Mainstreaming Conflict in Development*

Violent conflict is without doubt one of the biggest barriers to sustainable development globally (see for example OECD DAC 1996; Luckham et al. 1999). It is also a major obstacle towards the achievement of the International Development Targets (IDTs). Violent conflict inhibits progress on all of the IDTs by affecting the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, inhibiting progress on 'human development targets' and affecting environmental sustainability and the achievement of the regeneration target (Luckham et al. 1999; Fitzgerald and Stewart 1997).

In recent years there has been a plethora of new initiatives announced at multilateral, bilateral, and regional levels to address conflict. This 'international response' has sought particularly to address concerns about the rising trend of conflict in Africa (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Bigombe et al. 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; De Waal 2000).

Between 1980 and 1994 ten of the twenty-four most war-affected countries were African, and four of these (Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia) were ranked within the five most severely affected countries in the world (Luckham et al. 1999). In 1998 Kofi Annan in his report to the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa', observed that 'In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.' More recently the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noted that '... Africa is the most conflict-ridden region of the world and the only region in which armed conflict is on the increase.' (SIPRI 1999). Currently more than half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in or affected by conflict. The results have been devastating and include: problems of recurring humanitarian crises; genocidal wars; senseless plunder; the recruitment of child soldiers;
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the ever-rising numbers of refugees and displaced persons; the tragic victims of landmines; the destruction of infrastructure; the erosion of human development and environmental destruction.

The scale of the problems has forced the international community to seek new initiatives to deal with the symbiotic challenge of Africa's security and development dilemmas. This international response has been driven partly by public concerns following the failure of the international community to intervene in Rwanda to prevent genocide. It is worth noting also that this response has been developed against a backdrop of public concerns in industrialised countries about the waste of development assistance provided to war-ravaged countries, especially in Africa.2

So what are these ‘new initiatives’ and to what extent are they likely to succeed? A summary of the main initiatives reveals the following.

2 Multilateral Initiatives

2.1 The United Nations

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the international community supported ambitious peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Africa. This brought some significant successes (Namibia and Mozambique). Elsewhere, however, success in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has proved illusive. The UN's inability to restore peace in Somalia in the early 1990s (culminating in the Security Council's unprecedented response of withdrawing before the completion of its mission) soured international support for intervention in conflict zones and precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. One consequence of this was the failure of the international community to prevent genocide in Rwanda.

In the face of deteriorating conditions the international community has reluctantly been forced to rethink its policies towards conflict in Africa. Kofi Annan, commenting on the international communities inertia towards conflict in Africa, commented that 'We have failed them by not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development. This is the reality of Africa's recent past' (Annan 1998). In his 1998 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed four main types of action to prevent or reduce violent conflicts in Africa:

(a) Peacemaking
- More effective coordination and preparation required;
- Rival mediation efforts to be avoided;
- Establishment of 'contact groups' to mobilise peace efforts;
- Sanctions targeted at decision-makers and their families – including freezing of assets and restrictions on travel;
- Restriction of arms exports to conflict zones.

(b) Peacekeeping
- Of the thirty-two UN peacekeeping operations launched since 1989, thirteen have been in Africa (more than in any other region of the world);
- Peace-building elements to be integrated into the mandate of PKOs;
- Recognition of the greater potential role for preventive deployment;
- Reinforcing Africa's own capacity to mount peacekeeping missions.

(c) Humanitarian assistance
- Adherence to international humanitarian and human rights norms in UN's work;
- Improved coordination of UN humanitarian actions;
- Humanitarian assistance not to be treated as a substitute for political action.

(d) Post-conflict peace building
- Post-conflict reconstruction to be timely, multifaceted and adequately financed with high level strategic and administrative coordination;
- Where economic reforms are required, 'peace-friendly' structural adjustment programmes together with easing of conditionality necessary;
- Improved coordination in post-conflict peace-building.

In the past year, the Secretary-General commissioned a substantial review of progress on much of this work, led by the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations. The recommendations of the Panel are contained in the Brahimi Report. The key recommendations of particular relevance to development agencies include:

- Endorsement of the Secretary-General's appeal to 'all those who are engaged in conflict prevention and development; the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, governments and civil society organisations to address challenges in a more integrated fashion';
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to take a key coordinating role in post conflict situations;
- A doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts to increase focus on strengthening the rule of law and improving respect for human rights;
- Executive Committee on Peace and Security to recommend a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-building strategies and implement support programmes;
- The Department for Peace-Keeping Operations to formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining the use of UN volunteers;
- Establishment of integrated mission task forces with members seconded from throughout the UN;
- Support for the creation of a peace-building unit;
- The procurement, logistics etc. for smaller non-military field missions to be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS);
- A substantial enhancement of the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

The Brahimi Report highlights the fact that there are major questions about the ability of the UN to deliver on conflict prevention/peacekeeping. It signals the importance of closing the gap between high-level policy statements and reality in the field. Much will now depend on how its recommendations are implemented.

2.2 The G8
In recent years the G8 has made numerous pronouncements in support of specific initiatives on conflict prevention and non-proliferation/arms controls. In the December 1999 G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, five issues were identified for action: small arms; development and conflict; the illicit trade in diamonds; the targeting of children in conflict, and civilian policing.

In July 2000 at Miyazaki, G8 ministers endorsed several measures, including: dealing with the uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons; addressing the illicit trade in diamonds; ensuring that development policies are constructed so as to contribute to the elimination of potential causes of armed conflicts; addressing the impact of armed conflict on children. 3

The willingness of the G8 to follow up on this agenda remains unclear. The next summit takes place in Italy in Spring 2001 and it will be interesting to see what, if any, action results. Perhaps the most likely areas of follow up action will be on the extension of highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt relief for post-conflict countries and more coordinated action by the G8 to stop the proliferation of small arms and illicit weapons.

2.3 The World Bank
In the past few years the Bank has established a Post-Conflict Unit dedicated to easing the transition to sustainable peace and supporting socio-economic development in conflict-affected countries (Colletta et al. 1998). This aims to address needs such as the social reintegration of displaced and ex-combatants, community reconciliation, reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure, and institutional development.

The Bank is developing tools for financing in countries that are not eligible for standard International Development Assistance (IDA) lending. New financing tools include the Post-
Conflict Program Grants, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Grants, and learning and innovation loans. The Post-Conflict Fund supports planning, piloting and analysis of reconstruction activities. The World Bank also has a key role in mobilising post-conflict finance through Consultative Group meetings (Colletta 1998).

In practice the majority of Bank support in post-conflict situations is for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, which it perceives to be to its comparative advantage. Perhaps the key issues in the next period on which we are likely to see progress by the Bank are on Country Assistance Strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. If PRSPs begin to address the underlying structural causes of conflict and social exclusion, and the Bank is able to assist fragile government policy structures to develop coherent cross-sectoral poverty reduction strategies, we may begin to see a major reduction globally in the spread of violent conflict.

2.4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The IMF has largely focused on restoration of macro-economic balance in post-conflict countries. The IMF recognises the role it can play in 'catalysing balance of payments support from the international community within an appropriate macro-economic framework', it is however keen to avoid a flagship role in supporting countries in post-conflict situations. The key role for the IMF is likely to be to assist in co-ordinating integrated investment in post-conflict countries. Debates about a more appropriate role in post-conflict reconstruction have focused on 'Marshall type interventions' as opposed to pure market orientated strategies in politically sensitive 'transition processes'.

2.5 The European Community
Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution are important aspects of the new Cotonou Agreement between the European Community (EC) and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The EC Africa Working Group has been active in supporting conflict prevention and peace-building and the EC has also provided practical support to conflict resolution and DDR programmes in the Horn of Africa. Conflict prevention and peacekeeping is also likely to be a high priority under the Swedish presidency in 2001.

The establishment of the Rapid Reaction Facility (RRF) as part of the Common European Security and Defence Policy has potential implications for conflict-related work in Africa. The RRF is designed to enhance the European Union's capacity to intervene fast and effectively in crisis points outside the EU, to mobilise resources within hours or days rather than weeks or months. The RRF will be used to support: human rights work; election monitoring; institution building; media support; border management; humanitarian missions; demining operations; police training and the provision of police equipment; civil emergency assistance; rehabilitation; reconstruction; pacification; resettlement and mediation.

3 Bilateral Programming Initiatives
In addition to the multilateral initiatives mentioned above, many governments are involved in supporting specific bilateral programming initiatives. For Africa, some of the most important of these are as follows:

USA – Major peacekeeping training programme (the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)). Involves expenditure of approximately $20 million annually and expending $75 million since its inception in 1997. ACRI's battalion and command-post training are intended to increase African capacity to participate in Chapter VI peacekeeping. Initially eight countries were involved in the ACRI, including Benin, Cote d'Ivore, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Uganda (though the programmes in Ethiopia and Uganda were later suspended because of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea and because of Uganda's involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Nigeria's involvement in ACRI has been a more recent phenomenon.

France – As part of its revised Africa policy, France has significantly reduced its deployment of troops and military advisers in Africa. Its budget for military cooperation has also been reduced since 1997. As part of changes in
Franco-African relations, France has supported a new security assistance policy 'renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP). The initiative has three main pillars: instruction; sub-regional peacekeeping training exercises; and pre-positioning equipment in designated locations in Africa. RECAMP is viewed more as a concept rather than a programme. RECAMP does not have a firm annual budget. France's main African partners in RECAMP include Cote d'Ivore, Mali, Senegal and Togo. Other countries involved in RECAMP training programmes include Ghana, Cape Verde, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

Norway – Strong support for conflict resolution and peace-building activities has focused largely on the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) sub-region. The Norwegian Government is financing an ambitious five-year Training for Peace (TfP) in Southern Africa that aims to build capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. More than 250 officials from governments, representatives of defence and police forces and members of civil society have participated in TfP workshops. Norway also provides support for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and for the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security Development (PCASED), which plays a key role in the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) moratorium on the production, import and export of small arms and light weapons. Norway has also provided voluntary funds to a number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Sweden – Has provided US$136,877 annually to the OAU Peace Fund in 1998 and 1999. Sweden also supports work with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and PCASED and provides support for training and field exercises. In addition, a key component of Sweden's work on conflict prevention concerns its support to civil society projects. Sweden has also contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Denmark – Extensive engagement in peacekeeping training, particularly in Southern Africa. In 1995 Denmark undertook an assessment of the existing capacity of the Southern Africa region and identified the need for a regional centre and clearing house for peacekeeping training. In 1997 the Regional Peace Training Centre was established with Danish funding (US$2.7 million over three years). Its aim is to organise and finance ten peacekeeping courses over a three-year period and to provide short- and long-term technical advisers. In addition to voluntary financial contributions to a number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, Denmark has also contributed to the OAU Peace Fund.

Canada – Has identified participation in peacekeeping as a central part of its foreign and defence policies and has deployed its own troops to UN-authorised operations in Africa. Canada has also contributed to peacekeeping training (through its Military Training Assistance Programme). Canada has also supported sub-regional training initiatives and contributed to the OAU Peace Fund. In the past year Canada has provided US$700,000 in non-lethal material support for Ghanaian and Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone. Canada has also focused on children affected by war as part of its overall approach.

Japan – Has organised several conferences and symposia that address the issue of developing African peacekeeping capabilities. Japan has made significant financial contributions, through the UN and African regional organisations, to peacekeeping in Africa (including voluntary financial contributions for peace operations). In the past year Japan has established a Trust Fund with the UN called 'the Sub-account for the Trust Fund in support of Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping'. The aim of this now appears in part to include follow-up action on the G8 initiatives.

South Africa – Considerable potential both at governmental and civil society level, to contribute to conflict prevention in Africa.
The Establishment of the Joint Pools for Conflict Prevention in the UK

The UK has supported the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme funded to the tune of roughly US $4 million per annum since 1996. A central goal of this programme has been to help develop national military staff colleges into 'centres of excellence' for regional peacekeeping training through the Military Advisory and Training Teams. Some of this work is currently being reviewed.

The UK has also provided material and logistical support to African contingents preparing to deploy to peacekeeping operations and has played a prominent role in security sector reform in many countries.

A major new initiative in the past year has been the 'Cross-cutting reviews on conflict prevention'. These recommend ways in which government departments could improve the UK's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and management by working more closely together.

In July 2000 two sub-committees of the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy were established. One of the sub-committees is chaired by the Secretary of State for International Development and addresses the government's priorities and programmes for conflict prevention in sub-Saharan Africa. The other, chaired by the Foreign Secretary, fulfils the same role in relation to the rest of the world.

The aim of these new measures is to reduce violent conflict by improving the effectiveness, impact and efficiency of the government's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and management. The new arrangements entail the production of a cross-departmental joint strategy to facilitate collective decision-making and improve the effectiveness, impact and efficiency of the government's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and management. A joint pool has been established for sub-Saharan Africa, harnessing the resources that each department currently devotes to conflict prevention in the region, together with additional resources from treasury.

These new arrangements come into effect in April 2001.

South Africa intends to increase peacekeeping capacity in SADC. However, suspicions about South Africa's hegemonic intentions mean that there is a continuing need to build trust and confidence with other members of SADC.

4 Regional and Sub-Regional Initiatives (in Africa)

In 1990 the OAU heads of state and government rededicated themselves to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts. The declaration sought to put Africa at the centre of all attempts at dealing with conflicts, by emphasising that Africa, while welcoming the sympathy, understanding and assistance of others, also recognises that it is the primary responsibility of African governments to act, before all others, to tackle the phenomenon of conflicts.

In June 1993 the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The mechanism's aims are to anticipate and prevent conflicts. An OAU Peace Fund has also been established to support its operational activities. Since its inception, the mechanism has undertaken a number of initiatives in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo aimed at defusing tensions. The OAU has also played an active role in mediating between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Like many of the other efforts, overall the OAU has not been especially effective in its role in preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa. Political and bureaucratic difficulties have meant that the OAU mechanisms for conflict management have remained relatively weak and under-resourced. Nevertheless, the OAU will surely continue to play an important political role in conflict resolution in Africa in future.

Sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD are all fairly weak. They are all currently involved in work on preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, but in general have limited capacity to support conflict prevention and dispute resolution.

ECOWAS has a Standing Mediation Committee to mediate in disputes between member states. The large number of conflicts in West Africa in the past decade suggests that the ECOWAS mechanisms are not particularly effective. A number of factions have emerged within ECOWAS, partly as a counterweight to the dominant role of Nigeria in the region.

Within SADC there has also been discussion about regional peacekeeping and conflict prevention in recent years. The rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe has been a key factor affecting SADC’s role in conflict prevention and peacekeeping (for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo). The lack of an effective secretariat has also limited SADC’s capacity to be a more effective player on conflict prevention and peace-building.

IGAD is also weak as a result of the fragile peace between several of its members (for example Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti). IGAD also has limited capacity (a small secretariat) to play a more prominent role.

In bringing together the various types and levels of institutional responses to address conflict issues, various contributions of ‘non-state actors’ need to be born in mind, including: religious organisations – in particular the churches; non-governmental organisations; and security and private military companies. Non-state actors contribute to conflict prevention in Africa in a variety of ways. They are often able to work in areas occupied by rebel groups and have greater scope for action in conflict areas. One of the main contributions of NGOs in particular lies in their ability to work in areas occupied by rebel groups and their greater access to and experience of operating in conflict areas. Non-state actors often have extensive experience of operating in conflict areas and a considerable depth of understanding of the dynamics of conflict on the ground.  

5 Conclusion

In summary, it is interesting to note that there are probably more institutions now than ever before involved in responding to violent conflicts. In part this is perhaps in recognition of the failure of previous institutional responses to deal with the changing nature and scale of warfare. One might conclude that there has been substantial progress achieved at policy level in ‘mainstreaming conflict issues’ (OECD 1998). With few exceptions, key development agencies are now beginning to get more engaged in responding to conflict issues as part of their programmes. This is in marked contrast to much of the 1980s, when a relatively small group of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and practitioners were advocating for conflict to be given a higher priority in the work of official aid agencies. To what extent, however, has this actually resulted in improved practical outcomes?

Given the time-lags between the announcement of new policies and their implementation, realistically it may be too soon to judge outcomes. Indeed, one might argue that many of the policy pronouncements have yet to be backed by resources (financial and human) made available to support the policy shifts mentioned above.

A key theme running through all the major initiatives, however, has been the emphasis on the need for improved coordination and complementary action. This was highlighted in the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Guidelines on Peace, Development and Co-operation which state:

While concentrating on fields of action in which it has a comparative advantage, development co-operation can also work with other instruments; including diplomatic,
military and economic ones, to strengthen the possibilities of peace and development. (OECD 1997)

A closer analysis of the various institutional responses in the past few years shows in fact that there has been little analysis of how each of the initiatives fits together and how they complement others.

Improving coordination and ‘complementarity’ is complex. It entails a sharing of information, goals and assessment methods between agencies – an area that has proved notoriously difficult because of different political and institutional agendas (Uvin 1999; Macrae and Leader 2000). An example of this is the fact that there are currently fourteen different peacekeeping training initiatives being supported in Africa alone, entailing considerable duplication of efforts and ineffective use of resources.

Improving the possibilities for ‘complementary action’ also requires concerted action across geographical boundaries, including mechanisms for regular consultation and exchange of information. This applies both within an institution and between agencies (for example between field- and headquarters-based staff or staff from different countries or between field operations of different agencies across neighbouring countries).

Effective complimentary action also requires the sharing of information, goals and assessment methods across disciplines (within and between agencies).

Finally, effective complementary action requires timely access to resources and the availability of resources specifically earmarked for ‘coordination purposes’.

Progress on overcoming these fairly ‘basic constraints’ is bound to be difficult, but may lie at the heart of creating more effective strategies for conflict prevention, resolution and management.

Notes

* I am indebted to my colleagues Debi Duncan and John Goodhand for drawing my attention to the distinctions between donor approaches to conflict. They distinguish between policies that involve: working around conflict; working in conflict; and working on conflict.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of International Development.

1. The IDTs were agreed in a series of world conferences organised by the United Nations in the 1990s. They aim to assist measuring progress in development. The targets reflect broad agreement in the international community, and are arrived at with the active participation of developing countries, which leads to the steps needed to promote economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability and regeneration. Violent conflict inhibits progress on all of the IDTs. This was specifically referred to in the UN Secretary-General’s speech to the UN Millennium Summit, ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’, see http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/summ.htm

2. It is instructive to see the difference between the international communities’ response to conflict and humanitarian crisis in Africa and similar situations in Southern Europe. For example, there appears to be relatively little public questioning of the costs or the waste associated with the war in Kosovo, despite the fact that it was a very expensive and poorly implemented intervention.


5. A useful summary of the ways in which conflict prevention relates to the Lomé framework is provided in B. Jones and S. Frasad, ‘European Union development co-operation in the 21st century’, International Alert, 1998. See also M. Chalmers,


9. There is a need to be aware of the way in which Western powers are to some extent projecting roles onto countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. Peacekeeping by proxy has a very real potential to backfire with dire consequences for conflict on the continent. See, for example, A. Zacarias, ‘The new security thinking six years post-Apartheid: where are we?’ draft paper presented to the Conference on Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Prospects and Problems, Gabarone, Botswana, December 2000; A. Adebajo and C. Landberg ‘Prophets of Africa’s renaissance: South Africa and Nigeria as regional hegemons’, draft paper presented to the Conference on Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Prospects and Problems, Gabarone, Botswana, December 2000.


11. The kinds of roles that non-state actors play include: analysis - early warning, human rights monitoring, conflict and political analysis; mediation - at community level and with irregular armed forces; protection - identification of key groups at risk, child protection from recruitment; peace-building - community level and institutional reform; arms control - community, national and regional. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a particularly important non-state actor and through its mandate has extensive involvement with all parties in the majority of conflicts. Apart from its protection role, ICRC is involved in mediation and small arms control.

12. This was a point eloquently made by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, in his keynote speech ‘Africa, the United Nations and the Southern African Development Community’, at the Conference on Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Prospects and Problems, organised by the International Peace Academy, Gabarone, Botswana, December 2000.

13. The OECD DAC in its 1998 document ‘Conflict, peace and development cooperation on the threshold of the 21st century’ notes that ‘in practical terms (aid) coordination is based on five elements: (a) a common strategic framework for assistance; (b) timely access to resources for flexible implementation; (c) leadership among international actors; (d) mechanisms for field level consultation and sharing of information; (e) the availability of resources specifically earmarked for coordination purposes’ (p.31). See also J. Macrae and N. Leader, ‘Shifting Sands: the search for “coherence” between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies’, HPG Report, No. 8, London, Overseas Development Institute, 2000.

References


