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South Africa's Destabilization Policy: The Zimbabwe Experience

D.P. ChimaniKire
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (South Africa)</td>
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<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
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<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF-ZAPU</td>
<td>Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People's Organisation (Namibia)</td>
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<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army</td>
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Southern African region is today still a battleground. In two broad interrelated struggles, the mass of the population of the region are ranged against the South African ruling class and its apartheid regime. The first of these is the advancing national liberation struggles inside South Africa and Namibia, led by the ANC, PAC and SWAPO. These struggles are assisted in the region by attempts to co-ordinate the policies of the six African states grouped together as the Frontline States - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Secondly, the region is characterized by the struggle to advance different processes of economic and social development which are largely blocked by linkages between the economies of the states of the region and South African capitalism. In 1980, on the initiative of the Frontline States, nine Southern African states — Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe — formed themselves into the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), whose principal objective was the extrication of its member states from the negative effects of the domination of the regional economy by South African capitalism. In simple terms, the issues at stake are clear. Pretoria is fighting to preserve apartheid’s capitalist domination, and imperialist hegemony in the sub-continent, and the people of Southern Africa are fighting to extricate themselves from capitalist exploitation and racial oppression. Confronted by a deep-seated crisis since the early 1970s, the racist minority regime has decided to regionalize apartheid and turn Southern Africa into a battlefield. It is within this broad framework that Pretoria’s strategy of regional destabilization can best be understood.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DESTABILIZATION

There are a variety of interpretations of the destabilization taking place in Southern Africa today. One view, put forward by Pretoria and some Western apologists for apartheid, sees the liberation movements, the Frontline States and international communism as the main forces of destabilization in the subcontinent. South Africa, in contrast, is viewed as a stabilizing force in the region. This is pure fabrication without any basis. But amongst those who correctly see the apartheid regime as the main agent of destabilization in Southern Africa there are imp’s of opinion as to whether Pretoria is the sole author of the crisis or whether its actions are merely part of a wider strategy of global imperialism, orchestrated by the US.

Broadly speaking, the dominant view at present, not only amongst the Frontline States but also among liberal critics of apartheid in the West, is that South Africa is the sole or


principal architect of destabilization, although it clearly draws support from the West and particularly from the US. The strategic implications of this view are clear. American and other Western leaders must be persuaded to stop their support for South Africa. The situation in Southern Africa would then hopefully change. This is the underlying assumption behind statements by liberation movement leaders of South Africa and Namibia and also by leaders of the Frontline States.

The same sort of assumptions are shared by a number of well-meaning Americans who think the US can be persuaded to delink itself from South Africa, for in their view it is politically immoral to support apartheid. The second view, which sees destabilization not as a South African initiative, but as part of a much wider strategy of international imperialism, has been argued forcibly by some people. They argue that the struggle in Southern Africa is the struggle against the plans of international imperialism and the global strategy of the United States. This conceptualization of the Southern African situation has radically different strategic implications from the first view. For if destabilization and other actions by South Africa are the initiatives not just of South Africa but of a global imperialist strategy it would be an illusion to think that the US can disassociate itself from South Africa simply because it finds apartheid morally repugnant. It would, therefore, be wrong to personalize US foreign policy as if it were the brainchild of "reactionary" or "misguided" US officials. Strategically, the liberation movements and the Frontline States, according to this view, would have to stop counting on the US and concentrate instead on ways in which the liberation struggle could be waged by the people themselves.

As things are at the moment, it would appear that the second view is the most realistic. This is not to say, of course, that every act of banditry or sabotage by South Africa must have the prior approval of the US State Department. Within the broad US global strategy, South Africa, like Israel and other countries, has a degree of relative autonomy. But the broad dimensions of Pretoria’s policy in Southern Africa cannot be determined by South Africa on its own. Consultations go on all the time between the US and South Africa at various levels, official and unofficial, at inter-government meetings and in the boardrooms of corporations. It is at such meetings that the broad outlines of South Africa’s Southern African strategy are planned and fashioned.

DESTABILIZATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

In order for the United States and South Africa to maintain the status quo in Southern Africa, they have been indulging in the following activities. These acts of aggression will be expanded upon as the paper unfolds by giving concrete examples:

- Building South Africa’s economic and military power.
- Instituting a programme of reforms within South Africa which would remove "petty apartheid" and polish the rough edges of its segregationist social policy.
- Maintaining a total control over the movement of the black population.
- Isolating the more liberal whites who favour negotiations with Africans.
- Isolating the black population by integrating the other communities — e.g. the Coloureds and Indians — into decision-making structures, admittedly as junior partners.
• Keeping the liberation movements weak, divided and suppressed.
• Preventing the liberation movements from operating freely from neighbouring independent African states.
• Infiltrating the military and security organizations of the Frontline States.
• Encouraging opposition to the governments of the Frontline States by giving support to dissidents.
• Intimidating neighbouring countries through acts of sabotage and other actions so that they recognize the reality of South African power and are afraid to give support to South African liberation movements.
• Preventing neighbouring countries from uniting into a common front against South Africa.
• Keeping neighbouring states (and especially Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) economically weak and dependent on South Africa, and ensure that SADCC does not become a viable economic grouping.
• Preventing Namibia’s independence for as long as possible, by insisting on discussing irrelevant issues.
• Keeping in overall control of the situation, so that should change within South Africa become unavoidable the US can step in as an "honest broker" to work out a settlement that would preserve white settler interests in South Africa and protect the wider economic and strategic interests of Western imperialism.3

THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S POLICY OF DESTABILIZATION

In the last few years South Africa’s destabilization policy has received increasing attention and so there might be the impression that the apartheid state’s destabilization policy is of recent veritage. In fact, the destabilization policy is at least 10 years old, if one takes note of Pretoria’s 1975-76 invasion debacle in Angola when it, together with the USA, unsuccessfully tried to defeat the MPLA and ensure a UNITA/FNLA government in Angola by the time of Angola’s independence in November 1975. Further, if one takes into account Pretoria’s economic, political and military support of rebel Rhodesia, its illegal occupation of Namibia (in which South Africa’s mandate was terminated by the UN General Assembly in 1966, where South Africa was proclaimed to be in illegal occupation by the UN Security Council in 1969, and the International Court of Justice declared South Africa to be in illegal occupation of Namibia and confirmed the Security Council’s 1969 call for its withdrawal), then clearly South Africa’s regional destabilization policy goes back to

3 The conceptualisation of destabilisation and the conditions under which the U.S.A. and South Africa can maintain the status quo in Southern Africa are based on Yash Tandon’s contribution, "South Africa’s Strategy of Regional Destabilisation", in Michael Sefali and John Bardill, Development and Destabilisation in Southern Africa, pp.59-75, op. cit.
the mid-1960s. But it goes back even further in time if one takes a continental view of destabilization, because of South Africa’s military and economic support of the Tshombe secession in Katanga in 1961 which line of action continued with support for the Biafra secession during 1967-70. But Ibbo Mandaza observes that destabilization in Africa started at the Berlin Conference of 1884 when the European imperialist countries divided Africa amongst themselves.

THE APARTHEID STATE IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

The interventions by the apartheid state in the Southern African region — in the form of military incursions, assassinations, economic destabilization, offers of economic "co-operation" through a "constellation of states", and proposed land cessions — are a large part of the daily news of this region. Yet they should all be seen as particular tactics in a relatively coherent regional strategy developed under the Botha regime. In part, this should be understood as an aspect of the Total Strategy of the regime, and in part in the context of the history and specific dynamic of regional policy.

CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO THE TOTAL STRATEGY

From 1978 to 1984 South Africa's domestic and regional policies were consistently oriented towards a coherent strategic vision of the conditions necessary to ensure the survival of apartheid. Known as the Total Strategy this involved a complex mix of domestic "reform" and regional intervention. Clearly the Total Strategy was a direct response to four developments of the early 1970s:

- The re-emergence, after nearly a decade of political quiescence, of the new forms of organised, large-scale black opposition. The bloody suppression of the 1976 Soweto uprising clearly indicated that the apartheid state could not continue in the old way and that some form of change was essential to its survival.
- The onset of a deep recession. All the leading business people insisted that the easing of restrictions on the mobility and training of black labour, in order to permit its more productive employment in more highly capital intensive forms of production, was essential to any economic recovery.
- The defeat of Portuguese colonialism and the independence of Angola and Mozambique under socialist governments, followed by the debacle of the first South African invasion of Angola in 1975-76, the humiliating withdrawal of the South

5 This observation was made by Mandaza at the "Conference on Regional Security in Southern Africa", University of Zimbabwe, June 8-10, 1987.
African army and the collapse of Pretoria's "detente" initiative, all showed the need for a new vision of South Africa's regional role.

- The growing international condemnation of South Africa and its isolation from its major allies, embodied in the US vote for a mandatory arms embargo and demand for "one person, one vote" in 1977, together with the growing threat of sanctions showed the need for a dramatic improvement in image.

In 1977, the Department of Defence had argued that South Africa faced a "total onslaught". It advocated the mobilization of the full range of resources at the disposal of the state in order to preserve the "free enterprise system".

This was the Total Strategy, and it was a strategic shift away from the cruder forms of apartheid. It sought to restructure specific aspects of apartheid capitalism in order to preserve its basic parameters, to defuse developing mass unrest, and to reduce South Africa's international isolation. And the Total Strategy had both domestic and regional components.

The regional component of the Total Strategy rested on an attempt to internationalize the problems confronting the apartheid state. Its strategists argued that the source of instability and conflict, both within South Africa and across the entire region, was neither apartheid nor colonialism but external intervention. Elaborate theories of a "total onslaught" against South Africa,orchestrated by the Soviet Union but sometimes including the Carter Administration and the CIA, were proposed.

The fundamental objective of South African policy was now defined as the creation of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). Recognizing that apartheid was a barrier to formal alliances with neighbouring states, part of this tactic involved raising the spectre of "Marxism" in order to generate a counter-strategy. Pretoria argued therefore that all the states in the region faced a common "Marxist" enemy, and that they could not rely on the Western powers for support. It proposed "regional solutions" to this allegedly "regional problem". By so doing, South Africa hoped that its international isolation could be eroded through a transformation of regional relations.

Over and above its primary objective of forging a "Constellation of Southern African States" the Total Strategy pursued five related regional objectives. In brief, these are:

- Ensuring that neighbouring states would refrain from actively supporting the armed struggles led by SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa, and obliging them to act as virtual policing agents for South Africa, by prohibiting political activity by South African and Namibian refugees in their territory.

- Ensuring that "Soviet-bloc powers" (including Cuba) would gain neither a political nor military foothold anywhere in the region. Pretoria objected even to any state establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

- Strengthening existing regional ties, as noted above.

7 Dan O'Meara, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa: Total Strategy in Total Disarray", Monthly Review, April 1986, pp.52-53
• Ensuring that "black states" in the region would not support calls for mandatory sanctions against South Africa and that they shield South Africa from any such sanctions.

• Inducing moderation in the "heady anti-South African rhetoric" of the region.\(^9\)

### CONSAS COLLAPSES

Botha’s dream of CONSAS was naive, because it was built on two false assumptions: first, that Muzorewa would win the elections in Zimbabwe, and, second, that the majority-ruled neighbouring State shared the fear of a communist onslaught.

We would note here that Zimbabwe was the keystone to any regional grouping. The Frontline States (FLS) and Botha’s apartheid regime unveiled their plans in 1979 on the assumption that their side would win in Zimbabwe. The first shock to Pretoria was the massive ZANU-PF victory in Zimbabwe on March 4 1980. On April 1 Robert Mugabe took Zimbabwe into FLS and SADCC rather than CONSAS. The second shock was when all three other non-FLS members also joined SADCC. This meant that apartheid was seen as more evil than socialism.

Lesotho, although totally surrounded by South Africa, had been moving steadily away from it politically. For example, in 1978, Lesotho hosted a UN anti-apartheid seminar and opened warm relations with Mozambique. Malawi, the only majority-ruled state in Africa to have diplomatic links with Pretoria, had sharply cut the number of migrant miners going to South Africa, reduced its purchases from South Africa (from 41% of total imports in 1979 to 32% in 1981), and was quietly building better links with its neighbours.

Swaziland, too, was moving away; it gave tacit agreement for ANC guerillas to pass from Mozambique through Swaziland to South Africa, and became more critical of apartheid. On April 6 1981 it hosted a meeting of the heads of Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho which issued a communique denouncing "attempts by South Africa to destabilize her neighbouring black-ruled states".\(^10\)

Thus none of the neighbouring states was willing to be seen consorting with apartheid and the bantustans, and all supported delinking. With its CONSAS plans undermined, the apartheid regime appeared unsure of its immediate regional objectives, and during the second phase — from mid-1980 to the end of 1981 - it lashed out in a fairly indiscriminate way. Direct military action, and direct aggression through puppet groups, was taken against Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. In Namibia, a "dual-track" strategy sought to build the "internal settlement" under the DTA, while escalating military attacks against SWAPO bases in Angola in order to weaken it militarily and politically.

Compared with what was to follow, however, the destabilization measures taken up until the end of 1981 were relatively mild. By early 1982 Pretoria seemed to have recovered from the "loss of Rhodesia" and had worked out its immediate regional objectives more precisely.

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\(^9\) Dan O'Meara, op. cit. pp.55-56

South Africa now divided the states of the region into three broad categories and used a different mix of tactics against each. More conservative states, such as Swaziland and Malawi, were seen as real or potential collaborators and offered concessions in order to encourage them to strengthen their ties with Pretoria, or as rewards for "good behaviour". The second category of regional states identified by Pretoria were those considered unfriendly to South Africa but vulnerable to pressure, such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The third encompassed those whose political system and development strategies were seen as a direct threat to Pretoria's interests, particularly Mozambique and Angola. Both groups were singled out for intensified and sustained military and economic destabilization.\(^{11}\)

Limitations of space prohibit a discussion of the sustained and vicious assault on the countries of Southern Africa that has taken place from mid-1980 up to the present moment. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the Zimbabwe Experience as an example.

Destabilization represents the "outward move" of the militarized state even while it continues to suppress and oppress the majority of South Africans and indeed destabilization is the perfect linkage between the apartheid state's domestic and foreign policies.\(^{12}\)

THE ZIMBABWE EXPERIENCE

At the centre of the region, both politically and geographically, Zimbabwe was the biggest threat to South African hegemony. Robert Mugabe's joint policies of socialism and reconciliation raised the threat of a prosperous multiracial state which would challenge South Africa's apartheid policy. Zimbabwe is also critical to SADCC because it is literally the hub of regional transport and would thus be central in re-directing traffic away from South Africa.

In order to prevent the Southern African states from becoming economically independent from South Africa, the apartheid regime used some of the following methods in brief to destabilize Zimbabwe.

- disinformation (e.g. hundreds of letters and anti-Government leaflets were sent to Zimbabwe in 1983 and 1984)
- long-term invasion/occupation (e.g. Namibia since 1966 and Angola since 1975-76)
- attempted assassinations of the Prime Minister and senior Government/Party members (e.g. December 18 1981 bomb attack on ZANU-PF HQ in Harare)
- assassinations/murders of liberation movement leaders and other personnel (e.g. Maseru, Harare, Maputo, Lusaka, Gaborone during 1981-1983)
- attacks on oil installations and routes (e.g. in Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho since 1980)
- attacks on military installations (e.g. Inkomo Barracks and Thornhill Air Base in Zimbabwe August 16, 1981 and July 25, 1982 respectively)

\(^{11}\) Dan O'Meara, op. cit., pp.58-9.
\(^{12}\) Patel, H.H., op. cit., p.9.
• training, supplying, directing surrogate armies in neighbouring states (e.g. UNITA in Angola, MNR in Mozambique, LLA in Lesotho and Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe)
• attacks on transport routes (e.g. closures of the Benguela Railway in Angola, the Zimbabwe-Maputo line, the Malawi-Nacala line, the Malawi-Beira line, and attacks on the Zimbabwe-Beira road/rail line, during 1975-1980)
• port/border inspection of cargo, harassment of transport personnel (e.g. for Zimbabwe and Zambia 1986)
• limiting the use of South African railways, for example by manipulating the availability of railway wagons (done to Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia)
• restrictions on migrant labour (done to all immediate neighbours: Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique)
• curbing imports from neighbouring states (done to Zimbabwe and Swaziland)
• regulating the export of goods to black states, especially "food and oil" (done to Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
• restricting South African tourists (done to Lesotho and Swaziland)
• violating the Customs Union agreement (done to all three other members: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland)\textsuperscript{13}

Details of Selected Incidents Mentioned Above:

• The first incident occurred on August 3 1981. Joe Gqabi, representative of the ANC in Zimbabwe, was assassinated outside his Harare house. The murder weapon was never found. Later it emerged that Gqabi had been targeted by the South Africans and eliminated by a squad sent into Zimbabwe to do the job.

• The next incident in the sequence occurred on August 16 1981. A series of massive explosions ripped through the armoury at Inkomo Barracks near Harare destroying $36 million worth of armaments. This was done by South African agents.

• On December 18 1981, a 10-15 kg bomb exploded on the roof of the ZANU-PF Headquarters at 88 Manica Road, Harare. This was aimed at the ZANU leadership.

• On July 23 1982, six tourists — two Americans, two Australians and two Britons — were abducted by bandits on the road from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. This was to undermine Zimbabwe's tourist industry.

• Two days later, July 25, a quarter of Zimbabwe's air force planes were sabotaged on the ground at the Thornhill base near Gweru in the centre of the country by South Africa.

• Intelligence analysis around 1982 defined the strategic intentions of the bandits in three phases. The first phase was to recover cached weapons not yet located by the Government, and to train and arm recruits. Phase two was to attack isolated economic targets such as white commercial farms, stores, etc. Phase three was to

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, p.9.
attack police stations, army posts and security force patrols with the objective of making Matabeleland ungovernable. All this had the support of South Africa.

- Two other weapons, non-lethal but nevertheless destabilizing, which South Africa uses against Zimbabwe are propaganda and disinformation. Zimbabwean monitors first picked up a new station called Radio Truth on March 15, 1983, not long after the South Africans were known to have become involved with Super-ZAPU. The new clandestine station broadcast initially in Ndebele and Shona at 7 a.m. and 7.30 p.m. daily. Reception was poor and a change of frequency in June brought with it the introduction of broadcasts in English at 6.30 a.m. and 7 p.m. But reception remained poor. A further frequency change improved the quality of the reception of broadcasts in English but the reception in Ndebele and Shona remained of a poor quality. The transmitter was located near Johannesburg at the Meyerton Studios of SABC.

- The disinformation campaign was stepped up in 1983 after the creation of Super-ZAPU. Prominent politicians, diplomatic missions and individuals received a series of letters which purported to originate from a "Joe Moyo", said to be a member of the ZIPRA High Command.

- Fuel is another weapon South Africa has used to destabilize Zimbabwe. The rehabilitation of the Beira to Mutare oil pipeline, owned by the British transnational company Lonrho but closed during the UDI years, was a major post-independence priority. The reopening of the line was technically feasible by the end of 1981 but on October 29 the railway bridge over the Pungwe River, which also carries the pipeline, was damaged in a sabotage attack and the road bridge was totally destroyed. In December 1982 Zimbabwe suffered an acute fuel shortage which almost brought the country to a standstill and resulted in queues at petrol stations that stretched for several kilometres.

- The cheapest route to the sea for Zimbabwe is through Chicualacuala, in the extreme south-east, to Maputo. This was subjected to continuous attacks until the MNR closed it down completely on August 20, 1984. Thus, through its surrogates and through direct action, Pretoria forced Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries to return to almost total dependence on South Africa's trade routes. But Zimbabwe's response in committing troops to secure the Beira route obviously surprised Pretoria. And in the second half of 1985, faced with the prospect of the Chicualacuala route reopening by mid-1986 if security improved along the line, South Africa introduced a new tactic. This was a two-tier tariff structure offering lower contract rates than those published. The new contract rates undercut the previous Chicualacuala charges on four of Zimbabwe's main bulk exports — asbestos, tobacco, ferrochrome and steel. The message was obvious. Even if Chicualacuala was reopened it would be more costly to return to the traditional Mozambique routes than to use South Africa. Not only was it a way of further destabilizing Mozambique by denying it foreign currency earnings but it also exerted pressure on the Mugabe government.

- The vulnerability of Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries in the region was further demonstrated within a year of independence. First, South African Railways began to extend the turnaround time for railway wagons, claiming there was excessive demand for rail transport. Loadings per day, particularly of diesel tankers, were reduced. Then in April 1981, South Africa withdrew 25 locomotives loaned to the previous government of Rhodesia. It did this on so little notice that the Zimbabwe transport network was under severe strain for some time, forcing the loss of orders
and stockpiling of maize, steel and sugar for several weeks. Lost export earnings were estimated at $7 million a week.\(^1\)

- South Africa's destabilization in the first six years of independence cost Zimbabwe millions of dollars in additional import and export tariffs, lost orders, property destroyed by bandits, discouraged investment and tourism. Beyond that there was the cost of military operations against the bandits at home, the cost of guarding the Beira route and in July 1985, the deployment of fighting units in a joint offensive against the MNR.

- The latest is that an MNR contingent of armed rebels crossed into Zimbabwe just north of the border village of Cashel at around midnight on Thursday November 12, 1987. The following day, Friday November 13, a large number, perhaps 70, scaled the security fence of the compound at Nyambeya Forestry estate, some five kilometres inside Zimbabwe. Smashing windows and doors, and assaulting the workers and their families with pangas, knives and bayonets, the rebels lustily gathered food, clothing, watches and radios into 50 kg bags and absconded with 20 people acting as porters, including three women and a three-year-old child. The South African-backed MNR rebels have been sneaking into the Chiredzi District of Masvingo Province where they have been committing atrocities among some local Zimbabwean civilians during the past few months.

- For example, on September 9, 1987, a gang of 10 rebels murdered four people at Musumeki Village, about 160 km south of Chiredzi town in Sengwe Communal Lands. The gang set alight four caterpillar tractors belonging to the Ministry of Transport and also set fire to a grinding mill at Musukwe store. The following day (September 10) a child from the same village died after detonating an anti-personnel mine. On October 23, 1987 the bandits attacked Ndali Business Centre, about 71 km east of Chiredzi town. Six people were killed. The rebels burnt down a local clinic, two grinding mills and five stores they had looted.\(^2\)

- The story behind these bandits now, according to the former Lisbon spokesman for the MNR bandits, Paulo Oliveira, is that there is a clash of interests surrounding control over the bandits. He said that a "Washington-Paris axis" is trying to break the monopoly control exercised over the MNR by the South Africans and by the "Pretoria-Bonn axis". Oliveira further maintains that support from the United States comes from private rightwing institutions such as the Heritage Foundation and "Free the Eagle", and from individuals such as Tom Schaaf who appeared in Washington in 1985 as an MNR representative after being in Zimbabwe and passing through Lisbon.\(^3\)

**Destabilization Damage in Monetary Terms**

Of the SADCC countries, Angola and Tanzania are the least economically dependent on South Africa. All other members of the regional organisation are heavily or totally reliant

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\(^1\) P. Johnson and D. Martin, op. cit., Chap. 2, pp.43-72.
\(^3\) *The Herald*, Zimbabwe, March 26, 1988.
on South African distribution routes, due to the obsolete transportation and communication network inherited from colonial times. This situation, coupled with South African military attacks, especially against Angola, has resulted in approximately US$20 million in damage to SADCC member countries in the past 10 years. According to an SADCC study, damage amounted to US$11,36 billion in the 1980-84 period alone. Costs inflicted on SADCC member countries through a combination of economic pressure and military aggression on the part of South Africa in the past few years include:

- increased military expenditures: US$3.6 billion
- higher transportation and energy costs: US$193 million
- refugee relief: US$750 million
- losses from a decline in exports and tourism: US$261 million
- losses from trade embargoes: US$295 million
- losses from reduced economic growth: US$2.27 billion
- contraband and sabotage: US$215 million

This adds up to approximately US$7 billion, or the equivalent of the combined 1980 export revenues of the nine SADCC member countries. Additional damage in the amount of US$4 billion has been caused by South African military invasions in the past few years. This figure does not include some US$20 billion in damage suffered by Angola resulting from repeated South African raids since it became independent in 1975.

Sabotage alone has caused Angolans the equivalent of seven times the total value of the country’s 1980 exports. It is estimated that a full one-sixth of the combined value of SADCC members’ foreign trade was lost in 1980-86 as a result of South African aggression.

Yet, if the past seven years have been extremely difficult for South Africa’s neighbours, the near future looks even bleaker. As the white minority government feels threatened by world public opinion it is even more willing to use its full economic weight against SADCC members as part of its cat-and-mouse game. 17

**CONCLUSION**

The last two decades have seen the rapid growth and expansion of counter-revolutionary forces in Southern Africa. The counter-revolution is mainly directed against progressive states with the aim of disrupting their progressive economies, impairing their ability to govern, and thereby neutralising their support for the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa and impeding the implementation of socialism.

Zaire and South Africa, two of the major states in the region, are actively involved in this counter-revolution, either directly or through assistance to the rebel bands of UNITA, RENAMO and other rightwing dissidents. They do so with the full backing of the United States of America, whose policy of constructive engagement seeks co-operation with South Africa to check what US policymakers see as Soviet expansionism in Africa and to prevent...

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17 This evaluation of damage is based on Carlos Castilho, *Africa*, No. 4, October/November 1986, p.39.
any socialist experiment from succeeding in this strategically important region of the world capital economy. This is the context in which to explain US support for UNITA, including the supply to the latter of the sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles through Zaire. For these missiles are meant to ensure the strategic balance in favour of South Africa, by giving it greater advantage in the air so it can cripple Angola’s economy and society.

Apartheid is, therefore, the root cause of conflict in the region of Southern Africa which has already jeopardized the peace and security of the sub-continent, and which poses a grave threat to international peace and security. The preparation of genocide at home, and the practice of aggression and terrorism abroad are inherent in the system of apartheid. There can, therefore, be no peace, stability or security in Southern Africa until the obnoxious system is completely eradicated. Only the complete elimination of the abominable and criminal system of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial, democratic society in a unitary South Africa can constitute a sound basis for a just, lasting and universally accepted solution to the problem.

The international community must take concrete and substantive steps to compel the racist South African regime to abandon forthwith its reprehensive policy of apartheid.19

The demand for sanctions must be viewed in the context of both destabilization and Western support for the apartheid regime. Those opposed to sanctions argue that they will hurt the neighbouring states. Undoubtedly, this is true. But if it accelerates the downfall of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost.

There is no doubt that if comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions are imposed by the international community, particularly the major imperialist countries whose investments and trade relations form the basis of the South African economy, the South African regime will not be able to rule in the old way. The basic problem, however, is that precisely because the world imperialist system has apartheid South Africa as its integral and very profitable part, the efficacy of the weapon of sanctions is doubtful or will be marginal at the very best. Of course, apartheid can be made unprofitable and unworkable by revolutionary mass action and armed struggle in which case imperialist monopolies will pull out, but not as part of the international effort based on the principle of national and social emancipation in South Africa. Already a number of monopolies such as Bata, IBM, General Motors, General Electric, Coca-Cola, Honeywell, Barclays Bank, Kodak and others are designing modalities for disinvesting without losing out by transferring their exploitative capital to all manner of institutional devices. This goes to underline the fact that sanctions can accelerate the process of dismantling apartheid and enhancing the process of national and social liberation in South Africa and Namibia. Sanctions are, therefore, important but they are not the only way in which the backbone of imperialist monopoly capital that nurtures apartheid fascism can be broken.20

The imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions on apartheid South Africa would enlarge the prospect of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern African region as a whole.

19 See the Political Declaration of the Non-Aligned Countries, Harare, September 1-6, 1986.
20 This assessment of the impact of sanctions on South Africa shared by many people was expressed at the “Seminar on Southern African Response to Imperialism”, University of Zimbabwe, April 22-24, 1987 by S. Gutto, B. Hlatshwayo, S. Nzombe; "Sanctions and the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: Theses and Antitheses of Imperialism", p.5.
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- "America and South Africa", The Economist (March 30, 1985), pp. 17-34.


