Cities, Violence and Order: the Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of Security Provision in Cities of Tomorrow

Jaideep Gupte, with Steve Commins

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CITIES, VIOLENCE AND ORDER: THE CHALLENGES AND COMPLEX TAXONOMY OF SECURITY PROVISION IN CITIES OF TOMORROW

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Colombia, Medellín, Antioquia: A soldier stands amongst the remains of a community of displaced families razed to the ground the previous night in a fire. Families displaced by the violence and conflict more often than not find themselves living in areas where they are exposed to landslides and their wooden homes to fires. Photographer: Paul Smith/Panos.
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It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain where and why cities will falter and fail in the twenty-first century. It may be even harder to determine those cities that are likely to thrive and survive. However, one fact is beyond dispute: unprecedented urbanisation will play a fundamental role in determining their success or failure. The thrust of city growth is in the South and the East, with most future population expansion in the coming decades to occur in Africa and Asia. Just three countries – China, India and Nigeria – will account for 40 per cent of global population growth in the next decade. Profits, power and people are concentrated in and between metropolitan areas.

The speed and scale of the urban revolution is breathtaking. Just 3 per cent of the world’s population lived in cities in the early 1800s compared to more than 50 per cent today. There are currently more than 50,000 cities around the world, home to more than 3 billion people. Just 600 of them account for more than two thirds of global gross domestic product (GDP). Among the latter are 28 mega-cities housing one fifth of humanity. Yet the bulk of future urbanisation will take place in small- and medium-sized cities in low- and medium-income settings. The world’s slum population will expand from 1 billion to 2 billion people by 2040. There are tremendous opportunities in these fast-growing settings – but also unsettling risks.

Cities are re-emerging as critical referents in international relations. They have always served as the anchors of nation states. And cities are again acting as key nodes of global governance, channelling ideas, capital and labour. Policymakers and scholars alike are converging on the city to understand the character and trajectory of fragility and resilience. They are busily distilling the many external and internal risks that influence the onset, intensity and duration of violence in the city. Many are convinced that security and development is mediated at the metropolitan, even the neighbourhood, scale. The legitimacy of violence and those who exert it is hyper-local and determined on city streets.

The global turn to the city is capturing the attention of diplomats, development experts and defence specialists. Digital and street-level protests are playing out in the central squares and peripheries of Middle Eastern, North African, Western European, North and Latin American capital cities. The projected impacts of the freshly minted Sustainable Development Goals depend fundamentally on the fortunes of the world’s cities. Future stability and humanitarian interventions in response to wars are being planned with cities in mind. Across it all, global technology and infrastructure firms are salivating at the prospects of smart cities and vast concrete conurbations.

There are no simple solutions to achieving security and safety in cities. On the one hand, city living is typically correlated with longer life expectancy, improved health, higher education, and greater prosperity compared to rural life. Yet cities also commonly reproduce an array of risks and stresses – real and perceived. While expressing forms of resilience, living conditions in some of the world’s slums can be appalling. Ultimately, cities are exceedingly diverse and complex ecosystems. They exhibit overlapping spatial, institutional and material characteristics that benefit a narrow bandwidth of residents while excluding others. The lines dividing inner cities, suburbs, peripheries and slums are increasingly blurred.

Urban authorities – both public and private – are in the business of imposing order. In some cases this may be a means to an end – the securing of property rights and the promotion of growth. In other cases order is the end, driving growth models that benefit the elite at the expense of the majority. To exert the rule of law, norms are enforced, force is deployed and the built environment reshaped. Lawful rule is rarely evenly applied or experienced. Instead, it is projected onto highly stratified and dynamic societies segmented by politics, identity and
class. Where cities are unable to provide rudimentary core functions, including security, they are fragile. Violence may be exerted as a form of repression from above, or as resistance to the projection of power from below.

There is, of course, no such thing as a perfectly resilient or a completely failed city. All cities irrespective of their location exhibit properties of fragility and resilience. The prevalence of fragility emerges where risks and stresses accumulate, undermine services and expose citizens to chronic and acute vulnerability. Cities become more resilient when their formal and informal institutions are able to cope and adapt to risks and stresses, and rebound to a new and improved equilibrium. The ways in which fragility and resilience are expressed varies across space, time and demography.

Cities are at the centre of complex governance systems. Their ability to exit fragility and become more resilient is conditioned by international factors, but also the interplay of federal, state and municipal institutions. Some national institutions are more hostile to cities than others. The institutional and financial power of local governments may be stronger in the Americas and Europe than, say, in Africa and Asia. Ultimately, the way cities are governed, and the power constellations that produce their social contracts, influences the extent of fragility and resilience. In all cities there is an element of hybridity in the forging and sustaining of political pacts and settlements.

Throughout it all, urban authorities are in a constant process of enabling and managing complex services, including public security and safety. Just as the spectrum of threats they face is expanding, so too are the tools and methods available to address them. Many city leaders and societies are investing in urban upgrading, community-based models of policing, and new technologies to impose order. In some instances their efforts exacerbate insecurity, while in others they are credited with significantly reducing homicide, violent crime and fear. Where security provision is seen as illegitimate and inadequate, alternative providers – state and non-state – emerge. The privatisation of security in cities is now routine. The notion of security as a public good is fading: in many parts of the world it never existed at all.

Throughout it all, cities are increasingly central arbitrators of politics, economics and social affairs. In upper-, medium- and lower-income settings, ‘city-zens’ are asserting their rights to the city and exploring new forms of networked cooperation and collaboration that transcend national borders. Cities from the so-called ‘North’ and ‘South’ are co-designing and experimenting with ways to address climate change, diminish exposure to terrorism, and prevent and reduce overlapping forms of inter-personal and collective violence. Many of them are struggling to manage multiple violence entrepreneurs who, while operating at a hyper-local scale, may also benefit from political economies that transcend city and national borders. Such groups can and often do re-order institutions and social relations for better and for ill.

The Cities, Violence and Order (CVO) initiative offers a critical exploration of the future of urban spaces. Informed by Foresight methods, the project considers cities at the interface of power, economics, environmental change, but also the ways in which populations access services, apply new technologies and attach meaning to where they live. The editors caution against ‘predicting’ the future and over-simplifying, unintentionally stigmatising and overtly securitising urban spaces. And their focus is not isolated to mature developed cities like Barcelona, London, New York or Tokyo but rather fast-growing metropolises such as Bosaso, Karachi, Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro. These semi-planned cities are a kind of new normal and rarely conform to the historical patterns of slower-growing counterparts in North America and Europe. It is only by learning from them and coming to terms with our many blind spots that we are likely to make inroads towards reducing fragility and maximising city resilience in the next three decades.
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Any errors are our own.
Executive summary

How will security in cities be understood in the future? For whom will it be provided? What are the ways by which urban security provision will be governed? And, what impact will violence and order in cities have on the processes of state-building in fragile contexts in the future? These questions are uppermost in the minds of policymakers and academics. A growing body of evidence underlines the heterogeneity of security processes and outcomes, both within and between cities. Notwithstanding these recent advances, contemporary paradigms of urban development do not substantively account for the ways in which the social, political, economic and physical aspects of urban form interact and shape the mechanics of security provision in cities.

There is a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the manner in which international donors, multilateral agencies, national and sub-national policymakers respond to urban challenges today. Part of this gap is due to the separation between development theory or urban planning, and issues of fragility due to conflict and violence. These have usually been different epistemic and operational domains, to the detriment of either a comprehensive approach to analysing fragility and violence or effective approaches to security provision.

Key findings

By applying the predominant development practices and paradigms in use today to the potential challenges identified in future cities, we find that:

1. There are multiple and overlapping forms of violence, and the ways these interact have important consequences for understanding violence and order in future cities.
2. Violence is likely to be both a positive and negative stimulus for governance institutions at the city and national level.
3. The imposition of order in cities affects people differently and requires asking ‘security for whom’ in order to achieve universally inclusive outcomes.
4. Some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries today are projected to be mostly urban in the near future. Segmentation in the treatment of issues of security and order in cities will debilitate comprehensive interventions as well as macro understandings of the processes of state-building in fragile contexts.
5. More than half of the world’s urban population will reside in relatively small towns and cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. Some of these towns will rapidly grow into large cities. However, the current evidence base from these locations continues to be relatively thin concerning the lived experiences of violence and order on the one hand, and the mechanics of security provision on the other.
6. Blind spots related to safety in cities include the issue of non-state providers of security, lived experiences of security, and learning from counterfactuals.
Dimensions of cities relevant for futures thinking on cities, violence and order

Approaches to development that are city-focused should be foregrounded by three dimensions of cities, namely, ‘Grid’ – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as shaped by economic, political, technological, social and gendered factors; ‘Governance’ – focusing on the processes and structures that form the institutions through which people are excluded and included; and ‘Ephemerality’ – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities of violence, that are often related to the grid and governance of the city, but not reducible to them.

Policy implications of adopting a city-focused approach to development
We identify three overarching implications for the ways in which donors and other stakeholders engage on issues of violence, everyday security and order in cities.

1. Cities are central to the processes of state consolidation, transformation and erosion. Some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries are projected to have a majority of their populations residing in urban areas. This makes it vital to include spatially relevant and city-specific thinking in the wider paradigms of peace-building and political settlements.

2. The importance of maintaining focus on different typologies of violence remains central, particularly in the face of the varied nature of the lived experiences of violence and ‘everyday insecurity’ for city dwellers. Violence might occur ‘on cities’ (that is, cities coming under siege). But it might also occur ‘in cities’ (where violence is located in urban settings, but almost by circumstance), or it may be ‘inherent to cities’ (where the type and modalities of violence are specifically urban in nature; and even become ingrained in the everyday fabric of urban life). The three levels are deeply interconnected (through the cross-cutting theme of gender, for instance), but they also present significantly different challenges in terms of entry points for violence mitigation strategies.

3. Planning, policy or design interventions that misinterpret ‘ordered cities’ as synonymous with ‘planned’, ‘smart’ or even ‘charter’ cities, are likely to create insecurity, not reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and these processes can occur over very long periods of time. As such, ‘order and security for whom?’ continues to be the operative question that significantly impacts outcomes.
Implications for research on cities
The predominant view in the literature on urban violence is that the state is one of several actors involved in the processes and actions that produce or mitigate everyday violence, alongside local, non-state and other sovereign groups. The focus has therefore shifted away from a singular understanding of the role of the state, and moved towards processes of governance and multiple sovereignties that come together to produce outcomes of violence and order.

In this context, we identify two significant research gaps that presently limit policymaking:

1. **Evidence from small but growing towns:** more than half of the world’s urban population currently live in small towns of fewer than 500,000 people. Some of these towns will grow into large cities in the near future. While some of these growing agglomerations, such as Juba (South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), already feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or Muzaffarpur (India), continue to be hidden from view. A richer evidence base from these locations is required to enable comprehensive planning with timely interventions.

2. **Deep knowledge of municipal functioning:** as everyday violence and fragility goes beyond simple statistics of violent crime, future studies should explicitly include the differently governed or non-state governed spaces that the statistics identify. This also includes the destabilising factors that urban pressure can bring on the one hand to national politics, and the positive element that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. On the other, we might have ‘pirate’ cities in regards to how citizens have created their own service systems, which reflect the ways in which governance failures have an impact on local communities. A critical area where further research in this regard is still needed is on the day-to-day functioning of municipal governance, opening up the ‘black box’ of how local officials and front-line staff function and make decisions in practice. As municipalities will continue to be on the frontlines of how urban security provision is conceptualised and delivered, the importance of understanding how municipal authorities operate can hardly be stressed more strongly.

The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-cities such as Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, as they continue to change, but importantly also for smaller towns and cities that are projected to host more than 500,000 residents particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that a ‘get the economy right first’ approach, or even focusing too much on national institutions of government, without paying attention to local government, might create social and political fissures leading to violence in cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements are such that they tend to exacerbate processes of marginalisation, unless that is, issues of inclusion are explicitly placed on the table.

**Foresighting cityscapes in 2040 – a note on methods**
A group of urban experts and leading thinkers representing a broad range of disciplinary perspectives identified more than 50 potential drivers of change that might characterise cities in 2040. These were then distilled into eight slider-scales including the nature of technological change; the impact of technology on social interactions; health of the global economy; the nature of political power; population dynamics; access to services; how the city fits within broader narratives of development; and the type of impacts resulting from climate change. Care was taken not to reduce any one scale to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of each scale signify a nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of the identified drivers of change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linear/incremental change</th>
<th>Technological change</th>
<th>Rapid/disruptive change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasingly virtual interaction</td>
<td>Technology and social interactions</td>
<td>Interactions through physical contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recession</td>
<td>Global economy</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Political power</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated</td>
<td>Demographic change</td>
<td>Rapid population growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Access to services</td>
<td>Exclusionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thriving</td>
<td>Meanings of the city</td>
<td>Static/maturing/possibly in decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/mild impacts</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>Extreme/frequent impacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Varying combinations of these slider-scales are used to determine the boundaries within which future 'cityscapes' are generated. Cityscapes are characterisations of what cities might look like in the future. Foresight techniques are not meant to predict the future. Rather, they produce potential cityscapes that can be used as heuristic tools to help consider the nature of challenges in the future, and the types of policy response, both today and in the future, that these might necessitate.

Potential policy responses to everyday violence, armed conflict and climate change are placed within these potential cityscapes to provide a meaningful assessment of how they might operate and the impacts they might have. This material is then supplemented with expert consultations across a wide range of donors, practitioners and academic experts to identify key biases and blind spots in research, policy and practice.

JG, 7 January 2016
1 Introduction

Cities are not only critical nodes of governance in the global North and South, but also play a ‘critical role in the processes of state consolidation, transformation and erosion’ (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers 2013: 1). Indeed, as Tilly (2010) argued, the changing relationships between cities and states can help us understand the centrality of cities in such processes. At the same time, the state is no longer regarded as the sole or uncontested provider of security in cities. This is due to two key advances in knowledge around, firstly, how cities as a unit of government grew to be distinct from the nation state that is weakened in an ever-globalised world (see for example Schiller and Fouron 2003). As Friedman argues:

> the focality of the state in identity formation is giving way to competing identities from indigenous, regional, and migratory populations. The latter has also entailed a decentralisation of resources within the state… and an increasing division of powers, between the state as the representative of the nation and the subgroups that tend to displace it.
> (Friedman 2003: 8)

Secondly, the state is viewed as one of several actors centrally involved in the processes and actions that produce and mitigate violence (see for example Punch 2012), alongside local, non-state and other sovereign groups (Muggah 2014, 2015b). In parsing out the nature of state violence, the focus has therefore shifted away from a singular understanding of the role of the nation state, and moved towards processes of governance (Nugent 2004) and multiple sovereignties (Rodgers 2006b) that come together to produce outcomes of security and insecurity. In turn, the diverse types of violent encounters so produced only bear a superficial connection with the structures of the nation state, but instead, play out in the everyday (even intimate) spaces in the city (Datta 2012).

The most complex of these relationships are invariably playing out in the cities of low- and middle-income countries (Muggah 2015a), where most of the urban population growth in the coming three decades is set to take place (United Nations 2014). It is in these contexts that everyday lived experiences of violence undermine the confidence of citizens in government systems, directly and indirectly have a negative impact on livelihoods, and frequently reduce the quality and quantity of service provision. Though these impacts are varied and often characterised as hyper-local, they do collectively shape wider discussions on governance and state fragility at the national scale (Commins 2010).

1.1 Moving beyond the ‘feral’ versus ‘charter’ city characterisations

When it comes to the subtleties of addressing the concerns of how security will be provided in cities in the future, however, there has been a lack of thinking beyond simplistic doomsday scenarios or utopian projections. This is reflected in what are arguably simplistic understandings of order, governance and control in cities of the developing world.

At one end of this continuum are ‘feral cities’ (Norton 2010), characterised by a complete failure of the state to maintain the rule of law, thereby being overrun by all-subsuming slums (Davis 2006). As a result of their collective failures, state apparatuses at both the city and national levels are viewed in a non-distinguishable manner. They are contrasted only with a paradoxical balance between on the one hand informal institutions that control the city, and on the other, the greater international systems, such as trade and communications, that continue unabated to connect with the city (Bunker and Sullivan 2011). At the other end of this spectrum are ‘charter cities’ (Romer 2014). Romer describes these as monolithic entities,
newly created to be free of the vested interests and inefficient rules and bureaucracies that hinder security, growth and development.

Aside from the two extreme characterisations, pertinent questions around how security in cities will be understood in the future, how and for whom it will be provided, and how it will be governed, remain largely unanswered. A growing body of evidence showcases the heterogeneity of security processes and outcomes, both within and between cities (Gupte, Justino and Tranchant 2014). Notwithstanding these recent advances, contemporary paradigms of urban development do not substantively account for the ways in which the social, political, economic and physical aspects of urban form interact and shape the mechanics of security provision in cities. Part of this gap is due to the separation between development theory or urban planning on the one hand, and issues of security, conflict and violence on the other. These have usually been different intellectual and programmatic domains, to the detriment of a coherent approach to either analysis of insecurity or effective approaches to security provision. The gap also arises due to the weak knowledge base from which public policy is formulated. Most of the evidence is almost exclusively focused on the United States and to a lesser extent on the United Kingdom and Europe. For Latin America, for instance, Cohen and Rubio (2009) find that the few programmes from other regions that have been evaluated or reported on as being promising have not had the benefit of independent reviews and thus should not be considered as reliable evidence. They note that it is not easy to find even a rough inventory of what is being done.

This has left a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the manner in which we respond to urban challenges today.

1.2 Research questions and design of the study
This study is driven by three main research questions:
1. What might the challenges of security provision in cities look like in the future?
2. How can development policy and practice pre-emptively respond today?
3. What types of programmes should be given greater priority and support in the future?

The methodology used to answer these questions is centred around a ‘futures workshop’, which we explain in more detail in Section 2. A review of the relevant literature as well as relevant programmes, policies and interventions in a selection of cities, preceded the futures workshop. Both reviews were conducted iteratively and fed off one another. Following the futures workshop, a series of consultations with key informants (KI), stakeholders and experts were conducted, in order to help ground the workshop findings in current stakeholder and donor priorities. Data from the consultations also fed back into the review. The study design is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

1.3 Purpose and structure of report
This report summarises the methods and main findings of this Foresight study. The techniques used enable systematic thinking around what might be the current blind spots in policy, research and programming, and how we can pre-emptively respond to these challenges today. The report is structured as follows: a description of the Foresight methodologies used, and the dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on cities, violence and order, are provided in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the key concepts (of violence and order) and trends describing the changing geography of violence, and how these have come to be centred on cities. Based on the conceptual framework developed for this study, case study material from two cities (Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro) is presented in Section 4. Section 5 expands on the Foresight methodology in more detail, focusing on the drivers of change in future cities. In this section we also describe three future cityscapes that might potentially describe cities in 2040. Each of these cityscapes is used as a heuristic tool
to think through what the potential impacts of everyday insecurities, violence and armed conflict and climate change might be, and what policy response might look like in these future scenarios. The final section charts potential blind spots in current research and programming initiatives.

**Figure 1.1  Design of cities, violence and order study**
2 Foresight methodologies

2.1 What is Foresight?
Foresight techniques are not aimed at predicting the future – but they help in identifying a range of possibilities that help define, heuristically, what might shape the future, and in what ways. The methods invite us to consider the future as something that we can create or shape, rather than as something already decided. Foresight exercises (FE) are based on the premise that imaginative yet systematic assessments can assist urban planners, decision-makers and communities in exploring possibilities and scenarios for the future. As Béné et al. (2014) find, FE are increasingly used by urban literature scholars, planners and decision-makers in cities around the world to develop strategies, visions and plans. One of the most quoted definitions of FE stems from Martin (1995, in Hartmann 2011), who describes research Foresight as:

the process involved in systematically attempting to look into the longer-term future of science, technology, the economy and society with the aim of identifying the areas of strategic research and the emerging generic technologies likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits.
(Martin 1995, in Hartmann 2011: 335)

In this study, we define Foresight as 'the systematic outlook to detect early signs of potentially important developments. These can be weak (or early) signals, trends, wild cards or other developments, persistent problems, risks and threats, including matters at the margins of current thinking that challenge past assumptions' (Cuhls 2015: 3).

Extensive and rapid transformation of both local and global environments, posing new challenges for urban planners and governments, has triggered an increased reliance on FE (Béné et al. 2014), as has the recognition that current planning methods are less effective in dealing with these challenges (Krawczyk and Ratcliffe 2005). Hartmann (2011) points out that FE are increasingly used as tools to systematically develop or adjust strategic plans in order to:

- support decision-making and provide quantitative and qualitative input to strategic decisions for investments or actions;
- stir new ideas, identify opportunities and provide information on possible new markets, policy measures or other activities;
- increase anticipatory intelligence and provide information on future developments. This can help identify possible actions that can be reflected against, to increase the insight of their future context.

The Cities, Violence and Order team brought together a group of urban experts from a broad set of disciplinary backgrounds to participate in a 'Foresight' workshop to envision the possible futures of violence and order in our cities. Foresight techniques have traditionally been used in policy testing and strategy development by a range of business, governmental and, more recently, non-governmental actors (see Bingley 2014). The workshop process drew on a number of Foresight techniques, adapting them and modifying them to meet a range of objectives and to ensure that all participants had the opportunity to share their specific knowledge and expertise. The expert group included:
The process of creating the future cityscapes for this study involved identifying the potential drivers of change, formulating a selection of these drivers as slider-scales, and then allowing experts to select up to four slider-scales to help define the parameters of the cityscapes. These steps are defined in more detail below:

**Figure 2.1 Creating cityscapes 2040**

### 2.2 Dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on cities, violence and order

The workshop adapted a scenario planning process with the twin aims of ‘characterising what the challenges of security provision in cities might look like in 2040’ and ‘formulating ideas on how development policy and practice can pre-emptively respond today’. The process was designed to generate a set of narrative scenarios of the city in the future, referred to throughout the process as ‘cityscapes’. Shocks and stresses could be overlaid these cityscapes to ‘test’ their resilience. The resilience testing process would reveal weaknesses in the social, political and economic structure of the cityscape. Near-term development policy and practice interventions could then be designed to address these weaknesses and mitigate future impact.
For the purposes of this Foresight study, we conceptualised ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in cities as being functions of three interconnected dimensions (D) of the urban form:

D1.  
**Grid** – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as shaped by economic, political, technological, social and gendered factors.

D2.  
**Governance** – focusing on the processes and structures that form the institutions through which people are excluded and included; sociopolitical voice and participation versus marginality and exclusion; willingness and capacity of state actors.

D3.  
**Ephemerality** – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities of violence that are often related to the grid and governance of the city, but not reducible to them.

**Figure 2.2** Three dimensions of urban form – violence and order (V & O) in cities are a function of D1 (Grid), D2 (Governance) and D3 (Ephemerality)

These dimensions were conceptualised such that cities may display different configurations, with one or two of the dimensions dominating depending on local, temporal or spatial contexts. In the illustration above, the three dimensions of urban form are shown to have elements that are unique to each dimension, as well as elements that fall within the overlap of two, or all three, dimensions.

It is important, however, to acknowledge upfront that this three-way articulation was not envisioned to be an exhaustive description of the urban form, and was used more as a heuristic tool to widen the group's thinking, rather than as a framework to limit the scope of discussions. Indeed, several alternate castings are plausible, including one that is interpreted through the dimensions of Infrastructure-Governance-Contingency, or around Planning-Policing-Possibilities, for example, or castings that use fewer or more dimensions. The point of such a heuristic tool is not only to systematise thinking about cities into the various dimensions, but importantly to push us to focus on the **overlaps** of two, or more, dimensions.
For example, the organisational set-up of municipalities would pertain to the governance dimension (D2), while the role of non-state actors in the provision of essential services such as water or neighbourhood policing would be placed in the overlap of the governance and ephemerality dimensions (D2 \( \cap \) D3). As another example, elements of the city master plan, such as zoning demarcations (hawker zones, for instance) would be placed in the grid dimension (D1), but multiple or shifting uses of public spaces (street markets during the day, places of congregation or prayer in the evening, for instance) would be placed at the intersection of the grid and ephemerality dimensions (D1 \( \cap \) D3).

Based on this typology, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in the city are placed at the intersection of all three dimensions (D1 \( \cap \) D2 \( \cap \) D3). Doing so recognises that both ‘violent’ and ‘ordered’ outcomes in cities result from varying combinations of elements in each of the three dimensions. We will therefore use this typology to identify the elements pertaining to each dimension for the issues we focus on. For example, ‘everyday violence’ in cities could be broken into the following elements:

**Figure 2.3  Theorising the interactions between urban forms and everyday violence**
3 Key concepts and trends

3.1 Violence
One of the most complete definitions of urban violence continues to be Moser’s (2004) introductory roadmap that introduces a wide spectrum of ‘lethal violence and its associated fear and insecurity’ occurring in cities. Scholarship on violence has alerted us to look beyond the physicality of urban violence, and recognise the gendered, spatial and psychological manifestations of violence (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). Cities often contain unsafe spaces, in which women, men and children experience violence in very different ways, and these experiences vary depending on the time of day. They can be reflective of poor infrastructure or design of public spaces, public transport networks, or isolated areas such as dark paths and lanes, isolated bus stops or public latrines. These experiences are often exacerbated for the poorest in cities who, for example, need to commute long distances to work at odd hours, or who live in precarious locations that compromise the safety of residents.

The roadmap also highlighted the various policy approaches adopted to intervene in situations of urban violence. These are summarised in Table 3.1.

Advances in the scholarship on urban violence has extended our view beyond singular modalities of violence, to overlapped categories (for example, violence that is simultaneously political, social and economic, as described in Beall et al. 2013), or recognising the cityscape as inherently conflictual and only ‘tipping’ into violence when social, cultural and political mechanisms are not able to maintain peace (Moser and Rodgers 2012). Others characterise the ‘fragile city’ itself as an emergent social category (Muggah 2014). We are also challenged to view low-intensity violence not just as destructive, but also as a generator of social and entrepreneurial innovation (Rodgers 2006a; also see Box 3.1) (Clay and Phillips 2015). The ways in which different manifestations of urban fragility may interact with regional and national political settlements has been gaining attention as part of a spatial approach to fragility (Commins 2014). Where low-intensity violence is endemic, it interacts with the urban fabric and changes the nature of adequate urban living (Gupte 2012). In instances of extreme violence, the everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities – along with their civilian populations – become the main source of targets and threats (Graham 2009).

3.2 Order
Similarly, the literature on ‘order’ in cities has a long history of scholarship, which now distinguishes it from ‘city design’. While the latter refers to the design or planning of a city in a definite form at a given point in time, the former refers to the consistency of urban components and their relationships (Marshall 2009). This difference is particularly important since order need not be equated with ‘planning’. Urban order can contribute to city design, but urban order may exist without a finite design being involved. Le Corbusier designs, for instance, envisaged ‘cities of tomorrow’ as vast, planned and rational spaces (LeGates and Stout 2011). In doing so, he imagined a ‘good city’ as having definite order (a seminal critique of this approach can be found in Scott 1998). “It was assumed that the unruliness of the city could, and should, be planned away through rational, planned interventions into the organisation of urban space” (Mooney, Pile and Brook 1999: 3).

Though Le Corbusier’s ‘utopian’ vision1 continues to be extremely influential on the design of cityscapes today, ethnographic explorations of the city have shown us that even in the so-called ‘unplanned’ spaces, prevailing sociopolitical and spatial relationships at the local level

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1 Other ‘utopianists’ include Ebenezer Howard and Frank Lloyd Wright; see Fishman (1982).
imply that order exists. Remarkably, this is also true during moments of extreme urban violence or contexts of protracted violence (such as in informal settlements, as described in Gupte 2012). Thus a duality in our understanding of ‘order’ in cities emerges where, at one level, ordered cities can be exclusionary, repressive and ironically unruly, because of the unevenness of power relations their order generates (Mooney et al. 1999). As Gayer (2014) argues in his tour de force on Karachi, through the prevailing practices of planners and builders, the city can add fuel to violent social movements.

Table 3.1  A roadmap of violence in cities and the policy interventions employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy approach</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Type of violence</th>
<th>Innovative urban-focused intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>Violence deterrence and control through higher arrest and conviction rates, and more severe punishment</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Police reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Delinquency</td>
<td>Accessible justice systems; mobile courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Family violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Family violence</td>
<td>Community policing; all-women police stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>Violence prevention through the reduction of individual risk factors</td>
<td>Youth violence</td>
<td>Youth policies/social protection; education reform; entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational skills training; cultural and recreational activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of behavioural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict transformation/human rights</td>
<td>Non-violent resolution of conflict through negotiation and legal enforcement of human rights by states and other social actors</td>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>Traditional systems of justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional violence</td>
<td>Government human rights advocates or ombudsman; civil society advocacy; NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights abuses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitrary detention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention through environmental design/urban renewal</td>
<td>Reduction in violence opportunities through focusing on the settings of crime rather than on the perpetrators</td>
<td>Economic violence</td>
<td>Municipal-level programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen/public/community security</td>
<td>Set of cross-sector measures to prevent or reduce violence</td>
<td>Economic violence</td>
<td>National-level programmes; municipal-level programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>'Rebuilding' social capital, trust and cohesion in informal and formal social institutions</td>
<td>Youth gangs</td>
<td>Community-based solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic/family violence</td>
<td>Crisis services for victims; ongoing support and prevention; communication campaigns; school programmes; programmes for perpetrators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 3.1 Certain forms of violence can be socially constitutive rather than deconstructive

It is difficult to question the notion that the urban future will be violent. At the same time, however, questions nevertheless need to be asked about this violence, to problematise our understanding of the phenomena as it relates to urban contexts. Order can be violent, just as violence can be order. Order is not a neutral concept, it is an eminently political and therefore normative notion; the segregated city can be orderly, yet fundamentally violent in denying opportunities and possibilities to vast swathes of an urban population, for example. My own work on gang dynamics in Nicaragua, for example, has highlighted how under certain conditions certain forms of violence can be socially constitutive rather than deconstructive. In general, then, we need to move away from naturalising order and violence, and to think about their social functions more critically.

Violence can be a generator of innovation and dynamism (just as a little inflation is good for an economy). It provokes action and reaction. Indeed, you could push this contention further and argue that there might actually be a trade-off between securitisation and innovation in cities, and the current trend to trying to promote ‘safer and more secure cities’ is likely to be stifling…Obviously, questions can be raised regarding the potential associated with different kinds of violence. A distinction can certainly be made between internal and external forms of urban violence, for example. External forms of violence are unlikely to be a source of dynamism and innovation. Internal forms of violence, on the other hand, can have much more positive effects, with the high levels of chronic crime and delinquency that respectively plagued New York in the 1970s and Medellin in the 1990s arguably the cause for the well-known urban ‘renaissances’ that both cities subsequently underwent in the 1980s and 2000s, for example. Seen from this perspective, rather than focusing on violence, it may well be more interesting and promising to consider what structures and institutions allow a city beset by violence to best channel the phenomenon’s promise.

One way of conceiving of this is in terms of ‘resilience’. But we need to be clear about the kind of resilience we are talking about here. The notion is currently much in vogue, and seems to principally involve the identification of ‘best practice’ local projects. The historical experience of urban violence in cities such as New York and Medellin manifestly suggest that resilience can only ever really be systemic, however.

(extracted from Rodgers 2015)

At another level, contestation, conflict and even violent revolution are viewed as fundamental components of order in cities. We have seen this in medieval Europe, where the parameters of order and disorder switch such that ‘revolts were not… an antithesis, subversion or pathology of the political order, but formed a fundamental part of the political interactions in late medieval cities’ (Lantschner 2014: 4). We also see this in modern-day African cities where the destruction of protracted war has scarred the cityscape. Though parts of Monrovia or Freetown might be seen as urban ‘warscapes’,

…on the basis of the configuration of space, bodies, subjects, and violence within specific locations… these cities are best understood not in terms of destruction but as zones of excessive production. Like any space of capitalist production, the crucial element is the organization of labor.

(Hoffman 2007: 402)

Inspired by Agamben’s writing on the camp, Hoffman suggests that the organising principle of modernity of West Africa’s postmodernity is the barracks. He argues that ‘the barracks concentrate bodies (particularly male bodies) and subjects into formations that can be deployed quickly and efficiently… They may be called up at any moment as laborers on the battlefield, workers on the plantation, or diggers in the mine’ (Hoffman 2007: 402). That is, rather than viewing war as destroying the order in (or of) cities, it creates a new, even productive, order. This may be characterised as ‘infrastructural violence’ wherein the interactions between urban order and violence have implications for ‘spatially just cities’ (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012).
Yet another layer of framing order in cities locates the violence within ‘conflict infrastructures’ (Pullan 2013). In this framing, material structures within contested cities – walls, fences and mobility regimes – are viewed as necessary measures to separate and protect vulnerable populations in the midst of violent urban conflict (Pullan, Baillie and Kyriacou 2013) – as in Nicosia, Belfast and Jerusalem (Gaffikin and Morrisey 2011). In keeping with our broader understanding of order, these instruments of ‘territoriality’ (as used in Moore 2015) can protect just as they can be divisive or oppressive. They can create places of exchange, just as they ‘incorporate the breakdown of laws and institutions’ (Pullan 2011: 16) to suit the actors and agents of violence. They also can be used to separate by class or ethnicity, as in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil or, increasingly, in the processes of urbanisation in Lima, Peru.

3.3 Cities, violence and order: the ‘everyday’ realities of urban living

In this study we continue to use both concepts – violence and order – as a heuristic way to broaden the study’s vision. We do not use them in an interchangeable sense, nor do we characterise the two concepts as opposites. It is evident that the conceptual framings of ‘violence’ and ‘order’, as described in the sections above, share a great deal of commonality; not just in their pedagogical development, but also through the experiential evidence that has supported their advancement. Nevertheless, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ are also distinct in several ways that enable interactional relationships among the city, the economy, society as well as structures of power (Short 1996).

By employing both concepts, we are able to recognise that, at a level of aggregation that affords a holistic view of cities, ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’ are part of the same continuum. That is, situations that may be characterised as being ‘secure’, may only be characterised as such by people of certain genders or groups; in certain locations within the city; or in certain sociotemporal contexts. Those very situations could also be seen as being ‘insecure’ for different people or groups, in different locations, or in different sociotemporal contexts. In this, poor and marginalised groups are not only disproportionately impacted by urban violence, but evidence from cities across the developed and developing world show that they also display a variety of responses to living with violence and insecurity, and often can contribute independently and directly to building safer communities. By doing so, we implicitly include both – cities that are thriving as well as cities, or spaces within them, that are in decay.

As such, it is possible to conceive the fragility continuum in urban areas as relating to five interconnected and overlapping dimensions as outlined in an OECD report on fragile states. Recent work by the OECD has shifted away from ranking fragile states, and towards an approach that considers five dimensions of fragility (OECD 2015):

- violence (and crime)
- justice
- institutions
- economic foundations
- resilience.

Thus, for people in urban areas, part of their reality is what could be described as the conjunction of some of these factors that underpin ‘everyday fragility’. They experience highly unequal access to services, they live in ‘differently governed’ not ‘ungoverned’ spaces, and there frequently is a strong sense of abandonment (or predation) by the state and state actors.2 Frequently the central authorities within urban government have the view that the

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2 One researcher, Garth Myers, reported: ‘One of our interviewees in Pikine outside Dakar said it best: “the government doesn’t give a damn about us here”’ (Garth Myers, written communication).
marginalised communities are ‘not my problem’. Thus, for example, urban sprawl crosses governmental boundaries, and falls into the cracks as urban borderlands. The term ‘everyday fragility’ also reflects the greater risk to disasters, many of them ‘small’, such as fires, mudslides, local flooding or waste exposure.

From this point of view, then, violence prevention or security provision, may also be seen as ‘in the vernacular… [that is]… through the eyes of “end-users” of security arrangements, and how it is determined in the power laden and multi-levelled contexts of contemporary violent conflicts’ (Luckham and Kirk 2013: 339). This is an ‘end-user’ approach to security, wherein security is a basic entitlement of those who are supposed to be protected, and contrasts with understandings of security as the creation and maintenance of authoritative social orders including, but not confined to, those we term states.

3.4 Key trends

There is good reason for cities to be described as the ‘new frontier’ for international development (DFID 2010). Nearly two thirds of the global population of 9.1 billion in 2050 is projected to be urban. This implies a doubling of the global urban population from 3.3 billion currently, to 6 billion in 2050 (United Nations 2014). Tokyo is the world’s largest city with an agglomeration of 38 million inhabitants, followed by Delhi with 25 million, Shanghai with 23 million, and Mexico City, Mumbai and São Paulo, each with around 21 million inhabitants. By 2030, the world is projected to have 41 mega-cities with more than 10 million inhabitants. While approximately half the world’s urban population lives in smaller towns, our focus in this study is maintained on the larger urban agglomerations, as well as the smaller towns that are projected to grow to host more than 500,000 residents (see Table 3.2). These growing towns and cities are key as markers for policy and programming interventions on violence mitigation.

We find that while some of these growing agglomerations, such as Juba (South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), are already beginning to feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be relatively hidden from international view. Nevertheless, these are all locations where there are growing concerns over violence and order, ranging from the increasing presence of gang and criminal activity in Pokhara, violent evictions in Lubango, to social unrest and mob violence in Muzaffarpur.

Violence in both urban and rural contexts is a serious threat to human security (UN-Habitat 2007), and disproportionately impacts those who are already poor and marginalised (Justino 2007). Recent research points to the increasingly urban geography of violence (Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Raleigh 2015). This moves us beyond thinking of urban violence only as a periodic segment of war that is otherwise a rural phenomenon. When the violence of war does spill into urban areas, it is invariably indicative of changing strength ratios between rebels and government (see for example Holtermann 2014). We also know that violence against civilians during civil wars now occurs predominantly in urban areas (Raleigh 2012).

Box 3.2 The varied modalities of urban violence in Africa

The most violent African cities in recent years aptly demonstrate the variation in conflict forms and patterns. Militia activity in Benghazi, Libya; riots and protests in Cairo, Egypt; rebel and militia violence in Kismayo, Somalia; and rebels and militias in Bangui, Central African Republic reflect the variety of political contexts and consequences that give rise to urban violence. Countries affected by political instability – but without civil wars – often experience the highest levels of urban unrest, and rates are highest during periods of political contest, including elections and other periods of national instability.

(extracted from Raleigh 2015: 91)
Table 3.2  Small towns and cities with at least 300,000 people today that will soon host more than 500,000 people – these are key as markers for where policy and programming interventions on violence mitigation are likely to be located

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (by % change)</th>
<th>Urban agglomeration</th>
<th>Pop. in 2015</th>
<th>Pop. in 2030</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lubango, Angola</td>
<td>370,679</td>
<td>751,231</td>
<td>102.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>485,013</td>
<td>940,399</td>
<td>93.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hosur, India</td>
<td>352,261</td>
<td>678,939</td>
<td>92.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Goma, DRC</td>
<td>474,007</td>
<td>885,428</td>
<td>86.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Uvira, DRC</td>
<td>442,399</td>
<td>824,193</td>
<td>86.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Juba, South Sudan</td>
<td>321,115</td>
<td>596,192</td>
<td>85.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Roorkee, India</td>
<td>396,581</td>
<td>724,367</td>
<td>82.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Begusarai, India</td>
<td>361,544</td>
<td>656,714</td>
<td>81.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Santipur, India</td>
<td>395,703</td>
<td>686,223</td>
<td>73.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ranipet, India</td>
<td>357,852</td>
<td>618,581</td>
<td>72.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kikwit, DRC</td>
<td>427,245</td>
<td>724,708</td>
<td>69.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mbandaka, DRC</td>
<td>376,621</td>
<td>633,873</td>
<td>68.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Herat, Afghanistan</td>
<td>337,381</td>
<td>564,793</td>
<td>67.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kandahar, Afghanistan</td>
<td>428,849</td>
<td>717,068</td>
<td>67.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pokhara, Nepal</td>
<td>329,424</td>
<td>549,238</td>
<td>66.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Matadi, DRC</td>
<td>336,740</td>
<td>559,850</td>
<td>66.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Likasi, DRC</td>
<td>494,449</td>
<td>815,430</td>
<td>64.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Comilla, Bangladesh</td>
<td>493,473</td>
<td>792,663</td>
<td>60.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Barisal, Bangladesh</td>
<td>408,041</td>
<td>652,917</td>
<td>60.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Purnia, India</td>
<td>377,810</td>
<td>586,936</td>
<td>55.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dindigul, India</td>
<td>345,873</td>
<td>524,984</td>
<td>51.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Kolwezi, DRC</td>
<td>480,600</td>
<td>725,045</td>
<td>50.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rangpur, Bangladesh</td>
<td>370,280</td>
<td>557,896</td>
<td>50.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kottayam, India</td>
<td>420,768</td>
<td>633,707</td>
<td>50.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>English Bazar, India</td>
<td>379,319</td>
<td>568,835</td>
<td>49.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Hardwar, India</td>
<td>359,395</td>
<td>533,923</td>
<td>48.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Anantapur, India</td>
<td>395,171</td>
<td>585,773</td>
<td>48.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Karimnagar, India</td>
<td>344,638</td>
<td>509,334</td>
<td>47.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mymensingh, Bangladesh</td>
<td>429,416</td>
<td>632,800</td>
<td>47.36</td>
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<td>Shillong, India</td>
<td>399,073</td>
<td>577,555</td>
<td>44.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kadapa, India</td>
<td>387,041</td>
<td>559,684</td>
<td>44.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Bijapur, India</td>
<td>363,456</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Bellary, India</td>
<td>456,788</td>
<td>654,007</td>
<td>43.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Alwar, India</td>
<td>379,640</td>
<td>543,349</td>
<td>43.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Muzaffarpur, India</td>
<td>438,546</td>
<td>627,538</td>
<td>43.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from United Nations (2014).
(Cont’d.)
Table 3.2 (cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population 2014</th>
<th>Population 2015</th>
<th>Population Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bhilwara, India</td>
<td>400,455</td>
<td>572,921</td>
<td>43.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Junagadh, India</td>
<td>354,471</td>
<td>505,533</td>
<td>42.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Latur, India</td>
<td>424,573</td>
<td>605,464</td>
<td>42.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Rohtak, India</td>
<td>412,544</td>
<td>586,729</td>
<td>42.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Rustenburg, South Africa</td>
<td>382,716</td>
<td>544,001</td>
<td>42.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Yamunanagar, India</td>
<td>421,381</td>
<td>595,995</td>
<td>41.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Panipat, India</td>
<td>486,087</td>
<td>686,248</td>
<td>41.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Rampur, India</td>
<td>382,367</td>
<td>539,653</td>
<td>41.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Brahmapur, India</td>
<td>388,200</td>
<td>545,753</td>
<td>40.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Bardhaman, India</td>
<td>376,698</td>
<td>527,325</td>
<td>39.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Sagar, India</td>
<td>399,658</td>
<td>556,127</td>
<td>39.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Kakinada, India</td>
<td>478,691</td>
<td>665,533</td>
<td>39.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Davangere, India</td>
<td>469,362</td>
<td>651,571</td>
<td>38.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Bhagalpur, India</td>
<td>438,792</td>
<td>604,919</td>
<td>37.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Witbank, South Africa</td>
<td>371,398</td>
<td>511,917</td>
<td>37.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Korba, India</td>
<td>388,130</td>
<td>532,821</td>
<td>37.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Dhule, India</td>
<td>391,559</td>
<td>527,207</td>
<td>34.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Ahmadnagar, India</td>
<td>394,264</td>
<td>529,293</td>
<td>34.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Akola, India</td>
<td>438,856</td>
<td>582,958</td>
<td>32.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Buenaventura, Colombia</td>
<td>412,365</td>
<td>543,301</td>
<td>31.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Valledupar, Colombia</td>
<td>414,567</td>
<td>542,855</td>
<td>30.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Póto Velho, Brazil</td>
<td>463,663</td>
<td>599,996</td>
<td>29.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Macapá, Brazil</td>
<td>449,433</td>
<td>578,854</td>
<td>28.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Petrolina, Brazil</td>
<td>425,684</td>
<td>526,629</td>
<td>23.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Caxias Do Sul, Brazil</td>
<td>467,097</td>
<td>574,196</td>
<td>22.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Manizales, Colombia</td>
<td>448,951</td>
<td>545,546</td>
<td>21.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Campos dos Goytacazes, Brazil</td>
<td>447,129</td>
<td>531,712</td>
<td>18.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg, South Africa</td>
<td>494,828</td>
<td>587,714</td>
<td>18.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Vale do Aço, Brazil</td>
<td>497,065</td>
<td>581,519</td>
<td>16.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Volta Redonda, Brazil</td>
<td>446,933</td>
<td>517,235</td>
<td>15.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from United Nations (2014).

However, the types of violence associated with war or armed conflict are not the only significant modalities of urban violence. The destructive impacts of criminal and everyday violence can be more acute than traditional war – the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) finds that ‘by far the largest aspect of the global burden of armed violence is the deaths and injuries that occur in non-conflict or non-war settings’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 67). Of the 31 most fragile and conflict-affected countries today, 23 are projected to be significantly urban in the near future (see Table 3.3). At the same time, fatalities due to armed violence in non-war settings far outweigh war-related deaths. Much of this violence is centred in cities. Violence, therefore, is increasingly a defining characteristic of urban living in both conflict and non-conflict settings.
Table 3.3  List of fragile and conflict-affected countries projected to be at least 40 per cent urban in 2040, and their current rate of urbanisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Prop. of population urban in 2015</th>
<th>Prop. of population urban in 2040</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by Author, based on data from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division and the World Bank.

Table 3.4  Comparing homicide rates (per 100,000) in selected cities with the respective national homicide rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most populous city</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City homicide rate</th>
<th>National homicide rate</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>122 (2009)</td>
<td>46 (2009)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>116.6 (2010)</td>
<td>41.4 (2010)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>106.4 (2010)</td>
<td>41.7 (2010)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basseterre</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>97.6 (2009)</td>
<td>38.2 (2010)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>94.6 (2010)</td>
<td>66 (2010)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucipalpa</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>72.6 (2009)</td>
<td>82.1 (2010)</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseru</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>61.9 (2009)</td>
<td>33.6 (2009)</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>59.9 (2007)</td>
<td>33.68 (2007)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Spain</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>60.7 (2008)</td>
<td>35.2 (2009)</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>34.6 (2010)</td>
<td>21.6 (2010)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on UNODC data, as presented in Muggah (2012: 29).
An often-cited metric for death and victimisation in the city is homicide. According to the most recent data available, the 20 cities with the highest non-war related homicide rates were predominantly in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a few from sub-Saharan Africa, North America and Central Asia also making the list (see Table 3.5). It is also the case that homicide rates tend to be higher in cities as Table 3.4 shows.

**Table 3.5  Homicide rate per 100,000 people in 2012 (note where 2012 data was not available, 2011 data is shown)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Homicide Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Homicide Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>Belize City</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Sao Paolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>Tegucigalpa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Juba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>Panama City</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Ulan Bator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>Quito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bishkek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>Nassau</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>Santo Domingo</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Almaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>San José</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Almaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Port of Spain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Tirana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Not highlighted by these global trends are cities where the inconsistencies of national crime records prevent global comparisons. One glaring omission in this regard is Karachi, Pakistan, where ‘killings’ (not specifically defined as homicides) have dramatically increased over the past decade, and at the same time have come to be concentrated in a handful of neighbourhoods. In absolute numbers of killings, Karachi rates among the most dangerous cities in the world (Hashim 2012).

**Table 3.6  Number of killings in Karachi, 2005–2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gayer (2014).

Another aspect not captured in the global comparisons of the highest homicide rates, are emerging situations like that of India, where 43,355 intentional homicides were recorded in 2012 at a rate of 4.5 per 100,000 people (Gupte and Muggah 2015). This is more than four times the rate of the United Kingdom. Owing to the scale of unregistered births and deaths and the poor quality of police data collection, it is likely that the prevalence is much higher. Even assuming this conservative count, criminal violence generates at least ten times more
deaths and injuries in India than terrorism and conflict. In this, a comparatively small number of intermediate and large cities register a disproportionate amount of gun violence: four of the top five most violent cities in terms of murder by firearms are located in Uttar Pradesh. The most violent cities are not mega-cities, but rather mid-sized cities of between 1 million and 3 million people. These mid-sized cities continue to grow rapidly and feature disproportionately large populations of unemployed and under-educated youth. They are also exhibiting severely under-resourced services, including public police forces.

While current data make it difficult to directly compare gender-based violence (GBV) in urban and rural areas, there are recognisable linkages between the processes of urbanisation and GBV. As McIlwaine argues:

…on the one hand, cities provide women with greater opportunities to cope with violence more effectively in relation to tolerance, access to economic resources and institutional support. Yet on the other hand, social relations can be more fragmented, which can lead to greater incidence of violence as can the pressures of urban living, such as poverty, engagement in certain types of occupation, poor quality living conditions and the physical configuration of urban areas. Ultimately, cities themselves do not generate gender-based violence, and opportunities for reducing it can be enhanced in urban areas.

(McIlwaine 2013: 65)

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3 Interview with Rajan Medhekar, Director Gender (Retd.), National Security Guard, India.
4 Cityscapes now

Detailed case study material from Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, two contemporary global cities, was developed for this study, to provide a grounding of what violence and order look like in cities today. The case studies are summarised in the two sub-sections below, and the material broadly covers:

a. historical trajectories and processes that shape the urban form
b. contemporary regime-centric approaches to security provision
c. contemporary citizen-led approaches to security provision.

4.1 Mumbai

The city of Mumbai experienced one of the worst bouts of rioting in contemporary India, which lasted from December 1992 through to January 1993 (henceforth ‘Mumbai Riots’), and the neighbourhoods of south-central Mumbai experienced a particularly high intensity of violence. These neighbourhoods provide critical insights into how outcomes of violence and order in a contemporary mega-city are both inter-related and path-dependant.

The neighbourhoods are best described in terms of mixed power situations (as in Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008), where the boundaries between what is legal, legitimate or credible, and illegal, illegitimate or invalid, are often blurred. As a result, the taxonomy of security provision is far more complex than what is traditionally described in patron–client models of city governance. In particular, the nature of urban form, when understood in a relational rather than an isolative sense, appears to influence not only how security is delivered, but as a consequence also influences by whom and to whom it is delivered. As such, space is indeed central to several local political processes (Brenner 2004), but the lingering legacies of violence in impoverished urban spaces have impacts that reach further, as they also redefine the accepted parameters of adequate urban living.

The manner in which the state sees, relates to and categorises impoverished neighbourhoods is closely linked with its understanding of urban citizenship, and as a consequence, what it considers to be adequate living standards (Zérah 2009). This understanding of urban spaces based on their spatial and material parameters alone functions overtly ‘to impose order and… legitimate control by establishing clear-cut boundaries between the legal and non-legal’ (Chatterji and Mehta 2007: 129). By defining these boundaries, the state distinguishes between urban citizens, who are seen as legitimately possessing rights to which the state is accountable, and the ‘population’ (as characterised by Chatterjee 2004) which is a vague and heterogeneous grouping without legitimate claims on state provision.

The neighbourhoods of south-central Mumbai (erstwhile Bombay) are some of the oldest in the city (Chadha 2005). Today, the neighbourhoods of Nagpada, Madanpura, Agripada, Kamathipura, Dongri and Phydhonie can be described as busy inner-city neighbourhoods with an equal mix of residential and commercial buildings. Residents are predominantly Muslim, with Hindus and other minorities making up approximately 30 per cent of the population (Census of India 2011). There are a variety of businesses based in the localities, ranging from heavy metal and frame works, to tile shops, tailoring and leather works. The area is also home to Mumbai’s longest-standing red light district (Shah 2006). The neighbourhoods are mostly populated by chawls (concretised tenement blocks, typically made of sub-standard design and materials), some of which are inhabited by a mixed population of Hindus and Muslims. These ‘mixed’ chawls tend to be the most sensitive areas and have seen frequent instances of civil violence such as rioting and arson.
4.1.1 History of Nagpada and surrounding neighbourhoods

Despite the dilapidated living conditions in these neighbourhoods, throughout the early twentieth century they continued to attract wealthier and more established workers because of their proximity to the mills. In recent decades however, the area has become a predominantly low-income area. Following the Mumbai Riots, there was a steady exodus of business-owning Hindu families from the area, coupled with an inflow of poorer Muslim households who were being persecuted in other localities (as described in Masselos 2007: 176), leading to the further ghetto-isation of Nagpada and the surrounding neighbourhoods. Recent government and civil society interventions have relocated shanties and pavement dwellers to sites on the periphery of the city.

Under the banner of neighbourhoods somehow ‘unified by Muslims’, as one official in the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation characterised the area, facts and myths serve to glorify and stigmatise the neighbourhoods alike. Inasmuch as the bazaar and street-food vendors along Mohammad Ali Road are venerated for their uniqueness, the back-street chawls and dense residential areas of Nagpada are stigmatised as being backward and disconnected from the more affluent, and Hindu, neighbourhoods in the vicinity. An elevated viaduct that runs above the entire length of the Mohammad Ali Road was completed in 2002, allowing thoroughfare traffic an uninterrupted run to the affluent neighbourhoods in Fort and onwards to Colaba in South Mumbai, by-passing nearly all inner-city neighbourhoods. At the time of its construction, the flyover was heralded not only as an ingenious solution to Mumbai’s traffic, but also celebrated as a symbol of urban ingenuity as it stood to be the longest viaduct in India.

Much less attention was given to those neighbourhoods that fell under the shadow of the giant concrete structure. The increased media attention given to the opening of the flyover depicted the neighbourhoods below as homogeneous, dark and congested places. In an interview, an assistant commissioner of police attempted to convince us of his expertise on Nagpada, saying: ‘I visit Nagpada daily, I live in the eastern suburbs so have to take the flyover every day to get to the Commissioner’s Office [at Crawford Market, at the Southern end of the flyover]’. The implication was that just by looking down on these neighbourhoods from the flyover it was possible to understand these ‘social black holes’ (as in Appadurai 2000). The reality is quite different. The neighbourhoods which come under the flyover, namely Phydnonie, Null Bazaar, Mandvi, Chakla, Bhendi Bazaar, Dongri, Umarkhadi, Nagpada and Madaanpura, are ‘some of Mumbai’s most historic, economically vibrant, and culturally distinct neighborhoods’ (Khan 2007, 2008: 325). This vibrancy is a direct reflection of the many different Muslim communities that still populate the area, including Shia, Sunni, Deobandhi, Bareli, Konkani, Bohra and Memon communities, as well as a variety of Muslim sects including the Aga Khatnis and Ishana Asharis (Khan and Ghadially 2009).

Prodigous and seemingly haphazard growth of the built environment characterised Mumbai’s inner-city neighbourhoods in the early twentieth century. There were paddy fields and buffalo grazing grounds within a few miles of expensive real estate, while some sections of the city were completely crammed with buildings. The diversity in the various loci of power and authority flourished greatly at the local level in the near-complete absence of any consistent, sustained and city-wide urban planning.

Policing these newly industrialised neighbourhoods entailed many challenges. Not only were the demands of crime detection and prevention increasing rapidly, ‘the chief problem [for the police] was the proper housing of the police force, in a city where overcrowding and insanitation had become a public scandal’ (Edwardes 1923: 76). It was not only the lack of a consolidated urban plan for these neighbourhoods that led there to be such a high density of

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4 As per regional gazetteers and surveys dating as far back as 1871, more than 15 different categories of ‘Muslims’ lived in Mumbai (erstwhile Bombay) (Waterfield 1875).
building; this was also due to the adverse effects of a peculiar interpretation of tenurial conditions.

Nevertheless, the overcrowding of chawls of Nagpada and surrounding neighbourhoods cannot be understood simply in terms of maximised rent extraction strategies. In the longer term, this strategy also had a deep impact upon the social make-up of the communities that inhabited the crowded chawls. As the Rent Enquiry Committee of 1939\(^5\) found, self-selection was fast creating segregated ghettos. The cramped living arrangements caused there to be a reluctance of ‘the respectable to live with the rough, the skilled to live with the unskilled, the jobbers to live with ordinary workers and various castes to live with each other’ (Chandavarkar 1981).

By the late 1950s, the overcrowding of tenants reached a peak while land rents continued to rise. This caused builders to opt for the cheapest building materials and often disregard building regulations. Cheap timber frames were used for multi-storied structures, and inadequate waterproofing\(^6\) meant that these rotted at an alarming rate. Critically, builders also attempted to lower initial building costs by constructing on poorly built foundations and unstable plinths. As Klein (1986) describes, this had a knock-on effect on the drainage systems, which could not be cleaned due to the congestion of houses and quickly became wholly non-functional. So many buildings were built on inadequate foundations that excavation of the pavements to fix the drainage below would almost certainly cause the buildings to crumble. Nagpada was left to become one of the many ‘cesspools’ in the city where sewage from broken or clogged drains seeped into the sub-soil (Klein 1986: 742). This was also when the Rent Act, meant to protect the interests of low-rent tenants by maintaining subsidised rent levels, inadvertently put residents in a situation of greater risk and uncertainty.

4.1.2 Violence and order during the Mumbai Riots

During the Mumbai Riots, there were approximately 900 fatalities, and extensive damage to properties and businesses (Masselos 1994). The characteristics of the urban spaces where the violence unfolded contributed to the nature and extent of vulnerabilities that local residents faced. The effect was two-fold – insecure living arrangements heightened the impacts of violence on the one hand, while on the other, it was the flexibility inherent in these informal and extra-legal arrangements (such as local vigilante-style patrols) that enabled the most accessible and credible form of security. Notwithstanding the temporary nature of these security arrangements, lasting in some instances only for a few days, their impact was far-reaching, with entire households migrating across the city to relocate into neighbourhoods where they might benefit from them. These processes also reshaped how safety and security are conceptualised by local residents, leading to a shift in the present understanding of urban deprivation.

Official records provide detailed accounts of innocent bystanders, standing mostly in the tenement balconies above the streets, being shot by police bullets. For example, during the afternoon of 8 December 1992, an inspector from the Nagpada Police Station fired at a group of 100 to 120 rioting people who, purportedly, were stone-pelting the Bohri (Muslim) chawl, but instead he injured a two-year-old Muslim child standing in a balcony above (see Srikrishna 1998: II/22.14–17). Several other instances occurred in Nagpada throughout 7 and 8 December where the police response was questionable, either because of the excessive use of force or the apparent partisan nature of the response. When asked about these shootings, a key informant in the Mumbai Police said:


\(^6\) In the roofing as well as surrounding the washing spaces inside.
the [constabulary] receive next to no urban-specific training. How to control riots in the city is different from how it is dealt with in rural areas… For one, you cannot shoot warning shots upwards, there are people up above as well! Same issue with tear gas for example – in small lanes where is there space to shoot? Can you shoot around corners? In 1992 the situation was also very different, the police were also feeling trapped.

In contrast, local vigilante groups found they were able to traverse the lanes and by-lanes with enough ease to continue their patrols. Several respondents recounted the feeling of security this provided local residents – they felt protected from the ‘marauding Hindu mobs’ as well as the partisan police. It is interesting to note that even though these patrols were a fleeting and almost ‘ephemeral’ display of vigilante activity (as in Hansen 2005), which all but ceased after a few days, the actions had long-term impacts. Locally, the vigilantes were referred to as the *khadem-ul-quam akhirhuum*, implying they were the last of the ‘real men’ doing service to the community.

4.2 Rio de Janeiro

There exists an image of the favela of Rio as a source of violence and disorder. There exists another image – the favela as the locus of art, music and ‘Brazil-ness’. Both images contain elements of truth, but who beholds or owns these truths? Who defines the order and disorder? How does the label ‘disorder’ contribute to exclusion from citizenship? In the case of urban security and political, economic and social relations, the definition of order emerges substantively from the eye of the beholder, mediated by race, class, ‘youth’, as well as through perceptions of ‘threats’.

‘Security’ and ‘insecurity’ are sometimes understood as describing two different urban contexts, as if cities or even neighbourhoods were either ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’. ‘Everyday insecurity’ begins with the specific negatives of violence and unsafe spaces, but further points towards the importance of assessing how wider forms of insecurity – such as lack of livelihoods, insecure land tenure or poor services – also frame people’s life experiences and perspectives.

The forms of everyday fragility represent how urban areas can contain spaces that are relatively secure and those that are highly insecure. Cities are formed of a complex web of different spatial relations that are dynamic and not fixed, these spaces may overlap for different groups, in different locations, or in different economic, social or political contexts.

Rio has had a long history of exclusion based on space, class and in some specific ways, race – notably in the ‘favelas’. In popular terminology, the favela is the *morro* (hill) and the modern or safe city is the *asfalto* (paved road). For much of the twentieth century, different favelas were both the locus for poor immigrants from rural areas or smaller towns and a space of struggle for ‘control’ through different urban clearance efforts by elements of the state.

4.2.1 Security for whom?

In the case of Rio, how issues of insecurity are framed and by whom are part of the discussion. There are, for example, currently competing narratives over the ‘control’ or ‘order’ of the favelas and the relative ‘new policing’ of the UPP (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora/Pacifying Police Units), which began a favela-by-favela strategy of clearance and then occupation in 2008.

Not surprisingly, people live completely different lives within the same city. Exclusion is rooted in a complex stratification of society that governmental agencies have not adequately addressed. It becomes manifested in social stigma, economic informality, and political
marginalisation. Defining Rio as a ‘divided’ city or one with ‘no go’ zones produces a static and aspatial analysis, as the boundaries between state and non-state are fluid over time and depend on specific interests. How much, then, were the favelas cut off because of the criminal presence and how much did the rest of Rio cut them off?

Different understandings of ‘order’ in the favelas after 1980 took shape due to the roles of the state, local community groups and different criminal networks. In some favelas, and in some periods, order existed in the relationship between specific criminal organisations and the community, frequently including the Residents’ Association, and sometimes, local politicians and local police. From a state perspective, and from the view of some residents: order must be connected to the overall reduction in everyday insecurities. This includes the reduction in the power of criminal networks, the discipline of police in regards to the use of (lethal) force, and the opening up of social space for residents to engage in a range of daily activities.

Order involves trust in the state and the state’s institutions, as well as the functioning of the institutions in a transparent and accountable manner. Order may be absent in part because the social, spatial and political marginalisation of Rio’s slums has led to what has been termed ‘local government voids’ further leading to a crisis of governance, trust and inclusion. Local government voids emerge when there exists a conjunction of different forms of everyday insecurity: basic services, police protection and political attention disappear or require bribes or favours. The clientelism, corruption and its resultant disappointment and discontentment among citizens of these communities tend to increase the complexities of the local government voids. When these voids exist for long enough, other power-holders or power-seekers will step in opportunistically. In the 1980s, the expansion of the global drug trade through globalisation and the growing local government voids in marginalised areas, coincided to create a favourable scenario for the expansion of different criminal networks in specific favelas.

What emerges as particularly interesting in the case of Rio involves the timing of the growth of the criminal networks that coincided with the return to democracy in the 1980s. Thus, there were important connections between insecurities and criminals and politics, as part of the overall positive process of democratisation. For many of the favelas, the return to more competitive electoral politics did not establish strong state actors who could fill the governance void.

Violence and crime may contribute to the lack of access to services, and to further weakening social cohesion and trust. Most poor people live at a physical and social distance from formal NGOs or government agencies. Thus, when they face pressures from crime and violence, which affects access to schools and livelihoods, they may not have any formal systems of support or help. In addition, gender-related violence includes not only household violence but threats that prevent access to sanitation and water services. For young people, the key elements of the transition to adulthood are often truncated by the experience of or exposure to violence and crime.

When violence becomes accepted as part of everyday life and is viewed as a legitimate means of resolving conflict, this is described as the normalisation of violence. When it becomes a means adopted by the state and citizens alike, it could be called democratisation of violence. This is clearly the case in Rio, a city that has seen some of the highest homicide rates by firearms in the world. The ‘thin red line’ between order and disorder is fluid and ‘insecurity’ is a highly localised concept. At the street level, in particular, it is block-by-block and neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood, but often for the politicians and the media narratives, it is much easier to paint vivid colours across a wide map.
Political parties and local government provide order through policing, the provision of services and the allocation of tenure/security, but they also create disorder through the militarisation of policing as well as covert and sometimes fairly overt connections with criminal networks.

In December 2008, the government launched a new attempt at controlling crime and bringing favelas back under state control. This involved setting up a permanent police presence initially in some favelas through the UPP. Newly hired and trained police staffed the UPP, which explicitly did not have the elimination of all drug trade as one of its mandates. The initial list of favelas ‘taken over’ by the UPP forces were those that had relevance for the 2016 Olympics, again highlighting the political nature of policing.

The effectiveness of the UPP and other interventions against crime and violence necessarily varies from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Arias (2004) studied three favelas and found significant differences in the roots of order/disorder, the roles of the formal Residents’ Associations, and the actions of criminal networks. Similarly, the different interventions under the UPP had distinct results that require a better understanding of the internal dynamics of different favelas, local politics and the particular criminal networks. As the World Bank report noted, ‘Perceptions about UPP appear to be influenced by the history that each favela had with drug traffickers and the police before the arrival of the UPP’ (World Bank 2012: 14).

At a fundamental level, the divergent views point to the difficulty of creating an agreed upon and inclusive urban citizenship. The notion of citizenship within a democracy refers not only to the right to vote, but ‘citizenship now implies a broader set of rights to participate and voice opinions in political contests at all levels, benefit from transparency and accountability in decision making, and enjoy freedom from unjustified abuse by the authorities’ (Perlman 2005: 13). For the people living in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, these rights of citizenship are usurped by the criminal violence of drug traffickers and the structural and physical violence of the state, resulting in an authoritarian and repressive state within a state.
5 Foresighting cityscapes 2040

5.1 Drivers of change
The cityscapes were set in the 2040s, giving a 25-year time horizon. This time period was chosen to reflect commonly used high-level planning horizons (in the United Kingdom) and to go sufficiently beyond the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030 timeline so as to complement but not get completely diverted by the current debate. In addition, a 25-year time horizon is tangible enough for the participants to grapple with and relate to, yet far enough into the future for change to be quite dramatic.

Using a STEEP – social, technological, economic, environmental and political – framework, the opening session generated input on the key global trends and external forces driving change and impacting our societies, environments and cities. Five participants were invited to share short presentations identifying between three and five key trends or external forces that, from their perspective, are driving changes in violence and order now, or are emerging as drivers of future change. The workshop facilitators recorded and mapped the drivers onto a wallchart depicting the city, its transactional environment and the external forces affecting the core (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 The STEEP framework overlaid onto the city and its wider environment

Drivers of change identified by the group of experts at the CVO futures workshop were mapped according to the STEEP framework and according to the environment from which the driver emerged – external, transactional or from the city itself. Due to the specialist nature of the experts’ interventions, a plenary session was facilitated to explore drivers beyond the...

7 For more details, see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
city context, which may affect how individuals, organisations, institutions and cities function and interact in the future.

The list was by no means meant to be exhaustive, but served as a platform on which the following futures thinking could be based. Populating the wallchart as described allowed the rapid clustering of drivers under broader headings. The process generated nine broad clusters of ‘drivers of change’ (shown below):

1. **Population dynamics**: How ‘youth’ engage with cities and urban spaces in relation to, for example, economic migration, innovation, or illegality; shifting household arrangements – composition and location; ageing populations.
2. **Authoritative control of urban space**: Controlled or passive response to urbanisation; physical infrastructure generating division; fragmentation of cities; militarisation of domestic policing and order; the threat of conflict impacting city design; survivors of violence in cities.
3. **Changing meaning of cities and urban living**: Anti-urban movement; meaning ‘in’ cities and meaning ‘of’ cities; persistent patriarchy; politics of language and culture; the ‘maturing city’ – slower growth rates; decline of/circumventing of city economies; cities as engines of growth; within-city and intra-city inequality.
4. **Environment and resource scarcity**: Climate change; water availability; resource degradation; mega-disasters.
5. **Changing economies**: Networks of cities; economy based on knowledge and services (rather than manufacturing); increasing production and consumption (of particular commodities/goods/services); the ‘informal sector’.
6. **Movement (flows) of people**: Internal and international migration; ‘arrival cities’; conflict, development and disaster-induced displacement; rural–urban and urban–rural flows.
7. **Technological innovation**: Unknown (and disruptive) technological innovations; (equal) access to safe design and technology; information technology impacts; robotics; new technology for energy, transport, building materials; time and space for living/work/play.
8. **Complexity of governance structures**: Dispersal of order, security between actors; complex institutional fluidity; political threats to urban governance and rights; extent of decentralisation (‘charter cities’?); regulation and oversight of financial markets; ability to regulate the built environment; shifting roles of state, market and civil society; authoritarian models of development; shifting alliances between state and non-state; allocation of financing.
9. **Political economy of land, (illegal) commodities and services**: Elite interests in land control; increasingly organised (decentralised?) narcotics trade; provision and control of services and resources at city level; privatisation/informalisation of economy and land; privatisation/informalisation of services and infrastructure.

### 5.2 Visualising drivers of change as slider-scales

The nine clusters were then visualised as ‘slider-scales’. In conceptualising these slider-scales, care was taken so as to not reduce any one to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of each scale signified a nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of the drivers of change within that cluster of drivers of change.

Two scales for the Technological Innovations cluster were conceptualised: (1) ranging from being predominantly linear and incremental in nature, to being rapid and disruptive; and (2) as being reliant on increasingly virtual interactions to being reliant on interactions through physical contact. These are visually represented as follows:
And:

The scale for the Changing Economies cluster was envisaged as ranging from a global economy in recession, to it sustaining growth:

The scale for the Complexity of Governance Structures cluster was envisaged as ranging from dispersed political power, to situations where political power is predominantly centralised:

The scale for the Population Dynamics cluster was envisaged as ranging from differentiated demographic change to rapid (but not differentiated) population growth:

The scale for the Political Economy of Land, Commodities and Services cluster was envisaged as ranging from service provision in cities that is inclusive to service provisioning that is exclusionary:

The scale for the Changing Meaning of Cities and Urban Living cluster was envisaged as ranging from thriving to static (and possibly in decline):

The scale for the Environment and Resource Scarcity cluster was envisaged as ranging from low or mild impacts of climate change, to extreme and frequent impacts:

These slider-scales were not meant to be exhaustive in their descriptive potential, nor were they conceived of as a limiting set of factors impacting future outcomes. They are reflective of the specific Foresight methodologies used in this study. In the following sub-section, we
describe how potential future scenarios can be developed by shifting the slider-scales to get a combination of drivers of change that collectively describe the future cityscape.

5.3 Generating cityscapes

From these eight slider-scales, each of four groups was allowed to select between two and four spectrums to provide a framework for their future cityscape. This was a departure from the usual process of scenario development that is premised on the selection of two ‘high impact: high uncertainty’ scales which are overlaid to create a quadrant giving four potential scenarios.

In building the cityscape frameworks, the groups had to identify which end of the scale would be shaping the city, and in order to avoid group bias, they had to select one driver and use the opposite end of the spectrum to that which they intuitively felt would be more likely. This rule was instigated to stop the groups building cityscapes that were overly influenced by their preconceptions of what a future city may look like, and to ensure that a range of future possibilities was fully explored.

Groups were then referred to the ‘three dimensions of urban form’ – grid, ephemerality and governance (as detailed in Section 2) – as a point of reference for describing and articulating the interactions and dynamics between the STEEP drivers, as framed by each group’s chosen spectrum extremes. To help visualise the cityscapes, each group was encouraged to either select a known city, or name and locate their city – for example, a coastal city in southern Asia. For this workshop, this provided important context for considering issues such as the availability of land for expansion, or the types of climate impacts that may be experienced – for example, sea-level rise.

Once the cityscape narratives were fleshed out, the groups were also asked to consider the impact of three kinds of unmitigated and exogenous shocks and stresses on the interactions and dynamics between the actors, spaces and institutions, i.e. the worst case within the context of their cityscape. The shocks and stresses were:

S1. **Everyday insecurities** – this includes those insecurities and vulnerabilities which do not threaten the state *per se* but nevertheless form the everyday lived experiences of city-dwellers. These arise from (the threat of) crime, violence or injuries, economic insecurity (poverty, unemployment), and/or the gendered, racialised and religious structures that maintain unequal social hierarchies.

S2. **Violence, uprisings and armed conflict** – this includes protracted conflicts that are increasingly located in and around cities, or even if they are not, often have the control of cities as their objective.

S3. **Climate change and disasters** – this includes the many small disasters, i.e. fires, landslides, local floods, waste flows, not just the headline ones.

Thinking through the unmitigated impact of such shocks and stresses led to the identification of weaknesses in the cityscapes’ systems, institutions and interactions – or conversely to their strengths. Considering both the weaknesses and strengths, each cityscape group then took up the challenge of designing interventions – policy or programmatic – that would mitigate (in the case of weaknesses) or ensure management of (in the case of strengths) the shocks and stresses identified. The workshop generated a number of proposals that could be implemented, or worked towards in the near term to build, safer, more resilient cities of the future.

*Please note that the following cityscapes were not written to a specific structure other than the particular calibration on the chosen slider-scales. The write-up of each cityscape is therefore reflective of each individual group’s decision-making process, and to a lesser degree the choices of the designated note-takers. In terms of process, allowing this flexibility*
saved on coordination time, which was instead devoted to plenary discussions on policy responses and implications, without detracting from the overall purpose of the exercise.

5.4 Cityscape 2040: ‘Coastal collapse’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linear/incremental change</th>
<th>Technological change</th>
<th>Rapid/disruptive change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasingly virtual interaction</td>
<td>Technology and social interactions</td>
<td>Interactions through physical contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recession</td>
<td><strong>Global economy</strong></td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td><strong>Political power</strong></td>
<td>Centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated</td>
<td><strong>Demographic change</strong></td>
<td>Rapid population growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td><strong>Access to services</strong></td>
<td>Exclusionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thriving</td>
<td><strong>Meanings of the city</strong></td>
<td>Static/maturing/ possibly in decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/mild impacts</td>
<td><strong>Climate change</strong></td>
<td>Extreme/frequent impacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Notes provided by Dr Roger Williamson, IDS]

A coastal Chinese city with a population of 10 million and a broader urban region of 20 million making a poly-centric, export-dominated, special economic zone. In 2015, it was still a successful exporter of ‘white goods’ – for example, fridges, washing machines, microwaves and other manufactured goods to the European and North American markets. It had developed very fast from 1995 to 2015, but by 2040 there were serious signs of strain on the economic and social model on which the city’s development and prosperity had depended. The city is located on the coast – there is a river and at the coast there is a container port (which was modern in 2015, but has fallen on harder times with the decline in export demand). Rapid expansion to the megalopolis of 30 million people was rapid and not physically constrained (for instance, no mountains close to the coast). The main constraints were therefore the ‘workableness’ of the urban region – distance, traffic, commuting times and so on. Given that the city was located on the flood plain with a low-lying river delta, flooding and sea-level rise have been greater challenges.
The three slider-scales used to create this cityscape were positioned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recession</th>
<th>Global economy</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Description:** By 2040, there was a general and local recession caused by a shift in large-scale manufacturing out of China. There was still limited demand for the type of goods produced in the Chinese market as the middle class had developed (2015–35) but for the last five years (2035–40) even here demand slowed. Much of the basic manufacture and assembly for these goods was now done in other Asian and African countries. This was in line with the relocation of manufacturing industry as predicted by Chinese economist Justin Lin (2011). Chinese labour costs rose and the Chinese economy developed – as many had predicted, and in line with Chinese government policy – in the direction of a consumer-based and service economy.

Some of the entrepreneurial and managerial staff were able to emigrate and work in Africa in supervisory, planning, IT and managerial posts for the kind of firms which had been producing previously in the city region. In a return flow of migration, some foreign traders and a few people with specialist skills came from abroad to live and work in the city.

There are a lot fewer formal sector jobs. In rural areas, the informal development has been accepted. The situation is less clear-cut in the cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispersed</th>
<th>Political power</th>
<th>Centralised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Description:** By 2040, the Chinese political system had evolved, but not fundamentally altered. The Chinese Communist Party was still in control, but the difficulties in the economy and previous experience with the devolution of some decision-making autonomy to city level meant that (successful) local experiments were welcomed. Unsuccessful experiments adversely affected career chances for local officials and managers – leading in extreme cases to disgrace, demotion and/or relocation. But so did continued inadequate economic performance in the city and signs of public discontent. Citizens’ interest groups could organise around local issues of service delivery, economic performance, and issues such as the efficiency and cleanliness of the city, housing etc. They did not have to be under Party control but were still not allowed to challenge the system or threaten its ‘stability’ (order) as defined by the Party. To do so could trigger direct reprisals and police intervention – even with force – for example, clearing streets by police action if a demonstration ‘got out of hand’.

The coordinated pressure for better services on the one hand, and the comprehensive use of electronic surveillance technologies on the other, mean that there is now permanent potential for conflict. There is a danger that the middle class may become more insistent that the state should ‘get a grip’ and impose more order.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Linear/incremental change</th>
<th>Technological change</th>
<th>Rapid/disruptive change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Description:** The period 2025–2035 revolutionised the industrial base of the city. Computerised, robotised and fully automated production processes replaced the need for less skilled labour working in assembly for instance. The manufacturing process was mainly centred on carbon compounds and new materials, not metal. 3D printing largely replaced the need for transport of components and assembly. Finished items were much smaller and lighter. In many cases software transfer meant that customers could have their items locally produced in ‘3D print warehouses’. This meant that the large factory buildings were mainly
standing idle – but some were adapted to other uses – broken up into small units used for product design, such as 3D print shops of various kinds and centres for manufacturing green energy technologies.

The new technology inevitably meant that there were winners and losers – the main losers being lower-skilled workers and those working in transport.

5.4.1 Implications of drivers of change for demographics
Various factors need to be mentioned. The end of China’s one-child policy led to families having two children on average. Nonetheless, the city had an ageing profile with more and more ‘over 70s’ to care for – leading to increasing demand for health facilities and public/community transport and social services. The increase in the numbers of children also led to pressure on school places. Unemployment and retraining needs also meant that there was a greater demand for courses alongside a growing dissatisfaction that these ‘do not lead anywhere’.

There is a division between a growing middle class and first- and second-generation migrants who live in worse-quality housing and crowded conditions behind inadequate flood defences (which often fail or are overwhelmed). These are mainly near factories and the port where air quality has been bad, but is now improving as heavy industry declines. Many of those who have recently come to the city still leave their children with grandparents (in practice mainly grandmothers) to be cared for and educated in the villages from which they came. Many older workers do not want to return to their villages when their working life ends. They have grown accustomed to the urban existence and, in spite of nostalgic memories, are aware of the more limited opportunities in their places of origin.

The general recession means that even if people wanted to move, their job prospects would not necessarily be better elsewhere – particularly for the lower-skilled workers. Those who have arrived from the countryside and do not have full legal and residential rights under the hukou system, still are determined to stay in the city, as they feel their prospects would probably be worse if they returned to the countryside. They are discontent and are organising themselves to demand more rights. The authorities at city and national levels keep promising that they will be gradually granted more rights and their situation will be improved by a process of ‘controlled integration’, but resourcing and organising this process is increasingly difficult under recession conditions.

5.4.2 Implications of drivers of change for gender dimensions
The loss of factory jobs has disproportionately affected women, who have been most likely to become unemployed. Where they have kept their jobs, there has been a downward pressure on wages. With the ageing population and inadequate state/municipal provision of services, women are being pushed to take an even greater, unpaid caring role. Some younger men are prepared to share caring roles, but older men (and some women) accept or actively promote a more traditional division of roles within the family.

5.4.3 Implications of drivers of change for new industries
Some attempts at urban renewal have been made, with a refurbishment of the city centre – but this has mainly been in the richer areas. Refits of old buildings, particularly equipping high-rise offices and dwellings with solar energy, has provided some jobs and transformed the use of some factory space. More people are employed in some sense or other as guards/night-watch men and women, and in staffing and analysing the increased surveillance data.

8 Hukuo is the system of household registration required by law in China and Taiwan.
5.4.4 Wider implications
At municipal level, and from the organisations representing residents and workers, various scenarios have been elaborated for future visions for the city. These include ‘municipal quantitative easing’ – i.e. an appeal made to central government to support or allow deficit spending to transform the old ‘hollowed out’ industrial architecture, factories and workers’ housing. The government is reluctant to underwrite or to allow this. Local entrepreneurs are actively seeking to promote ‘city marketing’ – promoting the city as a place with a future – but so far have few successes to show. In any case, many other cities have similar, competing initiatives.

The informal economy is growing. Local street vendors are becoming more organised and pressing for improvements to their lot – an end to petty harassment and fines for technical and minor infringements, an undercover market to improve their working conditions and subsidised ‘lock ups’ or garages to store their goods securely overnight. There has been no considered response at policy level to these appeals. There is a general perception from all sides that the current arrangements are ‘not really working’ and the police engage in periodic crackdowns to show that they are ‘doing something’ – taking it out on the street traders and justifying this as a campaign against petty crime and pickpockets.

5.4.5 Sources of increased tension and potential violence

1. Everyday insecurities. There has been an increase in petty criminality.
2. Violence and armed conflict. Some of the disadvantaged and disaffected have organised themselves, with the development of gangs and fears that these may become armed groups. This alarmist rhetoric has been condemned but still persists in some circles and is used to justify calls for a ‘crackdown on criminal elements’. Citizens’ groups are trying to fill the gap left by the inadequate state provision and loss of jobs. They fear that the unemployed, some of whom are living as squatters in deserted buildings, may be oppressed. One initiative is to negotiate to try to avoid the criminalisation of those who cannot pay for housing – or their forced expulsion from the city.
3. Climate change. Sea-level rise and the backing-up of river water has led to a week of major flooding – a smaller version of the New Orleans floods. Much of the poorer area of the city is under water. Flood defences for that part of the city near the port have proved completely inadequate. On the other side of the river, the flood defences have held, but many of the middle class families have abandoned the flats and squatters have moved in. The city has not been able to cope with the flooding and citizens’ organisations have coordinated a response, trying to organise alternative sources of clean water, and (without authorisation) trying to clear and repair drains, provide sandbags for shops and houses and so on. Some people from outside the flooded areas have joined the initiative.

5.4.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence in this cityscape?

1. Social movement-led revival. The strong citizen response to the floods, coupled with a more responsive attitude by the authorities, creates new possibilities of a stronger coalition between the authorities and the wider population. The poorer sections of the population insist on no evictions and no victimisation for those involved in activism – particularly the squatters’ movement. The ‘No empty space’ movement is a citizen-led coalition campaigning for any empty housing to be made available and for factory space to be used at advantageous rates for business, community groups, self-help training initiatives and so on. The community is also providing labour at subsistence wages to build up the sea defences to provide a new
protective barrier for the poorer residential areas. The city is providing the rocks and cement to make this possible. Street vendors’ organisations succeed in their campaign for a more progressive policy and indoor space for regularisation of their status. A liaison group between the traders and the city and police negotiates a resolution of almost all areas of friction in a tolerable and mutually acceptable way.

2. **Muddling through. The precarious stand-off between the authorities and certain sections of the population continues.** Occasional victimisation of prominent activists, such as leaders of the street vendors or squatters, continues. Periodic ‘crackdowns’ lead to confrontation between police and local youth – sometimes with violence and counter-violence. Groups do not achieve any wider solidarity, each group has to ‘fight its own corner’ – leading to contestation over services and mistrust and competitiveness between different initiatives. There is some voluntary work and patchy philanthropic initiatives. The port is still functioning, but is of diminishing economic importance. Within the wider city area (the 30-million conurbation) some new small enterprises emerge and some ‘urban farm’ ventures develop on a small-scale cooperative model.

3. **Further decline. The downward spiral continues.** The ‘Chinese Detroit’ scenario threatens. City finances are non-viable – the city is effectively bankrupt and the state is not keen to bail it out or provide a rescue package. Policing and services are – step by step, without a deliberate policy or announcement – gradually withdrawn from the poor areas. The poorer sections of the population are left to fend for themselves and these areas of the city become effectively ‘no go’ areas for officials and outsiders from the residential areas which are not so hard hit.

5.4.7 Potential policy approaches and external involvement

- The city could be open to approaches from international networks of cities and Asian (and other) international disaster-preparedness networks for policy advice and options.
- They might welcome help in drawing up risk assessments and identifying the weakest points such as for additional infrastructure protection.
- Their ‘Green Economic Strategy’ might involve a commitment to decrease the carbon footprint and increase the use of renewable and low-energy options.
- Smart technologies and decentralised citizens’ initiatives using social media will likely provide an early warning system for sea-level rise.
- Predictive technology is also used at a much higher level (city/coastal region).
- The assumption is made that answers need to be ‘home grown’ and use the experimental flexibility in the Chinese system as it develops.
- The scientific/technical side was assumed to be strong but an exchange at BRICS level9 – particularly with the Brazilians – is used to strengthen the ‘social movement/citizens’ participation’ side of the response.

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9 That is, the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
### 5.5 Cityscape 2040: ‘Solar saviour’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linear/incremental change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low/mild impacts</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>Extreme/frequent impacts</td>
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[Notes provided by Thea Shahrokh, IDS]

This cityscape is built from a basic starting point of the city of Bosaso, a secondary city located on the coast of north-eastern Somalia.

- It serves as the region’s commercial capital and is a major seaport within the autonomous Puntland state. It is described as a ‘city state’.
- The ethnic or clan-based make-up of the city is diverse as a result of the civil war, however the population is majority Muslim.
- The post-civil war population increased from 500,000, and now reached 2 million as a result of economic development, including inward migration.

The slider-scales used to develop this cityscape were as follows:

#### 5.5.1 Extreme climatic conditions

With a hot desert climate, the city suffers from extreme water shortages with 19mm of rain a year. There are no controls for flooding so unexpected weather changes that bring large quantities of rain would have a huge impact on the city. There has been a recent move towards tree planting, however there are challenges to sustaining this. Sea-level rise also poses a threat to the city, which is 50m above sea level.
5.5.2 Meanings of the city

Meanings of the city

| Thriving | Static/maturing/ possibly in decline |

Its position as a major port has enabled a strong platform for investment in technology. Economic relations with China were established stemming from its port status and this has led to investment in technological innovation. The city has become a major hub for IT and technological innovation, particularly in the field of solar energy. Recent exponential growth has further strengthened and stabilised the city economy. Particular advances in solar power have connected into the city’s position as a port and solar ships are making major advances in clean transportation and trade. Economic migrants from Afghanistan and Yemen as ‘guest workers’ make up a large proportion of the industrial workers in the solar and shipping industry. This has expanded to include Greek labour as historical links have re-opened.

However, the social and political reality of the city is contested. The post-civil war context has meant that there are tensions along clan-based or ethnic lines within the city’s population, as citizens were displaced into this urban setting. Economic development and technological innovation over the last 15 years have seen a move away from illegality and piracy as a major economic pathway. Muslim Sharia law has maintained strength and is constituted. Young people who have benefited greatly from economic prosperity see themselves as better than the jobs in the shipping and industrial sectors and are therefore disaffected. There is an economic migrant population from Afghanistan and Yemen drawn in by the shipping trade. However, since they are brought in on short-term contracts, there is no livelihood security, leading to dejected migrant workers. There are also issues of integration and social cohesion as ethnic tensions are present among migrant workers, and also between them and the Somali population. A major issue is that although there is economic progression, the context is socially regressive: oppressive norms that subordinate women and people in marginalised groups remain. Women and minority ethnic groups are excluded from the labour force. A strong patriarchal gender order remains in place.

5.5.3 Technology

Technological change

| Linear/incremental change | Rapid/disruptive change |

The country has experienced growth in the technology sector with investment in innovation from China. However, these innovations are rapid in some areas, like solar power, but hampered in others, primarily by the geo-politics present in relationships with multinational corporations. The Department of Chinese Studies has opened up cultural links with China and Chinese youth.

Eco-friendly innovations in spatial design are wide-ranging and deeply influential. For example, passive systems determine tree-planting, there are cafés to encourage participation in leisure growing, and systems to harness solar energy are integrated into the mobility infrastructure for personal vehicles. Building regulations are now opening up – a new satellite town has been built. However, public transportation systems and services continue to be plagued with inefficiencies and are not maintained.
5.5.4 Governance

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Following 20 years of established democracy, the national political climate is described as an authoritarian clan-based ‘community of elders’ type of government. There are increasing moves towards creating a city state, led by the city's liberal municipal mayor. The city benefits from continued economic stability and good trade relations with China, indicative of continued growth. A respected community of elders maintains continuity with traditional/cultural norms. Economic growth is driven largely by the ports, and these remain under central government control. There is an aggressive system regulating migrant workers. Services and infrastructure are controlled through government investments. Modern free trade zones have been established, and incentives provided for financial services to set up trade.

5.5.5 Sources of increased tension and potential violence

1. Everyday insecurities:
   a. Disaffected youth and dejected migrant workers initiate competing armed waves of neo-piracy – the connection to regional terrorist networks and arms trades is particularly dangerous.
   b. Threat of this growing into drugs trading networks related to the shipping routes; a drug like Khat is consumed fresh so not a major risk in terms of exports – but imports could be.
   c. Violence against women becomes ‘invisible’ in the face of economic progress/modernity yet remains present in private and public spaces.
   d. Persistent gender inequalities, and inequalities for marginalised groups.

2. Violence and armed conflict:
   a. Perceived/real ‘threat’ to the power of the city state government by neighbouring states with alternative clan-leadership may lead to a repressive (military response).
   b. If the city state government evolves into a repressive regime then there is a threat of violence and conflict on multiple fronts.
   c. Attempted coup by an oil company (geo-politics) – led to the Bosaso government privately contracting the Chinese army to respond to this.

3. Climate change/disasters:
   a. Intense heat/sun levels affect agriculture and water. This is an intensely water-insecure area.
   b. However, this climate is also what has enabled the innovative response through the technology of the Bosaso government, which is generating income for the country.
   c. Major food supplies are imported however, which is very expensive for the majority of the population.

5.5.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence in this cityscape?

Impetus will need to come from a progressive mayor to nurture community and collective life in order to build resilience. ‘Guilds’ based on livelihoods/occupations will need to provide alternative spaces of association outside clan-based ethnic lines, which are driving ongoing tensions. Incentives for participation could initially come through tax credits. This would draw in migrant workers and include women. An annual festival celebrating the identity of these groups could help new cultures to grow. Establishing economic and political links through an economic alliance with China could enable the incumbent political power to solidify its
position and prevent a coup – the mayor of Bosaso could foster this through visits to China for cultural and political relationship-building.

However, concern might arise regarding the dependency on China and the extent to which the continued fulfilment of human rights and a participatory democracy would be constrained given this relationship. Building alternative relationships with other countries/regional bodies would therefore be important to maintain international accountability.

Youth employment and business opportunities that are initiated from the perspectives of young people enable them to provide their own pathways. Social networking and internet culture enable alternative spaces for youth culture to emerge, including cultural exchange. A Women’s Department of Film Studies could be established at the university to enable women to raise voices and share their ideas and imaginations.

A programme of gender and empowerment including ensuring girls and young women are fully participating in secondary level education would be critical to address longer-term gender inequalities.

There is a state-wide campaign to promote modern ways of being and to discredit piracy, offering a new future for the country – a form of public shaming of the idea of piracy. Freedom of press to report on piracy is established. This drive is complemented by international pressure on establishing norms against piracy. Meaningful engagements within the state diaspora are made possible through the state economic development agency, and enable the exchange of knowledge, ideas and monetary resources.

5.6 Cityscape 2040: ‘Post-capital commons’

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</tbody>
</table>

[Notes provided by Eric Kasper, IDS]

This cityscape was built using a contemporary non-coastal Indian city as a starting point. The slider-scales along which the city in 2040 was assessed were as follows:
5.6.1 Climate change

Climate variability is thought to be highly disruptive, with serious conditions of flooding and high levels of out-of-season rainfall interspersed with heat stresses getting more frequent and intense with time. However, as the city itself is not coastal, the climate-related shocks and stresses are perceived as ‘happening elsewhere’. As a result, risk management is not highly systematised across the city. Most efforts towards building resilience are mainstream and ‘off-the-shelf’ approaches. There are no indications that dedicated resources for risk management are being set aside. Food supply vulnerability has set in nationally.

5.6.2 Population

The population can be described by extreme demographic differentiation and accompanied by a reduction in family sizes. A change in gender dynamics is perceptively evident with women more likely to work, given the need for dual incomes across most households. Smaller family units also imply fewer elderly parents are able to live in the same home – this marked transformation in domestic space is significantly different from rural settings, where larger households are more common.

5.6.3 Implications of drivers of change for technology

The city is envisaged as being shaped by new technologies that are disruptive to the status quo. In particular, 3D printing technologies have rapidly developed and revolutionised two sectors. Firstly, new building technologies have replaced bricks and mortar with 3D printed materials. The technology has become widespread through middle- and upper-income neighbourhoods, where residents have been able to readily afford the expensive raw materials required to switch to this technology. Low-income neighbourhoods continue to use low-grade non-permanent materials. The regulatory environment has been unable to cope with the ‘democratisation’ of building technology, and this has inevitably led to a greater degree of non-conformity with building regulations. Recent government efforts have been aimed at regulating the design files, while building regulations need to be enforced through code inspectors.

Second, small arms manufacturing has switched almost completely to using 3D printing. The open-source nature of the design files has led to widespread gun ownership among civilians in all walks of life. Control of ammunition is one of few remaining state controls of firearm use.
5.6.4 Implications of drivers of change for the global economy

The dollar has all but collapsed and the Chinese have demanded repayment of their debt. As a result, a new Bretton Woods system has emerged that sets up a global consensus that the reconstruction of spaces and economies is in the collective interest, and directs money towards such efforts. Though cities become less important, this however does not exacerbate intra-urban inequalities. A group of global leaders articulate a different way of generating and allocating resources that ‘ensure the public good’ across countries and across cities.

5.6.5 Sources of increased tensions and violence

There is a central authority that regulates, but it is not integrated in its response to climate change and use of donor funding. Climate change in nearby coastal cities has led to increased inward migration, while other social impacts of climate change are seen indirectly in the city.

Since the city is not coastal, it has not been forced to be very organised in dealing with climate change. However, the post-disaster scenario in neighbouring coastal cities has created a large influx of internally displaced persons. The wealthier ‘refugees’ are able to enter the city and find space for relocation. The poorer arrivals cannot do this. People start to demand citizenship (e-passports) based on original city of habitation.

As city populations grow, they become more differentiated. Social differences become magnified. The fragmentation of population growth has been the result of alternate views of family sizes propagated by a popular wave of anti-religious sentiments. Although there are the same number of people in the city, there are now twice as many households. The widespread availability of 3D-printed building materials implies that the number of 3D-printed houses now vastly outnumber the basic service delivery points (like water, gas, electricity and sanitation) needed to service these households. This has created a growing feeling of resentment across both the consumers and providers of basic services.

Further tensions are likely as not everyone can afford to buy 3D-printed materials for building. Large sections of the city are getting left behind. For the middle class and upwards, there is uptake of 3D printing of homes, which is hugely resource-intensive. Others, who are excluded from this, use 3D printing to print arms.

A major disease outbreak occurs. It starts in dense populations in South Asia and spreads through the city. The unexpected thing is, it does not wipe out the poor, but goes through the piped water system and wipes out differentially the elite (more educated, skilled and wealthy) sections of society who are more likely to be connected to the infected water supply.

There is an exogenous increase in everyday insecurities. A few neighbourhoods face a spate of racialised arrests. This becomes all the more problematic as the city is not particularly integrated in its responses. New elites are emerging – those who control the internet, those who control 3D printing.

The city becomes dependent on 3D-printable concrete as a building material. This radically changes the architectural possibilities and reshapes the city – potentially into low-rise housing. The urban form leads to consequences for daily life. This further develops the hyper-localisation of society.
5.6.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence in this cityscape?

The nature of governance structures in the city imply that the burden of risk management cannot be placed on any one single scale, but is spread across local and national actors. Investing in a strong evidence base early is important, as is the need to empower communities with access to this evidence. Substantial resources need to be diverted towards re-imagining the conceptual frameworks used to understand ‘refugees’ and ‘internally displaced’. As people get displaced from one city and seek refuge in another, city-based citizenship becomes a contested topic that requires support from research funding.

Technology regulation systems are key to maintaining order and control, however there are differential impacts across the city. Innovators in design and usage of new materials are thought leaders and key influencers – so development interventions need to focus on including them in the process of change. Gender dimensions continue to be central, not only for the differential impact of violence, but also due to the gendered nature of the relationships people have with technological innovations. Interventions therefore need to focus on creating space for both women and men to be leading innovators.
Confronting the challenges of tomorrow in cities of today: Biases and blind spots in current policies, programmes and processes

Following the workshop, consultations were conducted with a range of experts, stakeholders, donors and practitioners. In light of the policy challenges highlighted through the future cityscapes, in our consultations we posed a series of inter-related questions:

- How do they currently understand and act upon the relationships between urbanisation and peace processes?
- What is the nature of the relations between urbanisation, urban violence, urban fault lines, and the national and sub-national peace processes and what are ways of assessing future fragility trends?
- What is the nature of the urban political settlement and how does it affect the sub-national and national peace processes?
- How do citizens currently negotiate for services or economic benefits in different urban contexts? How do ‘pirate’ or self-service cities provide opportunities for transitions out of fragility in non-traditional ways?

The table below summarises our findings relating to the nature of large donor-funded research programmes that are ongoing or have been completed within the last five years.

Table 6.1 Focus of current/recent programmes relating to cities, violence and order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing concept</th>
<th>Links with ‘violence and order’ framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Concept largely not city-specific; borrowed from other related fields and therefore potential to leave particular gaps in policy and programming; frequently considered separately from power, poverty, governance and violence issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragility</td>
<td>Fragile city terminology is somewhat dominated by its links with ‘feral cities’; capacities, particularly of citizen-led innovations are not highlighted to the extent they should be; there is the risk of a dystopian, ‘ain’t it awful’ view that misses on the diversity and ‘up from the pavement’ initiatives that reflect citizen engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Crime, violence and justice have been separate intellectual and programme domains from violence. When there has been attention to violence, especially in urban areas, it is usually in relation to ‘violent extremism’ or gender-based violence For the latter, this has been central to getting the issue of gender-based violence on international forums; but there is a continued disconnect with on-the-ground/day-to-day policing – how a crime is policed, how it is reported and our understanding of jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure development</td>
<td>Relatively well funded, but the links between violence and order are disparate</td>
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</table>

6.1 Blind spots

We report below a list of blind spots identified through expert consultations:
1. **Non-state actors as providers of security**: The state is not the sole provider of security in cities. This not only presents complexities in terms of how research and programming are carried out, but also raises ethical and moral questions. How does one think about non-state providers of security, particularly those that may also engage in illicit or criminal practices, as agents of change within broader conversations around the Sustainable Development Goals, for instance? We need to reconcile the need for the rule of law on the one hand, with a plethora of actors (both state and non-state) who are likely to be involved in providing security on the other; which of these actors will drive and sustain the rule of law? Just as ‘idle youth’ or ‘new entrants’ to cities are maligned as groups that might perpetrate violence, they are also victims of it, and for some, violence can be a route to identity and voice.

2. **Framing of security**: How people define and describe their own sense of security and insecurity could be better incorporated into the framing. There continues to be space to think about what security means, who delivers it, and whether it should be a public or private (i.e. excludable) good?

3. **Rapidly growing small towns**: More than half of the urban population currently live in small towns of fewer than 500,000 people. Some of these towns are slated to grow into large cities in the near future. While some of these growing agglomerations, such as Juba (South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), already feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be relatively hidden from view.

4. **Learning from the safest cities**: There is a growing amount of evidence on innovations leading to violence prevention located in cities where violence is prevalent, but much less is known about the dynamics of security provision in cities where violence is less prevalent (Osaka, Singapore, Tehran, Jakarta for example). This includes evidence on other, more hidden, forms of vulnerabilities, oppression and marginalisation that nevertheless take place in locations wherein physical violence might not be as prevalent.

5. **Planning and design**: Provision of affordable housing in the cities of the developing world continues to be driven by out-dated approaches. Lessons from failures of public housing projects such as Pruitt-Igoe, a failed housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, which was eventually demolished (see Hall 2014), seem to have been largely forgotten, or are ignored; just as urban planning treats cities as building blocks for grand schemes (‘Seeing Like a State’), so the lessons of how spatial and temporal relations function are treated as marginal points of view. This is at odds with an agenda towards building safe, inclusive and sustainable cities.

6. **Technology**: There are several promising innovations, but relatively sparse attention given to up-scaling technology-based innovations. Aside from a handful of notable exceptions, the police are missing from the conversation on finding, trialling and up-scaling technology-based innovations that are not militaristic in nature. There is much attention on ‘smart cities’ but not on people-centred technologies.

7. **Police reform**: The core agenda of police reform does not have any significant urban or city focus to speak of, and there are frequent internal obstacles within bilateral donor agencies over whether and how to engage with the police. This is despite very significant concerns being raised over police capacities, resources and willingness with city police forces. Emerging evidence is hinting at overworked, debilitated and disgruntled police forces providing security in cities – this calls for the need to train research agendas on police wellbeing and functioning.

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10 Including, the Mobile-Based Smart Policing Project (www.igarape.org.br/en/smart-policing), the Virtual Police Station (www.virtualpolice.in) and the Mobile Training Platform for Urban Police (www.ids.ac.uk/project/a-mobile-training-platform-for-urban-policing-in-india-and-nepal).
6.2 Implications for policy, practice and research

We find that there is a continuing need for donors to invest in more evidence-gathering and to undertake more detailed research on the interplay between violence and order in cities. In particular, we find that:

- This includes maintaining focus on different typologies of violence. Violence might occur ‘on cities’ (as in cities coming under siege). But it might also occur ‘within cities’ (where violence is located in urban settings, but almost by circumstance), or it may be ‘inherent to cities’ (where the type and modalities of violence are specifically urban in nature; and even become ingrained in the everyday fabric of urban life). The three levels are deeply interconnected (through cross-cutting themes of gender, for instance), but they present significantly different challenges in terms of entry points for violence mitigation strategies.

- ‘Ordered cities’ are often synonymised with ‘planned’, ‘smart’, or even ‘charter’ cities. Misconceived planning, policy, or design interventions are likely to create insecurity, not reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and these processes can occur over very long periods of time. As such, ‘order for whom?’ is the operative question that significantly impacts outcomes. In this sense, there is a critical gap in our understanding of the lessons that the safest cities provide us in terms of systems thinking – as opposed to violence preventing innovations in unsafe cities.

- Both national and local governments, as well as donors and other stakeholders, need to rethink their tools and analytical frameworks to assess whether the lived experiences of urban violence are being adequately taken into account. This should also extend to research, policy design and programme implementation.

- More attention and resources are necessary within each agency and with partners on different aspects of urban research, including improving data collection on violence and order in cities, particularly for informal settlements. Data on urban areas is very limited: sometimes even basic information such as up-to-date population numbers or spatial planning and zoning information for informal settlements is missing. There is continued reliance on sub-standard crime statistics that are often not available at the local level. When local-level crime statistics are available, they often suffer from a lack of temporal consistency of reporting as well as the methods used for particular statistics. Quality of data is also severely hampered by inconsistencies in the processes of officially registering violent crime, evidenced by the discrepancies between statistics presented in official records and those presented by human rights watch groups. Programming based on sub-standard data is not likely to succeed.

- Tracking performance at a sub-national level and across a number of categories and new dimensions will require a significant and sustained effort. Work could continue on specifying targets and indicators for new dimensions included in the post-2015 proposals that are relevant for the urban poor, not least access to land and decent housing, among others.

- Using ‘foresighting’ to help identify urban futures that are possible, probable and preferable. As heuristic tools, these future scenario-planning approaches are useful in helping to assess the nature of future challenges, and the types of policy response, both today and in the future, that these might necessitate.

6.3 Concluding thoughts

The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-cities such as Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, as they continue to change, but importantly also for smaller towns and cities that are projected to host more than 500,000 residents, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that an approach to ‘get the economy right first’, or even focusing too much on national institutions of government, without giving attention to local government, might create social and political fissures and create violence in
cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements are such that they tend to exacerbate processes of marginalisation, unless that is, issues of inclusion are explicitly placed on the table.

In terms of violence mitigation, there are tangible differences between ‘political settlements’ and ‘peace processes’ – in many ways, the former is static and non-transformative, while the latter is more geared towards the fluid future of cities. As we have noted, crime and violence statistics are useful proxy indicators of everyday violence and fragility in cities because they represent social stress, failures of state systems/legitimacy, and may create deeper processes beyond specific numbers (i.e. fear of taking certain bus lines, visiting certain neighbourhoods, or mistrust of other ethnic, religious and political groups).

But everyday violence and fragility also goes beyond simple statistics of violence to include the ungoverned or non-state governed spaces that they can represent. It also includes the destabilising factors that urban pressure can bring to national politics, and the positive element that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. One commentator refers to ‘pirate’ cities in regards to how citizens have created their own service systems, while another has referred to the ‘self-service’ state. But both reflect the ways in which governance failures have an impact on local communities. The complex nature of the overlap between urban and national fragility is, however, a pressing issue at a national and international scale as well.

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11 Garth Myers, written communication.
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