If you come to this area and say you want to set up a supermarket, the men will welcome you. When you call a meeting, more women will come, but the men will sit on the chairs. The women will receive the idea, and think how they can manage it. The men will struggle amongst themselves to work out an angle of personal advantage, and even come up to you after the meeting secretly to propose this. Men will sit on the committee, while the work will be done by the women. Then the men will become the managers. (NGO worker, Genesis, Kenya)

1 Introduction
The most lively response to a presentation I have ever received, was that to my first paper on men and Gender and Development (GAD) given at an Oxfam-hosted conference of European development agencies. The first respondent liked it, but as he was the only man in the room, I feared this did not bode well. I was right. The following speakers rained a torrent of accusations on me: my talk was offensive appeasement; I was a sell-out, not a proper feminist; once we started talking about men, women would be crowded out, because men love talking about themselves; what I was suggesting was like fraternising with the bosses rather than holding the line in trades union militancy. Quietly, later, often younger women came to me to say that they had been waiting for someone to speak as I had, that they warmly welcomed this breaking of the silence on men.

That was seven years ago, and a lot has changed. Books on masculinity(ies) have gone from strength to strength as a burgeoning industry; innovative approaches with men, particularly on violence, sexuality and fatherhood are arising at the project level; development agencies are increasingly interested to 'bring men in' to work on gender. The wider environment of gender politics has also moved on, making an exclusive stress on women problematic in a way that it was not in the late Seventies and Eighties.

Much of this change is, I think, to be welcomed. It is high time that the nominal shift from 'women in development' to 'gender and development' fulfilled its promise to promote a more integrated and relational approach. Nonetheless, as the 'men and
masculinities' agenda begins to be set in the development world, it seems a good time to re-visit those old concerns and to re-cast others in new form. Those early objections suggested that to talk about men and masculinity was dangerous, risking the hard-won gains of feminism and chronically open to co-option, since patriarchal values and practices remain dominant in both society and development institutions, overdetermining all talk and action. This article explores the validity of this, through a critical examination of the new 'masculinities' agenda and the way it is being applied in the development context. Throughout the article I draw in particular on observations made during a gender audit of the British aid (Department for International Development – DFID) programme in Kenya, which I undertook in 1998.

1.1 Lest we forget....

The basic fear of opening GAD up to men and masculinity is that the earth will move. The limited terrain which has been won for women in development will be eroded: the space itself will narrow and the landmarks subtly shift to accommodate the underlying patriarchal structures of the geomorphology below it. There is much to suggest that such fears are justified. The apparent high level 'pro-women' consensus in development discourse is belied by low level action, as progress in development institutions towards reversing gender discrimination remains extremely limited (Jahan 1995; Goetz 1995). For many, the emptying out of feminist commitment from the GAD agenda has long been underway, with the re-casting of GAD from a political challenge to the technical handmaiden of development (see e.g. Matlanyane-Sexwale 1994). But this is also an indicator of the continuing political sensitivity of working for women. The coordinator of the Kenyan National Women's Bureau, for example, emphasised the importance of embedding gender in a focused, programme-oriented approach. Being able to demonstrate its practical significance to particular problems was vital in deflecting potential resistance and/or hostility. As she put it: 'If you are just talking "women, women, women", people feel unsafe.'

Evidence from other contexts of attempts to mobilise men against gender inequality also suggest caution. Renate Klein (1989) warns of the sexual politics of men entering women's studies and assuming the central focus, posing alternatively as 'the expert' – understanding gender subordination better than women do; the 'ignoramus' – 'tell me all about it, help me to understand'; or the 'poor dear' – 'I feel so guilty...' Connell (1995:206–211) describes the tendency for men's groups to become defensive, depoliticised and unstable, with the distinct danger that a pro-feminist beginning shifts over time into an anti-women stance. Peter Redman (1994) notes the inherent contradiction in 'empowering men to disempower themselves'. He warns that most approaches to anti-oppressive education are simply unconvincing. While they may regulate certain public contexts, they fail to dislodge the internal resonance which makes sexist and racist views 'feel right'.

All this suggests two rather contradictory conclusions in terms of working with men. On the one hand, it clearly indicates the cultural sensitivity of excluding men, and that this may be counter-productive, creating or exacerbating antagonism (e.g. White 1997; Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994; Chant, this volume). On the other hand, it may also be read the opposite way. Reflecting precisely the anxieties of that early workshop, it intimates that patriarchal values and practices are still very near the surface, continuing to weight sexual politics strongly in men's favour. It was bad enough when we talked about women, but discussing men and masculinity takes us right into the belly of the beast. Fools rush in....

2 Men and their Problems

The argument for bringing men in to GAD is usually made on one of two grounds: men either have problems (they can no longer fulfil the 'breadwinner' role), or men are the problem (their sexual practices spread HIV). The first of these is easier, both because development deals in pathologies – if you have no problem why do you deserve assistance? – and also because it is better calculated to appeal to men. In practice the two positions amount to the same thing: whether men are or have problems, it still results in problems for women.

Now, there is nothing new about men having problems. In fact, there are well established patriarchal strategies for dealing with this. The nature of these of course differs by context, but I note here three of
the most prevalent generic forms. The first is to reassert the ‘old’ rights that have been lost. The movement of ‘Promisekeepers’ in the United States is an obvious example of this, in which men are mobilised through a right-wing reading of Christianity to ‘re-claim’ their proper place at the head of their families, legitimating their consolidation of power with a series of pledges of manly virtue (Stodghill 1997). The second is to shift the blame: if men are in crisis, women are at fault. This appears in the everyday wisdoms of weak men being attributed to domineering mothers in Britain, or quarrels between brothers being ascribed to disputes between their wives in Bangladesh. In social science one of the most striking examples of this (which is also heavily racialised) was the pathologising of black American families – and particularly black mothers – in the Moynihan Report (Moynihan 1965). In Kenya, the same pattern was starkly evident in a (woman) DFID manager’s attributing men’s abusive behaviour with sex and drugs to women’s ‘overempowerment’. The implication in this of gender as a see-saw in which, as women go up, men go down, is discussed further below.

Finally, blaming women leads into the third strategy: if men have problems, it is women who should fix it. This may even be elevated to a cultural principle, as in the Colombo slum studied by Suzanne Thorbek, where good women were expected to be able to ‘sway’, mould and reform their men (Thorbek 1994:137). One could argue, indeed, that the lead taken by women in seeking to bring men into GAD (see Pearson, this volume) is an example of precisely this syndrome of women taking responsibility for men’s problems.

Recognising that these (and many other) patriarchal scripts exist in relation to men’s problems is important, because the exclusion of men from serious consideration in GAD so far can lead to the naive belief that this is an uncharted field. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, there is a clear a-symmetry in the way that men and women are approached in much of the gender literature. ‘GAD for women’ is robustly materialist, concentrating on social relations particularly as they define rights and responsibilities in work, consumption and households. That is, it has not been characterised by the exploration of female subjectivities. ‘GAD for men’ is by contrast much more individualistic and personal, much more preoccupied with the self. This difference itself deserves reflection. Does it derive from the dominance of analytical concerns in the masculinities literature vs programme imperatives in ‘GAD for women’; from the coincidence of a broader preoccupation with identity in social theory which coincided with the ‘discovery’ of men? Does the concern with male subjectivities indicate an area that has been neglected in GAD, which should now be explored for women too? Or – perhaps in conjunction with any or all of these – might the difference reveal that our analytical frameworks are themselves pre-gendered? Is it simply coincidence that men appear (again) as self-reflecting subjects, complex individuals, while, as Mohanty (1991)
points out, GAD has purveyed composite images of 'third world women' which are typically positioned as object – of subordination, of programme intervention, of technical change?

As this suggests, 'bringing men in' necessarily raises new questions and generates new dynamics, which require reassessment of understandings of women, as well as of men; of gender in frameworks of analysis, as well as in society. Nor are the questions all to do with gender as such. The more personal approach to men has brought to the fore issues such as sexuality and violence, and so the examination of intimacy and intimate relations. On the one hand this is to be welcomed, in broadening the dominant economic preoccupations in much of GAD, and disputing the conventional boundaries around the private sphere, which have served to cloak and sustain abuse. On the other hand, however, it also raises issues of racial and class politics, and even civil liberties, whether there is a 'proper privacy' due to 'informants', and what constitutes the proper scope and limitations of development intervention. Are such moves liberative, or do they represent a Foucauldian 'incitement to discourse', the extension of surveillance into the lives of the poor? These are concerns too major to be explored here, but they should not be dismissed by default.

The tendency to study men in isolation also follows on the recognition that the subordination of women to men is only one part of the gender picture, that it also structures the subordination of some men to other men. This makes gender a legitimate focus in single sex contexts, and much of the 'masculinities' literature is in fact devoted to exploring how gender inscribes differentiation in and between men (see e.g. Barker forthcoming). The danger of this is that all attention shifts to competition between males and women are 're-excluded' (Brod in Hearn and Collinson 1994:98). For those not steeped in feminism, this partiality can easily be overlooked. It 'feels right' (as Redman would say) because it closely shadows the familiar picture of society constructed by conventional social and political thought. To avoid this, again, a more radical strategy is called for. This would problematise not only dynamics between same sex insiders, but also the construction of such a sexually segregated space, and the relations this construes with those on the outside.

3 Masculinities as Focus

The second area of difficulty lies with the use of 'masculinities' as a way of exploring the implications of gender for men. In the first place, there is considerable confusion as to what precisely 'masculinity(ies)' entails (Hearn 1996). In everyday English 'masculinity' seems to have a meaning symmetrical with the commonly accepted understanding of 'femininity'. That is, it is a more restricted, 'emphasised'2 (or caricatured) subset of the cultural imagery of manliness. This does not describe what (wo)men are actually like, nor (often) how they think of themselves, but rather how they imagine (certain, 'ideal') other (wo)men to be, or how they think of one aspect of what they are or should, or should not be. Thus, when asked in a class who identified themselves as men, all of the men present stood up. When asked who identified themselves as masculine, very few of the men stood, and one man explicitly excluded himself on the grounds of his age: for him, masculinity was something for the young. On the other hand, the expressions on some of the women's faces made clear that they were considering standing.

In the gender literature, however, 'masculinity' is often called on to do much more work than this, and becomes ever more expansive. Whereas feminists have long contended that cultural images of 'femininity' express only a fraction of what women are, 'masculinity' is increasingly used to encompass all of men. It aggregates to itself all other dimensions of social relations. Class, race, age, even femininity, are rendered simply inflexions of the ever more expansive masculinity, which is then made 'multiple' to accommodate them (see e.g. Connell 1995).

A major problem with this is the way it re-legitimates a primary focus on gender. Although lip-service is given to the importance of race and class, these are seen as colouring the primary, gender identity, rather than as being factors equal with it. Of course it is possible to tell the story this way, just as Paul Willis' classic study of adolescent boys, Learning to Labour, may be told as a story about (racialised) class or gender; but who is to say which is right? Why should gender be privileged over other social relations, for all times and all places, simply by the analytical framework chosen? What is to be said in favour of 'masculinities', as a way of describing the problem, rather than the more open 'multiple subjectivity', for example?
4 Setting down Markers: Rethinking Sex and Gender

Some of the problems in bringing men in do not originate with the men issue at all, but reveal existing fault-lines within GAD's theorising of sex and gender. The shift from 'WID' to 'GAD' was intended to signal a move from treating women as a natural group, with certain common and essential qualities, to seeing them as a social group, whose particular characteristics were constituted in society, and were therefore open to change. In practice, as Baden and Goetz (1998) point out, WID/GAD advocates have advanced their arguments with a heady and opportunistic mix of essentialist and social constructivist claims. Some of this is no doubt due to the exigencies of policy/politics, where the need to win hearts — and access to pockets — may run counter to academic demands for conceptual consistency. But it is also ironically pre-figured in the division between sex and gender, which was devised precisely to combat essentialist understandings of 'women'. As generally understood, this posits an underlying 'real' (sexual, biological) difference which is then 'dressed' by society as gender. This leaves scope for considerable play as to where 'biology' stops and 'society' starts, and so a major focus for political contestation. Even more critically, it reconfirms a fundamentally dualistic view: that human beings consist of two basic groups defined by sex, which gender then elaborates in socially and culturally diverse ways. Gender is still tied simply to (pre)sexed bodies — male vs female. Instead of displacing 'sex', it simply re-places it. So 'sexual division of labour' becomes 'gender division of labour' or 'people of my sex' becomes 'people of my gender.' The difference? Nothing at all. Unless you hold to the notion that sex is 'purely' biological, 'gender' simply renders 'sex' redundant.

Recent social theory has questioned this understanding of gender as 'sex dressed'. This begins by disputing the strict distinction between the social and the biological, with its implication that bodies exist somehow outside of society. On the contrary, bodies are very much part of our social being. The shape and size of bodies, what we do to and with them are fundamentally shaped by our cultural context, its understanding of proper behaviour, aesthetics and health, plus, of course, our poverty or wealth. This turns upside down our established understandings of sex and gender. Instead of sex preceding gender,
gender precedes sex (Delphy 1993:1). Or, to put it another way; our commonsense understandings of 'sexual difference' are themselves socially constructed. We do not have unmediated access to an outline sexual 'nature' over which we then write 'gender' in bold cultural strokes.

This recognition is vital if we are adequately to address issues of men and masculinities. For resisting the identification of gender simply with the politically correct re-label for sex liberates the bonds of dualism that tie men and women into two essentially opposed groups. In particular, it facilitates the differentiation between two associated, but distinct, functions of gender in society. This enables us to see, as Joan Scott (1988:42) puts it: 'Gender is [1] a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and ... [2] a primary way of signifying relationships of power.' Or in the words of R. W Connell (1995:223):

Masculinity is shaped [1] in relation to an overall structure of power (the subordination of women to men), and [2] in relation to a general symbolization of difference (the opposition of femininity to masculinity).³

Gender is thus not only about persons, but also very importantly about values; not only about social inequality, but also social meaning. In both aspects it is critically concerned with power. Also, the two levels are closely associated with one another, but not necessarily in predictable ways. This frees the imagery of gender from any necessary association with particular sexed bodies. So it is that in the classic butch/femme divide of Western lesbian identities (which of course is rejected by many gay and queer identified women) 'emphasized' masculinity and femininity are both shown as identity options for women.

Such 'gender play' may be highly instrumental. Theobald (1999) describes, for instance, how a Thai lesbian industrial worker who normally adopted a masculine style, would put on a wig and a skirt when attending job interviews, to present the model of docile femininity which she knew would gain favour. The 'play' involved here is more transparent because of the deliberate disruption between men/masculinity and women/femininity in presenting an alternative sexuality. But it is not essentially different from the 'submissive' behaviour adopted by a new bride in the house of her parents-in-law in Bangladesh, or the tough talk of adolescents in street gangs. The crucial point to note is that these images of masculinity and femininity do not 'belong' to individuals, but are part of the common fund of power/meaning on which they draw (though not freely) in negotiating their relationships. While images of masculinity are more available to men and boys, and those of femininity to women and girls, these cultural resources are drawn on in diverse ways to suit diverse contexts, and often involve cross-dressing.

This takes us a long way from the conception of gender as a seesaw in which the reason for men's 'dis-empowerment' must be sought in women's 'over-empowerment.' Men and women do not form such homogenous groups, and the relations between them are mediated by all sorts of other divisions, which together form a complex skein of power defining multiple positions, each of which has its compensations and its cost. To some degree the various axes of power share imagery in common. Casting eyes down, for example, serves in many societies as a generic expression of deference, which may refer equally to subordination by gender, age, race or class. The nodes of the skein also merge different dimensions together; thus the cloth cap in Britain provides a condensed symbol of at once working classness, maleness, and north-of-Englandness. Alternatively imagery may be lifted from one dimension of power and applied to another (see also Hearn and Collinson 1994). Masculine symbols may thus be used to assert other divisions: the lion of British imperialism against effeminated Bengalis; to resist other forms of subordination such as racism; to mediate other social divisions: black and white men may find common ground in sexism (hooks 1984); and to mitigate/disrupt other forms of subordination, such as deploying one's fatherhood in negotiating a labour contract (see White 1997). In sum, it is not 'masculinities' that are multiple, but rather the diverse ways in which men and women deploy, re-shape and subvert the symbolic resources of gender and other power divisions.

If masculinity and femininity are forms of representation, this significantly complicates their analysis. The supermarket story with which this article began
offers an example of this. At one level it bemoans the state of Kenyan men and implies dysfunctional masculinity. This is also, evidently, racialised. But if we are to understand what is going on, framing the problem in terms of a crisis in ‘black masculinities’ is not going to get us very far. Instead, it is important to set the speech in the context where it arose. The story is, in the first place, ambiguous. While it could be read in conventional GAD terms as lazy men vs virtuous women, it was also told with a smile, permitting the alternative meaning of naughty/clever boys vs worthy/simple women. The crucial difference seems to be down to ownership – condemnation comes from outsiders, while the insider admits that the men are rascals, but our rascals.

There is a further twist to this. The story was told by a black Kenyan development worker in a meeting of his colleagues and an outside team of a black Kenyan man and a white Western woman, undertaking a gender audit. It was part of a post-colonial negotiation of personal and national identity, inflected more immediately by the discursive bias towards women in development (which co-exists happily with the continuing dominance of patriarchal values and practices). Most obviously, the speaker and listeners were self-identified ‘change agents’, discussing ‘others’ within the farming communities. When the focus shifted to office employment, the picture was reversed. Here, men became the reliable, committed workers, while women were seen as difficult to place, less flexible, less likely to stay, jeopardising the work by requiring time out for maternity leave and so on. Class, discursive context and immediacy to oneself clearly make a tremendous difference in the negotiation and representation of what men and women are and should be.

5 Conclusion

This article argues that the fears of the battle-scarred feminists at that early conference had very real grounds. While patriarchy may have had a makeover, it has not gone away. While I still maintain that it is important to ‘bring men in’, I also believe there are strong grounds for caution in how this is done. This conclusion summarises the main aspects of this.

As men and masculinity are brought into gender analysis, that gender analysis itself will necessarily be transformed. Seen in one way this constitutes an opportunity for more imaginative approaches to gender and some of the conundrums that have so beset GAD. But it also requires vigilance to guard against re-deploying the old ‘truths.’ Men and masculinity may be new to GAD, but they do not constitute a virgin field. There is a real danger that in straying onto male terrain GAD will stumble into the old tracks, for the resilience of structures of inequality lie precisely in their ability to accommodate new contexts. As Ann Laura Stoler argues in relation to racism, what is striking:

is not so much modern racism’s break with earlier forms, but rather the discursive bricolage whereby an older discourse of race is ‘recovered’, modified, ‘encased’, and ‘encrusted’ in new forms. (Stoler 1996: 61)

‘Masculinity’ is used in highly ambiguous, multi-purpose ways. This is a particular problem when development seeks to apply it in diverse cultural contexts. It may be that the notion of ‘masculinity’ does not exist everywhere, and still less is it likely everywhere to be a significant preoccupation. In the absence of a clear definition of what it means however, it is very difficult to determine where it is not. This carries a real danger that local realities will be distorted as they are re-presented to fit the dominant terms.

This suggests the need for much greater reflection on the part development institutions play in constituting gender and other forms of social difference. They are not neutral observers, but actively involved in the production of authoritative discourses and the differential distribution of resources. Recent GAD recognition of its ‘missing men’ offers an entry point to this but it is of far wider significance, and by no means limited to those parts of development that engage explicitly with gender. Taking gender seriously means reckoning with the polyvalence and ambiguity of gender meanings, and the powers they can express. It is not clear that the profoundly realist discourse of development is well equipped to deal with this arena.

Masculinity does not constitute ‘men in cultural dress.’ Instead it provides a symbolism of power through gender, which is related to the structural subordination of women to men. This is articulated
also with other dimensions of social power, different aspects of which may 'stand in' for one another. Thus gender may be used to symbolise power/value in relation to other social divisions than sex, just as differences between men and women may be symbolised otherwise than through the imagery of gender. This suggests that policy interventions to address 'models of masculinity' should be adopted with care. They could be misdirected if masculine imagery is deployed to express, or resist, power in another arena. Put more critically, there is a real danger of mystification if problems are posed as about gender, when they are really about something else. Conceiving threats to people's livelihoods with changing global structures of production as a 'crisis in masculinity' for example, may misdirect attention away from the underlying problems of international and capitalist patterns of dominance.

Finally, the danger of a focus on 'masculinity/ies' is the way that its psychological or culturalist focus can mystify the practical nitty gritty of gender relations, and the powers that they express. In part this is due to the identification of masculinity as something 'belonging' to men, and so the tendency to 're-exclude' women, as noted above. But it also lies in its capacity to displace from the material to the cultural, from the particular to the general, from the outer to the inner, from the social to the psychological. In Bourdieu's (1977) term, all this may merely (re-) 'euphemise' power, and constitute practical resistance to change. McMahon (1993:690–1) expresses well the flavour of this, with a nice ambivalence as to whether it is observers' or actors' behaviour that is described:

While men's practices are criticised, it is masculinity that is seen to be the problem. ... Instead of wondering whether they should change their behaviour, men 'wrestle with the meaning of masculinity'. (quoted in Hearn 1996:207)

To put it in the words of the Director of Gender and Development Centre, Kisumu, Kenya, the ultimate justification for 'bringing men in' to GAD is a practical one:

Gender means oganda, community: men, women and children. There is that gender that is hostile to men, here we can't afford it. There are too many problems, we need to bring the men in so they do more.

Notes

1 My colleagues undertaking the gender audit were Dr Jacqueline Oduol, of the United States International University of Africa (Nairobi) and Patrick Mbullu, then of the University of East Anglia, Norwich.
2 This (somewhat ironically) follows Connell's (1987:183) use of the term 'emphasized femininity' as counterpart to 'hegemonic masculinity'.
3 Square brackets and numerals added.
4 Consistent with the widespread practice of identifying individual cases who buck (but do not undermine) the general gender rules, there were a number of commendations of individual women who were in positions of responsibility, stating that they were much more effective than their male peers.
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