Most African rural economies are changing rapidly. Women's and men's experiences of change are highly differentiated, and often a cause of conflict. This paper examines gendered access to resources in a village in eastern Sierra Leone, and shows how I researched this as an anthropologist [cf. Leach 1990]. In one sense it provides a case study of an anthropological perspective [cf. Roberts infra.]. Finding dissatisfaction with economists' household models, the paper shows how my anthropological field methods revealed a locally particular set of functional groupings, socio-economic relations, and relationships between 'domestic' and 'politic-jural' aspects of life. I also emphasise the importance of treating such relations as dynamic, which older anthropological approaches often failed to do. The resource flows associated with particular groupings and relationships can change from day to day, over an individual's progression through the social cycle, and in a historical time frame. This raises an important question for analysts: where do we look for the crucial relations between men and women in situations of change?

Madina, where I lived during 1987-88, is a Mende-speaking village of about 450 people, isolated in a highly forested area. The agricultural and social calendar has long revolved around the production of the staple food crop, upland rice, on a forest fallow system, intercropped with a wide range of condiment vegetables and hunger foods (e.g. cassava, sorghum). Palm oil is processed from wild palms, and hunting, fishing and the collection of 'minor forest products' have been important sources of food and cash income throughout the twentieth century. Since around the 1960s, some important changes have occurred. Much cocoa and coffee was planted in response to rapid export price rises, and remains a significant source of cash income. But rice and palm oil production have declined, and people now expect to purchase some of both each year. Money is increasingly needed to buy medicines, school fees, cloth and so on. In addition to crop sale earnings, villagers can obtain money from trade, brokerage services, and receipts from family members in urban areas, but these sources are often inadequate and unreliable. Villagers consider life increasingly difficult.

Rather than attempt to look for 'household units', I focused on gender relations and resource flows. I attempted to find out which relationships and groups were important to different people for different aspects of economic life, and which resources they might expect to obtain from them. Valuable insights arose from casual conversations and unexpected events as often as from formal 'data collection'. The latter focused on seven 'case study' families whose members illustrated a range of contrasts of age and social and economic position. Participating in and monitoring their labour, food use and income and expenditure patterns throughout the year proved an effective way to gain a highly detailed understanding of resource flows. Because I came to know them well, we had close and intimate conversations — in farm huts, while fishing — which revealed to me much about local views and perceptions of change. The few surveys I carried out did not involve formal questionnaires, but were designed 'on the spot' to check the generality of issues which arose during participant observation.

Groupings in Mende life

Survey snapshots

Socio-economic surveys in Mende areas [e.g. Engel et al. 1984] usually identify two relevant categories: The mawee, or residential household, and the farm-household. A mawee (from mu wele, 'our house') is headed by a locally important person, although senior women can become mawee heads. Members include his or her brothers, sisters (widows and women married to incoming men), children, wives, and grandchildren, and usually some unrelated apprentices or recent immigrants. Most of these people share a compound of four to five houses, including large divided ones for men and monogamous couples, and undivided 'dormitories' for the other women.

Farm-households are, in effect, 'sub units' of the mawee. They are usually headed by a married man, and include his wife(s), children, and perhaps an apprentice or client. Sometimes a married man farms with his father or older brother, so the farm-household contains two conjugal units. Widows and separated women usually head their own farm-households. Surveyors usually assume that production and consumption units coincide. Finding that farm-household members cook and eat together in the farm...
The head was expected to clothe members and meet from the mawee rice, hunger food and palm oil stores. Palm fruit, according to labour duties differentiated a warrior in the nineteenth century, and were expected production grouping as well as a residential one. In the past, the mawee was a politico-jural and Where the mawee and farm household are concerned, these issues must be understood in historical context. In the past, the mawee was a politico-jural and production grouping as well as a residential one. Politically, members sought the protection of the head (mawee mo) much as they had sought the protection of a warrior in the nineteenth century, and were expected to show him or her allegiance during factional rivalries. Economically, they annually cooperated to make a rice farm (kpaaw wa) and collect and process palm fruit, according to labour duties differentiated by gender and seniority, and were entitled to be fed from the mawee rice, hunger food and palm oil stores. The head was expected to clothe members and meet cash needs such as taxes with the proceeds from palm kernel and bushmeat sales. Payment of male members' brideprice allowed the mawee mo authority over their and their new wives' labour, and influence over marriage transactions. In short, both men and women were heavily economically, socially and politically dependent on mawee membership.

Since the 1960s, cash crop and marketing opportunities have assisted younger men (and to a lesser extent women) to acquire greater social and economic independence. Functional unities have changed accordingly. The primary importance of the mawee is now as a patronage grouping. The head helps members in court cases etc., and expects political support (e.g. in chieftaincy elections) in return. Common mawee membership less often means common residence as more people build their own houses and those who live in one part of the village can give their allegiance to a patron in another. Contrary to survey impressions, therefore, 'mawee' and 'residential unit' do not neatly coincide. Mawee size and composition are neither determined by kinship relations, nor static; they alter with shifting factional and patron-client alliances. Most women are little involved in patron-client politics, however. On a day-to-day basis they are more inclined to identify themselves with their sleeping house — a social focus and a locus for dispute settlement by the elderly female head — than with their mawee.

The modern farm-household is a product of this changing social organisation. As more men began to make their own marriage payments, it came to be assumed that men would start a rice farm with their own wives, children and clients. Farm-households are primarily production groupings which farm rice and intercrops together. However they also have social importance. Farm-household headship is important to adult male identity; today a man who still farms with his father or older brother is considered 'a small boy'. Farming rice with kin reaffirms kin ties, and the coming together of male and female tasks in sequence is a powerful affirmation of gender interdependence and conjugal unity.

These changes in the organisation of production have importantly, and differentially, affected different women's and men's access to resources. For example single women (widows and divorcees) were in a similar situation to married women when all were 'embedded' in large mawee-based farming groups. Now they are potentially vulnerable, since their lack of husbands denies them the male labour which is expected to accomplish land clearing. Only a few (middle aged or elderly) single women can substitute the labour of an adult son for a husband's.

Farm-household arrangements often vary substantially from year to year, however. A single woman can sometimes relieve male labour difficulties by joining her married sister's farm-household, or her daughter and son-in-law, for the season. Contractual arrangements are sometimes made, when a related or unrelated person (e.g. a recent immigrant) agrees to work for a negotiated proportion of rice with which he or she 'departs' after harvest. The functional distinction between farm-household and larger, patronage-based or mawee groupings is ambiguous. Currently powerful village patrons and mawee heads can often recruit junior kin, clients and their wives to their farm-households for the season, increasing the size and security of their farm enterprise. In 1988 one man incorporated his son's and a stranger's conjugal unit, for example; the latter had farmed separately in 1987. In 1989, following a severe hungry season, village chiefs decided that in addition to 'farm-household' farms, each mawee should combine to make a large farm in order to boost rice yields. In short, the trend towards small farm-households has not stabilised; 'mawee as production group' and 'patrons as production group heads' are still organisational options.

A closer look at kitchen 'units' reveals that these do not necessarily coincide with farm-households. Farm-household members who produce together often cook and eat together in the farm hut during the peak work season, but maintain separate kitchens in town, for evening and dry season meals. They acquire additional ingredients (e.g. fish, extra vegetables, purchased food) for such meals separately. Local notions of kitchen 'unity' (in as much as they exist) centre on marriage, not production. A married man is obliged to build a kitchen for his wife(s), and a wife is expected to cook for her husband and children, and to respond to
his requests to feed clients or guests. It is considered ideal for co-wives of polygynous husbands to cook together (thus demonstrating their socially correct, harmonious relations) but acceptable for the task to be allocated according to seniority or in rotating turns.

The group which eats from a single cooking pot varies from day to day. Guests appear and must be shown hospitality; temporarily recruited farm workers must be fed. Women often 'reorganise' cooking arrangements to suit their own economic and social interests, and men are expected to allow them this autonomy. Indeed few Madina women could state to whom they regularly dished out food, saying rather that 'I give to whom I please'. Women cook for visiting members of their own families, and reciprocate for goods and services (e.g. childcare) by sending cooked food to friends and kin in other parts of the village. They sometimes make inter-kitchen arrangements to meet food shortfalls; a woman who has run out of rice might begin to cook jointly with her daughter, who still has supplies. More rarely, kitchen sharing itself is rearranged. Women value kitchens for socialising and tool and crop storage as well as cooking. Co-wives who get on badly may manage to persuade their husband to build an extra kitchen, or a woman may move in with her mother, sister or a friend.

### Other groups

Beyond mawee, farm-household and kitchen, there is a range of other groupings relevant to economic life which endure over different time scales. Both women and men form work groups for particular activities. Some endure over several years; young men often form these to clear rice and cocoa farms, and women occasionally do so for weeding. These groups can theoretically be employed in return for food and an agreed wage, but political issues also figure; patrons create and consolidate political relations by calling on work teams, which are usually more willing to work the farms of the powerful. Other labour teams work an agreed number of times on each member's farm during the year. Although notionally egalitarian, members whose poverty or sickness prevents them meeting their work or food providing obligations often find themselves excluded the following year, which is one of the reasons why labour team membership tends to be re-negotiated annually. Women and young people form rotating credit associations (osusu) to keep money safe from others' claims and to allow their small, repetitively-acquired incomes to be converted into periodic larger assets. Again, these are unstable, and rarely endure from year to year.

Both men and women retain certain rights as members of their natal patrilineages (ndehu). Descent groups themselves endure from generation to generation, but the meanings of membership to a particular individual change as he or she progresses through the social cycle. Adult members have rights to farm lineage land every year, and to social and ritual support from family members and ancestors. When a woman marries, especially if, as is usual, she moves to her husband's village, she is expected to secure land and support through her husband's lineage. Nevertheless women retain rights to visit their natal kin, continue to contribute to ceremonies in their own families, and occasionally acquire land from them. For men and elderly women, lineage and inheritance negotiations are an important locus for power play.

All adult Mende men and women are also members of gender-specific 'secret societies' (Poro and Sande) which, although primarily of ritual importance, also have social, economic and political functions. Women acquire solidarity against male coercion, and the society will sometimes rally to protect a woman's rights in court or to visit her natal kin. Women from high ranking lineages who become society leaders often benefit economically from the fees and labour contributions of initiates, and socio-politically from the alliances they create by marrying them to important families [cf. Bledsoe 1984].

### 'Independent' activities

Women and men undertake a range of productive activities separately from the household farm. Men derive independent incomes from occasional bushmeat or 'minor forest product' sales, palm wine tapping, and day labour. Many women and young men make individual rice swamps, cassava and groundnut farms, and vegetable gardens. Women carry out small scale trade (e.g. of salt and dried fish) from their kitchens, and some trade more heavily in local markets.

Co-wives invariably have separate individual enterprises, often considering independence from co-wives even more important than independence from a husband. They often make divisions when their husband is inclined to treat them as a group, illustrating that men and women often conceive of unities differently. For example, the female members of a farm household have full rights to the vegetable and sauce intercrops on the upland rice farm. Male farmers simply consider them 'women's business', but women carefully designate individual ownership of the crops in the common farm space to keep their incomes separate and ensure a private source of supply for their own cooking. The consumption unit Mende multiple wives consider most important is usually themselves and their own children.

Most analysts who pay attention to individuals' 'independent' economic activities treat them as precisely that; a source of independence for the individual from the group, and a source of individual security against failure of the group enterprise. The
Mende women I knew shared these concerns with independence and security, but also pursued them indirectly, valuing their own resources as inputs into important networks of interdependency. For example women consider a private supply of swamp rice most useful to give to, or or cook for, their visiting natal kin.

**Resource flows and relationships**

The ways in which women use their independently acquired resources begin to indicate the importance they attach to a wide range of kin relationships in their economic lives. Whereas anthropologists usually focus on kin relations, researchers who adopt ‘households’ as units of analysis tend to treat them as ‘networks of extra-household relations’. But the separation of ‘household’ and ‘extra-household’ (aside from questions of household definition and stasis) is misleading. I found that resource flows within contextual groups, between them and between a member and a non-member can all depend on the particular relationship between the people concerned; specific relationships provide specific opportunities for claims.

Certain hierarchical kin ties carry expectations of material assistance. For example a young man is expected to give labour and financial help (e.g. purchasing medicines) to his parents-in-law both before and after his marriage to their daughter. Middle-aged and elderly mothers particularly value help from sons-in-law and often endeavour to marry their daughters nearby to maximise their chances of receiving it. Maternal uncles are entitled to call on the labour services of their nieces and nephews. In return, young men and women rely on them for assistance, such as with school fees, trading inputs, or marriage payments.

Patron-client ties are integral to Mende life. Patrons are entitled to draw on the labour and political support of their clients, although they are expected to provide financial help and loans when requested, meeting bad debts as well as good [Richards 1990]. Although patron-clientage is generally a more important source of economic help to men than to women, older women who have built up resources through trade or inherited clients from a husband sometimes compete with men on more even terms, and draw on clients’ services as male patrons do [Bledsoe 1980]. Patron-client ties and hierarchical kin ties are not easily distinguishable.

Some resource flows are more egalitarian and reciprocal. The help of brothers and sisters is often of this kind, as is help between friends. Reciprocity is usually generalised, and long term. For example at rice harvest time, both men and women who are short of rice on their own or farm-household account — usually because the farm has failed — expect to go and ‘find’ rice on siblings’ and friends’ farms. In 1988 several single women whose farms had failed due to male labour difficulties secured rice supplies for the next few months entirely in this way. The givers are well aware that future fortunes might reverse, and they find themselves the ones in need.

It is important to appreciate the different bases for resource claims to understand men’s and women’s different opportunities in kin networks. Whereas men derive leverage over others from their positions in kinship and patronage groupings, most women rely more heavily on reciprocal resource flows, and (in the last instance) on emotional pleas. Although these may make daily life viable, they are a relatively insecure basis for livelihood in the long term.

**Conjugal economic arrangements**

**Reallocation and conflict**

Over the last few decades there has been much adjustment and renegotiation of the ‘conjugal contract’ [Whitehead 1981] in eastern Sierra Leone. As in many parts of modern Africa, conflicts of interest between husbands and wives — especially over the allocation and use of labour and money — are frequent [cf. Whitehead 1990].

As men have become more heavily involved in cocoa and coffee production, wives are expected to assist with harvesting and processing, receiving only a discretionary gift of cloth and the right to glean fallen produce in return, and have taken over more peak season rice farm work. Women consider tree crop work to be ‘for my husband’, rather than of joint benefit, and many find their present labour obligations a serious drain on their time for independent vegetable gardening, trade and swamp work. In comparison, any assistance a husband gives a wife with her individual farm work is regarded as ‘help’; a voluntary contribution.

Reallocations of expenditure responsibility are harder to pin down. Men and women have always maintained separate income streams and expenditures, whether in cash or kind. As in most parts of Africa, there is no notion of a pooled, common conjugal budget. In the mawee of the past, men’s and women’s provision responsibilities were broadly divided on an item by item basis; men provided staple food and cloth, and women palm oil, sauce ingredients, and local medicines for their own children. Now (perhaps always ambiguous) divisions are less clearcut. There is little precedent for the division of new expenditures such as clinic medicines and imported consumer goods, while the increasing importance of money has reduced male and female spheres to potential substitutes rather than complements. Purchase responsibilities now tend to divide by resource flow rather than item. Men usually supply bulky items and...
meet long term needs, which suits their more 'lumpy' incomes. Women are expected to put their 'small-small', repetitively acquired incomes towards day-to-
day needs, such as additional rice and palm oil by the cup and the pint, and small needs for their children. But ambiguity remains, and no-one can state clearly who is responsible for what.

I found variability to be one of the most notable features of conjugal economic arrangements in Madina, and accounting for this a challenging task. Local people distinguish harmonious partnerships from those in which there is nothing but palaver over economic affairs. Personal issues are undoubtedly influential; people's generosity and tolerance varies, and some spouses are manifestly more affectionate, concerned for each other's welfare and interested in each other's opinions than others. However these are difficult bases from which to generalise, and we should be careful not to obscure in personal questions the 'structural' issues which often underlie these differences.

Spouses' relative ages and stages in the social cycle proved to be a more systematic source of difference. Young women who marry young men complain most heavily of burdensome workloads on household rice farms, of little time for their own farming and trade, and of little physical or financial help from their husbands. Yet the young men are often in a bind. Heavily committed to labour and material contributions to their wife's parents and the struggle to establish a tree farm, they often have little spare time or money to give. In such couples, quarrels over economic issues tend to be frequent, and wives usually continue to rely heavily on parental support. Young marriages tend to be relatively unstable, and young separated women, having few alternative sources of support, usually return to their natal kin.

By middle age, a man may have built up resources through farming or trade, have more control over his own labour, and perhaps be able to call on junior kin or clients. This puts him in a better position to contribute to his wives' and children's needs. He may relieve her workload by recruiting labour at tree crop harvest or rice planting time, and perhaps contribute to her own activities by clearing her swamp for her or giving her trading capital. Such wives tend to complain less of overburden, although they are just as concerned to maintain their own income streams. Mature, monogamous couples are most likely to appear 'cooperative'. Husband and wife may pool resources for particular projects, and bargain explicitly over the fulfilment of ambiguous responsibilities; for example agreeing each to pay half the cost of medicines for a sick child. However a court case or agricultural or trading venture which misfires can easily drive such a husband into temporary poverty, and conflict may result if his wife considers him to have been irresponsible.

Men's and women's relative positions often alter as they get older. Men acquire greater control over the labour of junior kin, but also face more sudden requests to help out with expensive family events such as funerals or a member's sickness. A wife often finds some of her farm work duties relieved by labour from other sources, but her need to 'fill in' gaps in her husband's finances to purchase joint food, cloth for herself and so on greater. She is, however, in a better position to do this than when she was younger, as she is more likely to receive assistance with her own farming and trade from adult children and sons-in-law. If she is widowed or divorced she can often support herself from such sources, and may not be especially vulnerable.

Widowed, middle aged and elderly women sometimes remarry younger men, either through a levirate marriage to their dead husband's younger brother, or because they return to their home town and choose to marry an incoming stranger, and acquire further wives for him. Some such women have greater relative power than their husbands because of their seniority and influence in secret societies and lineages, and experience conjugal resource arrangements quite differently. In one case in Madina, the wife kept and allocated all the income from her young husband's tree farm.

In polygynous marriages, co-wife relations also affect arrangements. Mende rank co-wives according to their order of arrival into the marriage and the first or senior wife (nyaha wa) has domestic authority over subsequent wives (nyaha wulo). The senior wife can usually relieve her own work burden and make more time for her own activities by devolving farm and domestic tasks on to junior wives. Juniors, by contrast, often complain of having little time for independent work. The senior wife is also considered responsible for ensuring female contributions to conjugal food needs, such as palm oil. Although she may have to spend more of her own money than other wives, a husband will often give her extra money for this, and reward her other services — such as managing the farm household rice store and watching out for local intrigue.

Generally, co-wives receive especially little help from their husbands. There is invariably implicit competition for their husband's resources, especially when these may benefit their children. A polygynous husband is expected to avoid overt signs of favouritism, and rather than face overwhelming demands on his finances by giving equally to each wife should one of them need money, will often leave his wives to furnish virtually everything for themselves. This is rarely a satisfactory solution, as wives often continue to suspect the husband of favouring one wife. Arguments over money tend to be frequent.
Thus the economic benefits which women derive from marriage, and levels of conjugal conflict over resources, vary as age, stage and co-wife relations alter levels of tension and relative bargaining power. These differences are all aspects of the developmental cycle of domestic groups [Goody 1958]. Although anthropologists have long used the concept in a static way to describe domestic group form, it also has useful application to contemporary analyses of resource allocation processes, bargaining and change.

I found that conjugal and co-wife conflicts tended to increase with poverty, since when there are fewer resources to go round, tensions over the directions of their allocation are heightened. Although the effects of general economic stress on gender relations are mediated through the issues I have discussed here, they should not be ignored, or we risk obscuring in sexual politics the facts and politics of wider impoverishment [Whitehead 1990].

**Other forms of ‘bargaining’**

The attention which economists have begun to pay to ‘bargaining’ processes is an important step in the analysis of gender conflicts of interest and their resolution. However most analyses adopt an open negotiation, face-to-face model of bargaining, which presumes that people are certain of and can act on their own interests, and do so overtly. My work in Madina suggested a rather different picture. Firstly, ambiguities and tensions over resource allocation were often dilemmas for all, not a pitting of conflicting male and female interests.

Secondly, women with clear complaints of male inadequacy — sometimes legally supported, if a husband had failed to clear a farm or provide staple food — were often not confident of upholding their claims in an open quarrel or a male-dominated court. I found it essential to pay attention to women’s other means of resolving or avoiding conflict and securing their needs.

Firstly, the private activities, kin relationships, and networks of reciprocity which women so concernedly invest in provide security which enables a woman who benefits little from marriage nevertheless to ensure her children’s welfare, at least in the short term. Women in Madina are more fortunate than those in many parts of Africa in that these — and the independent rights to land and contact with natal kin on which they depend — are still viable. A woman’s reaction to marital difficulty is often to turn to them and dissociate more fully from her husband on a day-to-day basis. She may hope that fortunes will change and prefer not to instigate palaver which may end in divorce.

Secondly, women engage in ‘covert’ activities. They frequently take, hide and sell small amounts of cocoa and coffee from the tree crop farms of their husbands and male kin. This is such an accepted practice that I was eventually able to carry out an informal survey about it amongst the women I knew reasonably well. As one put it, ‘men give us nothing from their farms — how are we to buy clothes for our children? we get nothing unless we take it.’ It is also common for young married women to take lovers, and treat the gifts and labour they receive from them as additions to their husband’s unreliable help. In some circumstances, both these ‘covert’ strategies are a way to acquire resources despite superior male control.

Men are often well aware that their wives are taking their crops and having extra-marital affairs, but they do not always create palaver. Husbands can view their wives’ ‘covert’ activities as resolutions to mutual dilemmas. They acknowledge that such resources are spent on children’s welfare. Income from ‘taken’ crops which women spend on conjugal food needs is kept safe from other calls on a man’s resources. Income is transferred to co-wives without risking the co-wife jealousies which accompany open gifts. Husband and wife alike may consider her lover as a useful potential client, and connive to take him to court for adultery. In such circumstances ‘covert’ activities are often, as villagers put it, ‘forgotten’.

**Conclusion**

These ‘covert strategy’ examples illustrate how important it is to take local, situation-specific views of resources flows into account. Without such views, observers might wrongly interpret crop taking in eastern Sierra Leone as ‘stealing’ or extra-marital affairs as ‘adultery’ in a western sense, and draw wrong conclusions about the state of gender relations. Locally-nuanced interpretations are an important, and perhaps distinct, contribution of anthropological approaches.

This brief and partial account of gender and resource access in eastern Sierra Leone has attempted to show how anthropological precepts and methods can reveal a picture quite at odds with economists’ models of ‘the household’. In Madina, I found that beyond misleading survey snapshots there is no equivalent local social category, and that attempting to pin one down would invite infinite descriptive problems and conceptual pitfalls [cf. Guyer 1986]. Indeed, the productive and reproductive activities usually associated with ‘households’ are diffused amongst a multiplicity of different groupings, which endure over different time scales, and which people contribute to or derive assistance from in different circumstances. Groupings tend to be sites of negotiation, bargaining and hierarchical resource distribution rather than collectivities of mutual interests [cf. Whitehead 1981]. Specific opportunities and obligations are associated with particular kin relationships, both within groupings (in a sense, each is a nexus of such
relationships) and beyond them. Productive and reproductive activities, resources and relations are embedded in wider socio-political relations. As social and economic conditions alter, the composition, functions and embeddedness of particular groupings can change. An individual's experience depends on his or her position amidst this multiplicity of potential relationships and resource flows, and on which of them he or she can activate in particular circumstances. In this sense ‘women’ and ‘men’ are far from homogenous categories; age, kinship and socio-political position, as well as gender, affect their opportunities.

Anthropological complexity is not an ideal substitute for economic simplicity, however. Especially when policy-focused analysis is at stake, it is important to move on towards clarifying concepts and common ground. For economic analyses of short term processes, decision-making and welfare, the main alternative to a ‘household’ approach has been to focus on individuals, and plot out how they gain access to resources. Yet women and men are not ‘individuals’; they work from locally particular social positions and relations of interdependence which construct their activities and opportunities. Seeking a universal analytical framework to encompass such local particularity is likely to prove a fruitless task. But in each situation, a useful starting point may be to analyse resource flows themselves (e.g. the mobilisation of women’s labour for men’s crops) and focus questions on the forms of interdependence and local understandings which enable them.

As Guyer [1986] points out, studies of long term change are also important. Economic and agricultural shifts make it difficult to pin down social categories and gender relations because these too are changing. But if we focus on change itself — the long processes of negotiation in, for example, commoditisation or agricultural intensification — component aspects of change all become potentially clarifying explanatory factors, and we can better understand how they interrelate.

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