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VULNERABLE WORKING HOUSEHOLDS IN
ZIMBABWE'S SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKETS:

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The report that follows is a response to a request for a case study of vulnerable segments of the labour market in Zimbabwe from the SATEP team of the International Labour Office in Lusaka.

We should, perhaps point out at the outset, that we have faced some problems of interpreting the conceptual terms of reference that defined both what the vulnerable segments of the labour market were, and the most appropriate methodology for research that would have concrete policy implications. The terms of reference for the study defined "vulnerable segments" of the labour market as follows:

(i) Relatively unprotected or under-privileged groups associated with large or medium-scale production (e.g. casual wage labour - daily or short-term; "helpers", disguised wage labour such as commission agents or sub-contracted home workers - "the putting out system");

(ii) Domestic service;

(iii) Illegal and underground activities (prostitution, drugs, smuggling, various tax-avoiding activities.)

The spectrum of social groups included in this definition of vulnerable segments, we found too diffuse for a strategic assessment of the contemporary labour market in Zimbabwe, as even within individual groupings, there is absolute, rather than relative impoverishment.

In this respect, we therefore had problems with the methodology proposed in the ILO proposal for the study which asked us to review the different forms of work, discussing how each has arisen, with different production and labour processes and how they have evolved as economic changes and production levels have increased - looking at individual incomes within each group, household incomes. Particular themes were to deal with included:
- stability and reliability of income;
- response of income in each group to recession, to economic growth, to various policy measures;
- lifetime income patterns;
- overall household incomes, where members are scattered across different production activities;
- employment trends in different segments.

With all due respect to the proposers, we are, however, of the opinion that such a methodology would not lead to an objective assessment of the basic causes of the vulnerability of working households in the Zimbabwean social economy and all that would be possible even given the maximum access to data would have been a description of the manifestations and existing at degrees of differentiation. The very definition of these vulnerable segments was noted in assumptions about the historic nature of industrialisation in Zimbabwe; which we felt had to be empirically put to the test, if it was to be at all possible to demonstrate the basic structural causative factors of the vulnerability of working households, rather than individuals.

Difficulties of interpretation have, in particular, arisen on the whole issue of how "work" is to be conceived in Zimbabwe, i.e. arriving at a conception of work that approximates more closely to that of the concrete social actors who find themselves vulnerable to impoverishment. We also felt that more important than beginning with a given set of 'target groups', it was more crucial to determine the issue of absolute vulnerability as opposed to relative vulnerability.

In the study, we therefore attempt to tackle the question from such a structural viewpoint, that will facilitate an understanding of what can be termed as the basic causes of social vulnerability. For, despite the fact that Zimbabwe inherited, at independence a relatively industrialised economy, we are far from convinced that this has meant that that segment of the working population
employed in a more capital intensive manufacturing sector suffers from relative rather than absolute impoverishment.

The focus by the ILO on the "vulnerable segments of the labour market" however, provides a useful entry point into some basic research and policy issues about the origins of surplus value and capitalist accumulation, which are too often neglected in many a development planning exercise.

The study will be structured in the following manner:

I. PROLEGOMENA

A review of the methods and conceptual approaches that can best demonstrate the phenomenon of vulnerability in the Zimbabwean 'labour market' - both actual and potential.

II. THE STATE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION FOR INDUSTRIALISATION - 1945 - 1980

This section will attempt to detail some of the basic historical causes of the 'vulnerability' of Zimbabwe's labour force. Of concern in the section will be a description of the types of settler colonial practices which, not only defined for the purposes of social and labour legislation the degrees of 'vulnerability', but also in a sense generated households that were structurally vulnerable to absolute impoverishment.

III. LOCATING VULNERABLE SEGMENTS WITHIN ZIMBABWE'S POST INDEPENDENCE SOCIAL ECONOMY

This section will review the changes in state practice since independence and explore the extent to which, at the level of the state, there has been a redefinition of vulnerability. Subject to data vulnerability, however, only some indices to impoverishment have been examined.
This will be done heuristically and not through a detailed analysis of the state legislation, but by a description of the social and economic circumstances of the following social groups in the post colonial Zimbabwean political economy;

(a) Unprotected workers (casual/seasonal labour/contract labour), both in the agricultural and industrial sectors - urban/rural locations, including workers in the emerging co-operative sector (mining, agriculture, commerce).

(b) Domestic workers;

(c) Illegal and underground activities;

(d) Squatters.

IV. SOME CONTEMPORARY POLICY QUESTIONS ON ZIMBABWE'S NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMME AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

The final section of the study will analyse some of the structural continuities and discontinuities in state policy on dealing with the vulnerability of working households to impoverishment, such as social welfare provisions and post-subsistence provisions by industry, their effectiveness in reaching different groups and the kinds of improvement that is possible. Particular attention will focus on the recent social programme proposed by the I L O. Close attention will also be devoted to an evaluation of employment strategies thus far adopted by the state in an effort to check the absolute exploitation of labour, i.e. state efforts to encourage the formation of co-operatives in the agricultural, mining, industrial and service sector. To what extent are the working households that are involved in the co-operative sector really protected against vulnerability to impoverishment?
SECTION ONE: PROLEGOMENA : THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS FOR DEMONSTRATING VULNERABILITY IN THE ZIMBABWEAN 'LABOUR MARKET'

"Why should some development economists or the International Labour Office have to convince their fellows, as well as such Capitalist-spirited officials as those who run Kenya of the virtues of what they call the informality be an economic variable? Some economists keep using this vague and euphemistic phrase instead of specifying what kind of economic structures exist in small-scale business, examining the limitations those structures pose for accumulation, and most important - asking why the distinction between formal and informal means so much to policy makers ... The one definition that can actually be used simply accept the criteria of local regulatory agencies: the informal sector is wherever the labour inspector, the buildings inspector and the tax collector do not reach."


"We know only a single science, the science of history. One look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men exist.


Before actually dealing with the historical origins of what we understand as the vulnerable segments of the labour market in contemporary Zimbabwe, which forms the subject of enquiry of the second section of the paper, it would be useful to briefly review some of the more conventional analytical approaches and suggest our own approach.

This is, however, by no means an easy task, given the multiplicity of disciplinary approaches and angles that have been employed. Indeed, at this conjuncture, when the African "crisis" has become topical at all sorts of fora, the task is made more difficult by the very extent to which social science discourrage employs metaphor, authority, symmetry and other rhetorical means of persuasion.

We have, therefore, made very strenuous attempts to achieve the following in this section of the paper:

(a) to use the common topics of human discourse rather than the de-natured...
methodology that is understood only by technical experts.

(b) to make a break with the familiar "what-to-do-about African crisis" genre of studies. For in most cases the 'crisis' referred to is of course the methodological anomalies besetting social science disciplines and not the rumblings going on in the real world out there.

(i) Why the Historical Method of Analysis is Crucial for an Understanding of Vulnerable Segments of the Labour Market in Zimbabwe

The existence of absolute impoverishment amongst the majority of Zimbabwean household groups can best be understood against the background of the pre-independence patterning of social and economic institutions, many of which have as yet to be dismantled. In this paper, we are not so much concerned with the transition to socialism, but with a sort of transitional process - the transition from the so-called primary labour markets with a circulatory migrant male labour force characteristic of primitive accumulation - to the secondary labour markets with stabilised urban working households, characteristic of capital intensive manufacturing industry. In a sense that transition in Zimbabwe has yet to be completed. The reasons for the failure of this transition have ranged from the 'political', identified as either the failure of the Central African Federation to the historical accident of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, to the failure of the 'liberal experiment', i.e. the failure by the majority of the settlers to develop scientific attitudes about race, that were compatible with the establishment of capital intensive manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe, after the Second World War.

Thus, Giovanni Arrighi, has neatly summed up these dilemmas produced by attempted transition in the following description:

"The problem here was the stabilisation of the proletariat, because the high rate of turnover associated with migratory labour retarded..."
specialisation within the manufacturing sector. This stabilisation which, as early as 1943, was deemed necessary by 'several industrialists' had an urban and a rural aspect. In fact, it implied the severing of the ties linking peasantry and proletariat, something which then had two implications. In the first place, a rise in the minimum wage in urban areas and mining locations would become necessary in order to put the workers in a position to support, even at bare subsistence, their families in the towns.' (1)

No doubt then, implicit in this historical projection was the assumption that a successful transition to the utilisation of labour from stable secondary markets would have eliminated the absolute impoverishment and exploitation of the working population, but as Arrighi goes on to say, the wave of capitalist reforms have brought about such a situation which is riddled with many inconsistencies.

"At the root of this total failure were a number of inconsistencies inherent in the reforms themselves. First and foremost was the fact that the new policies encroached upon the interests of those very classes on which manufacturing capitalism and its political counterpart still relied heavily, both economically and politically. As a consequence, government actions were continuously hampered by its dependence on the ruling party's rank and file and on the electorate. Such a dependence explains the abortive nature of the reforms which, in turn, accounts for the failure to encourage the growth of a sizeable African middle class and bourgeoisie." (2)

What these changes suggested with regard to labour, was that certain segments of the labour market, not only in colonial Zimbabwe, were in a position to develop into a 'labour aristocracy' suffering relative exploitation rather than absolute exploitation. Recognition that the transition would be long drawn, economists like Arrighi put forward a various formulae which they felt would deal with the other segments of the labour market still caught up within the logic of primary accumulation, and come up with the right mix of policies combining 'implicit' capital intensity and labour intensive techniques for the manufacturing sectors of African countries. Thus implicit in many prognostications and perspectives was the burning question of what was to be done about what are now described as vulnerable segments of the labour market, i.e. those residual groups left over in the transition to secondary labour markets, the 'under-employed', 'seasonal labour', the 'putting out system' as migrant labour, etc. Thus 'labour incentive techniques' were seen as one way of effecting a
transition to the relative exploitation of labour and diminishing the vulnerability of segments of the labour still enmeshed in primary markets.

"The use of labour intensive techniques would not only spread the learning process to larger sections of the African population, but also make it more complete and varied. The use of labour intensive techniques is also more likely to make possible the mobilisation of the under-employed labour of the African pre-capitalist system. Disguised unemployment in Africa is typically seasonal and periodic since no general population pressure on the land exists. The labour migration system (an adaptation to African conditions of the putting out system that has characterised primary accumulation in the now advanced economies), however inefficient, performed the function of mobilising this type of disguised unemployment for productive forces . . . the emerging pattern of investment is displacing the system, but no alternative way of mobilising under-employed labour has emerged." (3)

What clearly emerges from such a cursory overview of the various strategies that have been put forward to deal with the conventional definition of 'vulnerable segments' of the labour market is the difficulty of conceiving their evolution in linear symmetrical patterns related to particular branches of the manufacturing sector extrapolated out of the totality of the economic base. For even in the international context, wherein the entire Third World work-force seems like a subordinate segment within a world-wide division of labour, positing symmetrical patterns whereby 'vulnerability' can be adduced from the techniques and organisation of industrial production, has not reaped any explanatory dividends. The World Bank has, for instance, always taken the position that:

"Economic dualism" in the developing countries is widespread and that two sectors co-exist side by side, one characterised by capital-intensive technology, relatively high wages, large scale operations or governmental organisation and the other, the unorganised traditional, informal sector - economic units with the characteristics: labour intensive, small-scale operations using traditional methods, and providing modest earnings to the individual or family owner. In the modern sector, wages are usually protected in labour legislation and trade union activity; in the informal sector, there is easier entry but also less job security and lower earnings." (4)

The implications of this are clear; there are two classes of people very differently placed: a lucky minority working in the protected modern sector, and the majority outside it. Another aspect of this scheme of organised workers being relatively
vulnerable has been articulated in arguments regarding 'urban bias.'

Several assumptions need more questioning, not from the historical record of the abstract variables that have been put forward by world-class economists, but from the historical record of the concrete social actors whom social scientists have placed into neat pigeon holes:

(1) It is true that organised sector workers have historically had secure employment and much better living conditions and chances than other workers?

(2) How sharp in real life is the difference between organised sector and unorganised sector?

(3) Have organised and unorganised workers thought and acted as though Zimbabwe were a dual economy?

Obviously the answering of these questions would traverse the bounds of our present enquiry and are only suggested as further areas of research, more urgently these questions impress the need for an analytical framework that addresses vulnerability in the labour market in an integrated fashion that takes cognizance of the inter-linked nature of industry, not only with regard to finance and technology, but also employment.

In Section II of the paper, we shall therefore, attempt to demonstrate in the case of Zimbabwe from 1945-1980, how the labour market has been historically organised to correspond to the continuum with cheap and insecure casual labourers at one end, and permanent workers at the other, despite the relative importance of the manufacturing sector in the Gross Domestic Product statistics.

Before embarking on this exercise, it is, however, necessary in the remaining subsections of this prolegomena to criticise some of the more conventional approaches to the study of vulnerable segments of the labour market, not only from the view-point of inaccessibility to data, but from basic conceptual
II. The Hidden Economy Approach

The search for vulnerable segments of a given geographical labour market usually begins in attempts to measure the 'hidden economy' or underground economy. By definition, the hidden economy in the sense of those forms of labour activity that do not get formal state protection, eludes straight observation by means of official statistics even in the advanced capitalist countries that have evolved sophisticated technologies for gathering labour market statistics.

Nevertheless, attempts to quantify 'vulnerable segments' of the labour market from the hidden economy, usually make reference to official materials in various respects, e.g. as regards definition, or some indirect reflections of these activities such as loss of revenue to the national exchequer. Indeed, in such contexts, official statistics have served as a particularly useful reference when those sections of the economy are concerned which are hardly or not at all susceptible to hidden activities. The outcome of such studies based on official statistics has established and demonstrated that symmetrical patterns do exist between national accounting concepts and existing national classifications of various socio-economic statistics. Any estimates then reached would refer to the hidden ('off the records') activities of the self-employed as well as to similar activities of employees, the unemployed, etc.

Alternatively, the 'hidden economy' approach has involved measuring the size of the unaccounted economy from the official labour force participation rates. In the case of Italy, where such approaches have been popularised, they have been influenced by particular conditions. In Italy, the official or formal labour participation rate has decreased drastically since the 1950's, while unofficial surveys have estimated participation rates much higher than the official ones in...
recent years, suggesting that growing numbers of Italians are finding employment in activities not reported to state officials. (6)

Given an estimate of the 'underground' labour force (i.e. those groups engaged in illegal and criminal activities) it might have been possible to compute an estimate of the size of the "unaccounted economy", but we have very serious doubts whether it would be possible to establish that such estimates match closely with Zimbabwean national accounts concepts and existing national classifications of various socio-economic statistics. From the consideration of sustaining the historical method of analysis any crude attempt to match the figures from unofficial surveys with national accounting concepts, we would run the risk of merely using the present as some kind of abstract historical mechanism and in the process, end up paying scant attention to the real historical processes unfolding in Zimbabwe.

III. The 'Reliability of the Income' As An Index of Relative Vulnerability Rather than Absolute Vulnerability

Paragraph 14 of our external collaboration contract with the International Labour Office, in the sub-paragraph dealing with the nature of the work we agreed to undertake, required us to:

"look at income levels" in each of the identified groups, and as far as possible individual income within each group were to be contrasted with the range of earnings in the economy as a whole, so as to be able to pinpoint the differential returns to labour and household incomes, for households primarily dependent on each type of activity, should be contrasted with normative "poverty lines."

We found the above to be very problematic method of attempting to determine the vulnerability to impoverishment amongst any segment of the labour market. For in this proposed methodology, the central organising concept for the study would have been the nation of a reliable cash income. Though access to such an income has and is indeed crucial for the survival and maintenance of any domestic group in Zimbabwe, the term is in many respects vague in its definition,
because its attempts to conceptualise labour in the 'market' and not in the production process.

Besides the practical difficulties of measuring, even working at the micro-level, our attempts to obtain accurate figures about earnings for the groups specified as 'vulnerable' by the Contract, were not satisfactory. Reliable cash income for an individual is not necessarily sufficient for the maintenance of a whole domestic group.

Any definition of reliability in Zimbabwe would, therefore, have to take account of the perceptions of the concrete social actors - of the characteristics of what they consider a viable income, and not some statutory minimum wage or normative "poverty line", because even individual workers are concerned with the reliability of incomes to domestic groups rather than simply to individuals.

Merely disaggregating the participants in the secondary labour market, and accounting for the different degrees of scarcity experienced by people in casual employment or not securely employed would involve the whole question of absolute versus relative vulnerability. The formal/informal sector dichotomy constitutes only one very crude way of doing this, because people can be wage-earners as well as entrepreneurs in the 'informal sector'. But our understanding of what actually causes vulnerability would not be enhanced by a mechanical search for gradations within the secondary labour market as opposed to the primary labour market, because the progression from primary to secondary has not been linear. Our main area of concern is not, however, the opposite of the primary market nor is the focus on markets. Instead, we attempt a micro-level perspective on categories of people in present day Zimbabwe, who are not presently in secure employment (as defined) and only some of whom have access to a reliable cash income. Furthermore, these groups of people have to be seen as members of domestic groups and of wider structures which contribute the means...
for their material sustenance and their social survival.

The contemporary social mosaic on employment differs little from other Southern African countries - with some people employed as contract workers without any long-term security, others in piecework, others on co-operatives, some directly dependent on these workers and others are temporarily or permanently unemployed.

The factor which complicates a clear understanding of the vulnerability of all these groups is that their situation is influenced, not simply by their individual place within a market, but rather by the nature of the various relationships among them. (7)

We, therefore, have to move from more generalised tendencies such as the reliability of income to particular specific historic blocs that determined the nature of industrialisation in Zimbabwe, to donate present day incomes within a dynamic socio-political context.

Generalised poverty in the whole 'rural periphery' of Southern Africa has been and is being shown to result from the particular dynamics of capitalist development in the region. At this very general level, there has also emerged a considerable body literature pertaining to the logic of capital accumulation in under-developed countries which can be drawn on to show that increasingly capital-intensive productive is entirely consistent with a large and growing pool of households structurally vulnerable to absolute impoverishment. (8)

In the contemporary world division of labour, the modern capitalism of advanced metropolitan centres is now almost exclusively dependent upon the production of relative surplus value. A debate is raging on whether any of the countries of the Third World is moving or has moved to a similar situation. And given the unreliability of primary commodities as sources of national income, many economic strategies are agreed on the need for Third World countries to build
up economic bases for the export of manufactured products, through decentralised but capital intensive technologies. It is, of course, still a matter for debate whether this is indeed the best way to ensure 'growth with equity'.

More importantly, however, the question that all such debates beg is that of value which is by no means uncomplicated, as Geoffrey Kay succinctly put it:

"In theoretical terms, the distinction between absolute and relative surplus value is clear cut. In one case, the value of labour power remains constant at a level that gives the worker a miserable standard of living and surplus value is increased by extending the working day; in the other, surplus value is increased by reductions in the value of labour power while the length of the working day is held constant. In practice, the distinction is more blurred at any moment considerable variations exist among 'different countries and different industries.' (9)

If the reliability of income is not an adequate indicator of the extent of the vulnerability to impoverishment of working households, can we validly use the production of absolute and relative surplus as the criterion for defining phases of capitalist development in Zimbabwe? This, in itself, raises a host of issues, for it is one thing to distinguish absolute surplus value in theory, but quite another to execute a transition from one to the other in practice.

As we shall detail below, the post World War II period in Zimbabwe saw attempts to apply and develop new physical and social techniques necessary to increase the productivity of labour. Although the production of relative value was immediately dependant upon improvements in productivity only in industries producing wage goods, i.e. the manufacturing sector, where strenuous attempts were made to stabilize the hitherto migratory labour force, into an "organised" sector, the capitalist reforms were to fail, not so much because of white attitudes and the fear of competition, but because of the inter-dependence in the economy of one sort of production on another. This inter-dependence was such that improvements in productivity throughout the whole economy would have been necessary to eliminate the vulnerability of working households.
Earlier on, we stated that the transition in Zimbabwe began after 1945 from the production of absolute surplus value to relative surplus value is far from complete, and that it is still too early to be designating some groups as more vulnerable than others solely on the basis of sectoral aggregations. This is so because cognisance has to be taken of the fact that the changes required in the political and social fabric to bring about the production of relative surplus value as the general mode of exploitation are even more difficult to establish than the technical pre-conditions.

The introduction of more intensive capitalist techniques in the four 'little tigers' of South Asia, where there was a sudden growth after 1965 of new industries have, it can be alleged, still not managed to bring about the production of relative surplus value as the general mode of exploitation. As Kay has commented on the developments in South East Asia:

"The innovatory feature of this industrialisation is that it is the first occasion on which methods of production associated with relative surplus value in the advanced countries have been transferred into the "under-developed world where the political and social conditions of life are geared to the production of absolute "surplus value". (10)

Pre-independence in Zimbabwe and South Africa today, would in a sense, also provide valid theoretical case studies of attempts to apply methods of production associated with relative surplus value, where the political and social conditions of the majority of working households were geared through a system of institutionalised racism to the production of absolute surplus value.

From the discussion above, it is all but clear that theoretical discussions on whether what we are talking about when we refer to 'vulnerable segments of the labour market' in Zimbabwe is a situation of absolute rather than relative exploitation of surplus value can be inconclusive. The fact of the labour market segmentation would not provide all the answers, for the labour market in Zimbabwe has been segmented as much by the employer to pay as by several other criteria.
Therefore, instead of designating given 'target' groups, whose special circumstances have to be investigated using various formal occupational classifications, and attempting to assess the reliability of income, we propose that social groups be employed for purposes of research as mere heuristic devices to indicate more basic processes at work amongst the working population. Rather than positing given groups whose vulnerability should be assessed, it would be better to introduce more qualitative aspects such as the concept of "the quality of working life."

The concept of working life necessarily has a broad base. It encompasses not only better designed jobs, but also several other inter-related criteria. The question of improving the quality of working life can also be considered not in relation to only some selective aspects of the development process such as the type of technology or work organisation used, but in relation to the entire strategy of development in Zimbabwe.

It is such kind of considerations for existence that made us include members of Zimbabwe's co-operative movement as a 'vulnerable segment' of the labour market in Zimbabwe. Though it is a new form of work organisation which, in principle and on paper, eliminates vulnerability and exploitation, the reality is quite the opposite.

On the methodological plane, all such considerations point to the need to dispense with the fetishism of categories, which can through the positing of symmetry, obscure the more basic variables, that are likely to emerge from a broad definition of the work processes that generate absolute impoverishment.

The most important explanatory variables for the basic causes of working household vulnerability will explicitly and implicitly underpin our study, which will constitute of the following:
(a) the basic historical pressing demands of capital accumulation in the Southern African region;

(b) the contradictions inherent to capitalism, especially those pertaining to the confrontation between introverted micro-economic systems - (households) and the extroverted micro-economic system;

(c) the active struggle of all working classes against their total dispossession from commodified wealth.

IV. A Note on the Descriptive Methodology for Demonstrating the Vulnerability of Working Households in Zimbabwe

Implicit in the descriptive sections of the paper, will be an attempt to construct the historical and contemporary social space in which working households become vulnerable both to absolute and relative impoverishment. We have decided against an evolutionary approach to the so-called vulnerable segments, which uses an institutional approach based on indicators of income poverty lines, because we are of the opinion that if any progress is to be made in understanding the basic causes of this undesirable situation, a break has to be made with the tendency in social science to privilege substances - here the real groups that are vulnerable, whose number, limits, members, etc, we often claim to define - at the expense of relationship; and with the intellectualist illusion that has led many a researcher to consider the theoretical class, constructed by the sociologist as a real class, an effectively mobilised group. Secondly, we attempt to make a break with the economism that leads to the reduction of the social field, a multi-dimensional space, solely to the economic field, to the relations of economic production, which are thus constituted as co-ordinates of social position.

Coming to grips with the processes that shaped the meanings of time, social space and class is indeed an elusive task, but it can be made that much easier by clearly distinguishing through the historical and contemporary descriptions that follow, between mere manifestations, the underlying causes, and the basic causes. In many a conventional study, there has been too much
emphasis on the manifestations, such as marginality and migration, as Frederick Cooper has commented:

"The apparent permanence of marginality and migration is consequence of the apparently under-development of the periphery. Yet the dichotomy of core and periphery creates a new grand fetishism of space." (11)

What we aim to do in the case of Zimbabwe is to demonstrate that the relationship of supposedly marginal working households to formal employment, as well as to the rural areas is in fact more complex, fluid and changing than suggested by theory.

Seasonal labour migration, casual labour and other forms of "unprotected labour" we shall demonstrate, though appearing to be different labour processes, have indeed been generated by the same structural factors that have historically depressed the value of labour power. Thus, the various types of activity in the so-called vulnerable segments of the labour market have been generated by the same structural factors and reflect for many individuals and from his similar tactics.

Rather than attempting sectoral disaggregations by type of 'vulnerable activity', our concern will be to demonstrate that the generation of these types of activities ranging from casual labour to illegal activities, has been a necessary historical adaptation to general conditions of low pay and under-employment, and served to support a large proportion of the working population at precarious subsistence levels. In turn, the adaptations necessary to cope with the problems of the settler colonial and dependent capitalist economy generated responses that perpetuated the system.
SECTION TWO: THE STATE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION FOR INDUSTRIALISATION: 1945 - 1980

"It is important to be clear about what is meant by saying that a society designates its under-nourished producers and selects its dead. It sometimes happens that an organised power consciously and deliberately decides to overpower and exploit certain groups for the advantage of others ... but this is certainly not the usual kind of case, on the contrary. Engels was right to say that very often, when two groups engage in a series of contractual exchanges, one of them will end up expropriated, proletarianised and, often exploited, while the other concentrates the wealth in its own hands. This takes place in violence, but not by violence."


The post World War II era was indeed an important watershed in the economic history of colonial Zimbabwe. Important structural shifts in the economy were initiated by the state and international capital, with the intention of effecting a thorough going transformation of the economy and society, based on secondary industry. As Ian Phimister has noted, the drive towards industrialisation had begun before the war ended.

The growth of secondary industry during the war generated, not just an expanding demand for labour, but also a need for a stabilised work force, and eventually a wider and deeper internal market. A variety of measures to determine the physical conditions of production to support secondary industrialisation - conservation measures, destocking, centralisation of communal land holdings, etc., were introduced. But it was to prove quite a different kettle of fish for the settler state to successfully determine the social conditions for the reproduction of the labour power of African households.

At the points of production, this led to further segmentation of the labour force already segmented along racial lines by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. The demands of secondary industry for a stabilised work force were to involve further State intervention in the labour market. The years after 1945...
were, therefore, to see attempts by the settler State to replace the large floating population that had invaded the colony's urban areas with a smaller and more differentiated one, with each industry calling into the city workers it needed. The changes implied a modernisation of racial domination, and a new attitude towards the African Labour force, and particularly in the manufacturing sector, moving away from thinking of workers as so much anonymous labour power, and towards fostering within each sub-branch of industry, distinct patterns of recruitment, bargaining and advancement.

The pace of industrial growth recorded after the war in colonial Zimbabwe indeed gave rise to a sense of euphoria about the possibilities of achieving self-sustained industrialisation. After 1945, secondary industry increased steadily through time, as a proportion of national income, in other words, it grew faster than national income; the average real rate of industrial growth in Southern Rhodesia was 8.7% between 1948 and 1963, as against 6.4% for the economy as a whole. (13)

The period after 1945 also saw the doubling of the black urban population to about 200,000 by 1956, and an influx of white immigrants which drove the settler population up from about 80,000 in 1945 to about 125,000 in 1950. Factories increased in number from 299 in 1938 to 473 in 1948 and over the same period, their gross output grew from £5.1 million to £25.8 million. By 1950, manufacturing was second only to settler agriculture as a source of the colony's income. (14)

These aggregate figures, however, conceal some basic distortions in the whole nature of industrialisation in pre-independence Zimbabwe, in particular, the structural and institutional framework that in the final analysis would frustrate the attempt by the settler State and international capital to introduce methods of production associated with the extraction of relative surplus value into a territory where the whole survival of the State was premised on the continuance
and deepening of political and social conditions geared to the production of absolute "surplus value".

Thus, after 1945, though percentages of the labour force in wage employment in the manufacturing sector progressively increased, there is little evidence that the quality of working life improved, and given the pressures on the communal lands, the majority of African households became dependent on wage labour. Given that by the 1970's nearly one half of the population was under the age of seventeen and that only ten per cent of the working force were female, it has been estimated that between 50 and 60 per cent of all African households were dependent on income from employment as a main source of family income. (15)

The post-1945 period at the present conjuncture in the fortunes of the world capitalist economy has indeed become a major focal point of historiographical and philosophical inquiry by world class economists trying to ploy a way out of the crisis for the international petit-bourgeoisie that had for close to four decades now not found anything to quibble or vacillitate about the technical benefits of the capitalist mode of production. What went on in people's minds and what was physically implemented after 1945 are therefore useful markers or benchmarks for the study of the contemporary segmentation of the labour market in Zimbabwe. And even for the most extreme cultural relativist the year 1945 would still serve as a useful chronological assemblage point on which to base a metaphysical understanding of the contemporary socio-economic disposition of Zimbabwe's working households.

For the purposes of an historical and empirical perspective, however, our own inquiry is limited to elucidating the nature of state practice that in the period 1945-80 managed to generate such impoverishment as has been chronicled over the years amongst the country's working households. In this, an understanding of the manifestations of labour processes such as migration patterns, etc., is
secondary to an establishment of the historical linkages in Zimbabwe's social economy between income distribution, migration, surplus labour and absolute impoverishment of the working black population in colonial Zimbabwe.

I. The Nature of State Practice in Industrial Accumulation:

The most ponderous obstacle that has to be removed in order to understand how state practice rather than labour processes per se generated absolute vulnerability in the segmented labour market of colonial Zimbabwe, is the mystique of naturalism that still pervades discussion on the whole problem of 'the State'. Industrialisation failed to bring about the relative exploitation of surplus labour, not so much because of the failure of the whites to modernise their attitudes about racial differentiation in society, but because of the class nature of the State - petty agrarian bourgeoisie. It could not have been otherwise, unless we really want to stretch definitions and call the large-scale commercial farming sector, Zimbabwe's national bourgeoisie. Throughout the period 1945-80, the settler State did not succeed in inducing a non-inflationary growth path that could have been initiated by State investment. It would have been necessary that agricultural production should have grown at a commensurate rate and that investible resources would have been raised through the direct taxation of property incomes and indirect taxation on luxury consumption of labour power (as evidenced by the phenomenal growth of the domestic service sector to service the flood of white immigrants after the war).

A large part of the manufacturing labour force remained for most of the period unorganised, and if organised, segmented by industry and a guild-type of job classification hardly suited for assembly line production techniques. Agricultural workers and domestic workers remained almost entirely unorganised. Every theoretical consideration whether neo-classical or Marxist would therefore
point to a worsening of income distribution particularly in rural areas over social classes. Working households throughout the period were, therefore, to see their ultimate security and protection against vulnerability, not in increasing labour productivity at the factorial points of production in the urban areas, but in the communally held social points of reproduction in the rural labour reserves. In the long run of the years 1945-80, neo-classical predictions that the incomes of non-migrants would increase and the differences in the quality of life between the labour reserve and the urban sectors would be narrowed, were not to be fulfilled. In the circumstances that prevailed in the real world in Zimbabwean household production and consumption activities, out-migration from the rural perpetuated and widened the income gaps in the communal lands/labour reserves.

The sharp injection of foreign industrial capital into the moribund settler economy after the war did not drastically alter its basic agrarian nature. The pressures for industrialisation on the settler State were not so much because of a new liberal dawn in race relations in the colony, but because of the food crisis in the post war years. As Ian Phimister has written apropos the State's technical attempts to ensure the food security of the colony:

>'Conservationist concern for parts of the white countryside was brushed aside during the Depression. Such laws as there were went unenforced. The situation in the so-called reserves was again different. There, the State did initiate a land resettlement programme which incorporated clearly demarcated grazing and agricultural areas, buttressed by contour ridging. But it did so far less for conservationist considerations than for segregationist reasons. Similarly, the changed pattern of State intervention in the countryside after the early 1940's owed much more to Southern Rhodesia's loss of self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs as a consequence of tobacco's growth and the expansion of the economy as a whole than to the accumulating 'Logic of conservationist thinking.' (16)

Similarly, it could be argued that the logic of industrial accumulation, despite the federation years, never permeated State thinking on economic affairs, and throughout the settler era, the petty industrial bourgeoisie though backed by powerful metropolitan interests, failed to impose its own logic of accumulation
on State practice.

The post war injection of investment from the outset doomed the chances of the emergent local industrial petty bourgeoisie. From 1946, industrial expansion quickened only to falter almost immediately in 1947 and 1946, as the return of foreign competition cut into domestic and export markets. Indeed, as Phimister has remarked, many settler factories were 'little more than extended workshops characterised by small outputs, an extremely low capital to labour ratio and by low productivity. They were extremely vulnerable to competition and take over by international capital.' (17)

Capitalist development in post World War II colonial Zimbabwe was deepened within the context of particular agrarian relations and a particular power configuration in the world capitalist economy, and therefore depended crucially upon the State to widen its market. And yet after the Second World War, the settler State was not able to generate enough resources to maintain the tempo of its own investment. It was not to be able to achieve the latter. The industrial growth that did occur after World War II was not able to reverse previous structural trends in the economy: given the very slow expansion of modern industry before World War II, the occupational distribution of the workforce in absolute terms at best remained static and at worst changed to a slight proportionate increase in the burden of the primary sector. This has however, been effectively diagonised by the operation of the contract labour system. The Rhodesian African Labour supply commission (RALSC) was instituted in 1946. Under this contract system, the R.A.L.S.C. imported the equivalent of 338,204 workers, working one year or an annual average inflow of 13,528 over the 25 years of RALSC's operations from 1946-71. (18)

Thus, though the roots of the 'modern' industrial sector stretched back in certain instances to the 1890's and to World War I, it had expanded
substantially only as a result of the exogenous 'shocks' applied by the Depression and the Second World War, when imports from the advanced capitalist countries were drastically reduced. As a consequence of the very slow expansion of modern industry before World War II, the absolute numbers of people forced to draw a living from the land rose sharply, the land-man ration declined, and an acutely under-employed surplus population was the result. (19) This situation was manifested in the extraordinary growth of the so-called rural informal sector in the 1930's. Mosley's regressional analyses of wage series have demonstrated that right up to 1950, there existed a discrepancy between labour processes and the colony's growth rates. Consequently, he failed to establish a link between wage participation rates and rural urban differentials. The fastest growth of African self-employment in colonial Zimbabwe's labour reservations took place in 1930-35, and 1944-47, which were also the periods of falling real wages. (20)

The injection of massive foreign capital drawn primarily from Britain and South Africa, not only overwhelmed local industries and the economy, but in fact created serious problems of excess capacity. Annual foreign investment, which totalled £13.5 million in 1947, doubled itself in 1948, and was almost as much again in 1950 when it peaked at over £50 million. This foreign capital was distributed more or less evenly between the public and private sectors of the economy.

The role of the State in ensuring the conditions of industrial accumulation were in fact very limited despite the fan-fare that has been made about the 'lost chances' of the years leading up to U.D.I. The settler State was to find it politically difficult either to reform drastically the agrarian structure, or to tax directly the incomes or indirectly the luxury consumption of white landlords and capitalists to the required extent. State expenditures were initially in infrastructural and other areas with a high unskilled labour component which
it was hoped, would deepen the internal market by generating a rapid expansion in the demand for necessities, while the unreformed agrarian structure would prove unable to supply the most important necessity, food grain prices in the first instance followed by inflation also in prices of manufactured necessities, the latter determined by the position with respect to excess capacity and supply of the raw materials.

Little if any of the public investment in the infrastructure that was deemed essential for industrialisation to take place was to emerge from white commercial agriculture. The ambitious schemes for the planned production and revitalisation of the communal lands through conservation measures were financed through the agency of the Native Production and Marketing Development Act of 1948, which imposed a 10% levy on all African marketed crops and cattle. And later, the Land Husbandry Act, which, besides being a grandiose scheme to replace the existing system of land tenure, was also a five-year plan, would be financed by foreign capital in the form of a loan from the World Bank. (21)

The State's role in the industrial accumulation was, therefore, to be merely legislative, in line with the gate-keeping functions of a petty bourgeois agrarian state. In 1940, an Industrial Development Advisory Committee was formed. By 1942, the State had nationalised and expanded Southern Rhodesia's tiny iron and steel works. It also established a cotton-spinning industry. But as Phimister had remarked, these moves to give the State a bigger role in industrial accumulation "marked the end of a phase, not a beginning" for 'The colony's industrialists strongly opposed nationalisation, and the state subsequently retreated from an interventionist stance. Even the purchase of the railway system in 1947 was part of an infrastructural policy to establish 'a basis on which private enterprise can then build its own industry, and was certainly a part of a coherent attack on external monopoly control'. (22)
The structural contradictions in colonial Zimbabwe's industrialisation were soon to be manifested in the mid-fifties, at a time when prices began to decline following the Korean war boom years. Inflationary pressures emerged in the course of financing planned development, owing primarily to the class nature of the State. The State investment was unable to initiate a non-inflationary growth path that would have ensured that investible resources from the agricultural sector were raised through direct taxation of property incomes. By 1957, the pace of industrial growth had begun to decline, and the manufacturing sector had indeed moved into a position of excess capacity. The high net investment levels of the 1940's and early 1950's had irreversibly changed the production function to a more capital intensive one, and the using capital labour ratio's beginning in the late 1950's were not an indicator of capital intensity in production, but rather symptomatic of excess capacity. The capital stock of the manufacturing sector had in fact been designed for a level of demand that did not materialise, so that changes in employment did not accompany changes in net output - and by running machines for more hours without changing the number of employees, manufacturers were able to satisfy the increases in demand that occurred in the late 1950's without having to hire more labour. (23)

The U.D.I. period was to see no fundamental structural change in the economy, and from 1965 to 1974, the relatively high growth rates and import substitution, can be attributed to the utilisation of excess capacity. Expansion in manufacturing output occurred despite no new investment since the late 1950's. The 'commercial agricultural sector' right up to 1980 was not to provide an investible surplus for the growth of industry. In fact, it has been estimated that from 1965 to 1972, agricultural indebtedness rose by 98%, and that only about one in seven white commercial farmers earned enough to pay income tax. (24) The major capital investments of the U.D.I. period were not to be initiated by the State, but by South African based transnational capital. There was,
during the U.D.I. period, heavy investment in water resources development in plantations in the south-eastern lowveld, which cashed in on cheap labour, and underpriced irrigation water provided by State subsidies for infrastructural development. (25)

The above discussion sought to elucidate the nature of the role of the State in industrial accumulation in post World War II in Zimbabwe. The very agrarian nature of the State acted as a 'build-in depressor' in the complex of the settler colonial political economy, which it ensured that even with the establishment of a sizeable productive capacity for the manufacturing sector, there was throughout the period, a regime for the absolute rather than the relative exploitation of surplus value based on excess capacity and skewed capital labour ratio and very little internally generated productivity raising investment. In the subsection that follows, we shall attempt to demonstrate that in the final analysis it was the operation of this 'depressor' on the value of labour power, rather than state regulation of parallel labour markets, and administrative segmentation of the labour market, that condemned the majority of working households to absolute impoverishment.

(ii) Administrative Segmentation of Racially Parallel Labour Markets As An Underlying Cause of Absolute Impoverishment in Zimbabwe

In this subsection we shall pursue certain points with regard to the basic causative factors in the western petty bourgeois state formation that was called the Government of Southern Rhodesia (G.S.R.), that were raised in the formative development of the thesis of this paper, and developed in the above discussion which sought to determine the character or nature of the settler state in colonial Zimbabwe. It has been demonstrated amply in theory by Harvard 'gurus' on the theory of exploitation from the analysis of the following four segmented markets:

(a) grain markets;
that in parallel markets created by administrative fiat and intervention, prices will be higher (wages will be lower) than would be the case if the unified or undistorted market were allowed to operate. (26) But for the purposes of this report, we do not consider it necessary to delve into the Zimbabwean pre-capitalist social order to demonstrate that the biggest distorting effect on the optimal functioning of labour processes, was the administrative logic of western monopoly capitalism implanted in the social rule books of this country from 1890 to 1980. For to do that would be unnecessarily putting to the litmus test the functional social literacy of petty bourgeois administrative clerks and officers who have long since died. At any rate, the administrative segmentation of the labour market along racially parallel lines, and then after 1945 according to utility functions of international capital was only but a form which expressed the absolute social vulnerability of worker-peasant households in colonial Zimbabwe. The purposes of our historical inquiry are to clearly identify those social elements inherited from the brief episode of imperialist rule that in a sense are continuities of past social oppression. And in the final analysis administrative reform cannot be put forward as a substitute for social change. However elegantly the case for such reform is presented, it will only end up sharpening the instruments of social oppression inherited at independence of which the roving bands of casual and unprotected workers right down the ISIC code are but a living manifestation.

An understanding of the exact modalities employed administratively to set price tags across the various social and natural commodities is, therefore, secondary to an understanding of the distribution of value in the political economy of colonial Zimbabwe. We, therefore, need to go beyond the neo-classical equilibrium analysis of commodity markets consisting of observing
price distortions, calculating the resulting social costs, e.g. vulnerability to
impoverishment, and merely calling for their removal in contemporary
Zimbabwe. To the contrary, these distortions must be understood in terms of
their dynamic historical and social reality if any policy proposals to amend
them is to have any political relevance. A start can be made on this by closely
examining an element of the so-called agrarian question, i.e. the role of
white commercial agriculture as a built-in depressor of the value of labour.

For without sounding too dogmatic, in the particular circumstances of Zimbabwe,
policy solutions to the incidence of social vulnerability will be largely dependant
on the resolution of the agrarian question. We hope to demonstrate this in the
following sub-section.

(iii) THE CRUCIAL HISTORICAL ROLE OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN
THE STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DEPRESSION OF THE VALUE
OF LABOUR POWER IN MODERN ZIMBABWE

Perhaps, because the primary labour markets for the accumulation of agricultural
capital are the most visible phenomenon of the apartheid mode of production
that was legally instituted into the local social environment by that great
piece de resistance of British compromise the Land Apportionment Act of
1930, they perhaps offer the best heuristic device at hand to illustrate how
vulnerable segments of the 'labour market' were generated in the colonial
Zimbabwean political economy.

Duncan Clarke has clearly outlined the role that was played by the plantation
sector in colonial Zimbabwe in promoting and maintaining structural depression
of the value of African labour power, through its wage and labour supply
policies. Plantation production had been founded on policies of land
alienation, land segregation and subsidized settler expansion at the turn of the
century, largely through the instrumentality of politico-economic mechanisms to
displace competitive peasant producers and widen the gap in productivity between peasant and plantation production.

The plantation sector, being the most vulnerable throughout the century to changes in luxury consumption or tastes of the imperialist bourgeoisie, therefore had from the outset to rely on a combination of absentee ownership/management and a high level of extra-territorial labour migration for labour supplies.

Thus, from the early years of the twentieth century, farmers joined with mining interests to establish collective recruiting agencies for the importation of workers from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia through the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB). The R.N.L.B. was perhaps the first example of a collective consumer co-operative by capitalists for the most vital need - i.e. the surplus value of indigenous labour power. The collectivization of contracted supplies of labour was intended to supplement the inflow of workers that were coming to Southern Rhodesia as independent "free flow migrants." Clarke goes on to emphasize that whilst the whole country built up over the years a high level of dependence on foreign labour, throughout the 1900-1940 period, the plantation economy as a low-wage sector was even more acutely dependent.²⁸

In 1945, some 56% of the plantation labour force were of non-indigenous origin. By around 1955, ten years after, the peak of foreign labour dependence in the plantation sector had been reached, with 60% of all workers being of non-indigenous origin. By 1961, only 50% of workers were extra territorial, but by 1972, the proportion had fallen further to 36%.²⁹

Clarke perceived this "absolute and relative decline in the foreign labour input" as the single most important indicator of the 'internationalisation of under-development in Rhodesia.' In other words with the assumption of political sovereignty by Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique in 1975, the geographical labour market at the disposal of the plantation sector in Zimbabwe drastically
shrunk. Throughout the decades after 1955, then local peasant households were squeezed by all means at the disposal of the settler petty bourgeois state apparatus of their labour power in order to meet the plantation sector's labour demands at the traditional low wage ceilings paid to contract labour.

Rural labourers have, throughout the modern agricultural history of Zimbabwe, lived on the margin of subsistence, if not existence. The somewhat fallacious argument has been put forward by neo-classical economic historians that since agricultural labourers were paid a substantial part of their wage in customary kind forms, such as mealie meal, salt and beans, they have not to that extent, suffered real income declines in periods of recession or inflation.\(^{(30)}\)

In the inflationary situation after the Second World War, before the forms of wage payment and post-subsistence consumption were neatly fitted into compartments by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959, and the Industrial Labour Board system was instituted many of the local industrialists like their Kith and Kui in the agricultural sector were loathe to pay a minimum wage, let alone prescribe one. It was greatly feared that such a course of action would have unnecessarily raised the hopes of His Majesty's Native regiments who returned after serving king and empire to find that whites, regardless of the fact of whether they had served or not, were receiving fatter pensions than the loyal native retired askari. Paternalists feared that money would corrupt the morals of the indigenous people, so that the least of it they got, the better it would be all round even for their wives toiling in the communal plots.

In the inflationary situation of 1947, when yellow or 'Kenya' maize had to be imported from the United States as a result of a shortage of white maize on the world maize commodity markets, attention turned to the parallel grain markets that had enabled Africans to somehow make it during the Depression, it was indeed in many employers' interests to shift to cash wage payment in...
contravention of the provisions of the Masters and Servants Act of 1905.

Many formal and informal variations were to be made on the traditional single money wage structure from the State subsidisation of maize meal to the provision of hired housing for married workers under the Services Levy Act. The latter had been recommended to the government of Southern Rhodesia by an Urban Affairs Commission headed as part of a package for the stabilisation of African family life in urban areas to ensure the safest route for the accumulation of industrial capital in Southern Rhodesia. They fixed the wage payable to contract and casual labour as the guiding minimum which for urban industrial workers would be hedged around by subsidies on transportation, housing, food and entertainment. And for employers of plantation labour, this would be a cost to production, and would be considered on strictly commercial lines wherein each individual white commercial producer could establish his own labour unit cost per day, as he saw fit, within the very broad provisions of the Master and Servants Act.

Despite such favourable legislative provisions for the plantation sector, it continued to experience problems with the recruitment of territorial labour supplies. Political and economic needs were to push the settler government into direct State control of labour supplies to the plantation economy. As Clarke tells the story:

"On the one hand, the sector's special demand would have been left unsatisfied without the supply of additional labour from 'marginal peasant' groups because of the reductions in foreign supplies following the break-up of Federation and the growing uncompetitive levels of the R.A.L.S.C.'s contract labour wage rates; while on the other hand, the growing labour surplus in the rural economy was beginning to overflow into visible urban unemployment from 1958 onwards and more stringent urban influx control mechanisms became necessary to re-direct labour supplies to the 'labour-scarce' plantation sector."(31)
In such circumstances and given a situation wherein there was excess capacity in the manufacturing sector, both in supplies of labour and capital stock and more profit could be made by running machines for more hours without changing the number of employees, the basic shadow price for the manufacturing sector became the contracted hourly rates for casual labour usually taken on when factories closed for the Christmas holidays, which in many firms stretched from the beginning of the rains in October to well after Christmas. This has usually been the time when the more permanent employees of the manufacturing sector take leave to go and assist their wives in the cultivation of the family plot in the labour reserve.

At the height of the post-U.D.I. boom, the recorded number of African workers in employment grew from 656,000 to 933,000 in the 1965-74 period. This increase in the African formal wage labour force in various branches of production led to the development of a complex labour market pattern.

The basic dualism in this labour market was one that grouped on one hand, agricultural and domestic employment, whose conditions of working life were regulated by the Master and Servants Act and manufacturing workers on the other. The nature of production in this sector was also 'distinctive in its social relations' with varying patterns of dependency between workers and employees. A similar position existed in the mining sector.

In terms of earnings from employment by the 1970's, Black Industrial workers in colonial Zimbabwe had become more distinct as a group in comparison to plantation and domestic workers. The number of such workers had doubled in the post 1946 period and especially after 1963 under State promoted import substitution. This increase had taken place despite a substantial 'shedding' of labour in the mining industry and when the capital labour ratio had risen sharply after the War, as small workers became less significant in production.
This by no means meant that black industrial workers became a labour aristocracy suffering relative rather than absolute exploitation. And given the extended nature of the patterns of household production and consumption in Zimbabwe, black industrial workers who had no assets in the form of cattle, were indeed a very vulnerable segment of the labour market. For the desire for a rural plot to retire after a working life has not been a product of the rustic sentimentality of wage-earners, but a fundamental material need given the anarchy of labour market forces in Zimbabwe's modern history.

During the period 1969-75, total African formed employment in enumerated jobs grew from 735,000 to 945,000. But a projection carried out for 1976-85 in 1975 estimated that new entrants would ceteris paribus in the 10-year period would number around 886,260. Given the unemployment rates and the inadequate or no provisions at all for post-subsistence consumption by retired workers, the outlook for the average urban worker was indeed bleak. As Duncan Clarke then wrote:

"Undoubtedly, then a social security crisis is looming ahead at a time when no legal Unemployment Insurance exists and there is no statutory Old Age Pension provision for Africans. thus it might be expected, in the absence of legislative and other changes, that more persons aged 60 years plus will seek to find remunerative employment or will hold on longer to their job."(33)

A further source of insecurity and social vulnerability for the worker in the manufacturing sector was that most housing in the urban areas was 'tied-housing.' The more 'privileged' workers lived in rented accommodation from which they would lose their right of tenure after loss of employment; given the high labour turnover in colonial Zimbabwean industry, this indeed became a structural almost permanent condition of life.

Without making glib statements about the nature of labour processes, it is...
quite clear that the dependence on wage labour for subsistence was the most critical dimension for most African working households in the economy by 1980.

This section of the paper has sought to historically trace the role of the State in industrial accumulation in the specific historical situation of colonial Zimbabwe, after World War II. In this local drama of capitalist accumulation, the commercial agricultural sector was not only a parasitic element in that it had to be subsidized continually by the State, and it was not able to initiate investment in the manufacturing sector, but also constituted a built-in depressor of the value of labour power of African households.

To what extent has the restructuring or lack of it after independence made a change to the situation outlined above, and which are the more visible manifestations of vulnerability amongst working households? This and other questions from the object and discussion in the sections below.
This section characterises the three broad categories of vulnerable labour segments as separate sub-sections, namely: the unprotected workers, domestic service and illegal or underground activities. Before this, the paper reviews employment patterns in Zimbabwe from 1980 in order to place into perspective our discussion of overall household vulnerability.

First, a note on methodological problems encountered in the collection of relevant data. In the previous sections, the difficulties of differentiating groups in relation to social vulnerability, and the meaning and relevance of illegal activities in relation to "vulnerability" were discussed. The major practical problem encountered, however, was having to piece together scanty, contradictory data with qualitative information and insights in order to attempt what is considered to be a preliminary characterization of "vulnerable labour segments" in Zimbabwe. Because of lack of data and the absence of time to conduct micro-level empirical work for this report, it has not been possible to sustain some of the analytical categories; such as income reliability and stability, and inter-household or intra-household income variations, in the discussion. Lifetime income patterns, for example, in a migrant labour economy, are so complex that only micro-level analysis could be useful for meaningful research. For instance, we may well ask whether the size of households determine the chances of access to reliable incomes or whether the composition of the household (age and socio-economic position) is a more critical factor? Regarding reliability of incomes, we may ask, do the actual minimum sizes and frequencies of income tell us anything about household vulnerability and in any case what are the perceived socially acceptable incomes that determine this? All these are
concepts which need micro-level analysis that do not necessarily isolate family members engaged in particular sectors of the economy, that are regarded as either "informal", "marginal" or "black" for that matter.

As a starting point, therefore, it would be instructive to explore the scanty data inductively and utilize the theoretical and historical framework outlined in Section One, to characterise vulnerability as prescribed in the terms of reference. This would be useful as a guide for further research and set the stage for the detailed study of employment and labour policies in Zimbabwe, and the nature of labour mobilisation that has taken place since 1980. The focus later will then be on rural labour mobilisation, because this category is not included under the ILO prescribed categories and because this is an area where massive work and resources have been centred since 1980.

In the first place, however, we need to review the patterns of employment in Zimbabwe in order to identify the aggregate levels of household vulnerability.

A. Employment Patterns and Unemployment Levels

The evidence shows that employment levels since 1980 were closely and directly related to the economy's growth rates. Thus, while employment grew by approximately 2.5% when the G.D.P. growth rate was between 11% and 14% during the first two years of independence, employment drastically declined from 1982 up until 1984 and registered growth rates below 1% on average. In numeric terms, total employment declined from 1,045900 in 1982 to 1,035,00 in 1984 in the formal sector (see Table One).

Employment levels decreased substantially among the material production sub-sectors (especially agriculture and mining) while employment increases were registered in the construction, tourism and other non-material production sub-sectors. A breakdown of changes in employment among the sub-sectors (see Table Two) shows the employment in the manufacturing sub-sector actually
from 1980 to 1984, although it experienced actual declines in employment from 1982 to 1984, when the economic recession and drought had their worst effects on the Zimbabwean economy. Interestingly, the government based employing sub-sectors (public administration, health and education) showed relatively substantial increases in levels of employment, indicating

Table 1

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<th>Employment Levels by Industrial Sectors (’000)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry &amp; Fishing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution, Restaurants &amp; Hotels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance &amp; real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Material Production)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quartely Digest of Statistics, C.SO.

the State's commitment to development in these sub-sectors in spite of the IMF's negative conditions on government spending from 1983 onwards. These data, however, show that there were clear structural limits to employment in Zimbabwe's productive sub-sectors, during the period under study.
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
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<td>6,7</td>
<td>13,5</td>
<td>14,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>45,6</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIAL PRODUCTION TOTAL</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>717,4</td>
<td>-3,9</td>
<td>-11,2</td>
<td>-33,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
<td>-1,6</td>
<td>-4,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance and Real Estate</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>3,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>26,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>30,5</td>
<td>42,1</td>
<td>54,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>19,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MATERIAL PRODUCTION TOTAL</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>292,5</td>
<td>31,8</td>
<td>47,2</td>
<td>57,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent.</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>19,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ECONOMY TOTAL | Number | 1 009,9 | 27,8 | 36,0 | 23,5 | 25,1 |
| | Per cent. | 100,0 | 2,8 | 3,5 | 2,3 | 2,5 |

Source: Calculated from Quarterly Digest of Statistics C.S.O.
The data in Table Four also shows how planned employment expectations (in the Transitional National Development Plan, 1982) sharply differed from the actual employment trends, a pattern which is well explained by levels of retrenchment (Table Three).

### Table 3

**Number of Approved Retrenchments By Industry: 1983/84**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry/Industry Sub-sector</th>
<th>Number of Workers Retrenched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>1762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and footwear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4336</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A close look at retrenchments patterns in the manufacturing sector shows that the engineering, clothing and textiles industrial sub-sectors accounted for relatively large proportions of retrenchment. This trend in clothing and textiles manufacture resulted from the flight of industries from Bulawayo to Botswana, due to the "openness" of that economy. Although empirical data is not available at the moment, there are signals that such retrenchments are
Source: INDI Volume 1, Quarterly Digest of Statistics Based on Results of the Quarters,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4:

Changes in Employment (as per INDP) and Actual
also related to the increasing utilization of contract, part-time labour and casual labour in the major sub-sectors; particularly in agriculture, manufacturing and construction. Regarding construction, the tables above all show how "unstable" the work-force in the sub-sector was from 1980 to 1984: Employment here increased and declined alternately each year in a dramatic fashion.

Given the above patterns of employment, it would appear that indeed the main economic sub-sectors which have been the arena for labour vulnerability are, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and domestic service, where employment fluctuated the most and where there were declines in employment, and the highest levels of officially approved retrenchments.

As a result of such labour vulnerability by 1984, the number of unemployed persons was 357,181, while the total number fo persons engaged full-time communal farming, formal and informal employment was 2,498,032, and the rate of unemployment was 12.5% of the actual labour force.\(^{38}\) Apparently, when those in the informal sector are considered as "potentially unemployed", the unemployment rate would exceed 14%,\(^ {39}\) and also if those engaged in "full-time communal farming" are carefully scrutinized, (as to those who perform part-time casual labour as a result of low returns to communal farming), the number of persons actually employed (that is, considering those who are "full-time self-employed" peasants as against semi-proletarianised peasants), would drastically change. Accurate data that distinguishes these employment features is not yet available in Zimbabwe. What is clear, however, is that those who are in effect "unemployed", would increase by the same quantum of the level of landlessness, while those who are "employed" would increase according to levels of utilization of casual labour in the sub-sectors.

This means that due to weaknesses in the available data on employment and unemployment levels and patterns, it is practically difficult to arrive at accurate figures of the numbers of persons or households which constitute the
"vulnerable labour segments." In fact, vulnerability can only be relatively accurately discussed in terms of available data on casual and seasonal employment. Otherwise it is only possible to indicate which sub-sectors employ labour in a vulnerable fashion, as we have done so far, and assess labour vulnerability from various secondary data sources.

Clearly, therefore, a comprehensive sub-sectoral treatment of "unprotected workers" is not possible in this paper. The discussion that follows will focus on "unprotected workers" in the sub-sectors where data is readily available. Other information sources, such as the media, will be heavily upon throughout the rest of the paper.

B.1. Unprotected Workers (Casual/Seasonal Labour)

This category of the "vulnerable labour segment", defined as the relatively unprotected or under-privileged is in itself a segment of those active work seekers who have been unable to secure remunerative, regular formal employment in Zimbabwe's economy and have therefore to resort to such forms of labour defined as casual, seasonal contract work, extended family "hands" or "helper" of one of another form. It is, therefore important before we discuss this category of under-privileged workers to briefly discuss the context within which they arise, giving some attention to the pre-independence period.

From the onset, as mentioned earlier, the structural tendency of the development of Zimbabwe's economy over the last three decades has steadily increased the number of active work seekers unaccounted for in formal employment. Indeed, the increased level of unaccounted for work seekers in part determines the very vulnerability of those employed in casual labour, etc.

Already, by 1978, the Rhodesian think-tank, the Whitsun Foundation, had this...
to say about the impending employment crisis in Zimbabwe:

"The absence of adequate African Rural Development in the last two decades (1958-1978), coupled with legal, political and socio-economic constraints applied on the expansion of the 'informal sector' and the non-existence of unemployment insurance (apart from the now overburdened 'traditional' kinship mechanisms), will tend to cause the bulk of unaccommodated persons to become dependent on the labour market."\(^{40}\)

In fact, data from the same study estimates that during 1962-1975, there were approximately 182,364 adult males unaccounted for (let alone female work-seekers) while between 1976 and 1985, this number was estimated to have risen to 751,801 adult males.\(^{41}\) Moreover, in the 1969-1975 period, only 22,197 new jobs were created annually and while approximately 8,000 workers were to be sent to South Africa annually on contract, most of the overall formal employment created during that period was casual or seasonal contract.\(^{42}\)

Even then, the absorption of the unaccounted for work-seekers in the "informal" labour sector or in other marginal sectors not enumerated in the 1969 Census, was clearly not promising. For, the 1969 Census recorded only 15,980 self-employed African males who are not farmers, 13,130 employees of African farmers and a mere 12,540 employed by African businessmen.\(^{43}\) The actual number of employees in the peasant sector seems to have been grossly underestimated. Thus, at independence, given the level of supply of active work-seekers cited above and the levels of absorption in the informal and marginal sectors, the absolute numbers of unemployed available as part of the "vulnerable labour segments" as a whole were very high. In fact, according to the 1982 Census, Zimbabwe's unemployment rate stood at 18.5%.\(^{44}\) According to the same census department the absolute number of unemployed was approximately 300,000 in 1985, while self-employed communal farmers were 1,000,000, those employed in the formal sector were also 1,000,000 and finally those employed in the informal sector were 100,000.
Thus, for the purpose of this study, it should be understood that most of those within the "vulnerable labour segments" would essentially be derived from mainly three categories, namely, the unemployed: 300,000 informal sector employed: 100,000 and the formal sector employed: 1,000,000. This needs to be stressed for there are overlaps between those categorised in the census as unemployed, who may and are employed casually or seasonally, while many of those in the formal sector employment are for practical purposes largely unemployed. Also, it shall be necessary to isolate one or two sectors, which increasingly have high levels of formal casual or seasonal labour, for our analysis. As casual labour has the best long-term records in Zimbabwe's agriculture, we will focus our initial analysis on that category and generalise therefrom.

The data on Table 5 shows clearly that in 1984, casual labour had grown to over one-third of formal employment in Zimbabwe, as opposed to less than one-quarter of formal employment in 1977.

Table 5

Permanent and Casual Employment Trends, 1977-1984
Based on Agricultural Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Casual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>215 040</td>
<td>24 295</td>
<td>239 335</td>
<td>14 546</td>
<td>43 158</td>
<td>57 704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>210 170</td>
<td>23 765</td>
<td>233 935</td>
<td>11 908</td>
<td>39 686</td>
<td>51 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>205 287</td>
<td>25 236</td>
<td>230 523</td>
<td>14 927</td>
<td>41 375</td>
<td>56 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>181 251</td>
<td>17 017</td>
<td>198 268</td>
<td>20 349</td>
<td>52 674</td>
<td>73 023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>181 051</td>
<td>10 375</td>
<td>191 430</td>
<td>19 117</td>
<td>45 320</td>
<td>64 437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>158 564</td>
<td>5 480</td>
<td>164 044</td>
<td>18 327</td>
<td>37 857</td>
<td>56 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>149 920</td>
<td>4 818</td>
<td>154 738</td>
<td>21 837</td>
<td>39 438</td>
<td>61 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>146 000</td>
<td>4 213</td>
<td>150 601</td>
<td>24 523</td>
<td>40 366</td>
<td>64 889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This trend, however, needs to be related to the fact that total employment as a whole decreased mainly in the permanent employees category while growth of casual labour was rather slow. This means that technical shifts in either technologies used or enterprise shifts (in say agriculture) towards less labour intensive cropping patterns, may have influenced the status of casual labour in the economy. As can be seen, however, the biggest decrease was around independence, and so it may be considered that minimum wage policies played a significant role in influencing the employment trends.

Of interest, however, is the way the employment shifts affected women. Proportionally, the biggest drop of permanent labour was among females by five-sixths' of the 1977 labour force, while contrary to general expectations that the casual labour force increases largely among females, the greater increase was among males. In fact, there was a relatively stable trend of employment of females on a casual basis. This means, however, that while in 1977 female casual labour was almost two-thirds of total female labour in agriculture, in 1984 it now represented a relative (but not absolute) increase to approximately 90% of the total female labour. On the other hand, male casual labour in proportion to total male labour increased slightly over the same period.

In general, however, females today form the bulk of this "vulnerable labour segment", as they have been in the past.

Using 1984 data on casual labour in Zimbabwe as a whole, we find that by far the major employer of this category is the agricultural sector with 87.5%, followed by the Distribution sector with 3.5%, Manufacturing sector with 3.1% and Construction with 0.9%. This first quarter obviously reflects the peak of the agricultural season involving the distribution sector quite heavily. The figures change slightly in the second quarter with increased manufacturing (food...
processing, etc) while the construction sector peaks due to the drier weather conditions. This shows clearly the seasonality of casual labour in Zimbabwe, details of which are also evident for the transport, public administration, health and electricity sectors.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March Quarter - 1984</th>
<th>June Quarter - 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>34 063</td>
<td>58 780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2 899</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1 046</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>3 524</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Admin.</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>2 141</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>45 252</strong></td>
<td><strong>60 258</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regarding sex-ratios of casual labour, agriculture hired the major share of female casual labour, followed by manufacturing, distribution and public administration. Construction appears to favour predominantly male casual labour, due probably to the nature of the work, as opposed to other sectors with amenable types of work.

In order to highlight the nature of vulnerability in casual labour in Zimbabwe,
it might be instructed to give a summary of the situation of women in the canning industry, given their importance in the sub-sector. This industry, as most of the major industries which employ casual labour, is dominated by transnational capital. It utilised mostly cheap and convenient sources of labour, and tended not to take account of minimum wages, maximum working hours and maternity leave conditions. Special strategies are used by employers to retain casual labourers on a casual basis, by for example, ensuring that workers do not work continuously for six-week contracts, as such long contracts would confer most of the existing rights onto the casual labourer. Workers are engaged for two to five weeks and then demobilized for a few weeks and then re-employed for similar periods.

The food-processing sector in general, also tends to engage casual workers as agricultural workers by legal categorization instead of industrial workers in order to pay lower minimum wages. This was in fact a source of major industrial strikes last year.

It is thus, not uncommon to find casual labourers who have worked for over five years as such, without any change of employment status, wage levels, and without any training or promotion opportunities and with non-existent sick-leave, maternity and child care facilities. General accommodation, transport, eating and health facilities are also well below the average of rural dwellers for those casual labourers who work in rural-based industries. Women, of course, suffer the most in this sector, being less exposed to training and promotion opportunities, while on the other hand, being less involved in union activities.

Perhaps, we may develop further general insights by looking briefly into more detail at casual labour in the agricultural sector. As Table 7 shows most of the casual labour was employed in the large scale farming sub-sector in 1983, which was followed by the small-scale farming sector, resettlement farms and very little was employed by co-operative farms. Data on casual
labour in the communal farming sector was impossible to acquire.

When we look at the large-scale farming sector, we find that by far the largest region to employ casual labour in Manicaland Province, where most of the transnationals' tree-crop estate farming or the agro-industrial farm sector, is located. This not only reflects Zimbabwe's cropping pattern specialisation, since tree-crops are most suited to this region, but also locates the role of foreign capital in the determination of labour practices and hence the general vulnerability of labour. Here, we need to bear in mind the ability of transnationals to shift labour : capital ratios as well as their direct influence on government policies.

It should be borne in mind that Manicaland Province is where the majority of labour unrest over agro-industrial wages took place in 1985 (with the final wage compromise arrived at well below the generally accepted poverty datum line). Thus the scope for labour policy reform in such a situation is not a simple matter, and it is probably instructive to note that it is in this province that most of the unrest over "squatters" is concentrated, indicating the direct relationship between and effects of both land alienation and labour vulnerability within the province.

It is also of interest to note that the other two provinces, Mashonaland West and Central, with the second highest casual labour employed are located in the most fertile arable land. It is in these provinces that the highest settler farm and peasant farm crop-production occurs. On the one hand, although these provinces do not have the highest levels of unemployment, they are the most exposed to unprotected forms of employment, while on the other hand, this pattern reflects a concentration of such marginal incomes in regions of lower population density and better agricultural opportunities due to rainfall patterns among the communal land peoples of Zimbabwe. Vulnerability is related to unequal income opportunities among the already marginalised
rural populations of Zimbabwe. As is known, cash remittances, however small, play a major role in the general development of agricultural production in the communal lands. This analysis suggests that there is need to plan labour policies, incentives, etc., that recognize existing regional disparities in either opportunity of exploitation.

Wages in the casual labour segment of vulnerable labour are very difficult to pin down, due to general exploitative labour practices by employers. Such practices include tying employment of male workers to supplementary work by the wife or children, enlargement of daily piece-rates of each employee and payments in kind. It is, therefore, difficult to discuss wages in general, although we may note that there is a crisis among the vulnerable as one labourer put it:

"Farmers would stop employing women workers at the expense of men." 46

On the other hand, a farmers' union leader had this to say about the minimum wage:

"The move means that a lot of women will no longer be employed, because we have to pay them the same minimum wages as men." 47

B.2. Domestic Service Sector

Introduction

Domestic Service as a wage labour category has received relatively scanty scientific analysis in Zimbabwe and other African countries, for reasons which are as yet difficult to pinpoint.47 In some countries, this may be attributed to the relatively small share of incomes derived from such services, small proportions of those employed in domestic service (D.S.), the difficulties of keeping track of such employees and their income and the rather transient and/or unstable nature of this labour category. Furthermore, in many countries, domestic service is hardly defined as wage-labour category and in some instances it is looked upon as (and actually is) based on pre-capitalist
(semi-feudal and slave) social relations of production, as well as being a purely unskilled labour activity not worth much attention.

That such mixed-up views of the importance of Domestic Service in an economy and to the workers themselves are rife may for instance, be readily captured from the following quote from a letter to the media in Zimbabwe:

"I, therefore, take the view that it is totally honourable to be employed as a domestic, particularly that most of them are professionals, having worked either as cooks, housemaids and gardeners for years." 48

The dilemma reflected in the above quotation is of particular significance in the Zimbabwean case and indeed other Southern African countries, due to the racial underpinnings of domestic work there. Here the notions of "house-boy", "garden boy", etc., clearly indicated a fixed notion of the unimportance of this as wage-labour category and clear juvenile status it has been accorded: Certainly the white community would not agree with the above quotation. In Zimbabwe, it has become clear that, since independence, there is growing concern over the role of Domestic Service as a wage-labour category, as noted by Ida Muvuki:

"... given the significance of domestic employment in our economy today, and the magnitude of the unemployment problem, more ought to be done to facilitate the retention of domestic workers." 49

This recognition of Domestic Service is also related to the growing engagement of domestic workers by black Zimbabweans since independence. Thus, according to the same commentator:

"Before independence, the number of domestic workers who were employed by black home-owners was quite small - in absolute terms, and also as a proportion of the total number in domestic employers. The situation has since changed significantly. With the steady increase of blacks in higher paying jobs (previously the preserve of whites) and indeed jobs, in many cases where it makes a lot of sense to engage paid domestic help, the number of black employers has risen." 50

Indeed, the formation of the Zimbabwe Domestic and Allied Workers Union (ZDAWU) in 1982 with a paid-up membership fluctuation of around 9,000
TABLE 7

PERMANENT AND CASUAL LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE BY SUB-SECTOR AND PROVINCE, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>LARGE SCALE FARMING SECTOR</th>
<th>SMALL SCALE FARMING</th>
<th>RESETLEMENT FARMS</th>
<th>COOPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Casual</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>22 555</td>
<td>1 469</td>
<td>7 864</td>
<td>9 818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>43 561</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>4 511</td>
<td>12 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>28 098</td>
<td>1 103</td>
<td>2 200</td>
<td>5 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>26 158</td>
<td>1 113</td>
<td>2 741</td>
<td>8 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>4 659</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>6 004</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1 287</td>
<td>1 029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>6 741</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>24 038</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>2 025</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMPILED FROM:  
Crop Production Of Commercial Farms: (I.C.A. Supplement 1983)  
Agriculture Statistics C.S.O. 1983  
1983 Census Of Resettlement Schemes (By Scheme/Co-operative)
workers is testimony of the significance of this wage-labour category.

On the other hand, the material importance of Domestic Service as a source of income among the workers themselves is very critical to many of the unemployed as it is perceived (especially by women) as the last option for sustenance next to prostitution! According to a female domestic worker interviewed by 'The Herald':

"I know the money I get is far below the minimum wage and the conditions under which I work are harsh, but it is the only legal way for me to earn a living - otherwise I would turn to prostitution." 51

This perception is of particular importance for this study as it encapsulates the theoretical and methodological difficulties of defining various groups of "vulnerable labour segments" in terms of type, legality and formality of work, given high levels of unemployment and the relatedness of the limited work options available.

In the following, therefore, we briefly discuss the employment patterns, work conditions and policy issues concerning Domestic Service in Zimbabwe.

**Employment and Income Patterns**

The available data on numbers of domestic workers in Zimbabwe was found to be inconsistent between government sources (mainly the Central Statistics Office, C.S.O.) and the ZDAWU. The figures utilized below (Tables 8 and 9) should, therefore, be treated as approximations. This is particularly difficult because Domestic Service in low-income urban and rural areas has never been adequately documented. Also, it has been suggested by ZDAWU Officials that about 35% of these workers are part-time workers.

The statistics, however, reveal a number of interesting points, namely:

a) In absolute numbers Domestic Service has employed between approximately 80,000 to 120,000 workers in the last 10 years;
b) These numbers are significant in relative terms as Domestic Service has constituted between 9% and 12% of Zimbabwe's employment structure, which makes Domestic Service one of the major employment sectors;

c) The employment trend has been declining slowly in absolute terms from 124,100 in 1975 to 98,000 in 1986. The sharpest decline first took place during the period 1977 to 1980, this being related (apparently) to the large-scale emigration of whites at the height of the liberation war. The second sharp decline of 15% was from 1980 to 1984, related again to emigration and apparently to retrenchments related to minimum wage legislation, which has only been enforced since 1980. For example, it was reported that 2,000 workers lost their jobs during 1984 and 1985 as a result of the wage increases then.52

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Employees By Sex ('000) - 1975-1983</th>
<th>(Based on 1969 Census, Male/Female Sex Ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>102,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>124,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Share of Total Employees</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Statistical year book, 1985 Zimbabwe C.S.O. - Table 4.8 pp. 52)

d) According to retrenchment estimates there seems to be a distinct relationship between the proportion of workers sacked and the size of the city as follows:

56/...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Numbers Sacked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gweru</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwekwe</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data Source: *Herald*, 4/9/85)

The larger cities tend to have the greatest proportion of "vulnerable Domestic Service workers."

e) The same tables show that on average, 60% of the Domestic Service workers are males and that the major absolute share of decline in Domestic Service employment has been amongst males. This pattern of decline may have some relatedness to the "structural propensity" of male workers to engage in labour resistance activities and the general tendency of employers to prefer females in the unstable labour markets. Male employees are thus, more vulnerable in terms of exploitation, related to overwork and poorer wages. On the other hand, it appears that part-time Domestic Service is on the increase in Central Harare due to accommodation constraints and sharing of the domestic workers by employers to reduce wage bills.

In terms of earnings and wages over the last 15 years, some interesting patterns can be gleaned, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Income Earned By Domestic Service Workers (Estimates)</th>
<th>% of Total Incomes</th>
<th>Wage Level Per Year</th>
<th>Wage Level Per Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$30 Million</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>$276,00</td>
<td>$23,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$52 Million</td>
<td></td>
<td>$482,40</td>
<td>$40,20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$64 Million</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>$560,00</td>
<td>$47,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$87 Million</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>$890,00</td>
<td>$74,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: F. Mukono, Sunday Mail, 23/6/85)

The following observations are pertinent in terms of the earnings in Domestic Service:

a) Although earnings have more than doubled in absolute terms, this does not reflect the real terms wage increases;

b) The major proportion of earnings increases (1979-80) was directly related to political changes anticipating the take-over by the Patriotic Front forces.

c) While the absolute earnings in Domestic Service have increased, there has been a tendency for the proportion of Domestic Service incomes in relation to other employment sectors to decline (e.g. from 5.4% in 1970 to 3.4% in 1980).

d) Interestingly, there has been a negative correlation between the number of Domestic Service workers from 1970 to 1984 and the amount of earnings during the same period. That is, while the number of Domestic Service workers has declined, the total earnings have increased. It has been suggested in some quarters that this reflects a natural response to increased statutory minimum-wage levels. With the available information at hand, it has not been possible to verify this assertion which various letters to the newspapers (over the years) have been at pains to warn the government about.

In this connection, it may be interesting to point out that there has been a constant lobby, through the newspapers since 1980 to persuade...
the exchequer to consider granting tax-rebates to Domestic Service worker employers. This suggestion has, of course, not yet been taken up!

e) Overall, although $87 million (1984 earnings) represent a fair amount of earnings given the unemployment situation, when the wages are compared to other urban wages, Domestic Service is the lowest-paid sector (at $79,00 per month in 1985, compared to $143,00 per month minimum wage). In fact, this wage is about one-third of the projected poverty-datum line. Furthermore, according to ZDAWU officials, these wages are not paid to most Domestic Service workers, especially in the low-income urban areas and in communal areas. For example, a survey by *The Herald* found that in Nyanga and Beitbridge communal areas, households employed young boys aged 10-16 years, who could not afford school-fees and paid them between $8,00 and $20,00 per month. It was found that even civil servants and local businessmen practiced such Domestic Service labour exploitation.

On the other hand, it is clearly not possible, given the available time to ascertain the extent to which the decline in Domestic Service employment is related to increased expenditure by potential employers on household technology (washing machines, etc) and whether technology is likely to place a ceiling on the relative growth of employment in this sector. This would, however, apply mainly to the more affluent whites and the black petit bourgeoisie class, who could probably afford such household technology.

**Work Conditions**

Although this study was not able to conduct a systematic survey of the working conditions of Domestic Service workers, it is certain that, next to casual agricultural labour in Zimbabwe, this sector has the most brutal history of social relations of production. According to A. Chitewe of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions:

"Before independence, domestic workers bore the heaviest brunt of exploitation, receiving in many instances, wages and working conditions which could only be described as semi-slavery."

What is interesting, however, is that although majority rule has brought...
various increases in the Domestic Service minimum wage since 1980, and in good measure has enforced the wages, and that more blacks are, since 1980, employers of domestic workers, there has been a very sharp wave of criticism of the conditions of work under black employers. According to the ZDAWU, black employers are the 'main perpetrators of harsh working conditions', and are 'less understanding and less kind.'

What are these 'harsh working conditions?' It has already been pointed out that there are many who do not pay minimum wages and employ juveniles. However, there are more issues which deserve attention, namely:

a) The length of working hours until legislation in 1985 (Domestic Workers Employment Regulations) generally extended beyond eleven hours per day, and these have been reduced to 9½ hours per day or 54 hours per week. The ZDAWU is still struggling for legislation to reduce working hours to 48 hours per week at the moment. Prior to these changes, it was not uncommon for workers to work daily stretches from 6.00 a.m. to 10.00 p.m. Also legislation now entitles workers to a meal-break after a stretch of 6½ hours of work. Quite clearly the current working hours are in fact, too long and need to be amended as demanded by the ZDAWU.

b) Leave entitlements, including annual leave and sick leave have also been a major subject of contention. Workers were not entitled to leave in general and are now entitled to a month's leave, and to be paid during sick leave.

c) A major aspect of the vulnerability of domestic workers prior to independence, was the way in which they could be dismissed without any recourse to legal protection. Dismissal has now been streamlined to the extent that employers' reasons and/or an agreement by the worker 'about the termination of service. Numerous such cases of dismissal are currently dealt with in the Department of Labour. There has been a tendency of dismissals to occur around the time when wage increases are announced, but according to ZDAWU officials, about 50% of such cases are usually successfully won, either by the workers or through ZDAWU representatives.

d) Other working conditions of concern are:
i) lack of accident compensation at work (existing legislation does not cover Domestic Service.

ii) absence of retirement gratuities and this is critical since the newly proposed national social security scheme does not mention Domestic Service workers (see the concluding Section).

iii) lack of rights to stay with families in servants' quarters and poor standards of accommodation provided.

Again, the ZDAWU is campaigning for such improvements through its policy lobby activities.

Domestic workers also suffer from other general disadvantages related to access to education and health facilities. In the case of education, subsidized facilities are provided to residents of localities at "locality" schools and since domestic workers are not residents of suburban areas (where most of them work), their children have been refused access to such schools. These suburban schools, it should be noted, are most privileged and are dominated by white pupils and there has been a resistance to take in many blacks, most of whom would be domestic servants' children, on grounds of legal/property ownership-related residency. For example, in 1983, 300 children of domestic workers were refused attendance at Greystone Park Primary School, although they had been registered for the above stated reason.

What is clear, however, is that both the State and ZDAWU are engaged in dialogue to improve this situation. In the following section, we now discuss ZDAWU activities in brief.

**Domestic Worker Organisation**

The ZDAWU had 9 000 paid-up members in 1985, having grown from 5 500 members in 1983. This membership is a rather small proportion of the sectors' labour force (below 10%). The aims of ZDAWU are mainly to:
a) ensure that employers abide by the regulations of employment;

b) to mobilise a decentralised labour organisation (there are such branches) and teach regional officers to:
   i) manage branches
   ii) interpret labour regulations.

c) to lobby government policy-makers. Some of the specific objectives of the ZDAWU are to improve working conditions as suggested in the above discussion;

d) to establish workers co-operatives aimed at providing a rationalized domestic and related service to communities at a profitable rate.

e) to establish an unemployment fund (at the end of 1985, the fund had $2 000) for retrenched workers.

Members pay a joining fee and monthly subscriptions of $0.50.

Although the organisation is poor, it has a fairly vocal leadership whose long range plan needs a more technically based co-operative development strategy.

Conclusion

Since independence, there has been a marked improvement in the contractual working conditions of domestic workers, who, for the most part were in "semi-slavery". As apparent above, however, the wage levels are low, long-terms employment growth trends are highly improbable, the social security and general welfare of those currently in employment is poor. The scope for further specific improvement of conditions is wide, as is the significance of ZDAWU.

The policemanship of ZDAWU in ensuring that employers abide to regulations is critical, for as happens elsewhere in Africa, there is a tendency to employ "relatives" from poor families in rural areas, who are subsequently maltreated but fear to report to authorities. This is important because the Department of Labour's manpower is already widely spread in its activities, and can hardly cope with the scattered location of domestic workers' employers.
As far as the longevity of the Domestic Service Sector, emigration seemed to play a significant part in declining employment, while wage increases had some impact. The period of the economic recession and drought (both 1974-1976 and 1982-1984) did not appear to have any special impact on employment levels in the sector. However, employment levels are clearly on the decline and this sector is not likely to take care of the increasing urban unemployed, while the labour segment itself will continue to be "vulnerable" due to the systems incapability to police employers.

To conclude, the Domestic Service Sector clearly serves all the broad classes as it did prior to independence; then, it was the white classes and a few African petit bourgeoisie in the African townships. Today, the black petit bourgeoisie class utilizing the Domestic Sector has broadened, while increasing numbers of the skilled black working class can now afford domestic servants, although they cannot afford the real minimum wages. Hence, the conflict over tax-rebates and underpayment as articulated today. This, in itself will continue to make the domestic worker "vulnerable" as more urban wage-earners resort to family-based systems of exploitation.

8.3. Illegal and Underground Activities

8.3.1 Prostitution

Any discussion of prostitution in Zimbabwe has to consider this phenomenon as part of the development of capitalism in the Southern African region since colonial days. Africa of the "labour reserves" needs special treatment because of the specific structures and institutions created in order to facilitate labour movements and the special conditions under which labour existed and reproduced itself as well as the conditions of life and existence within the "reserves". It is in this context that the origins, extent and forms of incidence, causes and effects of prostitution may be traced. Moreover, the role of the state in the formulation of policies, laws and their enforcement...
needs to be understood in terms of its attempts to preserve a particular political economy in the interest of capital. It is in this context that some observers have pointed out that prostitution, just like other social phenomena, was utilized in the colonial era as instruments of social control and an institution in the service of the migrant labour system. (van Onselen, 1980). This, therefore, suggests that prostitution, within the "labour Reserve Economies" cannot be treated as a simple social - psychological problem of groups of "deviant" women but rather as a deeply rooted complex phenomenon.

Origins and Causes

The incidence of prostitution in Zimbabwe prior to independence was observed as far back as the beginning of the century and was considered as an aberration by the local populations resulting from the colonial penetration. It is interesting that most studies conducted on the incidence of prostitution suggested that it was never a systematically organised business, through brothels, pimps, night clubs and such other institutions in this country.

It has, however, occurred in different forms, including professionals, temporary participants - these involve fully-employed women, school girls and wives - and part-timers, e.g. shebeen queens. In most cases, it is a transitory activity as most of the women involved usually later get married or engage themselves in 'honest' occupations. It has also been observed to occur amongst children although very rarely, particularly in Salisbury in the 1950's, with parental 'approval', because quite a few parents lived off incomes from it.

Some of the studies suggest regional patterns of its incidence, indicating that it has been most acute in Matabeleland (Bulawayo) and Manicaland. In the rural areas, Zachrisson quoting the then Native Commissioner in the 1920's observes that the Mberengwa area had the highest incidence of prostitution and venereal disease because of the mining activities and associated labour
concentrations in the area. These regional patterns observed, however, do not seem to have been based on any rigorous scientific investigation.

Due to discriminatory residential and entertainment arrangements in Rhodesia, the venues for prostitution in urban areas were limited amongst Africans to township location beerhalls and tea-parties in the case of Salisbury while in Bulawayo the shebeens (illegal drinking places) and the streets in town were the common places where clients contacted the prostitutes. According to Willcox (p. 46) it occurred invariably with the imbibing of alcohol. In the rural areas, mining compounds were the main venues.

Quite clearly then, prostitution is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe and seems to have served clients of different 'classes' both black and white, as noted by van Onselen, due to the highly stratified wage structures in Zimbabwe. The literature, however, is pointedly silent as to the incidence of prostitution among whites and the way white men who had the power and monies, manipulated black women into this profession. Van Onselen briefly cites the tendency of this process in both farm and mining compounds.

Although prostitution has existed for long, it is difficult to demarcate a clear time period when its prevalence rose, although at the beginning of the century, many (for example, chiefs) associated it with the coming of foreign labourers from the region.

Others in a classically chauvinistic manner, for example Vambe, ascribe its origin to the coming of foreign women from within and outside Zimbabwe into local communities. Possibly one of the main circumstances that encouraged the development of prostitution in this country, was the phenomenon of labour migrancy associated with farm and mine compounds and the growing towns. It appears the living conditions in the settlements which did not allow or cater for family life and entailed extended periods of...
separation from wives created the demand for prostitutes. For example, the unequal sex ratios in such establishments persisted throughout the colonial period and was worse in men's hostels. This sexual deprivation was so acute that it raised a number of fears, concerning the growth of homosexuality and beastiality. The increase in prostitution at the turn of the century also began to worry the State and employers who feared that the resultant venereal disease was decreasing the productivity of wage labourers. According to Zachrisson:

"In 1907, syphillis was considered so common in Rhodesia that the Administration even thought the labour supply could be negatively affected in the future."

Therefore, the association of prostitution with living conditions in mining compounds has persisted for long because:

"the mass of workers came to the mines without their women, and from the very earliest days of the industry, prostitutes were a feature of compound life."  

In urban areas, this problem mostly involved young men, the majority of whom (60%) were below the age of thirty, especially in the "hostels" and on average were unmarried. "Hostels" are barrack-like storey buildings with small single rooms for men, provided by urban councils, which in practice, accommodated an average of three men per room. Quite clearly from above, that the State in collusion with municipalities and the management of mining industry, directly fostered the development of prostitution. This is so, because of the low wage structures and poor housing conditions provided, which together could not sustain whole families and naturally viable communities, in settlement areas.

Turning to the question of supply of prostitutes, it is important to consider the social and economic conditions prevailing in rural and urban areas during the colonial period, especially the impact of these on the womenfolk.
It should be remembered that from the turn of the century, the status of women in the rural areas changed a great deal. The main factors of change were labour migration, drought, land alienation, tax impositions and agricultural market restrictions. As a result, women had become the main cultivators in rural areas faced difficulties in meeting economic obligations in their communities.

These hardships led to large-scale movements of women to mines and towns in the 1920's and 1930's. Moreover, with the increased weakening of the local economies, the dependency of women on men took a different turn.

On the other hand, women who migrated to towns did not themselves find any lucrative employment opportunities. In general, wives in towns had no sufficient money to maintain themselves, working women who had enough money could not obtain accommodation and informal sector employment of women was extremely poorly-paying and exploitative. In short, Zimbabwean women in towns had to depend heavily on men for their basic needs.

As regards social pressures, quite a few customs and traditions were observed in the 1920's, to engender some rebelliousness amongst women, given the hard economic conditions the society experienced. In these early periods, Zachrisson (1978, p. 304) notes that some women were fleeing from villages because of oppressive customs related to marriage systems. Other social pressures which led to desparation included the uneven sex ratios within rural areas, which were not in favour of women, and associated high divorce rates in rural areas. Evidence of interviews of prostitutes in 1949 cited the following interesting reasons for becoming prostitutes:

i) "inability to afford further education;

ii) to spite father and deprive him of lobola money;

iii) lack of means of survival in town;
iv) desertion by husbands, divorce and widowing
v) to leave village kraal, and
vi) because prostitution was simple and paid better.\textsuperscript{81}

In more recent years, it should be noted that the influx of women into towns increased rapidly during the liberation war\textsuperscript{82} and that some of the above mentioned problems would be compounded by this. It could be asked in this connection, what the more than 20,000 female 'O' Level school-leavers of 1985 would be engaged in, given that many school girls in the 1950's turned to prostitution because of basic needs such as pocket money. Another interesting casual factor that has yet to be contested with currently is the impact of tourism. Numerous studies have found that there is a strong correlation between the increase in tourism and that of prostitution. In the Southern African region, a number of countries have been dubbed "the pleasure periphery" of South Africa due to the increased commercial consumption of the "forbidden fruit" in those countries. In this connection, the impact of increased tourism and conferences in Harare is becoming self-evident.

Finally, the impact of embourgeoisement of Zimbabwean society, (as evidenced in the larger numbers of middle to high income groups and consumeristic aspirations) on different forms of prostitutions has yet to be fully appreciated. N.B. Sugar-daddy phenomenon and other such related forms of trading sex.

It can, therefore, be appreciated that the explanation of the origins and causes of prostitution is rather varigated and complex - and as such, it requires a thorough investigation of its tendencies in modern-day Zimbabwe.

In 1985, after five years of independence, prostitution has clearly been on the increase according to police records (see Table 10 with figures available only for Greater Harare).
Table 10

Number of Prostitutes Identified in Greater Harare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year 1982</th>
<th>Year 1983</th>
<th>Year 1984</th>
<th>Year 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Working class</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, the rate of cited prostitutes and prosecutions multiplied drastically because in part, prior to independence, there was a clear neglect by the regime of prostitution as will be discussed later.

Prosecutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prosecutions</th>
<th>Prosecution rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>197%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1982 had the highest number of prosecutions, possibly because of a major police blitz and the fraught situation.

According to the police, there are two types of prostitutes in Zimbabwe today, namely; "working class" and non-working class" prostitutes. These are defined as follows:

i) Working Class:

These are mainly part-time in that they operate during the night. They have decent formal employment during the day and turn to nocturnal prostitution. They frequent expensive hotels and mainly look for "big fish" clients. They wear expensive clothes and are educated. They charge
an average of $10 and above a night.

ii) Non-Working Class:

Uneducated and consequently unemployed; hence their engagement in prostitution. They are full-time in the business in that they operate day and night. Found in cheap hotels, beer halls and night clubs in the high density areas. They charge an average of $2 for a "short-time" and $5 and above a night.

It is perhaps interesting to note from police definitions that our vulnerable segment of illegal activities is rather complex involving unemployment, levels of education, formal employment and very distinct levels of remuneration for illegal employment activities. As far as incomes are concerned, it might be noted that the non-working "class" of prostitutes is mainly after "basic needs" and yet they receive less payment for their services.

With the above overview of the origin and development of prostitution in Zimbabwe, it is perhaps instructive to discuss the role of the State and policy, in order to understand ways in which this problem could be dealt with.

It has already been suggested that throughout the colonial period, the State was rather ambivalent in its attitude and policies towards prostitution, to safeguard the migrant labour system and to "stabilize" labour.

The position taken by the State is aptly described by van Onselen as follows:

"Since their (prostitutes) services did much to attract and stabilize labour, mine management and State alike were unwilling to eliminate it in spite of its direct contribution to the spread of a deadly disease throughout the black work force."

It was only in the 1930's that the State concluded not to interfere with
prostitutes as much, but to regulate their activities on mine compounds through medical examinations and the issuance of medical certificates. Thus, although the State never legalised or taxed prostitution, it sustained enclaves of regulated prostitution within the mines. This compromise position only resulted from fears of the fall in labour productivity, due to venereal disease although in some quarters prostitutes were considered to improve the workers' health and stability, through the preparation of meals, etc. The State's ambivalence towards prostitution in the early 1900's and its determination instead to maintain the supply of labour, can further be seen in its meddling with marriage laws. By 1910, marital relations had been observed to be breaking down because of prostitution attributed to the influx of foreign natives and that this affected the supplies of local labour. As the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland put it:

"... many African males were deterred from working because of the fear that their women would misconduct themselves during their absence." In response and as evidence that the State was not so much concerned about prostitution per se, in 1917 legislation was brought in the make adultery, a criminal offence (among Africans only) and punishable by fine of up to £100, payable by the men. Of course, the authorities' mentality was completely off the mark (as it sometimes is today) for it was reasoned that such ordinances were meant to, "... check the polyandrous inclination of the local females." In effect, therefore, the phenomenon of prostitution was seen as both natural among "natives" and useful for labour stabilization; the only time it was to be dealt with was when it affected productivity on the mines. In the urban areas, the prostitution question was dealt with in essentially a similar manner with sporadic differences here and there. The problem confronted by the State, however, was different here because of the numerous interests of capital involved. Here, the interests of industry and commerce
in retaining low wages had to be considered just as much as the interests
of the municipalities which had to be financially self-sufficient in their
provision of housing and social services. Also, the racist health, moral and
separatist concerns of white communities had to be contended with.

To be sure, up to the 1980's the State every now and then rounded up
women; arrested, fined or banished them for vagrancy or evading pass laws;
but this practice was stopped because it contravened the interests of
capital and because it was said to be inhumane by municipal boards, since these
raids also affected innocent women.

The crucial issue, however, was the maintenance of low wage structures.
Industry and commerce were not willing to raise wages beyond the subsistence
level for "single" workers and municipalities were not prepared to subsidize
housing for whole families. Since prostitutes could provide the badly-
needed sexual services at no cost to the State and capital and informal
sector in general could provide supplementary incomes for households, it
was decided to adopt a laissez-faire policy towards these activities.

Of course, this policy applied mainly to the "townships and hostels", for
the "white" cities had to be kept "clean."

This "pragmatic" attitude of the State towards prostitution was also well
"justified" by the fears of the white communities of a "Black peril." It
was felt that if the black workers were sexually deprived for too long, they
would resort to assaulting and raping white women in the towns; and these
were much fewer than the white men for quite some time. Others feared
that the "natives", who had an insatiable sexual appetite and sexual prowess
would turn to political agitation if he was frustrated by sexual deprivation
for too long. This is how the "neutral" policy towards prostitution was
rationalised!
As in the case of the mining compounds, again the State's concern was only aroused by the spread of venereal diseases. A major study was commissioned by the State in 1949 under Mr Wilcox, M.D. which recommended that venereal disease was a social not a medical problem, which reflects the sickness of society, but it never considered the structural and social problems that brought about prostitution.

The State accepted Mr Wilcox's narrow approach towards prostitution which focused only on venereal diseases and adapt means of dealing with it "socially" by means of:

i) propaganda, which creates a "sense of shame" about venereal diseases, showed that it causes sterility and miscarriages and showed that it comes from prostitutes,

ii) modifying the Public Health Act of 1925 to deal with venereal diseases and its carriers.

Surely, a campaign against venereal disease was, and is, very important, however, venereal disease is only a symptom of the problems which engender prostitution. There was no interest in clearly unravelling the causes of prostitution or how these could be resolved.

As a result of the State's posture towards prostitution, the main policy instrument that did try to deal with prostitution and that remains in effect today is the Vagrancy Act (1960). The Act, however, is very unclear and imprecise about the morals it purports and since it is still applicable today, it deserves special scrutiny.

Firstly, the Act talks about "immoral acts" and living on "honest means", yet these are not clearly explained with reference to prostitution per se as these aspects are tied to general vagrancy, which in the Zimbabwean context, hinges largely on legal areas of abode. Although the Act mentions persons living
wholly or in part on earnings from prostitution, it does not mention
soliciting for commercial sex on the part of men or women. However,
soliciting seems to be the main delineator of prostitution in other countries.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the law determines living "wholly or
in part." Even if this was possible, it still raises questions about employed
females living on honest means who prostitute at night (dishonest means).

A second question that arises from the first is the discretionary enforcement
process which states that a police officer "may" arrest a person who appears
to be a vagrant. This suggests that the law is open to uneven enforcement
and indeed leaves many loopholes for abuse. This, in fact, occurred in the
1983 blitz and commentators expressed fears that a range of State agents,
including the youth brigade, social workers, police and soldiers abused their
authority and implicitly accorded them extraordinary powers over citizens.92
The same magazine also pointed out that mainly black workers and peasants
of migrant labourers families visiting towns were arrested.93 This is a bias
that can only be explained by the imprecise, contradictory and discretionary
features of the Vagrancy Act. How then do we define "vulnerability" in
such a context?

Finally, the Act raises another set of questions in its provisions for rehabili-
tation, because again of non-specific and apparently discretionary powers
conferred on officers. The questions that can be asked are: How is the
need, referred to when talking about "persons in need", determined? How
is the form and degree of instruction and training to be decided upon? When
is the occupation and training sufficient for "re- entry" into society? What
guarantes does the whole rehabilitation programme give that on re-entry the
affected persons will be gainfully employed and is this to their satisfaction?
Clearly, prostitution as a "vulnerable labour segment" in Zimbabwe needs to
be better understood and the laws that deal with it and remedies suggested need to be reviewed.

In conclusion, we see that the evolution of prostitution can be plausibly seen to be tied to various phases of urban development in Zimbabwe. Urbanisation and the specific forms of its development, together with mine and farm compound establishment provide the basis for the "demand" for prostitution. The Nature of demand for sex is quite different from that which took place, for example, in West Africa. Here, we see a high "demand" for prostitution and associated forms of relationships due to the highly uneven sex-ratios in towns and compounds. These ratios in turn, were kept unfavourable for men, *inter alia* because:

i) of the regulation of the movements of women through the vagrancy and pass laws;

ii) the low wage structures, deliberately kept down below levels adequate to maintain wives and families in towns;

iii) low levels of investment by central and local government authorities in housing stock creating inadequate housing for families (hence overcrowding, single rooms, etc) and,

iv) no special housing for single and married women.

This situation persists throughout the colonial period, but is accentuated during periods of major urban influx in the 1940's and 1970's, during the liberation war.

In the "Labour Reserve Economies" the supply of prostitutes and potentiates reflects the impoverishment of the reserves through time. This, in turn, leads to various conditions conductive to the growth of prostitution. Various laws, like the Maize Control Act (1930) and Land Apportionment Act (1950's) saw the decline of the peasant economy, already based on female farm management, due to restricted land and market opportunities. This, in turn led
to increased urban migration in the 1950's and widespread deprivation of females and their migration to towns. The effects of the war created further female urban drifts, reportedly of wives and single men into towns.

However, as pointed out earlier, the female urban drift has never been matched with adequate opportunities for gainful female employment, nor were any social services (e.g. housing) provided for them in the cities. The picture that emerges is, therefore, of widespread deprivation of females in the towns heavily dependent for basic needs on relatives, etc. This, in turn, creates the structural conditions for the supply of various forms of sexual services for the basic survival of many females, especially those without education and skills. Furthermore, at, and around independence, the opening up of tourism and "business as usual" increased the effective demand for prostitutes.

In the specific Zimbabwean case, we also see a more of less "neutral" policy of the State towards the prostitution problem as various conflicts which arose between industry, commerce, central and municipal governments were best resolved by inaction. This laissez-faire policy was justified on economic grounds, in order to keep the "natives' high sexual appetite" satisfied and to prevent the so-called "black peril", which would see white women assaulted. It was further considered best to remain neutral as too much frustration on the part of the urban African would exacerbate the political agitation that was becoming widespread in the 1950's.

The State, thus played a crucial role in the growth of prostitution, albeit indirectly. This demonstrates the effects of the nature of the State and its interests on the development of certain social phenomena. This is the context in which this problem takes a different turn at independence. However, the forms and incidence of prostitution, as it is seen after independence, need
to be clearly understood. As pointed out earlier, prostitution has always existed in various forms. Before the independence of Zimbabwe, due to various restrictions, resulting from the Rhodesia's Natives' Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act, Pass Laws, etc, the locci of incidence of prostitution has always been confined to venues in townships and a few other areas. Its expression was also constrained by the absence of a number of female rights and liberties. However, at independence, during the phase of the consolidation of national democracy, most of the restrictions, especially on peoples' movement and housing of the population, were removed.

Also the era of the "One City Concept" and the opening up of hotels, etc., have freed the movement of people in towns. As a result, the expression of, and venues for prostitution, have themselves opened up in most towns.

Just as the informal sector, which was constrained through various mechanisms, seems to suddenly emerge as an "eyesore" in the white/clean city at the eve of independence in Southern Africa and various battles ensue, regarding its status, so does the prostitution phenomenon.

Furthermore, the concern for the welfare of the majority and the provision of social services (especially health services) at independence, has boosted the medical and welfare statistics in venereal diseases. This, to the surprise and chagrin of many, because of the hitherto neglect of colonial governments, had led to much panic and sensationalisation which results in ad hoc and a historical treatment of phenomenon.

B.3.2. Other Illegal Activities

In this section, we provide some brief statements on the illegal and underground activities besides prostitution, which in one way or the other, may be
associated with the notion of the vulnerable labour segments. The section will be brief and descriptive, due to the unavailability of information on such aspects in Zimbabwe.

B.3.2.1 Smuggling

The major current areas of concern with smuggling centres around, the Gold Trade Act, Precious Stones Trade Act, Parks and Wild Life Act on ivory. Table 12 shows that smuggling of precious stones (mainly emeralds and diamonds) has the highest rate of incidence compared to gold and ivory. Elephant tusks and Rhino's horns are the main interest of smugglers. Gold smuggling begins with very ordinary peasants (according to the police) who pass these on the middlement from upper classes in urban areas. Emerald smuggling was rampant during the liberation war, especially in the central provinces and has since decreased security guarding of mines after independence.

Ivory smuggling involves mainly white middlemen and has increased in 1985 and 1986 with greater poaching from the Zambian boarder. Previously, Mozambiqueans registered high amongst the arrests for ivory smuggling in Zimbabwe.

Another area of smuggling on the increase is evasion of exchange and evasion of customs duties. The former has largely been the preserve of rich white landlords and businessmen. The latter has increased in the last four years among the low income group earners with alarmingly large numbers of mainly female Zimbabweans moving into South Africa and Botswana to shop cheap and sell at over 200% mark-up rates. Arrests for this have increased and procedures to obtain holiday allowances have been tightened up in an attempt to curb the prolific illegal movement of petty consumer goods. The high cost of living and low wages are cited as the reason behind this phenomenon.
B.3.2.2 **Hawkers**

Although not much information on hawking is available, it is an interesting aspect, as Zimbabwe, prior to independence, had very restrictive legal political and economic constraints on potential licenced hawkers. Most of the related laws have not been removed although access to licences and vending sites has been improved since independence.

On average, however, according to police sources, an average of 90 hawkers a month are arrested in Zimbabwe's capital city and these pay fines of Z$20 for each arrest, while the licence only costs Z$5 per annum. Hawking is highly seasonal due to fruit selling which is practiced frequently at entrances to major supermarket chains. Frequent police raids are visible monthly, and these tend to receive support from the petty bourgeoisie, who perceive hawkers as making the city dirty, while the poorer and new residents of the "white city" find hawkers' prices to be good reason for their existence. This aspect epitomizes the conflict of the informal sector and Zimbabwe's "white city".

B.3.2.3 **Drug Trafficking**

The two major problems areas of drug-trafficking in Zimbabwe are the more traditional marijuana (mbanje) trade and Mandrax. (See Tables 13 and 14). Although "mbanje" trade has been fairly steady as Table 13 shows, Mandrax cases have been on the increase peaking in 1984. The main arrests indicate India, Zambia and Botswana as the important sources of Mandrax, while South Africa tends to be the final destination.

B.3.2.4 **Squatting**

Squatting is one area which can be safely said to be seen as a major illegal or underground activity in Zimbabwe, and as such, has been dealt severe bulldozing blows since independence. Although Table 15 shows a decline in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value Involved</th>
<th>OFFENCE</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
<th>No. OF ARRESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Source: Returns of cases investigated by Hare and Mashonaland Cold Squad.

**Parks and Wildlife** includes elephant tusks and horns of Rhinos.

**Gold Trade Act** includes Trade Act 49, 55, 56.

**Precious Stones Trade Act** includes Trade Act 49, 53, 56.
### TABLE 13 MBANJE SEIZURE (GREATER HARARE)

**CASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>POSSESSION</th>
<th>CULTIVATION</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1 820</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>2 467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2 002</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>2 392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1 010</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1 045</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>1 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1 054</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7 856</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>1 692</td>
<td>9 973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 14 MANDRAX SEIZURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
<th>QUANTITY (TABLETS)</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</th>
<th>INTENDED DESTINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29 976</td>
<td>India, Kenya</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>399 326</td>
<td>Zambia (Mainly)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe/South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64 918</td>
<td>Malawi, India, UK, Botswana</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India/UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Criminal Investigation Department Drug Section Harare.
squatting (due of course to raids), the data also shows that the majority of
the male squatters are actually employed. This is contrary to the general
claim that squatters are general criminals and unemployed. Other data from
police records suggest a high content among foreigners. In one camp at Mount
Hampden, Harare, 42% of the squatters were Zimbabweans, while the others
were Malawians (28%), Mozambiqueans (23%) and the rest were Zambians. This
is not difficult to explain, given the long tradition of labour migrancy in the
region and the general tendency of foreigners not to have relatives in towns
with whom to lodge. However, there is much misconceptions about squatting
related to aspects of criminality, nationality and reasons for squatting. For
this reason, squatters are very vulnerable to physical violence.

Table 15

Squatters in Greater Harare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employed Male</th>
<th>Self-Employed Male</th>
<th>Unemployed Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>1,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>1,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Monthly Report on squatters and shanties - CITY OF HARARE
(Housing Inspectorate)

B.3.2.5. Tax-Evasion Activities

According to the tax department in an interview with *The Herald* 8/7/86, p. 1),
the main areas of tax evasion are among landlords (and sub-letters), married
couples, "emergency-taxi operators", property transfer dealers, Zimbabwean
employees of embassies and those whose income is derived from small private
contract work. Most of these activities have boomed as a result of the
removal of various discriminatory socio-economic policies, increased demand for housing and services and general enforcement of individual rights amongst the blacks, since independence. The amounts and numbers of people involved in such tax-evasion activities is unknown due to the restricted nature of such official information and the impossibility of related primary data collection.

It should, however, be noted that these activities are rampant and would require strict harsh measures by the State to counterveil such tendencies. It would appear also that all classes are engaged in such tax-evasion activities and that this tends to cripple the political will to combat these phenomena.

B.3.2.6. Closing Remarks

Altogether, our discussion so far has shown how the phenomenon of unprotected workers has been increasing since the mid-1970s, when the economy faced a recession, and how this pattern has increased since 1982, due to yet another recession and the effects of drought. Casualisation and retrenchment of workers has increased, within major sectors (agriculture, mining and textile manufacturing). Domestic workers' employment (on official records) declined, while there seems to be a generally large pool of domestic workers employed by relatively poor black households, under harsh working conditions. Female labour was seen to be most vulnerable in general, while children and women are reportedly major vulnerable segments. The advent of independence, minimum wage and other labour regulations have increased the tendency by employers to casualise and retrench workers, while the general restructuring by capital on a global scale and locally (markets, division of labour/industrial activity, etc.) has provided the basic impetus for such labour practices. The informal sector and other illegal activities showed a definite pattern of increasing in response to "independence" and the effects of capital's restructuring. Meanwhile, the
organization of labour, especially in domestic services had increased under the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which has tried to ensure that wages and labour regulations stipulated in the laws are abided with by employers. The ZCTU's independence from the State was not systematically assessed, although there are signs of weakness in ZCTU's organisational capabilities and a disappointing performance in the 1986 minimum wages bargaining exercise. The State, on its part, only recently (1985) changed the Labour Relations Act and is currently in the process of ratifying some of the basic ILO conventions, in relation to the changed circumstances after independence.

On the whole, the ability and practices of the State and trade unions to fight against labour vulnerability in the long-term cannot be said to be adequate and requires further investigation. Moreover, a range of policies (discussed in the next section) designed to avert household vulnerability, have yet to be implemented or require careful evaluation as to their efficiency. It is this last issue that the paper now turns to as a means of tying together the effects of capital's restructuration processes and the role of the State in protecting household vulnerability in Zimbabwe. We begin first with policies.
III POLICY ISSUES: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS

This section of the paper is divided into two, beginning with a synthesis of State policy formulations, plans and strategies for employment creation. This is followed in a second section by an analysis of such programmes.

A. POLICY ISSUES ON CREATING EMPLOYMENT, GENERATING INCOMES AND SUPPLEMENTING BASIC NEEDS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED, "UNDER-EMPLOYED", VULNERABLE LABOUR SEGMENTS" AND THE POOREST RURAL SEGMENTS IN ZIMBABWE

It has been necessary to comb through the Government of Zimbabwe's Transitional National Development Plan (INDP), Volumes 1 (1982) and 2 (1983), in order to identify the policies, objectives, strategies and programmes that have been proposed to assist those whom we have defined as Zimbabwe's "vulnerable labour segments". Our sub-title clearly specifies these categories, and the earlier discussions of methodology and our study approach both explain the rationale behind this analytical and real-life practice categorization.

In summary, what emerges is that strategies to assist the "vulnerable" households range from co-operativisation, self-help schemes, "income-generating" enterprises, the general promotion of the "informal sector" enterprises, the general promotion of self-employment (given leadership and skills training from the government) and the promotion of "small enterprises in urban and rural areas" (presumably a small but formal sector) through various institutional arrangements and State support services. The following outlines such policy issues.

The following summary positions were held by the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) in its plan documents:

"Government is committed to the establishment of co-operatives in all fields of productive enterprise, where this type of organisation if beneficial.
Government will provide training for co-operative personnel so as to ensure democratic, orderly and profitable operations. Other support activities will be undertaken, such as research and the design of simple technologies for rural production. Government will also assist community self-help efforts, building on the long tradition of self-help and community efforts in our society."

The co-operative issue even spelt out more specifically:

(a) "The present economic and political climate in Zimbabwe provides an excellent environment for co-operative development. The co-operative movement severely disrupted during the war, has been largely resuscitated and now provides a base for rapid expansion and re-conceptualization."

(b) "Service and audit infrastructure is provided by co-operative unions, the Central Association of Co-operative Unions and the Department of Co-operative Development. What is still lacking are a credit league to boost the small credit union movement, a co-operative bank, specialised activities by co-operative groups (as with management in the Southern and Western parts of the country), market societies to run market spaces, developed consumer and housing co-operatives and well-staffed independent research and training institutions."

2. On issues relating to employment and labour productivity: "Formal employment will increase at an annual rate of just over 3%, which means an additional 108,200 jobs over the plan period (or an average of 36,067 new jobs per year) will be generated. A large number of families will be resettled each year, while establishment and development of small-scale industries in rural areas and removal of discrimination against the informal sector will provide substantial levels of additional gainful employment."

3. On issues of rural and agricultural development, the following position was taken:

"Co-operatives will be encouraged and supported by introducing an appropriate legal framework, personnel training and finance. In particular, government will seek improvement in the utilisation of transport and
traction equipment and in the conservation and husbandry of renewable resources, especially timber and grasslands. Incentives will be provided to communities to ensure efficient utilisation of common resources such as grazing land, forest areas, woodlots and water.\textsuperscript{98}

4. In terms of overall development strategy:

"In the economic arena, the strategy requires increased domestic participation, ownership and control of the economy by nationals and the State and active worker participation and involvement in decision-making in industry and agriculture. It requires the establishment of State farms and encouragement of the development of co-operatives in both urban and rural economies."\textsuperscript{99}

5. Moreover, the government of Zimbabwe's preoccupation with full employment is clear:

"Government is committed to attaining and maintaining full employment. In the plan period, the goal will be to create maximum possible levels of additional employment ... (sic) will be difficult in view of constraining factors, including the following:

(i) the high degree of unemployment and under-employment already existing but the exact quantum of which is unknown;

(ii) the relative capital intensity of the modern sector which limits its capacity to generate high levels of employment and the changing of which requires considerable time;

(iii) to significant social, legal, economic and financial discrimination against the "informal" sector which limits the sector's capacity to generate high levels of employment than at present, and

(iv) the high estimated net addition to the labour force relative to the economy's capacity to generate productive employment."\textsuperscript{100}

6. These overall objectives, strategies and programmes very clearly coalesce under the issues of "community development". The plan becomes more clear as to the overall need to deal with household vulnerable through:

"Community Development in the context of the plan refers to community
level organisation and co-ordination of non-governmental activities which complement, and are co-ordinated with the appropriate activities of government."

(b) "The plan emphasis in the important role of people in development requires that community development provide the machinery for decentralisation and delegation of development responsibilities to local communities or distinct groups (e.g. women and youth), thus creating conditions conducive to development and reinforcement of the spirit of collective self-reliance. In this regard, by ensuring mass participation in the development process and the safeguarding of national independence, community development helps to lay the foundation for Zimbabwe's independent democratic and socialist society."

(c) One of the relevant objectives is thus:

(i) "Improvement of the quality of life through collective self-reliant community effort."

(d) In fact, the plan ties together the whole issue into one of self-reliance, and interestingly departs from using the "traditional" aspects of collective action, as follows:

"Co-operative organisation and development is an effective approach to national development at the community. It pools resources collectively and helps to realise economies of scale in production, marketing and finance. Some of the experience in mass organisation during the liberation war will be exploited to advance the co-operative movement in which government will assist in educating the population on the benefits of co-operation and co-operative development."

(e) "It is intended that co-operatives will be created in a number of areas; crafts, consumer, house construction, etc. To assist the establishment and development of co-operatives, government will:

(i) centralise co-operative development policy and co-ordination;

(ii) establish an operational centre to provide information on co-operative development;

(iii) provide training in co-operative management;"
(iv) institute popular education on the benefits of co-operatives, and
(v) facilitate financial and technical support co-operants. 101

However, the question is, to what extent has much of this government promotional activity been achieved?

7. The overal strategy is even disaggregated to the sectoral level, where specific programmes and underlying objectives are stipulated. What is interesting, before we outline the sectoral provisions for dealing with vulnerable households is, the silence (and thus implicit hesitation) to create special provisions for some of the sectors:

The main sectors not provided for are:

1. The manufacturing sector;
2. The energy development sector;
3. The domestic service ("servants") sector (which is a large long-standing employer),
4. The financial aspects (at the lower grass-roots level, although State institutions to provide this are proposed).

The rationale for these omissions or the silence on these sectors, cannot really be explored for this paper. It is important to note, however, that since 1982, co-operatives and small enterprises in these "formal" sectors have been established and in some cases supported by the government of Zimbabwe. To avoid misunderstanding, it should, however, be clear that these sectors listed above, from before independence have had "informal sector" participation, albeit in a small way. This also means that the government of Zimbabwe's statements to promote the "informal sector" in general, might take care of the omissions. This still, however, does not take away our point about specific sectoral provisions, for it is important to note this distinction, as part and parcel of a probable "response" by the State, at independence, to the exigencies of capital in Zimbabwe, and the structure of local and foreign control of the various economic sectors. Moreover, the point to be made is that, in the event (after 1982, when the economic recession had hit Zimbabwe), some co-operatives, etc in those
omitted sectors emerged, and this in itself is significant. That is, that during the recession, there was a form of "restructuring" by capital (in an economy already ridden with a crisis of capital accumulation since 1974, when the economic performance began to decline - never mind the "false boom" of 1980 to 1981), which include further transnationalisation and monopolisation of certain industries, the re-capitalisation of certain industries with less labour-intensive "new" technologies, to replace "the aged UDI capital goods sector technology" and, resultant and general labour retrenchment (mentioned later). The mining sector seems to have had the worst problems during the period and the State "responded" through various measures (see below).

The following, therefore, are the specific sectoral aspects from the plan (excluding agriculture, which has been noted already):

a) The strategy in the "Distribution and Tourism" sector was to form State Trading Corporations (STCs), which would have various tasks:

"For example, they will provide wholesale facilities in growth points and small rural distribution centres. Government will encourage the establishment and development of producer and consumer co-operatives in rural areas through education and training provision of some service such as auditing and consultancies. Because of their size, STCs and co-operatives will enjoy economies of scale which will lower unit costs, and, therefore, prices to consumers. The establishment and development of these organisations will also enhance the available skilled human resources in the sector."\cite{102}

That it is clear, was designed to deal with the overall "vulnerability" of household in general, and to create employment, incomes and reduced reproduction costs for the so-called vulnerable segments. In operational terms, institutional arrangements would be required. Thus, for example,

"... SEDCO is being established to provide financial assistance, training and consulting services to consumer and trading co-operatives and small wholesale and retail enterprises."\cite{103}
In the construction sector, the idea would be that:

"Popular participation will be encouraged and promoted by organising voluntary youth construction brigades which will assist and complement the self-reliant activities and co-operatives, both of which are central to government policy in the sector. The National Army will also be called upon to engage in construction activities."

So, regarding "vulnerable labour segments" per se, the following quotation from the plan is very revealing:

"The construction sector is labour-intensive, in which much of the labour is unskilled or semi-skilled. Training (much of which is on the job) in the required skills for the sector does not normally take a long time. Therefore, a large number of unemployed youths, particularly demobilised ex-combatants, will thus be absorbed into the sector and given training on the job and thus generate a large pool of construction manpower in a comparatively short time."

This shows a kind of self-admission of the existence of "vulnerability" of labour in this sector (i.e. "labour intensive", "semi-skilled"). However, the idea is that the youth should be further thrown into the sector, while employment absorption is not really guaranteed.

c) Specific strategies for the "vulnerable" in agriculture appear to have evolved around credit.

i) "As already noted, Zimbabwe has the beginning of a strong co-operative movement. In the credit field, the savings development movement, the Silveira Agricultural Group Scheme and the smaller Credit Union Movement represents a variety of approaches to self-help, thrift, and the economic education of members of the community. The AFC will increasingly be involved in a wholesale/retail relationship with these organizations so as to increase official and banking industry support for the efforts."

ii) And, regarding technological deficiencies among the "vulnerable", "Measures to be undertaken include the following:

investment and managerial support to communal, co-operative or private suppliers or traction and mechanical services", etc.

Very clearly, therefore, the State planned to support the "vulnerable" in a variety of ways. More specifically, in agriculture and rural development (where resettlement was a key factor) the plan said:

iii) "Government will also assist in the advancement of the co-operative movement..."
and help it improve its operational efficiency. A co-operative college will be established at Domboshava to train both members of co-operatives & government co-operative management support staff. Such training programmes will not, however, achieve the interim measures will, therefore, be needed to assist the movement. Such measures will include formulation and extension of comprehensive programmes of co-operative extension audit and supervision, consultancy and advisory services and representation in legal and other matters."

iv) This type of programme would obviously involve institutions such as ZIDS. On training programmes, the following specific aspects surfaced: "Government has established the Co-operative Training College and plans to operate a revolving fund which will provide finance for the establishment of co-operative depots and distribution/collection centres. The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) will, among other things, plan, promote and co-ordinate development programmes in rural areas."

This shows the already active engagement by the State 2½ years after independence. The co-operative effort referred to in the second quote, however, relates to primary and not producer co-operative unions. (Note, INDP, Volume 2 was published in 1983, when many events planned for in Volume 1 had become established while a new response by the State and the populace to circumstances were emerging).

8. It is interesting to note that the Second Volume of the INDP posed new problems on labour employment as well as sectoral aspects.

a) Some of the objectives in Volume 2, on labour and social services, which impinge on both the issue of vulnerability of labour segments and co-operativization as a means of assisting such segments include:

iii) "facilitation of progressive acquisition of productive entities by workers whenever this becomes necessary and economically viable."

b) Regarding this objective, in fact since 1982 (when the economic recession set-in and hit many productive sectors, particularly mining production, whose market-prices had slumped) the government has had to rescue (through
subsidies and joint investment) mining houses, and in some cases take over bankrupt mines, which have been either owned by the State Corporation (ZMDC) or organised for co-operatives to run (cases may be cited if necessary). This has partly been seen as a way of avoiding retrenchment.

c) Other objectives in the second volume include:
   vii) "provision of public assistance in circumstances of lost or unavailable income;

   viii) establishment of a viable social security system related to the employment situation." 109

The extent to which these objectives have been met, however, requires detailed study, which will not be possible in this paper. Programmes suggested include:

   ii) "programmes for employment generation, especially laid off workers with usable skills and programmes for enhancement of the capacity of people, especially in rural areas, to generate supplementary cash incomes."

   v) "examination, design and implementation of a national social security and pension scheme."

Again, some of these programmes have involved the formation of co-operatives and the emergence of "income generating" projects, whose efficacy and "viability" is for now questionable.

9. One final and interesting sector that had already received attention in Volume One of the TNDP, is the "Aquaculture" sector. Fishing (in other words) had been noted as a potential area for increasing employment and incomes in the rural areas. What is interesting in terms of the concept of "household vulnerability" here is that "peasant fishermen" and fishing industry workers were paid for long hours, low prices and exploitative wages (see various issues of The Herald in 1983). The need to protect this section of vulnerable households was spelt out clearly:

"Government will encourage the establishment of fishing co-operatives, where there is access to suitable water supplies and the building and stocking of fish ponds in rural areas as a means of contributing of productive employment and providing a supplementary source of protein." 111

This particular sectoral activity was very keenly taken up by the ministry of
Community Development and Women's Affairs, which, by mid-1983, had set up various fishing co-operatives in Binga district (near Lake Kariba). Interestingly, donor agencies (in particular non-governmental organisations - NGOs) keenly supported these with equipment and they are apparently thriving! This would need further analysis.

We might conclude this policy aspect by noting that it is in the areas (sectors) of primary production (agriculture, etc) and basic services, where programmes to combat household vulnerability have been most well established. The secondary sectors, with intensive foreign capital control are less well treated yet as our data presented earlier shows, it is particularly in the manufacturing sector, whose growth and tendencies have been most erratic, within the context of capital's restructuring at the global and local level, where the "vulnerable labour segments" - as defined by ILO are most prevalent. That sector and agricultural labour are the main problems in Zimbabwe today. As the government of Zimbabwe states:

Zimbabwe needs to develop new institutions and re-orient existing ones, in order to provide institutional and organisational support for the transition to more socialised forms of production and distribution, and launch appropriate community development programmes. Leadership skills need to be developed and broadened to facilitate the development of appropriate organisations at the village, communal and co-operative levels, which will assist the masses to function better, or more productively, in their socio-economic environment. The role of the youth and that of women in development will be emphasized and unjustified discriminatory practices against them will be eliminated.\footnote{112}

Whether the institutional and organisational re-organisation which has so far taken place in the above context of the plan, could or has effectively assuaged (at least) the household vulnerability is yet to be seen, and requires more research.

At this juncture, it would be instructive to briefly outline related policy issues that have been put forward in the current five-year development plan, concentrating mainly on new aspects not raised in the TNDP. Also, we need
to devote a few pages to a discussion of policy on co-operatives as an
employment strategy, as this is a crucial area to which "vulnerable households"
have turned, and which the State has supported. This will set the stage
for our later analysis of the actual employment resulting from this and its
viability.

POLICY ISSUES IN THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN
(FF - YNDP) (1986-1990)

1. Since most of the FF - YNDP objectives and strategy are close to those
   in the TNDP, we only need to make special references to those main
   objectives of relevance to this study. These include:

   "a) Transformation and control of the economy and economic expansion;
b) Raising the standards of living of the entire population, in particular the
   peasant population;
c) Enlargement of employment opportunities and manpower development."

2. The specifications are largely the same as in the TNDP, but special mention
   is now made of:

   "iv) establishment of co-operative ventures in industry, commerce, trade
   and agriculture, as well as participation of local authorities in the
   economy."114

This would immediately suggest a more holistic approach of co-operative
programmes in conjunction with active interaction with local authority
participation.

3. Another new specification under objective (c) is:

   "Irrigation schemes will be prepared for communal areas and this should
   also help in enlarging employment opportunities."115

This shows a new strategy of employment creation, especially in rural areas,
particularly where the peasants live in "vulnerable" agro-ecological situations,
and thus, for the most vulnerable rural households.

4. The FF - YNDP recognises the continued employment problem and the
government of Zimbabwe plans to divert 47% of total investment into
productive sectors of the economy (Vol. 1 p. 11).116 Manpower training
will be further consolidated to improve skilled labour. Thus, the major
difference is the emphasis on a renewed investment programme. (Details
are in the plan).

5. The plan notes that 4.2 million people (50%) of the total population by 1990 will be available for work (age-wise), so for this reason, new employment creation opportunities are given high priority.

6. Wage employment is expected to increase by 2.7% (i.e. 144,000 jobs over the plan period). Otherwise, self-employment and co-operatives will be promoted.

7. Sectoral development emphasizes the agriculture, manufacturing and mining sectors, which should increase raw materials for industry (Ibid, p. 23).

8. Government of Zimbabwe recognises that in 1985, "the volume of mining activity was " ... 2 - 3% lower than in 1980," and that wage employment there had declined by " ... 10,000 workers, from 66,000 in 1980 ..."

9. "Wage employment in the manufacturing sector is expected to increase from 169 000 workers in 1985, to nearly 200 000 workers in 1990."

Whether this is realistic is yet to be seen.

10. "Employment in the sector (sic: Construction and Housing) will grow at the rate of 2.9% annually." While employment in the "Distribution and Tourism" sector increased by 15 000 workers.

11. In the Transport and Communication sector, investment during the plan period is "...estimated at Z$855 million, Z$794 million of this will be financed through the P.S.I.P.. Employment is expected to increase from 50 000 in 1985, to 60 000 by 1990." While employment in the Health sector " ... is projected to increase from 82 000 in 1985 to 97 000 in 1990 ..." (Ibid, p. 38).

12. As before (in the TNDP), the Community Development Department will continue its mobilization activities.

The overall issues raised by the FF-YNDP to resolve the vulnerability of households, need careful attention, for it would appear that there is much optimism in the growth of "formal" sector employment, given the apparent economic recovery from late 1984, and the projected economic growth rates of above 5% per annum. Whether this optimism is justified, remains to be seen. For now, we turn to an overview analysis of rural labour mobilization through employment creating programmes.
The earlier discussion showed that unemployment was estimated between 12% and 15%, and with employment in the formal material production sector actually declining at approximately one half per cent annually.

A wide range of employment creation programmes were also discussed in terms of government of Zimbabwe policy. The informal sector employment programme and processes in Zimbabwe, have already been documented by I.L.O. commissioned papers (Mkandawire, 1983 and Mhone et al. 1984), and we need not treat that sector here. One of the employment creation programmes which has been significantly promoted in terms of absolute numbers of people engaged are the various types of "co-operatives" in Zimbabwe. However, co-operatives have not received much official attention locally, internationally or within I.L.O., in most presentations of Zimbabwe's employment process. Why this has been the case, we will not attempt to answer here. Instead, we would like to present and analyse co-operativisation as employment creation in Zimbabwe.

**FORMAL COLLECTIVE SELF-EMPLOYMENT: REGISTERED CO-OPERATIVES**

Since 1909, there have been various legal provisions for co-operatives in Zimbabwe, while the existing Co-operatives Society Act (Chapter 193) of 1956, marks the beginnings of co-operativisation amongst the black Zimbabweans, who constitute the majority of the "vulnerable households". The pattern of growth of co-operatives since then, up until 1984 is clearly depicted in the tables below.
GROWTH & DISTRIBUTION OF CO-OPERATIVES SOCIETIES (1956-1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural marketing and supply societies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farming societies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural societies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>557</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development.

Note: (1) Non-agricultural co-operatives include Art and Craft, Buy Aid, Civil Service Consumer, Credit Unions, Education, Fishing, Fruit and Vegetables, Herbal and Medicine, Housing, Industrial, Mining, Printing and Publishing, Public Relations, Security, Transport, Vendors and Hawkers.

The general increase in numbers of individuals engaged in the various co-operatives and their growth from only 1,099 members in 1981 to 21,371 members, is striking.

EMPLOYMENT & NUMBER OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATING CO-OPERATIVES (1981 - 1984)

Employment (A) and number of co-operatives (B) for each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fishing</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale &amp; retail trade</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the Department of Co-operative Development.

Note: There is a possibility of an overlap in employment figures since members can join more than one co-operative in different industries.

This data, however only relates to "registered co-operatives", although there are many more unregistered co-operatives.
In order to immediately contextualise our present discussion, it should clearly be emphasized that membership in "co-operatives" differs from other forms of employment creation programmes, in that it explicitly represents collective self-employment. In this sense, "registered" collectives would have their counterparts in "formal" self-employment (e.g. small-scale enterprises), while unregistered co-operatives (which in Zimbabwe include, recognised groups called "pre-co-operatives" and others, which are purely "self-help" groups - without any formal interaction with State support organs or NGOs); may be termed "informal" collective (self-help) self-employment. The point of departure is not so much the various types of State and NGO support that is offered to these two forms of self-employment, but the legal framework (implied in "registration", which as a rule, goes along with a formal constitution and bye-laws, that bind the members around certain agitarian and equitable rules concerning distribution of income, conditions of work and participation in decision-making). It is in this context, that the "vulnerability" of households, which are members of such "co-operatives" can be assessed, and in practice, it seems that inequitability and exploitation of some members by others tends to arise more in the unregistered groups, although the corollary does not apply for registered co-operatives.

A second distinction worthy of note is that, although the State and NGOs promote both types of "co-operatives", there is a tacit understanding that, on the one hand, most formally registered co-operatives were created with State support for the landless and unemployed (for example, in the resettlement programmes, at least initially). In the later years they were created (quite spontaneously) largely for retrenched workers, within disbanded enterprises and specifically for the expansion of natural resources (mineral, fish, etc) exploitation. On the other hand, regarding "pre-co-operatives", it would appear that the tacit understanding is to create employment for the "under-employed",
or those with "incomes below subsistence level", especially in the rural areas, and for the youth and woman as "self-help" programmes. There is another distinction that can be made in relation to the importance that has lately been attached to formal collective self-employment: That is, "considering the problems of creating employment in the formal sector - the creation of co-operatives as a means of employment creation could go a long way in solving the unemployment problem. It is actually with this consideration in mind that the government after independence, went on to step up provision and improvement of the socio-economic infrastructure, essential for the viable formation of co-operative economic units" (Ibid, p. 51); there is need to distinguish between:

(a) employment creating co-operatives which are basically those that guarantee employment to all registered members, e.g. collective farms, mining co-operatives, etc;

(b) from "service co-operatives which serve to enhance the productive capacity of registered members in their original occupations, but without providing direct employment other than the over-head staff, e.g. the Agricultural Marketing and Supply Co-operative."  

Although co-operatives and "pre-co-operatives" are considered to be important potential employment creation activities, formal collective self-employment constituted, however, only 2% of the total formal employment in Zimbabwe; in spite of an annual average increase of 5,349 persons so-employed. This report openly laments the low level of employment creation through co-operatives, due to the slow growth rate of co-operatives.

Another related sphere of employment creation (since independence) is the "building brigades" created for the "youth". These, although employed by local authorities, are according to our conceptualisation, another form of formal
collective self-employment since their services are open for general contracts. They differ mainly in terms of their relation to the means of production (which are usually owned by local level State authorities) and particularly in that they tend to be guaranteed building contracts by local authorities. Moreover, building brigades tend to be created within the boundaries or the framework of local government structures, so that tacitly, they are a form of decentralized employment creation, which in turn supports local level infrastructure investment, at "economic rates", presumably viable for the local authorities' budgets.

It is critical to note, before we pursue our analysis, that "viability" for local authorities in infrastructure development is circumscribed by central government budgetary allocations to local authorities and local authority revenue generation. Since independence, local revenue has been rather low, due to non-enforcement of poll-taxes or head-taxes, while local authorities rely on income generated from liquor sales. These local authority incomes, in turn, determine the levels of remuneration possible, for work done by the "building brigades" and other "self-help" groups; as well as the extent of reliance on "self-help."

In this context, local authority remuneration has a double-edged effect on household vulnerability. On the one hand, the statutory minimum wages within local authorities' employment structures are below national minimum wages, which in itself represents a low level of labour valuation in the rural areas (as suggested in the general conceptual framework presented in part one of this paper). On the other hand, the incomes received by members of various collective self-employed groups are also low, due to the generally low levels of profits realised by such groups. More importantly, incomes tend to be "unreliable" and "unstable", due to the ad hoc nature of work contracts available to such groups. Moreover, the reliance on "self-help" groups, (building community facilities, such as schools, clinics, boreholes, etc),
which is, in fact, unpaid labour, completes the picture of an employment generation strategy based on under-valued labour in terms of wages or benefits in kind (e.g. access to the services built by the same people).

Formal employment created through building brigades (based on data from 33 local authorities out of 55) is presented in the table below.

Table - Employment of Building Brigades by province: 1983 - 84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 577</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 647</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on information obtained from 18 local authorities of all provinces.

Source: Annual Review of Manpower - 1984, government of Zimbabwe, pp. 53

The patterns emerging are that:

(i) overall employment by building brigades actually increased from 1,577 in 1983 to 1,647 employees in 1984, which is substantial - given that there was no such employment before 1980. However, the overall of growth after 1983 has not been substantial.

(ii) In fact, it is only in 2 provinces (Mashonaland East and Matabeleland North) where brigades' employment increased. Incidentally, these provinces have districts, (such as Binga, Mutoko, Mudzi), which were "neglected" during the colonial period or are the regions where the liberation war was intense. Some of these were only created as separate entities after independence.
In general, employment decreased in the other provinces and the manpower report attributes this to the slump in the construction industry, and further suggestions that employment in this sector could pick up in future.\footnote{122} This is hardly plausible, given that these brigades work on planned local authority's infrastructure development budgets. Three other factors may explain the decline in such employment, in some of the provinces. Firstly, the more "advantaged reasons" (in terms of infrastructure development) do not have a high demand for such building activity, and therefore, this activity does not feature as a development priority in their plans and budgets.

Secondly, that persons trained in the brigades tend to be poached by private small and large-scale building contractors, which offer slightly higher statutory minimum wages. Thirdly, some provinces may actually be utilizing more local private, individual small-scale contractors in preference to building brigades, given the capitalist nature of the rural political economy. Thus, overall employment in this sector, when considered in view of the low demand in some provinces, as well as the general slump in building would suggest that construction is an unreliable, temporary and fluctuating employment sector. Household vulnerability can thus hardly be expected to be resolved there. Moreover, the usual part-time, seasonal and daily contract forms of employment make this labour segment one of the most vulnerable sectors, after agriculture and the manufacturing sectors. Building brigades thus have limited possibilities of increasing employment and they stand a chance where there is relatively serious political will to contract brigades preferentially.

\textbf{INFORMAL COLLECTIVE SELF-EMPLOYMENT: "PRE-CO-OPERATIVES AND SELF-HELP\textbf{}}

We may now return briefly to a discussion of employment programmes and actual employment trends in (what we have termed) the "informal collective self-employment" structures. This discussion has added importance (beyond
our conceptualization of these categories as areas of household labour vulnerability), because of the omission in government labour discussions (as in the above discussed report) on employment and employment creation programmes. This is not to say that government policy statements have not implicitly (and explicitly in some cases) regarded these categories as employment creating. What it does mean is that, the lack of "formality" explicit in terms, such as "self-help" and in the lack of legal provisions for remuneration and conditions of work, places such employment easily into vulnerability, and blocks potential state support, which would otherwise be provided if they were formally or officially recognized as employment activities. Our discussion is important as an analysis of past trends (1980-1985) and as a basis for future planning for such employment, and reducing household vulnerability related to such employment, especially in the rural areas.

Information concerning informal collective self-employment, in respect of the actual number of such groups and the number of people engaged, is rather difficult to get, because of the scatteration of groups. These groups are scattered geographically, by type of activity, form of organization, cohesiveness and sources of support.

The latter aspect, (support) is critical, as it usually involves financial, material, "technical advice" and "managerial" support provided from various sources, including, government - through number of Ministries such as Youth, Sport and Culture, Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement - in respect mainly of farmers' groups, and Local Government - which is less directly active in promoting such groups, but does so more at the district administration level, where it encourages "self-help", non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which include a number of Zimbabwean NGOs with or without church affiliations and a hose of international NGOs (with or without direct church backing, and with or without direct influence from their countries' governments). Also included
are groups supported by the private sector, especially local and transnational companies, which produce or market agricultural inputs, and thus tend to use such groups (working collectively to increase their cash cropping production) as points of inputs supply.

These agriculture-based groups have tended to increase household labour utilization, and the hiring of casual or temporary workers in the peasant sector (creating some employment in rural areas, but under informal labour agreements). This reflects the fact that since independence, the "communal lands" became a recognised productive sub-sector (and not merely "labour reserves"). The amount of household labour utilization and casual work increases have not yet been systematically estimated by both the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, to our knowledge, and no such estimate can practically be made for this paper. We might only point out that there has been a substantial increase in labour mobilization (or employment creation if the reader prefers) within the communal (or more realistically, the peasant) sector since independence. This labour, or unemployment is subject to the same or worse under-valuation of labour, and is in most cases, remunerated in "pre-capitalistic" terms (e.g. payments in kind, labour exchange or labour for use of rich peasants' draft power or keeping cattle for milk and organic fertilization, etc). These forms of labour payment have been observed by the authors in their field studies, but requires more systematic evaluation.

In the following, we provide crude estimates and an assessment of these informal self-employment creation activities, which arise as part of the mobilization meant to overcome the "perceived" under-employment in rural areas, by international development experts in general, and by the State and NGOs, which have been instrumental in the formulation and implementation of such employment creation programmes.
Our data collection efforts (albeit scattered and scanty sources) summarizes
the distribution in 1985 of unregistered pre-co-operatives, in the table
below.

(Source: Hanlon and the various government of Zimbabwe ministries):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Co-operative Type</th>
<th>No. of Co-operatives</th>
<th>No. of members at an average of 5/grp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fishing co-operatives</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Harare City Council women's gardening co-operatives</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ministry of Youth, medium-scale group/collectives</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ministry of Youth income generating groups (co-operatives &amp; pre-co-operatives)</td>
<td>100 (+ 50?)</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ministry of Community Development &amp; Women's Affairs' income generating projects</td>
<td>3 363</td>
<td>16 815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Savings Clubs of various affiliations</td>
<td>1 834</td>
<td>9 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Zimbabwe Women's Bureau income generating groups</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Others unidentified</td>
<td>300 plus</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESTIMATED TOTAL UNREGISTERED</strong></td>
<td>±6 000</td>
<td>29 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we calculate the number of people engaged in these groups using a minimum
group number (conservatively) of 5 members per group, we arrive at a minimum
of 30,000 Zimbabweans involved in our category of informal collective
self-employment. There are more church related groups (e.g. the "Vashandiri"
women's group of the Lutheran church, etc), which engaged women into
"income generation" activities but are not necessarily affiliated to, or supported
by the State and national and international NGOs. Our figure of 30,000 is,
therefore, a very low estimate of households engaged in collective work,
especially in communal areas where there are: (a) periodic self-help groups
formed around specific community projects (schools, clinics, dams, roads/culverts,
boreholes, teachers' housing, etc), organised through local authorities (councils,
etc), and the ruling party;
(b) crisis response (e.g. drought effects, etc) groups formed by the people on their own;
(c) private sector encouraged groups, which our table does not include;
(d) communal-farm-plot groups (called "zhundes");
(e) rural work programmes' local groups, organised by the State, under "work for cash" road building, etc, activities.

The quantity and extent of such labour or employment ca, therefore, not be under-rated in any discussion of employment creation programmes. The question, however, is to what extent and in what sense do households engaged in such activities constitute part of the "vulnerable labour segments" in Zimbabwe? As we cannot pursue this question further, due to the need to engage in empirical work to answer it, we might only suggest tentatively that a large measure of household vulnerability is self-evident in:

(i) the mere fact of engagement in such work, reflecting the need by such households to increase and/or supplement incomes, access to services and access to very basic needs.
(ii) the non-existence of regulatory measures to gauge the degree of exploitation of those so engaged, and to ensure regularity, reliability and stability of incomes therefrom.

(The exception here would be direct State works programmes and local authority contracts for brigades, although the wages here are also prone to labour under-valuation). Stability and regularity of incomes here are particularly circumscribed by either the ad hoc nature of the activities or the part-time/temporary nature of the programmes.

Our preliminary assessment, thus suggests that: both formal and informal collective self-employment are victims of vulnerability: the vulnerability lies in the very conditions under which co-operatives were formed.

Firstly, there are various reports which have so far listed numerous co-operatives that are not "viable" or profitable" in terms of their gross margins; and this is quite true. However, what these reports do not consider and our
current research on co-operative shows, is that this so-called "viability" has tended to omit calculations of "wages" in the co-operatives since both the co-operators and their "expert" evaluators hardly compute labour costs expended by co-operators into their gross margins' balance sheets. This means that in fact, if reliable, regular and stable wages were paid to co-operators (which they are not in the majority of cases), the viability or profitability would be even worse.

Secondly, many co-operatives were formed under difficult circumstances, such as:

(a) Resettlement on former large-scale commercial farms (mainly in the poorer agro-ecological regions), without the adequate management and specialised farming skills necessary to run such enterprises profitably, and without sufficient capital to run the large enterprises to their maximum potential.

(b) A number of co-operatives were formed as "defensive responses" to the earlier mentioned restructuring of capital. For instance, the general range of co-operatives formed in this fashion include:

(i) the take-over of non-profitable enterprises such as large farms, mines and factories, because labour was going to be retrenched.

(ii) co-operatives formed in response to drought effects, and thus based on "worst-case" enterprise planning, with mainly labour as the binding resource, while capital and operating costs were made available at the "philanthropic" mercy of NGOs (whose assistance conditions also place constraints on long-term durability, viability and "progressiveness", in terms of true socialist independence);

(iii) co-operatives organised as a part-time household activity (gardening and most income generating projects). These tend to scatter peasant household labour and to increase the labour burden on youth and women. Moreover, these are merely supplementary income generation "projects", and not solid enterprises with long-term viability.
Overall, therefore, co-operativeization in this context, (although it provides "employment") is generally subject to labour under-valuation, self-exploitation, increased exploitation of the youth and women, and is grounded in the "marginal economic" sectoral activities, where it is also confronted by steep competition from full-fledged capitalist productive enterprises, and thus is disadvantaged in terms of access to, and control of markets - given the predominance of large foreign capital. They are also dependent on State and NGO support, which can be restricted, given the convergence of the I.M.F. and the World Bank on reduced government spending and donor collaboration on influencing development policy strategy and thus, programmes. Co-operatives tend to rely (within the logic of capital in Zimbabwe) on servicing large capitalist enterprises (as intermediary producers and processors of raw materials at low costs), and diverting the burden of social security and welfare from the State in general (via fiscal policies) and from the private sector in particular (via decreasing direct formal wage employment).

What we have, therefore, is a widespread (geographically and sectorally and demographically) mobilization of labour (through co-operatives, clubs, associations, etc), "creating" collective self-employment, which, however, is a result of a "defensive response" to the restructuring of capital in the context of independence (black rule), the world recession (which affected Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1984) and the policy influences of multi-lateral lending institutions. To be sure, not all co-operatives, etc result from "defensive response", but this is a matter which requires further systematic investigation.

On the whole, therefore, our employment creation programmes are themselves "vulnerable" labour/employment creation programmes, which directly reflect household vulnerability, and the related concept we have attempted to develop in this paper. Thus, our "vulnerable labour segments" are greatly augmented by our analysis (beyond the three ILO categories identified in our
terms of reference). Furthermore, what this underguards is that the issue of household vulnerability in respect of labour exploitation and the reliability and stability of incomes, apart from requiring an appropriate research methodology and detailed empirical investigation needs to be placed in the broader context of the overall political economic structures (which are continuously being restructured).

And, from the point of view of the vulnerable households themselves, there is need to view these households in their real context, whereby they are confronted by a multiplicity of survival possibilities (or "options" if the reader likes) and strategies arising out of "employment creating" projects put forward by various actors (the State, capital, the churches, NGOs, local authorities, the party, etc), towards different ends which do not necessarily coincide with real benefits to such households. In any case, single households pursue a variety of options which together bring the sum total of household incomes, whose vulnerability is complex to measure, so that there is need for a social audit* of household strategies, to gauge the costs and benefits to households. Similarly, there is need for social auditing at the national level, in order to detect the tendency towards vulnerability.

* The concepts, "social auditing" and "defensive response" have been borrowed from England and Europe co-operativization processes (see references).
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Western crisis moment theory is bound, in the not very long run, to become very unstuck in its attempts to trace and explain the simultaneous use of market and non-market resources by the households in countries like Zimbabwe, that have historically based their strategies for survival on such a duality between market and non-market resources. But far from being discrete and unrelated acts, this is an interdependent element of an integrated strategy for the reproduction of labour power. Simple commodity producers in Zimbabwe either as households on a co-operative or in the communal lands, or in the urban squatterments of Harare and Bulawayo, have participated and survived in some labour markets precisely because they were able to collectively and consciously make a materialist choice to avoid participating in others.

The dividing line between the lily white 'legal' commodity markets (inclusive of those for the accumulation of black labour power) and the parallel black 'illegal markets' was not some abstracted historical notion of economic rationality, for participation in the latter, as in Zimbabwe has been by social groups, ranging from 'forced labour' by the settler state and maverick frontiersmen and plantation managers to petty marketeers of sexual services, "ganja", etc for survival. With regard to the latter activities, there is a need to understand the type of structural conditions that forced women to commodify their bodies in order to ensure not only their own individual survival, but that of their households.

It is not the modalities of the force applied to ensure the maximum extraction of surplus labour value, the technology for such extraction throughout the colonial period, of course, ranged all the way from sjambok to an elaborately worked out single migrant wage structure hedged around with housing subsidies for married workers and municipal subsidised sex and traditional beer...
for the bachelors.

We do not need to make any wild historical guessestimates to deduce from the contemporary and historical ground we have covered for this paper, that almost invariable, the first workers to be provided with stable living conditions were those in the vital industries - transportation, law and order, skilled domestic service in the hotels and bars. These were the workers who indeed found it difficult throughout the colonial period to have their feet in both worlds, due to having to cater for the luxury consumption of the white settlers during weekends that would have been better spent - giving on the spot instructions and cultivating the communal plot.

In the whole field of labour studies, there is a pressing need to re-emphasise the hope placed in legal instruments somehow bringing about an equilibrium between labour's production and consumption. The colonial government, in fact, had signed by 1933 all the I.L.O. conventions concerning the use of forced labour. Attention should be focused on those more indirect methods of compulsion and force that underpinned the social and economic institutions of settler colonialism. We need further to understand how the various forms of physical and social technology, rather than cyclical upswings and downswings in the economy, generated the so-called vulnerable segments of the labour market. The responses to absolute vulnerability by the concrete social actors must also be seen as important conditioning factors in the development of these technologies geared for the maximum extraction of the absolute surplus value of the labour power of working households.

In the event of independence and labour policy reforms since 1980, the tendency and inclination of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the State and capital, under the tutelage of the I.L.O. has been to emphasise administrative reforms with legal formalism. This emphasis is abundantly evident in the proposed social security scheme of 1985, which has
the following features:-

1. The nature of I.L.O. policy prescriptions reveals a tendency to deal with social security from the point of view of employers and those in formal employment in Zimbabwe's economy, excluding most of the labour groups discussed in the pages above as well as others, such as members of the growing co-operative movement. This, in part reflects the deliberate non-involvement of such groups in policy formulation as well as the constraints such groups face in terms of infrastructure and capability to lobby for a social security programme that would include them.

2. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) itself only seems to include domestic workers and, therefore, does not represent the other categories of our "vulnerable labour segments."

3. The social security scheme proposed will not cater for "unemployment benefits" and, therefore, emphasizes short-term formal employee benefits. It uses dualist assumptions which would suggest that those outside formal employment are not exploited through, for example, wages in kind and sales tax, etc.

4. Social security does not consider whether employers (private and State) could meet cost of a conservatively derived comprehensive security scheme in relation to economic growth. The main contributions are those of employees matched by employers, not the broader contributions the State and private employers can make towards social security. That is, the better-off employees are to benefit most from the proposed scheme.

5. The proposed scheme actually admits that its study could not investigate the nature of the organized employment market, the network of employment exchange offices and, therefore, could not adequately assess unemployment patterns; as usual prescriptions are being made through deliberate omissions. This needs attention for future policy formulation exercises.

6. The social security scheme leaves untouched the issue of private pension schemes and the concentration of employer contributions "stored" for higher income groups. This neglects the opportunity cost of these to the vulnerable segments and the unemployed.
The overall tendency is, therefore, to develop a policy framework meant for those already in secure formal employment. This gives additional strength to our feeling that the question of vulnerability needs more careful consideration, as a second phase of this paper.

However, as our analysis has shown, this emphasis on administrative reform and legal formalism serves the purpose of mystifying capital contemporary global project of restructuring, rationalization and the decentralization of technology and industrial plant.

Even the traditional co-operative form of organisation of production by workers for self-defence against the anarchy of capitalist market forces, is in mortal danger of being appropriated both at the centre and in the periphery by the forces of global monopoly capital. Whereas finance capital remains effectively centralised, technology production, marketing and services have increasingly been decentralised around the household, co-operatives and the "putting out" system.

In a very real sense, though capital's technological capacities have been advanced through application of high technology "soft-ware", its strategies for accumulation are in a sense reverting to earlier classical patterns and forms of social organisation that were employed during the first industrial revolution in Britain; that is, the putting out system, organised around free export zones and co-operatives.
Notes and References


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4. World Bank President - Robert MacNamara's 1975 address to the Board of Governors.


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12. For an in-depth discussion of these aspects see:


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