

State, Society and Political Institutions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

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Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are adjacent states on the West African coast, one an ex-British the other an ex-French colony. They are, at least superficially, similar in geographic, economic and sociological terms. Yet their post-independence political and economic histories have diverged quite markedly, providing the occasion for a continuing debate on the causes of these contrasting outcomes.¹ Côte d'Ivoire's spectacular growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled by foreign investment and the expansion of cocoa and coffee exports, were said to prove the superiority of opening up the economy to the disciplines of the international market. Ghana's economic decline, to the point where the state had lost control of its currency and agricultural exports dropped to levels below those of the 1920s, was held up as a warning against state-led protected industrialisation.² Now that Côte d'Ivoire, as the world's largest cocoa producer, is facing the worst economic crisis in its entire history as a result of falling commodity prices and the burden of 1970s foreign debts, the debate as to whether reliance on primary exports leads inevitably to structural failure and political collapse has been revived.³

The purpose of this paper is, however, to argue that the really significant differences between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire lie not in the realm of economic policy but in state-society relations and state capacity. With the exception of a brief experiment with rapid state-led industrialisation, 1960-66 (which apparently owed more to Rostow and Hirschman than to Karl Marx⁴), Ghana has continued throughout its post-independence history to be as dependent on its cocoa export economy as Côte d'Ivoire; but it has been less successful at *managing* that economy both in the

'macro' and 'micro' senses. Nor is it an accident that the principal political contrast between the two countries is in their respective records of political stability.

Côte d'Ivoire has been ruled not just by the same regime but by the same small leadership group associated with Houphouët Boigny since 1952, when the French colonial administration decided to co-opt Houphouët's party (the PDCI) as their local successors. Although the regime has both destroyed or co-opted opposition where necessary and slowly admitted younger generations, it is virtually a gerontocracy, now displaying dangerous *immobilisme* as the aged President resolutely postpones all questions of the succession. Ghana, on the other hand, since the overthrow of its decolonisation regime in 1966 (the CPP had ruled from 1951, six years before independence) has experienced seven changes of regime — two elected and five military — and an even greater number of governmental changes and attempted coups d'état. Its current government, that of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, has survived at least six coup attempts since 1982, partly through Rawlings' ability to deal ruthlessly with the army, and partly because the World Bank and the IMF have provided enough cash to fund life-saving improvements in the economy. Its future remains precarious.⁵

My principal focus is to try to explain, through comparison, Côte d'Ivoire's stability and Ghana's endemic instability, and to establish the consequences of all of this for the state's effectiveness in the implementation of an economic strategy. At the root of these differing histories are differences between Ivorian and Ghanaian societies, and the processes of political elite and state formation in each country. It will be argued that the most powerful explanation of the different outcomes is to be found in the different kinds of interaction which have occurred between state and civil society. These may be briefly described as differences in the relative 'balance' or 'proportion' between state and civil society in each country.

⁵ See: B. Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana 1982-6; the Politics of the PNDC', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 4, 1987; D. Ray, *Ghana: Politics, Economics and Society* (London, 1986); N. Chazan 'Politics and the State in Ghana' and R. Jeffries, 'The Political Economy of Personal Rule in Ghana', *Conference on West African States, SOAS, Centre for African Studies*, June 1987; J. Haynes, 'Rawlings and the Politics of Development Policy in Ghana 1979-86' unpublished PhD thesis, Staffordshire Polytechnic, 1988.

¹ See: P. Foster and A. Zolberg, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization* (Chicago, 1971); J. Woronoff, 'Ivory Coast; the Value of Development' and A. G. Rondos, 'Ivory Coast: the Price of Development' in *Africa Report*, 24, 4, 1979; C. Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, 1982).

² S. Amin, *Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris, 1967); E. Eshag and P. J. Richards, 'Comparison of Economic Developments in Ghana and the Ivory Coast since 1960', *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*, Nov. 1967; World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, 1981).

³ N. Ridler, 'Comparative Advantage as a Developmental Model — the Ivory Coast', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23, 3, 1985; Y. Fauré, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Une Crise et Son Analyse', *Conference on West African States, SOAS, Centre for African Studies*, June 1987.

⁴ T. Killick, *Development Economics in Action* (London, 1978) p. 21.

The term 'civil society' in this paper refers to all of those self-conscious associations and institutions representing private interest groups and local, class, religious and intellectual 'publics' which tend to emerge with the rise of a market economy.⁶ It thus encompasses but is not confined (as in Marx's use) to the social relations of particular forms of production and exchange. These institutional and associational forms in fact mediate between the state and individuals *qua* economic actors, and thus have political significance. The realm of the state begins at the points where the state enforces, upholds or represses particular relationships within civil society. In Ghana, a relatively strong state has been balanced by an equally strong yet highly fractured civil society, control of which has been difficult to establish; in Côte d'Ivoire, what began as a weakly established post-colonial state was able ultimately to overwhelm and dominate an even weaker and underdeveloped civil society.

A thorough analysis of all of this would require a detailed discussion of the social and political histories of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, but in this abbreviated assessment it will suffice to note a few important points. Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have long been very similar in terms of geography and, more importantly, political economy. Both colonial states were 'neo-mercantilist' inasmuch as they monopolised surpluses from peasant production of primary products which were then exported in concert with foreign businesses. This system reinforced the centrality of the state and the political elite as sources of accumulation and patronage politics. The explanation for Côte d'Ivoire's continued success at maintaining effective mechanisms for controlling, taxing and encouraging such production and export, and for the Ghanaian state's failure in these areas, is bound up with the histories of their civil societies, elite-formation and state-society relations since the mid-colonial period.

Ghana has always been more densely populated and more highly urbanised than Côte d'Ivoire. The peoples of Côte d'Ivoire — unlike those of Ghana — were scattered groups of refugees and migrants from other areas of West Africa. As a result, whereas in Ghana social and political identities and local political life were legacies of the highly articulated core states and urban centres that pre-dated colonial rule, in Côte d'Ivoire there were very few state-organised identities or pre-colonial centres of power which could underpin an autonomous 'African' civic life.⁷ The standard classification of Côte d'Ivoire's population into its main ethnic groups was largely an invention of colonial ethnography, and this meant that local

⁶ G. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (London, 1978) pp.77 and 81.

⁷ R. Stryker, 'Political and Administrative Linkage in the Ivory Coast', in Foster and Zolberg, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast*, p.76.

communities there — unlike Ghana — had a rather weak political self-consciousness. The system of colonial rule in Ghana catalysed social conflict (and consciousness), locally based legal systems and a neo-traditional elite which championed indigenous land claims. None of this occurred in Côte d'Ivoire until very late — the coffee and cocoa booms of the 1960s and 1970s — when migrations triggered mutterings of discontent about indigenes' land rights. Such issues had been salient in Ghana since the 1920s.

The rich peasant/small town society of southern Ghana which emerged during the colonial period was rooted in local communities with highly elaborated political, social and legal institutions and identities. The vigour of local political life and the degree of participation which developed, even before the party conflicts of the decolonisation period, have been recorded by numerous local studies. It is only when the party, associational or class groupings and neo-traditional mobilisations of the 1950s/60s are added to this legacy that some idea of the self-consciousness and strength of Ghanaian civil society can be grasped. In Côte d'Ivoire there are very many fewer of these local communities; and those that did exist, far from being politically and legally 'moralised', were systematically crushed by colonial policy. The land free-for-all of the 1960s, with its anarchic and sometimes violent conflicts, was only possible against societies too weak to resist. It is difficult to imagine a similar process having occurred in Ghana.

Political Elites and State Formation

(i) Côte d'Ivoire

The general underdevelopment of local communities and the weak constitution of civil society in Côte d'Ivoire was compounded and reinforced during the 1950s with the rise of an African successor elite. This was a crucial period in the formation of patterns of interaction between the nascent post-colonial state and society. Much has been written about the so-called 'planter bourgeoisie' which was said to be the basis of Houphouët-Boigny's early election victories and his subsequent rise to power.⁸ It is true that his fight to obtain labour supplies for the large coffee planters of the Syndicat Agricole Africain (who were disgruntled by the forced labour made available to the small number of white planters) gave him a particular power base, which was also predominantly from the central (Baoulé) region and the ethnic associations of Abidjan.⁹ But even in the very limited elections of the

⁸ A. Zolberg, *One Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, 1964); L. Mytelka, 'Foreign Business and Economic Development in I. W. Zartman and C. Delgado (eds.) *The Political Economy of the Ivory Coast* (Princeton, 1984); Y. A. Fauré and J. F. Medard, *Etat et Bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris, 1982); B. Campbell, 'Ivory Coast' in J. Dunn (ed.) *West African States* (Cambridge, 1978).

⁹ Zolberg, *One Party Government*, pp.67-8

late 1940s and early 1950s — an electorate of one-seventh of the adult population in 1952 — his electoral machine was both broader and shallower than this. The original leadership group, as Zolberg pointed out 25 years ago, was predominantly from the tiny *evolué* elite — junior civil servants, teachers, pharmacists — Houphouët's classmates from the Ecole William Ponty in Dakar.¹⁰

Like Houphouët, many of them had commercial farms; but once they had made their accommodation with the French in 1951, the logic of state-centred accumulation of power and wealth set in — and with it a process of departicipation and stasis. No PDCI congress was held between 1949 and 1959, the crucial years of power consolidation. The original leadership clique stayed in power, intermarrying and creating their own elite family corporations. Neither local party democracy nor formal local government or community politics were developed.¹¹ The party's election victory in 1957 — the first under universal suffrage — was a product of elite power-broking (including the whites in the colony) and local party machines run by centrally appointed secretaries. The trajectory of the centralised, highly policed French prefectural administration continued uninterrupted. The opposition which emerged, predominantly from areas threatened by the coffee and cocoa expansion, or the 'original' cocoa elites of the southeast, was fairly easily crushed or co-opted on terms set by the PDCI.

The early possession and use of state power by this group had more to do with their survival in office until independence than any popular 'peasant' base. The smoothness of this capture was also aided by the lack of mobilisation or representation of associational groups or other institutions within the state. An Ivorian bureaucracy, for instance, hardly existed. In 1957, there was not a single African in an executive position in the civil service. Even in the lower grades of white collar employment, foreign Africans (Dahomeyans, Senegalese, Togolese) dominated; one third of all clerical recruits in 1954 were foreign Africans.¹² The inevitable Ivorian protests against both whites and foreign Africans were crushed by the PDCI government. A junior civil servants strike in 1959 organised by the nascent Ivorian union movement led to wholesale sackings. Whilst it was convenient for the regime to continue using European administrators (in 1965, 80 per cent of managerial cadres in the civil service were expatriates, a figure which still stood at 48 per cent in 1973)¹³ discontent

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ They were in fact positively discouraged; see M. Cohen, 'Urban Policy and Development Strategy' in Zartman, *Political Economy*, p.64.

¹² Zolberg, *One Party Government*, pp.101 and 246.

¹³ R. Clignet and P. Foster, 'Convergence and Divergence in Educational Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast' in Foster and Zolberg, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast*, p.287; RCI, Ministère de la Fonction Publique, *Regards sur la Fonction Publique*, 1975.

could be managed by getting rid of foreign Africans and admitting a slow trickle of Ivorians. Thus an indigenous civil service did not emerge until after independence, and then it was very much a creature of the regime, recruited and controlled by the political elite.

Neither trade unions nor the bureaucracy presented any autonomous challenge to the PDCI in the 1950s. The same could be said for business elites, farmers and, after the crises of 1959-63, the educated middle classes and the university. Like the civil service, an Ivorian business class hardly existed. Nor has the PDCI regime showed until recently any interest in a policy for 'national capitalism'. Nearly 30 years after independence, foreign, particularly French firms dominate the manufacturing, financial and agri-business private sectors; and Ivorianisation of private managerial cadres still has a long way to go (only 32 per cent of top management and 62 per cent of '*cadres supérieurs*' in 1984)¹⁴. In the small and medium sector — taxis, transport, shopkeeping, up-country crop buying — one need only note that there are around 100,000 Lebanese in Côte d'Ivoire, the largest Lebanese community in the world outside the Lebanon.¹⁵ Ivorian business is very dependent on state patronage, either in the crop-trading field or through the parapublic sector which boomed so dramatically in the 1970s.¹⁶

The regime's connection with cash crop farming interests through the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA) was of a very particular kind. Farmers had never been mobilised in 'mass movements' such as those associated with the pre-war cocoa hold-ups in Ghana. Ethnic stratification and the migration and land issues, as indicated earlier, also meant that a united organisation comparable to the Ghana Farmers Congress (GFC) in the 1940s never engaged in Côte d'Ivoire, even though in class terms the leadership of the GFC was, like that of the SAA, a similar blend of larger planter and cocoa broking interests. In Ghana the farmers' organisation gave conditional support to the nationalist movement which, after the break with the CPP over the marketing issue, was the basis for an equally autonomous focus of opposition.¹⁷ In Côte d'Ivoire the SAA coffee planters elite was not at loggerheads with the state in the 1940s and 1950s over the general issue of marketing; on the contrary, it was busy arranging a special deal with the French to give special prices and protected quotas in the French domestic market to the coffee produced during the 1950s

¹⁴ RCI, Ministère du Travail et de l'Ivoirisation, *Le Secteur Privé et Semi-public en Côte d'Ivoire: Principaux Résultats 1984*.

¹⁵ *La Côte d'Ivoire en Chiffres 1986-7*, p.19.

¹⁶ See: Fauré, '... une Crise et son Analyse'.

¹⁷ See: B. Beckman, *Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana* (Uppsala, 1976).

expansion.¹⁸ It is difficult to disentangle in this deal the interests of the elite as holders of state power from their interests in the coffee industry. Whilst the price deal obviously benefitted all farmers, (and cemented the policy commitment of the political elite to export crop expansion) the special interests of the elite were soon manifested in the 'open door' policy on immigration which produced the extraordinary flood of foreign migrants into the rural areas in the 1960s; again whilst plentiful labour supplies benefitted larger farmers, not all migrants intended to be — or remain — labourers. The pressure of both foreign and internal migrations, together with the free land policy produced fragmentation in the farming community along ethnic and regional lines.¹⁹ The political representation of farming interests offered by the SAA/PDCI axis was therefore always very partial; but representation and eventually opposition outside its framework took an ethnic/regional form, and was thus easily marginalised or crushed.

Finally, an organised educated/professional middle class interest hardly existed in the 1950s, outside the very small group already incorporated into the PDCI. There was no university, and the small number of students in higher education (about 850 by 1960) were mainly in France or Senegal.²⁰ School enrolment of the 5 to 19 age group even by 1965 was only 29 per cent, compared to Ghana's 55 per cent, and was even more highly skewed regionally, being almost exclusively southern.²¹ The founding of the University of Abidjan in 1960 led initially (and typically) to a large influx of foreign students; of the 1,900 students enrolled in 1965, only one third were Ivoirians! Nevertheless it was from 'radical' students that Houphouët experienced his first real challenges in the late 1950s leading to the formation of the PDCI's youth wing in 1958 which was quickly destroyed in the plot upheavals of 1963.²² The weakness of the students and intellectuals was that they had no real local base. They were mainly 'returnees' looking for jobs in a very small market where the deliberately slow replacement of expatriates was the government's principal controlling mechanism.

Since independence the education system has expanded massively at the lower levels — the government spends more than any in Africa — but its products are still treated with extreme caution, and not without reason. Even though the majority of secondary school teachers were French until the early 1980s, (now reduced to about 30 per cent)²³ the teaching unions and university students have regularly

provided some of the rare ripples in the smooth surface of political conformity maintained by the regime.²⁴ But such dissent has never been allowed to persist; the lesson of the affair of the PDCI youth wing remained firmly imprinted on Houphouët's mind, and the original weakness of this group in social terms has been maintained politically through ruthless control of the job market and manipulation of the 'foreigner' factor. Whenever resentments against whites or foreign Africans build up, the government can buy popularity by generously mitigating the effects of its own policies. It is no accident that the recent slow-down in economic expansion has led to a rapid speed-up of ivoirisation.²⁵ Only when that process is fully completed will the regime have to look for an alternative safety valve — and hope meanwhile for a recovery of the cocoa market!

Overall therefore the political elite which took power under French colonial tutelage in 1952 was able to build an Ivoirian state very much on its own terms. The weakness and the lack of mobilisation of civil society, both in local community and associational and class dimensions, was such that the state was relatively free to choose what to incorporate and what to ignore or crush. Such contestations as did emerge did not permeate the state or seriously challenge elite unity and strength. The externality of the colonial state was reproduced but, unlike in Ghana, the lack of any agreed identity or legitimacy for the state hardly mattered. In spite of the view of some scholars that the Ivoirian state represents the '*baoulisation*' of society,²⁶ the Ivoirian governing class has always been notoriously unconcerned about what it means to be an Ivoirian; official propaganda peddles a rather feeble 'folk-lore' image of a pluralistic nation of village farming communities each with its own 'customs'. This rather unconvincing effort conceals not tribal dominance but the emergence of a powerful, centralised 'Abidjan' elite rooted in the state and its mercantile dependents. The cultural identity of this elite — increasingly multi-ethnic in origin although still southern Akan dominated — is unashamedly modern, French and *nouveau riche*/wealth seeking.

The autonomy of the state owes much, therefore, to the legacy of the decolonisation period and to the economic and political links established with France in the 1950s. But that is by no means the whole story. What happened after independence was even more extraordinary. Whilst the weakness of indigenous

¹⁸ Zolberg. *One Party Government*, p.167.

¹⁹ Chauveau and Dozon. 'Au Coeur des Ethnies . . .

²⁰ den Tuiner. *Challenge of Success*, p.279.

²¹ Clignet and Foster. 'Convergence and Divergence . . .' p.273.

²² Zolberg and Foster. *Ghana and the Ivory Coast*, p.16.

²³ Ministère du Travail, *Le Secteur Privé . . .* p.89.

²⁴ See, for instance the recent government conflict with the teachers' union which resulted in the imprisonment of teachers' leaders and the imposition of government nominees as union officials: G. Bourke. 'An autocratic democrat', *West Africa*, 1-7 May, 1989.

²⁵ N. Yeo and I. F. Lébry. '14,5 milliards d'économie grâce à la réduction des experts', *Fraternité Matin*, 6942, 30 Nov. 1987; Ambassade de France, *La coopération franco-ivoirienne 1987* (Abidjan, 1988).

²⁶ Chauveau and Dozon. 'Au Coeur des Ethnies . . .

society was perpetuated through continuing depatriation, the state grew out of all proportion to that society using foreign factors of production.

The number of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire is not just a useful addition to the labour supply, to be celebrated by liberal economists; it is central to one's understanding of the regime. The Ivorian state has created a kind of regional 'colony in reverse'. The territory has been offered as a market and an 'empty land' for migrants to 'make their fortune'. The development of the territory for cocoa and coffee exports, agribusiness and local manufacturing would not have been possible without foreign labour from the West African region and Europe, foreign capital and the substantial internal migrations. The importance of French and Lebanese business, and expatriate managerial cadres in the private and public sectors had already been mentioned. Here, the state's maintenance of the French backed CFA currency has been crucial.

In the urban and rural unskilled sectors the foreign labour attracted by the 'open door' and the cocoa rush was equally important. In 1973, 25 per cent of the total population was foreign (30 per cent if children born to foreigners were included); even in 1985, with the onset of the crisis, it was still 20 per cent.²⁷ But these figures do not convey the full significance of the immigrants. As over half the total population are children, immigrants form a much higher proportion of the work force; 41 per cent of those aged between 15 and 60 in 1980!²⁸ Foreign Africans accounted for 57 per cent of all jobs in the urban 'informal and artisan' sector in 1976, and 42 per cent in the overall 'unskilled modern sector'.²⁹ In the primary sector, they accounted for a staggering 72.7 per cent of all paid jobs in 1971 — reflecting the fact that Ivorian farmers are either 'self-employed' — or employers.³⁰ Even as a proportion of total population the figure reaches 50 per cent in some southern districts, and over 30 per cent in the new cocoa areas.³¹

Using these foreign factors of production, the Ivorian state facilitated — indeed through its own investments participated in — the successful economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s. It also used the wealth so created to expand itself enormously, yet without any integration with or obligation to the social basis of that wealth. The greater part of 'Ivorian' society is outside the boundaries of the Ivorian political community. State expansion, apart from creating channels of patronage

whose attractions were irresistible, created an administrative and security machine which is out of all proportion to the small size and weakness of what remains of an indigenous civil society. The distance between the state and the peasant villager or urban labourer, both in cultural and power terms, is much greater now than in colonial times. Control mechanisms are formidable, participation (notwithstanding recent attempts at reform) virtually nil. In this highly policed society, challenge from autonomous community or associational groupings is unlikely; and the rewards of cooperation overwhelming.

The Abidjan state has therefore built itself without needing to worry about integrating social conflicts which could reproduce themselves within the political arena. The real conflicts over land and labour present in the agrarian economy have not been represented politically by ethnic 'barons'; Houphouët-Boigny's famed skill at ethnic balancing has in fact been more of a token cooptation of educated elites and technocrats. Anybody seen as a real challenge with a potential following is excluded. The likeliest sources of elite disunity are internal — personal or familial factions, generational or institutional conflicts including the fully integrated Armed Forces.³²

The Ivorian state machine which, it is argued, has maintained effective control over this 'colonial' economy, is very obviously the creature of the political elite whose economic policies have produced the resources for its expansion. Elite consensus and coherence, together with management of the ivorianisation of a highly foreign-dominated administrative and managerial sector, have maintained strong forms of accountability in the administration. This is because political controls can be combined with an ostensibly technocratic and meritocratic ideology. The restricted output of highly educated manpower has meant that the very possession of the requisite educational qualifications is evidence of elite membership (like the 'Oxbridge' origins of the English ruling class).³³

Within these basic educational parameters, the pace of ivorianisation and of expansion have enabled the regime to manipulate (until recently) a relative fit between the number of candidates and jobs. This permits the preservation of meritocratic criteria whilst 'political' criteria can be used in the more subtle allocation of different types of jobs and postings. An explanation of this system in terms of 'personal rule' or the 'charisma' of Houphouët-Boigny is redundant. The power, the autonomy, the wealth and the unity of

²⁷ den Tuinder, *Challenge of Success*, p.124; INADES-documentation, *Etude des Conséquences Sociales de la Politique de Développement en Côte d'Ivoire* (Abidjan, INADES, 1986), mimeo p.10.

²⁸ Calculated from data provided in *Plan Quinquennal 1981-85*, p.590.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.63.

³⁰ den Tuinder, p.130.

³¹ INADES, *Etudes* . . . , p.9.

³² Senior military officers have been given cabinet posts in recent years and are to be found in larger numbers in the prefectural service. As the rise and fall of Lamine Fadika (Minister of the Navy) between 1974 and 1987 shows, it is better to have young ambitious officers in the cabinet as it enables the political leadership to smell trouble very quickly.

³³ den Tuinder, p.279; Clignert and Foster, p.275.

the political elite, and the lack of alternatives where even the wealthier foreign sector is intimately linked to the state, give a convincing enough account of the loyalty and effectiveness of the administration. Indeed if it were more purely 'personal', how could the state have escaped the destructive and chaotic corruption of Mobutu's Zaire?³⁴

(ii) Ghana

In comparing the formation of political elites and the post independence state in Ghana during the same period, the contrasts could not be more striking. Not only was the basic constitution of civil society stronger and more autonomous; the 1950s saw a growth in participation, and in associational and class formation which gave a political structuring to society that has determined all subsequent conflicts. These conflicts have been consistently reflected within the realm of the state, which itself possessed a more highly articulated machinery.

The Convention People's Party initially put together in 1949 a national coalition of farmers' associations, trade unions, small businessmen, white collar workers and community-based 'youth associations' (some of which would be called ethnic in Côte d'Ivoire). The prior mobilisation of the rural areas over the cocoa 'swollen shoot' disease and price/marketing issues, and the mobilisation of the urban masses through the Boycott Committees (organised to protest against European business) had already been intense.³⁵ When the cocoa farmers broke with the CPP after its election victory in 1951 and its subsequent decision to follow the colonial line on a marketing system for the cocoa exports, the CPP did not shrink to being just an elite with state power. Nor, in spite of the emergence of regionalist parties in the North and amongst the Ewe irredentists on the Togo border, could it be called an ethnically organised or interested party. Throughout the 1950s, fighting two democratic general elections and innumerable local elections in the new local government systems designed by colonial reformers to

³⁴ In Zaire state offices are given out as 'prebends' by Mobutu and his familial ruling group, and hence systematic plunder, anarchy and inefficiency are endemic in the state machine: in Côte d'Ivoire, whilst the political and commercial elites undoubtedly benefit from patronage (as in the parastatal corporations and the crop trading system) there is little evidence to show from recent observation of various Ministries (including the Prefectoral service) that the Ivorian bureaucracy has been 'patrimonialised' in the strict sense of this term. Many bureaucrats and technocrats including ex-Prefects have been formally co-opted into the political elite but this can be compared to the very similar career trajectories of bureaucrats in French politics. See: R. Crook, 'Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d'Ivoire' *African Affairs*, 88, April 1989. See also C. Young and T. Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison, 1985); T. M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (N.Y., 1984).

³⁵ See: D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-60* (London, 1964) for a general account of this period, and R. Crook, 'Decolonization . . .' for an analysis of the agrarian factor.

'modernise' Indirect Rule, the CPP established itself as the representative of some well identified general interests.

First, in the already well established arenas of local politics, the CPP was not just another local faction; it was the party of centralism and the state against the party of local autonomy, chiefly rule and all the legal, tenurial and economic structures associated with the colonial defence of 'traditional' culture.³⁶ A large proportion of the CPP's cadres, those who became leading officials in the 1960s, had come through this 'school' of local politics.³⁷ In the post-independence centralisation process, the CPP managed to integrate and coopt these locally-based elites — the only organisation in Ghana's political history to have achieved this, then or subsequently.

But the opposition to the CPP was equally well entrenched. After 1954, the Ashanti national identity was mobilised in defence of the neo-traditional and established business classes, not just in Ashanti but throughout Ghana. The regional dimension was explicitly expressed in the demand for a 'federal' constitution, and just as fiercely attacked by the CPP, which was attempting to articulate an ethnically neutral, secular and popular nationalism. The conflict was therefore *national* and split communities in Ashanti as elsewhere; but the politicisation of precolonial state and ethnic identities remained a permanent potentiality for conflict. (The northern regional interest turned out to be the weakest and most easily coopted at the elite level).³⁸

Secondly, the CPP represented a populism of the 'petty bourgeois'; its ideology of raising up the 'common man' and the black man (in Nkrumah's Garveyite rhetoric) appealed to the less well educated clerks, brokers and small businessmen of Ghanaian society and of course, to the working class (until the latter broke with the regime after independence).³⁹ Ghana's professional middle classes, its established businessmen and senior civil servants, were generally hostile and supported the opposition. Although large foreign companies have continued to operate in Ghana (mining, trading, local manufacture and services) since independence, an indigenous business class has grown outside the state.⁴⁰

³⁶ R. Crook, 'Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in Ghana', *Political Studies*, 35.4, 1987, p.568.

³⁷ R. Crook, 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Ghana: a Comparative perspective' in P. Lyon and J. Manor (eds.) *Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth* (Leicester, 1983).

³⁸ See: P. Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians: the Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana* (London, 1979).

³⁹ Crook, 'Legitimacy, Authority, . . .': R. Rathbone, 'Businessmen in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana 1949-57', *Journal of Development Studies*, 9, (April 1973); R. Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: the Railwaymen of Sekondi* (Cambridge 1978).

⁴⁰ P. Kennedy, *African Capitalism: the Struggle for Ascendancy* (Cambridge, 1988).

The demands of the 'popular' classes were easily translated, once the CPP had state power, into demands for the expansion of bureaucratic employment and the urban economy. The statist and centralising logic of the state was of course already powerfully present as it was in Côte d'Ivoire. But it was the CPP's constituency, which sought social mobility through state employment, that gave it a politically irresistible push. The conflict with the farmers over the state's decision to monopolise the cocoa marketing system through the mechanism of the Cocoa Marketing Board and the United Ghana Farmers Council set a fateful seal on the new state's attitude to the cocoa economy. The surpluses accumulated from cocoa exports were to be used for state-financed development and bureaucratic expansion — exactly as in Côte d'Ivoire.⁴¹ But in Ghana the industry was regarded as a convenient milch cow whose historic fate was to be transcended by a state-led industrialisation, *not* encouraged to further expansion. This policy, later dubbed socialist by Nkrumah, not only fitted the interests and statist aspirations of the CPP's militant supporters, but also accorded with their perception of the cocoa farmers as an opposition. The most dynamic area of the cocoa economy in the 1950s was Ashanti; but whereas the Baoulé coffee farmers in Côte d'Ivoire were enjoying the patronage of the French taxpayer and the colonial state, the Ashanti cocoa farmers were regarded by the CPP in much the same light as Mrs. Thatcher regarded the British coal mining industry in the 1980s.

At the level of state institutions, the CPP state also experienced early contestation. The Ghanaian civil service was large and (compared to Côte d'Ivoire) well established at the time of independence. The administrative grades of the civil service were 80 per cent Africanised by 1960;⁴² the service had already developed an institutional identity, and was connected socially with the educated elite and the university intelligentsia. The CPP regime eventually came into increasing conflict with the civil service and was moving from oblique attacks and the creation of parallel institutions to an outright politicisation just before its overthrow. The immediate impact of the CPP period on the civil service was increasingly poor morale, bad discipline and internal conflict;⁴³ the long term result, as regime succeeded regime, an increasing failure of accountability and retreat into formalism and self-serving behaviour.

Unstable or permanently shifting patterns of attempted politicisation also took their toll on the autonomy and effectiveness of the service, its worst moment being

⁴¹ R. Crook, 'Farmers and the State' in: D. Rimmer (ed.), *Rural Transformation in Tropical Africa* (London, 1988) p.129.

⁴² B. Amonoo, *Ghana 1957-66: the Politics of Institutional Dualism* (London, 1981) p.33.

⁴³ Amonoo, *Institutional Dualism*, p.61; Killick, *Development Economics*, p.338.

perhaps the 'purge' by the Busia regime in 1970. But equally bad was the experience under military rule of neglect alternating with wild demands, and the constantly creeping spread of corruption and cronyism. Yet through it all the public service continued to expand and survive as an institution, whilst suffering the results of permanent contestation within the state. Unlike the Ivorian civil service which was kept disciplined by the extreme nature of both the rewards and sanctions controlled by the political elite, and rarely questioned its subordination, the original strength of the Ghanaian service made it an object of contestation, so that it was permeated both by the pulls of resistance and cooperation as well as the conflicts of political factions and interests. Like the army, it was an institution riven with ethnic rivalries caused by the passage of recruitment cohorts.

The educated middle classes in Ghana also possessed an early political significance. The University of Ghana, founded in 1951, quickly became one of Africa's leading institutions and a world leader in African studies pioneered by a committed group of expatriates and Ghanaians in the 1950s. Its values were set by the 'Oxbridge' conceptions of its classicist first Principal, and by the late 1950s and early 1960s it was producing a stream of well educated graduates. Together with the expansion of the primary school base and (unlike Côte d'Ivoire) the secondary system, the result was the creation of relatively large (by African standards) professional and lower middle classes. By the mid-1960s the size and complexity of the output from Ghana's three universities and its teacher training colleges was such that the 'middle classes' could not in any sense be encompassed by — or catered to — by the state. Unlike the Ivorian scene, the public sector could not absorb the products of the higher and secondary system, and *Africanisation was virtually complete*.⁴⁴ White collar jobs required constant state expansion — and the economy to support that expansion.

The political salience and articulateness of this class has been a constant feature of Ghanaian politics. The university intelligentsia in particular asserted its institutional and ideological independence from the state in conflict with the CPP regime in the early 1960s. Lawyers and the legal profession have also played an especially important role in political and economic life, both as politicians and advocates for chiefly land disputes and within Ghana's highly developed state judicial system. The high point for these groups was probably the Busia regime of 1969-72; but they were the groups to suffer most markedly — and protest most vigorously — with the collapse of the monetary system and the public and trading economy under the Acheampong military government of 1972 to 1978.⁴⁵ Under the Rawlings government, at least in its

⁴⁴ Clignet and Foster, 'Convergence and Divergence . . .' p.287.

'radical' phase, the British-style legal system has suffered highly damaging and possibly fatal attacks on its professionalism and independence.

Thus not only was the nascent Ghanaian state opposed from the beginning by farmers, the neo-traditional elites, professional, educated and business classes and the forces of 'localism' and regionalism; these forces were encouraged through electoral politics, both local and national, to become nationally organised and articulated. Even though the CPP regime managed to incorporate or repress these groups (and the trade unions) between 1960 and 1966, the state was fully permeated and contested by these social interests — particularly the local communities — as its subsequent history has demonstrated. Further periods of competitive party politics between 1969-72 and 1979-82 revealed the legacy of this period of intense politicisation and mobilisation — as did the conflicts which the military regimes have experienced. Although the trajectory of statist bureaucratic expansion and dominance has continued with only minor interruptions, the pendulum has continued to swing between localism and centralism, professional and business classes against populism, cocoa farmers against the state bureaucracy.

The first army regime (1966-69), was probably the first to indulge in ethnic politics, perhaps because of the prominent role of 'minority' officers from the Ewe and Ga. But this was itself a reflection of the nature of the army as an institution, one of the few in Ghanaian life in which ethnicity had always been systematically and self-consciously manipulated.⁴⁵ The seizure of the state by the army therefore brought into state institutions a new type of contestation — one never acknowledged by the CPP, but which it accused its opponents of peddling — which had further corrosive effects on subsequent regimes. The first army regime itself eventually prepared the ground for a hand-over to the CPP's opposition — the business and professional classes and neo-traditional elites. But the Busia regime was also troubled by accusations of 'Akan tribalism', although the 'Akan' label — which is a language grouping — had never been used before in Ghanaian politics and had no pre-colonial referent. The regime in fact incorporated virtually all elements including the north. It was only the 'Ewe' sensitivity set up by the preceding military regime and the attempt to stigmatise Busia's ex-CPP opponents in the elections with the tribal label which set up this rather

⁴⁵ See: N. Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession 1969-82* (Boulder, Col., 1983); R. Price, 'Neocolonialism and Ghana's Economic Decline', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 18, (1984); R. Jeffries, 'Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana', *African Affairs*, 81, 324, (1982).

⁴⁶ See: S. Baynham, *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana* (Boulder, Col., 1986) and 'Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23, 4, (1985).

theoretical opposition.

The succeeding military regime unfortunately created a deepening whirlpool of ethnic and personal factionalism within the army, the full violence of which was only revealed in the first Rawlings upheaval of 1979. Whilst most accounts of this mutiny of soldiers and NCOs emphasise the 'radical' attack on corruption, one should not forget the important role played by northern and Ewe resentments.⁴⁷ The ethnic politics of the Acheampong regime were a symptom, perhaps, of what Chazan has described as the virtual privatisation of political channels, as the officer corps turned in on itself, losing contact with and control over the machinery of state — and over the hundreds of officers given administrative jobs. Yet, at the same time as the state machine was drifting, the government publicly espoused the CPP's statist tradition in economic policy and presided over the biggest expansions in the bureaucracy and the most extreme exploitation and corrupt mishandling of the cocoa economy the country has ever known. It was no accident therefore that the ethnic factionalism was cross-cut publicly by opposition from the old 'anti-CPP' social forces.

The elected PNP government which followed the first Rawlings coup incorporated once again many of the old CPP elements, at least in organisational terms, but the social forces which had once underpinned the CPP's populist rhetoric — the urban masses and lower middle classes — were in fact excluded and unrepresented. The PNP, in spite of its attempt to live off the Nkrumah myths, was a fake. Unlike the CPP, it had no capacity to integrate either the community-based politics or the mobilised associations and class forces of Ghanaian society. Nor could it cope with the post-CPP legacy of ethnic mobilisation; and, crucially, it showed absolutely no capacity to reestablish control over the cocoa economy — or even to revive it, since it could see no alternative to the flawed bureaucratic instruments at its disposal.

The PNP's replacement — the second Rawlings government — at first looked even weaker. The PNDC has been firmly enmeshed, and has fought for its survival, within the murky and violent world of a distintegrating army, in which the authority of the officer corps had been smashed,⁴⁸ and ethnic and personal cliques have fought amongst themselves. Rawlings' 'Ewe' troops within the army have until now ensured him victory, as evidenced by his success in killing or demobilising most of his opponents, particularly northern soldiers. (He has succeeded in reducing the army around 12,000 to only 5,000 men.)⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Baynham, 'Divide et Impera . . .'; Haynes, 'Rawlings and the Politics of Development . . .', pp.101 and 122-8.

⁴⁸ Baynham, 'Divide et Impera . . .'

⁴⁹ Haynes, 'Rawlings . . .', p.363; also Ray, *Ghana . . .*; and Chazan, 'Politics and the State . . .'

In relation to civil society, the regime appears to have no organised base since it broke with the radical student/intellectual movements and the urban workers after the failure of the 'spontaneous' Workers and Peoples Defence Committees. Even more ominously, Rawlings' inner clique is publicly known to be an Ewe and familial group.⁵⁰ The ideological stance of the regime is even more confusing; in some senses the heir to a CPP style populism, it has in practice shifted state policy firmly towards favouring the encouragement of cocoa exports and a better deal for farmers.

Ghanaian regimes have thus come full circle; beginning with the CPP's fatal attempt to bureaucratise the expropriation of the cocoa export surpluses, an attempt which failed through the CPP's lack of control over its bureaucratic creation, the cocoa farmers have suffered the most comprehensively through all regimes. Since the late 1970s, they have appeared almost as demobilised as an Ivorian local electorate. It is perhaps significant that their first champion in many years, Jerry Rawlings, has also recently implemented a plan for democracy which consists of elections at local level to District Councils⁵¹ — an exact repetition of the colonial reformers' assertion in the late 1940s that truly representative democracy could only grow at the local level. A hopeful interpretation of these moves is that the Ghanaian state is attempting at last to re-establish relations with elements of civil society long neglected or hostile; and to reduce the degree of contestation within the state to the point where discipline and accountability can be rebuilt.

The particular formation of the Ghanaian state during the 1950s and its mode of interaction with society since independence have together produced an unstable series of political elites, each failing to grapple with and integrate the conflicts arising from a highly mobilised and fractured civil society. In other polities, the development of civil society and of a state rooted in that society is normally regarded as healthy. Why has it been so destructive in Ghana? The explanation offered here is that during the decolonisation process, the state failed to create an uncontested source of either power or legitimacy. As in Côte d'Ivoire, the CPP reproduced the externality of the colonial state, an externality rooted in bureaucratic extraction from a peasant society with no organic connection to the state through landlord or agrarian classes. But the CPP, because of its 'statist' political constituency, not only failed to establish a legitimate and effective relationship with the peasant economy. It also attacked the powerfully developed albeit pluralistic sources of legitimacy in local society.

Its attempt to build a secular nationalist elite might have succeeded given time, power and resources. But unlike the Ivorian elite, it did not have the autonomy, power and wealth which came from that elite's ability to pursue a strategy of 'internal colonialism' and to act virtually independently of civil society. The CPP state was too strongly contested right from the start; it *mattered* that the character and representativeness of the Ghanaian state was not agreed, and that one of the regime's most fundamental interests, the peasant economy, was alienated and excluded.⁵² The political economy of cocoa in Ghana was quite different from that of Côte d'Ivoire; unlike the weak and scattered Ivorian communities, unable to resist the flood of migration and land-grabbing which was the hidden and potentially subversive cost of the cocoa and coffee boom, the cocoa-based communities of Ghana could resist a state policy regarded as inimical, and the boom of the 1950s did not split them so drastically into losers and winners. Although leadership had passed from the older Eastern Region cocoa areas, the Ashanti controlled their own boom in the new areas.

From the CPP's initial political and economic failures, embodied most vividly in the corrupt inefficiency of the Cocoa Marketing Board and its monopoly purchasing and political organisation, the United Ghana Farmers Council, no subsequent regime seemed able to escape.⁵³ The state machinery continued to expand, ever more out of control and unaccountable as the grip of succeeding political elites loosened and conflict within the state and with civil society intensified. The cocoa marketing story continued to be at the core of this failure, together with failures in infrastructural support and agricultural extension and lack of control over state agencies responsible for implementation.⁵⁴

The lack of discipline and accountability in the Ghanaian state can therefore be attributed to the continuing contestation within the state arising from the lack of elite consensus and strength and from the continuing ability of civil society to oppose and resist. Inevitably the process was cumulative; each swing of the wheel of fortune reduced the power of the next group to seize the state.

It is worth putting the situation of the current regime in Ghana into this historical context. The ideology of the 'Rawlings revolution' initially stressed precisely this need for 'accountability' and 'participation' in Ghanaian public life; this was to be the purpose of the new Peoples' and Workers' Defence Committees. Yet, in assuming that the committees could emerge

⁵⁰ Haynes, 'Rawlings . . .', p.392. The key figure in the regime is Rawlings' personal mentor and friend over many years, Kojo Tsikata, head of the security apparatus.

⁵¹ See: *West Africa*, 'Ghana' Special Issue, 11 Jan., 1988; B. Ankomah, 'Elections Extraordinary', *New African*, Dec., 1988.

⁵² The Kenyan state, as Medard shows, is beginning to experience the same identity problems deriving from an inability to officially admit the historically dominant role of the Kikuyu, whilst being unable officially to exclude them either.

⁵³ Beckman, *Organising the Farmers*.

⁵⁴ Killick, *Development Economics*, p.191.

'spontaneously' through self-selection, the leadership showed itself astonishingly ignorant of the structure of local and national politics in Ghana — and of the materialist perspective underlying populist rhetoric. No 'spontaneous' local committees could arise which were not either emergent from the well-established local political and social structures discussed above, or, if opposed to them, supported by a national organisation and/or the government's own administrative networks.

Rawlings' PNDC had no such national political organisation, and the field administrators were unlikely to help or support the local committees against the local establishment unless they were reasonably confident in the survival of the regime and could be relied upon to carry out the policy. The PNDC in fact had no means of articulating itself, either politically or administratively, into the countryside. The outcome was entirely predictable. Local committee members were regarded simply as hooligans extorting and running rackets in scarce imported goods where they could get the support of the local soldiery; or challenging the authority of the army, the police and the civil service (and hence the regime's fragile bases) when successfully operating. In Ashanti, local power structures simply crushed the committees even before Rawlings made his own decision to do the same.⁵⁵ The current policy is based on a return to a classic military/bureaucratic alliance and the restoration of military and administrative discipline (through fear and coercion), together with an attempt to gain official purchase on the structures of local democracy. These policy changes are entirely explicable in terms of the object lesson which Rawlings received in the realities of Ghanaian state-society relations. Yet where there are already highly politicised local elites such a strategy may be resisted — or adapted to local interests.

State, Society and Institutional Efficacy

In attempting to explain the contrasting histories of stability and instability in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, it has been argued that important differences existed in both the relative weakness and strength of civil society and in the type of interaction which occurred between state and society during the crucial formative period of each post-colonial state. The end result was, in Côte d'Ivoire a strong state which overpowers, indeed is out of all proportion to civil society, but which is able to maintain a strongly disciplined state machine capable

⁵⁵ R. Jeffries, 'Personal Rule . . .'; Haynes, 'Rawlings . . .', p.161. If the government had decided to support the PDCs, a repressive apparatus would no doubt have emerged; it is noteworthy that Rawlings' original idea for a weekend 'National Cadre School' for the PDCs focussed on 'weapons training'. Luckily for the ordinary citizens of Ghana, Rawlings' personal experience of meeting the members of the PDCs in the flesh convinced him that it would be best to cancel the whole idea (Haynes, p.179).

of maintaining the conditions for extraction of revenue from the peasant and mercantile economy. The Ivorian state has been virtually autonomous; a unified elite was able to use foreign factors of production to create its resource base, and foreign personnel to give itself continuing control over administration (through restricted recruitment) and over the private sector.

In Ghana, instability reflected the much greater strength and articulation of civil society and the inability of successive political elites to control or integrate the permanent contestation either within the state or over the acceptance of the state by different interests. The consequence of this instability was a growing lack of effectiveness, due to a lack of accountability and control over the state machine. This failure led in turn to an inability to maintain the conditions for continued extraction from the peasant and mercantile economies, and hence to the collapse of the state's own revenue base.

The core of the difference is demonstrated in each case in the history of the crop marketing systems. In Côte d'Ivoire its efficiency does not reside in one institution but in the whole range of state institutions dealing with the countryside: the Caisse de Stabilisation, the prefectural field administration, the Ministries providing infrastructural inputs and the state agricultural extension agencies such as SATMACI. Contrary to what is often asserted, the Caisse system is not 'efficient' because it is based on private traders working within an official price structure. The system in Côte d'Ivoire is a classic piece of mercantilism, in that it is designed to *guarantee* a profit to crop exporters regardless of the world price. (The state takes a profit if the world price is above the officially imputed CIF price; but it *reimburses* the traders if it falls below this — hence the current financial crisis of the state!)⁵⁶ . . . To be given a state licence to be a crop buyer and exporter is to be given a licence to make money. This privilege is held by around 30 agencies (some French, others Ivorian) each with a quota. But because profit depends on maximum actual purchasing, farmers benefit from competition between the thousands of up-country agents of the big commercial houses. The state regulates the grant of trading licences right down to the *sous-préfecture* level and control is strict. The system is thus built around the interests of the traders, but farmers benefit because they get the official price throughout the country and actually get paid in cash (until the current crisis).⁵⁷

Obviously the Caisse is at the core both of the state's

⁵⁶ See: H. S. Marcussen, 'The Ivory Coast Facing the Economic Crisis' in J. Carlsson (ed.) *Recession in Africa* (Uppsala, 1983) p.7; G. Delaporte, 'La CSSPPA: Vingt Années au Service du Planteur et de l'Etat', *Marchés Tropicaux*, 9 April 1976; F. R. Mahieu, 'Stabilisation des Prix de Produits Agricoles d'Exploitation et Financement du Développement; l'Expérience de la CSSPPA en Côte d'Ivoire', (Abidjan, CIRES, 1984).

revenue surpluses and of the patronage system. Although Fauré has referred to the system as 'patrimonial', it is doubtful whether the particular role of the Caisse should be taken as proof that there is appropriation and privatisation of state resources by office holders throughout the state apparatus. On the contrary, as Fauré shows, Houphouët-Boigny has demonstrated a ruthless ability to 'call in', control or close down the patronage machine as in the case of the parastatal corporations when their excesses seemed to threaten accountability and discipline throughout the rest of the state.

The continuing departicipation of Ivorian society and the externality of this powerful state is on the other hand vividly demonstrated by the operations of the prefectural system and the current attempt at *communalisation* and *responsabilisation* of local administration and tax gathering.⁵⁸ It is truly ironic that, 30 years after independence a high level administrative trainee at the Ivorian ENA could write in relation to this policy: 'l'Ivoirien peut faire maintenant son apprentissage de citoyen'. Control within the administration and over society are still the dominant realities of the Ivorian state.

In Ghana, the history of the crop marketing system provides a telling contrast. Apart from a brief interlude in the Busia regime when private upcountry purchasing was tried (and failed) the marketing board has consistently relied on buying and exporting all the

crop itself using its own monopoly or near monopoly agency. The Acheampong regime went further even than the CPP and ordered the CMB to finance and operate a massive expansion of state cocoa plantations.⁵⁹ Throughout, the farmers have suffered abuses resulting from corruption and inefficiency such as delayed payment (up to 9 months by the end of the 70s) or even non-payment. Meanwhile at a time when world prices were booming and farmers only getting 15 per cent of those prices, the number of employees of the CMB and its agencies had swelled to 74,357, compared to the UGFC's 13,000 during the CPP period.⁶⁰ It is only under Rawlings that any changes have looked likely, with the sacking of 28,000 employees and plans for privatisation.⁶¹

What remains at the heart of the problem, however, whatever system is adopted, is whether the Ghanaian state can develop the administrative honesty and efficiency to make it work and restore the conditions for successful agriculture and trade to function. The comparison with Côte d'Ivoire shows that the critical factor is accountability to a strongly established political elite. Given Ghana's turbulent political history this may seem an unrealistic prospect. On the other hand, the strength and mobilisation of Ghanaian civil society could, if better harnessed and integrated, provide a stronger basis for a participative and civic order than in Côte d'Ivoire. A sense of community still exists in Ghana and this is an invaluable potential.

⁵⁷ The ability of the system to underwrite both traders' profits and state financial demands even in a period of falling prices was finally ended in 1987-8, caught in the scissors of further price falls and Houphouët's determination not to drop the producer price. Neither the Caisse nor the banks were able to fund the advances needed to buy the 1988 crop; hence, in a replay of the 1950s, the French government has helped to 'arrange' a private purchase of a substantial portion of the Ivorian crop at 'Houphouët's price'. Even though this is unlikely to solve the problem of the world price, it will help the finances of the Caisse. This was followed in 1989 with a halving of the producer price for cocoa. K. Whiteman, 'Bitter Chocolate', *West Africa*, 12-18 June 1989; 'Quand l'Elysée se passionne pour le Cacao', *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 10 May 1989.

⁵⁸ Official justification for the policy may be found in *Plan Quinquennal 1981-85*, p.752 where it is linked with deconcentration of central ministries and the creation of extra rural *sous-préfectures*. The major thrust of both the new communes and the *sous-préfectures* is in fact to try to get local communities to pay for their own 'development', a financial and political necessity in the period of 'la crise'. Indeed, local areas are now being told that they must raise the cost of having their own new *sous-préfet*. There is also open official acknowledgement of the difficulty of getting the peasants to pay their new communal taxes. See: *Fraternité Matin*, 19 Nov. 1988; *Fraternité Matin. Spécial Indépendance. An 28*, 'Communes: un Pari sur l'Avenir', 7 Dec. 1988.

⁵⁹ J. Kraus, 'The Political Economy of Agrarian Regression in Ghana' in S. K. Commins, M. Lofchie, and R. Payne (eds.) *Africa's Agrarian Crisis* (Boulder, 1986).

⁶⁰ Haynes, 'Rawlings . . .' p.238; Beckman, *Organising the Farmers*, p.133.

⁶¹ 'Ghana' in *Africa South of the Sahara, 1987* (London, 1988).