland as a bribe to stop the trek.


100 C.O.417/39/2968, H.C. to Sec. State, 16 Feb. 1890. See also 39/2642.

101 C.537/125/528 (secret), H.C. to Sec. State, 19 March 1890.

102 C.O. Confidential Print7 African South 392/23.

103 On the legal vacuum see Palley, 87.


105 Ibid., minute by Salisbury, no date. See also F.O.84/2076, C.O. to F.O., 21 Feb. and F.O. to C.O., 28 Feb.

106 National Archives of Rhodesia, Microfilm 375 (the original is in the National Archives of Botswana, HC 162/1-2), Conf. Minute I.S.M. 'Bechuanaland', 4 Sep. 1890.

107 Ibid., H.C. to Shippard, 11 Sep. 1890.
Ross Johnston, 156-61, chap.7.
Palley, chap.5.
C. Newbury, "Treaty, grant, usage & sufferance": the origins of British colonial protectorates', in G.A. Wood & P.S. O'Connor (eds), W.P. Morrell, A Tribute... (Dunedin, 1975). I am indebted to Professor R.S. Roberts for drawing my attention to this article.
For an early definition of spheres of influence, see F.O.84/2087, f.40-3.
F.O. Confidential Print 5970/12, C.O. to F.O., 10 Jan. 1890; African South 392/33.
C.O.417/40/5491, H.C. to Sec. State, 4 March 1890.
Ibid., minute by Knutsford, 29 April.
Order in Council of 30 June 1890.
Great Britain, H.C. Deb., 334 (26 March 1889), 838.
C.O.417/40/5491, minute of 27 April.
C.O.417/47/16852, H.C. to Sec. State, 20 Nov. 1890. I am indebted to my brother, Mr. E.G. Warhurst, for obtaining this reference.
Ibid., minute of 9 Jan. 1891.
Ibid., Herbert to Fairfield, 4 Feb. 1891.
C.O.417/72/2871, Loch to Knutsford, 6 Feb. 1891.
Ibid., minute by Fairfield.
Ibid., minute by Bramston, 10 Feb.
Palley's discussion of the protectorate issue is very learned but does not make clear that well before the Boer trek the C.O. had decided to acquire rights to sovereignty by an Order in Council.
C.O.417/56/7024 (Johnston cites this as volume 57); 57/7986; F.O.84/2161, C.O. to F.O., 9 Apr.; 2163, C.O. to F.O., 23 Apr. As Kruger stood by the First Swaziland Convention, there was no problem diplomatically.
C.O.417/56/7024, H.C. to Sec. State, 7 Apr. 1891, minute by Knutsford, no date.
C.O.417/57/7847, Sec. State to H.C., 18 April 1891 (my italics).
C.O.417/69/8790, L.O. to C.O., 30 April 1891, minute by Knutsford, 1 May.
Stevenson, 164-9.
Great Britain, H.C. Deb., 333 (11 March 1889), 1402.
C.O.417/43/13242, minute of 11 July.
C.O.417/47/16852, H.C. to Sec. State, 20 Nov. 1890.
C.O.417/57/7847, Sec. State to H.C., 18 April 1891.
C.O.417/57/7986, H.C. to Sec. State, 20 April 1891.
Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/30/27 (secret), "The Boer "Trek" to the North", 3 May 1891.
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139 C.O.417/57/7986 (draft) C.O. to F.O., 23 April and minute by Knutsford, 21 April. See also, Great Britain, H.C. Deb. 354 (12/15 June 1891) 289/405.


141 Stevenson, 141.

142 Just after the Jameson Raid Kruger wrote privately to Robinson to say how bitter he felt against Rhodes, whom he had assisted over the Adendorff Trek, and HMG, which he had likewise helped in 1890. Leyds, 432.

143 Robinson & Gallagher, 213.