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1 INTRODUCTION

This *Bulletin* tackles the subject of 'linking relief and development'. The basic idea is simple and sensible. Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation. And they have spawned bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organizational cultures which duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them. By the same token, development policy and administration are often insensitive to the risk of drought and other shocks, and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. If relief and development can be 'linked', so the theory goes, these deficiencies can be overcome¹. Better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to development; and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two.

The scope and the need for linking relief and development are large. Emergencies have grown in number and intensity and many, especially in Africa, but also in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, are associated with war (Duffield, Walker²). Emergencies seem to have become more displacing of development. Furthermore, in some countries, the welfare problem has grown so much that emergency food aid has become habitual: Ethiopia is a case in point (Maxwell and Lirenso).

As a result of these trends, government and donor aid budgets have seen an ever-greater proportion of scarce resources absorbed by emergency needs. In Southern Africa in 1992, the total cost of relief was estimated as 12 per cent of the Region's GDP (Mugwara). In Ethiopia, the cost of relief in 1984/85, largely borne by donors, was equivalent to 36 per cent of government revenue or 94 per cent of capital expenditure (Maxwell and Lirenso). WFP now devotes over half its resources to emergencies and refugee operations, 80 per cent of these to man-made emergencies (WFP 1993; Herbinger). Even a donor

with a wider portfolio of activities, like Britain's ODA, has seen the share of emergency aid rise, from 2 per cent in 1982 to nearly 10 per cent in 1992 (ODA 1993; Holden)³.

Despite the opportunities, however, linking relief and development is 'by no means a mainstream concept' and remains experimental (Herbinger). We report some successes, predictably in countries such as Botswana (Buchanan-Smith and Tlogelang), Zambia (Eele and Luhila), and Zimbabwe (Holden). But the general picture is of potential unfulfilled, what Green and Mavie, writing of rehabilitation here, call an 'unserved limbo in development'.

This is emphatically not because the idea of linking relief and development is new. As Campbell (1994) has shown, the vocabulary can be traced back in the international policy-related literature for at least a decade, and in its constituent parts (relief works, for example) for over a century (Templer and Payne 1994). Linking relief and development, in various guises, was an important theme emerging from the analysis of the food crises in Africa in the 1980s (Thomas *et al.* 1989: 65ff; Singer 1985; Adams 1986; Hay 1986; USAID 1986; WFP/ADB 1986). More recent contributions have mainly - and helpfully - served to extend and reinforce earlier principles (Anderson and Woodrow 1989, 1991; WFP 1993; Frankenberger and Shaw 1993).

Nor can the slow progress of linking relief and development be attributed entirely to change in the character of emergencies, which has certainly occurred but which was foreshadowed in the early 1980s. Two changes cited (for example by Duffield) are the increasing number of 'permanent emergencies', especially in Africa, and the increasing prevalence of war. As early as 1985, Singer observed that: 'the old division, whether conceptual, administrative or resource allocative, between emergency... and non-emergency or development... simply collapses in the light of the present African experience' (Singer 1985: 13).

¹ 'Linking relief and development' is one description of this idea. Others include the 'relief-development continuum', the 'interface between relief and development', 'relief-development strategies' and 'famine mitigation'.

² Where authors' names are given without dates, the reference is to articles in this volume.

³ The ODA figures are not untypical. Corroborating evidence is to be found in this volume in the articles by Duffield and Walker.

Others similarly wrote about the importance of war in creating famine in Africa in the 1980s, in countries as widely dispersed as Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan (Borton and Clay 1986; Green 1986). Linking relief and development in war is a difficult task, but not impossible, as we shall see.

So why is the objective of linking relief and development not routinely integrated into every government and aid agency portfolio; especially if, as Duffield suggests, the concept offers an attractive defensive strategy to administrators of regular development aid, threatened by the predatory incursions of relief? Our collective thesis in this **Bulletin** is that for linking relief and development to enter mainstream practice, the discourse must shift a gear and address the underlying obstacles and analytical issues which beset the topic. Some of these are definitional or conceptual (Seaman, Longhurst), others to do with macroeconomic policy (Benson and Clay), cost-effectiveness (Maxwell and Lirensen), politics, or institutional change (Duffield, Davies, Green and Mavie, Askwith, and others). In some cases, an explicit attempt to link relief and development may not be necessary (Seaman, Ross *et al.* 1994:4ff); in other cases, interventions must be chosen to suit the characteristics and capacity of the country or region concerned (Maxwell and Lirensen, Green and Mavie, Mugwara).

As we pursue these issues, it is worth asking why linking relief and development should receive such prominence at this particular juncture. We identify five main reasons.

The first is to do with donor concern about the increasing portion of aid budgets spent on emergencies, reported above, and how to strengthen the links with development aid.

Second, and related to this, it is acknowledged that emergencies can make subsequent development more difficult, by diverting funds from local institutions, or creating new chains of command which are less responsive to development needs (Adams and Hawksley 1989; Buchanan-Smith 1990; Hubbard 1991). The macroeconomic dislocation caused by drought can also be long-term (Benson and Clay).

Third, rehabilitation has become much more important, especially given the close association between famine and war. The increase in the number of refugees and displaced people - perhaps 40 million

at present - is one indicator of the challenge of rehabilitation (Payne 1994, ACC/SCN 1994). Payne (*ibid.*: 41ff) has estimated that the number of refugees in Africa increased from around 1 million in 1970 to 16 million in 1994, a rate of increase of 12 per cent a year; the estimate precedes the recent Rwanda refugee crisis.

Fourthly, it is now widely accepted that the compartmentalization between relief and development is artificial as far as poor people themselves are concerned. The poor live constantly with the risk of crisis and plan their livelihood strategies accordingly (Chambers 1988, 1989). At least in Africa, poor people plan, as Mortimore (1989) has argued, for 'uncertainty as norm'. In a growing number of cases, particularly in the Horn of Africa, this has become 'emergency as norm' (Maxwell 1994). In this connection, it has become misleading to talk of a linear sequence of 'relief-rehabilitation-development': more complex models are required, which recognize the complexity and diversity of livelihood strategies (Ross *et al.* 1994: 2).

Finally, linking relief and development offers positive benefits, the 'silver lining in the cloudless sky' (Maxwell 1993). The ideal model is one in which relief and development interventions are implemented harmoniously to provide poor people with secure livelihoods and efficient safety-nets, mitigating the frequency and impact of shocks and easing rehabilitation. In practice, the different interventions may actually take place simultaneously, as NGOs or government departments adjust their pattern of activity according to need (Walker, Ross *et al.* 1994:4).

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the sharp division between development and relief is becoming unsustainable, as emergency needs increase and as the experience of living with high risk becomes ever more central to poor people themselves. Linking relief and development finds itself forced onto the agenda.

2 APPROACHES TO LINKING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Frameworks of analysis

The usual point of entry for a discussion of linking relief and development is the household and community level, focusing on sources of 'entitlement',

mainly to food (Sen 1981, Swift 1989), or more generally on the 'capacity' to withstand shocks (Anderson and Woodrow 1989, 1991)⁴. This relates to sources of 'vulnerability' (Chambers 1988; Anderson and Woodrow *ibid.*, Watts and Bohle 1993), to 'sensitivity' to shocks and to the speed of recovery, or 'resilience' (Oshaug 1985, Bayliss-Smith 1991).

Longhurst provides a guide to the 'bewildering' diversity of conceptual frameworks in circulation and presents a simple classification to link the competing paradigms. The central idea is that household vulnerability is defined by the capacity to manage shocks: some households may be unaffected by shocks, some may recover more quickly, and some may be pushed into irreversible decline. Some households, indeed, may even profit from the misfortunes of others. It is increasingly suggested that, in parts of Africa, vulnerability is rising, as coping strategies are overwhelmed by growing poverty (Davies 1993). Longhurst points to the behaviour changes which occur when a minimum threshold is passed.

Although an analysis of how poor people experience shocks must take place at household and community levels, the impact is also felt at the national level (Maxwell 1992: 16ff). Benson and Clay trace the pathways from reduced rainfall, through reduced agricultural output, hydro-electric power and industrial production, to the government budget, the Balance of Payments, inflation and living standards. They make the important point that the impact of drought shocks may be greatest, not in economies where the agricultural sector is predominant, but in slightly more developed economies, such as Zimbabwe. In that country, for example, the 1992 drought led directly to a 25 per cent reduction in the volume of manufacturing output, mainly because of shortages of water and electricity, combined with shortages of inputs and reductions in demand. Drought shocks are rarely considered in macroeconomic planning; yet, in a study of crises forcing the adoption of IMF stabilization programmes in Africa, drought or other natural disasters had been 'an important, perhaps dominant' factor in over one third (Killick and Malik 1991, quoted by Benson and Clay).

2.2 Better development: reducing the frequency, intensity and impact of shocks

Considering both micro and macro dimensions, the key to linking relief and development from the devel-

opment side is to find ways of reducing (a) the frequency and intensity and (b) the impact of shocks, which will in turn reduce the need for emergency relief.

Reducing the frequency and intensity of shocks might seem to be beyond the reach of policy. However, many shocks are policy-related. Figure 1 provides an overview of the main risks to household food security; and, in addition to 'natural' events, identifies a series of shocks in the realms of state policy, markets, community activity and 'others', mostly war-related. A first set of actions for policy-makers is to collect information about vulnerability to these shocks and to assess how they can be reduced in frequency or intensity. This could involve flood defences, for example, or measures to stagger tax increases, or market intervention to stabilize cereal prices.

Reducing the impact of shocks means making individuals, households and economies both less sensitive to shocks and more resilient, in the sense that they will be less affected by shocks when they do occur and also better able to recover after a shock. Interventions could include: farming systems development, for example encouraging the adoption of drought-resistant varieties; diversification of income-earning opportunities, for example through non-farm activity; measures to encourage saving, either in physical form through grain stores, animals or trees, or in the form of financial savings in local banks or credit unions; and development of health and water facilities, to reduce the risk of illness and the possible synergy between food crises, ill-health and malnutrition (de Waal 1989).

Many policy measures come out of a framework of this kind, at both macro and micro levels. Among those most frequently cited in this **Bulletin** are:

- Redirecting resources from high potential to low potential areas and from less vulnerable to more vulnerable social groups, in order to increase the asset-base, income and long term security of those most exposed to risk, as well as their access to physical and social infrastructure and to national markets.
- Investment in 'drought-proofing' the agricultural sector, to protect poor households, both against the immediate shock of lower production and against the impact of higher food prices or deteriorating

⁴ In Anderson and Woodrow's terminology, 'capacity' can be understood as physical, material, social, organisational, motivational

or attitudinal. Watts and Bohle add dimensions related to social relations of production and class.

Figure 1: Sources of risk to household food security

Types of Risk					
Sources of Entitlement	Natural	State	Market	Community	Other
Productive capital (land, machinery, tools, animals, farm buildings, trees, wells, etc.)	Drought contamination (for example, of water supplies). Land degradation. Fire. Flooding.	Land or other asset redistribution/confiscation.	Changes in costs of maintenance.	Appropriation and loss of access to common property resources.	Loss of land as a result of conflict.
Non-productive capital (jewellery, dwellings, granaries, some animals, cash savings)	Pests. Animal disease.	Compulsory procurement. Villageisation. Wealth tax.	Price shocks (for example, falls in value of jewellery and livestock). Rapid inflation.	Breakdown of sharing mechanisms (for example, communal granaries).	Loss of assets as a result of war. Theft.
Human capital (labour power, education, health)	Disease epidemics (for example AIDS). Morbidity. Mortality. Disability.	Declining public health expenditures and/or introduction of user charges. Restrictions on labour migration.	Unemployment. Falling real wages.	Breakdown of labour reciprocity.	Forced labour. Conscription. Mobility restrictions. Destruction of schools and clinics during war.
Income (crops, livestock, non-farm and non-agricultural activity)	Pests. Drought and other climatic events.	Cessation of extension services, subsidies on inputs or price support schemes. Tax increases.	Commodity price falls. Food price shocks.		Marketing channels disrupted by war. Embargoes.
Claims (loans, gifts, social contracts, social security)		Reductions in nutrition programmes (for example school feeding, supplementary feeding).	Rises in interest rates. Changes in borrowing capacity.	Loan recall. Breakdown of reciprocity.	Communities disrupted/displaced by war.

Source: Maxwell and Smith, 1992:16

terms of trade between food and what they themselves sell (labour, animals). This involves research into modifying production systems, but also investment in irrigation, environmental protection and agricultural diversification.

- Macroeconomic stabilization, to offset the negative impact of drought on production, foreign exchange earnings, price levels, government revenue and (if a drought relief operation has to be mounted) government expenditure. Apart from the implications for fiscal and monetary policy, the most important intervention here is the management of foreign exchange, perhaps in the form of a contingency fund (see also Belshaw 1992).

2.3 Better relief: consistent with and reinforcing development

Two conditions must be met for a developmental approach to relief.

The first, and minimum, condition is that relief should not undermine development. This may mean intervening early: to preserve livelihoods (Buchanan-Smith *et al.*, 1994) or, more generally, to safeguard development assets, as for example the movement of fodder to ensure the survival of the Gujarat dairy herd during the drought of the mid-1980s (Seaman). It may also mean providing financial aid to Governments, to help stabilize the macroeconomy (Benson and Clay). Where an international relief operation is needed, it should be planned to incorporate the basic principles normally applied to development projects. This is easily stated, but difficult to achieve. The logistics of mobilizing large quantities of relief and delivering them quickly to remote destinations usually dominate planning and implementation, at the expense of careful consideration of design and approach. The usual relief model is very different to that advocated for longer-term food security planning (Figure 2): centralized, top down, standardized, resource-intensive, donor-dependent and subject to sudden termination. The outcome is frequent 'decapacitation' (Green and Mavie) of local administrative capacity.

Where the minimum condition has been met, the **Bulletin** articles suggest that the following measures have often been adopted:

- Integrating relief administration into existing government structures, giving local government the main responsibility for the first line of defence

against shocks of all kinds. In the best cases, local government has been equipped, trained and financed to deal with emergencies; and does so in a way which draws on the resources of existing line ministries. For example, drought might require additional water sources to be developed and this would be the responsibility of the existing Department of Water Resources, which would receive additional finance for the purpose. Similarly, additional food distribution might be required, and this could become the responsibility of health centres or existing food and nutrition agencies. Or alternatively, existing public works schemes could be expanded. Of the case studies in this **Bulletin**, Botswana has made most progress in this respect.

- In the absence of strong, local government capacity, NGOs have often played a major role in relief operations. In the most successful cases, they have worked closely with local bodies and have set out to leave them stronger than before the emergency. Enhancing local capacity is a stated objective of their intervention (Walker).

- Finding distribution mechanisms which are appropriate to local culture and society, involve local people in administration and organization and are gender-sensitive. A successful, but rather rare example of a relief operation of this kind is OXFAM's relief operation in Northern Kenya, which started in 1992 (Buchanan-Smith 1993). Seaman discusses SCF's work in Mogadishu in similar terms.

The second condition to be fulfilled is for the relief operation to contribute as far as possible to development. All relief does this in a very direct way, of course, by saving lives. It is also possible, in some circumstances and for some people, to turn a consumption subsidy into an investment subsidy. Examples cited in this **Bulletin** include:

- Using relief food not for direct distribution, but rather as a wage to pay for development work. Thus, rather than receiving food free, people affected by disaster are employed to build roads, plant trees, develop irrigation facilities or carry out soil conservation works. These are intended to increase incomes and reduce vulnerability in the future. Wages may be paid in food, but equally may be paid in cash, with relief food being sold through the food marketing system to stabilize prices and generate cash to pay for public works. Relief works are a popular vehicle for linking relief and development (Hay 1986; Drèze and

Figure 2: Characteristics of relief planning and longer term food security planning

	Relief Planning	Longer term food security planning
Objectives		
General	Immediate relief for a population from inadequate access to food, and the threat of excess mortality	Longer term and sustainable improvement in a population's access to food, increasing self-reliance to reduce dependence on externally provided resources
Timescale	Short term, urgency	Long term, evolutionary
Approach to planning and implementation		
Level of planning	Centralized	Decentralized*
Style	Top down, often hierarchical	Bottom up, participatory*
Management	Resource intensive, predominance of expatriate personnel	Resource extensive, emphasis on indigenous management
Information requirements	Specific information on relief needs to direct immediate action – who and how much. Emphasis on early availability of information.	Detailed information on food insecurity - types of food insecurity, who and why. Cumulative process of information collection over time.
Information collection	Rapid, often formal surveys carried out by visiting teams	Flexible systems of data collection, usually emphasizing participation of target population
Role of target population	Passive	Active, participatory providing key resources
Source of resources	Heavily donor dependent	Recipient government and local community contributions expected as well as resources provided by donors
Mobilization of resources	Rapid emergency procedures for releasing donor resources	Procedures for releasing funds (both by donors and recipient government) often require detailed and lengthy processes of appraisal and approval
Interventions		
Type	Usually standardized, single tracked activity	Multidimensional, varied activities
Profile	High profile	Low profile
Winding up of donor support		
Process	Emphasis on rapid withdrawal of relief, often abrupt removal of donor supported structures and systems	Emphasis on handing over to local management and funding, leaving systems in place*
* Indicates characteristics which are most difficult to achieve in practice. Source: Buchanan-Smith, 1990		

Sen 1989: 113ff; von Braun *et al.* 1992; Templer and Payne 1994; Buchanan-Smith and Tlogelang). They work when there is sufficient pre-planning and administrative capacity, when they start early enough to employ people before they become too weak to work, if there is surplus labour, and when they run alongside schemes to help those who cannot work, particularly the elderly, the infirm and those with high demands on their time, for example women with very young children⁵.

- Using emergency relief to develop infrastructure that will be of value after the emergency has ended. This could happen, for example, if new health centres or water sources already identified as necessary in local or regional plans could be built under emergency programmes, which in effect accelerate development plans, as is the case in Botswana. The key is ensuring that the infrastructure can be sustained afterwards.

2.4 Rehabilitation

Much less attention has been paid to rehabilitation, both in the literature and in aid policy, than to other aspects of linking relief and development (see, however, Morgan 1986; Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Green 1992a and b; WFP 1992; Berke *et al.* 1993, and other references cited in Campbell 1994).

Rehabilitation needs are often very large, especially in the many emergencies caused by or associated with war. Green and Mavie, for example, provide a graphic account of the situation facing Mozambique in 1992: one and a half million war-related deaths since 1980, a cumulative loss of output of \$US 20 billion, the collapse of transport and social infrastructure, and over half the population forced out of production, mostly as refugees or displaced people. Added to these economic costs are the social and psychological costs described by Anderson and summarized in Walker. Mozambique is certainly not alone in facing these problems: Eritrea is cited by Askwith; Angola, Bosnia and, of course, Rwanda, all face similar problems.

The articles in this **Bulletin** suggest that rehabilitation can offer more than a return to the status quo, particularly where the emergency itself induced positive change: a much-cited example is the improved status of women following the war in

Eritrea (ACORD n/d; Seaman). Green and Mavie note that, in the case of returnees after war, the reconstruction phase offers considerable scope for poverty reduction and for overall output gains, to the extent that it should be integral to national macroeconomic policy and planning. Similarly, Eele and Luhila demonstrate that the 1992 relief programme in Zambia provided a template for the development of a permanent social security system.

Green and Mavie offer a programme check-list for rehabilitation, especially relevant to recovery after war. The list includes transport home, food until harvest, agricultural inputs, user rights over land, restoration of physical and social infrastructure, short term employment and the restoration of market access. In war zones, the interventions include mine-clearing. Outside Mozambique, examples of similar programmes are provided by Herbinger, Walker and Askwith.

At the same time, the needs of people whose livelihoods have been devastated by drought or war are often barely distinguishable from the needs of those living in absolute poverty and facing a 'permanent emergency' (Duffield). Hence, there is overlap between the interventions, and it is frequently the case that NGOs and others are engaged simultaneously in relief, rehabilitation and development activities (Walker). One important difference may have to do with the terms on which assistance is provided. Thus, during an officially-designated rehabilitation period, pastoralists may be restocked free of charge or free tools may be provided to agriculturalists. Green and Mavie point out that there is a normative case for subsidies of this kind, but also that cost recovery is a practical impossibility during post-war rehabilitation.

Successful rehabilitation programmes depend upon incorporating some of the same development principles mentioned above for relief: working with and through local institutions; consultation with local people about their perceptions and needs; and where possible, linking rehabilitation work with existing and related programmes and projects. However, the articles in the **Bulletin** make it clear that successful rehabilitation is still more of a hope than a reality. Green and Mavie speak of results that are 'distressingly modest'.

⁵ Cases discussed in the **Bulletin** include Botswana (Buchanan-Smith and Mooka), Zambia (Eele and Luhila), Ethiopia (Maxwell and Lireno) and others cited by WFP (Herbinger).

3 ISSUES IN LINKING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT

Many analytical issues cut across the programmatic interventions discussed in the previous section. Some are uncontroversial, though no less important for that: putting livelihood security at the centre of analysis; the need for pre-planning; institutional strengthening and reform. Other issues are more contentious.

3.1 'Horses for courses'

The first issue is about the feasibility of different actions to deal with different kinds of disaster in different countries or regions: the question of 'horses for courses'.

To take country classifications first, Benson and Clay distinguish between simple, intermediate, complex and dualistic economies. Figure 3 takes a broader perspective to explore the differences between different national or sub-national situations in Africa, on five axes: the main character of food security; the extent of liberalization; the commitment to poverty reduction and food security; state capacity; and political stability. Many permutations and combinations are possible, but the Figure identifies seven basic country types, ranging from Somalia in 1992 at one extreme, being a case of extreme state failure and war, to Zimbabwe at the other, being a stable state, at peace, with a strong commitment to poverty reduction.

The scope for interventions which link relief and development obviously varies from one country or region type to another and it is dangerous to generalize across them⁶. Where state capacity is weak and commitment to poverty reduction low (in the absence of war), the range of strategies for linking relief and development is likely to be limited to those of NGOs. As state capacity strengthens, however, government programmes become feasible. Whether they are implemented or not depends partly upon whether a commitment to poverty reduction can be sustained. Similarly, the scope for linking relief and development will depend on the main character of food insecurity: it may be a lower priority (but paradoxically easier to achieve) where the prevalence of food insecurity is low and shocks infrequent.

What needs to be done in each situation will depend on the type of emergency. An accepted classification of emergencies by WFP has been to distinguish sud-

den natural calamities, man-made disasters, and slowly-maturing crises of food availability caused by crop failure or drought (see also Hay 1986). This classification appears to leave out the 'extended', 'continuing' or 'permanent' emergency (Clay and Singer 1985: 58ff), which is really an extension of the slowly-maturing crisis, but should be seen as 'a symptom of wider agricultural and food sector problems that require broad, radical food policy measures' (Clay and Singer *ibid.*). It also understates the complexity of man-made disasters, which are usually associated with protracted political crises, and, as Duffield points out, 'have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies'.

Merging these ideas into the original list gives four different emergency types:

- i Rapid onset emergencies, triggered by natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods. The crisis is usually temporary.
- ii Slow onset emergencies, triggered by natural disasters, such as drought and pest attacks. Compared with (i) above, the emergency develops more slowly, for example as a result of crop failure or livestock losses, and has a limited life-span. Drought emergencies in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe fall into this category. This kind has been most extensively studied and is best understood.
- iii 'Permanent emergencies', where there is a very large problem of structural poverty and a need for more or less permanent welfare. Natural disasters like drought may of course exacerbate this kind of 'permanent crisis'. Many parts of Ethiopia fall into this category, as well as parts of Northern Sudan. Food relief is now provided on a more or less constant basis.
- iv Complex political emergencies associated with internal war, such as southern Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. Mozambique and Ethiopia are emerging from this kind of emergency.

For the drought-related, slow-onset emergencies, the issues in linking relief and development are most straightforward, albeit hard to put into practice. It is essentially a question of 'better' development, more sensitive to shocks, and 'better' relief, more

⁶ On this topic, see also Frankenberger and Shaw (1993: 3).

Figure 3: Classification of food security country – or region – types in SSA

Characteristic	Country or region type						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
1. Main character of food insecurity	Somalia 1992 South Sudan	Ethiopia pre 1989 North Sudan pre 1989	North Sudan post 1990 Ethiopia 1989-91	Mali 1980s	Ethiopia post 1991 Eritrea	Kenya Malawi Zambia	Zimbabwe Botswana
	Very high chronic and transitory, generalised	Very high chronic and transitory, regionally concentrated	Very high chronic and transitory, regionally concentrated	Transitory plus chronic, regionally concentrated	Very high chronic and transitory, regionally concentrated	Transitory plus chronic, regionally concentrated	Transitory plus chronic, regionally concentrated
2. Policy stance	–	Interventionist	Liberalizing	Liberalizing	Liberalizing	Liberalizing	Liberalizing
3. Poverty/food security orientation	–	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	Medium to high
4. State capacity	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium-High	High
5. Political stability	War-affected	War-affected	War-affected	Not War-affected, but unstable	Not War-affected, reasonably stable	Medium-High	High
Source: Maxwell							

developmentally oriented, as described in the above two sections. In the third category of the 'permanent emergency', relief is usually driving the agenda. The dilemma is whether to recognize explicitly the need for some kind of permanent welfare system (where funding may be a problem), or to carry on in relief mode, trying to fulfil certain development objectives at the same time. The fourth category of war-related emergencies opens up a very different set of issues, which are touched upon in (e) below.

In all these cases, the first priority in discussing relief-development linkages must be to assure basic relief, so that human life is protected (Maxwell and Lirenso). This must take precedence over any sophisticated attempt to use relief for development purposes; and also over development expenditures, even those designed to reduce vulnerability.

3.2 Institutions, politics and planning

A recurrent theme of articles in this *Bulletin*, especially of the case studies, is that the scope for linking relief and rehabilitation is limited by institutional problems. Some of these are common to the country- and disaster- types identified. Others are more specific. War presents special problems (see (3.5) below). Davies makes the important point that the litany of complaints is largely familiar from other fields and can best be understood, if not resolved, by reference to the wider debate on institutional reform. She builds particularly on the discussion about 'good government', new forms of public administration and decentralization.

External problems created by aid policy loom large in the discussion: efforts to link relief and development are impeded by donor policies or regulations which maintain a rigid separation between the two (Seaman); the use of emergency funds is unnecessarily restricted (Herbinger); or unacceptable lags take place in the delivery of aid (Green and Mavie). Over centralization remains a problem, also: for example, Mugwara finds that the regional response to the 1992 drought in Southern Africa, coordinated by SADC, was handicapped by the failure to delegate sufficient authority from Rome to SADC headquarters in Harare.

In addition, there is now greater political conditionality applied to aid - for example, related to good governance and to human rights records, which reinforces the sharp distinction between relief and development aid assistance. Thus, there is little

prospect of linking relief and development in countries such as Sudan, where the development aid budget has been slashed, because the country does not comply with political criteria for aid, and it is only eligible for humanitarian assistance.

Stagnating or declining aid budgets also mean that the emergency portion, which is getting larger, takes on greater significance as the most visible and politically sensitive part of the aid budget (at least with western electorates). A number of donors are currently working towards increasing their profile in emergency work, for example the European Union and ODA. This may weaken the incentive to blur the distinction between relief and development activities.

Finally, relief aid is 'easy' money, development aid is not: this reinforces the tendency to dress up interventions as being pure relief, rather than dressing them down as appropriate to longer term development as well. Aid money for rehabilitation and recovery is often hardest of all to access, despite the fact that this may ease the transition from relief to development. In countries no longer eligible for development aid, doing any rehabilitation work at all becomes almost impossible.

Although the donors are working towards linking relief and development - Holden, for example, reports on changes at UK ODA, and Askwith on attempts to improve UN coordination - progress is slow, and the motivation for forging links between relief and development must be strong enough to overcome the constraints described above.

Within affected countries, institutional problems largely reflect state capacity. Some countries handle emergencies with little outside support and are successful at linking relief and development institutions: India (Seaman) and Botswana (Buchanan-Smith and Tlogelang) are cases in point. Others lack strategic capacity and find themselves decapacitated by large, autonomous, externally-funded relief operations: Mozambique (Green and Mavie), and Ethiopia (Maxwell and Lirenso) exhibit this problem. In this second category, budget constraints feature frequently in the list of institutional constraints.

Even where institutional capacity is adequate, there are limits to the scope for linking relief and development. Herbinger cites the case of food for work in Lesotho, which was expanded by a factor of three in

1992/93, in order to help meet relief needs: even so, it was able to assist only 15 per cent of the population eligible for relief food.

A further set of problems arises because linking relief and development inevitably involves trade-offs where choices have to be made. Some of these cause political disputes within donor agencies (Duffield, Davies); others within countries, for example between residents of high- and low-potential areas (Maxwell and Lirens). In Botswana it has been politically expedient to use relief to alleviate poverty, on a quasi-permanent basis, thus avoiding difficult long term policy decisions (Buchanan-Smith and Tlogelang). The political problems can be expected to be more severe where there is no public commitment to food security or poverty reduction.

Finally, linking relief and development seems always to be constrained by the different organizational cultures which beset relief and development organizations, summarized in Figure 2, with vested interests in perpetuating the divide.

The wider literature on which Davies draws does not promise answers to all these problems. However, she finds helpful pointers to support civil society institutions, greater public accountability, better strategic planning, and, especially, greater decentralization. She identifies the greatest potential for effective linking of relief and development at the Regional or District ('meso') level and explores the potential of greater subsidiarity.

These ideas are echoed in other articles. Maxwell and Lirens, for example, identify four principles to govern the pace and sequencing of efforts to link relief and development in Ethiopia, including decentralized processes and a diversity of approaches. Green and Mavie introduce the idea of 'iterative flexibility' in implementation, an approach certainly consistent with new approaches to process planning in public administration.

Indeed, it would be wrong to allow linking relief and development to become associated with top-down, over-centralized, data hungry and time-consuming planning. Similar initiatives were taken with multi-sectoral nutrition planning in the 1970s (Field 1987) and with food security planning in the 1980s (Maxwell 1990). In both cases, central units began to take on some of

the characteristics of 'super-ministries', making many enemies in government departments in the process.

The lessons of the nutrition planning and food security experiences have been summarized as follows:

Integrated planning but independent implementation ('no super-ministries'); the importance of a bias to action over planning ('start small and grow'); the value of risk-taking and innovation ('pilot projects'); and the importance of addressing explicitly the need for new modes of organization in multi-disciplinary team work ('task cultures not role cultures').

Maxwell 1990: 6

The new planning models implicit in the quotation above suggest an alternative role for government departments (and aid agencies) concerned with linking relief and development, as planners, facilitators and mobilizers, rather than as decision-makers and resource controllers. The Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is one organization moving in this direction (Maxwell and Lirens).

3.3 State versus civil society

An issue which follows from the institutional question is about the balance of activity between regional organizations, government, NGOs and local communities themselves, again in different kinds of country. The main topic addressed in the articles is the role of NGOs. In some countries (Zambia), an expanded role for NGOs is seen as positive; in others (Mozambique, Ethiopia), doubts are expressed about their continuing dominance.

The cases are very different. In Zambia, already weak state capacity had been undermined by political influence during the First and Second Republics, so that strengthening alternative channels was a valid strategy: the Programme for the Prevention of Malnutrition was set up as a partnership between government, donors and NGOs, and eventually spawned a new, non-governmental institution to continue its work, the Programme Against Malnutrition. In Ethiopia, by contrast, NGOs had been the channel for over 80 per cent of relief during emergencies in the 1980s, reflecting donor distrust of the Mengistu regime. New aid relationships following the change of government in 1991 required a better balance and a stronger co-ordinating

role for Government. A principle suggested by these cases is that a balance is needed between state and civil society, though an alternative principle gives pride of place to NGOs, arguing that 'the state should do what others cannot' (Ross *et al.* 1994:12).

Referring more generally to community organizations as well as NGOs, Davies argues that, in the semi-arid countries of the Sahel, represented in categories III and IV in Figure 3, non-state capacity for dealing with drought is usually well-developed, whilst state capacity is often weak. She argues that the priority should then be to strengthen civil society further, a kind of comparative advantage principle applied to institutions. There must be limits to this policy, however, as the Mozambique and Ethiopia cases illustrate.

3.4 Costs and trade-offs

Linking relief and development is often presented as a list of uncosted 'good ideas', with no discussion of possible trade-offs. The costs will be financial and administrative: the opportunity cost of staff time may be particularly high.

For example:

- investment to stabilize agricultural output may be at the expense of faster growth;
- investment in low potential areas may have a lower social rate of return than investment in high potential areas (but may not, of course, especially when the cost of relief is taken into account);
- employment-based safety nets are more expensive to implement than free food distributions, and require substantial skills to plan and prepare;
- holding a foreign exchange reserve, indeed any insurance policy, whether at macro or micro level, has an opportunity cost in terms of consumption or investment foregone;
- if relief operations are planned to incorporate development principles, this may delay implementation;
- if existing development institutions are used to implement relief programmes, they may become overloaded and their ongoing development work will suffer.

The costs and benefits of linking relief and development remain surprisingly little explored. Maxwell and Lirenso examine two examples, the redirection of resources to resource-poor areas and the cost: benefit of employment-based safety nets. On the first, they observe that the return on investment in low potential areas ought, by definition, to be lower than in high potential areas; but that a shift in priorities may be justified if shocks are frequent and the costs of relief high. On plausible assumptions for Ethiopia, relief costs are not high enough to switch the rate of return ranking, which suggests a bias against low potential areas. However, there are other factors to consider, including issues of inter-regional equity and the possibility of finding high return 'niche' investments in low potential regions.

As far as employment-based safety nets are concerned, the costs over and above relief include tools, supervision and the cost of additional calories consumed in manual labour: these may add 50 per cent to the cost of pure relief. At the same time, productivity on relief works is normally lower than on standard public works. Experience from Botswana shows how relief and development objectives can conflict. No calculations are available to test whether relief works have a positive benefit: cost ratio, though the presumption is that they are cost-effective.

3.5 Complex political emergencies, accompanied by war

The ordered discussion about costs, sequencing and institutional aspects of linking relief and development tends to fall away in war situations, the complex political emergencies identified above. This is extremely important because of the rapid growth in the number and severity of such emergencies, already reported, and their share in total development spending. Duffield goes as far as to argue that the permanent emergency is the characteristic feature of marginalized areas in the post-cold war world order, a view to which recent events in Rwanda might lend some support, although Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique provide counter-examples. Whatever the truth of Duffield's proposition, Herlinger is not alone in suggesting that 'in man-made disasters, prevention and preparedness measures are most difficult and complex, and rehabilitation leading to development often more protracted'.

Duffield makes the important point that the prevalence of war has brought significant changes to the nature of the international relief system. He traces the rise of 'military humanitarianism' following the Gulf War and the evolution of negotiated access by the UN in conflict zones. He argues that 'humanitarian assistance has become closely integrated with the dynamics of violence ... in many complex emergencies, the infrastructure now exists for aid to ebb and flow with the level of violence'. In these circumstances, he believes, attempts to link relief and development have an air of unreality.

Other articles are more sanguine about the prospect for linking relief and development in complex political emergencies. The earlier discussion provides pointers to principles that can be followed even in war zones, especially to do with building on local capacity. For example, relief is usually restricted to the 'five essentials' - health, nutrition, shelter, physical protection and water/sanitation. Recent experience shows, however, that a broader approach is possible, including building social institutions and legitimate political formations, and working to support psychological health and demilitarization (Walker, Seaman). The decision of SCF in Somalia to work with local doctors and nurses rather than importing autonomous medical units is a good example of an alternative approach (Seaman).

Similarly, rehabilitation efforts often build on long term work with refugees during complex emergencies, particularly in health and education (World Bank/WFP 1991:17ff and Herbinger). The current interest in rehabilitation bears witness to the potential for linking relief and development in complex emergencies, even after refugees begin to return home.

It would be unwise to minimize the difficulties which surround attempts to link relief and

development in complex emergencies. Nevertheless, the articles here do provide some grounds for optimism.

4 CONCLUSION

Linking relief and development seemed at the outset to be an attractive, even a necessary idea. A more detailed look at the issues suggests that there are circumstances where an explicit attempt to link relief and development is not appropriate, that the question of cost-effectiveness needs more attention, and that linking relief and development is certainly more difficult in war zones than elsewhere. Nevertheless, the articles in the **Bulletin** broadly endorse the concept and contribute many practical suggestions on what might be done.

They also help to explain why progress has been slow: there are definitional and conceptual problems, but the main constraints are institutional and political. They are rooted in the cultures, policies and practices of donors, in the capacity constraints of recipients and in the politics of moving poverty reduction higher up the policy agenda, as well as the politics of blurring the distinction between emergency and development aid. These are not all immovable: the precise way forward is highly situation-specific, but there appears to be genuine room for manoeuvre for donors, NGOs and governments wishing to build stronger links between relief and development.

The issues raised certainly require more research: on institutional issues, calculations of costs and benefits and more work on conflict and post-conflict situations (Ross *et al.* 1994: 14). However, the greatest immediate need is for experimentation and careful monitoring, to expand knowledge on what works, when, where and why⁷.

⁷ We are indebted to Professor Reg Green for emphasizing this point.

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