

## Introduction

Of all the requisites necessary for sustainable development, peace is without doubt the most fundamental. In its absence it would be illusive to expect an improvement in the human condition. Currently, however, the developing world is replete with civil conflicts and political instability. According to the records of the International Institute of Strategic Studies there are some thirty major armed conflicts around the world, the vast majority taking place in the developing world (IISS 2000). Armed conflict interrupts the process of development (Fitzgerald 1999; Stewart and O'Sullivan 1999; Tansey *et al.* 1993); it destroys infrastructure and communities, disrupts economic activity, uproots populations, undermines social capital and leads to the impoverishment and marginalisation of its victims. Confounded in their efforts to promote development and deliver humanitarian assistance, donor agencies have begun tentatively to address the complex relationship between conflict, security and development (DFID 2000; Annan 1998; OECD DAC 1998).

The growing consensus on the need to address security as a development issue was reflected in, and reinforced by, the adoption of the Security First initiative in Mali. In 1994 a United Nations Advisory Mission to Mali concluded that the lack of capacity of the police, gendarmerie, national guard and border guards to control smuggling and banditry was blocking both the implementation of the peace accord and economic and social development. The Mission proposed a 'Security First' approach under which aid for development and the re-integration of ex-combatants was integrated with assistance to improve policing and border controls. The initial success of the Mali experiment stimulated the adoption of other initiatives modelled on the 'security first' philosophy, such as the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Cooperation in West Africa (PCASED). So far, however, 'security first' programmes have only met with limited success in terms of enhancing security and stability in conflict-burdened regions.

The 'security first' approach represents an important step in mainstreaming security in development, but it fails to address the deeper

# Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder

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IDS Bulletin Vol 32 No 2 2001

structural problems that lie at the heart of conflicts in the developing world. Theories of how and why violent protracted conflict occurs generally distinguish between structural factors on the one hand and accelerating, or triggering factors on the other (Azar 1990; Azar 1999; Galtung 1976). Structural factors, which must be viewed as long term, include interconnected political, social and economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic human needs, population pressure, distributional injustice, the depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions. Accelerating or triggering factors, on the other hand, operate in the context of the above adverse structural factors, but involve specific events, attitudes or decisions, which provoke or encourage violence. Such factors may include the abuse of political and military power, the proliferation of small arms, ideological conflict and struggles to exert control over natural resources.

Currently much of the international donor communities' efforts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping focus on policies that prioritise mediation between adversaries, ceasefires, micro-disarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration of ex-combatants, security sector reform and the overseeing of free and fair elections. While these are important elements to any programme that is tasked with establishing peace and stability, they tend to focus on the triggering rather than structural causes of conflict.

This article argues that *one* of the major structural causes of current patterns of violence and conflict is to be found in the general failure of neoliberal policies underpinning the current phase of globalisation, to deliver more equitable patterns of development to large parts of the world. While globalisation has enhanced the wealth of the already rich and powerful (both states and people), it has simultaneously impoverished and marginalised many economies and peoples on the periphery of the global economy. Widening socio-economic polarisation exacerbates social, political, cultural and ethnic tensions and contributes to growing levels of social unrest and conflict, particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs).

In many situations where the inclusion in formal economic activity has been closed off – either

because of economic collapse, debt crises, economic marginalisation or social disarticulation – there has been a notable emergence of cultures of violence predicated on patterns of primitive accumulation, reflected in the rise of organised crime and/or non-state military actors intent on controlling natural resources (Berdal and Malone 2000). Analysts such as Collier (2000) argue that greed primarily motivates the warlords and criminal elements that utilise violence and undermine security in many parts of the developing world and transition economies of the former Soviet Union, but, as this article attempts to argue, social, economic and political marginalisation represent equally strong motives for taking up arms.

In elaborating upon these issues the first section of this article briefly explores the changing global order and the role that neoliberal policies have played in global restructuring. The second part explores the relationship between globalisation and economic insecurity, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of conflicts in the developing world occur. The third section explores the relationship between debt and poverty. The fourth discusses the relationship between poverty and conflict. The fifth section looks at the new forms of conflict and how they are structured, influenced and incorporated by the forces of globalisation, and the final section proposes an alternative approach to enhance security and development.

## **2 The Global Order/Disorder**

The end of bipolar confrontation encouraged the global spread of capitalism as the former Communist economies were 'opened up' and integrated into the global economy. In Washington, renewed zeal for neoliberal policies dictated that market liberalisation and deregulation underpinned the global economy. A new ideology, 'liberal internationalism', inspired by Fukuyama's *End of History* (1992) thesis, advocated the notion of a 'democratic peace', which maintained that the global spread of capitalism would induce global stability and peace. This proposition was based on two assumptions; one that globalisation, in the form of free trade and the deregulation of markets encourages economic growth resulting in an improvement in the standards of living of the

world's poor, thereby reducing tensions and conflict about the distribution of resources (World Bank 1997). The second assumption is that economic interdependence brought about by globalisation would render war unprofitable, because if a country's main markets are likely to be destroyed through conflict a disincentive is created to initiate war for reasons of vested interests (Gilpin 1992). In this sense globalisation was thought to reduce the previous altruism of the dominant nation-states, encouraging greater cooperative behaviour on a global scale through a process of collective self-interest (Beinen 1992).

These ideas coalesced within the powerful multilateral institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to form the 'Washington Consensus', which set the terms of debate on the development strategies of the transition economies of the former communist world and for the rest of the developing world (Manzo 1998). Orthodox macro-economic strategies based on trade liberalisation, the opening up of domestic markets to foreign investment and competition, the privatisation of state assets and the deregulation of markets were applied with renewed vigour via IMF structural adjustment programmes and World Bank development aid. At the same time, new forms of political conditionality were introduced into IMF and World Bank policies to encourage democratisation, good governance, greater transparency and accountability, and compliance with human rights norms. The neoliberal model of development has all but replaced the developmental model that was widely favoured and promoted in the 1960s and 1970s.

The shift in preference for neoliberal policies is ideologically motivated, rather than being determined by the efficacy of one model of development over another. Ideological fervour, spurred on by the triumphalism associated with the end of the Cold War, has in effect blinkered the dominant global institutions to the actual and prolonged effects of neoliberal reform on the economic performance and security situation in the poorer parts of the world.

The mood of optimism about world peace and the benign spread of capitalism was short-lived,

however. The transitional problems experienced by the newly democratising states in Central Europe and Central Asia led to a rise in nationalism and inter-ethnic rivalry, which in turn acted to undermine the sovereignty of states. Europe witnessed the return of genocide with the war in Yugoslavia. The US peace enforcement operation in Somalia ended ignominiously with the loss of eighteen US Rangers' lives. The debacle of Somalia proved a turning-point in the international communities' commitment to peacekeeping operations in the Third World.

Against this background, the perception of a 'new world order' fast disintegrated into the notion of a 'new world disorder'. Liberal internationalists, severely shaken by these events, have chosen to explain such conflicts as the 'collapse of civilisation' and a return to anarchy – a Hobbesian state of nature in which order and rationality are suspended (Kaplan 1994). Rarely, if ever, has there been introspection, in which the fallibilities and mythologies of the dominant liberal discourse about peace and stability have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny, let alone a recognition that shock therapy, rapid market liberalisation and onerous structural adjustment programmes might be part of the security problem rather than the solution.

### **3 Globalisation and Economic Insecurity**

The neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation have without doubt contributed to a growth in world output and increased global volumes of trade and capital mobility; but mounting evidence also suggests that globalisation has resulted in increased economic volatility that undermines the basic economic security of many millions of people and contributes to a severe fissure between the 'winners and the losers' in unfettered global markets (UNCTAD 2000; UNDP 1999).

The *losers* include some 1.3 billion people in eighty-nine developing countries who are worse off now than they were ten to fifteen years ago. The neoliberal idea that somehow the benefits of global economic growth will 'trickle down' to the world's poor, has been challenged by the stark reality of the experience in the world's poorest societies. Some sobering

UNDP figures summarised the balance of poverty, at the end of the twentieth century (UNDP 1997):

- More than a quarter of the developing world's peoples still live in poverty as measured by the UNDP's human poverty index (HPI). About a third of total global population, 1.3 billion, live on incomes of less than \$1 a day.
- Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of people in poverty. Some 220 million people, half the population of the continent, live in poverty, and the proportion is rising.
- Eastern Europe and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have seen the greatest deterioration in their living standards in the past decade. Poverty has spread from a small proportion of the population to about a third. There, 120 million people live on less than \$4 a day.
- Certain groups of people are particularly vulnerable to poverty; these include children, women and the aged. An estimated 160 million children are moderately or severely malnourished, and some 110 million receive no education. Women are disproportionately poor and often disempowered. Their lack of access to land, credit and better employment opportunities inhibits their ability to be able to improve their economic circumstances. The aged often live their final years in acute poverty and neglect.

While the ratio of trade to gross domestic product for the world has been rising over the past decade, in the forty-four LDCs<sup>1</sup> whose populations total more than a billion people, the ratio of trade to economic output has in fact deteriorated since the beginning of the 1990s (UNCTAD 2000). Between 1997 and 1999 the combined annual index of free market prices for primary commodities, which represent 80 per cent of Africa's export earnings, fell by 25 per cent. Despite rapidly rising export volumes in the 1990s, the purchasing power of exports remains significantly below the levels attained in the early 1980s. At the same time, rapid trade liberalisation has not been matched by increased market access in developed countries.

The LDCs' economic future looks bleak. Those countries whose real GDP per capita income has been in decline or was stagnant during the period 1990–98, 'can be expected to become caught in a situation in which economic regress, social stress and political instability interact in a vicious circle' (UNCTAD 2000). Even for those LDCs whose economies are growing, there will be an ever-present danger that external shocks, natural disasters or negative spillover effects from neighbouring LDCs will disrupt economic activity, throw their fragile growth trajectories and cast them into a spiral of economic decline, instability and conflict.

#### **4 Debt and the Poverty Trap**

The protracted deterioration in terms of trade experienced by the majority of low-income countries has led to foreign currency deficits and high levels of indebtedness. For instance, at the beginning of 1998 the total external debt of sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to be \$328.9 billion, of which approximately 45 per cent was owed to official bilateral sources, 30 per cent to official multilateral sources, and 25 per cent to commercial lenders. To service this debt fully, African countries would have to pay more than 60 per cent or \$86.3 billion of the \$142.3 billion in revenues generated from their exports. In fact African countries as a whole paid more than 17 per cent of their total export earnings to donors and commercial lenders, leaving a total of \$60.9 billion in unpaid accumulated arrears.

For almost two decades unsustainable debt has undermined human development in many of the world's poorest countries. It remains a profound threat to the efforts of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) to achieve the international development targets set for the year 2015. Moreover, as Kofi Annan has noted, the failure to meet basic needs due to the debt burden in no small measure contributes to the level of tension and conflict on the African continent (Annan 1998, Section 93).

While Africa cannot avoid its share of responsibility for the present debt predicament, the international community needs to acknowledge its own role in creating and perpetuating the debt problem. More precisely, it needs to recognise the ways in which the current macro-economic stabilisation

programmes used by the international community to address the debt crises undermine human development and contribute to the growing levels of human insecurity and conflict on the African continent.

The international community deals with indebtedness through the IMF's enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF). Under the terms of IMF conditionality, indebted countries must undergo a package of economic reforms, which invariably involve the following elements:

- A reduction in government expenditure, by making public-sector redundancies, freezing salaries, instituting cuts in health, education and social welfare services;
- The privatisation of state-run industries, often resulting in large-scale lay-offs and the loss of services to remote or poor areas;
- Currency devaluation and export promotion, leading to the soaring cost of imports, land use changed for cash crops, and reliance on international commodity markets;
- Raising interest rates to tackle inflation, which often has the effect of putting small companies out of business;
- The removal of price controls, leading to rapid price rises for basic goods and services.

Faced with severe balance of payments problems, indebted countries have few choices – they are either obliged to implement IMF policies, even when they are ill-suited to their economic and social circumstances, or risk economic isolation. Most governments are prepared to sacrifice their economic sovereignty rather than face isolation and economic sanctions. As a consequence, the IMF in its role as 'lender of last resort' finds itself managing the economies of a growing number of countries around the world. It currently dictates the macro-economic policies of some eighty developing countries, affecting the lives of over two billion people, or one third of the global population.

Two thirds of all ESAF programmes are located in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these countries have been subjected to IMF-imposed reforms for a decade or more, yet the overall performance of these economies remains remarkably poor, despite considerable progress on liberalisation and

deregulation. The average annual growth of real GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 2.5 per cent between 1985–89 to 1.9 per cent between 1990–97. During the 1990s, financial direct investment (FDI) flows to sub-Saharan Africa economies were negligible, despite considerable efforts by LDCs at economic reform and trade liberalisation. Overseas development assistance continues to be the main source of financial flow, but remains at a pitiful level; that is, too low to generate any sort of development gains for the majority of LDCs (UNCTAD 2000).

During the 1990s, per capita income has also declined in most of Africa's LDCs. According to the World Bank, the minimum requirement for a basic standard of living is an annual income of \$370. In 1997 average per capita income in low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa was \$350 per annum, life expectancy at birth was fifty-nine years, infant mortality was seventy-eight per 1,000 live births and illiteracy was 47 per cent of the population over the age of fifteen (World Bank 1998).

Public expenditure cuts have meant that social spending in ESAF countries has deteriorated significantly. Per capita education spending has fallen by an average of 0.2 per cent per annum, with the result that the number of children attending school is on the decline. On present trends, approximately 80 per cent of ESAF countries will miss their target of achieving universal primary education by the year 2015. Health spending has been another casualty of IMF-imposed economic public expenditure cuts, with the effect of an increase in child mortality within ESAF countries. The ESAF countries are unlikely to reach the target of reducing child mortality by two thirds by the year 2015 (Oxfam 1999).

In the majority of LDCs, levels of debt continue to be unsustainable, despite prolonged exposure to IMF-imposed economic reforms. The HIPC initiative introduced by the World Bank and IMF to deal with unsustainable debt has so far provided little, if any, genuine debt relief. Acceptance for debt relief, under the HIPC initiative, has proved onerous and has generated concerted criticisms from NGOs and some of the more enlightened donor countries for radical reform of the HIPC

initiative to ensure a genuine commitment to debt relief that is compatible with international targets for poverty reduction. So far, however, the reforms suggested by the G7 at its Cologne meeting that propose to develop mechanisms for strengthening the linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction are at best weakly integrated into strategies for achieving the internationally agreed human development goals set for 2015. If the linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction is to be strengthened, ESAF must be integrated into a broader, longer-term strategy for human development. With regard to eligibility for HIPC, debt relief should be provided at the earliest possible stage to governments demonstrating – through a Debt-for-Development plan – a capacity to absorb savings into national poverty reduction strategies (UNICEF/Oxfam 2000).

## 5 Poverty, Instability and Conflict

Globalisation, far from being benign, is now widely recognised to have a dichotomous nature, which simultaneously, includes and excludes, integrates and fragments the global community (Rogers 2000; Kofman and Youngs 1996; Cox and Sinclair 1996). While certain states and their economies have been strengthened via the process of economic integration, many states in the periphery – exposed to the twin forces of globalisation, namely the ITC revolution and market liberalisation – have been weakened and marginalised. Weakened states, stripped of their sovereignty in economic affairs, are no longer able to operate in their national interest (Cerney 1996; Strange 1996). In a growing number of cases the state has been so undermined that its ability to provide basic public goods such as welfare and security to its citizens has been all but nullified.

When governments fail to provide social welfare, health, education and security to their citizens they lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. One of the only channels left open for citizens is to demonstrate against hardship and injustice. As Woodruff and Ellis-Jones (2000) have recorded, civil unrest, demonstrations, strikes and violence opposing the effects of structural adjustment are on the rise. These should indicate to the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors that their policies are not only excluding the poor, but are contributing to social unrest and political instability.

The IMF and World Bank tend to distance themselves completely from their failed programmes, blaming inadequate political will or corrupt governance. Of course it would be improper to overlook the role that irresponsible and corrupt governments have played in the impoverishment and mismanagement of their economies. But it is equally inappropriate to overlook the role that external agencies have played in exacerbating poverty, tensions and conflict in these vulnerable and weak economies.

Conflict theorists have for some time been at pains to point out that poverty, the unequal distribution of wealth and the failure to meet basic human needs constitute a source of structural violence that lies at the heart of many conflicts (Azar 1990; Rogers 2000; Suhrke 1999; Tansey *et al.* 1993). Nowhere is this more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa, where the spiral of poverty, indebtedness and conflict is most visible. An examination of the development statistics of sub-Saharan countries engaged in conflict, or recently emerged from conflict, reveals a startling pattern of low per capita income, low life expectancy, low levels of FDI, low levels of overseas development assistance (ODA) and high levels of indebtedness (see Table 1).

It can be argued that the statistics in Table 1 reveal the effects of conflict on development, but for many of these countries economic collapse preceded the outbreak of violence. Moreover, most of these countries have been subjected to prolonged periods of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes which have done little to stimulate growth but much to intensify social tensions and unrest.

## 6 Globalisation and the New Forms of Conflict

The simultaneous rise in debt, loss of economic sovereignty, weakening of the state, unequal terms of trade and growing levels of poverty have resulted in the emergence of what the French writer Alain Minc call *les zones grises* – grey areas (Minc 1993). These are regions in which state legitimacy and the rule of law have all but broken down. They are on the increase especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union. In these regions, authority is increasingly divided between what is left of formal institutions, local warlords and gang or

Table 1: LDCs in Africa affected by conflict 1997

	GNP per capita \$	Life expectancy	FDI \$m	ODA \$m	External debt % GDP	Debt service % of exports
Angola	270	46	412	436	91	13
Burundi	140	44	0.5	119	120	33
CAR	320	48	4.3	92	90	7
Chad	230	46	37.4	225	65	11
DRC	110	52	-7.4	168	149	12
Eritrea	230	49	n.a.	123	11	n.a.
Ethiopia	110	47	67.9	637	152	10
Guinea Bissau	230	42	10	126	304	22
Liberia	n.a.	39	291	95		n.a.
Mali	260	46	39.4	455	129	14
Mozambique	140	46	64.4	963	208	25
Niger	200	46	-7.1	341	104	17
Rwanda	210	22	2.6	592	61	17
Sierra Leone	160	34	9.6	103	122	22
Somalia	n.a.	47	0.1	104	n.a.	n.a.
Sudan	290	51	97.9	187	91	9
Uganda	330	41	175	840	53	24

Source: UNCTAD (2000)

Mafia leaders. In such circumstances the risk to life and property have grown substantially – a situation compounded by the permissive and abundant flows of small arms.

Of the thirty major conflicts recorded around the world in 2000, twenty-three are inter-societal, and many of the latter are protracted. For instance, the wars in Angola and Columbia have been going on since 1963 and 1961 respectively. Over time, protracted conflicts exact a huge cost in human life and resources (see Table 2 for details). In total, the twenty-three conflicts listed have resulted in over four million deaths and have cost the countries a total of 138 billion dollars (1995 prices). These figures must be treated with caution, however, as statistics from conflict-prone developing countries are notoriously unreliable. Nevertheless, they do provide some kind of indicator of the immense socio-economic costs that conflict exacts and give some kind of scale to the human tragedy that this form of conflict generates.

Yet another group of states has only recently emerged from conflict yet remains vulnerable to the

legacies of violence. This includes Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Mali, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Yemen. Yet other states have formal ceasefire agreements in operation, but conditions remain tense: these include Congo, Western Sahara, Abkhasia, the Kurdish region of Turkey, North Osetia, South Osetia and two large regions in Peru.

Wars and violence in developing countries have been variously characterised by liberals as conflicts between 'erratic primitives of shifting allegiances, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order' (Peters 1994), or conflict is seen to be motivated by 'fanatical, ideologically based loyalties' (van Creveld 1991). Conflict thus perceived is depicted as irrational and dysfunctional, as it interrupts the benevolent processes of economic development and democratisation promoted by civilised powers in the North. In accordance with this view, conflict resolution takes place when the various parties are persuaded to see reason, to recognise the plus-sum advantages of peace for all, and when the state is reconstituted and the *status quo ante* is resurrected.

Table 2 : Current inter-societal conflicts

Country	Duration	Fatalities	Costs US\$m ('95 prices)
Afghanistan	1992-	72,000	1,800
Angola	1961-	1,555,000	3,350
Algeria	1992-	82,000	7,500
Burundi	1993-	208,000	126
Colombia	1963-	47,000	25,640
Congo	1997	13,000	35
DRC	1996-	100,000	735
Iran	1979	28,000	6,700
Iraq	1988	198,000	n.a.
Indonesia	1975	244,000	23,000
Kashmir	1989	23,000	25,000
Mexico	1994	5,000	10,620
Myanmar	1985	9,000	18,300
Philippines	1968	121,000	5,100
Rwanda	1990	813,000	466
Russia (Chechnya)	1999	5,000	1,300
Senegal	1997	2,000	33
Sierra Leone	1991	43,000	226
Somalia	1991	375,000	280
Sudan	1983	52,000	940
Sri Lanka	1983	66,000	7,200
Uganda	1993	4,000	354
Total		4,065,000	138,705

Source: IISS 2000

But the fact that conflicts in the periphery have proved largely resistant to the international communities' peace initiatives suggests there is something more than irrational behaviour that motivates and perpetuates violence in the global periphery.

The interpretation of war and violence as irrational and dysfunctional has been contested by a number of authors, who argue that conflict serves an economic function in those regions of the world where social fragmentation and collapsing states have become the norm (Berdal and Malone 2000). Keen, for instance, challenges the common assumption that war is a contest between two sides, each trying to triumph over the other. Rather, he argues, war has become an alternative system of profit, power and protection, in which adversaries

often cooperate in their pursuit of profit (Keen 2000). In much the same vein Duffield argues that, far from being irrational or anarchical, the proliferation of international criminal networks, shadow war economies and cultures of violence in the developing world are rational, calculated responses that maximise comparative advantage in the periphery of a deregulated and liberalised global political economy (Duffield 2000).

Collier argues that the majority of wars are driven by the economic motive of greed rather than by grievance (Collier 2000). This somewhat determinist argument has been contested by analysts such as Ero (2001) who maintains that grievance is still a major factor contributing to violence in many developing countries. Often, of course, grievance arises due to the economic

exclusion of certain ethnic or social groupings, but this economic motivation is very different from the motivation of greed identified by Collier. Moreover, the motivational forces of armed groups often change over time (Keen 1998). Groups dominated by warlords, such as UNITA in Angola, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the FARC in Colombia, have moved from a strong ideological agenda that predominated during the Cold War, which was based on grievance, to one dominated by economic aims in the current post-Cold War climate.

Wars motivated by greed often centre on the control of natural resources such as mines, forests, endangered species, cocaine, marihuana and opium fields, and lucrative trade routes for illicit traffic. They tend to be less to do with taking control of the state. In this context, control of the state and state borders has become increasingly meaningless. The state has in effect been replaced by multiple centres of authority dominated by local elites or 'warlords', who may not even have a particular interest in capturing the reins of government, except perhaps as a means to extend their commercial activities. To describe such conflicts as interstate, as is so commonly done, is misleading, as the very phrase presupposes there is a 'state' over which, and inside which, combatants are fighting. Duffield (1998) prefers to refer to these types of conflict as 'post-modern', a phrase which takes account of 'the emergence of long-term political and economic projects that no longer need to anchor political authority in conventional territorial, bureaucratic or consent-based structures.

For many actors in conflict, war makes rational economic sense, not only because it enhances their local status and wealth, but also because it is rooted in the power relations in the global *status quo ante*. War provides ample opportunities for elites to develop links with the global economy via the diamond trade, money laundering, drug and gun smuggling. War economies such as those that have evolved in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are highly integrated into both legitimate and illegitimate global markets, reflecting a symbiotic relationship between current patterns of globalisation and conflict. This is most starkly illustrated in the relationship between global corporations and local military elites. During the

Mozambique war, British Petroleum was obliged to pay what was effectively protection money to members of Frelimo, whilst Renamo obtained regular payments from a subsidiary of Lonhro, for protecting the Beira oil pipeline (Keen 1998: 16). Until the recent campaign to control the conflict-diamonds trade, De Beers bought up the diamonds traded by UNITA to sell in the global market-place; and in the Congo, Laurent Kabila reportedly received £30 million from a consortium of South African and Namibian businesses, as well as the Namibian Government, to finance his military campaign against the rebels threatening to overthrow his government (Pythian and Duval-Smith 1998).

Militarised elites, both inside and outside government, have been able to manipulate control over local resources and generate political support via the distribution of rewards to followers, reinforcing and strengthening the evolution of the kleptocratic state on the one hand (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999) or leading to its fragmentation and collapse on the other (Zartman 1995) – a situation in which warlords and criminal networks flourish. In both situations the gun has replaced the rule of law, bestowing political and economic power. It has become a means to accumulate wealth and a guarantor of personal security. Berdal (1996: 17) has noted that, in such a context, 'weapons always have an economic as well as a security value'. The widespread resort to arms can thus be viewed as a Darwinian form of survival through the use of force in situations where formal guarantees of economic and physical security have broken down.

Collectively, these observations help to explain the durability of violence and conflict in the periphery, and the general resistance that they have to the international community's attempts at conflict resolution and international peace-brokering (Berdal and Malone 2000). Far from being the irrational responses of primitives, these 'post-modern' forms of conflict are highly rational in a situation of economic scarcity and exclusion (Duffield 2000). But more than this, these forms of conflict are a product and a process of the evolving global order, not an aberration as is often assumed in liberal discourse.

## 7 Security and Sustainable Development

The traditional discourse on security and development is found wanting in a world where familiar boundaries, structures of authority and identity are breaking down.

For far too long the concept of security has been tied to the idea of territorial security, the protection of national interests in foreign policy (or the idea of global security free from the threat of a nuclear holocaust). These concepts have overlooked the fact that for many millions of people the greatest threats to their security come from disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. In recognition of this hiatus, there has been a shift in the referent point of security from one that lays stress on territoriality and sovereignty, to one that emphasises human security.

Human security is here understood as 'freedom from fear and freedom from threat', and is concerned with economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. These elements form an interdependent whole. When the human security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, other nations are often drawn in. The problems of famine, disease, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration know no borders. Their consequences traverse the globe. Thus the provision of guarantees for human security to those most threatened in their daily lives ensures greater global security.

The challenge of transforming an environment that marginalises and impoverishes people with one that provides sustainable livelihoods is a starting point for guaranteeing human security for all. The emphasis placed on sustainable development rather than on more orthodox economic growth strategies derives from a realisation that policies of development based on material enrichment, as measured by gross national product (GNP) per capita, have not necessarily improved the conditions of the vast majority of the populations of the developing countries of the world. In fact, despite growth in GNP, poverty and deprivation has been on the increase and with it a growing incidence of human insecurity and violence.

The paradigm of sustainable human development values human life for itself. It does not value life simply because people can produce or consume material goods. Nor does it value one person's life over another (UNDP 1994). In this paradigm, no human being ought to be condemned to a short life just because they are born in a certain region or country, are a certain race or sex. Development should allow individuals the choice to explore their human potential to the full and to put their capabilities to best use. The universal right to life is the link between the needs of human development in the present and those of the future – especially the needs for environmental preservation and regeneration. The strongest argument for protecting the environment is the right of future generations to opportunities similar to the ones earlier generations have enjoyed.

The universal right to life is also the common thread which binds the notion of sustainable human development to that of human security. The fear or the reality of want and of physical threat are the major factors that contribute to the insecurity for the poor and marginalised in the developing world. In the sense in which sustainable human development provides an ethical and normative framework conforming with certain fundamental universal moral values about the right to life and freedom of choice, it can also be viewed as a tool for conflict prevention and local and regional security.

The recognition of the need to manage economic reforms in such a way as to enhance, rather than undermine, political stability has been forced rather reluctantly on the agendas of the Washington institutions by the experience of the East Asian crisis. It has opened the way to an acknowledgment that governments must be fully involved in defining the reform process and that programmes must not be imposed formulaically, but instead tailored to each country's particular political and economic circumstances. But if economic inequality is to be challenged effectively as a source of structural violence, the international institutions need to do far more than simply tinker with reforms. There needs to be a fundamental transformation of the ideological foundations upon which these institutions legitimise themselves. Global security will not be enhanced until such

time as the existing economic orthodoxy is challenged and replaced.

## 8 Conclusion

The neoliberal view of globalisation as a benign process encouraging peace and development lives on as the dominant doctrine of the multilateral organisations. Yet the protracted failure of IMF- and World Bank-imposed reforms to deliver the most basic of human needs to over 20 per cent of the global population, is a testimony to their failure as a model of both development and stability. Rather, neoliberal policies constitute a form of structural violence that places the greed of the few above the basic human security of the many.

Increasingly, demands are being made for a reform of the current patterns of globalisation to redress its destabilising effects (DFID 2000; Hellenier 1999; UNDP 1999). Kofi Annan (2000), in his Millennium Assembly speech, observed that the best way to prevent conflict is to promote healthy and balanced economic development, combined with human rights, minority rights and political arrangements in which all groups are fairly represented. To achieve this will require the adoption of a different model of development to that which currently dominates the multilateral agenda.

Attempts to articulate an alternative value system for the global economy are to be found in the 'Alternative Declaration' produced by the NGO Forum at the Copenhagen Summit. It lays stress on equity participation, self-reliance and sustainability.

The 'Alternative Declaration' 'rejects the economic liberalism accepted by the governments of the North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation rather than the alleviation of the global social crisis. Moreover, it identifies trade liberalisation and privatisation as the cause of the growing concentration of wealth globally' (Thomas 1998: 459). Its alternative conception of development values diversity above universality, and is based on a different conception of rights than that which is articulated by the 'Washington Consensus'. It poses a challenge to the economic orthodoxy and existing global structures of power, and intrinsically establishes a relationship between globalisation and the rising insecurity in the developing world. In the absence of a doctrinal change that concretely deals with the suffering and marginalisation caused by the inequities of the global system, the spectre of disorder, instability, crime and violence will only grow. These are, after all, the rational responses to the survival of the fittest in a global system that puts profit before people's basic needs.

## Note

1. The criteria defining an LDC include low income as measured by GDP per capita, weak human resources as measured by a composite index based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie intake, combined primary and secondary enrolment and adult literacy, low levels of economic diversification, as measured by a composite index based on share of manufacturing in GDP, share of labour force in industry, annual per capita commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD's export concentration index.

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