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**SANCTIONS AND COUNTER SANCTIONS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR FRONTLINE STATES AND SADCC**

by

H Simelane

University of Swaziland

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Historical Background and Western Attitudes

The history of agitations to impose economic sanctions on South Africa is as old as independent Africa itself. Following Sharpeville, there were widespread discussions on the desirability of the economic isolation of racist South Africa with the aim of forcing the Republic to adopt social and political policies conforming to internationally acceptable standards of moral behaviour. As such, international condemnation of racism in South Africa has always been on the forefront. The initial idea was to impose economic sanctions backed by a complete blockade.¹ However, this early notion of pressure soon died down, a feature which characterized the late 1960's and 1970's.

Much as the initial idea failed to achieve comprehensive implementation, the whole issue of sanctions has continued to be internationally appreciated as an important strategy for bringing about genuine reform and eventual decolonization in South Africa. The 1980's have seen a more fervent revival of calls for sanctions. This has mainly been due to changing political configurations in Southern Africa. The decolonialization of Mozambique and Zimbabwe made South Africa the only remaining bastion of western imperialism and settler supremacy. For the first time world opinion focussed on racist South Africa, much to the embarrassment of her western allies. For the first time Southern African nationalists were able to combine and mobilize world opinion towards the ostracization of the South African regime. The birth of the Frontline group of states, the emergence of Zimbabwe and the eventual regional reorganization in the form of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) all helped focus attention on South Africa and ferment a regional struggle against imperialism.

Early as well as present proposals for sanctions have been confronted by the reluctance of some leading European nations which are at the same-time leading investors and business operators in South Africa. Western arguments against sanctions have always been basically a reflection of self interest although humanitarian grounds have always been used for legitimization. The importance of South Africa's impressive mineral wealth has always been seen as crucial to western imposition of sanctions on South Africa. The United States Geological Survey has identified twenty seven minerals as critical in industrialized societies.² Eleven reserves of these are found in South Africa. The United States consumes 46% of South Africa's chromium, 15% of manganese, 72% of vanadium and 67% of platinum. The prevailing fear therefore in most western nations is that if the South African supplys are cut, the west may increasingly depend on the Soviet Union for supplys. In this vein, South Africa is viewed as a regional power which should be drawn to the western block.

In recent years the commitment of American and European firms in South Africa has grown substantially. U.S. investors alone increased by 13% in 1981-³ The 1,200 British companies, followed by 375 American and 350 West German firms with a total foreign investment of R30 million in 1982 indicate the pervasive nature of western imperialism in the South African economy. Thus Southern Africa attempts to combat South African imperialism must recognize its western anchorage. The persuasions directed towards the west to isolate South Africa is a recognition of this fact.

West reluctance has in major part been due to what we can call a new cold war attitude. The west under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, believe that any radical disruption of the international status quo is masterminded by the Soviet Union.⁴ From this belief comes the conclusion that any

revolutionary movement of national liberation is Soviet inspired. The imposition of economic sanctions is in most western views seen as a threat to the international capitalist system. The propaganda of a Soviet design in Southern Africa has been recently been alluded to by Ian Smith. In a conference in Washington he argued that the unrest in Southern Africa was mainly a Soviet campaign to take over South Africa and thus control the strategic minerals found there.⁵

In spite of western intransigence the move toward a positive direction has been obvious. This was clearly manifested in the Commonwealth communique of 1986. There was general agreement on the adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa. There was agreement to ban all air links with South Africa, a ban on new investment or re-investment of profits earned in South Africa.⁶ Further additions were a ban on all bank loans to South Africa, a ban on the import of Uranium, coal, iron and steel and withdrawal of all consular services.

Much as international opinion seem positive towards the isolation of the racist regime, there is still the question of practical implementation. Commentators like Paul Johnson posing as a British expert on modern history has argued that "...the current attempt to destroy the South African economy seems to me one of the most wicked things that has occurred in the world since the days of Hitler and Stalin."⁷ Mrs. Margaret Thatcher has maintained that sanctions would not help bring about internal change in South Africa. These attitudes demonstrate the fact that agreeing to impose sanctions is completely different from implementation. For instance, Mrs. Thatcher has agreed in principle with a sanctions package provision agreed upon by EEC leaders at their summit in The Hague in June 1985.

Demonstrating the contradictions inherent in western government policies, she proposed to put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa and another voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. British companies will not be forced to cease new investment, but will be exhorted, and persuaded to do so. Further, the Thatcher administration has refused to withdraw its consular facilities from South Africa. It is argued that there are approximately 800,000 people in South Africa entitled to British passports and thus making consular services indispensable.

Southern Africa Attitudes and New Western Moves : Contradictions:

The issue of Western reluctance to impose complete sanctions is an obvious one and goes a long way to show the difficulties to be expected in the attempt to bring about decolonization in South Africa. Of crucial importance at the sametime are Southern African initiatives to impose sanctions. Botha has challenged South Africa's neighbours who were urging the EEC to impose sanctions to do so first. He boastfully asserted, "They should have the courage of their convictions instead of continuing to enjoy the considerable benefits of close association with South Africa while leaving it to others to pay the price of sanctions."⁸ From a regional and international perspective, a Southern African initiative seem crucial. some Southern African nationalists have alluded to a need for Southern African member states to take an initiative. President Kaunda of Zambia states that, "we must as fellow Africans help our brothers in South Africa. And if in striving to ease their suffering we have to suffer too, then we will suffer..."⁹ It would be very encouraging if all the South African leaders shared the same sentiment. Theoretically, African political leaders supporting black nationalists have argued passionately that they are morally obliged to set anexample to the rest of the world by imposing or

endorsing boycotts at what ever cost. Even the majority of political groups within South Africa feel driven to demand for sanctions because nothing else seems to move the South African government which is either obdurate or paralysed.

The most disquieting feature is that neither the Frontline states nor the SADCC member states are united in the agitations for sanctions. Such a feature goes a long way in demonstrating the various responses toward combatting forces of imperialism. It also points out to the difficulties of achieving unity in Southern Africa at the face of external divisive issues. Indeed Kaunda's cabinet minister, Alex Chikwanda, was not exaggerating when he observed that, "Only Zambia and Zimbabwe have the resolve to embark on sanctions. But these two countries' action will be negated by the actions or breaches of neighbours, thereby rendering regional sanctions futile."¹⁰ The division of the Frontline states and SADCC member states along the political spectrum seem to have some relevance on their attitudes toward the imposition of regional sanctions. While adamantly arguing against sanctions, some seem (at least form their actions) to be willing collaborators with the racist regime. Lesotho has in no uncertain terms made her stand clear. On the 9th of July 1986, Lesotho's secretary for Labour Mr. A.L. Thoahlane told South Africa's Minister of Manpower, Mr. Pietie du Plessis that "A very large percentage of our gross national product depends on remittances which are dependent on employment opportunities in South Africa. Should there be a decline in employment, it will have an impact on us".¹¹ Botswana and Mozambique have also indicated their reluctance.

The more conservative states of Malawi and Swaziland have unreservedly pronounced their unwillingness to isolate South Africa and infact have gone further to collaborate on certain crucial areas. For instance Swaziland accepted South African assistance in building a railway line through Swazi territory linking the Eastern Transvaal with the port of Richards Bay. The South African government duly made a supplementary R50 million payment in 1982.¹² Economically the move makes emminently good sense. For instance, Richards Bay would afford Swaziland's sugar an alternative to Maputo, which has not recovered form the ravages of the war of liberation. It would also link all of Anglo-America's Swazi forestry products holdings with its processing facilities being built at Richards Bay. At the same time, this is a demonstration of a least firm commitment to economic liberation from South Africa. Infact in this respect Swaziland, a charter member of SADCC is moving counter to the organization's top priority of forging a transportation network independent of South Africa. Swaziland is by no means alone in these ambiguities, Botswana is aiming its own railroad across occupied Namibia to the Atlantic.

The above reactions have a very strong bearing on the icnreasing proposals for sanctions. It is high time that the Frontline states and SADCC member states make some soul searching. It would seem that theirs is a marrige of convenience which could easily crumble under the pressure of outside influence. As political and economic configurations, they seem to lack a united resolve to eliminate imperialism in the region. For a successful struggle against South African imperialism and decolonization the Frontline states and SADCC member states need to forge stronger bonds of unity. To successfully wage a sanctions war from a regional basis, there is a need for a strong resolve across the board, least we are accussed of demanding the outside world to give to our brothers in South Africa what we are denying them.

It is encouraging to note that some leading western nations are slowly responding to the call to isolate South Africa. This response is at the same time symbolic and cosmetic. As pointed out earlier, Britain has responded with embargos on arms, oil exports, nuclear collaboration, withdrawal of military attaches, discouragement of cultural and scientific agreements. The most important feature about the responses is that they carefully avoid economic issues which are viewed as counter productive and potentially harmful to Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has been very quick to point out that economic sanctions would hit hardest on blacks and neighbouring economies.

There are presently pointers to a deterioration in South Africa - United States trade. In March 1986, the South African Commerce Department lamented over what it called "strained trade relations between South Africa and the United States."¹³ It is estimated that US exports to South Africa for 1985 fell sharply from \$2,3 billion in 1984 to \$1,2 billion in 1985. This was a 47% decline. Much as this can be seen as a reflection of the ongoing economic recession, it shows the growing unwillingness of US enterprises to do business with South Africa. Further more, the US Congress was able to pass the anti-apartheid act of 1986. There is also a drive among liberal congressmen to close loopholes that have emerged in the sanctions bill.

Limited though these developments seem, they are unparalleled by any regional initiative in Southern Africa. All that seem to be happening are developments toward limiting the effectiveness of sanctions. Indeed Botswana businessmen, and entrepreneurs in the mountain kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland are already gearing up to package South African fruit, fish and meat under internationally acceptable local labels for handsome sanctions - busting rewards. Limited western responses can make positive

contributions towards pressurising the Pretoria regime to reform. It is estimated that limited sanctions as they are at present would reduce South African mineral exports by about R1 billion, agricultural exports by between R200 and R300 million, and service exports by about R1 billion.¹⁴ This would in no way exert the necessary pressure to produce political as well as social changes in South Africa. What is needed are longer and stiffer sanctions which are presently anticipated. In this case, it is estimated that most agricultural and manufactured goods would be affected. Furthermore, they would precipitate a 30% drop in the countries mineral exports. The total loss in monetary terms would be approximately R13 billion. Econometric analysts suggest that shortages of raw materials and intermediate goods for the manufacturing industry could develop. There is therefore a need of a total strategy if the sanctions war would achieve the desired goals. All these point to the need for the Frontline states and SADCC member states to shift from theoretical assumptions to more practical ones.

The imposition of sanctions would definitely produce specific attitudes within South Africa. The South African government has warned that it will never surrender to threats and sanctions, an attitude resembling that of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and reminiscent of Churchill during the Battle of Britain. Sanctions will thus initially consolidate white South Africa in an adaptive reaction of collective defence against an outside world which appears hostile. This reaction will further be reinforced by a feeling of pride and satisfaction of surviving under pressure. Defiance will definitely acquire a positive connotation. The norms of a besieged country will quickly be imbibed by the young and enforced at school. These types of attitudes were clearly evident in Smith's Rhodesia. Frontline states and SADCC member states should not be discouraged by these early attitudes. To the South African states they should serve as pointers to a prolonged struggle which they must be prepared to wage.

On the other hand, sanctions though tending to contribute to the promotion of intransigence among South African whites, they will also promote political consciousness among Africans. The strength of sanctions will thus lie on their role as adjuncts of African nationalism rather than as inducements to white reform.¹⁵ By serving to thwart economic growth, hasten the rundown of the infrastructure, create conditions of insecurity and business apprehension, and by facilitating unemployment in the African sector, with the subsequent migration to freedom fighter ranks, sanctions will serve as an adjunct to the growing assertion of the African population for rights and political power. The Rhodesian experience clearly demonstrated these factors and South Africa can be no exception.

The main problem so far is that there seem to be a very strong voluntary element in the proposals, and international cooperation is far from assured. Such a development seem to be at the advantage of the South African government. Previous experience of sanctions suggests that the technique of slowly applying pressure overtime will give South Africa the opportunity to adjust and find alternative outlets or suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic opinion. The lack of a forceful momentum will encourage South Africa to diversify its economy and resort to unconventional trade on a larger scale. There is therefore a great need for the implementation of sanctions to take a more aggressive direction. This is especially true of the Southern African states, which are presently in great need of a mechanism to show the world the right or desirable direction vis-a-vis the South African situation.

Counter Sanctions and Their Implications

The most crucial issue concerning the Southern African independent states is that of counter-sanctions as a retaliatory measure by the South African regime. Responding to the tough sanctions stand by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, South Africa threatened that if Zambia and Zimbabwe continue asking for trouble they

will get it.¹⁶ The two states were further 'advised' not to harbour too many illusions about the west rescuing them from sanctions induced calamity. Zimbabwe was further singled out as the main culprit and 'warned' that South Africa could strangle the country's economy in a matter of weeks should Robert Mugabe go ahead with his sanctions threat. These warnings have had a great impact on the propensity of some Southern African states to support the imposition of sanctions against South Africa let alone impose the sanctions themselves.

All the threats of counter sanctions are seen within the ranks of the South African ruling oligarchy as mechanisms of preserving what is called the "national interest". The South African government is already gearing up for tighter control over imports passing through its territory. All this seems to be directed against pro-sanctions African states. Zambia has already tasted this fate. South African authorities have implemented a customs clamp on all supplies flowing through South Africa to the land-locked African state. Essentially, a provisional payment or cash deposit, now has to be paid on all goods destined for Zambia. Forwarding agents in South Africa refuse to lay out the millions of rands required because of the risks involved. On the other hand, Zambian importers are unable to come up with the money from their side because they lack foreign exchange. The result will be a severe shortage in Zambia of petrol, wheat, coal, clothing and tinned goods within a short period. These restrictions imposed by the South African Commissioner of Customs and Excise are a demonstration of the nature of counter-sanctions which the South African states may have to face.

South Africa's counter-sanctions threats are based on a recognition of the degree to which the Southern African states are dependent on her. The Southern African Development coordination conference came into being mainly out of this recognition. It defined its principal

objective as the reduction of external dependence and in particular dependence on the Republic of South Africa. It is thus crucial to note and appreciate the apprehension of the Southern African states toward sanctions and counter-sanctions. The greater the degree of dependence the less vocal they are in advocating for sanctions. For some of them like the former High Commissioner Territories to advocate for sanctions is seen as tantamount to committing suicide. Even the more vocal ones have shown less propensity to impose sanctions (that is if we disregard some of the rhetorical justifications which have been advanced). Realizing South Africa's dominance and preparedness to embark on counter-sanctions, South Africa's Minister of Manpower claimed that, "Southern Africa is like a Zebra - if you damage the white parts then the black parts will naturally also die."¹⁷

According to South African authorities Zimbabwe stands first in the line of fire. It is argued that the country's economy could be severely disrupted within a month if South Africa is stung into applying full scale retaliatory sanctions. In terms of volume it is estimated that 90% of Zimbabwe's trade passes through South Africa. More than 797 000 tons of the countries' exports travel on South African railroutes. Furthermore, more than 1,2 million tons of Zimbabwean 'imports' are carried by South African railways. More than 445,000 tons of the above figure were (in 1985) imports Zimbabwe desperately needed to keep its economy afloat. More than Z\$240 million (R369 million at an exchange rate of Z\$0,65 to the rand) or 16% of Zimbabwe's total exports end up in South Africa. It is further estimated that about 20% of Zimbabwe's imports originate in South Africa. Recent South African Transportation Services (SATS) statistics indicate that in 1985 there were about 2,500 South African Railway trucks in Zimbabwe and Botswana compared with only 918 Zimbabwean trucks on SATS lines. This illustrated the one way nature of the traffic.

These figures demonstrate Zimbabwe's heavy dependence on the South African transportation network. With the rail link to Beira notoriously unstable because of inroads by anti-Frelimo insurgents sponsored by South Africa, and the alternative port at Dar-es-Salaam congested and unreliable, Zimbabwe is caught in an intricate structure of dependence to SATS. Mr. Mugabe has indicated that if South Africa retaliates with counter-sanctions by closing its borders all efforts will be made to get the Maputo link into full operation. His concern on the issue is demonstrated by the deployment of more than 8 000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to flush out MNR rebels who sabotage communications with Zimbabwe.

There are unfortunately still question marks on the capability of the ports of Beira and Maputo to handle Zimbabwean traffic. These ports currently carry 10% of Zimbabwe's exports. It is estimated that at best Mozambique can handle 40% of Zimbabwe's export. Observers have pointed out that for this to happen, more than R3-billion is required to return Mozambique's transport to its former operating conditions. All these issues point to a crucial need to restructure the country's transportation system to avoid dependence on South Africa. Some commentators argue that it will take two years, if funds are made available for upgrading Maputo port facilities, before it can take 30% of Zimbabwe's exports.

Zambia is in no better condition. The majority of the country's imports pass through South Africa. Zambian traffic is worth R18-million to SATS. The country is also highly dependent on trade routes through South Africa. Most of the imported goods are vital to the survival of the country's economy. these include things like foodstuffs, capital equipment, textile, medicine, and fuel.

Regarding the former High Commissioner Territories, the situation is even more gloomy. Their dependence on South Africa is overwhelming. This dependence has further been reinforced by the integration of these countries to South Africa's labour catchment area. As late as 1982, approximately 12,243 Swazi were recruited to South Africa.¹⁸ Lesotho had approximately 140 000 of her citizens employed in different categories inside South Africa. In countries like Swaziland, whose geographical location and possibly political orientation has subjected her completely to South African domination, slight shifts within the South African economy are immediately felt.

The degree of dependence thus become relevant to a country's commitment to economic liberation from South Africa. It has great relevance on perceived fears of South Africa's retaliatory counter-sanctions. Each country's response to those issues quickly boils down from being an issue of theoretical assumptions to bread-and-butter issues. It is precisely at this point that the threat for counter-sanctions appear to have serious implications for the Frontline states block as a political configuration and SADCC as a regional organization aimed at achieving economic liberation from South Africa and other external forces of imperialism. The most crucial question is, does a demonstration of commitment or solidarity to the Frontline states or SADCC has any relevance to a state's ability to minimize the disastrous repercussions of counter-sanction on that particular state? In other words, is there a mechanism or resource potential within the Frontline states block or SADCC to rescue a member state from being swept by the wave counter-sanctions? There is a great need for belonging to these organizations to provide security measures. The fact that belonging to the Frontline States or SADCC does not guarantee a state against counter-sanctions is bound to produce cracks on the embryonic wall of

unity in Southern Africa. As long as states are circumstantially forced to respond to South African threats on an individual basis there is little hope of success in the efforts to eliminate or reduce South African deminance. As long as South Africa manages to deal with each state individually, then varying responses to imperialism cannot be eliminated.

There is great need to appreciate the efforts made by nationalist leaders to bring about re-organization of regional structures through SADCC. This was a clear indication of the leaders' recognition of their vulnerability vis-a-vis their dependence on South Africa. This is a form of vulnerability which to a great extent limits their political options. It is also encouraging to note that the international community is aware of the predicament Southern African states find themselves in. There is need to increase the intensity of efforts to achieve economic liberation from South Africa. This was also expressed by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Sir Shridah Ramphal who assured us that, "This assistance is being mobilized through the Southern African Development coordination Conference. One of these is practical assistance to Zambia and Tanzania to upgrade the Tazara railways."¹⁹ This shows a Commonwealth anxiety to make progress on the international front to dismantle apartheid.

There has also been efforts made to help the countries neighbouring South Africa loosen Pretoria's economic stranglehold. A group of Democratic and Republican senators and members of the House of Representatives in the United States introduced Bills that would provide US\$ 100-million to the Frontline States, and a further US\$ 700-million over a five-year period from the 1988 fiscal year which started in October. The aid is meant to improve transportation and communication links in the nations, thus helping them achieve economic independence from South Africa.

There is no doubt that the Southern African transportation and Communications sector needs a complete restructuring. There is no doubt that the same sector should receive priority considerations. The goals of SADCC show too much prioritization of this sector. The emphasis placed on it seem to be more than necessary.²⁰ At the same time the projects presently undertaken seem to offer no radical change from what existed during the colonial period. While they may go a long way in reducing dependence on South Africa, they seem to be re-inforcing old dependencies or substituting one set of dependencies with another. The projects are infact reinforcing the much talked about disarticulated transportation systems inherited from colonialism. It must be noted that dependence and imperialism are just what they are irrespective of the actors. Any effort to eliminate dependency need to be radical and genuine. One wonders if SADCC donors would still be enthusiastic if the projects were no assurances of a continued Southern African economies' connection with western economies. Their reluctance to finance projects in Angola nad Mozambique must be a cause for concern.

The transportation improvements presently undertake by SADCC completely fall short of achieving regional integration which may bring about regional economic independence. Southern African economies are just as disintegrated as ever without any element of complementarity. It is therefore necessary for SADCC to take a more progressive approach towards reducing dependency. There seem to be little use of narrowly interpreting dependency as basically that denoting the relationship between the economies of independent Southern African states and the South African economy. The main characteristic of the colonial economy was that Southern African economies were vertically integrated upwards to metropolitan economies.²¹ For the

region to achieve economic independence, SADCC must aim at refashioning these links to produce horizontal ties between the Southern African states. This is obviously no easy task, because even the present willing donors will frustrate it.

The threat of counter-sanctions calls for the Southern African states to restructure their productive forces. This is especially so as regards the issue of food security. Some of the Southern African states have shown a chronic inability to produce enough to feed their own nationals. This has produced a high level of dependence on South Africa for food commodities. For instance, the market places of countries like Swaziland survive through retailing South African food commodities. These include things like potatoes, tomatoes, and all kinds of fruits. In the event of counter-sanctions, the small entrepreneurs who make a living through retailing South African goods would go out of business. Further, thousands of consumers would have to dramatically change their consumption patterns. This would definitely be the problem faced by most states in the region. To successfully defend themselves against counter-sanctions, these states must of necessity aim at food self-sufficiency. This in turn necessitate the mobilization of resources toward improving productivity in the Rural areas.

Aims at increasing the productivity of the rural areas must be concrete, as against high sounding political slogans. In Swaziland the ex-Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini coined the slogan - Ekhaya - back to the rural areas. The aim of the policy was to encourage most Swazi to go back to the rural areas to till the soil to increase food production which would consequently reduce the country's dependence on

South Africa. This was a policy enacted by a government with no resolve to make it a success. There was no mobilization of resources to enable the people to till the soil successfully. For all of the Southern African region, as long as there is dependence on South Africa for food, isolating South Africa will always be seen as tantamount to committing suicide. It is therefore necessary for SADCC as a vehicle for reducing dependence, to put more emphases on food security.

The issue of sanctions and counter-sanctions need to be seriously considered by the Frontline states and SADCC member states. This is especially true as regards political stability within each state. The greatest instrument in the hands of Africans to eliminate colonialism was the inability of colonial governments to solve most economic ills. This tended to conscientize most Africans and thus increasing the ranks of politically relevant groups. Sanctions and counter-sanctions will definitely lead to a number of shortages, the impact of which shall be felt by the majority of the people. An unavoidable development would be the identification of the leadership with these problems. Any backlash will necessarily be viewed as a product of their actions. To a large extent, there will be a growing desire to eliminate governments identified with the shortages brought by counter-sanctions.

Already the issue of sanctions has brought evident schisms within some governments. While Zimbabwe's ambassador to the United States, Mr. Edmond Garwe declared that Zimbabwe, "would declare sanctions against S.A. within three months,"²² such confidence was not very evident in Zimbabwe. In cabinet chambers, boardrooms, clubs and pubs, the mostly hotly debated issue is whether support for an economic blockade will mean survival or suicide. In Zambia, serious cleavages have already been manifested. Zambian members of Parliament have continued their attack on

President Kaunda's declared intent to impose sanctions against South Africa.²³ Several MP's of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) spoke out against sanctions. Rallying behind backbencher Laurence Sinyani, they expressed a fear that it would be suicidal for the government to impose sanctions. Enock Kavindale stated that, "Sanctions will finish us off because our economy is interwoven with South Africa."²⁴

These kinds of debates and sentiments are not limited to high ranking officials, but pervade even lower stratas of most Southern African societies. Some Zambians have suggested that the government put the sanctions issue to a referendum so that Zambians could state categorically whether or not they really want their country to impose sanctions against South Africa. If such a suggestion is adopted, it would go a long way in exonerating the leadership from blame in future if the sanctions backfired. This maybe a very useful suggestion for most of the states. For those which have never bothered to consider public opinion to decide and implement policy, this may be good starting ground. Rather than leaders imposing their decisions they must receive the mandate from the people. What ever decision would thus be to the interest of the people, and to a large extent avoiding a high scale of political instability which might afflict the region.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that proposals for sanctions have always been frustrated by western reluctance which is based on the value of South Africa to western economies. The rising commitment to sanctions proposals on the part of the frontline states, and the emergence of SADCC as a regional organization, western reluctance has been minimally broken. We have argued that the greatest drawback at the moment is the failure of Southern African states to impose regional sanctions to lead the rest of the world. Such a failure has serious implications on the commitment of the Frontline States and SADCC member states to isolate South Africa. Much of the failure is due to the political heterogeneity of the Southern African States.

The political options of the Southern African States are limited by their degree of dependence to South Africa. There is therefore a need to reduce dependence. We have argued that SADCC has a narrow interpretation of reducing dependency. All efforts are directed toward liberation from South Africa's economic grip, while continuing to reinforce traditional dependencies. At the same time SADCC and the Frontline states block, do not contain any form of security to member states in case of retaliations by South Africa. This further reduces the preparedness of each state to disassociate itself from South Africa. This makes the threat of counter-sanctions more penetrating and contribute to the growth of differences between the Southern African states.

There is great need in Southern Africa for economic restructuring with the aim of achieving regional self-sufficiency. This does not mean the construction of closed economies, but economies which are not completely subordinated to either South African or western imperialism. Within the present structures sanctions and counter-sanctions may lead to widespread political instability.

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