1 The Politically Engaged Society

Gordon White's greatest contribution to the study of China was his analysis of the politically engaged society.1 Beneath the surfaces of Maoist-era totalitarian authoritarianism punctuated by serious bouts of genuine popular revolutionary mobilisation, and of Dengist-era repression and market-driven demobilisation, Gordon was consistent in unearthing and exposing to our view real political bargaining, strategising, posturing and, ultimately, influence by a breathtaking range of social classes and groups engaging with the state. The content of these politics changed a great deal over time, as the parameters that the economy, and particularly the state, set for society changed radically. But the genuineness of these politics was there consistently, and they inevitably continue. Gordon illuminated them for the first half-century of the People’s Republic of China, showing how teachers, workers, farmers, bureaucrats, scientists, bankers, and ordinary citizens caught in the complex matrix of class-based Cultural Revolution politics, all became involved in politics to advance their material, professional, sectoral and ideological interests. In doing so, he also showed us how to continue to analyse politics for the coming decades. Finally, in discovering that the Chinese people engaged in normal politics even in abnormal and inhospitable times, he demonstrated the profoundest respect for them.

Gordon was not alone among political scientists in ‘bringing society back in’ to the study of Chinese politics. Many of his generation reacted to the field’s overwhelming focus on elites, which flowed from the concatenation of the Cold War, the traditions of Sinology, and the fact that starting in 1949 China did, after all, develop a state with a great deal of capacity over and autonomy from society – one in which political elites arrogated a great deal of power to themselves, even if some of them used it radically to challenge the new state that they themselves had created. In the 1970s, the field quickly downshifted to studies of grassroots politics. Some of the new work conceived of state and society in terms analogous to a happy marriage blessed by the mass line. Others saw an oppressive and even violent bond, like that between domineering father

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1 Thanks to all the conference participants for the stimulation they provided, and to Bob Benewick, Paul Bowles and Barbara Harriss-White for comments that helped improve an earlier draft.
...and child or abusive husband and wife. Still others made out the clever, heroic struggles of the underlings to protect themselves or, better yet, to strike back and even to overthrow their oppressors and create a new world in which oppression would be banished. In contrast to all this Sturm und Drang, Gordon discovered a relationship between state and society that was much more businesslike and normal – no small feat in the study of a country that had been anything but that. In seeing even in revolutionary socialist China a state and society that engaged each other politically through ongoing negotiations, signals, threats, and offers, in which each side developed and used a rich panoply of strategies and tactics to advance its positions, in the end Gordon developed an astute appreciation of China's polity, society, and, ultimately, its economy as well. His was appreciation not only in the analytical sense of apprehension, but in the normative sense of approbation. Where others of his generation of critical scholars evinced their awe for China by focusing on the struggles of its people – whether through their new state or against it – to realise noble values of equality, democracy and socialism, Gordon showed China genuine respect by treating it more as an equal, as a country whose state and society engaged in ordinary politics.

Awe implies greater distance between subject and object than does respect. The difference is one key to Gordon's extraordinary perspicacity about China. For while many scholars of his generation focused on the overt and seductive revolutionary machinations that were, after all, right before our eyes (even if we could only glimpse them from our then-remote outposts), Gordon chose the far more arduous path of unearthing the normal, workaday politics that were so hard to see through all the thrilling, if often bizarre, radicalism. Where the work many of us did took us down a road that now appears to have been an exciting but ultimately sobering, even depressing, dead end, Gordon's lifelong work illuminated the path that China is still traversing – the unavoidable political engagement of classes and groups with their state. Analytically, his achievement was more awesome precisely because he never regarded China with awe.

For example, his first scholarly monograph focused on the bitter struggles over the definition of class, on which lives literally hung in the balance – for to be on the wrong side of the class struggle often meant ruination, if not death. Amid the maelstrom, though, Gordon somehow found that 'the continuing ambiguity over "class" reflects the political compromise arising from the Cultural Revolution' (White 1976:64). Where many other radical scholars looked to the Cultural Revolution debates over class for inspiration about ways to adapt Marxist categories in order to address the bureaucratism and elitism of 'actually existing socialism' so that its liberatory potential could finally be realised, Gordon spoke in a rather different analytical lexicon:

This study intends to go beyond the analysis of theoretical innovation by relating changes in the ideological definition of 'class' to practical policy issues and to the nature of socio-political interests at various levels of the Chinese political process. (White 1976:1)

Likewise, in his third monograph, on the teaching profession, Gordon found not just schoolmarm but politically savvy citizens. At crucial moments they made truly symbiotic alliances with potentially sympathetic leaders like Deng Xiaoping, in which they not only benefited themselves or influenced educational policy, but also helped swing the national political balance.

Although much of the fluctuation in official educational policies over the past two decades can be attributed to competing tendencies within the CCP leadership, it was also in no small part subject to the political influence – negative and positive – of teachers. Teachers have not been an inert social force subject to unrestrained political manipulation. They have provided one weight in the political balance which has, over the long run, swung power away from the radicals...
toward the modernisers ... They are one part of a 'grand coalition' of social forces which supported the removal of the Shanghai group in 1976 and underpins the strategy of the post-Mao leadership. (White 1981:89–90)

Moreover, teachers' political tactics shifted smartly with the times. In radical periods, they exerted 'negative' power through 'passivity and silent opposition' that frustrated the intentions and reduced the impact of official educational policies. During modernizing periods, on the other hand, teachers have been allowed to exert positive power over issues of educational policy and professional status. In periods when they did so effectively, their relationship with the Party has been a form of 'interest group politics'. (White 1981:86; emphasis in original)

Gordon's greatest scholarly achievement lies in the fact that the politically engaged society proved to be a durable theme in Chinese politics, traversing both the Maoist and Dengist periods despite their vast differences. Gordon was better prepared than most of us to analyse the political bargaining, conflict and compromise among social classes and groups, and between them and the state, that became apparent in the Dengist period, precisely because he had developed his tools in the Maoist period, when they were harder to use. His focus on the politically engaged society continued in the work on basic-level government, banking, and, of course, reform in general, where it infused the overall conception as well as every chapter of Riding the Tiger (White 1993). In one more late example, Gordon found that pension reform involved debate among institutional actors but also social groups, including people from various regions, state- vs. collective-sector workers, the 'public sector as a whole and the rest of the formal sector', and 'employees in the formal sector, particularly in state enterprises, and those who have been cast adrift from it' (White 1998:183–4). His focus on the politically engaged society reached its climax in In Search of Civil Society (White et al. 1996) of course. The book's penultimate sentence formed the coda: 'the organised forces of emergent civil society could be the architects of the new post-Communist China.' Ever tempering what Gramsci called optimism of the will with pessimism of the intellect, the book ends: 'However, given their current diversity and potential for conflict, the transition to a new political order is likely to be a rough and rocky one.' (White et al. 1996:218). In these last two sentences of Gordon's last book on China, we see his scholarly honesty ultimately tempering, though never triumphing over, his visions and hopes for China's politically-engaged society.

If this society was at the core of his analysis of political and economic change, he always situated it in a complex matrix of historical, cultural, ideological, institutional, and economic forces. He was a serious enough scholar of history in general, and of the history and culture of China in particular, to be careful to position his grasp of society in these terms. But his commitment to social science and to purposive social change driven by human commitment and will always drove him to see history and culture as malleable. To put it in terms of his modernism, he saw them as obstacles to be overcome.

He was less taken with cultural explanation. It never figured significantly, even as an object of criticism, in his work on China. But in the end, writing with Roger Goodman, Gordon explicitly rejected cultural explanations of East Asian welfare as bad social science – in the sense that they operate only tautologically, analogically, ahistorically, and with only residual explanatory power at best.

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5 He came to China studies with his Oxford Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Classical Mods and Greats and a Master's degree in Mycenaean Archaeology from Cornell. Dorothy Solinger, a fellow graduate student of Chinese politics at Stanford, related a telling anecdote. In 1968 Gordon encouraged her to attend a lecture on medieval Chinese history, far removed though it was from their shared modern concerns about China. 'You have to immerse yourself in it,' he urged (personal communication, 5 April 1998.) It is no accident that he was one of the very few students of modern Chinese politics who referred to the field as 'Sinology'.

6 Though Gordon was a person with strongly critical views, in his published work he hewed to a positive approach, out of a conviction that the best way to argue against his foes was to outdo them rather than attack them. That in turn sprang from his modernist impatience to advance scholarship rather than dwell on its existing fallacies, as well as his sheer humanity and gentlemanliness.
(White and Goodman 1998:15). At the end of his own substantive contribution to the book, he concluded a section on the distinctiveness of China's social security reforms by giving in to rhetorical temptation:

In contrast to these 'culturalist' approaches [to explaining that distinctiveness], which contain more than a modicum of ideological flannel, this chapter has emphasised the over-determining role of historical, structural and political factors in shaping the trajectory of Chinese welfare reform. (White 1998:194)

This passage, with its rare evocation of Althusserian conceptualisation, also reminds us that Gordon, a committed modernist scholar and engaged citizen, also rejected post-structuralist culturalism.

Gordon was much more focused on the ways in which politically engaged society was situated by the economy. Political actors' economic resources feature prominently in his work. He took a broad view of what constituted such resources, including in them anything of value in the political arena. By treating the market as an institution, Gordon took an equally complex view of the ways in which such resources were constituted, organised, and exchanged. Finally, he was able to discern the importance of economic resources in society's negotiations with the state, even in situations in which state institutions and policies obscured them. For example, he showed how, even amidst the Maoist-era hostility to markets and skills, teachers were able to trade on their valuable knowledge and their location at one of the linchpins of social and economic reproduction (White 1981:84-6).

Yet for Gordon, economic factors, even when broadly and institutionally conceived in terms such as the mode of production, were never enough by themselves to explain very much. Society's engagement with the state was too rich to be reducible to the pursuit of material gain. The teachers he studied may have engaged in 'interest group politics', but they were no mere interest group. They were also, as his title features them, trained experts with specific ideological, existential and professional interests. From a structural point of view on the economy, a concept like 'capitalism' was also too simplistic. China had taught Gordon that modes of production like socialism and capitalism are protean (e.g., his neologism 'social capitalism' (White 1987) as well as his frequent disquisitions on market socialism). The reason is obvious from this example: economic forms are fundamentally situated socially and, especially, politically.

Indeed, for Gordon – as a political scientist and an intensely political person – society in the broadest sense was situated mainly by the state and politics. When he sketched his analytical models, the political usually came first. In setting out his chapter on social security reform:

I shall be using a political economy approach which analyses the policy process in terms of a dual interplay: first, among various politically influential forces and interests and, second, between these and certain basic economic, social and demographic constraints and pressures. (White 1998:176)

Or, in the work on civil society:

One can identify a dual dynamic in the emergence of civil society. The first is a political dynamic which reflects the impact of totalistic political institutions on a society and the political tensions and conflicts to which this gives rise ... The second dynamic of 'civil society' is a market dynamic, analogous to the 'Great Transformation' wrought by the spread of market relations in Western societies. In this context, civil society is a consequence of a separation between state and society resulting from the rise of a market economy and the concomitant redistribution of social power away from the state to new strata which are thereby empowered to rein in and restructure the state.' (White et al. 1996:7)

Thus, even this second(ary?) 'market dynamic' turns out to be thoroughly political and sociological. This brings us to Gordon's contribution to understanding the Chinese state.

7 Gordon's choice of profession was driven by his commitments, not the other way around. He was never loyal to political science for its own sake. Yet, his political commitments never clouded his scholarship; indeed, they only enlivened it.
2 The State

At one level Gordon treated the state as something of a ‘given’ – an explicans rather than an explicandum. State formation was one of those grand historical questions that did not suit itself terribly well to his middle-range analytical concerns. A primarily institutionalist focus on the ways that specific features of state organisation per se shaped society’s political engagement was too narrow for him.* The machinations of elite politics were best left to Pekingologists and journalists, who could not really understand them because they could not situate them in their wider contexts. For all these reasons, Gordon did not focus on the state itself (i.e., by itself). It figured in his work mainly (though, as we shall see, not only) as a powerful structural force that necessarily shapes China’s politically engaged society.

The process by which it did so was dynamic, usually divided, and itself political. For example, in his early work on the politics of class in the Cultural Revolution, the story began in the 1950s, when the state shaped the lives and, therefore, the interests of a huge proportion of society through its politicised policies on the distribution of economic resources, social power and political position. When serious conflict between the top elites and their respective supporters broke out, these state-created ‘classes’ joined in a pointed debate over the normative definitions of class (White 1976). In another example, developmental phases of the Maoist period afforded teachers greater latitude to practice their profession and pursue their interests compared with radical periods (White 1981: ch. 5). In yet another arena, Gordon, writing with Jude Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan, adumbrated four modalities – political, managerial, developmental, and bureaucratic – by which the state situated the organisation of civil society. Because they are uncoordinated, they set up a complex and fragmented nascent pluralist pattern of social engagement with the state.

But if in general Gordon took the state as a ‘given’ – an institutional and political matrix within which the politically engaged society was situated and by which it and its politics were shaped – he also regarded the state as neither static nor unassailable. He thought that social classes and groups engaged in the kinds of politics he studied in order to advance their interests, not to reshape the state. He was not particularly interested in direct assaults on the state, for example in China’s revolutionary politics during the Maoist period, or in dissident politics in the Dengist years. But he was also acutely aware of the ways in which society’s political engagement could bring about profound political change over a long period of time and in ways that it might not have intended. Riding the Tiger concluded with a trenchant disquisition on China’s alternative political futures. By and large it fit the pattern of his work: the state’s strategic postures and decisions will set parameters that will shape society’s political engagement with the state.

Even In Search of Civil Society, with its focus on the politics of society, began with the state setting the parameters for society’s political engagement.

In the Soviet case, for example, a democratic transition was sponsored and organised by reformist elements within the existing political elite, in a situation in which civil society in any organised form was virtually non-existent. In South Korea, the state elites of the ancien régime retained a commanding position in the transition, but were forced to deal with an increasingly assertive business elite in the chaebol sector and with opposition politicians bolstered by widespread mobilisation of public support by social organisations such as labour unions and church groups. In Zambia, by contrast, the previous one-party system was collapsing, and it was the elites of civil society – from the unions, church groups, and business – who sponsored and commanded the transition to democracy. In terms of the balance between state and civil society, China may perhaps be situated somewhere between the Soviet Union and South Korea: the key elites of the Leninist régime – in the Party, decentralisation of China’s state institutions itself promoted reform. By contrast, Gordon offers a more comprehensive, complex explanation that includes politics within the state but also between state and society.

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* The best illustration of this particular ‘road not taken’ is the contrast between his Riding the Tiger (White 1993) and Susan Shirk’s The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (1993), two major statements on the politics of reform that appeared in the same year. Shirk offers a tightly focused, nuanced study of how the
the state bureaucracy, and the military – are still the overwhelmingly dominant political force, but the new social groups and organisations resulting from the economic reforms are creating an increasingly influential counter-force ...

The viability of this scenario of bargained or crafted transition depends partly on the emergence of a reformist leadership within the CCP ... It also depends on the ability of influential social forces ... to come together and agree on the form of new political arrangements. By so doing, the organisations of civil society and their leaders can play a crucial constitutive role not only in impelling and organizing the transition to a democratic polity, but also in defining its distinctive institutional shape and political character. (White et al. 1996:217-18)

In each case, the extent and form of civil society's emergence is a function of state action. In turn, the emergent civil society engages with the state in specific ways. Finally, that pattern of engagement can reshape the state itself.

In considering the reshaping of the state, Gordon did not shy away from predictive and even normative argument. He specified the conditions under which society's political engagement would be salutary or detrimental for the future of the state. For example:

There may be a form of Chinese 'Brezhnevism' to see out the millennium as the current leadership tries to stay in power. If this is indeed the case, then the political contradictions and trends which I have identified will intensify and make it more likely that the transition, when it comes, will be sudden, radical and possibly violent. (White 1993:255)

Alternatively, were the state to take the constitutional and institutional steps to open space for civil society, by undertaking legal reforms, redefining the role of the Party, and enlivening and granting some autonomy to existing state corporatist institutions, the result would be 'social democratisation' pursued under a 'grand accommodation' between the state and a more politically engaged society, in turn increasing the chances of a smooth transition (White 1993:252–3).

Gordon cared deeply about the state because he thought it had specific, inescapable social roles that are also political and moral responsibilities. A committed democratic socialist immersed in the study of state socialism, he had a profound grasp of the role of the state in economic development and in socio-economic distribution. He pioneered work on the developmental state, never forgetting the achievements of import-substitution in China and other state socialist countries during their early phases of industrialisation, even as he was recognizing that such policies, and the régimes that instituted them, had outlived their usefulness. In article after article, he wrote of the egalitarian effects of the market, even as he welcomed its role in improving allocative rationality and economic growth, and in opening political and social space. He noticed approvingly that in East Asia, where society was not in a position to impel the creation of welfare systems, they were nonetheless created by states (Goodman and White 1998:15). He wanted the state with which society was engaged to be a strong state.

Even if the market becomes predominant through radical reform and even if it takes a capitalist form, which is very probable, there is a continuing need for a new form of developmental state to tackle ... social and economic problems [such as market failure and its consequences for the poor]. In the short term, moreover, the role of the state is even more crucial because of the need to break through the 'hard policy constraint' and manage the transition from a planned to a market economy. This is a process ... which is fraught with instability and tensions arising from the opposition of vested interests, threats to economic security, inflation and growing inequality. A strong state is needed to provide the political order and direction necessary to underpin this transition and regulate an emergent market economy in a huge and increasingly complex country. (White 1993:238-9)

To be both effective and democratic (or at least not excessively authoritarian), this state would, despite its strength, require support from society, which it would do well to cultivate. For example, Gordon showed us how Deng Xiaoping sought the support of teachers for the reconstruction of the state in the
late 1970s (White 1981:89). He laid out the ways in which, during the Cultural Revolution, rival élites advanced different postures on class and class conflict in order to cultivate popular constituencies for their political programmes. He understood acutely that the Chinese state pursued welfare as a 'political strategy of accommodation with key groups', to win their support or at least acquiescence, and even thereby to stave off democratisation (White 1998:178).

Gordon was, of course, no fan of political authoritarianism. He decried as much as anyone the Draconian restrictions that the Maoist and Dengist states placed on citizens. Yet he never associated himself with dissidents, politicians, pundits and political scientists who campaigned for democracy and political freedom in China. One reason is that, where their concern was usually focused on enhancing individual rights, Gordon's was with the development of space for society to engage itself as fully and effectively as possible with the state. Since he had demonstrated that it was already able to do so under the People's Republic of China, he argued that it was not necessary to tear down the state in order to democratise it. Instead, the envelope could be pushed open; the parameters by which the state constrained (but never eradicated) social politics could be relaxed. A second reason that he drew up well short of calling for the end of the People's Republic of China was his surmise that - at least for the foreseeable future - the alternative could be worse. He was deeply concerned that the sudden collapse of the state could have disastrous effects on economic development, distribution, rationalisation of the market, and social order. The problems of post-Soviet society, which had not yet emerged at the time that he was finishing Riding the Tiger - the book in which he most pointedly explicated these concerns - demonstrate his perspicacity and prescience. So does the emergence in China of civil society-like forms in the 1990s, despite the fact that the decade began with a violent crackdown against protesters and several years of tight repression.

3 Policy

Gordon's concern with the necessary roles of a strong state led him, of course, to an interest in policy. A modernist, he wanted a better world here and now, and he saw good policy as a key tool to achieving it. Yet he never got involved in policy advising. This refusal had Sinological roots, since for so much of his life he studied a country to whom offering advice was out of the question. More important, though, were the intellectual roots. Gordon was profoundly cognizant of the complexity of the specific social, political, economic, cultural and historical settings and cross-pressures within which policy had to operate. Thus he was deeply suspicious - contemptuous, even - of the policy-wonk with the quick fix. Policy problems were always 'difficult,' their context 'complex', and their prospects of success 'ambiguous'. His hesitation also had political roots, first in his commitments to anti-imperialism and to self-determination, and second in his abiding appreciation of the capacity of the politically engaged society to work out (or at least work on) solutions for itself.

Yet he did hope to influence policy in more intellectually and politically honest ways: by providing cautionaries for policy-makers and consultants, and by writing for and working with social scientists in other countries, especially China. In one of his last published works, he clearly relished, in his sympathetically critical way, the lively colloquy he had had with Chinese welfare planners, and that they were having with various foreign models (Goodman and White 1998:188–93). His final projects were his most policy-relevant. Yet they were scholarly research, not policy studies or consultancies. Gordon had sufficient respect for Chinese policymakers, administrators, and citizens simply to put his scholarship before them and let them do what they would with it.

4 Comparison

Gordon White went further than any China specialist in placing China squarely in comparative contexts. In Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World, he led the way in getting not just China, but also Cuba, Mozambique, North Korea, Vietnam and Yemen, out of the 'communist' closet and into the mainstream of theory, analysis and debate over 'development'. For example:

Third World socialist countries face many of the same external constraints as their non-socialist counterparts: distorted post-colonial economies, a weak base of available resources, dependence
on a few commodities, chronic balance of payments deficits, etc. (White 1983:15–16)

His capacity to see through and beyond the conceptual juggernauts of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ sprang in part from the fact that he did not reify the mode of production or treat it as a deterministic explicans. Rather, in Gordon’s hands ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism’ were shorthand for complex, variegated, and often contradictory forms of organizing activities that all economies must undertake: ownership, allocation, management, planning and distribution. Thus, *Revolutionary Socialist Development* developed a conceptualisation of third world revolutionary state socialism, in China and elsewhere, that was distinct both from its Soviet and East European ancestors-cum-siblings, and also from its non-revolutionary ‘socialist’ associates such as Tanzania. Moreover, *Revolutionary Socialist Development* was able to show that third world revolutionary socialism tended (for it itself was a variegated category) to have some specific developmental advantages (such as the capacity to mobilise resources for rapid import-substitution industrialisation, control problematic international economic relations, and promote developmental and distributional balances) and disadvantages (such as long-term productivity and efficiency problems and prolonged political authoritarianism).

Likewise, he was the first China scholar to locate China within the paradigm of East Asian developmental states, a club that had previously been reserved for capitalist states. Comparativist development scholars – both in the mid-1980s, when this work began to see print, and certainly now – might regard this move as neither earthshattering nor, perhaps, particularly helpful, since in joining the club China was bringing not its eroding state socialism but its putative emerging capitalism, with which they were already familiar. But Gordon’s innovation was stunning from the point of view of China studies, which, even in its anti-Sinological, more social-science-oriented forms, was still focused on the country’s distinctiveness. Yet China studies gained enormously from Gordon’s bold stroke. The field had suddenly found itself forced by history to make its own structural adjustment from the theoretical and analytical worlds of totalitarianism, command central planning, and Maoist revolutionary politics to capitalism, the market, political economy, and a political hybrid of depoliticised Leninism and run-of-the-mill authoritarianism. Gordon lightened the load by providing invaluable and, by now, well-used tools such as the guided market, indirect planning, regulation in lieu of planning, the dynamics of transition from import-substitution to export-led growth, and the developmental state.

It is not surprising, then, that his work on welfare, too, brought China into the wider analyses of distinctively East Asian forms. It is for others to say how much his analysis of what was now, not China, but the Chinese case, has contributed to the understanding or even development of welfare systems in other countries. But the palpable effect on China is visible both from Gordon’s own work (White 1998:188–93) and from the activities of myriad scholars, agencies and government officials who are hard at work trying to improve life for China’s poor.

Gordon’s achievement in bringing China into the mainstream of comparative social science was also related to his views on politics and the state. His analyses of the politically engaged society and of the state were not distinctively Chinese (though he always applied them carefully, with ‘Chinese characteristics’ always in full view). Because, rather, social engagement in politics was distinctively human, it happened everywhere. Again, it is for others to say how much his work contributed to their grasp of politics in, say, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, or beyond. But the perspicacity with which Gordon White was able to strike an academically and politically honest balance on the question of China’s present political predicament and its proximate prospects⁹ is a testimony to his scholarly genius as well as his profound humanity.

⁹ For example, see the conclusions of White 1993 and White et al. 1996.
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