1 Introduction

Sudan is geographically the largest country in Africa, covering an area of about 1 million square miles. Besides its enormous size, Sudan is also a land of extraordinary diversity with an estimated population of about 28 million that is divided into about 56 ethnic groups and more than 595 sub-ethnic groups who speak more than 115 languages. Sudan is justifiably considered as a microcosm of Africa because of its central location, reflecting within its borders all the racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of the continent.

Tragically, since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been at war with itself and about 36 of the past 46 years have been wasted in two major civil wars (1955–72, 1982–present). These conflicts have been perceived as reflecting a cleavage between the dominant Islamic and ‘Arabised’ north – two-thirds of the land and population – and the subordinated, but potentially richer ‘African’ south that is predominantly traditional in its religious beliefs.

Since the current civil war erupted in 1982, Sudan has experienced recurrent famines – notably in 1984, 1988, 1991 and 1998 – while the south, which was not famine-prone during the first civil war (1955–72) or the inter-war period of 1972–82, has suffered two major famines, in 1988 and 1998. The increased vulnerability to famine of the war-affected population highlights the need to understand better the complexity of this ongoing conflict.

This article is an attempt to highlight the link between increased vulnerability to famine in southern Sudan and the unique characteristics of the current civil war, particularly the global dimension, which has often been overlooked in famine analysis. As the national and micro-level factors that contributed to the famine of 1998 are discussed at length in Deng (1999), this article focuses on how new and additional global factors unfolded into increased household vulnerability to famine, specifically through intensification of counter-insurgency warfare.

2 The magnitude of famine in 1998

2.1 Malnutrition

The nutritional status of a community during a ‘complex emergency’ is generally assessed through
the nutritional status of children younger than 5 years. A nutrition survey conducted by UNICEF in June 1998 in the Bahr el Ghazal region showed a considerable deterioration in nutrition status, particularly in areas exposed to counter-insurgency warfare (Awiel, Wau, Twic and Gogrial), as shown in Figure 1. While the level of severe acute malnutrition averaged about 20 per cent among the resident population, it reached as high as 40 per cent among the internally displaced population. The nutrition assessment also indicated a higher prevalence of malnutrition among boys than girls; a difference that eroded as the situation started improving. The social profile of households with children in feeding programmes in Gogrial shows no major difference between poor and non-poor households, suggesting structural changes in the initial wealth status of those communities exposed to counter-insurgency warfare (Deng 1999: 12).

2.2 Mortality

The size of the population in southern Sudan is highly politicised and is hotly debated by the local authorities and humanitarian agencies, as there are no commonly agreed population estimates. Even the national population censuses that were conducted in 1973 and 1983 were doubted and questioned by southern Sudanese. The long history of instability and civil war in southern Sudan has also caused considerable distortion in the demography of the region, particularly in patterns of mortality and fertility, which makes any attempt to assess aggregate famine mortality necessarily subjective.

In assessing mortality during the famine in 1998, the author used data from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) (Belgium), Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and a survey personally conducted in 1999. In comparison to other African famines, the crude mortality rate (CMR) among the resident population in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998 is comparable to Ethiopia in 1973 and 1984/85, Darfur (north Sudan) in 1984/85 and Niger in 1974. The CMRs among the displaced population and children under 5 years of age during the 1998 famine were far higher than any other recent African famines, as shown in Figure 2. In July 1998, the CMR peaked at 26/10,000 among the
adult displaced population and 46/10,000 among children under 5 years of age. These rates greatly exceeded the normal CMRs for developing countries (Salama et al. 2001: 564). As a baseline CMR is not available to assess excess mortality during famine in 1998, the 1973 national census crude death rate of 36/1,000 persons during the census year (approximately 1/10,000 per day) was used, as a proxy for baseline crude mortality. With actual CMR as provided by various sources, Deng (1999: 17) estimates excess mortality to be around 70,000 persons during the famine in 1998. Alternatively, using the emergency CMR cut-off point (1/10,000 per day) as a baseline, together with actual average CMR (1.9/10,000 per day) for the resident population (721,529) and CMR (14.8/10,000 per day) for the internally displaced population (141,505) calculated from various sources (Deng 1999:16), the excess mortality during the period of famine (April 1998–January 1999) is estimated at about 78,000 persons.

### 3 Conduct of civil war: the curse of assets

The links between civil war and vulnerability to famine are fairly well understood in the context of conventional civil wars. In the context of Sudan, communities attach more importance to counter-insurgency warfare than to conventional warfare between the government and rebels, as counter-insurgency warfare has more direct effects on their livelihoods. In order to unpack the dynamics of conflict in Bahr el Ghazal in the 1990s, Deng (2002a) classifies counter-insurgency into *exogenous* and *endogenous* warfare, where *endogenous* counter-insurgency emanates from within the community, while *exogenous* counter-insurgency originates from outside. Deng (2002a) shows that endogenous counter-insurgency has more profound negative effects on rural livelihoods and household assets management strategies than other forms of conflict.

It was found in the case of Sudan's civil war that the initial level of household asset-holdings is positively related to the occurrence of endogenous counter-insurgency warfare, with non-poor households being more susceptible than the poor, primarily

---

**Figure 2: Famine crude mortality rates (CMR) in Africa 1973–98**

![Graph showing Famine crude mortality rates (CMR) in Africa 1973–98](source: Seaman (1993), MSF (Belgium) and SRRA)
because of symmetric information (Deng 2002a). Interestingly, while social capital was found to erode in the context of endogenous counter-insurgency, social cohesion and community-based risk sharing arrangements tend to strengthen during exogenous counter-insurgency. A strong and significant positive correlation was found between famine mortality in 1998 and initial wealth, particularly among households exposed to endogenous counter-insurgency warfare, whereas a ‘normal’ inverse correlation prevailed among households exposed to drought.

The really puzzling question is: Why have communities in southern Sudan, particularly in Bahr el Ghazal region, become more prone to recurrent famines during the current civil war than during the first civil war of 1955–72? In attempting to answer this question, this article discusses the main causes of the current civil war, with an emphasis on global factors that have translated into increased vulnerability to famine in southern Sudan.

4 Unfolding of the global dimension of famine causation

Though it is depressing, as mentioned by Devereux (2000: 24), to explain the persistence of famine long after it ought to have been eradicated, such explanations are an important ingredient of a new famine prevention policy agenda. Most theories attribute contemporary famine to triggers such as ecological shock, population growth, economic crisis or civil war. This conceptualisation resulted in famine being seen initially as an ‘act of God’ or ‘law of nature’ and more recently as ‘economic crisis’ at household level or ‘act of man’ at national level (Devereux 2001: 120). As such, the global dimension has been overlooked. This article attempts to highlight the global context in explaining the Bahr el Ghazal famine of 1998, with the aim of contributing to the synthesis of theoretical debates and empirical experience.

4.1 The British colonial legacy: structural political vulnerability and exclusion

The first civil war erupted in 1955, just before Sudan’s independence, and was primarily caused by the British colonial authorities who falsely forged the current united Sudan after pursuing a pattern of development during the colonial period that created social, economic and political inequalities, which left the south absolutely and relatively disadvantaged. For southerners, the independence brokered between the British and the northern elite was a mere changing of faces of colonial power from the British to Arabised northerners (Deng 1995: 135).

Not to the surprise of most southerners, successive post-independence central governments pursued policies that deliberately marginalised southerners socially, economically and politically. The army, police and employees of the southern Sudan administration immediately after independence became overwhelmingly ‘northern’, with southerners occupying less than 10 per cent (14 out of 152 scale G officials) of the total senior positions (Oduho and Deng 1963: 18). By 1960, the share of southern Sudan in intermediate, secondary and university education was, respectively, less than 8 per cent (21 out of 270 total streams), 4 per cent (3 out of 71 total streams) and 5 per cent (60 out of 1,216 total students) (Oduho and Deng 1963: 46).

Even during the brief period of relative peace (1972–82) after the Addis Ababa Agreement that granted self-government to southern Sudan in 1972, the long-standing inequalities between north and south worsened further. The south, ravaged by 17 years of civil war, failed to receive adequate revenue transfers from central government, and the average realised budget for the southern regional government during this period barely covered 20 per cent of the planned budget (Deng 2002b: 14). As a result of inadequate resourcing, social and economic services deteriorated in the south relative to the north. For example, the number of people per hospital bed in 1980 was about 800 in northern Sudan, but 2,000 in the south. Inequality was more dramatic in terms of access to education, as about 2,000 northerners shared one primary school in 1980, compared with 8,000 southerners. Even more striking was admission to the national university, where about 3,500 northerners, but almost 200,000 southerners, were competing for one place in 1983. These profound horizontal inequalities generated a sense of frustration and feeling of injustice and exclusion that eventually
led people in the south to resort again to armed struggle (Yongo-Bure 1993: 51). Garang (1987: 21) argued that ‘under these circumstances the marginal cost of rebellion in the south became very small, zero or negative; that is, in the south it pays to rebel’.

During the current civil war, successive central governments in the north promoted fierce counter-insurgency warfare and invoked an Arab–Islamic paradigm to mobilise the north Sudan, Arab and Islamic world against the allegedly ‘infidel’ south, particularly in regions adjacent to northern Sudan, such as Bahr el Ghazal. These policies, that are aimed at ruining people’s livelihoods, transferring assets, extracting natural resources and enslaving the south, are rooted in the British colonial legacy, which handed over the south to northern domination. It is this colonial legacy that has created the structural vulnerability that continues to haunt and decimate the communities of southern Sudan.

4.2 The crisis of subsistence in the North: internationally sponsored development and reform

The neo-Malthusian thesis attributes civil wars to environmental degradation that has led to critical scarcities of natural resources, and some environmentalists have explained the current Sudanese civil war in these terms. Suliman (1999: 88) argues that the nature of conflict in the Sudan has evolved from a classic ethno-religious conflict into one mainly over resources, driven by economic crisis in the north.

In the early 1970s, the central government initiated policies, sponsored by the World Bank, that encouraged and subsidised shifts towards large-scale, commercial and export-oriented agriculture as a ‘quick fix’ to rapid economic development. In 1970, the government passed the ‘Unregistered Land Act’, which effectively legitimised the state’s control and ownership of any piece of land. This act allowed the government to expropriate thousands of hectares of prime savannah land from the farming and pastoral communities, which were then leased to wealthy citizens and foreign investors for capital-intensive farming (Kebbede 1999: 115). It is estimated that during the 1970s an average of 8,750 km² of forest was removed annually to make room for mechanised farming (Berry and Geistfeld 1983: 69). The World Bank alone provided funding for the clearing of more than 2 million hectares of nomadic grazing land for large-scale farms (Bennett 1987: 57). In southern Kordofan in 1973 about 84,388 hectares of fertile land was turned, with loans obtained from the World Bank, into publicly and privately operated mechanised farming schemes (Ahmed 1983: 55). In southern Blue Nile, a wealthy Saudi Prince obtained a 99-year lease on 464,000 hectares of land ‘to produce sorghum to feed animals in the oil-rich nations’ (Prendergast 1990: 41). One consequence of wholesale forest clearing was the rapid decline of the Acacia senegal, an important tree for poor farmers as sources of both charcoal and gum (Cater 1986: 10).

Moreover, many subsistence farmers and pastoralists in northern Sudan lost their farms and grazing lands during the 1970s. Economic necessity compelled nomadic and agropastoralist communities in Kordofan and Darfur to look for new grazing lands or settlement areas to the south, creating tension and conflicts over scarce grazing and cultivatable land. The expansion of mechanised farming accelerated deforestation as well as soil exhaustion, and exacerbated the recurrent droughts in the early 1980s that ultimately resulted in the famine of 1984/85 in western Sudan. This subsistence crisis prompted destitute herders to seek to replenish their livestock through raiding, and traders with squeezed profit margins to turn to financing cattle raiding in the south as a lucrative business (de Waal 1996: 8). These former herders also became easy prey for successive central governments, who used them to fight the rebellion in the south through counter-insurgency warfare that subsequently caused the famine of 1988. Keen (1994: 78) shows how famine and displacement in the Bahr el Ghazal region were strongly correlated, both geographically and chronologically, with militia raids.

Besides the crisis of subsistence in the rural economies in northern Sudan, the debt burden and structural adjustment reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1970s crippled the national economy. While Sudan’s foreign debt was about US$424 million in 1970; it reached US$6.12 billion in 1983. The debt-export ratio, that was about 1:13 in 1970, reached
5.78 in 1983, with debt service alone consuming most of the country’s export earnings. As a result of the second ‘oil shock’ in 1979/80, coupled with deteriorating terms of trade, the cost of imports doubled between 1980 and 1983, while export earnings declined sharply. Consequently, the trade deficit reached about US$626.5 million in 1983 compared with a trade surplus of US$10.8 million in 1968. The level of foreign reserves also shrunk in 1983 to almost one-quarter of their 1965 level.

Sudan’s economic situation in the early 1980s was described by Daly (1993: 22) as ‘a financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude’. By 1983, the economy had virtually imploded to the point of bankruptcy. In order to appease right-wing Islamist opponents and to retain power, the central government stepped up ‘Islamisation’ and abrogated the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1983, thereby triggering the current civil war in southern Sudan.

4.3 The curse of mineral resources abundance in the south: multinational corporations

The thesis of attributing the causes of civil war to resource scarcity has recently been challenged by contrary evidence that suggests that natural resource abundance is a primary cause of conflict. Some economists have provided empirical support for the proposition that natural resource deposits motivate rebels’ greed and fuel civil wars (Collier 2000: 2). The case of Sudan, however, suggests that it is the greed of the ruling elite and multinational corporations, rather than that of rebels, that generated grievances and rebellion in the south. The first historical contacts of the present southern Sudan with the outside world – Arabs, Turkey, Egypt, Britain – were characterised by brutal invasion by outsiders ‘destitute of wealth’ in search of resources such as gold, ivory, water and slaves (Churchill 1940: 2). This pattern of extraction of natural resources from the south continues to benefit the north, with brutality on a massive scale that characterises the Sudanese economy during the post-colonial period, together with an increasing role for multinational corporations. The south, being well endowed with natural resources and wealth, has become, paradoxically, a victim of its virtues, which expose it to increasing vulnerability to recurrent famines.

The extraction of oil from southern Sudan by multinational corporations triggered and sustained the current civil war through counter-insurgency warfare. When commercial oil deposits were discovered in southern Sudan in 1979 by the Chevron Oil Company, information related to the location and size of the oilfield was deliberately concealed from the public because of fear that discovery of such a huge economic resource in the south would trigger renewed feeling among southerners to secede. Southerners were also afraid that the central government would steal their oil reserves that they desperately needed for economic rehabilitation after 17 years of civil war. This fear was crystallised in 1980, when the central government redrew the map of Sudan to shift the northern areas of the south – where the oilfields were discovered – into the north (Lesch 1998: 48). This action was followed by shifting the site of the oil refinery from Bentiu in the south to Kosti and later to Port Sudan in the north.

In an effort to create a stable operational environment for Chevron to exploit the oilfields without interference from the south, the central government unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1983, by dividing the south into three weaker regions and transferring southern soldiers (former rebel fighters) to the north. These actions further provoked and infuriated the southerners, and directly fuelled the current civil war. After its formation in 1983, the rebel movement in the south immediately attacked and disrupted the oil development and forced Chevron to suspend its operations by mid-1984.

The idea of a ‘militia strategy’ in Sudan’s civil war is linked to oil development and gained momentum in the late 1970s, when the central government failed to provide security around the Chevron oilfield operations in the south. With the economic crisis in the late 1970s, the central government subcontracted the impoverished Arab pastoralists in western Sudan as a local self-provisioning protection force for the oilfields. The ‘militia’ was later adopted by near-bankrupt successive central governments as an opportunistic way of waging counter-insurgency warfare in the south during the 1980s.

In order to resume development of the oilfields in southern Sudan, the central government exploited
divisions within the ranks of the rebel movement, and succeeded in creating a split in 1991. It then used the rebel splinter groups together with Arab militias to intensify counter-insurgency warfare during the 1990s. By 1992, oil production resumed and the government started exporting oil in 1997, a year prior to the famine in Bahr el Ghazal region. It is not paradoxical that the occurrence of famine is neatly correlated with production of oil, as this generated the necessary resources to finance the government’s military expenditure. The national military budget was 80.6 billion Sudanese pounds in 1995–6, and reached 932 billion Sudanese pounds in the year 2000, when oil exports accounted for about 75 per cent of total exports (as shown in Figure 3). It is interesting to observe from Figure 3 that while inflation declined dramatically in 1998 in northern Sudan as a result of oil extraction from the south, the crude mortality rate among children under 5 years of age reached as high as 46 during the famine in Bahr el Ghazal region in 1998 (see Figure 2).

The oil development has devastated the livelihoods of the communities around the oilfields. Recent reports (Gagnon and Ryle 2001: 33; Christian Aid 2001: 22) show how oil is funding and sustaining the civil war and how the government of Sudan is pursuing ‘scorched earth’ policies to clear the oilfields of civilians in order to make way for the exploration of oil by foreign international oil companies. The government uses a wide range of multinational oil corporations to conceal its violations of human rights and massive displacement of the local communities of the oilfield areas. There are about 17 exploration and 25 development oil wells in southern Sudan, which are managed by multinational corporations from Canada (Talisman), Sweden (Lundin), France (Elf), Italy (Agip), Austria (OMV–AG), Netherlands (Dutch Shell), Belgium/France (TotalFina), Gulf, Malaysia and China with estimated daily production of more than 250,000 barrels. These multinational corporations are becoming part of the government policy of ‘scorched earth’ as they effectively fund war efforts and thus participate in exacerbating the suffering of the inhabitants of the oilfield areas and derail the prospects for peace in the Sudan (Gagnon and Ryle 2001: 33; International Crisis Group 2002: 132).

4.4 International aid agencies: The ‘normalisation’ of crisis

The dilemma faced by humanitarian intervention during complex emergencies is subsumed in current development jargon, which insists that ‘Africans do
not starve, they cope’ (Seaman 1993: 27). Davies (1993: 61) argues that an emphasis on ‘coping’ may blind policymakers and researchers to the need for a radical reappraisal of the requirements of people’s livelihoods in marginal areas. Since the mid-1990s, there has been growing criticism of humanitarianism, particularly relief aid, which is characterised as addressing symptoms, creating dependency, incapacitating social institutions and undermining markets (Macrae 1998: 315). This criticism resulted in the ‘relief-development continuum’ gaining momentum, with increasing emphasis on reducing relief and working with communities to increase their capacities, in order to ensure sustainability. This ‘normalisation’ of crisis, as described by Bradbury (1998: 330), is characterised by a creeping acceptance of higher levels of vulnerability, malnutrition and morbidity. As a result donors started shifting their funding away from relief aid, which resulted in a global decline in aid transfers and persistent under-funding of UN operations in complex emergencies (Bradbury 1998: 334).

In the context of southern Sudan, the relief food delivered by the World Food Programme (WFP) declined from 30,020 metric tons in 1993 to only 12,484 metric tons in 1997, with Bahr el Ghazal receiving the least (Figure 4). These declining food aid flows during the 1990s did not reflect the increasing vulnerability of Bahr el Ghazal region, where counter-insurgency warfare intensified and drastically eroded livelihoods. During 1996 and 1997, the relief food delivered by WFP to southern Sudan constituted only 12 per cent and 38 per cent respectively of assessed needs (Deng 1999: 70). For the same years, WFP received only 62 per cent (US$25 million) and 50 per cent (US$22 million) of its total annual appeal for its humanitarian operations in southern Sudan. By June 1998, when the famine reached its peak in Bahr el Ghazal, the UN and WFP had received only 48 per cent and 54 per cent of their respective appeals (US$109 million and US$32 million). As a result the minimum food requirement target was only met by the WFP in November 1998, seven months after the famine became apparent in April (Deng 1999: 72).

Instead of challenging the changes in international aid policy that steadily reduced relief entitlements, the leading aid agencies operating in southern
Sudan became complacent and accommodating of crisis. When the famine occurred in 1998, some aid agencies resisted recognising the famine, preferring to ‘normalise’ it by describing it as ‘extreme distress’ or ‘crisis’ or even ‘normal transitory food insecurity’ (Deng 1999: 6). By the time crude mortality and malnutrition rates reached unacceptable levels, most British aid agencies, which were among the few aid agencies operating in Bahr el Ghazal, curiously decided that the crisis in Sudan did not warrant a national appeal. While the aid agencies were divided about the severity of the situation, the media intervened and press coverage of Sudan peaked in May (as shown in Figure 5), resulting in the announcement of a national appeal for the Sudan famine victims by all British aid agencies on 21 May 1998.

It was hardly surprising that the food security monitoring systems implemented by these agencies were insensitive to increasing vulnerability in Bahr el Ghazal region in 1998. Most of these systems were designed under the doctrine of ‘Africans do not starve, they cope’ that tends to normalise any crisis. For example, the ‘food economy assessment’ estimates of the vulnerable population in 1998 show not only a considerable decline in vulnerability in Bahr el Ghazal but also show no significant difference in vulnerability among the regions of southern Sudan (Deng 1999: 99). Also during the early stages of the famine, valuable time was wasted as explicit criteria or standards for defining an emergency or famine were missing, while some leading aid agencies were concerned to project the success of their programmes – for fear of jeopardising their long-term activities – and reluctant to accept the reality of famine. At the time famine was gaining momentum in Bahr el Ghazal in March/April, the UN operation (Operation Lifeline Sudan) was more concerned about the success of their polio eradication campaign in meeting global targets (Deng 1999: 82). Some of these aid agencies even concealed facts about the famine from the media and took measures designed to manage the press in a way reminiscent of the Sudanese government’s attitude to press freedom (Alagiah 1998).

5 Conclusion
The southern Sudan famine of 1998, though primarily caused by civil warfare, cannot be attributed entirely to internal factors. This analysis has shown how global factors translated into
increased household vulnerability to famine, through causing both the civil war and an intensification of counter-insurgency warfare. The prevalent view, which 'internalises' the causes and costs of contemporary civil wars and their accompanying famines, needs to be revisited in the light of growing evidence that highlights the global dimension. While internal factors are important, they are not sufficient to describe the bigger picture and the global responsibility for localised suffering. So what lessons can we draw from the 1998 famine in Sudan?

First, the analysis of the Sudan civil war shows the role of global causes that will require global solutions. International actors should accept that they are part and parcel of the current civil war and they should not shirk their responsibility for causing conflict and ‘war famines’. Specifically, while the British government blames the Sudan government or the rebels for the conduct of civil war, it should equally accept its own moral responsibility in the colonial genesis of these crises. The increasing analytical emphasis on internal causes and the primacy of internal solutions has become a scapegoat for the international community to absolve itself of responsibility, which is paradoxical in a world characterised by a discourse of globalisation.

Second, the civil war in Sudan has shown how the extraction of mineral resources by multinational corporations and internationally sponsored development have caused the current conflict and sustained it through counter-insurgency warfare.

The commonly held view, that the war is a result of the criminal acquisitive ‘greed’ of rebels triggered by mineral resources, masks the global dimension – particularly the ‘greed’ of multinational corporations that are increasingly becoming key players in causing and sustaining civil wars. The case of Sudan presents a classic example of the ambiguous encounter and apparent coalition between humanitarianism and multinational corporations, that requires a global solution. The inability of the international community to protect and assist communities who are subjected to increasing vulnerability, recurrent famines and gross human rights abuses simply because of extraction of their own mineral resources is a challenge to global values.

Third, the case of the Sudan famine in 1998 shows how humanitarian agencies operating in political emergencies run the risk of compromising the criteria and standards for defining a famine or emergency by ‘normalising’ crisis, largely for fear of jeopardising their long-term programmes. The lack of standardised and globally accepted explicit criteria or standards for defining a famine or emergency poses a real risk of accepting different life chances for different populations (Bradbury 1998: 332). While there are opportunities for pursuing rehabilitation programmes during civil wars, communities in the conflict areas are still highly risk-prone (Deng 2002a) and the argument of sustainability should be used cautiously, particularly in the context of endogenous counter-insurgency warfare.

Notes

* This article draws from Deng (1999) and the author's doctoral research fieldwork, which was generously funded and facilitated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Hugh Pilkington Trust, Christian Aid, Catholic Relief Services, World Food Programme (WFP) and Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA).
References


Christian Aid, 2001, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, London: Christian Aid

Churchill, W., 1940, The River War: An Account of the Conquest of the Sudan, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode


Daly, M., 1993, ‘Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war’ in M. Daly and A. Sikainga (eds), Civil War in the Sudan, London: British Academic Press


Lesch, A., 1998, Sudan, the Contested National Identities, Oxford: James Currey


