Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic

Niagalé Bagayoko
November 2010
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Summary

This paper analyses how the security sector reform (SSR) process in the Central African Republic has been defined and then implemented, putting emphasis on the interactions between national and international actors. Therefore, it advocates an approach which consists of expanding the agenda of the traditional multi-level governance approach and which seeks to seize both the top-down and the bottom-up dynamics of decision-making processes. The first objective is to capture the sets of factors and procedures which drive the reform process, and to map out the various levels of government at which decisions are made. Secondly – and more fundamentally – is to capture the intermingling of domestic and international decision-making processes which increasingly overlap and interfere with each other in Southern countries.

Keywords: security sector reform; Central African Republic; European Union; multi-level governance; policy networks; African military; security decision-making processes.

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Contents

1 Introduction

2 Theoretical background: expanding the multi-level governance approach beyond the analysis of the EU
2.1 Dispersed governance: identifying the distribution of power
2.2 Networked governance: emphasising the importance of policy networks
2.3 Multi-sited governance: bringing the ‘policy transfer approach’ into the analysis
2.4 Methodology

3 Policy formulation phase: agenda-setting and programming
3.1 Normative resources
   3.1.1 Multilateral stakeholders: the central role of the EU
   3.1.2 Bilateral stakeholders: the role of France
   3.1.3 CAR domestic stakeholders
3.2 Assessment resources
3.3 Programmatic resources
3.4 Distribution of power in the policy formulation phase

4 Implementing phase: managing and monitoring
4.1 Institutional resources
4.2 Financial resources
4.3 Technical resources
4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) resources
4.5 Distribution of power in the implementation phase

5 Conclusion

Appendices
A1 Two-fold SSR coordination structure
A2 Political history of the Central African Republic

References
Acronyms

ACP  
African Caribbean Countries

AEF  
French Equatorial Africa

BONUCA  
Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine (UN Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic)

CAR  
Central African Republic

CEMA  
Chef d'État-Major des Armées (Chief of Staff)

CEMAC  
Communauté économique et monétaire des États d’Afrique centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)

CFSP  
Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSP  
Country Strategy Paper

DDR  
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DRC  
Democratic Republic of Congo

ECCAS  
Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS  
Economic Community of West African States

ENP  
European Neighbourhood Policy

ESDP  
European Security and Defence Policy

EC  
European Community

EDF  
European Development Fund

EU  
European Union

FACA  
Central African Armed Forces

FIDH  
Fédération internationale des droits de l’Homme (International Federation for Human Rights)

ICG  
International Crisis Group

M&E  
Monitoring and Evaluation

MICOPAX  
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic

MINURCA  
Mission of United Nations for the Central African Republic

MISAB  
Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements

MLG  
Multi-level governance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Regional Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Réforme du secteur de sécurité (see SSR)</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>Permanent Technical Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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1 Introduction

In 2008, under international pressure, the Central African Republic government accepted the challenge to engage in a holistic and comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) process. This SSR process was launched during a national seminar whose conclusions were officially endorsed by President Bozizé.\(^1\) To oversee the SSR process, a two-fold coordination structure was set up consisting of:

- a national committee, headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence, which brings together representatives from each ministry that deals with security and justice matters;

- an international committee, that is in charge of coordinating financial and technical assistance and is made up of international partners, namely the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and France (see Appendix 1).

This coordination structure aims to harmonise interactions between the different levels of decision-making, and can be seen as a formalised ‘forum’ that is meant to deal with the complexity of governance (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). Security governance in the Central African Republic (CAR) involves a wide range of institutional actors embedded into networks with competing agendas and objectives. Both national and international stakeholders are involved in the management of the security sector which, consequently, must be seen as being governed increasingly on multiple levels.

Probing the decision-making processes at stake in security sector reform is particularly important since security policy is traditionally seen as the preserve of sovereign states. One could argue that the Central African State has never been sovereign in the area of security, due to France’s historical influence in its security policy after independence (see Appendix 2). However, the phenomenon that is presently at stake is much more than a simple post-colonial bilateral relationship.

This article aims to investigate the governance of the security sector in the CAR by using the lens of the multi-level governance approach (MLG), which offers a relevant framework in which to investigate the inter-institutional processes, particularly those that weaken the impact of the formal arrangements (administrative procedures and legal framework), and supplement them with informal dynamics (social network ties, ideas and beliefs). One way to get a better understanding of the international movement of ideas and practices in the security sectors is to deepen and widen the concept of multi-level governance – which has been utilised to date almost exclusively to study EU policies – in order to grasp policymaking processes in a non-EU context.

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Analysing how the SSR process in CAR has been defined and then implemented, this article puts emphasis on the international interactions between institutional actors and networks that may be geographically/territorially situated at different levels of the policymaking process in different places around the world, thus suggesting ways to grasp multi-actor and multi-sited governance. Therefore, it advocates an approach which consists of deepening and expanding the agenda of the multi-level governance approach. The issue here is to capture the interactive institutional dynamics at an international level, thus developing a methodological framework that is likely to capture both the top-down and the bottom-up dynamics of decision-making processes. In addition to theory development around the concept of multi-level governance, this article aims to contribute more broadly to the knowledge and understanding of security policymaking in ‘Southern’ countries.

Studying multi-level security governance requires the adoption of an approach that side-steps issues of formal sovereignty and focuses instead on where power is actually located, taking into account inter-institutional relationships and the governance arrangements in the particular social context of the country in question – in this case the CAR. The aim is to identify the sets of actors and procedures which drive the process, and to map out the various levels at which decisions are made, answering the following key questions: How is security governance organised? Who decides, and on which matters?

More fundamentally, the challenge is to capture the intermingling of domestic and international decision-making processes into networks which increasingly overlap and influence each other in Southern countries. Indeed, what makes the MLG approach different from the traditional one – in which multiple external actors seek to influence (or even control) the actions of sovereign states – is the network idea.

First of all, this paper will present the theoretical framework based on a multi-level governance approach. Then, it will analyse the decision-making processes that are found specifically in the formulation and implementation of the SSR process in the CAR, focusing on the interactions between the international actors (both bilateral and multilateral), and the national stakeholders, each of them being embedded in specific networks.

2 Theoretical background:
expanding the multi-level governance approach beyond the analysis of the EU

In recent years, a multi-level governance approach has become increasingly fashionable amongst scholars who study the European Union. Initially, the multi-level governance approach aimed to analyse the changing relationships between actors situated at different territorial levels, both from the public and
private sectors, in the context of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Research based on a multi-level governance approach deals mainly with the complexity of decision-making processes within the EU itself, focusing on the relationships between a wide range of European institutional actors, at the supranational, national and sub-national levels.  

Recently, the multi-level governance approach has been expanded to emphasise the role of the many actors involved in EU foreign policy, and the way in which they interact with each other. According to Michael Smith (2003):

> governance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement and enforce rules in a specified policy domain. Multi-level governance refers to the sharing of this authority across an institutionalised, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms and power resources.

Yet, most of the research that uses a multi-level governance approach, including that studying the foreign policy of the EU, is primarily focused on the decision-making processes in EU circles which involve the institutional actors of the CFSP/ESDP (Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence policy) on the one hand, and national constituencies within the EU member-states on the other hand. Whilst this is very relevant to capturing the power configuration and decision-making processes that shape EU foreign policy at the European level, this multi-level governance approach has too often only addressed one side of the question. In fact, the multi-level governance approach to EU foreign policy is focused mainly on the formulation phase of the CFSP/ESDP. Put another way, most of the multi-level governance streams of research focused on the EU CFSP/ESDP do not take into consideration the fact that, with governance being ‘internationally multi-sited’, there is a dire need to integrate local partners into the analysis.

Consequently (and regrettably), the MLG approach has been little used in the study of the relationships between the EU’s institutional actors and their non-European partners (i.e. outside EU territory and jurisdiction) on the one hand and in the study of governance in other regions or other polities, on the other hand. Yet, the MLG approach can offer a relevant framework in which to study governance in Southern countries, if complemented and combined with other frameworks of analysis.

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2 For a critical overview of the literature dealing with a governance approach to European integration, see Jachtenfuchs (2001).

3 From this perspective, Michael Smith’s approach to multi-level governance is related to the ‘actor-centred institutionalist approach to policy research’ proposed by Scharpf (1997) – and derived from the study of political-organisational fields. Scharpf’s approach focuses on the ‘policy domain concept’, defined as the set of groups and organisations active in formulating, advocating and selecting policy options. The basic idea of the ‘policy domain’ concept is that ‘the solutions to a given policy problem must be produced by the interdependent choices of a plurality of policy actors with specific capabilities and with specific perceptions and preferences regarding the outcomes that could be obtained’.
2.1 Dispersed governance: identifying the distribution of power

Although stimulating as an overriding framework, the multi-level governance concept's explanatory powers are not self-evident. A number of authors have criticised MLG for standing as a purely descriptive presentation of changing processes of public policymaking. Recently, Ian Bache (2008a, 2008b) made an attempt to address the multi-level governance approach’s silence with regard to the issue of the distribution and exercise of power. As he states, 'multi-level governance is an intuitively appealing concept that offers some insights and informs a research agenda… There is a need for empirical research on multi-level governance that adopts a more critical stance on the issue of power' and is informed by the following requirements:

1 Firstly, a clear explanation of its assumptions in relation to the nature and location of power. ‘There is a need to explicitly theorise how actors’ power is structured (generally unequally) within governance arrangements’. According to Bache, a good starting point is to situate MLG in relation to three aspects of the power and policymaking debate: (1) decision-making; (2) agenda-setting; (3) preference-shaping;

2 Secondly, clearer empirical benchmarks for what does and does not constitute multi-level governance. If a growing number of actors are involved in policymaking, the question is to determine if this changes the outcomes. ‘Presumably, governance should signal more dispersed influence over outcomes’, as stated by Bache. Consequently, there is a need to specify empirically when participation becomes meaningful, that is whether different participants actually do influence outcomes, and when multi-level governance arrangements demonstrate a dispersal of power. Understanding the distribution of these resources (financial, informational, political, organisational and constitutional-legal) and the skills with which actors use them is key to explaining policy-decision and outcome-implementation matters.

3 Thirdly, explicit theorising on the relationships between actors, governance arrangements and social context, which largely explains the distribution of resources between actors:

There is a further structuring of actors resources by the nature of the particular governance arrangements (e.g. formal rules, rules of the games, type of network). Beyond this distribution of resources, policy decisions (and outcomes) are shaped by the skills with which actors employ the resources available to them (agency). Social constructivism brings to MLG research a focus on the social characteristics of agents to highlight their cultural, economic, social and symbolic capital. There is a need to go beyond the first face of power to investigating less tangible forms of power by relating governance dynamics to the context... Members with particular social and/or functional backgrounds [are] able to dominate decision-making in the process of MLG.

(Bache 2008a)
Such a research agenda urges us to deepen the multi-level governance analysis by putting the stress on two complementary analytical frameworks, namely the 'policy networks analysis' on the one hand and the 'policy transfer'/external governance approaches on the other.

2.2 Networked governance: emphasising the importance of policy networks

As suggested by Ian Bache’s approach, what is distinctive about the MLG approach is not only its emphasis on a multiplicity of actors across levels of the system but also of the networks they constitute. This connects to the ‘policy network approach’.

In the 1970s, scholars became increasingly interested in how to solve problems of multi-organisational coordination, arguing that hierarchical control was being supplanted by complex patterns of inter-organisational and inter-governmental cooperation, and informal social networks. This initial approach evolved in the 1990s into a new robust literature on policy networks which analyses inter-governmental and inter-organisational ‘network governance’ and focuses on theorising policy network and predicting policy outcomes by examining interactions within those networks (Peterson 2003, 2004; Bomberg 1993; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Andersen and Eliassen 2001). Some authors have called attention to the operation of local or regional policy networks in Europe and to the vertical policy networks characteristic of European ‘multi-level governance’ (Ansell 2000).

The policy networks analysis does not deny the power of classical actors such as national governments but contends that policy outcomes cannot be explained exclusively by national preferences or interests. On the contrary, networks must be seen as a meso- or sub-systemic level of decision-making which is fully compatible with macro-theories of power, including realism.

Policy networks form around functional areas or policy sectors and consequently can be defined as ‘clusters of actors, each with an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson 2003).

The policy networks approach states that networks can be more than the sum of their parts and produce outcomes which are not simply a summation of the views of their most powerful members; the influence exercised by the network is seen as an emergent property. It results from the interactions and is not simply a product of individual properties of the constituent parts. In other words, the ability of the network to shape outcomes comes from its interactions

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4 For instance, Heclo (1978) argued that the American policy process is influenced by a different set of stakeholders grouped into ‘issue networks’ which are defined as complex networks focused on specific issues and which extend far beyond those actors holding the formal power to set up policy. Heclo views such issue networks as incorporating a wide range of decision-making centres which have different views of policy outcomes as well as conflicting interests.
and the complexities of the ways in which actors influence one another through them.5

Two streams of literature are particularly relevant to this study: first, the policy network literature which insists on resources dependencies. Second, the policy network literature which insists on the importance of beliefs. Both these streams of policy network research can be related to Ian Bache’s analytical framework presented above.

Benson (1982) defines policy networks as a cluster of ‘organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies’: in his view, the structural dependencies between actors serve as channels for communication and exchange of information, expertise, or trust. Stephen George (1997) develops a similar perspective, considering that policy networks are characterised by the pattern of resource interdependence between the organisations in the network. In George’s view, it is the shift in the pattern of resources which explains changes in the nature and operations of the network. To Kenis and Schneider (1989) too, the boundaries of a policy network are not determined by institutions or formal distribution of power but by a mutual recognition of resources dependencies. Resources dependencies are also a major aspect of the famous Rhodes model which focuses on the way in which networks are structured in a policy sector: in Rhodes’ view this will presumably determine (and consequently explain) policy outcomes.6

Another stimulating perspective goes beyond the resource dependencies paradigm and stresses the importance of values and beliefs within networks. Using a ‘policy domain approach’, Frédéric Mérand has been investigating policy networks in the ESDP and how social network ties and beliefs affect the decision-making process. According to Mérand, a policy domain approach is best suited for a relational understanding of policymaking that focuses not only on governments and formal organisations but also on social relationships and beliefs affinities among organisational actors such as diplomats, parliamentarians, defence experts, etc.

A policy domain is an arena where the structured interaction of various groups of organisational actors generates policy decisions... Policy domains are made of actors who interact with each other and seek to

5 A lot of criticism has been formulated against the policy network approach, for example:

- Thatcher (1998) and Koenig (1998) who consider that policy network is only ‘a useful metaphor, but does not constitute a model or theory’.

- Another kind of critic (Richardson 2000) considers that policymaking at the EU level is too fluid for stable networks to exist or persist; according to his view, actors may form alliances and work together on specific issues (‘the issue network’) but once formed, these alliances quickly disintegrate.

6 In the Rhodes model (Rhodes 1997a, 1997b) the following factors are emphasised: the resources dependencies; the relative stability of network memberships; the relative insularity and autonomy of networks (i.e. the degree to which interests not directly involved in a given policy are effectively excluded from influence, for instance the parliament or the population at large).
promote their beliefs. Networks ties and affinities are the building blocks of a comprehensive analysis of the decision-making process in the policy-domain. The value added of a policy domain approach is that it goes beyond formal organisational charts and decision-making mechanisms. (Mérand 2009)\textsuperscript{7}

Mérand’s approach to policy domain focuses on two determinants of decision-making: first, the social networks which refers to the Laumann and Knoke (1987) approach. The objective is to provide a structural description of the key organisational actors and their relationships. Second, belief systems which seek to understand the role of ideas in forging coalitions around policy proposals (as opposed to coalitions based on short-term policy preferences). The objective is to identify the core beliefs about the role of the state, the nature of security challenges and the purpose of their organisations.

2.3 Multi-sited governance: bringing the ‘policy transfer approach’ into the analysis

As mentioned above, most scholars who refer to the multi-level governance approach have left out the question of the impact that national partners have on the policies supported by international actors. In other words, the national actors are treated as outside the network or in a separate one. Either this assumption must be challenged empirically or made explicit by integrating into the analysis the role of the national partners. To do so, the multi-level governance approach has to be deepened and enriched with the burgeoning literature on ‘policy transfer’.

Developing a research agenda on multi-level governance in Central and Eastern Europe, Paul Stubbs has addressed the 'missed opportunity' which characterises most of the research based on a multi-level governance approach by proposing to bring into the analysis the challenging perspectives which can be provided by political sociology, political anthropology and political economy. With reference to Bache and Flinders (2004), Paul Stubbs’ research highlights the need to conceptualise and understand decision-making processes 'in terms of complex overlapping networks' (2005). Stubbs focuses on ‘the way the multi-level governance concept allows for an understanding of the transformation of the role of the state towards new strategies of coordination, steering and networking’. To do so, he refers to the ‘policy transfer’ approach, defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) as ‘the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’. The aim of this research agenda is to capture the impact of foreign institutions as

\textsuperscript{7} This sentence is quoted from the rationale of the research project currently led by Frédéric Mérand: ‘The European Security and Defence Policy Domain: Network Ties, Beliefs System, and Decision-Making’. Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada.
the source of policy ideas, policy design as well as implementation in developing countries. Stubbs then explains that:

the multi-dimensional, confusing and contradictory nature of policy transfers can be understood in terms of the ways in which codified knowledge, seen as globally applicable, and working through standards, techniques and ‘best practices’ becomes tacit knowledge through a series of interpretative encounters.

(Stubbs 2005)

Finally and more importantly, Stubbs highlights the importance of taking into account the dimensions of ‘policy resistance’ and ‘resistance strategies of apparently weak groups in the context of asymmetric dependencies’, using contributions from anthropology (Bache and Taylor 2003) and referring to James Scott (1987, 1992), which focuses on internal actors’ diverse strategies not only in terms of immediate interests, but also with respect to the profound importance of historical legacies, experience and contexts. These perspectives of Stubbs’ advocate an understanding of how international decision-making processes (in his case study, the EU decision-making processes) interact with formal and informal channels of decision at the national level in partner countries. His interest is not just on formal decision-making processes, but also on semi-formal and informal ones.

Stubbs however, has not paid enough attention to the role played by networks per se. His approach still mostly focuses on the influence of individual actors within the network and has not yet wholly seen the potential of the emergent property of influence that comes from the network as a whole. Focusing on the interface between donors and recipients, Janine Wedel (2000, 2004) has developed an approach similar to Stubbs’ but has better addressed the interactions between multiplex networks where actors interact in a variety of capacities, with multiple identities. Yet, the most powerful approach to policy transfer integrating a network analysis is with no doubt the ‘external governance approach’. The concept of ‘EU external governance’ has been developed to study the expansion of the prescriptive scope of EU rules, norms and policies beyond EU borders. Drawing on the recent literature on Europeanisation and policy transfer, Sandra Lavenex (2004) has sought to move beyond the restrictive focus of contemporary studies on the EU’s effects on member states, and has suggested a framework for analysing its external effects on non-EU member states. From Lavenex’s perspective, the scope and shape of policy transfer is conditioned by existing institutional links between the EU and the other countries concerned, the latter’s immediate domestic situation at hand, and the costs of non-adaptation associated with an EU policy. Lavenex distinguishes between three different functions of policy networks: information networks, which are set up to diffuse policy-relevant ideas, knowledge, and best practices among the members; implementation networks which focus primarily on enhancing cooperation among national regulators to enforce existing laws and rules – be they national, international, or European – and which can complement more hierarchical modes of interaction when adding a more cooperative implementation structure to a unilateral decision-making one; and regulatory networks which are the most powerful
ones in terms of governance due to their implicit or explicit legislative mandate, and which are geared at the formulation of common rules and standards in a given policy area. Lavenex’s conclusions regarding European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are particularly thorough:

The external dimension will normally reflect the modes of interaction that dominate internal policymaking in this area; the extension of network governance presupposes the existence of such networks internally. Nevertheless, in the external dimension, problem constellations may take very different forms than within the EU and interaction is much less pre-structured by institutional norms, rules and routines… The expectation that the extension of network governance works particularly well, the more technocratic and unpoliticised a policy area is, could be generally confirmed. [The] study however also identified structural limits in the extension of network governance to heterogeneous contexts… the opening of theoretically horizontal and participatory policy networks to other countries does not necessarily mean the absence of hegemony. On the one hand, networks can be instrumentalised as alternative instruments of policy transfer, thus compensating for weaknesses of strategic conditionality. On the other hand, their participatory potential is currently hampered by heterogeneous political structures, unequal expertise and policy traditions in ENP countries. Nevertheless, these emerging webs of institutionalisation yield new functional landscapes, thereby pointing at the advent of flexible integration beyond formal EU membership.

(Lavanex 2008)

Thus, the most systematic developments of the multi-level governance approach have been focused on the EU context and this article will mostly refer to this literature. However, it is important here to mention the fact that some conflict literature too has advocated a global-to-local approach, whilst some authors have considered how violence and armed groups are networked across national borders (Schlichte and Veit 2007). Likewise, there is an important and fast growing literature on the hybridity of African states and of their governance arrangements which has put the stress on multi-layered governance and networked power in development/conflict contexts. One of the most important references is Jean-Francois Bayart’s 1989 book *L’État en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre* (*The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*), which focuses on the persistence of deeply embedded patterns of African statecraft. Bayart deals with the formal institutions of the modern state exported by the French colonial power, analysing the extent to which African governments have shaped the outcomes and appropriated Western governmental institutions to pursue long-established strategies. Whilst Bayart pays attention to governance in authoritarian African post-independent states, Richard Banegas (2003) has analysed the same dynamics at stake in electoral democracies, confirming Bayart’s conclusions. In another piece of research, Bayart, together with Ellis and Hibou (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999), has studied state-supported criminal activities in Africa, showing how individuals’ roles are embedded into group responsibility: contrary to many studies on corruption in Africa which put the stress on individual responsibilities, these scholars have stressed the linkages
between African governments and institutionalised fraud, the growth of private armies, the plundering of natural resources, the privatisation of state institutions, and the development of ‘economies of plunder’.

There is also a long tradition of organisation theory, going back to the French sociologist Michel Crozier (1964), which has focused on informal networks and forms of power in bureaucracies. Forging what would be called later the ‘French school of strategic analysis’, Crozier analysed what he called the ‘bureaucratic phenomenon’, developing a theoretical and empirical study of two French organisations – a book-keeping agency and an industrial monopoly. Focusing on their respective social systems – namely interpersonal relations, group relations, and power relations – Crozier challenged and re-examined Weber’s concept of efficient ideal bureaucracy in light of the way institutional bureaucracies have actually developed. Such a theory has inspired the way in which Robin Luckham (1971) analysed the micropolitics of military and security institutions in Nigeria and how they link to their wider political environment: Luckham has shown how particular groups within the security apparatus are able to secure an informal power in their organisation that has little relation to their formal status.

2.4 Methodology

Based on the analytical frameworks presented above, this paper suggests an analysis of the security governance arrangements aimed at capturing the distribution of power in the social context of the CAR, by analysing the kinds of resources that are mobilised by different networks of actors (domestic and international) at every stage of the decision-making process.

To capture multi-level, multi-sited governance, there is a need to focus both on the formulation phase (agenda-setting and programming phase) and the implementation phase of policymaking (managing and monitoring). Indeed, security governance in CAR involves a wide range of domestic stakeholders (national authorities as well as non-governmental, and non-state actors) and international actors (international organisations as well as other states) intervening along with specific policymaking processes (both formal and informal), which themselves interact and interfere with each other. Consequently, security governance in CAR is shaped by inter-institutional power relations, and the outcomes of this policy result, to a large extent, from the interactions between the resources mobilised respectively by the international and the domestic networks during the policymaking processes. As stated by Jeanie Bukowski (2001):

unlike neo-realist analyses, the multi-level governance view dictates the consideration of all actors involved in the various stages of policymaking. The rationale here is that, in reality, those people and groups in charge of

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8 Marks (1993) has taken into account both of these phases when analysing European integration in his first conceptualisation of multi-level governance.
It is important here to mention the fact that the UNDP is also a major stakeholder in the SSR process in the CAR. However, this article does not address its role in detail, and specifically focuses on the EU’s role.

Carrying out a policy have as much or more influence over its actual impact as those who initiate and legislate the policy. Moreover, the ‘formulators’ and ‘implementers’ may or may not be the same actors.

Consequently, I propose to capture power distribution in CAR’s security governance by identifying the kind of resources (both material and normative) that are mobilised by international and national actors involved in security governance in the CAR since the launching of the SSR process, namely the EU,\(^9\) France and national stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental) at the following stages of the policymaking process:

1. Policy formulation phase (agenda-setting and programming)
2. Implementing phase (managing and monitoring).

The issue at stake is to capture both power distribution between and within policy networks.

### 3 Policy formulation phase: agenda-setting and programming

To identify the distribution of power during the agenda-setting/programming phases, there is a need to identify who has been providing the guidelines, setting the priorities, and defining the general purpose of the process meant to reform the security sector in CAR and then, identify who has been involved in programming the different stages of the process. Throughout this policy formulation phase, three kinds of resources have been primarily mobilised: normative resources, assessment resources and programmatic resources.

#### 3.1 Normative resources

Normative resources here refer both to values and systems of beliefs but also to the way in which a problem is conceptualised – that is, what the problem is thought to be and the range of possible solutions or responses to it that are considered viable. Studying normative resources enables one to capture the representation of security that underlies the approach of each set of stakeholders. This paragraph therefore emphasises the representation of security in a context marked by a plurality of actors with different objectives, strategies and expectations.
3.1.1 Multilateral stakeholders: the central role of the EU

The EU is the most important international actor that supports the SSR process in CAR. The European approach to SSR is one of the most operational applications of the multi-functional approach promoted at the strategic level by the European Security Strategy, which highlights the holistic approach of EU foreign policy, where security, economic development and democracy are seen as essential contributions to the generation of political stability in the EU’s international environment. In addition to anti-terrorism and disarmament missions, the European Security Strategy has identified support to SSR in partner countries as a new EU field of intervention, thus contributing both to enlarging the initial spectrum of the Petersburg Task, and to the inclusion of security missions in the framework of Community policies. Consequently, the EU SSR policy is rooted in two different policy frameworks: first, the ESDP under pillar 2; second, Community policy under pillar 1. The EU’s support of the SSR process in the CAR process is exclusively a Community-driven policy and provides a good example of the policymaking processes at stake in a foreign policy led outside the framework of the second pillar.

The EC (as well as the ESDP) SSR documents explicitly refer to the SSR guidelines (Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice) adopted by the OECD/DAC and translated into political and operational principles in the OECD Handbook on Security Systems Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. The SSR process supported in CAR by the EU appears as an ideal-type illustration of the holistic approach developed by the OECD/DAC, according to which, security sector reform seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their

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10 For an overview of the EU SSR approach, see: Babaud and Kerts (2008); Bagayoko (2008).

11 There are two documents that define the role of the EU in the field of SSR. The EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, draft in October 2005 by the General Secretariat of the Council, in accordance with a PSC’s (Political and Security Committee) tasking EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform; Council of the European Union, 13 October 2005, Brussels; and the May 2006 Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, which provides a framework for the EC support to SSR. A third document – Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform; 2736th General Affairs Council meeting, 12 June 2006, Luxembourg – is meant to synthesise the ESDP and the EC SSR Concepts (Commission of the European Communities 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2006).

12 While most of the time the foreign and security policy of the EU is seen as exclusively referring to the second pillar, the support provided by the European Commission to the SSR process in CAR gives a sense of the major role that the EC in EU foreign policy can play: the EU SSR policy proves how the first conceptualisation of multi-governance – which is used to concentrate on the central role of the European Community institutions in the integration process (Marks 1993; Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1999) – remains topical and relevant. The EU SSR policy also demonstrates the validity of Michael Smith’s statement (2004) according to which ‘the TEU provides a greater degree of autonomy for EC organisational actors in European foreign policy during specific phases of policy process’.

13 The first version of the concept was presented in 1998 by the then British Development Minister, Clare Short, who presented SSR purpose as ‘to ensure the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance’. The OECD/DAC has deepened and conceptualised this initial British approach to SSR.
societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR not only includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing. Indeed, the overall objective of the OECD approach is to introduce a rationalisation in the organisation of the security apparatus, and to promote democratic oversight and supervision mechanisms. It is important here to note that the SSR concept itself, as framed by the OECD, promotes a multi-level approach of security governance. As stated by the OECD/DAC Manual, the overarching objective of SSR processes is to introduce a system of ‘multi-layered security governance’, promoting a democratic accountability at multiple levels of oversight:

In many developing and fragile states, the design of justice and security development indeed requires a multi-layered approach that provides assistance to a range of legitimate state and non-state providers at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs.

(OECD 2007: 68)

Furthermore, the OECD/DAC Manual strongly envisages the role that international partners are likely to play when providing support to SSR processes: international donors are seen as an integral part of the multi-layered governance system promoted through SSR (OECD 2007: 63–86 and section 8).

The endorsement of the SSR concept by the European Commission has clearly been driven by the Directorate General for Development (DG Development, often referred as DG Dev). In the mid 1990s, a discourse emphasising the role of security as a precondition for development emerged within the DG Development which was the driving force in the adoption of the first EU document focused on African conflicts (European Commission 1996b) and promoted the notion of ‘structural stability’, that underlined the key role played by development in the prevention and regulation of African conflicts. During the 2000s, security and conflict prevention have been increasingly included on the Commission’s agenda (European Commission 2001, 2003), the Directorate General for External relations (often referred as DG Relex) having joined the DG Dev to promote the security-development nexus. Increasing involvement in African conflict and security issues have constituted a means for the DG Dev to respond to the doubts expressed about the efficiency of its development strategies in Africa (European Commission 1996a, 2000), and the general validity of development aid. DG Dev has always tended to consider Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’ and has been eager to defend this privileged geographic area of intervention by investing in a functional field – the security one – in which it has not traditionally intervened. (Bagayoko and Gibert 2009). These policy and conceptual adjustments witness the progressive connection with the

14 In 2001, DG Relex created a ‘Conflict and Peace Building unit’ in charge of coordinating the Commission efforts in conflict prevention.

concept of SSR, promoted by other development agencies. As very well captured by Michael Brzoska, a lot of international development agencies have seen a great opportunity in SSR:

Security sector reform can be understood as an attempt to connect, in one concept, the opportunities of expanding development assistance into security-related fields and the challenges of new demands on development donors, and to provide both with a common vision. That vision is one of a security sector which promotes human development, helps to reduce poverty, and allows people – including poor people – to expand their options in life.

(Brzoska 2003)

Within the Commission, it thus has been the ‘development network’ (DG Dev and its connections with other Development agencies) which has been driving the SSR-related policy. Endorsing a human-security-based concept as its concept of reference, the DG Dev has increasingly promoted an approach to security focused on individuals’ physical security and the protection of their rights. Consequently, the approach promoted by the Commission as such is ‘governance-oriented’ in the sense that it is centred on good governance and the promotion of human rights, which implies that security can no longer be seen as the preserve of the state but has to involve a wider range of stakeholders.

3.1.2 Bilateral stakeholders: the role of France

From independence, France has been more deeply engaged in Africa than any other European country. Any analysis of security governance in Africa must bear in mind that relationships with France are critical to the understanding of the state of the security sector in a number of Francophone African countries. From the time of independence, a special relationship has prevailed between the new states and their former colonial powers. France kept close and constraining strategic ties with its former colonies: Paris was tied to them with a system of diplomatic, economic, cultural, and defence agreements. In the realm of security, French intervention has consisted of ensuring its own access to base facilities; leading direct ‘stabilising’ interventions; and positioning military and security personnel and advisers in ministries. The essential characteristics of the Franco-African security relationship thus includes defence agreements (guaranteeing the continual presence of French troops in a number of Francophone states or mutual defence clauses), military advisors and close military and police cooperation (including the training of officers and the sale of weapons and related equipment). From the 1960s African Francophone states have suffered the permanent presence of French troops, when linked to France by a defence agreement, and therefore have been protected from external and

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16 Quentin Weiler (2009) has subtly analysed the progressive assimilation of the SSR concept by the European Commission in general and the DG Dev in particular.
in some cases internal aggression, with France serving as the guarantor of their sovereignty.\footnote{A lot of French specialists of French African policy have thoroughly analysed the dynamics of this post-colonial policy. For a comprehensive literature review of this topic, see Bagayoko (2003) and Bagayoko (2010).} In addition, the so-called ‘coopérants’ – technical advisors (in the defence as well as in the police and justice sectors) permanently deployed in Francophone African countries (for a two- to three-year period) have been deeply involved in assisting the newly independent authorities in establishing a national security apparatus.

Since the independence of the Oubangui-Chari provinces, France has been the main bilateral actor in the Central African Republic and has been more than deeply involved in the governance of the CAR’s security sector. France signed an official defence agreement with the country which allowed French forces to be permanently stationed in CAR. After the 1997 withdrawal of its military forces (following two waves of mutinies within Central African barracks), France maintained a contingent of 220 soldiers and, in October 2006, strengthened this contingent by sending supplementary soldiers when a rebel group launched an attack against the government. Besides direct military assistance, French servicemen have also participated in the training of Central African servicemen, whilst French technical advisers work on a daily basis within the Central African Ministries (Defence, Interior, Customs, Justice, etc). Since 2003, the military cooperation of France with the Central African Republic has been characterised by the application of an emergency plan for the benefit of the Central African armed forces, which is based on the reorganisation of the Central African armed forces (FACA) and its Gendarmerie. Significant support has also been provided to the police forces.

However, due to the growing accusation of paternalism, neo-colonialism and complicity with authoritarian (and the case of the Rwanda ‘genocidaire’) regimes, France has been eager to obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its interventions on the African continent and has been increasingly integrating its interventions within the EU framework. Bruno Charbonneau (2008) provides an interesting analysis of the multilateral turn of the French security policy in sub-Saharan Africa, showing how new standards of governance promoted by multilateral organisations are offering France new opportunities to re-legitimise its policy of intervention and military cooperation in Africa. In his view, France has found in the multilateralisation of its security policy an opened space to reposition its power and influence and thus to re-legitimise and re-authorise its practices and discourses. Accordingly, for a decade or so, French security policy has largely been modified and adapted to fit into the global system of liberal governance which promotes democratic standards. When stating that military aid is now defined as development aid, Charbonneau is demonstrating that French policy has from now on to be read in the light of the increasingly influential ‘security-development nexus’.

The French security policy in CAR is a perfect example of the process through which French security policy has been modified and adapted to fit into the
system of liberal security governance promoted at the EU level. The SSR paradigm as promoted by the EU has given a new legitimacy to the traditional French security policy, especially to the ‘military and technical permanent assistance’. Indeed, French security cooperation is now meant to pave the way for good governance and development. In fact, the integration of French assistance into the EU-led SSR process allows France to remain involved in the governance of the CAR’s security sector whilst blunting accusations of neo-colonialism.

It is worth, however, investigating more accurately the normative rationale for such a new stance. It is important here to mention the fact that, from a normative perspective, France has been one of the last European countries to officially embrace the SSR concept: indeed, it was only in November 2008 (that is, ten years after the United Kingdom) that France published its own official SSR-related doctrine (Comité de coordination interministériel pour la réforme des systèmes de sécurité 2008) which endorses most of the human-security-based concepts of the OECD-SSR doctrine. A lot of reluctance to or misunderstanding of the SSR concept has been shown by many of the French actors traditionally involved in security and defence cooperation policy. In reality, the SSR concept promoting a human-security perspective on security is clearly side-stepping the traditional French approach to military/security cooperation: the French approach to CAR security reform is still deeply informed by the views of a network whose approach is operationally-driven in essence and mainly focused on the security of the state as well as on the re-organisation of the security forces. Interestingly in the CAR, SSR-related matters still fall under the responsibility of traditional security assistance coopérants (military and police officers) and not under the responsibilities of development actors. Those French traditional security coopérants form a very strong network whose normative representation of security is mainly defined in terms of stability/stabilisation: in their view, the reform of the security sector has to result in a political order compatible with French interests in Africa, in fact an objective more than similar with the purpose of the reforms promoted by French cooperation policy since independence.

### 3.1.3 CAR domestic stakeholders

Different representations of security reform are competing among the Central African Republic’s domestic actors.

First, the CAR’s political actors, namely the opposition parties and rebel groups as well as governmental authorities, do refer to a very traditional vision of security: security reform is overall seen as a means of building up a security apparatus (essentially a militarised one) that can guarantee the State’s legitimate violence and thus ensure political continuity and the hegemonic position of ruling actors. The context of war which has been prevailing in CAR for more than a decade has deepened this tendency. It is extremely important to mention the fact that almost all the influential political actors on the CAR political scene today have been playing a leading role in national politics for decades: most of them have occupied the highest functions (Former Presidents...
of the Republic, Ministers of Defence, Prime Minister, Chief of Staff) before joining the ranks of different rebel outfits or of the opposition. That is the reason why it is possible to identify what can be called a ‘ruling elites network’, made up of politicians as well as high ranking officers or rebel group leaders. Interactions between the members of this network are informed by a subtle game of solidarities as well as rivalries. Most of them have at some point been linked by a political alliance. One can hardly identify programmatic differences between individuals who used to be affiliated to one leader before showing allegiance to another one. Today, this ‘ruling elites network’ is dominated by Bozizé’s faction. But shifts in allegiance are still at stake today, a number of individuals initially affiliated to Bozizé’s rivals having been hired to ministerial positions. All these political leaders have seen the military as the best instrument to support their access to power and for twenty years the successive Heads of state have attempted to instrumentalise the armed forces in order to perpetuate their dominant position. In the views of the government, SSR mainly – if not exclusively – amounts to reinforcing the skills of the military. The role of the police force is considered as marginal since armed forces have always been used to perform traditional police work. Consequently, the reinforcement of the police forces – seen as essential in the EU SSR normative approach – is considered as useless, if not inappropriate. In sum, the sense of security developed by the CAR’s political elites network, currently dominated by Bozizé’s faction, fundamentally differs from the normative approach promoted by the OECD and international actors such as the EU who refer to it.

Beyond political circles, it is possible to identify two alternative representations of security reform which are widespread among two other sets of Central African actors:

- the representation of security reform among security actors themselves: the armed forces as well as the police forces (mid-level officers and rank agents) and other security services (intelligence services, customs, water/forest services) form a ‘national security network’: they have developed an approach to security reform which is mostly focused on the ways in which their working conditions and individual financial and social conditions could improve. The most widespread claims among security providers themselves are systematic demands for the payment of back pay; regular access to the so-called PGA (Prime générale d’alimentation – Food allowance); free access to medical care; construction of barracks where families could be accommodated; supply of new equipment; access to training.

20 See chapters in Brock and Pettit (2007) Springs of Participation by Dee Jupp, Sarah Levy, Linda Mayoux, Kate Newman, Helzi Noponen, and Alice Welbourn. Strikingly, and more widely than these six, almost all the creative participatory freelance consultants I can name are women.

21 As an amateur facilitator I have noted, and resented, the intrusive approach of some professional facilitators (by no means all) who justify the high cost of their contracts not by keeping quiet, but by intrusively disrupting lively groups that are happily muddling towards coherence with questions like ‘Are you sure that you have achieved clarity about your objectives?’
The zaraguinas consist of Central Africans and nationals of neighbouring countries, particularly Chadian. The zaraguinas range traditionally in the northern regions of the country, but their action tends to spread throughout the whole territory. Zaraguinas have been operating for a long time in the border zones of the CAR, Cameroon and Chad. They attack mainly travellers on roads and widen their raids to villages, taking advantage of the quasi-absence of security authorities in the northern regions. They particularly target breeders, mainly Peulh nomadic communities, whom they force to sell their cattle to pay a ransom in exchange for their children held as hostages. Human Rights organisations accuse the zaraguinas of proceeding to summary executions while the local populations blame the FACA for not defending them. To flee from the zaraguinas, many communities have abandoned their villages and are camping in the jungle. The attacks of zaraguinas have forced some communities to set up self-defence units in their villages.

Finally, it is important to mention the fact that, whilst the OECD approach considers the role of civil society as crucial in the politics of security sector reform (see Caparini 2005), it is hard to identify in the CAR a strongly structured civil society: a number of associations (human rights defenders, women associations) do exist, the most important of them being structured around religious networks, mainly Christian in essence. However, such organisations have not formed any constituency nor developed any advocacy actions to represent citizens’ views and monitor the activities of state security institutions.

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3.2 Assessment resources

The agenda-setting phase of the SSR process in CAR sheds light on the important role played by international experts in the policymaking process.

A team made up of international (non-African) experts, from a variety of backgrounds (both academic and practitioner) was initially set up to make a comprehensive assessment of the CAR’s security apparatus: each sector (the armed forces, the police force, the justice sector, the intelligence services, management procedures and mechanisms, Parliamentarians and civil society resources) has been audited in detail. This expertise provided the rationale for the 2008 SSR National Seminar. Interestingly, a lot of connections exist between this team and the DG Dev of the European Commission. This team was initially contracted by the UNDP and by one EU member state, namely Belgium. A lot of the members of this expert team were themselves Belgians. This involvement of Belgium in a country that does not belong to its traditional sphere of influence reflects the will to resume a more active policy in Central Africa after having withdrawn from the African scene following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. However, this involvement can also be interpreted as a symptom of the strong influence of Belgian nationals within European institutions: in Brussels, Belgians are often in charge of African Affairs, in the General Secretariat as well as in the Commission, especially in the DG Dev. Interestingly, Belgium was one of the first EU member-states to endorse the OECD/DAC SSR doctrine. The connections between the DG Dev and the Belgian government of course intensified when Louis Michel, former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed as Development Commissioner to run the DG Dev. The team of international experts has clearly promoted the views and beliefs promoted by the DG Dev and favoured a human-security-based approach to SSR. Their assessment has been central in the definition of the agenda of the security reform process in CAR: Peter Haas’ definition (1992) of an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ perfectly describes the connections that exist between the DG Dev and the external experts in the CAR’s SSR process. 19

In contrast, the influence of Central African nationals in the agenda-setting process has been more than marginal. A National Preparatory Committee, made of Central African personalities, was set up to prepare the National SSR Seminar. The National Seminar itself formally involved an important number of Central African participants (both from governmental and non-governmental circles). However, most of the Central African stakeholders involved in the assessment process were in fact hardly able to mobilise credible expertise.

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19 The approach developed by Ruth Hanau Santini (2006) should be extended to integrate into the analysis the cognitive influence that experts deployed in Southern partner-countries can have on policymaking. Ruth Hanau Santini advocates an approach based on the relationship between French and German foreign policy epistemic communities (composed of experts as well as policymakers) to analyse the CFSP and the elaboration of the European Security Strategy.
Seeing the striking lack of national assessment capacities, the international partners finally decided to send an international SSR team from the OECD to train all members of the Preparatory Committee. National stakeholders thus were influenced by their incorporation into the international SSR networks in developing their own conceptions of security. Having been constrained by this international SSR network from expressing their own real views, they have been unable to put forward their own conceptions of security. It is clearly the views of international experts – themselves converted to the human-security-based approach to SSR – which have largely framed the agenda and a two-year timeline of the SSR process.

3.3 Programmatic resources

The mobilisation of programmatic resources is meant to identify the priorities, to establish a hierarchy between them, and to select appropriate resources and funding mechanisms in order to set up a planning programme. The resources for SSR have been mobilised by three international actors – the EC, the UNDP and France – and have been combined to put SSR on CAR’s agenda: goals, objectives and timelines have been defined in order to fit into the Poverty Reduction Strategy.

The identity of the EU institutional actors involved in SSR-related programmes in CAR is to a large extent derived from the financial instruments dedicated to external assistance. The role of the ‘Brussels-based development network’ has thus been central in the programming phase of the SSR. In accordance with the guidelines on project cycle management (Babaud and Kerts 2008), the DG Relex and the DG Dev have been involved in the programming phase of the SSR process in CAR.21 Besides this, the EuropeAid office has also been involved in the programmatic phase. The support provided by the EC to the SSR process in CAR is funded by the Instrument for Stability, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the EDF (European Development Fund). This largely explains why an important part of the two-year timeline (the so-called ‘chronogramme of activities’, which describes in detail all the activities to be launched in each

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20 In 2005, the OECD/DAC agreed that a number of SSR-related activities (SSR civilian activities and democratic oversight of the military forces) could be funded by development budgets. Accordingly, several thematic and geographic financial instruments dedicated to external assistance are supporting SSR-related programmes. Furthermore, some SSR programmes can be funded under the European Development Fund (FED – which does not come under the Community’s general budget but is managed by a special Committee within the Commission). Finally, some plans are being considered with the option of funding some SSR activities using the Peace Facility budget.

21 Indeed, the framework for EC-led SSR processes is the Country/Regional Strategy Paper (CSP or RSP), which sets out the main objectives and sector priorities for cooperation for a seven-year term (six years for ACP countries). More specifically, SSR-related programmes are included within National or Regional Indicative Programmes (NIP or RIP) which detail specific activities and expect results corresponding to the strategic objectives of the CSP/RSP. DG Dev and DG Relex have overall responsibility for developing CSPs, in theory in close collaboration with partner countries.
sector of the security system) relates to activities aimed at promoting human rights and democratic oversight.

Another key EC actor in this programming phase has clearly been the EU Delegation in Bangui which has played a pivotal role, both at the political and technical level, acting as an interface between the Directorates-General in Brussels and the international and national stakeholders in CAR. In fact, the major guidelines of the EU support to the SSR process are based on the Delegation’s input to the DG Relex and DG Dev. This pivotal role of the EU Delegation in the implementation of EU support to the SSR process in CAR sheds light on the major importance – often underestimated – of the EU Delegation in the European foreign and security policy decision-making processes. Little has been published about European Commission delegations or their precursors. Veronique Dimier’s research (2003, and with McGeever 2006) – dealing with the evolution of the status and role of the Delegations of the European Commission in Africa from the 1960s onwards and showing that this evolution reflects the bureaucratisation of the external service (in the Weberian sense of a rational and professional civil service) in parallel with that of the administration of the Commission as a whole – offers an interesting (neo-intuitionalist) approach to grasp the growing influence of the EU Delegation in the EU foreign policymaking processes. Furthermore, whilst not dealing with the EU (but rather with the United Nations system), the perspective developed by Klaus Schlichte’s scholar group (on the Micropolitics of Armed Groups) at Humboldt University could relevantly be tailored to EU foreign and development policy. Focusing on the processes of knowledge production and implementation, Klaus Schlichte and Alex Veit (2007) develop the model of ‘coupled arenas’ and argue that the ‘outcomes of state-building policies have to be “associated with organisational problems and connected ways of perceiving reality within interventionists” camps’. The activities of international agencies active in the field of peace and state-building are occurring in different locations simultaneously and policy outcomes can be better understood when conceived as the results of the interactions between actors in three different arenas, namely: the metropolitan (most of the time Western) headquarters, national base camps (located in the capital of

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22 It is important to mention that the SSR process in CAR is also shaped by interactions between the different multilateral stakeholders. Since 2005, international donors’ coordination in partner countries has supposedly meant to be based, wherever possible, on the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which lauds donors’ coordination. The UNDP is the major multilateral partner of the EU in the SSR process. Consequently, one of the most important tasks of the EU Delegation is to coordinate the EC SSR-related programmes with those of the UNDP, in order to clearly define roles and responsibilities, and to avoid ambiguity about divisions of labour that could hamper implementation. As stated by Lisa Laakso (2005), EU interactions with international organisations (and third states) are not sufficiently acknowledged in the multi-level governance model.

23 The EU Delegation in CAR is part of the External Service of the European Commission (Directorate General for External Relations). However, the Delegation does not only represent the Commission, but the EU as a whole. In 2003 the EU Delegation’s responsibilities expanded considerably as a consequence of the devolution policy adopted by the Commission in 2000. From then on, the Delegation has covered all aspects – from identification to implementation and evaluation – of the EU external assistance and aid programme.
partner/recipient countries) and local offices ‘in the bush’. These three different arenas are interactive, for instance through financial resources or staff transfer which are both top-down and bottom-up in essence (e.g. financial resources transferred from the headquarters to the field and knowledge and information acquired locally which are transferred by agents located on the ground). Finally, the three levels are mutually dependent as they produce legitimacy for each other. As mentioned above, the multi-level governance approach to the EU’s CFSP/ESDP tend to focus on the interactions between decision-making actors located in member-states’ capitals on the one hand and in Brussels-based circles (that is the bureaucratic actors of the different directorate of the General Secretariat of the Council and – even if to a lesser extent, the bureaucratic actors of the Commission) on the other hand. However, the CFSP/ESDP involves a much larger set of decision-making actors than those two categories: to better understand the policy outcomes of this policy, it is necessary to integrate into the analysis the European decision-making process, actors which are based in partner countries, namely the EU in-country representatives (the EU Delegation) and the representatives of EU member states (the embassies and the cooperation services affiliated to them). In fact, the programmatic phase of the SSR process has also been highly shaped by the interactions between the EU Delegation and France. Being a leading member of the EU – especially as regards the EU Development policy – as well as the major bilateral player in CAR, France has both an ‘inside’ and ‘outside partner’ role with the EU delegation, which together with its long experience in the country reinforces its influence on EU policy in the CAR. France in particular is among the main contributors to the European Development Fund (EDF) and consequently can favour one or other programme within the EDF Committee. In the programmatic phase, France proved to be eager to see its own bilateral policy integrated into the SSR process. One of its first requirements has been to have its traditional military and security cooperation network fully associated to the design of the SSR programmes meant to be funded by the EC. In particular, the French traditional security network has lobbied France and the EC to better take into account the views of the ruling elites valuing a traditional approach to security (state-centred rather than human-security centred). It also proved eager to ensure that social interests of the security services were taken into account in the two-year timeline. Whilst the CAR government did not manage to promote the social condition of the security services (excepting those of the presidential guard and other praetorian services), the traditional French cooperation networks have been very efficient in supporting the claims of the CAR security network, on behalf of the ‘arms fraternity’ (fraternité d’armes).

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24 France has traditionally been the main contributor to the EDF – its contribution represented 24.3 per cent of the 9th EDF (2003–2008). This is about to change, however, as Germany will be the main contributor to the 10th EDF (2008–2013), while France’s share will drop to 19.5 per cent.

25 The EDF Committee consists of member-state representatives and meets every two months in order to give an opinion on the programmes proposed by the Commission.
3.4 Distribution of power in the policy formulation phase

Mostly based on the human security paradigm, the OECD/DAC approach to SSR endorsed by the EU fundamentally challenges the state-centric and sovereign conception of security: it aims to broaden the set of actors involved in security policy beyond government circles. Through SSR, the EU in particular and development agencies more generally are fundamentally trying to change power relationships in Southern countries by making policymaking processes more inclusive and accountable. International actors – driven by development agencies – are trying to support a greater involvement by national non-state and non-governmental actors as well as to promote the role of international ones (in fact themselves) in the governance of the security sector, by promoting more decentralised and pluralistic decision-making processes. From this point of view, the OECD/EU approach to SSR is an illustration of governance as defined by Marcus and Torfing (2007) who consider that ‘governance implies a decentring of governing away from the state and a pluralisation of actors involved in governing’: SSR is not in essence a move away from the state but an attempt at embedding security policymaking in wider regulatory and control networks. In sum, security reform as conceived by the EU – mostly influenced by the views of the Brussels-based development community, itself made up of Commission officials (DG Dev, DG Relex and EuropeAid) and experts sharing their beliefs – is primarily seen as a way of diffusing liberal norms and values of democracy and human rights into the security field.

This approach has to some extent been completed by France which has both supported and counterbalanced it: whilst French diplomatic actors have clearly endorsed the human-security-driven agenda, it has also been agreed that the traditional ‘French military/security cooperation network’ would stay fully involved in the definition of the SSR agenda. This network has acted as a mediator to promote the social claims of the CAR’s military staff. Such a network is also very sensitive to the views of the ruling elite network, seen as the best guarantee to perpetuate a political order conducive to some kind of stability in the region.

Yet, the vision of security promoted through the SSR concept is not in accordance with the vision of security which is most widespread among CAR’s political stakeholders, be they in the government or not. However, the political actors (including those currently ruling the country) have not been able to mobilise assessment and programming resources to promote their own conception of security reform, which is primarily seen as a means to reinforce the military apparatus. Central African actors have not been able to mobilise significant expertise and programmatic resources to have a major impact on the formulation phase. The solutions privileged by the CAR population to meet their definition of security (which mostly amounts to physical security and in fact are not very concerned with matters of transparency and accountability) have not really been taken into account. This can be explained by the fact that the populations are not represented by any powerful or influential civil society network.
The SSR process has consequently been almost exclusively framed by international actors (mainly the European development network and the French coopérants networks). In sum, it is difficult to identify any major influence by the national actors over the policy formulation phase of the policymaking process.

4 Implementing phase: managing and monitoring

To assess the distribution of power in this implementing phase, I will focus on four kinds of resources which are mobilised:

1. institutional resources
2. technical resources
3. financial resources
4. monitoring resources.

4.1 Institutional resources

Three kinds of institutional resources are considered in the following paragraphs: constitutional resources, legislative resources and decentralised resources. The issue is to determine to what extent the CAR institutional framework is conducive to democratic security governance as defined by the OECD/EU doctrines. Indeed, it is highly important for SSR processes to be tailored to fit the institutional regime of the partner country.

The new Constitution of the Central African Republic, adopted by referendum on 5 December 2004, was promulgated on 28 December 2004 by President Bozizé. Elaborated on the basis of the previous Constitution of 14 January 1995 (and constantly violated by President Patassé), this new fundamental law established a semi-presidential regime. The constitutional framework is largely inspired by the French Fifth Republic Constitution which formally favours the concentration of power in the hands of the Presidency. According to the Constitutions, the President of the Republic, as Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, is able to define the national defence policy, which is executed by the Minister of the Armed Forces, under the aegis of the Prime Minister. As in most Francophone African countries, these constitutional provisions have resulted in a situation where the security domain is, to a large extent, the exclusive monopoly of the President, assisted by a limited circle of civilian and military advisers (Bagayoko 2010). However, such exorbitant prerogatives were apparently not sufficient. Since 2003, General Bozizé has held concurrently the roles of President of the Republic and Minister of Defence, in violation of Article 23 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the function of the President of the Republic is incompatible with the exercise of any other political function. Under
international pressure, General Bozizé finally decided to create the post of Minister of State for Defence, which he conferred on his son.

One of the central objectives of the SSR process is the promotion of the role of Parliament in the supervision and oversight of the defence and security institutions. In the CAR, the Parliament is unicameral: the National Assembly consists of 105 representatives. At present, the Central African National Assembly is dominated by representatives associated with President Bozizé. They include: the independent group KNK26 (a political association created by General Bozizé and not yet constituted as a political party), associated to a myriad of small parties headed by individuals who have joined the presidential majority, without integrating the KNK itself. The KNK holds 45 seats of the whole 77 seat majority. The parties of the opposition are former President Patassé’s party (taken over by Jean-Jacques Démafouth), the former President Kolingba’s party, the party of the historical opponent Abel Goumba (companion of the CAR’s founder Barthélemy Boganda) and some other small associations of lesser importance on the political scene. According to Article 61 of the Central African Constitution, the National Assembly is empowered to exercise parliamentary control over the defence and security forces. Two Parliamentary committees are in charge of security matters: the ‘Defence’ Committee, in charge of questions relating to the FACA (Forces armées de Centrafriques – Central African armed forces) and to the Gendarmerie, and the ‘Home/Law’ Committee, in charge of questions relating to the internal security forces. These Committees are endowed with the power of inquiry and are supposed to control ministerial responsibility through oral or written questions, or can even vote for a censure motion against ministers; they are also supposed to approve and control the defence and security budget and to supervise the interventions of the armed and security forces. However, the Parliamentarians do not in practice exercise the powers they are entrusted to by the Constitution. In fact, empowering the National Assembly as planned by the SSR process largely amounts to reinforcing the government itself, given that the Central African National Assembly is dominated by Parliamentarians belonging to political parties associated with the President. Consequently, most of the members of the Defence and the Internal Affairs Committees belong to parties from the majority group and are very unlikely to launch information enquiries or to adopt legislation that the government does not agree with. It is worth noting as well that it is hard to consider the political parties not affiliated to the presidential majority as opposition groups: most of the members of these parties have been participating in one way or another in successive governments of the current regime, confirming the prevalence of a ruling elites network. Nevertheless, the democratic legitimacy of the Central African Parliamentarians cannot be denied: indeed, the unquestionably fair legislative elections of May 2005 truly gave the head of state a majority in parliament. Yet, it is also an unquestionable fact that most of the political groups in the National Assembly are chaired by close relatives of President Bozizé.

26 The meaning of this acronym is ‘Koua Na Koua’ which in sango more or less refers to labour.
The SSR process is also planning to increase the influence of decentralised actors over security governance. The objective is to create zones of defence in order to develop a ‘défense de proximité’ (defence of proximity): these zones of defence are to coincide with the government of administrative regions and are meant to be managed by the prefects of each zone. The idea is to confer on the prefect the responsibility for coordinating the troops deployed in his prefecture. It is also planned to reinforce the municipal police forces and consequently the power of the mayors who are legally responsible for overseeing those forces. Yet these zones of defence, as well as the regions, are empty shells. Indeed, administrative regions were created on paper and should be headed by governors. Law 88.005 and Order 88.006 of 5 and 12 February 1988 determine the administrative organisation of CAR and override Laws 64/32 and 64/33 of 20 November 1964. However, both the 1988 orders have been only partially implemented so far. The municipality is a territorial jurisdiction, consisting of villages, districts, areas and neighbourhoods, the territorial limits of which are determined by law. According to the texts, mayors are elected by the city council, who is itself elected for five years. However, no municipal election has ever been organised in the Central African Republic and, at present, mayors are appointed by the central power by decrees or orders. That is why mayors are called ‘Présidents de délégation spéciale’ (presidents of special delegation). Besides, mayors failing in their duties can be revoked by the President of the Republic, in a decree of revocation. Moreover, in spite of the 1988 laws, there were no prefects in the regions (provinces) until 2003: it was the military governors who managed the problems of administration and police. The 1988 law regarding prefects and sub-prefects is now effective. In his district, the prefect is the representative of State. However, it is doubtful that increasing the responsibilities of decentralised actors as envisioned by the SSR process would result in a more balanced management of the security sector. Indeed, decentralised actors such as prefects and mayors are appointed by the central government and these positions are also always entrusted to close relatives of the President or to relatives of opposition leaders who have joined him.

4.2 Financial resources

As one of the poorest countries in the world, the Central African state clearly cannot mobilise the financial resources needed to fund a holistic SSR process. In fact, the funding required is almost exclusively provided by the international community.

Following the 2008 National SSR Seminar, the EC decided to focus its support of the SSR process on the following core actions:

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27 Currently, the Central African Republic is divided into 16 prefectures, each placed under the responsibility of a prefect. These prefectures are divided into 66 sub-prefectures, then into 175 municipalities. Moreover, there are 8,800 villages or districts.
• supporting the deployment of an international SSR multidisciplinary team in charge of assisting the Central African stakeholders (both in governmental and non-governmental circles) with the implementation of the reforms defined in the two-year timeline;

• funding the 33 months of back-pay of the servicemen (7 million Euros);

• financing a 10 million Euros plan to support justice sector reform;

• and continuing to provide financial support to the regional peacekeeping force, MICOPAX, that the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has created and which is entrusted with an SSR mandate.

On a bilateral basis, France has also been devolving an important part of its cooperation budget in the CAR to finance security-related programmes.

However, international donors only have partial control over the resources they provide to fund the SSR process. It appears that the CAR’s government is largely able to control the way in which the financial resources dedicated to the SSR process are used, particularly those dedicated to the defence sector. Officially, the defence budget, voted on by the Parliament, amounts to 12–13 per cent of the national budget. Yet, the budget of the armed forces appears to be only symbolic. It is extremely difficult for the Parliamentarians and the oversight bodies (auditor general, inspector general, Ombudsman, Audit Account Court) to obtain information about the realities of the defence budget. Only the President and the Deputy Minister of Defence (his own son) know the reality of the available amounts and, apparently, they are the only ones who can decide on the allocation of funds. Nobody within the armed forces, not even the CEMA (Chief of Staff), has access to the budget, which is administered directly by the Presidency: the CEMA has to send requests monthly to the Deputy Minister of Defence to be allowed to engage in any expenditure, from printer toners to funding for ammunitions or training sessions. A number of international experts (both contracted by multilateral donors and by France) confess that the question of the defence budget remains totally mysterious to them: this issue is too sensitive for them to dare ask questions.

This situation partly explains why one of the key objectives of the SSR process is to introduce transparency and sound principles in the management of the security sector, particularly by favouring the development of auditing capacities. However, most of the institutions and procedures that international partners are trying to support are in fact deprived of any significant influence over the budgeting process. For instance, whilst the Audit Account Court is seen by international donors as a key independent oversight body, the magistrates from this jurisdiction confess to being very reluctant to control the expenses of the security sector, tacitly considered as an exclusive monopoly of the Head of State. Furthermore, the Audit Account Court has not been given any means

28 Interviews with representatives of international donors, Bangui, April 2008.
29 Interviews with representatives of international donors, Bangui, April 2008.
by the Government or the Parliament to fulfil its missions: the Court members do not have any cars or computers. Similarly, the Parliament votes on security budgets as requested by the government without being given any information regarding its content.

In fact, it appears that even external funds cannot be sufficiently controlled through the national budget system: the audit and control procedures are not functioning and the budgeting process is in fact largely controlled not by the government as such, but exclusively by the Presidency.

### 4.3 Technical resources

The international experts have been very important players in the implementation process since the set up of the multidisciplinary SSR advisory team, responsible for assisting the Central African stakeholders in the implementation of the reforms defined in the two-year timeline chronology. This team has been jointly supported by the EU and the UNDP: whilst the UNDP has committed itself to funding three of the experts, the EC has funded five experts, namely the head of the team, the defence sector reform adviser, the police sector reform adviser, the public finances expert and the land settlement expert. Interestingly, France has been able to integrate its own national experts into the EU-funded team: indeed, a number of French individual agents who had been involved for several years in the French security policy in CAR, have been hired to implement the EU SSR policy. Among the five EU-funded experts, two are French coopérants (the military expert and the police expert) who were already posted in the CAR before the launching of the SSR process. The military expert, formally special adviser to the Deputy Minister of Defence, has become the military expert of the SSR multidisciplinary team. One of the French police coopérants of the Mission de Sécurité intérieure affiliated to the French Embassy has become the international police expert for this team. The public finance expert was also of French nationality. They have all only changed their 'French helmet' for an EU helmet. Such a shift in their formal position has been a way to make the reform process more acceptable to the views of the CAR government, already familiar with those individuals: those experts – who have also been involved in the formulation phase as mentioned above – have been very close to the central African military and security elites. It has also been a means for France to share some costs of its bilateral defence and security cooperation. Finally, it has given France the opportunity to keep some control over the SSR process.

In addition, around 50 French security coopérants are still posted in the CAR, working under the supervision of the Mission militaire de coopération as regards technical support to the military, the Mission de Sécurité intérieure, as regards technical support to the police and the gendarmerie forces, under the supervision of the Service d’action culturelle et de coopération, as regards support to the justice and the customs sector. Thus the traditional ‘defence/security cooperation network’ has stayed profoundly embedded into security reform and governance in CAR.
Regarding domestic expertise, most of the national experts who have been designated to implement the SSR process (especially the ‘point focaux’ responsible for coordinating the reforms in each area of the security sector) do belong to the ‘first proximity circle’ of President Bozizé. Those local experts have been to a large extent implementing the technical options designed by the EU-funded team or by French technical advisors.

4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) resources

Monitoring resources are mobilised to review progress and achievement and to evaluate the impact of the SSR process. Monitoring is used as a management tool to adjust assistance programmes to changing context and needs. In the CAR’s SSR process, monitoring resources are exclusively mobilised by international actors: the EU Delegation is responsible, in cooperation with EuropeAid, for coordinating all of the assistance provided by different Directorate Generals of the Commission (Directorate General for External Relations; Directorate General for Development; EuropeAid) and for evaluating and auditing the reform process. The experts who have been mobilised for M&E related-tasks are more or less the same individuals who had previously been mobilised in the assessment phase and belong to the Brussels-based development network.

4.5 Distribution of power in the implementation phase

The implementation phase of the CAR’s SSR process is clearly dominated by the government and more precisely by the Presidency which is proving to be able to control both an important part of the financial resources (even if those are almost exclusively provided by international partners) and the institutional resources located in non-governmental policymaking circles. The government has ‘cherry picked’ between assistance programmes in order to enforce its own agenda; that is, fighting the rebel groups in provinces. Non-governmental decision-making circles (especially the Parliamentarians and the decentralised actors) meant to be associated with the governance of the security sector or to control and supervise it are in fact to a large extent – if not fully – controlled by the government, which has penetrated most of the other decision-making centres. In fact, the local actors that international partners are aiming to fully associate with the security decision-making process are frequently an instrument of the government itself.

Notwithstanding this range of formal mechanisms, it is worth noting that:

- most of the domestic decision-makers supposed to be involved in the SSR process belong to the same ethnic group as the President or are closely related to him by kinship relationships. Today, as an ICG (International Crisis Group) report succinctly underlines, the real power is monopolised by the President of the Republic and his close relatives:30

  as analysis of the Bozizé regime reveals, real power was monopolised by the president and his close associates, most of whom were
members of his immediate family or ethnic group. (...) Analysis of the list of names most frequently mentioned in this context by both foreign and CAR observers aware of the workings of the regime leads to a triple conclusion: the ‘alveolar’ division of power, the strong personalisation of power and the over-representation of General Bozizé’s ethnic group, the Gbaya. We can distinguish several operational circles around President Bozizé, all of which are supported by the state’s institutional framework (...). They all depend on direct access to the head of state, a source of a power unhampered by rules. This is clearly true for his close friends, more distant relatives and also for the regime’s political commissars, the people who silently get the work done and their auxiliaries in key administrative posts or serving as brokers at the international level.

(International Crisis Group 2007: 18–19)

- other important domestic stakeholders come from political factions who finally chose to show allegiance to President Bozizé. General Bozizé, after his election in 2005, brought many prominent personalities from back grounds different to his own into the government. Some important positions have indeed been attributed to personalities previously affiliated to Bozize’s enemies. This is, for instance, the case with the former Chief of Staff of Patassé who was hired head of the SSR coordination structure (Secrétariat Technique Permanent) before being hired as Minister of Foreign Affairs, after the 2008 Political Inclusive Dialogue.

In fact, inter-institutional relationships in CAR are underpinned by a complex system of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional nature. Informal links and structures of power based on such factors as ethnic group/family as well as informal political connections count as much as the formal institutional mechanisms (Bigo 1988). Put another way, inter-institutional relationships in the CAR’s social context are working ‘via a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships of which the formal mechanisms are either a component thereof or are, alternatively, merely the formal expression of these power relations’ (Williams 2005).31 Governance is networked in the CAR but the informal social and political solidarity networks do not necessarily contribute to the democratic governance of the security sector: the actors that the international stakeholders

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30 Contrary to his predecessors, since he seized power in 2003, General Bozizé cannot really be accused of leading an ethnic policy in the army. Recently, to satisfy the international community (one of the major objectives of security sector reform being to introduce a better balance in the ethnic com position of the armed and security forces), the Deputy Minister of Defence launched a recruitment drive for 500 soldiers, recruited from the whole of the country. However, when interviewed, servicemen (as well as gendarmes, policemen, and customs officers) admitted that only the Gbaya (from the President’s ethnic group) have authority, whilst the Yakoma (from the ethnic group of former President Kolingba) are marginalised. All the highest positions are occupied by those who represent the ascendancy of the Gbaya group.

31 Only a few researchers have investigated the security decision-making processes in Southern countries (Bastian and Hendrickson 2008).
are seeking to mobilise are in fact controlled by the government which does not have the same agenda or at least the same definition of security as the one underlying the SSR concept.

On the other hand, international stakeholders such as the EU only have limited influence – essentially exercised via their financial and monitoring resources – on the implementation of the SSR process. The most influential international actor in the implementation phase is clearly France through its technical, military and security advisors.

5 Conclusion

The case study of the SSR process in the Central African Republic shows how decision-making competencies are shared amongst a variety of actors, internationally located at different territorial and institutional levels and organised around different networks. Investigating the kind of power distribution at stake in the SSR process clearly suggests that there is a growing dispersion of power in the CAR’s security governance. As stated by Yves-Alexandre Chouala:

[the] multi-level governance context is characterised by the multiplicity of actors with a different nature and unequal resources and positions. It’s therefore a situation marked by divergent objectives and interests. In such a context therefore, triumphal objectives and interests are those of actors having the advantage of the balance of resources within the security governance field (pers. comm.)

The policy networks at stake in the security sector reform process in CAR are namely:

- The European Union development community, which promotes a governance approach to security based on the human security paradigm and is forming an epistemic community made up of experts from some member-states and civil servants from the European Commission;

- The French traditional security cooperation network, which promotes a more classical perspective on security assistance and whose fundamental objective is stability. The influence of this network has urged France – both an insider and an outsider as regards its relations with the EU – to re-orientate the EU approach: consequently the EU is mainly funding technical SSR programmes (military, police, public finance) which are traditional areas of French cooperation (and are in fact directly implemented by French technical security advisors). Through this network, France has been present at almost all levels of the policymaking process (both in the formulation and implementation phase);

- The CAR’s ruling elites network, presently dominated by the Bozizé faction, which is adhering to a very traditional approach to SSR. Whilst unable to enforce such a perspective during the formulation phase of the SSR
process, Bozizé’s faction has been able to dominate the implementation process, being able to keep control both on the financial resources and on the domestic actors supposed to supervise his own use of the security forces.

New international players such as the EU (and the UNDP) have undoubtedly been able to set up new priorities and new conceptions of security in CAR. However, their influence over the outcomes is in fact limited to a large extent to the policy formulation phase (normative and assessment resources). The implementation phase, on the contrary, is mostly dominated by the Central African executive power which is the only actor able to mobilise and control both the local resources and, to a lesser extent, some of the international resources. However, the CAR’s government network is not a separate network which would act independently from the two others: in fact, the French traditional security cooperation network has been providing the bridge between the ruling elites network and the European Development network, promoting a kind of ‘meso-approach’.

The approach to security sector reform, as promoted by multilateral actors, is mainly framed in terms of technical questions of coordination and political questions of democratic governance. Such an approach interferes with the CAR’s value systems and patronage networks, which are today largely dominated by Bozizé’s faction. One of the main problems of the EU SSR concept, itself derived from the OECD approach, is that it is too often based on theoretical models which are drawn from western political science and which are of limited use in understanding how the security sector actually works in practice in African states. It is then necessary to take into consideration the micro-social dynamics and the diverse forms of organisation and civil control, which are unconstrained by formal legality in practice, and which involve other social processes and interfaces. A wide range of informal procedures shape decision-making in the CAR, and interfere with the norms and procedures that are promoted by multilateral actors. These kinds of informal processes, often rooted in kinship, customary and patronage networks but also in shadow-political networks, co-exist with the state’s formal decision-making structures, inspired by the Weberian rationalist organisational model (inherited from French colonial rule) and increasingly by the decentralised mechanisms that multilateral actors are attempting to introduce via the SSR process.

Furthermore, the actors that can be seen as an immediate alternative or rather a complement to the presidential security apparatus are presently not located in the check-and-balance institutions inspired by the Western institutional model. These actors can be seen as belonging to two categories: first, the vigilante and self-defence groups (the so-called ‘local forces’ and ‘archers’) established by the villagers in the provinces; secondly, traditional and customary justice institutions. However, these actors, even if meeting some expectations of the population, do not always intervene on behalf of the democratic and human rights standards promoted by the SSR concept.

The multi-level governance approach – when complemented by a ‘policy/social network approach’ and by the policy transfer approach which put the stress on informal, loose structures, network ties and belief affinities that extend across,
and beyond, hierarchies – is well-equipped to grasp such processes. Indeed, the value that is added by a multi-level governance approach is that it goes beyond formal organisational arrangements, and formal decision-making mechanisms, recognising complexity far more than traditional politico-administrative models do. The multi-level governance approach can provide a relevant framework to study the way in which domestic security governance in some African countries is reshaped by the interactions of the heterogeneous norms, standards and procedures underlying international and domestic decision-making processes, which thus contribute to challenging the state-centric definition of sovereign security governance.

The question of the state-centric notion of sovereignty does matter, particularly in the context of a policy aimed at reforming a sector that is traditionally at the core of state institutions. But investigating the SSR process in CAR through a multi-level governance approach allows one to incorporate sovereignty and the informal realities of multiple actors and processes, thus enabling one to draw conclusions about the kind of security governance which is emerging in the Central African context. The security sector, traditionally seen as the preserve of the sovereign state, is no longer centrally governed, but increasingly multi-level governed. However, this situation does not mean that the Central African state has lost its prominence in the realm of security. At present, local or indigenous procedures as well as political and patronage networks controlled by the ruling elite controlling the state are likely to prevail over technical procedures and inclusive governance arrangements promoted by international actors.32

Determining if the incorporation of currently peripheral CAR actors (Parliamentarians, Audit account, Ombudsman, decentralised actors, etc.) into the international networks may lead to change in the future (towards more democratic security governance) might constitute a very stimulating agenda for a multi-level governance approach to security governance in Southern countries.

32 According to Yves-Alexandre Chouala (pers. comm.) ‘Historically and practically, sovereignty has never been absolute and in this sense, the Central African Republic has never been a full sovereign State in the security field. But, if one agrees that sovereignty is more often conceived as the room for manoeuvre and autonomy that a State conserves in a constraint and relational context, the Central African Republic probably remains a sovereign security State’.
## Appendices

### A1 Two-fold SSR coordination structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National structure</th>
<th>International structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Sectoral RSS Committee (interagency)**  
Chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence  
Composed of ministers involved in the process;  
Chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence, assisted by Minister of Justice;  
Rapporteur from the Ministry of Interior;  
Rapporteur assistant (also President of STP);  
Representatives (1 – 3) of each Ministry, two representatives of civil society (Human Rights and Women’s Association);  
Ten representatives of international donors. | **International Committee RSS**  
Ambassadors (France, Belgium) and representatives of multilateral institutions (BONOCA, UNDP, EC)  
Head of the international multidisciplinary team whose seven members are assigned to each cluster (interface between the national structure and international structure)  
International team of external evaluation |
| **Permanent Technical Secretariat (STP)**  
Coordinator: General Gambi (being replaced), assisted by a deputy;  
Three permanent secretaries (gender, legal and institutional framework; synchronisation of activities), working under the responsibility of the Chief of the multidisciplinary international team  
International experts: defence, policy, planning, public finance, justice, democratic control; DDR | **Associates and former advisors’ embassies (France, EU, UNDP, BONOCA)** |
| **Thematic groups (coordinated by a National Focal Point)**  
Seven groups (defence, policy, planning, public finance, justice, democratic control);  
Each cluster is led by a focal point identified within each department and consisting of one international and three to five national members. | **Cooperating bilateral technical staff seconded to ministries** |
A2 Political history of the Central African Republic

Since the proclamation of the independence of the Oubangui-Chari province of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) in 1960, and after the murder of the father of the nation, Barthélemy Boganda, five different presidents succeeded one another (one of them, David Dacko, held two terms in 14 years).

The current political actors of the CAR political scene have played a leading role for decades: most of them occupied high level positions (as shown in the table below) before joining the ranks of different rebel outfits.

**Table A2.1 Presidents of the Central African Republic 1960–present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Post occupied prior to Presidency</th>
<th>Reason for the end of Presidential term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Dacko</td>
<td>1960–1965</td>
<td>Ngbaka</td>
<td>Secretary of Home Affairs, the economy and finance</td>
<td>Coup (31 December 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bédel Bokassa</td>
<td>1966–1979</td>
<td>Ngbaka</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td>Dismissed in his absence by the French troops (21 September 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Dacko</td>
<td>1979–1981</td>
<td>Ngbaka</td>
<td>Advisor to Bokassa’s staff</td>
<td>Coup (1 September 1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André Kolingba</td>
<td>1981–1993</td>
<td>Yakoma</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td>Defeat at the elections (19 September 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Bozizé</td>
<td>2003–…</td>
<td>Gbaya</td>
<td>Former Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Central African State is characterised by the ethnicisation of its politics. General Kolingba particularly favoured his family and his ethnic group, the Yakoma; a minority ethnic group who represent less than 5 per cent of the population. To punish Ange-Félix Patassé for having stirred up a coup attempt, General Kolingba ordered punitive expeditions in the ethnic fiefs of the putschist, especially in the region of Paoua (Patassé’s home town) and Markounda. A lot of people were massacred, creating a long-lived hatred of Kaba Sara against Yakoma. Kolingba inaugurated the instrumentalisation of ethnic membership for political purposes. It is in the army, and in particular in the Presidential Guard, that the ethnic policy of Kolingba was most obvious. At the end of his mandate, in 1993, 70 per cent of the FAC (Forces armées centrafricaines – the Central African armed forces) came from the minority ethnic group of the Yakoma.

After three presidents who were natives of the South (David Dacko and Jean-Bédel Bokassa both Nbaka, and André Kolingba, of Yakoma origin), Patassé
was the first president stemming from the North. The new Head of State widely aggravated the division between Northerners and Southerners, by setting ‘people of the savanna to people of the river’. Patassé largely distrusted the army, and particularly the Presidential Guard, seen as Kolingba’s personal militia. First, he tried to guarantee his personal safety by putting the Yakoma Presidential Guard back into the ranks of the FACA. Privileged under the previous regime, soldiers and officers from the Yakoma ethnic group sunk then into dissatisfaction. The new Presidential Guard also turned out to be a tribal militia, this time quasi-exclusively constituted by Sara-Kabas, Patassé’s northerly ethnic group. The rivalries between this new Presidential Guard and the FACA, who were increasingly neglected, were largely the origin of the mutinies of 1996–7.

In 1996 and 1997, three mutinies broke out to protest against the non-payment of salaries and the degradation of the living conditions of the FACA. Fifty people were reported dead. Following these mutinies, France decided to put an end to its permanent military presence in the country.

Supported by France, six African countries – Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad and Togo, agreed to send troops within an inter-African peacekeeping force, the MISAB. 750 African soldiers were so deployed in Bangui. On 15 April 1998, the MISAB handed over to the 1,350 strong MINURCA (Mission of United Nations for the Central African Republic) troops. On 1 April 2000, the MINURCA ended, leaving the place to the Office of the UN observation mission in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which consisted of 70 civilians.

On 28 May 2001, a commando attacked President Patassé’s residence. Although General Kolingba claimed an overthrow on national radio, President Patassé quickly suspected the Minister of Defence, Jean-Jacques Démafouth, who was duly dismissed and arrested. Jean-Jacques Démafouth was acquitted by the CAR courts, after Patassé identified a new actor hidden within the overthrow attempt in the person of General Bozizé, the Chief of Staff, who was dismissed. In violation of the agreement negotiated with General Lamine Cissé, head of the BONUCA, Ange-Félix Patassé tried again to seize François Bozizé, who succeeded in fleeing to Chad, and then on to France. After the coup attempt, Patassé launched a hunt for Yakomas in Bangui, which ended in 300 deaths and the flight of 50,000 inhabitants from the capital.

Supported by the Chadian armed forces, Bozizé’s loyalists launched a new raid on Bangui in October 2002. The opposition in exile lined up behind General Bozizé, who also benefited from an alliance of regional leaders against Patassé, which included President Déby, who had just launched a counter-offensive of governmental forces in the North of the Central African Republic against Chadian rebels. He provided Bozizé with elements of his Presidential Guard; President Joseph Kabila of DRC sent the requested armaments; President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo Brazzaville financed the operation; Gabon’s President Bongo offered his ‘blessings’.

On 15 March 2003, General Bozizé arrived in Bangui with troops consisting of 80 per cent Chadians. The FACA did not react to the offensive (led while
President Patassé was abroad) whereas the force of the CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire des Etats d’Afrique centrale) did not oppose the arrival of the rebels. The French Operation Boali, aided the stabilisation of the new regime. In May 2005, President Bozizé won the presidential elections with a relative majority in parliament, in a ballot judged as regular by the observers.

The FIDH accused Patassé and Colonel Miskine, in charge of the pacification of the North, of having been involved in numerous massacres of civilians. Bozizé’s loyalists were also accused of having committed a lot of abuses.
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