POPULAR PARTICIPATION
AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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Edited by
Njuguna Ng’ethe

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INTRODUCTION

This Occasional Paper constitutes the proceedings of a workshop which brought together social scientists from universities and other institutions within the Eastern Africa Region at Westwood Park Hotel, Nairobi, from 27th to 30th March 1978. In keeping with previous meetings of the EASSRCG, the theme and venue for this meeting had been proposed at the end of the workshop held in Arusha in 1977. At that time, having discussed issues relating to rural transformation in Africa, it was felt that one important factor underlying the problematic of social and economic transformation was the question of popular participation which was itself pertinent to any discussion of self reliance as a strategy of development. Consequently, it was felt that discussion during the 1978 meeting should focus around the theme of Popular Participation and Rural Development.

Because of cost constraints and considerations of other logistics it has been the case that meetings of the EASSRCG have generally been held either in Tanzania or Kenya, the only exception being 1976 when the meeting was held in Ethiopia. For 1978 it was agreed that the meeting be held in Nairobi. The feeling had also been expressed that over-reliance for financial assistance from only one source (Ford Foundation) was not particularly healthy. As a result the convener for the 1978 meeting was instructed to survey possibilities for additional financial support.

The meeting was jointly sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the International Development Research Centre who gave equal financial assistance to meet the cost of workshop. The Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi was responsible for the basic administration and organization of the meeting. Twenty-five participants were invited from Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. But although all of them accepted the invitation most of the participants from Tanzania and Zambia did not arrive. There were also observers from other local and international agencies.
2. **Organization of the Report**

The report follows closely the basic organization of the workshop which, while addressing a number of general questions was organized around country topics. The major questions that participants addressed themselves to may be summarized as follows:

(i) What kinds of institutions and organizations (both private and public) have been used to encourage effective popular participation in agricultural development?

(ii) What success or failures have such measures achieved?

(iii) In the process of attempting to expand indigenous commercial farming, and more recently food production (generally subsumed under the label of rural development), how effectively have the peasant farmers participated in this process?

(iv) What kinds of incentives have been used to induce such participation?

(v) What are the latent and manifest assumptions behind agricultural policies and administrative structures and other institutions (cooperatives, extension, etc) inherited from the colonial period?

(vi) What is the impact of the persistence of such administrative structures on the formulation and implementation of an integrated rural development policy?

(vii) To what degree had the continuation of such colonial policies and administrative systems been responsible for the maintenance and expansion of export oriented economies basically dependent on cash crops, for
accelerated class formation and for the lack of meaningful food policy; resulting in food shortage - either in some local areas or nationally?

(viii) What are the implications of the recently emerging approaches to development (notably, the New World Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach) to popular participation in rural development?

The report contains the papers presented at each of the sessions. In addition, at the end of the report is a summary of the minutes of the business meeting held at the conclusion of the academic discussion. In the Appendix are the names and addresses of all participants and observers and the paper by Drs Maro and Mlay from Dar es Salaam which was received after the workshop.

3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Institute for Development Studies would like to express gratitude to the Ford Foundation and the International Development Research Centre whose goodwill and support made the meeting possible. We would also like to express our appreciation to all the participants, some of whom substituted for those originally invited and had to prepare their papers at very short notice.
 PARTICIPATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

By

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and
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I Introduction

To participate is to be involved. For the purposes of this paper this involvement must accrue specific benefits to the participants. It is possible for people to participate in a given programme such as rural development without much direct benefit. It is for this reason that we have to identify different types of participation. Participation as such is not enough unless certain conditions are met, an issue we shall debate later in the paper.

The above introductory remarks become even more pertinent when we consider what people are participating in. In this case we are concerned with the importance of participation in rural development. Therefore, the question is what is development itself before we can fully study the problem of participation?

Development has been defined variously from different value points. Development is not a value free phenomenon since it has to do with the improvement of peoples' lives. People are not homogenous category - some are poor - some are rich, some are illiterate some are literate, some are exploiters others are exploited and many other things. When development is looked at by an economist, or by a sociologist or by a political scientist let alone the businessman or a government bureaucrat, we are dealing with very often differing, sometimes contradictory views. It is even the case that participation is determined by the practical
view of what development is about. Who should participate which simply means who should benefit?

For example development strategies were predicated, prior to the 1970s, upon the assumption that the major constraints were capital and technology. Those with capital and technology were essentially to be the ones to bring about development. A "partnership" was to be established between the poor nations and the rich during which capital and technology would be found and development would ensue. It is clear in this case who would be the participants and the underdevelopment literature is too rich to be summarised here.

Development did not come in spite of capital and technology transfer because the bulk of the participants, levels of which will be discussed later remained outside the improved livelihood systems. Growth of some kind, especially in the GNP was realised but as we shall see later growth alone is not a sufficient condition for development even though it is necessary. The point simply put is that one cannot dissociate the understanding of what development is about from what it means to participate.

II Development Defined

In the context of this paper development involves three basic components. For the time being, we would like to argue that these are necessary and sufficient for development to occur.

(A) Development involves growth. Growth can be simply defined as increase in certain capacities depending on what is to be developed. If one for example talks about the development of health services one must be talking about increase in hospitals, dispensaries, maternity centres, baby care centres etc. It must include everything that increases the peoples awareness of these services. Increase also must include improvement in the quality of the services provided i.e. it is
not hospitals that are run by nurses instead of doctors; it is not centres where curable diseases cannot be treated because of lack of equipment. If one talks of the development to education, one must not simply mean in the infrastructural capacity alone but also the quality of education and its value to those who acquire it. In the same way, when we talk of rural development we must be clear what are the dimensions where we are to increase growth and for what purpose. No development programme can avoid growth as an objective. This growth is both quantitative and qualitative.

(b) The second necessary component is participation in the generation of this growth. The first point to be made is that for purposes of analysis we shall talk of a development unit. A development unit is a human collectivity in which the development process takes place. As we have indicated earlier it may be a continent or a group of countries. The level therefore, is elastic. What is clear is that participation becomes more and more complex as one increases the size of the development unit. The complexity of the task involved and the nature of participation become a rich area of sociological investigation. For example does participation in one aspect dovetail into others? What is the minimum participation that we can expect of members of a community in which development is taking place? These are issues that have to be debated elsewhere.

Participation in the generation of growth is a necessary condition for development because development is primarily a process to benefit the people in the development unit. If growth is generated by an outsider it will not have meaning to the people in the development area. Development is a personal, a group, a collectivity experience. Only then does it have meaning. Only then can it have the capacity of self sustenance and recreation. As an author has put it:

At the basic economic level, participation in society can be seen as employment in a profitable occupation. At another level, it is active involvement in the decision making process with regard to plans and priorities for the development resources and assets.
at the community and ultimately national level. Participation denotes an intimate involvement whereby people critically influence the decision about how, when and in what form they acquire benefits; it implies power transfer to the target groups. (Mbithi: 1973:26).

(C) The third component that is necessary in the development process is distribution of the consequences of growth. This can be seen at three levels. First of all, there is the benefit that accrues to the individual participant as personal gain. The point is simply what does the individual get for his participation in the generation of growth? Secondly what benefits accrue to a group of which this individual is a member? Thirdly what benefits go to a collectivity - within the development unit as we have defined it?

These three aspects, in our view of development dovetail into one another to make what we call development. One without the others is insufficient; two without the third are incomplete. The issue of the paper then is how do we, at the conceptual level, translate these ideas to apply to the rural areas? The rest of the paper will be an attempt to embellish these ideas taking the rural as our development unit.

III Growth in Rural Development

Although the rural area is our context for discussion, we must not take it as independent or isolated from the centre which may be the urban areas - the capitals in particular where power resides, or the exploiting capitals of the world. No rural part of East Africa is not linked up with the world economy. We therefore must try to understand the context of growth, participation and distribution - the context of development in other words. Given our definition of development, can it be achieved in a neocolonial system? Can it be achieved in a country where the ruling class has decided that it is the few who must participate and share in the benefits of the growth that may have
taken place? The answer is no, but this is not to say that nothing happens.

The rural areas are increasingly being penetrated by urban-based international organizations. Increasingly, banks are finding their way into the rural areas, trading centres making it easier for the peasants to sell their produce, are increasing at rapid rate both in numbers and size. Better houses are being built and no doubt improvement in the living standards is taking place. But how are these changes taking place in rural East Africa?

From our definition of development, it is not a process that can just take place. It is a result of conscious planning in a large measure. A rural planner must be clear of what dimensions should experience growth not in isolation from the people but in full cooperation with them. When things take their course and change takes place which may result incidentally in growth of certain dimensions of the rural setting, we should talk of rural transformation. Some individual entrepreneur starts a huge farm in a rural area. In the process he provides employment to the rural unemployed or under employed. Some peasants near the farm engage in some economic transactions with the labourers on the farm and improve somewhat their monthly incomes. On the face of it, we might say that since there is growth, there is at least one aspect of development. But this would be to mistake an illusion for reality. This kind of growth is not a result of autonomous participation, nor can its benefits be fairly distributed. It is therefore important to understand how the growth comes about in relation to the involvement of the people in the development area. One cannot be a squatter and be seen as a participant in development as we define it here. One cannot be a slave and be a participant in development.

We take the view that man is endowed with certain basic potentialities. Autonomy refers to the ability to realise these potentialities. Autonomous participation, therefore, is participation which leads to
self actualization of the people in the development unit, in this case in the generation of growth for their benefit. If one produces and the other eats we have what is widely known as exploitation. If two people or more produce what they eat we talk of autonomy. Since we are dealing with a social collectivity, it is when people generate the growth from which they benefit that we can talk of proper generation of growth.

This process can be aided and must be aided. This is the only reason that justifies the existence of government in society. In summary then, one must be clear about the conditions of growth, how the growth comes about before one sees it as a necessary component of development. With specific reference to rural development, we must distinguish it from rural transformation where a handful of people may generate change with ramifying effects.

IV Participation and Rural Development

We have already seen that participation is involvement, but involvement can be of different kinds. One can be involved in a process of change without being conscious of it. Very often this kind of participant is subjected to forces beyond his control. He is a fish carried on the crest of a wave without using its fine. To continue the analogy, the fish may ultimately be thrown on the land and left in the lurch as the wave ebbs away.

We have already referred to unconscious participation and its possible consequences. The opposite of it is conscious participation, when the participant is not only aware of his involvement but also of what it means in terms of returns. A participant of the latter kind is an autonomous one. The question may be asked, can one know the consequences of participation - know all results of his efforts? He is not a god but certainly there is a lot he can know!

While merely focussing on political participation Milbrath has developed categories of participation some of which are quite useful even when they are generalised. (Milbrath 1965). For example,
he distinguishes autonomous from compliant participation.

"All action is a response to a stimulus of some sort, but there is an important difference between a person who responds to an inner or general environmental stimulus (e.g. awareness that a campaign is in progress) and a person who responds to solicitation..." (Milbrath 1965: 10). The conditions which lead to the appreciation of the general conditions can be discussed at length, something outside this short paper. But what is education supposed to do? What is community work supposed to do? What about barazas?

Milbrath also identifies, approaching vs avoiding participation, episodic vs continuous, input vs outtake, instrumental vs expressing, social vs nonsocial etc. The point that is being made is simply that the type of participation, the conditions of participation are important aspects of study in the rural areas if participation is to have relevance for rural development. Not all participation leads to development. From this point of view harambee is not necessarily a development phenomenon although it could be put to that purpose.

The second aspect of participation is the quantity of it that will contribute to the development process. As Milbrath points out, continuous participation yields greater rewards than episodic participation. It would appear from simple observation that the more participation takes place not only in one activity but several, the greater will be the development of the need to participate, and even develop autonomy. This, however, cannot be taken for granted because some people will participate up to a certain level and will lose interest or will feel they have nothing to contribute. Participation is influenced by the availability of opportunities and resources conducive to participation. Reactionary systems make sure that such facilities are not equitably distributed to the majority of the population thus institutionalizing incompetence (Dowse and Hughes, 1972: 289-332). It has been found for example, that education, rural or
urban residence, sex, religion etc. influence participation. Keep the people on the low side of each of these and you reduce participation. In that context development is secondary.

At another level one could look at the difference between individual participation, group participation and the participation of aggregated groups who form communities. From what we have already said, one individual's actions can have ramifying effects but no one individual can develop another. Even in teaching it is mere aid to the students. It is our view therefore that participation which involves a conscious and an autonomous collectivity has greater relevance to development than individual participation. The question is when does a unit become too large for participatory activity? This certainly will depend on the fundamentals of the development being sought where delegation may have to be used. This leads to a possible categorization of participation based on the degree of involvement.

We can talk of primary participation where the individual or group is directly working on issues face to face. The members of a village community come together and decide they need water in their houses and then they go ahead to construct the water system. Secondary participation is one where one decides on who is going to participate but does not actually participate in the issue in question. A general meeting of the members of a cooperative society elects the management committee which runs the day to day business for the cooperative. Usually such a committee is given powers to select among itself who to represent the interest of the cooperative outside, what we may call tertiary participation. From this it is clear that primary participation may be more generative of growth than the other levels with declining returns as one moves away from the mass of the people to the oligarchies.

To conclude this section, it is essential to observe that participation has more to it than meets the eye especially if it has
to have a development input. Once again, we must be concerned about
the quality and quantity of participation, the conditions of participation
if we are to comprehend its consequences for development. In the
context of rural development, like any other context, we have to under-
stand development in its multicomponent character.

V Distribution and Rural Development

The issue of distribution has been a contentious one in the
history of man. The literature on the rights of man, social justice,
human dignity includes philosophers and utopians as well as men of
practical affairs. Many development plans, slogans such as "the war
against poverty, disease and ignorance", or even HARAMBEE and African
socialism can be traced to the same root. In simple terms the
question that has been constantly asked is who gets what and why?

In the context of this paper we are concerned with equitable
distribution of the results of growth which people have generated, in
the process of production. Just as participation in the growth,
sharing in the benefits of growth must be a process of self actualiza-
tion. As we have already indicated, there is personal gain, group gain
and benefit that goes to aggregated groups. Individual gain will be
development conducive if it is celebration of life within the community.
It is when individual gain is part of the development unit welfare that
it will be a component of development. Only then does it seem to lead
to self reliance and self-recreation. The question is what kinds of
distribution lead to this process.

The first major component of distribution is the satisfaction of
basic needs. Every member of a given social collectivity by virtue of
his membership, is entitled to a share of the resources to meet those
basic needs. Since every human begin has these basic needs differential
distribution to satisfy them is contrary to the basics of what we have
called development. Even in the case of the distribution of luxury
benefits of growth, if people have participated in its generation,
unusual distribution is not only unjust but also contrary to development. Individual energy and social energy derive from the enjoyment of the results of labour.

What kind of 'goods' are distributed? First of all there is the distribution of consumables. For example food and drink. Improvement in the quality and quantity of these 'goods' is essential for development. People must be healthy to undertake the task of development; people must be healthy to think about tomorrow and self improvement.

The distribution of growth generating goods is another factor. For example roads, industries, schools etc. need to be provided. In other words the infrastructure has to be there. It is basic for the generation of development energy. When we talk of rural development therefore, we must not only ask as to whether there is food but also where there is a capacity to generate more food.

Above we talk of the distribution of luxury goods, a point we may now reflect upon. Given our definition of development can one in fact talk of luxury goods? Luxury exists because some people plant while other reap; some people toil while others vegetate on their labour. By definition luxury is exclusive, a possession of the few. Conspicuous consumption is what it is because the majority are bystanders. The question of luxury does not arise if distribution is equitable. In such circumstances we can only talk of an increase in the standard of living. If the community generates growth such that everyone can afford a car, a refrigerator, steak etc., these will no longer be luxuries but essentials in the continuing rise of the standard of living.

Equally important is the question whether this is possible. Can people achieve in the same way? Our concern is not with individual achievement but social achievement; man on his own is a wild beast; man to himself is a tyrant; he is an agent of the survival of the fittest doctrine, the bedrock of capitalist exploitation.
Distribution has another dimension. Distribution includes capacity to survive for the members in the development unit. This is so because it ensures self actualization, the basis of creativity. Therefore the distribution of the benefits of growth is not only of benefit to the individual but to the group as a whole. This is a necessary condition for the generation of growth. The development equation is therefore complete when participation generates growth and the benefits of growth are distributed leading to more participation and growth. The question that may now arise is how does the development process start?

VI Policy and Development

When we talk of policy we usually mean well thought out guidelines. This has been more so in the era of planning which is about programmes and prognosis. In the colonial period in East Africa, especially in Kenya, the 1940s saw efforts towards some kind of mass participation. Words, slogans such as "mass education", "basic education", "community development", became current which by the end of the colonial era had almost become a fettish, yet these were all strategies not for development but control. As one observer has put it, the appeal to community development "was both a political and economic instrument. It was political in its naive image of the 'good African' practicing village democracy and blissfully unaware of any large issues. It was economic in its emphasis on making better use of existing resources available to the community and the use of expensive technology. In both its economic and political aspects, it was regarded as a means by which colonial stability could be achieved." (Wallis 1974: 2).

This strategy could in no way lead to development. In fact it even failed in establishing colonial stability as it had been anticipated given the events in the 1950s in Kenya.

In fact 'community development' was put to use more blatantly in the 1950s as a counter-insurgency measure against the Mau Mau as the
achievements of this strategy attest among the Akamba during this period. T.G. Askwith, then Commissioner of Community Development indicates this in his observation.

"During the emergency, it was thought extremely probable at one time that the tribe would join with the Mau Mau. The fact that this did not occur was undoubtedly due to the good administration, but it should not be forgotten that one of the prophylactic measures taken was a considerable increase in community development work. In the event the tribe on the whole remained loyal to government, and is now probably one of the most progressive and prosperous in Kenya." (Askwith quoted in Wallis 1974: 5). One needs to look at the society referred to in the above quotation to find out that in fact the strategy did not lead to prosperity as was supposed to be the case.

After independence we have witnessed several development plans asserting that the rural areas must be mobilized for development. The "better farming" syndrome is well known with the selection of progressive farmer as the hub around which rural development would be achieved. Development has even been seen as dependent on the extent of "government penetration" in the rural areas with the resultant bureaucratization instead of local initiative and participation.

In Kenya the concern with local participation was given a new impetus after independence when harambee was encouraged by the political leadership as a strategy for mass mobilization and development. An evaluation of these efforts in detail is beyond the size of this paper. But it should be noted that policy which purports to be development inspired must face the problems not simply of control but of growth generation, participation and distribution if development is to come about.

In this paper we have tried to define participation as a coordinate of development. Participation is only part, but an important
part of the development process along with growth and distribution. Rural development is not different from other developments in as far as these dimensions are concerned. It is hoped that the workshop will not only present detailed case studies but will face up to the challenge of what is development itself and the position of participation therein.
END NOTES.


MODELS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOTSWANA

By

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I. The Elite, or Aristocratic Model of Participation in Rural Development.

Studies of rural development, particularly agricultural extension research, has revealed, confirmed and re-confirmed, that rural development policies and programmes benefit a minority of large scale and "progressive" farmers. It is this group that has the greatest access to scarce development resources of ideas, materials and extension services. This restricted participation is justified at the level of ideology in an elitistic or aristocratic model of development which holds that it is the few great men who make history and that it is the rural elite who can best use scarce resources to effectively and efficiently transform and modernize rural society.

The aristocratic view of rural development holds that change agents should seek out the few great men (opinion leaders) of the rural areas so that they may jointly transform rural society. It is only within the framework of this model that scarce resources can be used to maximize production and growth. Any rural development policy that seeks to broaden resource distribution beyond this elite will result in greater equity but limited output. In this broadening of resource allocation smaller amounts of limited resources are thinly spread over a greater number of the rural poor increasing the probability of failure and misuse of resources.
According to the aristocratic model of participation in rural development a commercial bank should lend larger loans to a smaller number rather than lending smaller loans to a greater number. In the restricted participation option the costs of administration are lower and the chances of bad debts reduced. Intensive extension services are based on similar assumptions.

However, the studies mentioned above not only find that rural development policies and programmes are organized in terms of aristocratic participation, they also find that such programmes do not result in overall development for society as a whole. Such resources allocated to individuals may benefit them but not necessarily the village as a whole. The economic and social conditions of the rural masses remain static or decline. The sum of the rural well-to do does not lead to a well-to-do whole via 'trickle down' and two-step communication process. After about 100 years of agricultural extension directed at individuals, rural areas have remained underdeveloped or have become under developed. It is this challenge of the aristocratic model of participation in rural development that has led to alternative modes of participation which range from mere modification to radical overhaul. Robert Chambers believes that these critical evaluations of extension are unjustified because they expect too much in the short run from a process that works in the long run.

II The Mass Model of Participation in Rural Development

The alternative to restricted participation is increased participation of rural peoples, beyond the elite, the rural poor. Several words have been used to describe this: mass, popular, grassroots, and local participation. These are useful symbolic labels, but the idea of participation behind them must be reduced to lower level concepts that clearly assist the task of operational specification of participants and modes of participation.
In the case of Botswana rural participants may be specified into the dichotomous groups of the elite and mass on the basis of level of income and cattle ownership.

Cattle "......ownership is highly skewed with 45 per cent of rural households owning no cattle at all while over 50 per cent of national herd is owned by only 5 per cent of house holds".

It is this 5 per cent that may be called the rural elite and Holm, J. has used the term 'royal class' having shown that the rural elites that control modern politics and the economy are traditional chiefs and headmen.

Recognizing the existence of rural inequalities the President has observed that:

Our concern to reconcile economic development with social justice poses many such dilemmas. Botswana is justly famous for its cattle, and every Botswana is popularly supposed to own cattle, yet this is not the case. Over half the national herd is owned by men with more than fifty cattle and nearly 14,000 out of a total of nearly 48,000 farmers in the tribal areas, where 86 per cent of our cattle are grazed, have no cattle at all. Around 21,000 have less than twenty-five head and thus find it difficult to engage in arable agriculture without borrowing ploughing oxen from more fortunate friends and relations. (politics and Society op.cit. p. 471).

It is reported that 45 per cent of the rural households have no cattle and that a further 20% own fewer than 10 cattle and "it appeared that 40% of the rural households, containing 35% of the rural population were subsisting below the rural poverty datum line".

This is one way of specifying the categories of rural elite and rural poor masses.

A more detailed description is presented in Table 1. Botswana development resources have been largely allocated to the
Table 1: Household Income by Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household income group (annual)</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Farming</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Trading</th>
<th>Transfers</th>
<th>Gathering</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The richest, 99+ percent Average income P140, 30% in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle, 60-85 percent Average income P1670, 40% in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle, 15-50 percent Average income P420, 50% in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest, lowest 10% Average income P180, 70% in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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mining and livestock sectors. "Cattle and other livestock account for over 80 percent of Botswana's total agricultural production", and exported livestock products were 36% of national exports in 1975. In terms of table 1, it is the richest and the upper middle households who have participated in rural development policies and allocations. It suggests that rural development policies in crop-production and in employment generation are the ones in which the lower middle and the poorest in some groups could have a high potential for participation.
The poorest group of rural peoples in Botswana includes about 10,000 Basarwa whose mode of production is hunting and gathering. Involving this group into rural development would mark the highest level of participation of the most poor in the rural areas of Botswana. While hunting and gathering is traditional to this group, other rural households, European farmers at Ghanzi, turn to hunting and gathering to break-even and survive in the hostile arid conditions of the Kalahari.

In identifying these groups who need increased participation in rural development, we are using an external observer model. It may be that these groups do or do not feel a need to participate. A subjective model of mass participation could be constructed on the basis of social science interview along the lines of public opinion research. This has not been done. The constructed objective models may be radically different from the subjective models of the rural people and it may be that the change agent and the social scientist are imposing development models onto the masses.

The ethics and the politics of the change agent and his target have not been given serious attention. It may be that some sections of the rural society want to participate and want to develop. Where the people are indifferent to development and the change agent is enforcing his 'helping' hand, it is important to consider the actual interest, ethics and politics of the change agent and the masses involved in the process.

In this connection we may note the current popularization of a 'need' approach to rural development and the Ivan Illich's comments that a problem is "an imputed lack which turns into more power and money for the problem solver", that "development is the transformation of hunger into a need for calories - a broken arm into a need for medical services" and that change agents,
"... decide that people have learning difficulties and therefore we need specialists in learning difficulties. They decide that society needs literates and therefore they develop people who imprison others in order to make them literate. They say we need mastectomies and therefore we can develop gynecological oncologists."\(^{16}\)

In terms of Table 1 and the rural areas of Botswana livestock, crop farming, trading, employment, gathering and transfers\(^{17}\) activities specify fields of potential participation. Rural peoples are participating, without external (central government and Foreign aid) influences, in changing the rural areas\(^{18}\). When change agents intervene and identify projects in each of the above fields and these projects are translated into policies\(^{19}\) then the issue of participation arises and in terms of the model defined above, more of these activities will lead to bureaucratisation\(^{20}\) or increased mass mobilization\(^{21}\) or various combinations between these two extremes. "Several countries have found that rural people have perceptions of needs and possibilities which are generally different from those of "national" officials. The "right" balance in this relationship is hard to strike. At one extreme, also common, officials may make the final decisions and recommendations\(^{22}\)."

It is not a case of whether one approach is better than the other. Socialists tell me they are the ones who are right. Capitalists tell me they are better than socialists. I don't believe both. What I need to know is which of them is in power and then I know what to expect. It is the politicians who choose what tendency is consistent with the ideology of the ruling groups. Each approach has its own strengths and limitations. The bureaucratic emphasis tends to be strong on techniques, procedures of the masses and more particularly, for developing countries, it inhibits and obstructs innovations.

The mass mobilization approach tends to get at the interests of the masses but is constrained by lack of administrative techniques. It is these points that I have in mind in classifying Boswana among
those countries that emphasize the bureaucratic mode of development.

The 'What' of Participation in Rural Development

In specifying the who participates in development I have already indicated what they participate in: livestock, crop production, gathering, hunting, employment and traditional mechanisms of social welfare. I merely want to emphasize and amplify a "what do they participate in" perspective. The amount of participation varies with types of activities. There is minimal participation in livestock whereas there is a lot of participation in gathering. Rural people will participate more in mutual aid credit societies than in government co-operatives and more in the latter than in agricultural extension services.

Participation in any rural area is segmented as well as generalized with respect to activities. A Village road project is of interest to all members of the village, but cattle dozing project or groundnut scheme or housing and trade plots, are activities which benefit specialized segments of the village. This variation in types of activities suggests caution in deriving aggregate measures of participation for a village, let alone for a country.

I have found hierarchization of development resources to be a typical mode of allocation. As we move from the remote corners of rural society the quality of resources declines whereas participation increases. There are more primary schools than there are secondary schools and there are more secondary schools than there are universities. Most primary schools are in the rural areas; most secondary schools are in the districts and the national university is in the capital, Gaborone. A similar statement can be constructed for water, power, roads etc. In all of them participation on a scale of quality and participation on a scale of quantity are inversely related.
Participation differs in terms of the activities of making decisions implementing these decisions, and utilizing the results. There is a tendency to exclude the rural people from the decision making process, but to assign to them the role of labourer at the implementation stage and to involve them in consuming at the lowest end of quality graded products and services.

Botswana rural development policies are in favour of increased participation but within the frameworks and standards of a bureaucratic mode of operation. The officials are faced with a dilemma in reconciling these goals. If local groups are requested to produce a village of district plan thereby increasing local participation in decision making the result tends to be a shopping list of wants and desires that do not fit the techniques and models of economic planning. The response has been to assign planning officers to the districts and to translate the technology of planning into how to do it manuals. The result is that the plan is really a central plan with local participation contributing the 'labour' or 'executive' component.

The other approach has been to develop a tentative policy and then take it to the people for consultation. The policy is communicated to the people by radio and is discussed by radio learning groups. On the basis of feedback the policy is changed in light of complaints and contributions from the rural areas. This has been successfully done in the case of the current tribal grazing land policy.25

Mobilizing and activating greater rural participation may result in too much participation and a lot of demand or inputs may be aroused to a scale impossible to satisfy. This problem has been expressed in the concept of the revolution of rising expectations leading to rising frustrations and leading politicians to the politics of depoliticization.

In USA community development programmes a guideline calling for maximum participation possible had to be replaced by a guideline calling for 'maximum participation feasible' because the volume of community demands that were aroused could not be met.26
In Botswana self help schemes were linked to food and tentative research indicated that higher participation in rural development is associated with receiving food. In a survey of Molepolole (sample size 281) 44% (125) said they had participated in self-help rural development projects. 33.6% participated to improve the village and 66.4% participated to get food. Many said they ought to have been given cash. In return for working on village self-help projects people were given food. Research is needed about the long term effects of this on motivation for self-help.

IV. The "How" of Participation in Rural Development

We have already touched several aspects of how people participate in development. They may participate only in decision making; others may participate in translating resources into products and services and everyone should participate in enjoying the fruits of development. As we have argued this participation shows considerable variation.

Harambee in Kenya and Ujamaa in Tanzania are different 'hows' of participation under self-help as the general concept. In Botswana the equivalent concept is Ipelegeng and was a combination of self-help and food for work aid. It seems to have been successful.

...But do not doubt that the will is there. This is evidenced by the enthusiasm with which the majority of our people are concerned to implement the principle of self-reliance. Throughout Botswana our people, guided by the deliberations of the village development committees I mentioned earlier, have build classrooms, teachers quarters, storage facilities, clinics, latrines, dams, roads and have in other ways worked to improve facilities in our rural areas. This revival of the principles of communal self-help which characterised our traditional life was first prompted by the food-for-work schemes which operated during the drought. It was these schemes which reminded our people that change could come through their own efforts, and there has been decline in enthusiasm since independence. This effort has led to the wider application of self-reliance. When people in the rural areas are obliged to struggle for the most basic services, it is not just that town-dwellers should enjoy rewards and services that our society and our economy cannot sustain.
Self help is usually episodic and only in permanent mobilized societies is it sustained for a long time and even force, rather than motivation, may have to be used. Sir Seretse Khama has ruled out the use of force and I fully agree with him having personally experienced self-help under the barrel of the gun in Uganda for only one afternoon of self-help by everyone in the country.

There are also institutional efforts to increase the participation of rural peoples; these are the co-operative movements marketing boards, and a brigade movement. These activities exhaust the range of populistic participation in a society in which the central methods of participation are capitalistic.

In Botswana the elite model of participation is dominant. Liberal democratic politicians identify what the goals of society are and in identifying and implementing these policies the expert is the medium organised in terms of extension services, that tend to result in participation being restricted to the rural elite. Currently there is opinion that favours increasing and extending participation within limits tolerable to the bureaucratic mode of operation.

Gradualist group extension is to replace gradualist individual extension, within the Ministry of Agriculture. Rural peoples may be 'consulted' by radio and radio learning groups. This increases the range of contact at least in terms of communication and is likely to increase innovativeness because it is like a national brainstorming session. It is however expensive in money and time and cannot be done frequently, while what is needed is frequent feedback from the rural areas that by-passes some steps in the levels of bureaucracy.

It should be recognised that withdraw, i.e. alienation, from rural development policies and programmes is a form of participation as well as active opposition. The groups that stand to gain from rural development policy will actively support the policy; the groups whose
interest is threatened by rural policy will actively oppose the project, and both groups will demand a lot of participation. When the costs of oppositional participation are high, these threatened by policy will seek to make it fail by indifference and covert subversion. This is what is happening in some areas of Tanzania.

V. Conclusion

The predominant mode of production in Botswana is capitalistic within a political context of liberal democracy. Individuals will bring about development but they need the services of experts organized in extension hierarchies. This results in restricted participation of the rural poor and group and radio oriented modifications have been proposed.

This is the dominant spirit. But there are aspects of populistic participation in self-help (Ipelegeng), in anti middle men marketing arrangements of the co-operative society and the marketing board, and in the brigades movement.

In any attempts to increase participation, the following propositions may be helpful:

(i) Participation on a scale of quantities is inversely related to participation on a scale of quality.

(ii) Participation varies with the left-right ideological dimension of the leaders.

(iii) Participation varies with cost; the lower the cost the higher the participation.

(iv) The lower the level of technology the higher the rate of participation.

(v) The higher the scale of operation (size) the lower the level of participation on decision-making.
Maximation of growth is likely to be associated with low participation; maximization of equity (distribution) is likely to be associated with high rates of participation.
FOOTNOTES


This is a rendering of the development model in


In East Africa they were known as progressive farmers and in Botswana they were known as pupal to master farmers.


Ibid.

Ibid. p. 73.

During the 1975-76 plan period 42% of the total development budget was allocated to finance the Selibe-Phikwe mining infrastructure and only 8% went to agriculture. This comes from John Holm see footnote 1 above.

National Plan, op.cit.

The term Bushmen is not in common usage because it is regarded as offensive. Similarly, it is not polite to call the Kalahari a desert.

15. Ibid

16. Ibid.

17. Transfers are a kind of informal welfare, service of the traditional system. Transfers to rural households largely consist of remittances of mine workers, traditional gifts and food from international aid.

18. The central argument of the theory of the development of under development is that external and internal elites or classes, exploit and underdevelop the rural areas, the periphery.

19. The column entries of Table 1 constitute potential policy. We now have a Botswana livestock development policy and an arable production development policy is under preparation.

20. This is associated with the aristocratic model of participation.

21. This is associated with mass participation.

22. I have observed the operation of this generalization in my own province in Uganda, the western province (Kigezi and Ankole districts in particular).


26. I cannot recall the reference that I read eight years ago while a graduate student in the USA.

27. The concept of 'stress' and 'overload' comes from general systems theory. The African response has been described by Nelson Kasfir as the shrinking political arena.

29. Sir Seretse Khama, Developing Democracy op.cit. One cannot help but admire the frankness and sincerity of Botswana politicians.

STRATEGIES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
A CASE STUDY OF LESOTHO

By

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I. Introduction

The importance of rural development in Africa is underlined by the preponderance of the African population living in rural areas and engaged in agricultural activities. Out of a population of 450 million in Africa, only 5 million belong to the working class and in Lesotho more than 95% of Lesotho's population live in rural areas with 60% of the country's GDP derived from agriculture.¹

Rural development has been a subject of interest of late to some social scientists—economists, agricultural economists and even political scientists and substantial literature has already appeared on this subject in the last few years.

The World Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa have shown particular interest on the subject and are responsible for significant research and a number of publications on rural development in the "Third World."²

Although the problem of rural development has been high-lighted by most authors, on a subject of crucial importance for combating rural poverty and promoting economic development of the "Third World," there seems to be no unanimity on the concept of "rural development." Under the general label of "rural development", a variety of not exactly identical projects have been undertaken in the rural areas and agricultural sectors of the "Third World" and more particularly in Africa.
This paper attempts to examine briefly but critically some of the concepts of rural development in development literature, the strategies of rural development in Africa, programmes of rural development in Lesotho and problems encountered in the implementation of these programmes. A tentative evaluation of the impact of rural development programmes on agricultural development and socio-economic development as a whole will also be attempted.

II Concepts of Rural Development

Rural development was defined by the Regional Conference on the Integrated Approach to Rural Development, which took place at the Co-operative College in Moshi, Tanzania, from the 13th to 24th October, 1969 as "the outcome of a series of quantitative and qualitative changes occurring among a given rural population and whose converging effects indicate in time, a rise in the standard of living and favourable changes on the way of life of the people concerned." Uma Lele defined rural development as "improving living standards of the mass of the low income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining." It is specifically emphasised in some publications on the subject that integrated approach to rural development is not mere agricultural production even though "the economic base of most rural areas depends on agriculture." That rural development is not a mere sectoral programme, but that its objectives are much wider. It is said to be "a mix of activities, including projects to raise agricultural output, create new employment, improve health and education, expand communications and improve housing;" for the nature and content of any rural development project should, according to these publications reflect the "political, social and economic circumstances of the particular country or regions." There is no doubt that rural development does not only defy easy definition, but as well defies unanimity on the nature of the
and hence the multiplicity of concepts of rural development in economic literature.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa publication,\textsuperscript{8} conceptualises rural development into two main approaches. Firstly, the orthodox approach to rural development, which refers to the more conventional programmes on rural development like community development and rural animation, agricultural extension, co-operatives, rural credit institutions and regional development planning. This type of approach to rural development was initiated by the Colonial administrations during colonial rule in Africa, and until recently was the most familiar concept of rural development.

The second concept which originated in the post-independence era in Africa is the now popular integrated approach to rural development. "The concept of integrated rural development is generally used to signify an inter-disciplinary approach - agriculture, health, education, etc... it suggests the need for the integral development of a national economy."\textsuperscript{9}

Examples of integrated approach to rural development in Africa given by the publication of U.N. Economic Commission for Africa are the Tanzanian Ujamaa settlement schemes, the Aswan region in Egypt and the Awash region in Ethiopia.

The World Bank publication on the one hand conceptualises rural development into three approaches: Firstly, the minimum package approach aimed at increasing agricultural productivity; Secondly the Comprehensive approach which can be either nationally integrated programmes or area-based rural development programmes, and Thirdly, sectoral and other special programs, including rural public works, education, training and credit schemes.\textsuperscript{10}

Occasionally when the concepts and programmes of rural development in Africa are discussed reference is made to the strategies of rural
development in other parts of the world. The experience of the Soviet Union in the agriculture of collectivisation and the Chinese experience in the "Communes" are mentioned and briefly discussed under the general term of "group farming".11

These strategies of socialist transformation of agriculture are discussed and lumped together under the general label of "group farming" with non-socialist rural and agricultural development programmes like the Ujamaa settlement schemes in Tanzania and the Israeli Kibutz system.

Another example of a rather simplistic approach to agricultural development strategies in current literature is a frequent attempt to contrast Kenyan and Tanzanian rural development strategies as "capitalist" and "socialist" respectively. There is no doubt that the rural development strategies of Kenya and Tanzania are in many respects different, but it may be too early to contrast the latter strategy as "socialist" to the former's apparently capitalist orientation.

There is a crying need for methodological clarity, among social scientists in the analysis of social phenomenon. While journalistic literature may be condemned in using the terms "socialist" and "capitalist" loosely, there is no excuse for social scientists, especially economists to do likewise.

The rural development experience in Africa in the last decade has primarily been within a capitalist framework and the attempts to ascribe "socialist" content to some of these programmes has in most cases been premature. It is however, really possible that rural development experiences of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia in the second half of the 1970's will introduce a new social content that will bring us to the situation where one may with some justification talk of capitalist and socialist strategies of rural development in Africa.
III Rural Development Programmes in Lesotho

(a) Community Development Programmes

Orthodox rural development in Lesotho dates back to colonial days when the British colonial authorities initiated a series of measures of community development like agricultural extension and village water supplies with the declared objective of improving agricultural productivity and introducing some elementary rural services.

This approach was continued in Lesotho in the independence era as self-help community projects intended to create amenities and basic infrastructure in rural areas that would increase the well-being of the rural people. These projects include among others, construction of feeder roads, tracks, foot bridges, water supplies, conservation works, vegetable gardens, fish ponds, sanitary facilities, etc.¹²

All these projects are carried out under the Food-for-Work Programme assisted by the World Food Programme and the Catholic Relief Services of the United States.

In the Second Plan period, 1976-1980, it is expected that the value of food to be used in these "self-help" projects will be R7,997,000 and total allocations for these activities in the second plan is R8,928,000.¹³

(b) Area-Based Rural Development Projects

Lesotho, like many other independent African states has began to experiment in the integrated approach to rural development. The integrated approach to rural development has taken the form of area-based rural development projects initiated in the first plan period (1971-1975) and continuing in the second plan period (1976-1980).

Most of the area-based rural development projects in Lesotho are not only funded by external agencies but are also managed by external authorities designated by the funding agencies.
Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project based on an area of 75,000 acres in central Lesotho began in 1973 at the cost of R6.5 million provided by the International Development Association (IDA), a subsidiary of the World Bank. Other external agencies contributing to the funding were USAID, UNICEF and the UNDP. Lesotho government also contributed R1.6 million to the total capital cost of the project.

The main objectives of the project which covered 17,000 farm households, in the words of the Second Five Year Plan were:

- "To control erosion and to increase crop production through dryland farming;
- To transform land use so that integrated farming, combining appropriate crop rotation with livestock production, could be introduced;
- To provide a more assured subsistence and to increase considerably the income derived from crops and livestock;
- To provide data for the preparation of similar rural development projects in other areas."

The peculiar feature of this project was the emphasis it placed on cash crop production as against staple food production and the introduction of asparagus.

Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project was terminated in 1977 being integrated into the proposed Lesotho Governments' rural and agricultural development scheme.

The Leribe Integrated Rural Development Project was launched as a pilot project in 1970 in the mid-northern area of the country covering an area of 2,300 hectares with a population of 1,000 small farmers. The UNDP provided R822,000 and Lesotho Government contributed R430,000 to the initial capital cost of R1.252 million.

The Leribe Pilot which terminated in 1975 had sought as its objective to demonstrate the efficiency of an integrated approach to increasing and intensifying production.
The Leribe Pilot Project was phased out into the R5 million Khomokhoana Rural Development Project which began in 1975 with funds from the Swedish International Development Association (SIDA). This larger project covers an area of 64,500 acres in the catchment area of Khomokhoana River occupied by approximately 8,000 households.

The main objective of the project is the intensification of crop and livestock production through improved systems of crop and livestock production, credit, input and marketing facilities, the integration of conservation works with agricultural production as well as greater participation of farmers as measures designed.

The Sengu Rural Development Project begun in 1972/73 in Mohales' Hoek and Quthing southern districts of the country at the total funding of R1,938,200 provided by UNDP and FAO.

The project which covers an area of approximately 50,000 acres has as its main objective to improve crop production to the point where farmers can produce a surplus of major subsistence crops and the production of cash crops for sale.

The Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project launched in 1975 is a R3 million integrated strategy based on livestock industry in the central mountain region of Lesotho. It is funded by the Canadian International Development Association (CIDA) and it covers an area of 46,500 hectares in the pastoral heartland of Lesotho.

Besides special emphasis on range management and livestock, the project will also include crop production and inter sectoral provision of economic and social structure for the region.

Phuthiatsana Irrigation Project is a special project which is still in the pre-design stage. Situated in the catchment area of Phuthiatsana River in central Lesotho, the project covers a total area of 117,000 hectares (2,000 of irrigable lands, 42,000 hectares of arable
land, and 73,000 hectares of grazing land and village area.)

The seven year project with preliminary estimated cost of R23 million has among possible external funding sources, the African Development Bank. The plan involves the construction of a dam on Phuthiatsan River, installation of a sprinkler irrigation and drainage system, supply of electricity, construction of access roads and housing, provision of agricultural machinery, equipment, and crop production inputs.

(c) Nation-Wide Rural Development Project: BASP

Although the area-based projects remain Lesotho Government's main channels of investment in agriculture, the government's main rural development policy appears to be shifting in favour of a nation-wide rural development strategy known as Basic Agricultural Services Project BASP.

BASP is intended to provide "basic agricultural services to all farming households in the project areas" in the form of basic inputs like fertilizer, certified seeds, pesticides, animal feed as well as establishing roads, storage, distribution, and credit facilities.

For the Second Plan period, BASP costs are expected to total R9,286,000 for an area of about 295,000 hectares of three-quarters of Lesotho's arable land. The programme is to be funded by EEC, the U.K., the Federal Republic of Germany, IDA, and the Lesotho Government. It is expected that by 1983 the project will have covered the whole country.

(d) Emergency Rural Development Programmes

Some rural development projects in Lesotho have been conceived as emergency programmes in response to the economic pressures being applied by the Republic of South Africa on Lesotho in recent years.
The Labour Intensive Public Works programme was originally conceived as a contingency plan for dealing with the emergency employment situation that would arise in the event of the repatriation of Basotho mine labourers employed in the Republic of South Africa as was experienced in 1974 when about 15,000 miners returned unexpectedly to Lesotho and created a serious employment problem.\(^{17}\)

Lesotho’s dependence on south Africa’s labour market is highlighted by the fact that about half of Lesotho’s labour forces, some 200,000 persons find employment in South Africa, of which 113,000 are employed in the mines. This employment dependency on South Africa makes Lesotho highly vulnerable to pressures from the Republic of South Africa, hence the importance of the emergency public works programme currently being studied.

On the recommendations of UNDP/World Bank mission, Lesotho Government decided to establish a Labour Intensive Construction Unit (LICU) within the Ministry of Public Works to undertake studies into a wide range of labour-intensive activities including road construction, maintenance and soil conservation with a view to creating employment opportunities for repatriated workers and reducing employment dependency on South Africa.

The Co-operative Crop Production Programme (CCPP) was launched in 1976 by the Government on experimental basis as a share-cropping programme between the government and farmers on mechanised winter wheat cultivation.

The programme was the direct result of adverse developments in Lesotho's international political and economic relations highlighted by the border closure with the Transkei in 1976 and the withdrawal by South Africa of the subsidy paid on wheat flour and maize supplies to Lesotho.\(^{18}\)
These economic pressures applied by South Africa on Lesotho to bring about political compliance with the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa have had an adverse effect on food supplies bordering on a crisis situation. In the lowlands of Lesotho food prices have gone up by 50% and in the most seriously affected areas of Qacha's Nek and Qutning bordering on Transkei, food prices have not only gone up by 100% but supplies have occasionally been cut or impeded.

The CGPP which is intended to produce enough food domestically in order to meet any possible halt in food supplies from the Republic was commended by the U.N. Faray Mission that visited Lesotho in January, 1976 as commanding high priority. 19

A bumper wheat crop was reaped in the 1976/77 season in some districts of Lesotho but the outstanding issue remaining to be resolved between government and the farmers is the review of the share-cropping system itself with a view to bringing about a more equitable sharing of costs and harvest than it is the case at the moment.

IV Administration of Rural Development in Lesotho

Planning and administration of rural development is a new experience in Lesotho and has still not developed to the stage of maturity.

Until 1976, when a new Ministry of Rural Development was established, most of the self-help community development projects mentioned above were administered by a small Department of Community Development within the Ministry of the Interior.

Even though the Central Planning and Development Office had been in existence for about a decade now, it had very little effective central planning authority over the area-based rural development projects that have operated in Lesotho since the beginning of the 1970's. The
conception, design, funding and implementation of various rural development projects continued to be done on sectoral basis, even though the CPDO was responsible for ensuring better co-ordination at macro-interministerial level.\textsuperscript{20} The position of the CPDO in this regard does not seem to have changed significantly even to-day.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Marketing and Co-operatives seems to have overall sectoral responsibility for most of the area-based agricultural development projects and the Ministry of Works headquarters the Labour Intensive Construction Unit concerned with the labour-intensive construction works.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Marketing and Co-operatives seems to have overall sectoral responsibility for most of the area-based agricultural development projects and the Ministry of Works headquarters the Labour Intensive Construction Unit concerned with the labour-intensive construction works.

The picture in Lesotho is that of a multiplicity of institutions sharing responsibility for the planning and implementation of rural development in the country without a single central authority assuming overall responsibility.

There are however signs of an emerging hierarchy in the administration of self-help community development projects in Lesotho with the establishment of the Ministry of Rural Development in 1976. At the apex of this hierarchy is the Ministry of Rural Development with overall national responsibility for self-help community development projects in the country.

At the district level are the District Development Committees (DDC's) which are chaired by the District Administrators appointed by the Central Government and serviced by District Development Secretaries. Membership of these committees includes officials of the technical ministries posted in the districts, Principal and Ward chiefs of the district concerned as well as "public opinion leaders and prominent citizens."\textsuperscript{21} These DDC's are responsible to the Central government for the co-ordination of community development projects in the district.

Under the District Development Committee are Ward and Village
Development Committees which are supposed to identify the local community needs and communicate them to DDC and in turn be responsible for the implementation and supervision of the projects in the wards and villages.

V. The Impact of Rural Development Programmes on Socio-Economic Development

The experience of rural development programmes in Lesotho is too recent to allow for a more conclusive evaluation of their impact on socio-economic development. Nevertheless, it is still possible on the basis of existing experience, however short it may be, to make some preliminary evaluation on development.

Evaluation of the impact of the rural development projects, especially the externally-funded ones cannot be complete without a simultaneous examination of some of the problems they have encountered.

(a) Some Salient Problems

The official view in Lesotho is that among the most salient problems of externally-funded rural development projects is the failure to implement the financial programmes of most projects. This view was strengthened by the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1973 which led to a shortfall in the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project.

Still another serious problem connected with the funding of these projects, in our observation, the excessive portion of project funds that are spent on the non-productive infrastructural overheads like project housing, motor vehicles and staff salaries compared to the portion of funds actually spent on the farms in the form of productive inputs like farm machinery, certified seed, fertilizers and pesticides. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the non-productive investment of financial resources as set out above is in the region of 75% in some projects in Lesotho.
Other problems encountered in these projects are those occasioned by faulty design during the planning stages with some projects covering too large an area with limited resources and with scanty knowledge by the planners of the area concerned.

Some projects have been implemented in a hasty manner without enough preparatory work being done or sufficient time allowed for some preliminary demonstrative work on possible impact of the project. Even doubts have been expressed verbally in interviews about the location of some projects, with political rather than economic factors suggested to be the main consideration for the location of projects in certain areas.

The still much more crucial problem is that of the administration of rural development programmes. The Administering authorities of these projects are normally expatriate staff designated by the funding agencies. These "external" administrations find it difficult to enlist local participation and to appreciate the village needs and yearnings as communication with the local farmers becomes difficult.

Even the District Development Committees in Lesotho have been described as "ineffective" in the Government of Lesotho Publication Donor Conference Papers, because of "lack of adequate training, experienced and development orientation of DA's and DDS's." As a result the publication observes, and correctly in our view, that the central issue in the administration of rural development in Lesotho is to seek "means and ways to ensure better motivation, commitment, and increased participation of rural individuals in the rural development programs."

(b) Socio-Economic Impact

The internationally funded rural development programmes have so far been regarded as of no significant impact in the solution of the main agricultural problem of Lesotho - the achievement of self sufficiency in food supplies. This is the result of the excessive emphasis of most of the projects on such cash crops as beans, potatoes and asparagus to the
detriment of the increased production of the staple crop of maize on
the understanding that these cash crops would bring about faster change
in the standards of living of the rural people by increasing the
"individual incomes" of the poor farmers.

As it will be seen from table 1 below relating to the Thaba-Bosiu
Rural Development Project, which as already stated above placed emphasis
on cash crops like beans, potatoes and asparagus, in the project
period; the acreage of cash crops to total land under the project has
steadily increased as the acreage of the stapple crops like maize and
sorghum has steadily fallen.

Table 1.

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<td>Staple crops</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>Cash crops</td>
<td>28</td>
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Source: Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project - Annual Report No.3,
Ministry of Agriculture, Co-operatives and Marketing, 1975, p.3.

It is observed that this emphasis on cash crops may be a misdirection in
the strategic objective of agricultural development regarded as the
achievement of self-sufficiency in food supplies. 24  And yet one may,
perhaps with some justification, regard the increased cultivation of
cash crops as against staple crops a successful impact of a project
that is oriented towards increasing rural "incomes" by way of commercial-
ization of peasant farming. The further argument being that with
increased incomes the peasant may buy the staple food with part of his
earnings. But since most food in Lesotho is imported from South Africa, and
food supplies from that country are becoming uncertain of late, the
argument may be weakened.
Although the declared aim of the strategy of rural development is "raising the productivity of the poor", it has been observed that the beneficiaries of some of these programmes are the well-to-do individual farmers or even salaried "telephone farmers" in towns with better access to the inputs of the programmes because of their positions of influence in society as "pivotal Men."

Accordingly the question has been asked as to whether the projects' impact is in the direction of social upliftment of the "rural poor" or towards further social stratification leading to aggravated social inequality, misery and rural poverty. As already suggested, much more longer experience with this programme will provide the definitive answer.

VI CONCLUSION

The examination of rural development strategies of Africa and Lesotho in this paper is on the main tentative in view of the novelty of the phenomenon under review. As already observed above, the rural development strategies of African countries are on the whole within a capitalist framework of agricultural and rural development, a transformation which runs short of bringing about structural changes in the socio-economic formation.

The experience of socialist transformation of peasant agriculture undertaken in Russia following the 1917 Socialist revolution is of particular interest to all developing countries of Africa which wish to bring about the much desired transformation of small-scale peasant agriculture along large-scale collectivist lines and yet avoiding the horrors of capitalist proletarianisation of the peasantry and the development of large-scale capitalist agriculture.

African countries are placed in an advantageous position than many Asian and Latin American countries for utilizing the experience of Russia and China in socialist transformation of small-scale peasant
agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, like pre-revolutionary Russia and China, the Economies of African countries are predominantly agrarian in character. Even though there were pockets of highly developed monopoly capitalism in Russia in the main centres of Moscow and Petrograd, the central economic figure in Russia like in most of Africa, was the small peasant.

Secondly, and even much more important, the predominantly communalistic character of land relations in Africa, serves as a good parallel to the public property of land in socialist countries and a reliable take-off ground for co-operativisation of small-scale peasant farming.

It is argued here that there are two main strategies for rural development in the world. On the one hand there is the capitalist-orientated strategy directed at raising "individual incomes" of the middle and rich peasant to a point where-by he would be transformed into a full-fledged capitalist farmer and on the other hand the socialist strategy directed at the prevention of further social stratification and favouring the development of small scale - peasant farming along collectivist and egalitarian lines.

The former strategy is being followed in most countries in Africa and is better known, while the latter strategy, the distinguishing features of which is planned and collectivist transformation of agriculture is less known in Africa.

Nevertheless a few countries in Africa like Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have already embarked upon this strategy. In these countries, rural development is carried out as a national and overall planned strategy of socialist transformation of society, the surest guarantee against the proletarianisation of the African peasantry and the emergence of capitalist farming. The pace towards economic development and social progress on the continent will to a large extent depend on the strategies chosen for rural development in Africa.
FOOTNOTES


8. Ibid, p.33.


15. Lesotho Second Five Year Development Plan, p.83.


LABOUR MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF LESOTHO

By

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1 Introduction: General Background

Lesotho is a small country completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Its size is estimated to be about 30,350 square kilometres. Over two-thirds of the country is mountainous. The rest consists of lowlands, foothills, and the Orange River Valley. A greater part of the mountain area is suitable for grazing (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, Murray, 1976). The climate goes to extremes, with snow-covered mountainous areas for a greater part of the winter and lowlands area which can become quite hot and dry. The average annual rainfall is about 700 mm.

The country's de jure population is estimated to be about 1.2 million and the bulk of it is concentrated in the low-land areas. About 95 percent depends on agriculture for its livelihood (Claus et. al., 1977; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). Only about 13 percent of the land surface (or less than 40,000 hectares) is cultivated. The mean farm household landholding is 2 hectares while about half of the rural households own stocks (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). The land is generally eroded, and poor for farming purposes. It is estimated that about 0.2 percent of the total arable land is lost annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976).

Although the majority of Basotho are rural, the agricultural sector does not generate enough income for the population, nor is there self-sufficiency in food (Cobbe, 1975; van der Wiel, 1977). Among the
Factors regarded responsible for low agricultural output are the following: climatic conditions, land tenure system, shortage of land, general deterioration of land (fragmentation and erosion), poor farming methods, and overgrazing (Rutman, 1974; Wallman, 1972; Williams, 1971; Van der Wiel, 1977).

Labour Migration in Lesotho

The economic development and survival of Lesotho is closely related to the phenomenon of migrant labour. A large number of Basotho regularly go to South Africa to look for employment; no aspect of contemporary village life in Lesotho can be understood without central reference to the dependence of villagers for their livelihood on earnings derived from the export of labour. (Ward, 1973. According to Marray 1976)

This phenomenon has been referred to extensively in literature (van der Wiel, 1977; Williams, 1971). Lesotho Government is aware of the crucial role played by labour migration in the country's economic development. This is reflected in the current development Plan.

Lesotho's general economic structure is strongly influenced by the fact that a large number of Basotho are employed in South Africa - some 50% of the male labour force (140,000 men) plus some 10% of the female labour force (about 25,000 women). (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976)

It is estimated that about 81 percent of the Basotho labour migrants are employed in the mining industry in South Africa, while the rest are in other sectors like manufacturing, construction, domestic work, government, agriculture and other (van der Wiel, 1977).

Financial benefits accruing to Lesotho from the export of labour are substantial. Lesotho Government estimates that migrant earnings amount to at least as high as the country's Gross Domestic Product (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976).

Motivations for Basotho to migrate have been delineated elsewhere (Böhnig, 1977; van der Wiel, 1977). These include, among other things,
higher wages in South Africa, lack of employment opportunities in Lesotho, and low agricultural productivity and income in Lesotho. Evidence also shows that the incidence of migration is related to landlessness (Mojorele, 1962, part 2).

This paper is intended to explore some of the possible effects that labour migration has on the rural development efforts in Lesotho, with particular reference to agriculture. There is a strong belief among a number of people that the exodus of migrants retards the 'take-off' of rural development endeavours in the country (Murray, 1976). There is an interesting vicious circle here: people migrate because of the low agricultural productivity; at the same time the very same out-flow of people accelerates the low level of agricultural productivity.

III Possible Effects of Labour Migration
3.1 Absence of Male Labour

Regarded as one of the most serious negative effects of labour migration is the fact that it deprives local home communities of male power needed to undertake development projects (Wallman, 1972). Such projects, particularly those concerned with agricultural operations are left in the hands of women, children and old people. The end result is the deterioration of agricultural productivity (Cobbe, 1975; William, 1971). According to van der Wiel (1977), most of the Basotho begin migrant work at the age of 18 to 20 and stop at the age of about 45 - a very 'productive' age range. In an investigation based on some agricultural projects in Lesotho, van der Wiel (1977) found that 'migration rates reach a maximum in the 25-29 years age cohort' showing a slight reduction at the age range 30-34, and a sharp decline after age 39. The study further showed that about 45 percent of the migrants were below 30 years old, and that approximately three-quarters of them fell between the age class 18-39.

Williams (1971) argues that there is lack of organization in ploughing in the absence of males. Women and children left behind are
not capable of practising sound farming methods. A case of deficiency in ploughing can be illustrated by the fact that women and children tend to make shallow furrows which are a threat to both the growth and survival of plants. Such inadequate ploughing methods accelerate the process of soil erosion (see also Cobbe, 1975). Another point Williams (1971) makes is that in the absence of the household head, the wife makes the 'traditional' decision with regard to farming. For example, the introduction of cash cropping may be impeded by the absence of males since decisions on such activities are traditionally the responsibility of men. Women, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on subsistence crops.

Apart from this, women are already overburdened with other household duties such as taking care of children and cooking. They are not strong enough to do efficient ploughing. This concern over rural women being overburdened with too many household tasks besides that of food production has been expressed in international organization circles (McDowell and Hazzard, 1976, Fagley, 1976).

Another issue raised by Williams (1971) is that the absence of male from home reduces the rate of capital formation in the rural areas and in soil conservation efforts. Labour intensive operations such as the construction of irrigation channels, contours and grain storage huts suffer when there is no male labour:

This lower rate of capital formation and maintenance may also operate to exaggerate the demand for agricultural credit in areas where self-help projects have been frustrated by insufficient labour.

Stahl (1977) points out that the impact of labour migration on rural capital formation is an important issue not only because most migrants come from rural areas but also because improved agricultural productivity is an important factor in national development. He observes, however, that agricultural productivity has been deteriorating in Southern Africa. His conclusion is that 'years of labour emigration in southern Africa have done little to augment capital formation in agriculture' (p.14).
Male labour and leadership are needed in non-agricultural development projects including village water supply projects and road construction. Williams (1971) reports that as a result of lack of local leaders; most of such potential leaders were working in South Africa. He argues that South Africa tends to recruit males who are not only productive, healthy and enterprising, but also those who have leadership qualities. The latter, according to Williams, are usually offered financial inducement by the South African mines.

Williams (1971) also quotes literature which shows that the absence of males may generate some psychological problems which may have far-reaching effects on the rural development undertakings. For example, the local community may lose moral incentive by losing their important male labour. This in turn leads to deterioration in 'effort and output' (p.165).

Perhaps a more serious problem is the exodus of skilled and middle-level manpower, as well as professionals like teachers. Wilson (1974) has put it this way:

Artisans, carpenters, plumbers and a growing number and range of skilled workers are educated and trained at great cost to Lesotho's educational budget only to find work in the Republic, where wage rates are higher and the cost of living lower. (This 'brain drain' is checked only to a limited extent by the natural aversion of the Basotho to living under apartheid laws). A team for the German Development Institute (GDI) recently completed an investigation into the phenomenon of Lesotho out-migration of skilled and semi-skilled technical manpower (Claus et.al., 1977). The study showed that about 70 percent of a sample of business enterprises indicated that there was a definite shortage of technical manpower. For 50 percent of them the shortage problems was 'severe' while for 30 percent this shortage affected production, expansion and maintenance. More importantly, most enterprise managers quoted migrant labour as the main cause of the shortage of technical manpower. The GDI team observes that, for the country as a whole.
The lack of skills slowed down the implementation of the First Plan, and is a heavy burden for the implementation of the Second Plan, (including the big development projects in agriculture and infrastructure), and the development of the modern sector. (Claus, B. et.al. 1977, p.2).

It is evident that Lesotho Government is aware of the fact that 'skill drain' is taking place in the country and that this presents manpower shortages which frustrate the implementation of development projects (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). This situation often necessitates the importation of technical aid from outside the country (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). The limited labour-intensive programmes being launched by the Ministry of Rural and Community Development as well as the Soil Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture deal with projects like village road constructions, soil conservation and village water supply schemes. These are mostly 'food-for-work' projects (although there is minimal supplementary cash payment for the village participants). Figures from the Second Development Plan document indicate that there are about 13,500 participants in these projects from the rural areas.

Eighty percent of these participants are females. The female participation rate of 80 percent is very significant indeed, particularly considering the physical demand involved in such projects. The point to be made here is that, it is not that women should not be involved in the these kinds of projects (in effect women constitute an important force) but that the presence of adequate male force would make things that much easier (for the women), and, possibly, the implementation of the projects would be accomplished sooner. The Second Development Plan document also states that participation in these projects is seasonal.

The Lesotho-co-operative Credit Union League (LCCUL) and the Institute of Extra Studies (IEMS) at the National University of Lesotho have been conducting a sample survey on the operation of the credit union societies in Lesotho. The study involves a sample of 36 credit union societies and over 2700 individual members. Preliminary results show that women comprised about 68 percent of the sample of membership, while males made up 32 percent. The results also show that a total of 228 were committee members, at 'society' level. Of these,
175 (or 77 percent) were women, while 53 (or 23 percent) were male. There are no figures to indicate what proportion of these women were migrants' wives. But the sex differential for both ordinary and committee membership sizes is quite significant. The results of this study further show that most of the loans (for those members who took them) were for investment in agriculture. Unfortunately, there is no information on the number of women among the borrowers. What is known, however, is that all members of the Board of LCCUL are men. Herein lies the paradox: while women are the main participants in rural development activities, the management and decision making body is dominated by men. This seems to be the trend in most developing countries (Fagley, 1976; Tinker, 1976).

3.2 Migrants' Earnings

There are three methods in which migrant earnings are remitted to Lesotho: money sent home during the period of contract, deferred payment, and cash brought home at the end of contract (van de Wiel, 1977).

Migrant remittances are of vital importance to the economy of Lesotho, helping to offset the country's trade deficits. It is estimated that the total earnings of migrants at present amount to at least as high as Lesotho's total GDP (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, p.6). In 1976 the migrants' net earnings were estimated to be over R100 million (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977).

The important question to consider is the extent to which these earnings of migrants are used in rural development endeavours of the country, particularly in investment in agriculture. In 1975 Lesotho Government instituted a system of compulsory deferred pay system for Basotho mine workers in South Africa. A minimum of 60 percent of each miner's wages (for a certain period of contract) is saved and deposited into Lesotho Bank. One of the aims was to create funds which could be used in development projects in Lesotho, but as Wallis (1977) points
It is suggested by van der Wiel (1977) that migrant remittances invested in agriculture go for things like renting a tractor, ploughing oxen, or livestock in general, and for purchasing seeds and fertilizers. Williams (1977) argues that relying on renting these items (which sometimes includes hiring local manpower) is risky sometimes because people work on their own land or that of relatives and friends, before they can work for payment. This may decrease the chances of the migrant's fields being ploughed early to take advantage of early spring rains and to avoid autumn frosts. It has also been suggested that the availability of productive techniques like hiring a tractor or share-cropping may actually operate to encourage migration (van der Wiel, 1977). The 'proposition' here is that a migrant who owns land may still be able to obtain profitable agricultural output while still holding on to his job in South Africa. He is therefore better-off than would be the case if he were a full-time farmer. This point is also raised by Williams (1971) who states that a migrant may actually be afforded the chance to take the agricultural produce concerned and use them for his own immediate consumption needs. So it looks like the effects of a success of an 'investment-oriented' migrant would be to encourage him to continue being a migrant. In the long run it might be difficult to convince that kind of migrant to come home permanently. The point made by van der Wiel above is significant considering that the Lesotho Government has recently introduced a 'share-cropping plan under which Government co-operates with farmers, using mechanized technique, to raise farm yield' (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977, p. ME-4).

It has been strongly proposed by Williams (1971) that the availability of foreign source of income may actually operate to make the government to delay instituting and implementing necessary reforms to promote better agricultural practices:
While externally produced incomes may temporarily prevent per capita consumption from worsening, if not properly utilized, they serve to increase over time the minimum rate of domestically induced growth required to achieve the 'take off' into sustained development, assuming that the agricultural surplus remaining after the departure of the migrants is used primarily for consumption purposes. It is likely, moreover that total agricultural product will decline with migrant. (Williams, op.cit. p.167)

Williams goes on to say that

.... far from constituting one of the few tangible benefits of the migratory institution, external income earning opportunities operate as a disguised, long term backward effect since they
(a) considerably reduce the pace of domestic agricultural innovation
(b) fail to serve as a substantial source of capital formation or agricultural input and since they
(c) relax the pressure on national decision makers to take the difficult, yet increasingly necessary, steps toward constructing an environment capable of eliciting rational producer responses to economic stimuli. (Williams, Ibid p.168).

The amount of migrants' earnings invested in agriculture has been reported to be generally low. Most of it is spent on consumer items (van der Wiel, 1977). Williams (1971) proposes that the portion of migrant earning invested in agriculture is not enough to increase agricultural productivity or lead to self-sufficiency in food production among the rural Lesotho population. He quotes figures which show that in 1966 Lesotho imported goods worth R23 million. Out of this figure only R336,000 was for agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and machinery - excluding tractors). Meanwhile in 1965/6 migrants' deferred pay (voluntary at that time) and remittances amounted to R7 million. Even if it can be assumed that the whole of R336,000 was from migrants earnings, it still represented a relatively small proportion fed back into agriculture. As for the landless migrants, the assumption is that the portion of their earnings going into agricultural investment was even more negligible. It may not even be assumed that migrants imported the agricultural items directly to their homes because of the problem of transporting such bulky material. Rutman (1974) suggests that the land tenure system makes migrants feel that it is insecure to invest in agriculture, they would rather use
their earnings on some consumer items which they can have as collateral rather than on land improvement.

3.3 Migrants' Attitudes and Perceptions

The knowledge of how migrants perceive their role in, and behave towards the country's development endeavours can be of great importance to rural development planners in Lesotho. At present relevant literature shows that the attitude of migrants is negative. Wallman (1972) suggests that Basotho migrants do not regard Lesotho as 'a place of work' (p.2). They do not believe that Lesotho is capable of being self-sufficient. The author in fact describes Lesotho as a "dormitory suburb of peasants" where migrants commute "across an international boundary" to work (p.2).

The suggestion by Wallman is disputed by van der Wiel (1977) who argues that there is no apathy or "economic pessimism" (p.95) among the rural Basotho. Rather, the social system of which Lesotho is a part guarantees unequal distribution of resources and it is this system which is to blame. The system, as van der Wiel sees it, operates to:

guarantee sufficient poverty to ensure a labour supply for the mines and sufficient development to provide a 'homeland' which can act as a substitute for a social security and welfare system.

He argues that even if a migrant comes home with a desire to bring about changes in his community, he will not be successful 'because on the large scale the distortion in the allocation of resources to his region deprives him of the elementary frame-work required for success' (p.95-96). van der Wiel concludes by saying that:

The stimulus for change requires not the reform of the migrant's community as Wallman proposes, but a reconstruction of the political and economic system by which resources are distributed.

Williams (1971) contends that Basotho migrants have a belief they are entitled to a period of rest at home between contracts:
Many are idle for six months at a time. This proclivity is closely related to the seasonal nature of effort in traditional agricultural operations. Basotho males are accustomed to short periods of intense activity at ploughing and harvest times and almost complete inactivity during off season.

He states that a Basotho male regards his main activity in agriculture as ploughing; therefore once he has performed this task, the yield will not be affected by his presence at home since other activities like weeding are traditionally for women. Another issue that Williams points out is that, the fact that migrants know they can always get temporary employment in South Africa makes them relax in their input effort in agricultural activities. Cobbe (1975) contends that migrants tend to have a negative attitude towards their country's development prospects. They regard their period at home between contracts as "a sort of extended holiday" (p.10). They spend their time resting, being waited on, or sometimes drinking and then getting ready to go back to South Africa.

One of the concerns at the recent Donor Conference in Lesotho (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977) was that there is lack of incentive among those involved in agriculture. The return from agriculture cannot compete with the level of wages in South Africa. Further, returned migrants are also cash-oriented, and it is not known how their reaction is toward payment in kind which presently operates as the main mode of remuneration in some of the rural development projects in Lesotho.

It is evident that there is no agreement on the attitudes of the Basotho migrant workers towards their country's economic viability and ability to launch successful development and job-generating programmes. More research is needed in this aspect. It is an important issue which may have far-reaching effects. As Moltse (1969) puts it: "When people lose faith in themselves, even miracles do not help."

3.4 Seasonal Pattern of Migration

One crude measure of the extent to which migrants engage in agriculture is to determine whether their arrival and departure is related
to the amount of agricultural activities at home. One would expect migrants to come home during peak periods of the year to ensure adequate labour supply on farming. McDowall (1974) suggests that fluctuations in the rate of recruitment of migrants follows agricultural cycle. For example, he reports recruitment figures for Basotho mine workers during the period 1964-1972 which show that this pattern holds. During this period, recruitment was high in January, February and March, declined in April and May, and then rose gradually. McDowall admits, however, that the high rate during the new year (January - March) was probably partly due to the fact that miners had delayed their departure so that they could enjoy Christmas with their families.

McDowell's findings are disputed by some people. Williams (1971) argues that whether or not migrants plan their arrival home to coincide with ploughing or seeding season, agriculture still suffers because the time is too short and the migrant has no time to do preparatory cultivation, nor is the migrant able to take advantage of the rain seasons. Above all, the requirement of labour demand in South Africa does not allow him to always take advantage of the peak periods in agricultural activities at home. Williams (1971) quotes figures which show that for the period 1966-68, 75 percent of 90,000 Basotho miners had spent "less than six months at home" (p.161). Now he calculated that in a total of about 8 to 9 months (i.e., October/November - July), it is no way in which 75 per cent of the miners could have effectively and there/engaged in agriculture. His argument is that all agricultural activities, including weeding, are crucial for high yield in maize - a staple food for Basotho.

Van der Wiel (1977) suggests that seasonal factors have had relatively minor influence on the flow pattern of miners, at least until, 1972. However, he quotes recruitment figures which show that during 1975 and 1976 such seasonal variations did exist. According to Wilson (1974) migrant labour in Lesotho is not a "seasonal phenomenon" (p.27). It is the recruiting organizations who control the flow of labour.
3.5 Length of Period Between Contracts

The average length of the period the returning migrants spend in Lesotho before signing the next contract could have some implications on the amount of input migrants have in agricultural activities at home. This is based on the assumption that migrants do get involved in such activities, during the period between contract. McDowall (1974) reports a mean stay of 7.2 months and a medium of 4.5 months for miners. He points out that young miners spend a shorter time in Lesotho than do older miners. Van der Wiel suggests that married migrants and those who are heads of households spend longer time at home than do the single and non-household heads. However, van der Wiel states that the mine recruiting agencies have ways of regulating the length of migrants' stay at home. For example they offer migrants "Early Return bonus payment" (p.48), which guarantees that a miner will be re-employed by the company provided he applies within a certain period of time. These incentives and constraints may go a long way to influencing the length of migrants' stay at home. Van der Wiel argues, however, that the able-bodied men who are available between contracts are usually not very much involved in agricultural work and most of the domestic work is done by those remaining behind.  

Related to the above is the question of home visits during contract period. Such visits are usually too short to allow the migrants to do much in terms of agricultural work. As van der wiel (1977) points out, the frequency of visits home will be determined by a number of factors, such as distance involved to get home, availability of money for transport, and desire to see one's family.

3.6 Transfer of Skills Gained in South Africa

There is a proposition that migrants may acquire skills from their jobs in South Africa which they can use to influence the home activities like improvement of home production and resources. However, it has been observed (see Williams, 1971) that skills and habits acquired
by migrants' do not filter into important factors of production in the migrants rural home villages. Instead, the tendency is for the migrants to imitate the consumption habits of the industrial societies (demonstrated in the migrants' eagerness to purchase luxurious consumer goods). Nor are the migrants able to transfer to the agricultural operations the practice of adhering to work schedules. According to Williams, the lack of transference of skills acquired from the place of work in South Africa is due to two factors: First, there is no fully developed mining industry in Lesotho, also for agriculture is basically mechanized in South Africa. Secondly, the acquisition of knowledge and skills and their translation into home situation are inhibited by the low educational level of most migrants. Some of these points are also raised by van der Wiel (1977).

IV Conclusion

The general conclusion to be made is that the phenomenon of labour migration is a constraint on the Lesotho's rural development efforts. At the most, migrant workers are part-time farmers.

The solution seems to lie in the reduction or total elimination of labour migration. The discussion of how this can be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper. There have been suggestions from some people on how migration can be maintained without sacrificing the welfare of the rural development efforts. For example, Williams (1971) suggests the Lesotho Government should issue 'migration' permits only to those who conform to certain prescribed standards of agricultural practices. He admits, however, that the success of such a policy would depend on whether the Government is prepared to make certain changes and provisions, such as availability of credit, transport and marketing reforms, as well as the revision of land tenure system. William's suggestion leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, what happens to migrants who do not have any land or livestock? Another suggestion he makes is that a big portion of the migrants' earnings
may be deposited into Agricultural Development Bank which would offer farm credits. Alternatively, the Government may stipulate that a portion of migrants' earnings be deferred into personal bank accounts of the migrants with specification that they be used only for investment in agriculture. This suggestion might be hard to take: there is a limit to which government can control one's personal funds. Claus et al. (1977) make two relevant suggestions. One is that the Lesotho Government should try to lessen the wage gap between South Africa and Lesotho, so as to make wages in South Africa less attractive to potential migrants. It is difficult to envisage how this can be achieved, given the existing poverty situation in Lesotho. Secondly, the authors suggest that a system of bonding for students in technical institutions be established. The system of bonding exists in Lesotho for higher education but it has always proved hard to enforce.

The Lesotho Government is planning to institute a Labour-Intensive Unit within the Ministry of Works (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). This is a short-term emergency measure intended to take care of unexpected mass-repatriation of Basotho migrants from South Africa such as happened during the 1973/74 disturbances in some mines in South Africa. The problem with this scheme is that even if it were established as a permanent, long-term programme, it would need substantial cash input. It might not be able to compete with South Africa, wage-wise.

It does look like the Government of Lesotho is in a dilemma. On the one hand it wants to produce enough food for the nation, and in order to realize this end it has a declared policy of mechanization in agricultural activities (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). On the other hand mechanization will demand less manpower - a situation which in turn might lead to more migration. It is a question of deciding between production-oriented approach and employment-oriented approach.
Solutions are hard to come by in this issue of labour migration and rural development. One would suggest that while such solutions are being sought, steps should be taken to improve the productive capacity of the women left behind. For example, they should be offered more recognition (particularly in decision-making on affairs relating to rural development projects), training, and improved techniques and tools.
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I Introduction

The study of Harambee movement - Kenya's version of self help has received relatively little attention compared with other phenomena like villagisation in Tanzania. This is surprising and at the same time somewhat expected. First, unlike villagisation in Tanzania, Harambee on the surface appears to be a relatively non-formal response to the problems of rural poverty in Kenya. It was not ushered in as part of a systematic ideology for rural development. Rather, it has developed on its own momentum, first from a slogan in 1963, then to small and medium sized projects such as cattle dips, access roads, schools and health centres by the late sixties, and finally to the present ambitious Institutes of Science and Technology. The momentum has continued despite a realisation by the Government in the late sixties that the movement was getting "out of control" and, therefore, needed to be incorporated into central planning. The rapid pace with which Harambee has expanded, might mean that both scholars and government have not had time to fully understand the phenomenon.

Last year however, (March 1977) the Government indicated that there was need to study Harambee activities from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance and Planning is contemplating some studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 1977) the official enthusiasm is characterised by newly found confidence


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Last year however, (March 1977) the Government indicated that there was need to study Harambee activities from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance and Planning is contemplating some studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 1977) the official enthusiasm is characterised by newly found confidence
which is reflected in such a statement as "Harambee is a good model for development in the Third World" (Ibid.)

The building blocks of the model are, yet to be fully understood. It is, therefore, perhaps premature to talk of a "model" for the "Third World" when it is not yet clear what type of a model is being discussed and whether it can be uniformly applied to Kenya as a whole, let alone the entire "Third World". One suspects that the enthusiasm is a result of the hope that Harambee has not sufficiently evolved to a stage where it is now possible to analyse it with a view to isolating and presumably highlighting its self-justifying elements. It is claimed that one of these elements is the participatory nature of the movement. However, as will become evident later, it is not easy to isolate an element such as participation and claim for it, the role of the principal concept underlying Harambee without grossly oversimplifying the nature of the movement.

The major problem, however, is not separating Harambee into its constituent components though the problematic aspects in this connection would not be underestimated. In our view, the primary problem is one of conceptualising Harambee is such a way that its many facets can be viewed as sub-concepts of one overall concept. Only afterwards can we then assess the limits and potentials of its applicability on a wider scale. The choice whether to start analysis before attempting any synthesis is precisely that viz. an individual choice. So far, most of the students of Harambee seem to have approached the phenomenon analytically without much attempt to synthesize their empirical findings. Before we look into this problem, a few words on the general character of harambee expectations.

Harambee has been characterized by increasing expansion and though the call for Harambee was made in 1963, the movement did not really pick up momentum until three years later when what was originally a slogan started being translated into development projects.

This, of course, does not mean that the idea was allowed to lie dormant for a period of three years. In those three years, more than
9,600 kilometres of access roads and over 1,000 small bridges were constructed on self-help basis. During the same period, more than 145 kilometres of pipeline, 50 dams and rock catchments, and 500 protected springs were installed through the same method. In addition, over 2,500 community facilities such as schools buildings, nursery centres, health centres and dispensaries were built. (Kenya Government: Second Development Plan, p.523).

The momentum gathered in the first three years began to be reflected in 1967. In that year alone, over 3,600 community facilities were completed, 119 piped water supplies were installed, and 410 wells and protected springs were built. In addition, 1,659 fish ponds were built and stocked. The same year saw the first attempt by the Government to break down the nature of the inputs that went into Harambee projects, an exercise that has continued over since. In that year, the people's contribution to self-help projects in terms of labour, cash and material amounted to approximately K£ 2 million, quite a substantial sum. The Government's contribution was, however, quite small. It constituted only 4% of the total value of projects completed in 1967. But, despite the small, almost negligible, Government contribution, the latter took Harambee seriously enough of put aside K£ 444,000 for part-financing of self-help schemes during the period of the Second Development Plan, 1970-1974. (Ibid).

A year by year presentation of data on self-help inputs and outputs is perhaps not necessary at this stage. Suffice it to say that after 1967, the self-help movement continued to expand to the extent that the Government was obliged to take a serious view of the phenomenon as a planning problem. This was done in the second Development Plan. During this plan period, it was estimated that the people's contribution in cash and kind amounted to K£ 8.5 million. The current plan estimates that the total value of self-help projects will be K£ 11.5 million between 1974 and 1978. Of this amount the Government expects to contribute K£ 815,000 (Third Development Plan, p.482). The rest is expected to be contributed by the people. Overall, it is now estimated
that Harambee activities constitute about 30% of all capital formation in the rural areas. (Voice of Kenya, January 1977).

It is ironic that despite the obvious expansion of Harambee activities, the movement is still surrounded by a great deal of mystery, and few people are able to say exactly what it represents.

II Impressions

A listing of all the ideas associated with Harambee, confirms the view that there is still no consensus as to the social, political, economic and even theoretical meaning of Harambee. A random listing attributes the following meanings to Harambee.

1. A continuation of an old tradition under the umbrella of African socialism.
2. A social movement for rural development
3. A form of rural savings and capitalisation
4. A political slogan calling for a spirit of co-operation which has accidentally been translated into projects, with a peculiar method of financing.
5. A political favour to the president
6. A means for politicians to ingratiating themselves with the President
7. A means for politicians to ingratiating themselves with the peasants
8. A method of forced taxation
9. An irrational behaviour by the individual peasant contributors
10. A community phenomenon which comprehends the contradictory principles of voluntarism and coercion
11. A community reaction to "felt-needs"
12. A political mechanism of rural participation
13. An economic mechanism for utilising local resources.
Although the declared aim of the strategy of rural development is "raising the productivity of the poor", it has been observed that the beneficiaries of some of these programmes are the well-to-do individual farmers or even salaried "telephone farmers" in towns with better access to the inputs of the programmes because of their positions of influence in society as "pivotal Men."

Accordingly the question has been asked as to whether the projects' impact is in the direction of social upliftment of the "rural poor" or towards further social stratification leading to aggravated social inequality, misery and rural poverty. As already suggested, much more longer experience with this programme will provide the definitive answer.

VI CONCLUSION

The examination of rural development strategies of Africa and Lesotho in this paper is on the main tentative in view of the novelty of the phenomenon under review. As already observed above, the rural development strategies of African countries are on the whole within a capitalist framework of agricultural and rural development, a transformation which runs short of bringing about structural changes in the socio-economic formation.

The experience of socialist transformation of peasant agriculture undertaken in Russia following the 1917 Socialist revolution is of particular interest to all developing countries of Africa which wish to bring about the much desired transformation of small-scale peasant agriculture along large-scale collectivist lines and yet avoiding the horrors of capitalist proletarianisation of the peasantry and the development of large-scale capitalist agriculture.

African countries are placed in an advantageous position than many Asian and Latin American countries for utilizing the experience of Russia and China in socialist transformation of small-scale peasant agriculture.
agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, like pre-revolutionary Russia
and China, the Economies of African countries are predominantly
agrarian in character. Even though there were pockets of highly
developed monopoly capitalism in Russia in the main centres of Moscow
and Petrograd, the central economic figure in Russia like in most of
Africa, was the small peasant.

Secondly, and even much more important, the predominantly
communalist character of land relations in Africa, serves as a good
parallel to the public property of land in socialist countries and a
reliable" take-off ground for co-operativisation of small-scale
peasant farming.

It is argued here that there are two main strategies for rural
development in the world. On the one hand there is the capitalist-
orientated strategy directed at raising "individual incomes" of the
middle and rich peasant to a point where-by he would be transformed
into a full-fledged capitalist farmer and on the other hand the
socialist strategy directed at the prevention of further social
stratification and favouring the development of small scale - peasant
farming along collectivist and egalitarian lines.

The former strategy is being followed in most countries in Africa
and is better known, while the latter strategy, the distinguishing
features of which is planned and collectivist transformation of
agriculture is less known in Africa.

Nevertheless a few countries in Africa like Angola, Mozambique
and Ethiopia have already embarked upon this strategy.26 In these
countries, rural development is carried out as a national and overall
planned strategy of socialist transformation of society, the surest
guarantee against the proletarianisation of the African peasantry and
the emergence of capitalist farming. The pace towards economic
development and social progress on the continent will to a large extent
depend on the strategies chosen for rural development in Africa.
FOOTNOTES

8. Ibid, p. 33.
15. Lesotho Second Five Year Development Plan, p. 83.
LABOUR MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LESOTHO

By

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I Introduction: General Background

Lesotho is a small country completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Its size is estimated to be about 30,350 square kilometres. Over two-thirds of the country is mountainous. The rest consists of lowlands, foothills, and the Orange River Valley. A greater part of the mountain area is suitable for grazing (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, Murray, 1976). The climate goes to extremes, with snow-covered mountainous areas for a greater part of the winter and lowlands area which can become quite hot and dry. The average annual rainfall is about 700 mm.

The country's de jure population is estimated to be about 1.2 million and the bulk of it is concentrated in the low-land areas. About 95 percent depends on agriculture for its livelihood (Claus et. al., 1977; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). Only about 13 percent of the land surface (or less than 40,000 hectares) is cultivated. The mean farm household landholding is 2 hectares while about half of the rural households own stocks (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). The land is generally eroded, and poor for farming purposes. It is estimated that about 0.2 percent of the total arable land is lost annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976).

Although the majority of Basotho are rural, the agricultural sector does not generate enough income for the population, nor is there self-sufficiency in food (Cobbe, 1975; van der Wiel, 1977). Among the
factors regarded responsible for low agricultural output are the following: climatic conditions, land tenure system, shortage of land, general deterioration of land (fragmentation and erosion), poor farming methods, and overgrazing (Rutman, 1974; Wallman, 1972; Williams, 1971; Van der Wiel, 1977).

II. Labour Migration in Lesotho

The economic development and survival of Lesotho is closely related to the phenomenon of migrant labour. A large number of Basotho regularly go to South Africa to look for employment;

no aspect of Contemporary village life in Lesotho can be understood without central reference to the dependence of villagers for their livelihood on earnings derived from the export of labour. (Ward, 1973. According to Marray 1976)

This phenomenon has been referred to extensively in literature (van der Wiel, 1977; Williams, 1971). Lesotho Government is aware of the crucial role played by labour migration in the country's economic development. This is reflected in the current development Plan.

Lesotho's general economic structure is strongly influenced by the fact that a large number of Basotho are employed in South Africa - some 50% of the male labour force (140,000 men) Plus some 10% of the female labour force (about 25,000 women). (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976)

It is estimated that about 81 percent of the Basotho labour migrants are employed in the mining industry in South Africa, while the rest are in other sectors like manufacturing, construction, domestic work, government, agriculture and other (van der Wiel, 1977).

Financial benefits accruing to Lesotho from the export of labour are substantial. Lesotho Government estimates that migrant earnings amount to at least as high as the country's Gross Domestic Product (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976).

Motivations for Basotho to migrate have been delineated elsewhere (Bohning, 1977; van der Wiel, 1977). These include, among other things,
higher wages in South Africa, lack of employment opportunities in Lesotho, and low agricultural productivity and income in Lesotho. Evidence also shows that the incidence of migration is related to landlessness (Mojorele, 1962, part 2).

This paper is intended to explore some of the possible effects that labour migration has on the rural development efforts in Lesotho, with particular reference to agriculture. There is a strong belief among a number of people that the exodus of migrants retards the 'take-off' of rural development endeavours in the country (Murray, 1976). There is an interesting vicious circle here: people migrate because of the low agricultural productivity; at the same time the very same out-flow of people accelerates the low level of agricultural productivity.

III Possible Effects of Labour Migration

3.1 Absence of Male Labour

Regarded as one of the most serious negative effects of labour migration is the fact that it deprives local home communities of male power needed to undertake development projects (Wallman, 1972). Such projects, particularly those concerned with agricultural operations are left in the hands of women, children and old people. The end result is the deterioration of agricultural productivity (Cobbe, 1975; William, 1971). According to van der Wiel (1977), most of the Basotho begin migrant work at the age of 18 to 20 and stop at the age of about 45 - a very 'productive' age range. In an investigation based on some agricultural projects in Lesotho, van der Wiel (1977) found that 'migration rates reach a maximum in the 25-29 years age cohort' showing a slight reduction at the age range 30-34, and a sharp decline after age 39. The study further showed that about 45 percent of the migrants were below 30 years old, and that approximately three-quarters of them fell between the age class 18-39.

Williams (1971) argues that there is lack of organization in ploughing in the absence of males. Women and children left behind are
not capable of practising sound farming methods. A case of deficiency in ploughing can be illustrated by the fact that women and children tend to make shallow furrows which are a threat to both the growth and survival of plants. Such inadequate ploughing methods accelerate the process of soil erosion (see also Cobbe, 1975). Another point Williams (1971) makes is that in the absence of the household head, the wife makes the 'traditional' decision with regard to farming. For example, the introduction of cash cropping may be impeded by the absence of males since decisions on such activities are traditionally the responsibility of men. Women, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on subsistence crops.

Apart from this, women are already overburdened with other household duties such as taking care of children and cooking. They are not strong enough to do efficient ploughing. This concern over rural women being overburdened with too many household tasks besides that of food production has been expressed in international organization circles (McDowell and Hazzard, 1976, Fagley, 1976).

Another issue raised by Williams (1971) is that the absence of male from home reduces the rate of capital formation in the rural areas and in soil conservation efforts. Labour intensive operations such as the construction of irrigation channels, contours and grain storage huts suffer when there is no male labour:

This lower rate of capital formation and maintenance may also operate to exaggerate the demand for agricultural credit in areas where self-help projects have been frustrated by insufficient labour.

Stahl (1977) points out that the impact of labour migration on rural capital formation is an important issue not only because most migrants come from rural areas but also because improved agricultural productivity is an important factor in national development. He observes, however, that agricultural productivity has been deteriorating in Southern Africa. His conclusion is that 'years of labour emigration in southern Africa have done little to augment capital formation in agriculture' (p.14).
Male labour and leadership are needed in non-agricultural development projects including village water supply projects and road construction. Williams (1971) reports that as a result of lack of local leaders; most of such potential leaders were working in South Africa. He argues that South Africa tends to recruit males who are not only productive, healthy and enterprising, but also those who have leadership qualities. The latter, according to Williams, are usually offered financial inducement by the South African mines.

Williams (1971) also quotes literature which shows that the absence of males may generate some psychological problems which may have far-reaching effects on the rural development undertakings. For example, the local community may lose moral incentive by losing their important male labour. This in turn leads to deterioration in 'effort and output' (p.165).

Perhaps a more serious problem is the exodus of skilled and middle-level manpower, as well as professionals like teachers. Wilson (1974) has put it this way:

Artisans, carpenters, plumbers and a growing number and range of skilled, workers are educated and trained at great cost to Lesotho's educational budget only to find work in the Republic, where wage rates are higher and the cost of living lower. (This 'brain drain' is checked only to a limited extent by the natural aversion of the Basotho to living under apartheid laws).

A team for the German Development Institute (GDI) recently completed an investigation into the phenomenon of Lesotho out-migration of skilled and semi-skilled technical manpower (Claus et al., 1977). The study showed that about 70 percent of a sample of business enterprises indicated that there was a definite shortage of technical manpower. For 50 percent of them the shortage problems was 'severe' while for 30 percent this shortage affected production, expansion and maintenance. More importantly, most enterprise managers quoted migrant labour as the main cause of the shortage of technical manpower. The GDI team observes that, for the country as a whole.
The lack of skills slowed down the implementation of the First Plan, and is a heavy burden for the implementation of the Second Plan, (including the big development projects in agriculture and infrastructure), and the development of the modern sector. (Claus, B. et.al. 1977, p.2).

It is evident that Lesotho Government is aware of the fact that 'skill drain' is taking place in the country and that this presents manpower shortages which frustrate the implementation of development projects (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). This situation often necessitates the importation of technical aid from outside the country (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). The limited labour-intensive programmes being launched by the Ministry of Rural and Community Development as well as the Soil Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture deal with projects like village road constructions, soil conservation and village water supply schemes. These are mostly 'food-for-work' projects (although there is minimal supplementary cash payment for the village participants). Figures from the Second Development Plan document indicate that there are about 13,500 participants in these projects from the rural areas. Eighty percent of these participants are females. The female participation rate of 80 percent is very significant indeed, particularly considering the physical demand involved in such projects. The point to be made here is that, it is not that women should not be involved in the these kinds of projects (in effect women constitute an important force) but that the presence of adequate male force would make things that much easier (for the women), and, possibly, the implementation of the projects would be accomplished sooner. The Second Development Plan document also states that participation in these projects is seasonal.

The Lesotho co-operative Credit Union League (LCCUL) and the Institute of Extra Studies (IEMS) at the National University of Lesotho have been conducting a sample survey on the operation of the credit union societies in Lesotho. The study involves a sample of 36 credit union societies and over 2700 individual members. Preliminary results show that women comprised about 68 percent of the sample of membership, while males made up 32 percent. The results also show that a total of 228 were committee members, at 'society' level. Of these,
175 (or 77 percent) were women, while 53 (or 23 percent) were male. There are no figures to indicate what proportion of these women were migrants' wives. But the sex differential for both ordinary and committee membership sites is quite significant. The results of this study further show that most of the loans (for those members who took them) were for investment in agriculture. Unfortunately, there is no information on the number of women among the borrowers. What is known, however, is that all members of the Board of LCCUL are men. 

Herein lies the paradox: while women are the main participants in rural development activities, the management and decision making body is dominated by men. This seems to be the trend in most developing countries (Fagley, 1976; Tinker, 1976).

3.2 Migrants' Earnings

There are three methods in which migrant earnings are remitted to Lesotho: money sent home during the period of contract, deferred payment, and cash brought home at the end of contract (van de Wiel, 1977).

Migrant remittances are of vital importance to the economy of Lesotho, helping to offset the country's trade deficits. It is estimated that the total earnings of migrants at present amount to at least as high as Lesotho's total GDP (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, p.6). In 1976 the migrants' net earnings were estimated to be over R100 million (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977).

The important question to consider is the extent to which these earnings of migrants are used in rural development endeavours of the country, particularly in investment in agriculture. In 1975 Lesotho Government instituted a system of compulsory deferred pay system for Basotho mine workers in South Africa. A minimum of 60 percent of each miner's wages (for a certain period of contract) is saved and deposited into Lesotho Bank. One of the aims was to create funds which could be used in development projects in Lesotho, but as Wallis (1977) points
out, the way the funds are used is still not clear. There seems to be no clear indication of the extent to which the earnings of migrants contribute to rural development achievements (Stahl, 1977).

It is suggested by van der Wiel (1977) that migrant remittances invested in agriculture go for things like renting a tractor, ploughing oxen, or livestock in general, and for purchasing seeds and fertilizers. Williams (1977) argues that relying on renting these items (which sometimes includes hiring local manpower) is risky sometimes because people work on their own land or that of relatives and friends, before they can work for payment. This may decrease the chances of the migrant's fields being ploughed early to take advantage of early spring rains and to avoid autumn frosts. It has also been suggested that the availability of productive techniques like hiring a tractor or share-cropping may actually operate to encourage migration (van der Wiel, 1977). The 'proposition' here is that a migrant who owns land may still be able to obtain profitable agricultural output while still holding on to his job in South Africa. He is therefore better-off than would be the case if he were a full-time farmer. This point is also raised by Williams (1971) who states that a migrant may actually be afforded the chance to take the agricultural produce concerned and use them for his own immediate consumption needs. So it looks like the effects of a success of an 'investment-oriented' migrant would be to encourage him to continue being a migrant. In the long run it might be difficult to convince that kind of migrant to come home permanently. The point made by van der Wiel above is significant considering that the Lesotho Government has recently introduced a 'share-cropping plan under which Government co-operates with farmers, using mechanized technique, to raise farm yield' (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977, p. ME-4).

It has been strongly proposed by Williams (1971) that the availability of foreign source of income may actually operate to make the government to delay instituting and implementing necessary reforms to promote better agricultural practices:
While externally produced incomes may temporarily prevent per capita consumption from worsening, if not properly utilized, they serve to increase over time the minimum rate of domestically induced growth required to achieve the 'take off' into sustained development, assuming that the agricultural surplus remaining after the departure of the migrants is used primarily for consumption purposes. It is likely, moreover, that total agricultural product will decline with migrant. (Williams, op. cit. p.167)

Williams goes on to say that

.... far from constituting one of the few tangible benefits of the migratory institution, external income earning opportunities operate as a disguised, long term backward effect since they (a) considerably reduce the pace of domestic agricultural innovation (b) fail to serve as a substantial source of capital formation or agricultural input and since they (c) relax the pressure on national decision makers to take the difficult, yet increasingly necessary, steps toward constructing an environment capable of eliciting rational producer responses to economic stimuli. (Williams, Ibid p.168).

The amount of migrants' earnings invested in agriculture has been reported to be generally low. Most of it is spent on consumer items (van der Wiel, 1977). Williams (1971) proposes that the portion of migrant earning invested in agriculture is not enough to increase agricultural productivity or lead to self-sufficiency in food production among the rural Lesotho population. He quotes figures which show that in 1966 Lesotho imported goods worth R23 million. Out of this figure only R336,000 was for agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and machinery – excluding tractors). Meanwhile in 1965/6 migrants' deferred pay (voluntary at that time) and remittances amounted to R7 million. Even if it can be assumed that the whole of R336,000 was from migrants earnings, it still represented a relatively small proportion fed back into agriculture. As for the landless migrants, the assumption is that the portion of their earnings going into agricultural investment was even more negligible. It may not even be assumed that migrants imported the agricultural items directly to their homes because of the problem of transporting such bulky material. Rutman (1974) suggests that the land tenure system makes migrants feel that it is insecure to invest in agriculture, they would rather use
their earnings on some consumer items which they can have as collateral rather than on land improvement.

3.3 **Migrants' Attitudes and Perceptions**

The knowledge of how migrants perceive their role in, and behave towards the country's development endeavours can be of great importance to rural development planners in Lesotho. At present relevant literature shows that the attitude of migrants is negative. Wallman (1972) suggests that Basotho migrants do not regard Lesotho as 'a place of work' (p.2). They do not believe that Lesotho is capable of being self-sufficient. The author in fact describes Lesotho as a "dormitory suburb of peasants" where migrants commute "across an international boundary" to work (p.2).

The suggestion by Wallman is disputed by van der Wiel (1977) who argues that there is no apathy of "economic pessimism" (p.95) among the rural Basotho. Rather, the social system of which Lesotho is a part guarantees unequal distribution of resources and it is this system which is to blame. The system, as van der Wiel sees it, operates to:

- guarantee sufficient poverty to ensure a labour supply for the mines and sufficient development to provide a 'homeland' which can act as a substitute for a social security and welfare system.

He argues that even if a migrant comes home with a desire to bring about changes in his community, he will not be successful 'because on the large scale the distortion in the allocation of resources to his region deprives him of the elementary frame-work required for success' (p.95-96).

van der Wiel concludes by saying that:

- The stimulus for change requires not the reform of the migrant's community as Wallman proposes, but a reconstruction of the political and economic system by which resources are distributed.

Williams (1971) contends that Basotho migrants have a belief they are entitled to a period of rest at home between contracts:
Many are idle for six months at a time, this proclivity is closely related to the seasonal nature of effort in traditional agricultural operations. Basotho males are accustomed to short periods of intense activity at ploughing and harvest times and almost complete inactivity during off season.

He states that a Basotho male regards his main activity in agriculture as ploughing; therefore once he has performed this task, the yield will not be affected by his presence at home since other activities like weeding are traditionally for women. Another issue that Williams points out is that, the fact that migrants know they can always get temporary employment in South Africa makes them relax in their input effort in agricultural activities. Cobbe (1975) contends that migrants tend to have a negative attitude towards their country's development prospects. They regard their period at home between contracts as "a sort of extended holiday" (p.10). They spend their time resting, being waited on, or sometimes drinking and then getting ready to go back to South Africa.

One of the concerns at the recent Donor Conference in Lesotho (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977) was that there is lack of incentive among those involved in agriculture. The return from agriculture cannot compete with the level of wages in South Africa. Further, returned migrants are also cash-oriented, and it is not known how their reaction is toward payment in kind which presently operates as the main mode of remuneration in some of the rural development projects in Lesotho.

It is evident that there is no agreement on the attitudes of the Basotho migrant workers towards their country's economic viability and ability to launch successful development and job-generating programmes. More research is needed in this aspect. It is an important issue which may have far reaching effects. As Molise (1969) puts it: 'When people lose faith in themselves, even miracles do not help.'

3.4 Seasonal Pattern of Migration

One crude measure of the extent to which migrants engage in agriculture is to determine whether their arrival and departure is related
to the amount of agricultural activities at home. One would expect migrants to come home during peak periods of the year to ensure adequate labour supply on farming. McDowall (1974) suggests that fluctuations in the rate of recruitment of migrants follows agricultural cycle. For example, he reports recruitment figures for Basotho mine workers during the period 1964-1972 which show that this pattern holds. During this period, recruitment was high in January, February and March, declined in April and May, and then rose gradually. McDowall admits, however, that the high rate during the new year (January - March) was probably partly due to the fact that miners had delayed their departure so that they could enjoy Christmas with their families.

McDowall's findings are disputed by some people. Williams (1971) argues that whether or not migrants plan their arrival home to coincide with ploughing or seeding season, agriculture still suffers because the time is too short and the migrant has no time to do preparatory cultivation, nor is the migrant able to take advantage of the rain seasons. Above all, the requirement of labour demand in South Africa does not allow him to always take advantage of the peak periods in agricultural activities at home. Williams (1971) quotes figures which show that for the period 1966-68, 75 percent of 90,000 Basotho miners had spent "less than six months at home" (p.161). Now he calculated that in a total of about 8 to 9 months (i.e., October/November - July), is no way in which 75 per cent of the miners could have effectively and there/engaged in agriculture. His argument is that all agricultural activities, including weeding, are crucial for high yield in maize - a staple food for Basotho.

Van der Wiel (1977) suggests that seasonal factors have had relatively minor influence on the flow pattern of miners, at least until, 1972. However, he quotes recruitment figures which show that during 1975 and 1976 such seasonal variations did exist. According to Wilson (1974) migrant labour in Lesotho is not a "seasonal phenomenon" (p.27). It is the recruiting organizations who control the flow of labour.
3.5 Length of Period Between Contracts

The average length of the period the returning migrants spend in Lesotho before signing the next contract could have some implications on the amount of input migrants have in agricultural activities at home. This is based on the assumption that migrants do get involved in such activities, during the period between contract. McDowall (1974) reports a mean stay of 7.2 months and a medium of 4.5 months for miners. He points out that young miners spend a shorter time in Lesotho than do older miners. Van der Wiel suggests that married migrants and those who are heads of households spend longer time at home than do the single and non-household heads. However, van der Wiel states that the mine recruiting agencies have ways of regulating the length of migrants' stay at home. For example they offer migrants "Early Return bonus payment" (p.48), which guarantees that a miner will be re-employed by the company provided he applies within a certain period of time. These incentives and constraints may go a long way to influencing the length of migrants' stay at home. Van der Wiel argues, however, that the able-bodied men who are available between contracts are usually not very much involved in agricultural work and most of the domestic work is done by those remaining behind.\(^{15}\) (p.33).

Related to the above is the question of home visits during contract period. Such visits are usually too short to allow the migrants to do much in terms of agricultural work. As van der wiel (1977) points out, the frequency of visits home will be determined by a number of factors, such as distance involved to get home, availability of money for transport, and desire to see one's family.

3.6 Transfer of Skills Gained in South Africa

There is a proposition that migrants may acquire skills from their jobs in South Africa which they can use to influence the home activities like improvement of home production and resources. However, it has been observed (see Williams, 1971) that skills and habits acquired
by migrants' do not filter into important factors of production in the migrants' rural home villages. Instead, the tendency is for the migrants to imitate the consumption habits of the industrial societies (demonstrated in the migrants' eagerness to purchase luxurious consumer goods). Nor are the migrants able to transfer to the agricultural operations the practice of adhering to work schedules. According to Williams, the lack of transference of skills acquired from the place of work in South Africa is due to two factors: First, there is no fully developed mining industry in Lesotho, also for agriculture is basically mechanized in South Africa. Secondly, the acquisition of knowledge and skills and their translation into home situation are inhibited by the low educational level of most migrants. Some of these points are also raised by van der Wiel (1977).

IV Conclusion

The general conclusion to be made is that the phenomenon of labour migration is a constraint on the Lesotho's rural development efforts. At the most, migrant workers are part-time farmers.

The solution seems to lie in the reduction or total elimination of labour migration. The discussion of how this can be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper. There have been suggestions from some people on how migration can be maintained without sacrificing the welfare of the rural development efforts. For example, Williams (1971) suggests the Lesotho Government should issue 'migration' permits only to those who conform to certain prescribed standards of agricultural practices. He admits, however, that the success of such a policy would depend on whether the Government is prepared to make certain changes and provisions, such as availability of credit, transport and marketing reforms, as well as the revision of land tenure system. William's suggestion leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, what happens to migrants who do not have any land or livestock? Another suggestion he makes is that a big portion of the migrants' earnings
may be deposited into Agricultural Development Bank which would offer farm credits. Alternatively, the Government may stipulate that a portion of migrants' earnings be deferred into personal bank accounts of the migrants with specification that they be used only for investment in agriculture. This suggestion might be hard to take: there is a limit to which government can control one's personal funds. Claus et al. (1977) make two relevant suggestions. One is that the Lesotho Government should try to lessen the wage gap between South Africa and Lesotho, so as to make wages in South Africa less attractive to potential migrants. It is difficult to envisage how this can be achieved, given the existing poverty situation in Lesotho. Secondly, the authors suggest that a system of bonding for students in technical institutions be established. The system of bonding exists in Lesotho for higher education but it has always proved hard to enforce.

The Lesotho Government is planning to institute a Labour-Intensive Unit within the Ministry of Works (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). This is a short-term emergency measure intended to take care of unexpected mass-repatriation of Basotho migrants from South Africa such as happened during the 1973/74 disturbances in some mines in South Africa. The problem with this scheme is that even if it were established as a permanent, long-term programme, it would need substantial cash input. It might not be able to compete with South Africa, wage-wise.

It does look like the Government of Lesotho is in a dilemma. On the one hand it wants to produce enough food for the nation, and in order to realize this end it has a declared policy of mechanization in agricultural activities (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). On the other hand mechanization will demand less manpower — a situation which in turn might lead to more migration. It is a question of deciding between production-oriented approach and employment-oriented approach.
Solutions are hard to come by in this issue of labour migration and rural development. One would suggest that while such solutions are being sought, steps should be taken to improve the productive capacity of the women left behind. For example, they should be offered more recognition (particularly in decision-making on affairs relating to rural development projects), training, and improved techniques and tools.
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Introduction

The study of Harambee movement - Kenya’s version of self help has received relatively little attention compared with other phenomena like villagisation in Tanzania. This is surprising and at the same time somewhat expected. First, unlike villagisation in Tanzania, Harambee on the surface appears to be a relatively non-formal response to the problems of rural poverty in Kenya. It was not ushered in as part of a systematic ideology for rural development. Rather, it has developed on its own momentum, first from a slogan in 1963, then to small and medium sized projects such as cattle dips, access roads, schools and health centres by the late sixties, and finally to the present ambitious Institutes of Science and Technology. The momentum has continued despite a realisation by the Government in the late sixties that the movement was getting “out of control” and, therefore, needed to be incorporated into central planning. The rapid pace with which Harambee has expanded, might mean that both scholars and government have not had time to fully understand the phenomenon.

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HARAMBEE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTICIPATION:
NOTES ON AN ILLUSIVE IDEOLOGY

by

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I Introduction

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which is reflected in such a statement as "Harambee is a good model for development in the Third World" (Ibid.)

The building blocks of the model are, yet to be fully understood. It is, therefore, perhaps premature to talk of a "model" for the "Third World" when it is not yet clear what type of a model is being discussed and whether it can be uniformly applied to Kenya as a whole, let alone the entire "Third World". One suspects that the enthusiasm is a result of the hope that Harambee has no sufficiently evolved to a stage where it is now possible to analyse it with a view to isolating and presumably highlighting its self-justifying elements. It is claimed that one of these elements is the participatory nature of the movement. However, as will become evident later, it is not easy to isolate an element such as participation and claim for it, the role of the principal concept underlying Harambee without grossly oversimplifying the nature of the movement.

The major problem, however, is not separating Harambee into its constituent components though the problematic aspects in this connection would not be underestimated. In our view, the primary problem is one of conceptualising Harambee is such a way that its many facets can be viewed as sub-concepts of one overall concept. Only afterwards can we then assess the limits and potentials of its applicability on a wider scale. The choice whether to start analysis before attempting any synthesis is precisely that viz. an individual choice. So far, most of the students of Harambee seem to have approached the phenomenon analytically without much attempt to synthesize their empirical findings. Before we look into this problem, a few words on the general character of harambee expectations.

Harambee has been characterized by increasing expansion and though the call for Harambee was made in 1963, the movement did not really pick up momentum until three years later when what was originally a slogan started being translated into development projects.

This, of course, does not mean that the idea was allowed to lie dormant for a period of three years. In those three years, more than
9,600 kilometres of access roads and over 1,000 small bridges were constructed on self-help basis. During the same period, more than 145 kilometres of pipeline, 50 dams and rock catchments, and 500 protected springs were installed through the same method. In addition, over 2,500 community facilities such as schools buildings, nursery centres, health centres and dispensaries were built. (Kenya Government: Second Development Plan, p.523).

The momentum gathered in the first three years began to be reflected in 1967. In that year alone, over 3,600 community facilities were completed, 119 piped water supplies were installed, and 410 wells and protected springs were built. In addition, 1,659 fish ponds were built and stocked. The same year saw the first attempt by the Government to break down the nature of the inputs that went into Harambee projects, an exercise that has continued over since. In that year, the peoples contribution to self-help projects in terms of labour, cash and material amounted to approximately K£ 2 million, quite a substantial sum. The Government's contribution was, however, quite small. It constituted only 4% of the total value of projects completed in 1967. But, despite the small, almost negligible, Government contribution, the latter took Harambee seriously enough to put aside K£ 444,000 for part-financing of self-help schemes during the period of the Second Development Plan, 1970-1974. (Ibid).

A year by year presentation of data on self-help inputs and outputs is perhaps not necessary at this stage. Suffice it to say that after 1967, the self-help movement continued to expand to the extent that the Government was obliged to take a serious view of the phenomenon as a planning problem. This was done in the second Development Plan. During this plan period, it was estimated that the peoples contribution in cash and kind amounted to K£ 8.5 million. The current plan estimates that the total value of self-help projects will be K£ 11.5 million between 1974 and 1978. Of this amount the Government expects to contribute K£ 815,000 (Third Development Plan, p.482). The rest is expected to be contributed by the people. Overall, it is now estimated
that Harambee activities constitute about 30% of all capital formation in the rural areas. (Voice of Kenya, January 1977).

It is ironic that despite the obvious expansion of Harambee activities, the movement is still surrounded by a great deal of mystery, and few people are able to say exactly what it represents.

11 Impressions

A listing of all the ideas associated with Harambee, confirms the view that there is still no consensus as to the social, political, economic and even theoretical meaning of Harambee. A random listing attributes the following meanings to Harambee.

1. A continuation of an old tradition under the umbrella of african socialism.
2. A social movement for rural development
3. A form of rural savings and capitalisation
4. A political slogan calling for a spirit of co-operation which has accidentally been translated into projects, with a peculiar method of financing.
5. A political favour to the president
6. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the President
7. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the peasants
8. A method of forced taxation
9. An irrational behaviour by the individual peasant contributors
10. A community phenomenon which comprehends the contradictory principles of voluntarism and coercion
11. A community reaction to "felt-needs"
12. A political mechanism of rural participation
13. An economic mechanism for utilising local resources.
The list, though not exhaustive, is perhaps enough to show the bewildering array of meanings that have been attributed to Harambee. In an attempt to put some order to the above list, we shall first discuss the official view of Harambee and secondly we shall discuss the views and research findings of academics who have analysed the phenomenon.

III The Official View

Administratively, Harambee activities come under the Department of Community Development, Ministry of Housing and Social Services. The administrative arrangement gives us a clue to the Government's view of Harambee. The Department of Community Development is supposed to work "essentially from the basic principle that sound, self-generating economic and social growth arises from participation of the people at all levels". The Community Development approach to social/economic development is supposed to be most effective "amongst the smallest collective groups." (Kenya Government - plan 1970-74, p.523). Thus, we can see that the Government views Harambee first and foremost as a form of community development whose basic function is to create participatory mechanisms especially for the smallest collective groups. This at least, is what can be inferred from the Second Development Plan.

Administrative and political participation is however, only a means to a goal. The goal is social/economic development and it takes capital investment to effect it. In this respect, the Government views Harambee as a means of promoting "domestic savings and investment". While the major burden of creating the savings would fall on the people, the Government would be a co-partner by making small capital injections as a means of "maintaining the momentum" of projects. (Ibid) Although the capital injections by the Government would increase in time, and one assumes in proportion to the total Harambee inputs, the central idea would still remain "to encourage the enormous demonstrated capacity of the people to develop .......through self-help".
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The Government also takes a social-psychological view to Harambee in addition to the political/economic views. Thus, as well as people getting tangible social/economic benefits as a result of development through self-help, intangible benefits are also supposed to accrue to the people. These would include "social confidence" as the people participate and become "more economically self-reliant". It is in this connection that immediately after independence i.e. during the First Development Plan, the emphasis was placed on the "stimulation of the self-help spirit". Put differently, the focus was on motivation per se, as opposed to planning". The focus had to be shifted to planning during the second Development Plan.

The shift in focus was facilitated by a number of factors which have also been noticed by academicians (see next section) in their attempts to explain Harambee. First, "lack of community development or technical personnel to give advice at both the planning and execution stages and a lack of area targets" meant that projects were allowed to drift. Secondly, many self-help groups had acquired "a degree of autonomy so great" that they had gone forward on projects "where it was doubtful that recurrent costs of operation could be ensured". Thirdly, "political and personal considerations... sometimes influenced the initiation and location of projects often to the detriment of good overall planning". (Kenya Plan 70-74 p.524). On the surface, these factors appear to be explanatory. However, without a concept of what type of development strategy Harambee is meant to be or has become, it is difficult to assess the explanatory value of the "deviations" which have necessitated some re-thinking on the part of the Government.

Some academicians have noticed the problem and consequently have tried to put forward what might be called "partial-explanations". They are "partial" because at this stage, they cannot be construed as propositions within an overall conception of Harambee. Rather, they seem to constitute a check-list of items to be expected by a student of Harambee.
At the broadest level, the main question seems to be why the harambee movement? If this question can be answered, then the "facts" of concern isolated by the Government might fall into place. As it is, the Government assumes that the factors are of equal importance. Furthermore, no attempt is made to try and explain the factors, in the context of social/political and economic development in Kenya. The Government further assumes that "the people" are a homogeneous category that is able and willing to participate. Perhaps the people are willing, but certainly they are not a homogeneous category. Their ability to participate cannot be taken for granted and neither can their reasons for doing so. It is these and other questions that academicians have addressed themselves to in an attempt to explain Harambee as a social, political and economic phenomenon.

IV The Academics' Interpretations

One should re-emphasise at the outset that so far, no overall explanation of Harambee has emerged. Rather, what we have are a number of themes — what we have called a check-list-usually found in studies of Harambee. The themes, as we have pointed out constitute only partial explanations. They are explanations because they go further than the Government in the conscious attempt to answer the question: Why Harambee? They are partial because, so far researchers have encountered problems in attempting an overall conceptual integration of the themes.

4.1. The Social Tradition Theme

This theme is common in what might be called the community development approach to the study of Harambee and it can be summarised as follows. Harambee is among others, a form of traditionally sanctioned informal co-operation i.e. a traditional mode of operation is being utilised to correct the orthodox community development approach whose major fault has been its failure to combine planning and implementation at local levels leading to a situation whereby rural changes have been
imposed on the peasants. Accordingly, Harambee is an indigenous participatory mechanism because it utilises traditional structures of co-operation like a clan, thereby alleviating the need for new participatory institutions and at the same time correcting the faults of textbook approaches to community development. (Askwith 1960, Holmquist 1970; and especially Mbithi 1972).

As can be seen, this theme comes very close to the official view. Although it might be unfair to criticise it without having expounded it in full, a few questions might be raised. First, it might be accurate to say that some aspects of Harambee have traditional legitimation, but it would be premature to conclude, like some politicians in Kenya have done, that Harambee and traditional self-help are the same phenomenon. This is an issue that can only be settled after analysing the socio-economic and political environment of both traditional and present societies. The same argument applies to the claim that Harambee has managed to correct some faults associated with the community development approach. The extent to which Harambee facilitates local planning and implementation is still tied up in the vagueness of the notion "local" especially when one tries to take into account the socio-economic composition of the "locals".

However, despite the fact that the two issues cannot be easily settled, one can argue that although traditional structures might have been incorporated into the Harambee movement, we cannot equate the latter with traditional communal self-help for at least two reasons and possibly more. First, except in the colonial period — and even this applied only to an aspect of self-help at that time viz. the Government supervised community development activities in Central Nyanza, North Nyanza, Machakos, Kitui and Kiambu — the State was not involved. Secondly, traditionally, contributions were made mainly in the form of collective labour, but the gains were largely individual. Thus there was little chance of an individual contributing and not getting any personal benefits, something which is likely to happen today. Thirdly, the community development approach, whether orthodox or modified, can itself be, and has been questioned especially because of its apolitical
approach to development (Krammer.) manifested by general tendency to assume away intra-community conflicts, and especially conflicts arising out of different class interests.

4.2. The Development Theme

This theme has a number of sub-themes. At the broadest level, it has been argued - that the one criterion that distinguishes Harambee from self-help activities in other countries, is its rural nature, i.e. Harambee is first and foremost a rural development strategy. (Bolnick 1974) A modified form of the argument is that Harambee is not an alternative to rural development in Kenya, but part of the whole strategy of rural development in the country. (Mbithi 1972) But what type of rural strategy is Harambee and on what social economic groups should it be predicated? The second question will be discussed in the next section.

One answer to the first question is that Harambee is a non-developmental type of strategy for a number of reasons. First, through its own dynamics, or through some phenomenon that has as yet not been discovered, the strategy encourages financing of consumer projects such as schools, community halls, health centres, etc as opposed to farm oriented productive projects whose surplus can then be ploughed back into the farm, thus increasing productivity. (Mbithi 1972) Second Harambee is non-developmental because it increases rural differentiation because money is raised from everybody, including the very poor, to finance projects which are inaccessible to the poor. This is particularly true of schools and institutes of technology which charge fees above the ability of the poor. Thus, the contributors are not necessarily the beneficiaries, and this leads to increased inequalities among the peasants: (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973; Anderson 1971) Third, depending on the nature and the site of the projects, Harambee can lead to a situation where the country becomes increasingly indebted to outsiders, both in terms of providing the initial capital and in
terms of providing the staff and the running expenses. Again, this is particularly true of the Institutes of science and technology. (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973. Godfrey 1973).

Another answer to the question raised above is that Harambee is development but it takes the form of pre-emptive development. Pre-emption has several characteristics. First it is characterised by the tendency to choose a project unlikely to be initiated by the Government but likely to be taken over (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973). Second groups try to pre-empt the field of contestants by convincing the Government that it is politically and economically unwise to deny support to a superior local efforts, and in the process any central plan that may exist is ignored or what amounts to the same position, self-help groups purposely go beyond the plan because they probably would not receive aid without pre-emptive local effort. (Holquist 1970). Third, there is a tendency to initiate projects before defining the goals and strategies, thus sharply contrasting community needs with the priorities defined by policy-makers. (Mbithi 1972) The political implications of the pre-emptive strategy will be discussed in the next section when we try to answer the second question raised above viz. on what social groups should Harambee be predicated?

As to whether the distinguishing criterion of Harambee is its rural nature or not one would argue that this cannot simply be asserted. The study of Eastern Nigeria by David and Audrey Smock (1972) and of Acholi District Uganda by Colin Leys (1967) suggest that rural-orientation of self-help activities in Africa, is a widespread phenomenon. The implication is that even if the rural orientation of Harambee were to be established, this alone would not be a distinguishing criterion.

The question of whether Harambee is developmental or not depends first on the available evidence. If the evidence shows that most of the projects represent the interest of particular socio-economic groups with the effect of increasing inequalities, then one would have to reassess the developmental claims made for Harambee.
With reference to the distinction made by Mbithi (see above) between farm-oriented projects and consumer-oriented projects (with the latter being non-developmental) one can argue that there is no dominant reason why rural development should be conceived solely in terms of directly, productive projects. Increased farm productivity might be desirable. However, the problem of rural development is also social and political in sector, rural development does not just happen. It takes place in a socio-economic environment which has its own tensions and ultimately dominant interests. Mbithi's distinction would be relevant, however if it were possible to show that consumer projects, by their very nature lead to the exploitation of some groups by others, something which it can be argued was nearly impossible in traditional farm and individual-oriented self-help.

The question of external indebtedness, which is raised by some students of Harambee, should be taken seriously, especially when one takes into account political-economic structures which seem to encourage the indebtedness.

Finally, whether and why harambee is a form of pre-emptive strategy is basically a political issue that calls for an examination of the nature of resource distribution in the country, with a view to finding out why the peasants would resort to this type of strategy. One would however, have to ascertain that the strategy should be predicated on the peasantry as a whole as opposed to stratum of the peasantry, or any other socio-economic group.

4.3 The Political Theme

Like the development theme, the political theme has several strands which can be looked at separately. First, we shall deal with the issue raised above, viz. whose development strategy is Harambee.
One answer which is readily derivable from those who have analysed Harambee from the point of view of community development is that Harambee is basically a peasant strategy for rural development. Thus, the peasants, by deciding to do something about their "felt needs" (Goyal 1974) are in fact making a political statement. They are in effect expressing dissatisfaction with the ways development resources are being allocated at the centre, and thereby questioning the wisdom and the priorities of the central planning mechanisms. (Mbithi and Resmusson 1974; Colebatch 1973)

Seen from this point of view, Harambee assumes aspects of social protests, though some people would argue that protest, in this case would manifest itself through withdrawal rather than through active participation, thereby legitimising the very institutions that the protest is aimed against. (Migot-Adholla, 1977)

A variation of the argument above is that Harambee is basically a peasant strategy, but the peasantry is clever enough to know that there is no reason why 'perceived need will correlate with action". (Holquist 1972) Thus, in order to correlate perceived needs with action, the peasantry co-opts both local and national elites as the main sponsors in exchange for political support. (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973; Anderson 1973; Holquist 1972.)

Still at the community level, it has been argued that politically Harambee represents a symbolic mechanism for identifying with national development. (Mbithi 1972) In this sense Harambee is a "reaction" kind of behaviour as opposed to initiative-oriented behaviour.

Whether this can be translated into power relations is not clear. Politically, symbols can perform an integrative function and are nearly always created by the ruling elites whenever it serves their interests. Mbithi is not clear on this point as he does not examine the direction of the symbol. However, if we accept the interpretation that Harambee is a result of manipulation of symbols, from the top, then this might
be consistent with the nature of political symbolism.

Perhaps the most popular political interpretation of Harambee is that it is an arena for elite competition, both at the local and the National levels. From the community perspective, it is argued that one characteristic of the Kenyan political system at the national level is that it has gradually become depoliticised, thereby increasingly relying on the legitimating role of the President. The result is that "political process devolved from national centre to the periphery and harambee activity has become an important arena within which political leadership at the local level is determined. (Colebatch 1973; Mutiso & Godfrey 1973 p.1) Thus Harambee has become a vehicle for personal ambitions. (Holmquist 1973)

An extension of the same argument is that the elites are not simply manipulating the peasants. The peasants are aware of what is taking place and they in turn make use of Harambee as a means of forcing accountability/politicians. Furthermore it is not simply aspiring political leaders competing with each other. There are the additional elements of local elites competing with national elites (Oyugi 1974) and the political elites competing with administrative elites. (Nyangira 1970; Wallis 1973) All the affected elites in this situation are aiming at legitimising their roles if not personal positions and this is how competition develops.

The elite competition can easily develop into conflict and attempt to control each other. Thus the administrative elites, citing the need to stay "within the plan" or "security reasons" would, for example, refuse the political elites the licenses to hold Harambee meetings and the politicians would react by sending extra-large donations through local clients. Thus, despite local initiative, the fate of a project can end up by being resolved at the centre (Colebatch 1973) especially when a project needs a sponsor like an M.P. who has access to national resources. In this case the competition and control are by proxy.
As can be seen, the extended argument is really that it does not matter "whose" strategy Harambee is. Different strata in the political system make use of it depending on their immediate and particular interests.

The various political interpretations outlined above are a little confusing because it is not clear what the main argument is. If for example, we accept that Harambee is a peasant strategy, how then do the elites feature so prominently in some projects? One can go even further and pose the question: what does it mean to say that Harambee is a peasant strategy? Does it mean that the peasants are always the main beneficiaries in social-economic terms, or does it mean that regardless of who the eventual beneficiaries are, the peasants take the initiative both in planning and in implementation and then co-opt the elites as some writers' argue?

One can argue and there is some evidence to show that at least at the micro level the answer as to whether Harambee is a peasant or an elite strategy is not either or. It would depend on many factors which would include the nature and degree of political competition and also the size of a particular project. The more severe the political competition and the bigger the project, the more likelihood that both local and national elites will try to control the project and make it appear as their own.

But even if one were able to show that contrary to popular opinions Harambee is really a grass-roots phenomenon, the question still remains: why is it that even elites who do not appear to have anything to gain-politically or otherwise - from a particular project appear to be willing to send large donations and have their donations publicly announced in areas hundreds of miles from their own home area? This shifts the discussion from the local level to the national level.
In respect to the question raised above one would have to disagree with the argument (Mutiso & Godfrey, 1973) that leadership battles in Kenya are fought at the local level which would partly explain the donations from outside the community. In its place one could substitute the argument that the issue is not simply a question of personal power and leadership. Rather we have to look too at the ideological character of Harambee. In other words, the idea of development through patronage serves the economic and political interests of a particular stratum in the political system at the same time as it serves individual interest. This means that the dominant political interpretation of Harambee viz. clientelism should be further analysed to draw out the full implications and to see whether it is compatible with other modes of analysis.

Clientelism has been applied to Harambee sometimes without pausing to draw out its full implications. It is a handy concept to apply to Harambee especially because it seems to explain some of the problems which have bothered researchers who have analysed the Harambee phenomenon. For example, it might explain the role of traditional and ethnic structures in facilitating self-help.

However, if we should accept that Harambee operates on a patron-client basis, then we must also entertain the possibility that we are looking at a mode of exchange which is unequal by its very nature. An assumption that is often unquestioned in applying the concept of clientelism to Harambee is that the patron-client relation operates on a basis of reciprocity. Reciprocity, however, does not mean equality. It has been argued, for example, that an "imbalance in reciprocity" is inherent in patron-client relations. The patron is in a position to supply unilaterally goods and services which the client needs for survival and well-being. (Blau 1964) Furthermore, like an insurance company, the patron can afford to get rid of one or even a few clients without too much loss. The client is not in such a position.
Even without resulting to a detailed theoretical analysis, it is evident that clientelism is based on asymmetrical linkage between individuals of unequal wealth and power (Maquet, 1966). The asymmetry is crucial as any significant shift of resources moves the relationship toward greater equality of status and the transformation of clientelism into bargaining relationships among equals. Clientelism is thus a relation of domination perpetuating the inequalities between patrons and clients. Furthermore, it is conservative and status-quo oriented. This serves the interests of the patron elites. However, to maintain loyalty of clients, some resources and benefits must be distributed. (Lemarch and Legg, 1972; also Scott 1972)

One of the conclusions arrived at from theoretical analyses similar to the ones just outlined is that clientelism is a form of exchange which is characteristic of situations of underdevelopment. (Cotler, 1972) In terms of stratification, clientelism creates a form of vertical stratification, either along ethnic lines or along regional lines. This it can be argued serves an ideological/political purpose through its blurring of any class divisions that might be developing. (de Kadt, 1970 and Salvati, 1972)

The mystifying weight of clientelism is such that even reputable social scientists have been tempted to always juxtapose it with any other form of stratification and particular stratification along class lines (Graziano 1973). Sometimes the argument is quite explicit to the effect that clientelism is incompatible with class formation. (Johnson, 1973). Still, others, have argued that a patron-client relationship is developmental, at least in the political sense as it offers a stable reciprocal relationship. (Powell 1970) Furthermore, it is integrative politically, socially and economically since the middle men serve the integrative function. (Weingrod: 1968: Smith 1960)

The point here is that depending on ones views about development, clientelism can be viewed either as developmental or non-developmental.
Thus, if one's conception of development is premised on stable exchange relations, regardless of the inherent inequalities and the political functions of such an exchange, then the conclusion that clientelism is developmental is at least consistent.

The few comments above are perhaps enough to show that it is not enough to simply mention that Harambee is based on patron-client relations, without attempting to draw out the implications of such relations, and the complexities of the very concept of clientelism. At the very least, one must be clear as to what is being exchanged for what, the political implications of the exchange, and the equity implications of a system based on a series of patron-client exchanges.

4.4. The Theoretical Theme.

There is very little deliberate theorising on Harambee, and the little there is centres on the question: why do the peasants contribute to Harambee projects? Is it really due to felt needs? More significantly, are individuals, being rational when they contribute?

One of the most popular arguments is that Harambee contributions are not entirely voluntary, though it is impossible to estimate the extent of coercion. For example, in Central Province, during the construction of Kiambu Institute of Science and Technology, receipts of contributions to the institute had to be produced before transacton of any official business like paying schools fees, purchase of licence etc. At the Coast workers and teachers unions agreed to a 25% deduction from the members salaries (Mutiso and Godfrey 1973) Even for very small projects, it has been noticed that Chiefs tend to be authoritarian in their demand for contributions. (Wallis 1973, Colebatch 1973 - Nyangira 1970 Ng'ethe (on going).

A second argument is that though there might be elements of coercion, Harambee contributions are by and large voluntary. They
are voluntary because their analysis cannot be predicated on individuals. For example, citing evidence from the organization of groups movements (Bittner 1963) Mbithi (1973) argues that group movements like Harambee have dynamics of their own which manifests itself through hostility to individualism. Thus individuals have to conform as a result of articulated and sometimes unarticulated group pressure.

A somewhat similar argument is that though people contribute as a result of what appears to be group pressure, the pressure is really instigated by bearers of "new ideas" like national leadership and local leaders. (Bolnick 1974) Thus the contributions are neither a result of community "felt-needs", nor pressure by the entire community, since the latter is never a homogeneous entity.

Whether one accepts the second argument and its variation as being sufficient, or not, it seems that there is a need to be clear first on the dynamics of Harambee contributions and secondly (and perhaps more important) on the issue of coercion. The authors experience is that the issue of coercion is partly a red herring unless one looks at Harambee from a much broader perspective in which case the issue might assume some significance. Still, one has to answer the question. Why do people contribute for projects which fall under the theoretical category of collective consumption goods.

According to the free rider "hypothesis" rational individuals will not voluntarily support a collective consumption service when exclusion from use of the good as a penalty for failure to contribute to the cost of the project is technically impossible (as with national defence) or impracticable (as with a road). In this circumstance (non-excludability) one's benefit is largely independent of ones contribution. Thus each individual has a choice of donating or not donating with approximately the same benefits. In wither case "rationality" dictates that one does not contribute. (Bolnick 1972 and 1974)
It is in recognition of the free rider problem that some students of Harambee have argued that peasants make contributions as a result of a number of factors which include inter alia, social influence, and the fact that the peasant community might be so small that one contribution is significant relative to the whole and would therefore be noticed and missed. This argument however is limited to the community and sociological levels. Furthermore, as we have pointed out it applies when the rationality of contributions for collective consumption goods is under question. If we now take contributions for all types of "goods", shift the level of analysis from the community to the national level, and re-interpret the contributions then the question becomes: Is it probable that the idea of Harambee has, politically, acquired ideological weight, that is, something that one feels one must subscribe to and if so, what social political and economic dynamics have led to the situation.

The questions raised so far might appear somewhat incoherent and indeed they are. The reasons are obvious. The questions suggest themselves, not from an integrated approach to the phenomenon of Harambee, but from a disparate number of approaches which include bureaucratic interpretations, system level interpretations, community level interpretation, sociological interpretations, political interpretations, anthropological interpretations, economic interpretations etc.

For our present purposes, however, the main question is: Is Harambee a participatory mechanism, and if so, to what extent? This question, in a sense, underlies most of the other unresolved major issues such as the nature and extent of coercion in Harambee and the ideological/political nature of Harambee. We should note however, that even liberal development thinking has come around to the view that meaningful development must be predicated on maximum participation. The implication is obvious. One cannot evaluate participation, without at the same time evaluating development and vice-versa. It is characteristic of the liberal
development ideology however, that it usually refers to "Peoples" participation without an indication as to who "the people" are in terms of their socio-economic characteristics. It is, therefore, an ideology that tends to relegate possible class conflicts or even collaboration to the periphery of the debate unless circumstances were such that the issue could not possibly be ignored. The community development approach to Harambee is utterly compatible with this ideology.

But to go back to our main question, we can see that according to the official view Harambee is both participatory and developmental, given a number of shortcomings. The main ones are inadequate planning, and politically motivated projects. One suspects that the official conclusion is based on the logic that expansion equals participation and development. To a certain extent the logic is, of course, accurate. However, is it probable that the expansion has resulted from particular class relations in which case the participatory and development nature of Harambee needs to be re-evaluated in this context. The same question can also be raised with reference to the non-official approaches to Harambee? Why the expansion? Is it due to Harambee's peculiar African roots? Is it due to political reasons and in particular the patron-client nature of Harambee? Is it because people are basically irrational and therefore continue to contribute or is it because Harambee is obviously developmental?

It is quite evident that it is not always possible to obtain consistent answers to the questions that have so far been raised. Part of the problem may now argue lies in the very nature of the Harambee phenomenon itself, particularly its internal contradictions. The major part of the problem, however, lies in our inadequate theoretical grasp of the phenomenon, as we have already mentioned. A possible approach and one that so far has had few adherents is a class-based conception of Harambee. More about this in a moment.
The most important internal contradiction of the Harambee concept seems to be that it is an ideology that embraces the seemingly contradictory principles of entrepreneurial individualism and collective efforts. In other words, at the ideological level, Harambee is a collective ideology, but the gains are sometimes individual. It follows that a social group that stands to gain economically or politically, directly or indirectly from the movement, would become the driving force behind the movement. The contradictory nature of Harambee is such that we would expect the gains to be a mixture of individual and class related gains.

One of the few writers to attempt a class-based analysis of the Harambee movement (Holquist, 1975) rightly criticizes other writers on Harambee for their failure to offer full explanations of the phenomenon. He takes issue with the government, which "would probably credit itself with the rational foresight to announce such a policy because an explanation based on such a view of the process of governing" wrongly assumes a high degree of government leverage through ideas on a process based on peasant initiative. Furthermore, the explanation would beg the question 'why' since it naively assumes that abstract rationality determines policy choice ... regardless of the political interests of people making the policy". He also criticizes his earlier attempts to explain Harambee in terms of "intense community organization and competition ... oriented to extracting resources from governmental and/or various private agencies", at a crucial time after independence. His reason for criticizing himself is that community culture, social organization, and local economies did not radically change, at independence – but ruling structures beyond the community level did. Therefore, changes removed from the village level set off the very real dynamics of the movement.

These changes, however, were largely political in nature, and since political structures ultimately reflects class relations, and the fortunes of competitive segments of each class, then a full explanation
of Harambee phenomenon would have to take into account class relations. Fair enough, with only one serious flaw in the argument as far as the government's explanation is concerned. It cannot be assumed that the process at least in Kenya was originally based on peasant initiative, and even if it were to be so assumed one must try and pinpoint which segment of the peasantry took the initiative. Holmquist, does try to pinpoint this segment of the peasantry, but then this does not in any way make up for his initial assumption. How then would a class based analysis of Harambee look like? We will start by outlining Holmquist's suggested framework.

V Towards a Class-Based Hypothesis

Holmquist's major premise is that the "real movers" of self-help in Kenya at independence and to the present day are a segment of a particular class - namely the rural petty bourgeoisie. His thesis is that

"the character and rates of self-help in Kenya - ultimately depend upon the balance of power in the rural areas, and the social base of regimes of the centre, between two segments of the petty bourgeoisie - a rural segment (wealthy peasants, African trading and commercial elements, and local immobile civil servants and a bureaucratic segment that was transferable through the country and was largely recruited on a basis of educational attainment"

(Holmquist. 1975 p.5)

How then do these fractions of the petty-bourgeois influence the rates and character of self-help? The main argument here is that the locally based rural wing of the petty bourgeois generally 'needed' self-help to reserve and advance their political and economic positions, while the bureaucratic segment did not need it, and in fact, tended to see it as a threat. An elaborated form of the argument runs something like this:

Independence time in Kenya was the culmination a protracted struggle waged by an alliance between rural petty bourgeoisie and the
peasantry. The success of the struggle meant loss of power by the central government bureaucracy, vis-a-vis the alliance. This loss of power was evidenced in extreme form by the radical decentralization embodied in the Majimbo constitution. The result was that the rural petty bourgeoisie were now the patrons and brokers of rural politics. Therefore, the bureaucracy and the party would have to deal with this petty bourgeoisie in most relations with the peasant majority.

The strategy of self-help, was consequently, not accidental but an accurate reflection of the structure of power in the countryside and the base of support at the centre. The strategy in effect acknowledged that the rural petty bourgeoisie was best suited to mobilize the peasantry to help themselves in lieu of powerful and resource-rich bureaucracies. Therefore, the strategy was not a "policy by default" but an inevitable outcome of the structure of power at that time, not to mention that it would facilitate development "on the cheap".

The result was intense community competition and organization. Competition because the resources were scarce and organization because the nature of desired projects was such that they were public rather than private family farm goods, thus requiring organization. In the process, the communities searched for patrons and offered themselves as clients. The petty bourgeoisie became willing patrons, but why?

The reason was that the rural petty bourgeoisie was competing for scarce political roles, which could in turn be put to ones economic and prestige advantages. In fact it might even be said that the rural petty bourgeoisie "needed" self-help since the bureaucracy reserved most of the functions of programmatic policy - making for itself." Assistance for self-help was, therefore, one of the most important arenas within which the petty-bourgeoisie could play a visible and useful role. The petty bourgeoisie could afford to play the role of patrons since it did not threaten their economic and political clout. This was because there was "a pervasive incentive to create rather than diminish inequality". In other words, a patron who was economically
representative of the peasantry was all but useless and could not last long. In addition to all this, the petty bourgeois became willing local patrons because they had a personal interest in local amenity development i.e. far more interest than their centrally recruited class counterparts in the bureaucracy. How did the latter fraction react?

The bureaucratic fraction reacted by arguing that self-help was "out of control" planning structures. Besides, self-help investment was not directly productive, a complaint that had an element of truth. The solution, therefore, was to channel self-help through planning structures. In terms of power relations, this would erode the peasant initiative and augment the power of the bureaucratic petty-bourgeois class fraction. "The result of the power struggle between the two factions" of the same class was a "half-way style" of self-help which neither controlled by the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie nor by the peasantry/rural petty bourgeois alliance.

The "half-way style" was also convenient for the rural petty-bourgeoisie because it went far enough to need their assistance without going far enough to render their brokerage function unnecessary. Thus both bureaucrats and local notables. The bureaucratic fraction made inroads but could not fully win because the rural petty-bourgeoisie "remains a key prop of the regime".

It can readily be seen that the framework which we have just outlined raises many questions which cannot be resolved without going into a detailed analysis of the transition to independence in Kenya, something which is beyond the scope of this paper. For example, while it might be accurate to say that independence was "the culmination of a protracted struggle by an alliance between rural petty bourgeois and the peasantry", it is by no means certain that what occurred after that is accurately reflected by Holmquist.
But rather than engage in a full-scale criticism of Holmquist, it might be more fruitful to modify and elaborate his hypothesis. This way, the areas of agreement and disagreement will become evident.

VI A Modified Hypothesis

In the early and mid-sixties, Harambee can be seen as having represented the dominant petty bourgeois ideology of that time. The ideology was also expressed in other documents such as the Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism. In political terms, the ideology of self-reliance served the purpose of maintaining the link between two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie, viz. the urban based ruling fraction and the country-based fraction which had direct links with the peasantry, and which was in an alliance with the peasantry. It was true, and to a large extent still, is that the ruling fraction needed the petty - bourgeois/peasant alliance.

It is not unreasonable to assume in this context, that there were some doubts about the movement by the bureaucratic fraction of the petty bourgeoisie, though the reasons are not all that clear. In formal language, this resistance was couched in the language of improper project planning etc. However, it is doubtful that the resistance could be interpreted solely in terms of power struggle between the bureaucratic fraction and the rural-based fraction of the petty bourgeoisie. An additional hypothesis is that the resistance reflected the unpredictability of a new dependent economy, with the bureaucracy seeing itself as the guardian of the economy. The urban-based political fraction saw this and therefore, concurred with the bureaucratic fraction. The rural-based petty bourgeoisie, we agree "needed" the movement and so did the ruling fraction. It was, therefore, maintained albeit largely at an ideological level, through small capital injections squeezed from the bureaucracy by the ruling petty bourgeoisie. This was the period when the idea was being sold to the people.
Around the time of the second election (1969) and the end at the first Development Plan, (1970) the political and in general the control significance of Harambee had started to be obvious. We believe that the Holmquist framework applies largely to this period. While the first plan discusses self-help in technocratic language such as the effect of unplanned projects on the growth rate and welfare (325), the second plan is downright political, albeit within the framework of planning. It is this Plan that states that "projects must be built with the full knowledge and acquiescence of all relevant authorities particularly the District Development Committee". It is also the same Plan that identifies some of the problems related to the projects as the great degree of autonomy acquired by many self-help groups and the political and personal considerations influencing the initiation and location of projects. (p.524). It is not difficult to detect the elements of the power struggle between the two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie that Holmquist refers to.

Soon after the second elections and the end of the First Plan, a number of new developments took place which could be regarded as significant. After nearly a decade of constructing educational facilities aimed at providing general education, Harambee now enters another phase in the early seventies where the emphasis is on "directly productive education." This phase is characterised by the large Institutes of Science and Technology. True this phase partly reflects the general economic situation in the whole country where secondary school leavers without technical and, therefore, "immediately productive education." can no longer find employment. However, it is also possible to argue that this new phase is related to another development viz. the emergence of a group which is closer to a bourgeoisie than to the petty bourgeoisie. In strictly local terms, this group is politically and economically powerful. One of its interests and the interests of international capital such as World Bank is a cadre of technically qualified manpower which can service the industries in the lower and middle echelons and also service
some sectors of the public service. With specific reference to Harambee as a general phenomenon, this group could be described as follows:

First, unlike any ordinary member of the rural-based petty bourgeoisie, this group has access to international capital either directly through personal and corporate connections or indirectly through directorships of foreign owned companies and share-holding of the same companies. Through the same mechanisms, it also has more access to local capital than a member of the rural based petty-bourgeoisie. Part of this local capital is raised from minority groups which are wealthy but politically inactive. These groups, thereby participate by proxy. "We believe that it is this group which Mbithi and Rusmusson (1977 p. 94,) refer to as "conspicuous donors". This group will tend to take part in large and medium sized projects that require a great deal of capital such as the Institutes of technology, large secondary schools, technical high schools, and of late, water projects. Churches are another favourite type of project. We believe there is a special significance in the choice of churches in particular. This latter type of project might be an attempt to by-pass the structural barrier between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry by appealing directly to the non-material side of the peasantry."

Because of its tendency to be attracted to large projects demanding a lot of capital, there is potential conflict between this group and the peasant/rural-petty bourgeoisie alliance. This tendency as Mbithi and Rusmusson have noted, (1977 p. 90) might and does attract the grassroots away from immediate and local needs, despite the fact that "the peasantry end up being the largest contributor even to the Institutes of Technology." (Mbithi et al. 1977 p. 94).

Secondly the bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its private accumulation. It has other avenues of accumulation. It's industrial and commercial roots seem to be relatively secure and sufficiently catered for by the general economic structure. A school, a Village polytechnic, a feeder road, a health centre, a cattle-dip, a church, a nursery school, a water project, a women group, these are some of the
most common projects in the rural areas. Only in very very indirect ways would they facilitate accumulation by the bourgeoisie. True, most members of the bourgeoisie, have directly productive and accumulating ventures in the rural areas, but they are likely to have access to water, feeder roads, electricity etc. long before the initiation and completion of a Harambee project aimed at bringing these facilities to the peasantry and its local patrons.

Thirdly, this class participates in Harambee way beyond its immediate and personal political requirements. It is understandable that a wealthy politician, or even an aspiring businessman should pay special attention to his own immediate environment, and most usually do. However, once he's more or less secure or even before he is, the individual will start participating outside his immediate political environment, which suggests that there is more to bourgeois participation than simply the desire to get political rewards.

Why then would the bourgeoisie participate in Harambee? Personal political considerations are obviously a factor but one tends to believe that this is not all. First, the bourgeoisie has more membership than the available political posts. All the more why the competition should be severe, it might be retorted. True, however, the limits to open political competition are well known in Kenya. These include ethnicity, regionalism, personalities etc. Second, if the observation that the bourgeoisie tends to participate beyond its personal political requirements is anywhere near being correct, then this also requires an explanation. So does the observation that the bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its immediate personal accumulation. A number of possible hypotheses can be put forward.

First, there are the requirements of capital to be taken into account. These include technical requirements such as the products of some of the Institutes of technology and more important political requirements such as political stability. As Holmquist points out the
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backbone of the regime in Kenya is the peasantry and the rural-based petty bourgeoisie. In order therefore, to maintain political stability, it is important to maintain constant developmental and political dialogue between the bourgeoisie at the centre and the rural-petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. Harambee performs this function well. The dialogue is not only maintained, but stability is further assured by shifting the locus of demands from the centre to isolated localities. (Bienen 74) Politically, concerted and centralized demands are potentially destabilizing. While international capital demands political stability, the bourgeoisie, for obvious reasons also wants political stability.

Secondly, the bourgeoisie would participate in Harambee out of symbolic reasons and the need to propagate the ideology. This is done through cash contributions and also through the occasional attempt to articulate the ideology at well publicized and well-covered public meetings. The often noticed fact that "people" are still the backbone to Harambee (Mbithi et.al., 1977) is a testimony to the ideological role of the bourgeoisie. This role represents potential conflict between his class and the technocratically-minded elements of the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie. While the bourgeoisie attempt to by-pass the rural petit bourgeoisie and directly urges the peasantry to construct more Harambee projects, some members of the bureaucracy still maintain that self-help in Kenya is still unwieldy, though this cannot be interpreted as active resistance by the whole of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie.

Thirdly the bourgeoisie also participates out of its own need to express solidarity. This may take the form of the well known inter-tribal rallies. Even more important and a bit removed from the public limelight, the bourgeoisie maintains class solidarity through selectively approaching members of the same class for contributions as anonymous "friends". Class solidarity is also maintained through
the inverted mechanism of competing to see who will raise more on particular occasions, both from the peasants but more important from “friends”. What is the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie in the context of Harambee? First the characteristics of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Holmquist describes the functions of the rural based petty bourgeoisie as if they were all politicians competing for political posts. They, of course are not all politicians, and like the Bourgeoisie, not all are interested in elected positions. It is accurate, however, to argue that the rural based petty bourgeoisie, play an important role in sustaining Harambee at the grassroots level. They do not necessarily need to provide all the funds, but they provide ideas, plus organisational skills and leadership. They play a particular important post in initiating projects (Mbithi et.al p. 75). They might then withdraw into the background, or in some cases become committee members. Where communication with the centre might be needed, they might play this role, as members of the project. They are also entrusted with the funds. (A common comment during the authors recent field survey of Harambee projects in a District near Nairobi was that "you cannot entrust the money to a poor person. And besides" a leader is expected to make sacrifices." So he much have the means to do so.)

Unlike the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie has little access to international capital unless it works through the bureaucracy to attract some funds from voluntary organisations. However, this class does have access to government matching funds, or material and it is in this respect that the petty-bourgeoisie makes itself useful to the peasantry. It seems incorrect to argue that the rural-based petty-bourgeoisie is in conflict with its counterpart in the bureaucracy. It needs the bureaucracy in order to attract Government funds and the limited external sources available. The bureaucratic fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie at least the rural-based fraction needs the petty-bourgeois co-operation otherwise it might fail to
demonstrate tangible development orientation, something which is becoming increasingly relevant in terms of career prospect. Thus, although the locally based petit bourgeois technocrat might question some aspects of a project, this now seems to be a routine requirement. Few, if any projects have been turned down at the registration stage, where presumably, all the technical questions are supposed to be answered. At the same time, few if any projects surveyed by the author, are initially planned in terms of proper cost estimate, time schedule, etc. The bureaucracy could always stop them on technical grounds, if it so wished.

A second characteristic of this class and also an explanation why it willingly participates, is that it needs Harambee to facilitate personal accumulation. Indeed, it might be argued that it needs general rural development to facilitate accumulation. This, perhaps more than the individual willingness to serve as patrons to the peasants, brings it close to being a coherent class. Rural areas are characterised by remarkably stable social/economic relationships, and it is possible to argue that any strata that is already better off is likely to remain so or even become much better off vi-a-via the ordinary peasant, with the general improvement in rural welfare and rural social-amenities.

However, one should caution that the relationship between Harambee and petty-bourgeois personal accumulation is difficult to establish. But, it can be argued that a cattle-dip is of interest to those who have a piece of land on which to keep cows. A water project in some cases excludes a vast majority which cannot make the initial deposit, not to mention that such a project would usually be justified, in terms of improving the farming. (In addition of course to "saving" the women). A nursery school is a luxury to an ordinary peasant, but a necessity to a member of the "progressive" peasant and the rural petty bourgeoisie. But since it is rather difficult to establish the relationship between Harambee and personal petty-bourgeois accumulation,
we could perhaps agree with Holquist, that this class has personal interests in most of projects. We might add that these interests are likely to be similar across individuals. In other words, though there have been cases of a member of the petty-bourgeoisie accumulating at the expense of the peasantry and other members of the petty bourgeoisie, the more common thing is for this class to push for projects which in the long run would facilitate increased accumulation through improvement of rural "general welfare".  

Finally the rural petty-bourgeoisie could handle by far the majority of the rural projects without the aid of the national bourgeoisie. Except for a few conspicuous projects, the majority of rural projects are small, and the survival in objective terms of the movement is not now dependent on large projects. Indeed it could be argued that there is potential conflict between the national bourgeoisie and the local petty bourgeoisie, especially where the local petty bourgeoisie gets the feeling that is is being "overwhelmed" and not getting the chance to play the brokerage role. It then argues that Harambee is being politicized. The normal modus operandi however, is for the two classes to cooperate unless there are overwhelming personal differences.

While the peasant - rural petty - bourgeoisie "alliance" is an important historical phenomenon that reflects itself in the Harambee phenomenon, it should not be assumed that the participatory pattern of the two groups always coincide. It is true that the wealthy strata of the peasantry has little to distinguish it from the rural petty-bourgeois. One expects, therefore, and one usually, finds that both groups are interested in similar types of projects. These projects in turn reflect a higher level of accumulation and might facilitate an even higher level of accumulation. Two of the most controversial but nevertheless desired projects are water projects and electrification projects. The former type of project seems to have taken root, despite the fact the even a small water project is an expensive undertaking. Electrification projects have yet to be fully accepted.
As one respondent put it "I can always use water for cows but electricity is really for those with stone houses. We need the houses first". In this particular case, a councillor with a stone house and refrigerator waiting inside was pushing for a Harambee electrification project. The local farmers wanted to complete a water project first.

The above incidence is illustrative of a division in the peasant petty-bourgeois alliance which has sometimes not been given enough attention. After the construction of secondary schools, primary schools, Health Centres, Village Polytechnics etc, then what? The rural petty-bourgeois pushes for projects that are sometimes not fully understood such projects would include nursery schools and the already quoted electrification projects. These projects are in the books, but one senses that the peasant support for them is at best half-hearted.

The peasant reaction to what it sees as an obvious misplacement of priorities is difficult to pinpoint. However, one might venture the hypothesis that the proliferation of what appears on paper as "Womens projects" is part of the reaction. The womens projects are an interesting phenomenon and they constitute the largest group of one-type projects. These projects in turn can be divided into two major categories. Those which attract national attention, are under the leadership of the rural petty-bourgeois and usually have a bourgeois patron. Their raison-d'etre, is to raise enough capital to purchase land (normally big ranches or coffee estates).

The other, and more numerous category consists of small groups, of about 30 or so members, contributing about 5/= each to begin with. This is usually raised to between 2/= and 5/= a week depending on the ability of members to contribute. Most of the members would be proletariat in background. They do not need a patron except the help of a Community Development Assistant to get the registered. They earn the money by cultivating on other peoples shambas and whatever they can save, they pool together. After a month, all the money is handed over to a member. She can do what she wants with it. Alternatively the
group has made a prior decision to buy cups, plates, etc, for each
member until all the members have acquired these domestic items. They
do this for the first two years or so then they start saving to buy a
plot of land on which they can construct a shop or more often they start
buying land shares in cooperatively acquired land. Asked what their
long range plans were, nearly all the groups mentioned acquisition of
land as the long range objective, but their immediate objective is to
cater for very immediate needs.

It is difficult at this stage to argue conclusively about
what the womens organisations represent. However it can be said with
confidence that most of the organisations are closer to the traditional
concept of self-help than most of the other activities which attract
attention. The effort is collective, but the gains are individual.
This seems to explain the continued participation by this segment of
the peasantry, albeit in a new form, after its initial disillusionment
with collective efforts that did not yield anything personal and which
in some cases left them excluded from making use of the final product.
Their participation in self-help seems to be based on the fundamental
belief that they can benefit personally from the collective effort and
in addition they have more chances of attracting "government attention"
when they work together as a group.

Under a normal self-help project such as a school, "government
attention" would mean attention from the bureaucratic fraction of the
petty bourgeoisie. Such attention could take the form of financial
aid or eventually take over of such a project. This of course, is
where the brokerage role of the rural petty bourgeoisie would come in.
But where would it come in under the women's organisational form?
This poses a dilemma both to the would be patrons and their counterpart
in the bureaucracy.

The resolution is usually dictated by the logic of the situation
and as would be expected it is not without its paradoxical side.
The women's groups are encouraged to organise themselves. Sometimes they are provided with organisational skills such as book-keeping by the local Community Development Assistant and sometimes given exhortation by the would-be-patron who might even manage to get them a plot from the local authority. In most cases, however, the assistance is limited to exhortation, ideas and organisational skills. It would perhaps be unrealistic to expect much else. In this situation, the complexities of the situation are added to by the fact that the clients and the would-be patrons might be competing for the same resources, not for public use, but for individual benefit.

The complexities of Harambee participatory patterns have been adequately captured albeit in different frameworks by such authors as Mbithi and Rasmusson (1977) just to mention the most recent work on the subject. It is perhaps, therefore, not necessary to speculate any further along the lines sketched so far. It remains however, to make a few comments on a group whose behaviour has so far not been subjected to any detailed analysis and which, one must confess, one knows little about, not having carried out any field work in the urban areas. For the present purposes, we shall simply refer to this group as the urban-based salariat. We shall define it as a group of salary earners who have no other source of income.

Unlike the peasantry and the rural based petit bourgeois, the salariat is removed from actual Harambee projects just enough not to benefit directly or personally from the projects. Why then would this group participate as it does? It has been suggested by colleagues that this group is potentially the most hostile to the idea of self-help. It participates therefore out of pressure from friends and clansmen, and the need to defend its status. In addition, it has also been suggested that this group grudgingly participates when and if its families in the rural areas stand to gain and in this sense, it invests in future goodwill. The participatory behaviour of this group is so little known that not much else can be said at this point.
VII. In Lieu Conclusion

The challenge to the students of Harambee is to develop a method of looking at the phenomenon which would allow one to integrate economic, political, and social aspects - some of which have been described in the first part of the paper.

A class-based analysis of Harambee is a possible and desirable alternative. Unfortunately, the obstacles to such a class oriented analysis are formidable. The notes in the second part of the paper indicate that a number of conditions have to be fulfilled before such an analysis is possible. First, we have to know the structure of classes in the whole country, something which we can only guess at the moment. Second, we need to know the structure of classes in the countryside and how this is related to the development of classes in the whole country. Then it would be possible to assess the class-basis of Harambee taking into account its historical evolution, its changing phases and functions and how and when each class has been able to utilize the movement. Until then, we can only speculate on the social-economic foundations of Harambee. By the same token, Harambee's participatory implications will remain part of the bigger problem.
FOOTNOTES


2. See Peter Flynn "Class, Clientelism and Coercion" Comparative politics XII (2) July 1974 where he draws out the political implications of class and clientelists modes of stratification.

3. Needless to say that the ideology of technical education did not serve its intended function as a substitute for more basic economic reforms. In any case, the Institutes of Technology and the village Polytechnics have, up to now, continued to play a secondary role to older and more established schools such as the Nairobi and Mombasa Polytechnics. (I am indebted to Kabiru Kinyanjui of IDS for this point).

4. It should be re-emphasised that the relationship between rural-petty-bourgeois accumulation and Harambee is a complex one. The petty-bourgeois, however, is always quick to point out that "progress cannot be achieved without stability and unity", two notions which have become built-in elements of Harambee. This is hardly surprising if we take into account the often observed fact that most national policies are directed toward maintaining and strengthening rural petty-bourgeois interests. (Holinquist 1975; Ascroft et al. 1972.)

5. This is perhaps applicable only to some parts of the country with certain developmental characteristics. In field research, one notices in numerical terms heavy concentration of effort towards "Women's Projects", most of which are very small indeed. More on this later.

6. It should be pointed out here that members of the bourgeoisie often invoke this argument but it is not easy to generalise as to whom the intended target is. On the surface, it seems the target is more often than not the rural petty bourgeoisie.

7. In one District surveyed by the author, the "Women's projects" constitute nearly 50% of all projects registered since 1971.
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I. What Is Harambee?

Harambee is a cry for co-operation. It is a work-song that is used to draw individuals together when they are lifting a log, putting a roof on a granary or pushing a car out of mud. Harambee, therefore, means the pooling together of resources and energy. It recognizes that the individual, left to himself, cannot do much. There are certain tasks that can be initiated by individuals but which cannot be completed by them. Individuals, moreover, cannot initiate any task unless they are aware beforehand that group effort will help them complete it. Harambee, further, confirms two things about human life: one, that men produce and reproduce their lives, i.e. survive, only in groups, beginning with the family, to the clan, the assembly line, the school and so on. Two, that individuals within these groups, seen merely as individuals needing survival, are basically equal. That whatever methods of production they can adopt in the art of survival, they do so because they are always looking for ways to make work, the source of survival, easier and more efficient. When, therefore, men are called to work "in the spirit of Harambee". Harambee becomes a mobilizing force and work ethic that seeks to cement team-work among these basically equal individuals.

II. History of Harambee

Harambee is not a product of independence, it pre-dates it. During the colonial days, the African masses were discriminated against
in many ways. Apart from the colonial state being used as a machinery for the political oppression of the African masses, it was also used to organise their economic exploitation by white settlers, Indian sugar-growers and multi-national corporate owners of tea estates. Able-bodied young men left their villages in Nyanza to go and work in the tea estates for meagre wages. With these wages they paid taxes which financed the building of schools for their children and the paying of the armed forces to defend their property. Back at home, in the villages, there were no hospitals for the children, no schools for the young ones and no roads to link the various communities together. But the Africans were working, only that their work was for the benefit of the dominant groups in society: then the Europeans and the Asians, helped by the colonial state machinery.

So as to work for themselves, movements of HARAMBEE were started in Kenya. In the Central Province they took the form of the Kikuyu Independent School Movement; in Nyanza Province the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation (LUTATCO), was a prominent Harambee project in colonial times. If the colonial state could not provide schools for our young ones, if the state could not even tax us and use the taxes to build schools for us, then, it was argued, we could raise money from our own resources and build schools. In these schools, we could provide our own teachers, teach our children about our own culture, and tell them the truth about the inequalities of the system that was denying them schooling opportunities. The Kikuyu Independent School System was therefore both a self-help movement as well as a protest movement. Beginning as a way of providing social services to the masses because the state could not do it, the independent schools themselves became vehicles for politicising the masses, for making them conscious of their own environment, for mobilizing them. It was because of the very nature of the political environment in which the schools were started that they became avenues for the political mobilization of the Kikuyu masses.
The same can be said of the Luo Thrift. Started specifically to raise capital for building trade and commerce in the Luo community on a corporate basis (although this has now been challenged), LUTATCO also became a force around which political mobilization could be done.

In both cases, however, the organizational framework was from the grassroots upwards. The purpose for which resources were pooled by grassroots was to provide services that were identified by local people as lacking for the community as a whole. Acting independent of governmental power, projects were initiated and their magnitude tailored to fit into the capabilities of their initiators to maintain them.

With the defeat of the colonial regime, political independence was seen to be meaningful only if it was accompanied with the improvement of the ordinary lives of people. If the African masses had been denied hospitals and schools by the colonial regime, then the defeat of this regime should mean improving possibilities of access to these services. But hospitals, schools, roads, village markets, polytechnics and so on do not, like manna, fall from heaven. They need money so as to get started. There are two ways of getting this money: People can get together on a self-help basis and raise funds of building a primary school - that is what the Kikuyu Independent School Movement was about; or, the government can from its own resources, build schools and hospitals for its citizens - and this is what the colonial government had not effectively done for the African masses. Both villagers - pooling their resources together - and the government - spending from its revenues - have limited resources.

The government's sources of revenue can be categorized as follows: (1) Internally-generated revenue, i.e. revenue from various types of taxes and government earnings from rent and public property; (2) externally-generated revenue, i.e. revenue from foreign trade, foreign aid and foreign loans. From these revenues the government has to spend on major types of projects which we can categorize as follows:
(1) administration, i.e. running the machinery of the state; (2) Social services, of education, health care and community development; (3) revenue-producing projects, e.g. road-building and other public works, industry, commerce, agriculture, and so on; (4) servicing of loans, i.e. paying interest on borrowed money.

Regarding sources of revenue, the government will, as much as possible, tend to rely more and more on internally-generated revenues. This is because some externally-generated revenue, like loans, require servicing, i.e. extra expenditure on them which should be limited. With regard to expenditure, the government will tend to favour those projects which are productive, or revenue-generating. While trained manpower and skilled labour as a result of improved education will eventually increase productivity, this alone will not lead to the emphasis on spending on education if the economy cannot absorb the trained manpower. Emphasis must, therefore, be laid on spending on productive projects in the economy, both for infrastructural and substructural development.

But more than that, the government is not an independent entity. Before any public policy is made, there are groups which make known their preferences to the government and influence what types of public policies are generated by governmental machinery. The powers that these groups wield and their influence on policy makers will determine the pattern of expenditure of government revenues.

When Harambee was re-generated as a way of pooling resources together at the grassroots for social and economic development, the post-colonial government encouraged it for the following reasons:–

(1) To raise resources, on a self-help basis, to provide urgently needed services by the ordinary citizens, e.g. schools and hospitals;

(2) To limit pressure on the government by citizens for the provision of these services since the government did not have enough revenue to concentrate on such services or, if it had such revenues,
it had other projects in mind;

and (3), to create a work-ethnic and a "developmental" ideology by which community development and planning would begin from the grassroots upwards. Whether, in practice, this happened, would perhaps not be the test of this ideology. The test would be whether it made certain "developmental" programmes popular or not.

The first years of the Harambee Movement in the 1960's and very early seventies saw the success story of Harambee, both from the point of view of the government and of the grassroots. Schools and hospitals mushroomed across the nation from the Lake Districts to the coast. Peasants, contributing their hard-earned incomes of two shillings, one goat, a bunch of bananas or even their own labour-power, voluntarily contributed to these projects. Some of these projects were soon taken over by the government, and yet others mushroomed from year to year. Both the government and the people encouraged the building of more schools and hospitals for, however, many came up, they could never be enough.

A problem, on the other hand, soon emerged. How could non-viable projects be prevented from coming up? How could people be stopped from enthusiastically starting projects which they could not complete?

III. Economic Competition and Social Inequality

It has, for a long time, been a fact that improved schooling leads to greater social mobility. If a man can afford to send his children to a good school, he gives them the chance to move up the socio-economic ladder. Competition for social mobility therefore begins at the primary school level. With the mushrooming of Harambee school projects, it was politically difficult for the government to put a stop to schools that were bound to be unviable. For each community was the building of their own school as a way of waging the economic struggle for upward mobility.
Two things happened. One, in the spirit of competition, unviable projects saw the meagre resources of poor communities wasted. Two, among those projects which succeeded, taking secondary schools for example, students continued to receive education that reflected the economic capabilities of their own communities. Thus a poor community that could not furnish its school with science laboratories could not expect good science results in school certificate, hence no doctors or engineers could come from such communities in the future. Schooling, then, became a mechanism of social stratification or class division in society. Established families with the history of sending their children to established high schools such as the Alliance High School, Maseno High School, Kagumo, Kakamega, Kenya High and so on more-less continued to do so uninterrupted. Rich families which could afford good and expensive private high schools contributed to Harambee projects but continued to send their children to these schools. We now have a fixed pattern of schooling: the relatively disadvantaged Harambee system and the more formalised and advantaged government or public system. This led to some disillusionment with Harambee projects on the part of the masses. For schooling was not leading to social mobility but to the creation of further social stratification and inequality. But the much more demobilizing factor has been what I will choose to call "The Sociological transformation of Harambee."

IV The Sociological Transformation of Harambee.

Although some of the projects started in the sixties failed because the communities which started them could not complete them, they shared a common characteristic: they were all started from the grassroots on a self-reliant basis. During the early seventies, Harambee projects started becoming bigger and bigger. Instead of secondary schools, institutes of technology, organized on much broader scale, and initiated from above, came up. No longer was it sufficient for communities to raise their meagre resources for self-help purposes; they could not do this because the projects they were involved in were much bigger, needing
more complicated planning and much more long-term financing. Elites within particular communities descended from the cities to initiate and contribute to such projects.

Harambee meetings themselves became arenas for Elite political competition. With the dominance of the only legal political party, KANU, and given that Harambee was originally a mass-based self-help movement, elites found it a ready-made set-up within which they could ingratiate themselves with the masses. If A contributed 5,000 shillings for a project X while B gave only Shs. 500, A would expect to do better at the elections because members of project X would be more grateful to him. If members of project X have more A's and B's to play around with, then they do not need to mobilize their own resources to complete the project. All they need to do is to invite more A's and B's to compete with each other at contributing to buy their votes, as it were.

Elites soon realized that, given their own resources, they could not contribute as much to self-help projects. That they needed to get some extra sources of income to compete with their opponents. This urge led to two things: one, a top-heavy organization of Harambee and mobilization of economic resources for Harambee projects. A senior civil servant, with ambitions to enter politics, would initiate a prestige project in his constituency, and invite his elite friends from the towns for a Harambee day. The friends would go, or send their contributions, knowing full well that "the friend" would reciprocate when his turn comes. This quite often led to political clientalism which often means that once so-and-so has contributed to C's project, C dare not go against him politically or within the sphere of policy formulation within bureaucracies. Political clientalism leads to demobilization of participation.

Two, this urge also leads to setting in motion of processes of corruption and primitive accumulation of wealth which (a) hurt efficiency in public administration and (b) lead to the over-taxation of certain social strata in society. Let me elaborate.
Take the case again where a senior civil servant is initiating a project in his would-be constituency, and he invites friends. He will also invite his subordinates who, because they are junior to him, will feel compelled to contribute else they fall in disfavour with their boss. The senior civil servant's other friends in similar positions like him, will do the same. So each will converge on the Harambee day with contributions "FROM HIM AND HIS FRIENDS." Because of the very nature of the way in which the money was raised, nobody would know exactly how much so-and-so contributed by himself and how much he got from his friends. We have to rely completely on the trustworthiness of the senior civil servant. Most of his friends being his subordinates, one would not expect them to bring the civil servant to task even if they suspected the latter had misappropriated their contributions. It must be remembered that very often a subordinate contributes to his boss's project as an individual and once the boss finally donates his and his friends's contribution in the HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS, who is the subordinate to think that his mere 200 shillings was not accounted for?

Situations rarely arise where bosses feel obliged to donate to projects in which their subordinates are initiators. A subordinate, in actual fact, will be very reluctant to send out a memo to his seniors reminding them that on "Sunday the 19th of March, I have been invited to attend a Harambee Project at such and such a place; could you please contribute something." Very few junior officers would ever pass such circulars of memos to their seniors, yet heads of departments, managers, foremen - you name it - find it just too easy to use their official positions to tax their subordinates for Harambee projects. In a situation where a subordinate approaches his boss for a donation he would have no way of reprimanding his boss if the cheque given as a donation BOUNCES. The boss, on the other hand, would not hesitate to call to count a subordinate whose cheque bounces.

We therefore find that there is an increased taxation of certain social strata in paid employment. The middle classes in the cities, in
particular, who are seen by their colleagues and communities as occupying "representative positions", are daily being approached by every Onyango, Kamau and Arap Koskei to contribute to this or that project. It means that wage-earners are finding it more and more difficult to survive on their earnings, and resorting to other ways of getting cash-incomes. Instead of a bureaucrat being in his office at 3.00 p.m., he may as well be at his car, trying to earn some money to subsidize his wages. A civil servant with political following and political clientalism, will equally devote less time to his work and spend more time on MAGENDO, if only to raise just a little more to contribute lavishly to a Harambee project. In both cases, efficiency in public administration suffers.

Harambee has not only been transformed into an arena for political competition by elites, it has also become an avenue for the primitive accumulation of wealth by some elites. We have seen how, in our example of the civil servant, there is no way by which we can determine how much money he raises from "his friends" prior to the date of contribution. It is quite possible for him to raise the money three months before the donation day and use it as initial capital for getting a loan at a bank to start a chain of supermarkets. It is also possible that he may take part of the contribution and use it to build a house in Kisumu which he rents for money. In both ways, the lack of accountability in the Harambee movement, because of the very way in which it is organized, makes it possible for certain elites to use it as a source for the primary accumulation of wealth - or capital - in our free-enterprise economy. This, too, leads to administrative inefficiency and mistrust of leaders by their subordinates and the masses as a whole.

V What, Then Needs to be Done?

First, we must be a big enough nation to recognize our mistakes and rectify our failures, we can only do this if we encourage criticism of public policies and programmes and not regard such criticisms as unconstructive dissent or lack of patriotism. For quite often lavish
praise of public programs and policies does not come from committed but from opportunists and self-aggrandizing individuals. Hypersensitivity to criticism breeds a docile nation, a nation of sheep and not an active nation, a nation of self-conscious individuals.

We must, therefore, secondly, promote participatory democracy in Harambee projects. Participatory democracy will take us back to the early phases of Harambee when organisation began from the grassroots and when people felt involved - in theory and practice - in their own projects. Participatory democracy will also involve the evolution of organizational structures in which accountability will be possible, corruption minimized and other forms of primitive accumulation of wealth within the Harambee system eliminated.

But thirdly, we must realize that those two things cannot be done unless there is democratisation of our political processes, particularly the political party. As long as aspiring politicians do not have avenues for mobilising their followers within the political party, as long as the party does not rejuvenate mechanisms for disciplining its leaders and making them accountable to the electorate, wealth will continue to be the basis of political power and with it the tendency to use other mass movements - like Harambee - to gain access to political office.

Fourthly, the genuine mobilization of the masses to participate in development and to hold public servants accountable will also mean improving administrative mechanisms for planning development projects. At the moment the government has such mechanisms, beginning with sub-locational planning committees to the Ministry of Finance and Planning itself. But because Harambee has become a top-heavy organisation, an inverted prism in terms of participation and initiative, grass-root planners are often embarrassed when projects are imposed from above in the middle of their planning year. What does a District Planning Committee do when, in the middle of the year, they have to handle 1/4
Fifthly, I propose the initiation of a HARAMBEE TAX. Instead of harassing primary school teachers and public officials every 2 weeks to contribute to projects they never budgetted for, let there be a HARAMBEE TAX, officially recognised and known to all that certain income groups will pay differentially to finance development projects rationally planned for by our planning agencies. This would eliminate the current inequality that is emerging in Harambee projects where only sub-locations with 2 permanent secretaries, a professor and a D.O. are sure to get successful projects while those with a sub-chief, 10 primary school teachers and a clerk in the Ministry of Water Development stand very few chances of inviting donations from big whigs. Our task as a nation is to PULL TOGETHER, pool our resources together, and develop our nation as one people, one country, one GOD.
I. Introduction.

The capitalist colonial powers in Africa were solely concerned with the exploitation of the resources of the continent for the benefit of their metropolitan states and peoples. All forms of development that took place in Africa colonial territories were mainly concentrated in urban centers to service European communities. In so far as non-urban areas were developed such development was to service European settler farmers and facilitate mineral exploitation. The consequence was an ever increasing gap in development levels between urban areas and rural areas. Nomadic pastoralists took a disproportionately large share of the unfavourable side of this unequal treatment because such communities generally occupied areas deficient in resources attractive to colonial development. This state of affairs continued till the achievement of independence and even into the post independence era.

Of late, however, postcolonial African governments have after varying periods of hesitation and delay, and with varying degrees of commitment, shown a tendency of increasing orientation towards an emphasis on rural development in their development plans and programmes. In the very recent period this tendency has been accelerated by a sense of urgency consequent upon the devastating droughts of the 1970's that have left us with horrible memories of human starvation and destruction of livestock in the nomadic areas of the continent.
This policy switch towards emphasis on rural development is reflected in Kenya by the 1970-74 Development Plan:
"... Rural development ... will in this plan represent the basic strategy." \(^1\) (Kenya 1970)

Within the rural sector itself, roughly three quarters of Kenya is too dry for reliable cultivation and is suitable only for livestock development. North Eastern Province is wholly in that dry portion of the country being a hot region with scarce rainfall, poor soils and sparse vegetation. The province runs virtually the whole course of the Kenya-Somali border and is inhabited by various nomadic pastoralist communities of Somali ethnic origin. These nomads who keep on migrating from place to place in search of better grazing and water have an entirely livestock-based economy. They depend on their flocks of camels, cattle and goats for their main diets of milk and meat, and, occasionally sell the live animals or their products so as to acquire cash with which to buy newly needed commodities lacking in the traditional economy. In view of the prevailing climatic and ecological conditions the basic strategy of rural development merely confirms an already obvious single policy option for this area, namely, livestock development as the only viable form of development.

This paper examines the implementation of that policy option and particularly the suitability of the administrative structure and the related subject of popular participation.

II \hspace{1cm} \textbf{Policy Objectives.}

Any development programme has to be based on clear policies if it will succeed. It is therefore pertinent to ascertain the overall national policy of the Kenya government with respect to livestock development and then within that the particular policy objectives for the area of study.

In 1967 the Ministry of Agriculture established a special division to be responsible for the maintenance, improvement and development of
animal production. The national livestock policy is contained in a document titled "Animal Production Division, National Policy", published by that division in 1974. The document states that its purpose is to set out policy guidelines for National Animal production Development as laid down under the National Development Plan.

Briefly, the policy is to maximise livestock productivity so as to diversify the agricultural industry. That is to be effected through strategies such as increasing offtake by increasing the number of stock and increasing liveweight through improved management of existing stock. The policy is heavily cattle biased and in this regard emphasises the need to increase offtake in range and high potential areas, and, to increase the availability of immatures from the range areas for fattening on the high potential area ranches.

These of course are the general policy guidelines. The document provides that national policy guidelines may be modified to suit particular sections of the country, and further, that each province or district could draw up its own policies within those guidelines. The question then is, what specific policy objectives apply to the area?

The National policy of increasing livestock production is biased towards the low potential areas. This bias is also reflected by the Development Plans. Apparently the bias is because the high potential areas have already reached the possible peak of their development. The 1970-74 Development Plan (Kenya 1970) lists the range areas. The list includes areas wherein production is characterised by conditions of traditional pastoralism, with little or no modernisation and where the herds are owned by semi-nomadic moves in search of water and grazing. Since the area under study fits in this category the national policy in emphasizing rangelands provides for this area. And so the policy for the region is to make it the main source of immatures for the high potential ranches area. It should be noted that the objectives of this policy are to meet the existing national and export demand for protein
foods and at the same time raise the nutritional level and welfare standard of the pastoralists. The income received from exports out of the region would in turn finance other types of developmental projects. The rising national and export demand for beef, and, the climatic and ecological conditions which are unfavourable to dairy production, have all accounted for the emphasis on beef cattle.

III Implementation.

The policy objectives having thus been formulated, the Government through the Range Management Division of the Ministry of Agriculture embarked on preliminary investigations into the sociology, migratory movements, and the land tenure systems of the people, and the area’s ecology. A team of camel, cattle and ecological experts, and a sociologist was employed. The team found that the 47,000 square-mile area of the province is not desert but medium potential rangeland, but that only 10,000 square miles were being used during the two dry seasons due to lack of water in the remaining areas. They further noted the lack of livestock markets and the loss of condition of animals through excessive walking to and fro water-points. They recommended the development of ranching schemes.

Since, however, the water-deficient environment would not allow the immobilisation of the people and therefore permanent ranches were out of question — at least initially — the authorities opted for the development of grazing blocks. Preliminary investigations into the migratory movements of the people had revealed that there is a general pattern of the nomads concentrating around the few waterpoints (mostly handdug wells) during the dry seasons, thereby badly overgrazing the surrounding areas, and moving away during the rainy seasons to other areas which relatively had been undergrazed for lack of water. (Overgrazing around a water point of course meant that the nomads camped further and further away from that water source as they sought...
better grazing and consequently the animals spent more time walking to
and fro that water point). Therefore, the whole territory was
categorised into wet season and dry season grazing areas. This in
effect is an informal restroation system of grazing dictated by the
vagaries of nature.

The grazing block scheme is in reality the formalisation of this
informal grazing system. A defined area is set aside exclusively for
an appropriate livestock population - the exact number being determined
by the estimated resource potential of the area. Each such area
includes wet season and dry season grazing areas. New water sources,
mainly pans and dams, and sometimes even boreholes are provided in the
wet season grazing zone so as to increase the time during which the
area can be used after the rainy season and exhaustion of natural water
pans.

For as long as there is water in the wet season grazing area,
animals are kept off the dry season grazing area so as to enable the
grass to recover. The consequent shortening of the period of grazing
in the dry season grazing area correspondingly reduces the distance of
livestock camps from the water sources and the loss of condition of
animals through excessive walking. Some of the new water sources are
boreholes which spread out the animals during the dry season and reduce
excessive concentration around a few water points.

The programme began in 1970 with the establishment of the first
such block - Mudo Gashe Grazing Block - which was soon after split into
East and West Mudo Gashe Grazing Blocks. By the end of 1972 these two
and a third had been clearly established, all in Garrisa District where
the provincial Headquarters are situated. Since then the process of
establishing the blocks has been proceeding into new areas principally
in Wajir District and recently preliminary survey work has began in the
third and last district - Mandera District.
Within the blocks, cattle dips are constructed along with crushes as the campaign against rinderpest and other animal diseases has now become easier. At about the same time that the decision to increase livestock production in the province was taken, the ministry established livestock Marketing Division to provide marketing facilities. The body buys livestock, mainly immatures, from the pastoralists and after immunisation against various diseases sells them either to the Kenya Meat Commission or the highland and Coast private ranches for fattening.

From its inception the exercise has been bedeviled by a number of administrative problems and lack of a satisfactory level of popular participation.

IV Problems of Administrative Structure.

The formal establishment of grazing blocks as a new experiment in range management and development in the country has not been accompanied by innovations in the administrative structure to meet the demands of this new experiment. Consequently the Ministry of Agriculture through the Range Management Division is responsible for the establishment and development of grazing blocks. But this Ministry, and in fact the entire national administration, is to a large extent structurally a continuation of the colonial order, with the chief characteristics of functional as opposed to a real operation of virtually watertight departments. The consequences for livestock development in North Eastern Province are quite a number.

Centralisation has traditionally assigned the role of formulating the plans to the men at the top whose orders are then passed down the administrative hierarchy for implementation by the technical bureaucrats on the ground. In accordance with that tradition, the national livestock policy was prepared by the Animal Production Division at the headquarters of the Ministry. The planners faced their task primarily from the point of view of increasing beef supply and to a lesser extent the supply of
goat meat so as to meet the increasing national and foreign demand for these products.

Since there was no felt internal or external demand for the products of camels, and, since the bulk of Kenyan peoples would frown at using these products anyway - a feeling the planners themselves may have had - the policy does not even mention camels in its list of livestock types. True, the planners did depart from tradition in providing that within the general policy guidelines, each province or district may draw up its own policies. But the fact that there just aren't any guidelines for camels and secondly, the lack of a tradition of local planning inhibits the speed with which that power can be acted upon by the supposed local planners. This is witnessed by the fact that so far the provincial personnel has not formulated any policies for this particular category of livestock.

The total lack of concern for camels shown by the government in its livestock policy sharply contrasts with the towering place the animals occupy in the socio-economic life of the pastoralists. This is a major failure because the climatic and forage conditions are ideal to camel life here: the beasts can go for up to fifteen days without water and cover up to fifty miles to and fro water sources; secondly whereas cattle thrives on grass, camels prefer various shrubs and non-grass herbacious plants that do not appeal to cattle and so there is no competition between the two for forage resources. If markets could be found - and there is reason to believe that they could be found in the middle East only if appropriate steps were taken - camel farming in the area could provide an additional contribution to the gross national product and to that extent promote the welfare of the pastoralists. At least, there is now evidence of recognition of this flow at the top by the technical bureaucrats in the province who have made calls for the remedying of the situation.
Centralisation of administrative structure has also led to allocation of votes to departments in that area which often get exhausted prematurely leaving behind half accomplished tasks. Thus in 1974, the vote for the pastoral Training School, an institution whose function is to educate the pastoralists on the advantages and management of the grazing blocks so as to promote popular participation of the people in their own development got exhausted and some badly needed courses could not be conducted. Also in the same year, the travelling and accommodation vote to sustain the Range Inventory and Track Construction Unit in the field was exhausted in September and the team was disbanded. As the name suggests, the team had been employed on the one task to construct tracks in the grazing blocks and on the other hand to compile livestock and forage data. The latter is particularly vital for any meaningful planning. Lack of range resource inventories means that planning becomes highly speculative in that it will be based on the assumptions of the range planners rather than on empirical data. Whereas one has to concede that the allocation of limited public funds between competing departments and services have always resulted in complaints from one quarter or another, the complaints from the fieldworkers do indicate the need for the political bureaucrats who are not directly involved in the development of the grazing blocks - such as the personnel of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the top strata of the Ministry of Agriculture to better appreciate the special demands of the province vis-a-vis the rest of the country.

The point is the conventional planning approach which still applies in Kenya involves the formulation of very general guidelines by the Ministry of Planning and the formulation in the light of those guidelines of individual policies and programmes by the various Ministries. There is just no room for the contribution of the fieldworkers. But only these fieldworkers can adequately appreciate the peculiar problems of the area - the vastness of the area, the sparse population and the poor communications to mention but a few. The attempt at regional planning
following a recommendation of the Ndegwa Commission Report in 1972 to the effect that the district be made the basic unit of plan formulation and implementation has seen first the establishment of provincial Planning offices. But the experience of the provincial planning offices indicates that this new machinery is merely a coordinating one for the various plans and programmes of the individual ministries and makes no local planning as such.

The Range Management Division of the Ministry of Agriculture is the department primarily involved in the exercise. But the development of the blocks involves the construction of pans, dams, and boreholes particularly in the wet season grazing areas. This function of providing new water sources falls under the jurisdiction of the former department and now Ministry of Water Development. Similarly, the construction of tracks would in principle fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of works. Consequently, an essential precondition for the success of the programme is a sufficient degree of coordination and cooperation between the various departments concerned. Unfortunately, however, not falling under one ministry, it becomes difficult for the technical and even political bureaucrats concerned, to achieve that level of 'working together'. That the problem is a real one in the area of study is shown by an annual agricultural report bemoaning the lack of such effective coordination.

"The Range Management Division has been out of touch with the work of (Trackway Construction Unit) because the latter reports its progress and programmes to departmental offices in Garissa and Nairobi".

A natural result is that the Range Management Division may not always know when the Track Construction Unit intends to construct tracks in a particular area and so cannot plan properly in advance. Or the Track Construction Unit may discontinue its programmes for its own reasons without consulting or even informing the Range Management Division. The latter may continue with its programmes on the basis of
the earlier plans of its partner and all of a sudden be stuck on finding that in fact there are no more tracks. And so, for example, a range inventory team wanting to move into a new area may be handicapped in the last minute.

Another administrative problem is the shortage of qualified manpower. From the national viewpoint itself, the 1970-74 Development Plan admits that this a severe constraint on range development which will take some time to overcome. (Kenya 1970)

In the area under study the problem assumes a relatively emergency proportion because the range management staff is trained on a national basis and not specifically for the particular province with its own peculiar problems. It must be noted that the trainees are more geared towards the permanent ranches and that does not equip them sufficiently for grazing blocks which involves a migratory rotational grazing system - a new experiment in the country. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the bulk of the staff, and particularly the senior staff, comes from outside the area and the sociological and cultural differences between the pastoralists on the one hand and the communities from which the staff is drawn on the other are very marked. These differences are further fanned by a certain feeling of mistrust which exists between the two groups of people due to the irredentist claim by Somalia to the area and its people. The result is administrators find it difficult to appreciate the problems they are supposed to solve, or probably more correctly, the 'developers and the developed' fail to understand each other. One cannot help sympathising with the dilemma in which the administration finds itself in this regard: on the one hand the dangers of relying on personnel who both by virtue of training and virtue of social and cultural backgrounds are ill-suited to their task; and on the other hand, the dangers of drawing such personnel exclusively or mainly from the area concerned which to some degree is bound to be unsatisfactory in quality because of low educational level of the area's peoples. Added to that are the sentiments
that favour national integration of the various ethnic groups which are generally antagonistic to that type of localisation of personnel and particularly antagonistic in a politically sensitive area as the North Eastern Province.

Lastly, there is another category of administrative problems. This is the category of frequent transfers and unpopular postings. The first basically results from the latter which is caused by a multiplicity of factors such as remoteness from the area from the national headquarters; lack of city amenities such as electricity, recreational facilities, availability of good schools for children, and so on. Nor should the possibility of 'penal' postings be ruled out. As a result administrators acquire bad faith in their work and tend to travel away to the national headquarters to seek better transfers or on flimsy excuses resulting in the loss of valuable man-hours. Also transfers become frequent. The seriousness of this problem is shown by Randall Baker (Baker 1975) writing on the Samburu District which though in a different administrative region is identical to our area of study in terms of factors that promote resentment of postings there. Thus he tells us that in 1970 meeting of the District Development Committee which he attended, out of ten government officers present only one had been present in the district for more than one year. This in turn reduces the chances of on the job training which could otherwise well compensate for the lack of specialised formal training for the area. A proper understanding of the people and the area by the administrators is an essential prerequisite for meaningful planning and implementation but that is just impossible in the prevailing circumstances.

V. Popular Participation

From the beginning, one major obstacle to the implementation of the exercise has been the non-compliance by stockmen with the guidance given by the stock management personnel. The range management personnel may direct that the pastoralists leave the dry season grazing
area so that the grazing may recover. Or, they may direct that outsiders must not use the resources of a particular grazing block. Or still, they may direct that some grazing and reserving water for harder times ahead takes time to appeal to the nomad for a number of reasons.

The traditional and tenure system of the pastoralists is community based. That means all the members of a particular ethnic community have equal rights in common over the territory of their community. No individual or group can acquire superior rights to any identifiable portion of the community's land, excepting rights of first use over wells by the persons who dug them. Otherwise, all have equal rights of access to the grazing resources in each and every part of the community's territory.

Against this background of the traditional community based land tenure system whereby no individual or group within the society could lay exclusive claims to a tract of land, the whole idea appears non-sensical to those nomads who are not included in the grazing block and are thereby excluded from the enjoyment of resources they believe is their natural right. And so they encroach on to the area whenever they have the opportunity. This in turn negatively affects the compliance of those within the block because such compliance involves a certain degree of inconvenience and therefore they tend to adopt attitudes like "after all even if we move away from this area of reserve this water for the dry season, others will come and use these resources. Therefore why should we inconvenience ourselves?" And so fail to participate in their own development.

In addition, the traditional social bonds and strong sense of community have been little affected in this area by the changes that have engulfed most of the rest of the country in this century. Lineage and clan affinities involve the social responsibility of hospitality and help to other fellow members hence the failure of the members of
the block - at least initially - to help keep out 'trespassers' from the block. The same problem was met in the establishment of the first Maasai Group Ranches as testified by Olekapare, who explains it in the following manner:

"The misconception here was that the Maasai like their agricultural counterparts in the rest of the country would feel attached to the land and thus keep trespassers." 3

Like the Maasai Group Ranches the establishment of grazing block is largely an imposition from without. There was no mass involvement in the essential planning and preparatory stages. Consequently the masses did not understand the benefits to be derived from the exercise. In these circumstances their initial poor response is understandable.

Moreover, there are no legal enforcement measures to back the guidance of the range personnel. When administrators apprehend 'trespassers' at most they can only move them out of the area or otherwise put an end to the 'trespass' by using the police if need be - a course of action they detest for a valid reason indicated ahead. Beyond that, they cannot rely on any legal sanctions such as prosecutions or fines which could have a deterrent effect. This is because the development of grazing blocks is so far purely an administrative exercise lacking totally in legal basis or regulation. This does raise the interesting question, if only for academic purposes, as to what is the precise legal status of the grazing blocks. The official view seems to be that:

"Whereas it is not legal in the sense that it has no legal basis yet it is not illegal because it is government policy." 4

The correct position would seem to be that since customary law is part of the laws of Kenya and therefore customary land law of the area continues to operate in so far as it has not been replaced by statutory law through the process of adjudication and registration, and in so far as it has not been modified by any other statutory provision
including the repugnancy clause, the establishment of grazing blocks is illegal because it purports to create exclusive property rights for some people and at the same time denies others access to traditional grazing resources. The administration would probably reply to that by the morally sound argument that the urgency of relieving the pathetic state of underdevelopment relative to the rest of the country must not be compromised by respect for such legal technicalities.

The administrators have at their disposal a miasma of statutory powers that could be used to combat noncompliance. They could use the Trust Lands Act, or they could use the numerous regulations that already exist under the Agricultural Act. Or still, the Minister could exercise his powers and issue new regulations specifically aimed at promoting the development of grazing blocks, including sanctions against noncompliance. But they have refrained from that for the valid reason that at this crucial stage, far from promoting compliance such a legal enforcement machinery will in fact frighten people away. They are afraid that the nomads will ask such questions: 'Well, if they really mean to help us why are they confiscating our animals? Or, why are they putting our hardmen in jail? Or, why are they imposing fines on us?' Development - at least meaningful development - cannot be achieved by duress. For the same reason the use of police powers to evict 'trespassers' is uninviting.

Therefore it was rightly realised from the outset that the best way to generate popular participation would be by educating the people to appreciate the advantages of grazing block development rather than by provision of a machinery of legal sanctions. Hence the Pastoralist Training Centre was constructed at Gelfitu. The school provides short courses to pastoralists, including chiefs and their assistants, on range management and animal husbandry with emphasis on range water in the pans and dams. Initially, in 1971, the student attendance was poor but gradually this improved so that by 1974 'a considerable enthusiasm had developed', according to that year's
provincial agricultural report. Also barazas are held in the field with the same educational objective.

This educational programme has now produced some fruits - the formation by the people themselves of grazing committees in a number of the blocks. The development of new resources use technique of grazing blocks had outflanked the resources use control mechanisms of the traditional social order. Now there is the question of who should shoulder the responsibility of day to day running of the boreholes. Initially a chaotic system of each herdsman providing his own fuel for the water pumps became the practice. Consequently disputes arose from time to time as to who should water his animals first, such disputes were at times settled in a non-peaceful manner. Therefore the development of new resources control institutions from within the traditional set up is a welcome development. They now raise fees to meet the running costs of the new installations such as fuel costs and enforce the observance of range use guidelines provided by the administrators. Their development demonstrates that any people once they are helped to understand are capable of participating in their own development and gives lie to the myths and emotional bouts that often surround the question of nomadic development. There is reason to believe that these new resource management institutions will succeed and certainly being entrenched in the traditional set-up they are better equipped than the administrative machinery for the tasks of managing grazing block resources.

We have seen that the administrative structure and consequently practice is far from satisfactory. But the question as to exactly how far these administrative problems have hindered the success of the exercise and in particular contributed to the poor start in popular participation is a difficult one to answer. It is difficult because this paper is largely based on secondary - source data consisting of official reports prepared by the same administrative machinery. Yet it is a general truism to say that we human beings are not very prone to admitting mistakes and tend to assign our own failures elsewhere.
or to rationalise them away. But one thing is clear. The level of participation by the people will always depend to a certain extent on the suitability of the administrative structure and particularly on the degree of mutual understanding and co-operation between the 'developers' and the 'developed'. The administrative problems discussed above frustrate the creation of that kind of atmosphere within which the 'developed' can participate in their own development. It is submitted that if those administrative problems did not exist, or for that matter were less in magnitude, then the level of popular participation and therefore performance of the grazing block would have been correspondingly better.

VI Evaluation and Conclusion:

In view of the prevailing climatic and ecological conditions, the policy option of livestock development is valid in principle as the only viable developmental approach in the area. The exercise was in principle well preceded by field researches into such subjects as the sociology of the people and the area's ecology.

It might be premature to judge the success of grazing block development when the exercise has not yet run for a decade and has still to extend to a substantial part of the region. However, official reports indicate that in the established blocks both the quantity and quality of livestock production has improved despite the recurrent droughts that have featured most of the period since they were first established. There is no doubt that under appropriate organisation and management the area could provide the national and export markets with substantial livestock products and thereby improve the welfare of the pastoralists.

We have seen that the valid policy option has not been marched by innovations in the administrative structure which is hierarchically centralised and functionally departmentalised with the consequence that the political bureaucrats are largely divorced from the realities of the
ground and the technical bureaucrats are insufficiently equipped and poorly coordinated to deal with the peculiar problems of the area. It is therefore proposed that there is an urgent need to follow the lead of Niger (Ministry of Nomadic and Saharan Development and establish an area Ministry of or department (separate from the Range Management Division) to deal with livestock development in the marginal areas. Possibly a Ministry of Livestock Development in Marginal Areas. The current extension of the grazing block system to other administrative regions in Northern Kenya will definitely increase the magnitude of the problems highlighted in this paper. Such a ministry will generate special training, research and consultancy demanded by the peculiar problems of its operation and at the same time by having its own permanent staff reduce the problems of unpopular posting and frequent transfers. The few administrators who have so far acquired some specialisation in the area from practical experience would provide the nucleus of such a new ministry or department.

The structure of that ministry should further be designed so as to suit the marginal areas. This writer does not offer any blue print proposals. But a department of research into the social norms and aims of the peoples of these areas and resource use and management problems would seem a necessity. Related to that, the ministry should design its own special training programme to suit the regions peculiar problems which hopefully will be highlighted by the research department.

It is conceded that there could still develop further administrative bottlenecks within such a ministry by way of centralisation therein. Nonetheless, the fact that the ministry would operate not on the larger national level but within a section of the country may well reduce the degree of centralisation. Ultimately, centralisation and the lack of popular participation can only be reduced by conferring greater discretion on the district level of the administration - in effect some kind of genuine regional planning - and by laying emphasis on mass involvement right from the outset.
FOOTNOTES

1. In 1975, an acute shortage of Camel Meat was reported in the middle East and some Arab businessmen came to Kenya to explore the Camel Market potential and Kenya's Northern areas.


4. View gathered from a discussion with a senior officer in the Ministry of Agriculture.

5. Kenya, Republic of, 1967, Judicature Act 1967 5.3. This Provision enables the courts to declare customary law rule as 'repugnant' to justice and morality and therefore invalid.


7. See for example, the numerous rules and Regulation, appended to the Crop and Livestock Act, Cap 321.
REFERENCES


6. Various materials on pastoralism generally and on Maasai Group Ranches.
Introduction

The last three or four decades have been characterised by what in retrospect, appears to be a never-ending spinning by development scholars and practitioners of "new strategies" for rural development. The life-spans of these strategies have been short. Their impacts, if any, have been short-lived and too selective in terms of the number and groups of people reached. The strategies have in general failed to involve the broad masses of the rural people in the programmes and projects conceived and implemented under them. The result of this has been the creation of serious inter-regional and intra-regional inequalities in income distribution and ultimately in general welfare.¹

Yet in the face of such glaring inequalities, few development scholars and practitioners appear, until very recently, to have been seriously concerned about such outcomes. The purpose of this paper is first to offer a short review of what the author perceives to be the reasons behind the failure of development scholars and practitioners to seriously consider the case for mass or popular participation of rural people in rural development strategies that they conceived and implemented, and secondly to report on a Kenyan field experiment aimed specifically at creating mechanisms for popular participation in rural development.
Concern for popular, i.e. mass participation in rural development did not come into vogue before the early 1970's. At the close of the 1960's, certain events occurred which appear to have awakened scholars and practitioners of rural development not only to the seriousness of the income disparities that had been created by past developmental efforts but also to the overwhelming numbers of people in the rural areas of developing countries who had literally been bypassed by development activities and who as a result, were continuing to live under conditions of abject poverty and who, each year, seemed to sink deeper and deeper into the condition. Some of the events which preceded this general awakening included: the newly discovered danger of a world population growth which was threatening to outstrip the world food supply, with widespread famine as the foreseen consequence; the rising gaps in per capita incomes between the peoples of the developed and those of the developing world, a more serious and widespread questioning of the achievements of past development programmes in general and specifically those that had been financed by massive loans and grants from developed countries or from specialized agencies such as the World Bank, etc.

Thus in the early 1970's, what a lot of people appear to have been asking was, how come that poverty (more specifically hunger), ignorance and disease were still rampant in the third world even after twenty or more years of "development" in these countries? What had the millions of dollars, deutsche marks, sterling pounds, yens, etc. that had been given as "aid" to these countries achieved and for whom with respect to the eradication of these three evils? Wasn't it paradoxical that many countries in the third world that were reported to be achieving economic growth rates of between 6 and 7% per annum also had more than 40% of their populations living below the poverty line—whatever the line was?

These and other questions and the issues they addressed notwithstanding, we can also raise the question, why were these issues being raised only in the early 1970's? Why had they not been raised before? We do not pretend to have ready answers to these questions. It appears
however, that some of the reasons which led to this neglect have to be sought from the various paradigms of "development" out of which "development" was originally conceived, theories about it constructed, and policies and programmes for its achievement formulated. Rogers (1976) identifies one such paradigm which he characterizes as "the ruling paradigm of development and guided national development programmes". It's historical genesis was rooted partly in the experience with the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe and North America, the colonial experience of countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa and again, according to Rogers, "the quantitative empiricism of North American Social Science". The Western capitalistic and political philosophies also played a part in the evolution of this paradigm.

The definition of development deriving from this paradigm centred around the criterion of the rate of economic growth as measured in terms of growth in GNP or per capita GNP (the quantitative empiricism of N. American Social Science). Thus according to this paradigm, such economic growth was to be achieved through industrialisation. After all, it was argued, the industrial revolution has been marked by rapid economic growth and since according to this paradigm such growth was synonymous to "development", then it was only logical that third world countries adopt industrialisation as their sure ... strategy for development. At the heart of this industrialisation pathway to development was technology and capital which would substitute for labour. Yet the fact that these were labour-surplus economies, that these countries had different socio-cultural settings vis-a-vis those of Western Europe and North America at the time of the Industrial Revolution did not appear to come into the argument for the type of strategy these countries ought to follow.

How could such countries adopt such a pathway that glaringly ignored the fact of the essentially agrarian nature of their economies as well as a resource endowment that called for more labour absorbing investments rather than those based on capital intensive technology?
Preoccupied by economic as measured by GNP aggregate or per capita income, the ruling paradigm could not be bothered too much by such questions. The central issues according to this paradigm were those concerned with how to achieve such growth in the shortest period of time. Indeed, the paradigm was not even concerned with the question of how the fruits from such growth, if and when achieved, would be shared between the various sectors and individuals within these countries. After all, economists were in charge of this paradigm of "development" and for them the motto was, "Growth-first-and-let-equality-come-later". And at any rate, why worry about equality of distribution of the fruits of economic growth when the "trickle-down" theory assured that in the long-run (whose long-run?), through the magic of this theory, everyone would benefit?

And so it was that "development" or growth in GNP was sold to the developing countries. They in turn practiced this "development" over the years but at the tail end of the 1960's, it had already began to dawn on these countries that this pathway that they had so enthusiastically followed was spawning more problems than it was solving. The human conditions for a large proportion of their populations was deteriorating rather than improving. Meantime, in the academic world, the old paradigm of "development" had already come under heavy criticism. It had already lost a lot of credibility and scholars were at work trying to come up with a new paradigm.

Central to the new paradigm was the conceptual separation of economic growth and development and also the assertion that there was no one pathway to development. Development in the new paradigm came to be defined as "a widely participatory process of social change in a society, intended to bring about both social and material achievement including greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment."

Thus the conception development included not only the objective of rapid economic growth, but also such other objectives as: equality of distribution of information, socio-economic benefits, etc., popular participation in...
self-development; self-reliance and independence in development with emphasis on local resources and also the integration of traditional and modern system for smooth transformation of societies.

For practitioners, the additional objectives of equity, popular participation and self-reliance meant that development policies, programmes and projects based on the old paradigm had to give way to new ones since to achieve equitable economic growth and to ensure mass participation in the growth, mechanisms of distribution and participation that had as their underpinning the "trickle down" theory could not be relied upon. To this end, Robert McNamara (1974), among others, argued that in the new style of development that was emerging from the new paradigm, the issue would not be so much the question of the rate of economic development. The issue would be one concerned with the nature of that development. McNamara continued to argue that with about 40% of national populations being bypassed by past development efforts, policies with explicit goal of improving the conditions of life of this populations had to be formulated. Such policies, according to him would comprise:

1. Specific targets for income growth,
2. Direct attack on unemployment and underemployment,
3. Institutional reform,
4. Elimination of distortions in the the prices of land and labour as well as capital.

The above programme of proposed policies looked quite well thought out and appeared to have the potential of improving the lives of the poor. But how was the programme of action envisaged by such policies going to be implemented? What specific programs and projects were those countries willing to follow McNamara’s advice going to implement to achieve those ends? Without specifying the mechanisms through which these objectives were to be pursued, this type of policy pronouncements amounted to no more than mere talk.
While these debates and blue-print formulations were taking place at the international level, what was going on inside Kenya with respect to these same issues? Serious planning for development in Kenya, albeit based on the old paradigm of "development" began soon after the country achieved her political independence in 1963. Such planning continued from 1964 onwards but before long, its shortcomings began to be felt widely. For a good number of years, the country had been growing at an average rate of about 6% per annum. Yet this commendable performance notwithstanding, the problems of poverty, hunger, unemployment and underemployment continued to grow both in the urban and in the rural areas, fueled by a burgeoning population and a school system that was producing an increasing number of largely unemployable school leavers. Faced with these "time bombs", Kenya began to seriously debate these issues with a view to seeking solutions. The first such serious debate came in the form of the "Kericho Conference on Education Employment and Rural Development", convened in 1966. The conference was charged with the task of analysing these three closely related and complex problems with a view of coming up with programmes of action one each for education reform, employment and rural development.

Within the conference proceedings, it was argued that since about 90% of Kenyans lived in the rural areas and that since the majority of this population was dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, then the overall strategy for creating employment and improving the condition of life for these people, should be centred around rural development in general and agricultural modernisation in particular. Within this framework, education was to be reformed to serve the ends of rural development.

But even for the Kericho conference, resolutions and recommendations were not enough! It was still necessary to develop a strategy through which agricultural modernisation and hence rural development, could be carried out. But such a ready measure strategy was not available. One had to be formulated.
To this end, the Kenya Government appointed a Committee - the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) - charged with the duty of overseeing the formulation of the new strategy. The strategy that emerged from the NRDC deliberations was conceived in terms of an experimental programme—the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP)—to test new approaches to certain basic problems in rural development. In other words, the programme was to test a coordinated approach to the task of increasing employment opportunities as well as raising the level of incomes in general in the rural areas.

To set the SRDP ball rolling, 14 areas (Divisions) were selected in 1968 to provide a representative cross-section of levels of and problems of development in the smallholder farming areas of Kenya. Six of these areas were designated "first phase" areas. The experiences to be reported in the rest of this paper were gained in Tetu Division in Nyeri District—one of the first phase areas.7

With the NRDC being responsible for coordinating the whole programme and for negotiating external financial and technical assistance with donor agencies and countries willing to participate in the programme, the Kenya government decided to take for itself Tetu Division. Other donors who took other divisions included Sweden, Norway, Britain, USA, the Netherlands, West German, Denmark and FAO.

Since it was intended to implement results as soon as they were obtained, the programme was to be monitored and evaluated as it proceeded. This monitoring was to be carried out by the staff of the NRDC Secretariat with appropriate assistance from the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Nairobi.

**General Objectives of the SRDP**

The primary objectives of the SRDP as stated by the NRDC, were to increase rural incomes and employment opportunities. The secondary
objectives were to establish procedures and techniques for accelerated and self-generating rural development which could be repeated, i.e. replicated, in other similar areas and in particular, to improve the developmental capacity of Kenya government officials in the field.

Essentially then, SRDP had to be a planning exercise in which an attempt to set a pattern for realistic planning based on the local potential was to be made. Accordingly, in approaching each of the selected areas, the procedure followed was to ask a series of questions:

1. What is the potential of the area?
2. What are the constraints preventing that potential from being realised?
3. What programmes or actions can be taken to overcome those constraints?
4. What funds, staff, transport, training, etc. are needed to carry out those programmes?

Although the administrative Unit represented by each of the selected SRDP areas was the division, most of the planning for the first phase areas was carried out by the Nairobi Central office staff and by the Provincial level staff, with generally considerably less participation by district and divisional staff. At this early stage, mechanisms for generating popular participation by rural people themselves had not been seriously considered since the mentality of farmers who it was hoped could expand their farming activities quickly and start offering employment to the landless as well as those they would displace through buying out their parcels.

The Tetu SRDP

The basic objective of the Tetu SRDP according to the division's Outline Programme (1969) were to:
"....increase incomes and employment and to improve the quality of rural life. It was intended to enable smaller farmers to break out of subsistence cultivation and larger farmers to develop and provide employment. Economic diversification and the development of infrastructure will present employment opportunities and improve the amenities of rural life." But whereas this broad objective could serve as a framework for programme design and implementation, there was need to spell out more specifically what actual projects would have to be introduced in the area in pursuit of the SRDP goals. To this end, the outline went further to suggest that, ".... the initial thrust of the programme will be agricultural production and marketing; An intensive extension effort, concentrating on farm management and credit, will be mounted for farmers.... written materials, including a farm management manual, will increasingly be used to exploit the high literacy rates in the area.... The capacity of the Wambugu Farmers Training Centre (FTC) will be expanded.... through these means, attempts will be made to increase productivity of food crops, both to release land for cash cropping and to provide a regular marketable surplus which will encourage families to move further into the cash economy and buy more of their food. Special attention will be given to hybrid maize cultivation. In addition, tea, pyrethrum, coffee, pigs, dairy and beef will be improved and extended as and when possible."

The foregoing statement of the broad objective and some to the specific projects provided the terms of reference for the Tetu programme. But these were not enough. Even the so called specific objectives were not specific enough for programme operationalization. There was no mention of the actual tactics that would be used for instance in implementing the broad extension effort. It was not specified what kind of farm management was to be introduced, what forms of credit and it was not specified who was going to participate in these projects and how.

Yet these ambiguities notwithstanding, the IDS team that took up part of the responsibility for implementing the Tetu SRDP decided to take these broad statements of objectives as a base and from these, develop an experimental design of field research to determine which of various inputs could produce the greatest adoption of those behaviours likely to increase productivity of food, other crops and livestock.
3.2. The Tetu SRDP Extension Project

To avoid the problem of "planning without data", the IDS team decided to first undertake a baseline study of the division so as to generate data pertaining to the state of agricultural development in the area and to the social life of the people in general. This study was carried out in 1971. From some of its findings, the team discovered that the farming population of the division was stratified into various groups. There was a small group of topnotch farmers whom the team classified as the most "progressive". Below this group was another relatively large group who were classified as "Upper Middle Progressive" farmers. Next to this group came a third lot termed "Lower Middle Progressive Farmers" and lastly, a group of farmers forming about a quarter of the population who were least advanced vis-a-vis farming. This group was named the "Laggards".

This classification was based on an index of innovativeness formed from scores obtained from the number of modern agricultural innovations a farmer in the random sample had adopted and the number of years since adoption. Thus according to this criterion, the laggards were farmers who for one reason or another, had not adopted any of these innovations. They did not participate in extension education, did not have access to agricultural credit, etc. In general, this was a group that could be said to have been "left behind" by the kind of economic growth that was taking place in the division.

With this knowledge on hand, the IDS team in conjunction with local government and other organizations' officials, decided to base their extension experiment on the least progressive farmers since these were the people who were not participating in the development taking place in the area. They were the people with the lowest levels of productivity, incomes and also probably among the ones suffering most from serious unemployment and underemployment. This decision however, was not supported
by some policy makers. According to them "scarce resources" had to be used on the progressive farmers who were capable of expanding total production easily and more efficiently. With very modest efforts, the policy makers argued, these progressive farmers could double their output. At any rate, this group constituted what Swynnerton had identified as the group that would constitute the torch bearers of Kenya's rural development. They were the ones capable of buying out small "uneconomic" pieces of land held by the laggards in exchange for employment as farm labourers on their expanded farms.

At this early stage of the evolution of the SRDP, the question of equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth had not been seriously considered because discussions on "development" were still guided by the old paradigm of development discussed earlier. However, just before the experiment was started late in 1971, equity was added to the goals of SRDP. This helped to legitimise the earlier decision taken by the IDS team and local government officials.

But there was a problem. How was this group of "hard cores" going to be persuaded to participate in the SRDP? What incentives were to be used in their recruitment? What relatively simple and inexpensive project could they be started on to serve as a carrot? At the time of the baseline study, it had been discovered that Tetu division was and had always been, a deficit area with respect to maize - the basic staple food in the country. In addition, the baseline data had revealed that in 1971, only about 31% of farmers in the division were growing hybrid maize. As such, maize yields and ultimately output for the rest were very low.

Given the above facts, the combined team of IDS and government staff decided to base it's field extension experiment on a campaign aimed at accelerating the rate of adoption of this important food and cash crop. The campaign was in the first instance to be directed at the least progressive farmers whose adoption of the crop would increase yields to levels
which could generate a marketable surplus. Additionally, increase in yields would allow this group of farmers to devote a smaller area of land to maize and other food crops, leaving the rest of the land for other high income cash and livestock enterprises.

This line of reasoning was quite acceptable to policy makers who by now had accepted equity as a goal of rural development but some field extension officer were still sceptical with regard to the possibility of actually involving the laggards in this experiment. But the IDS team was convinced that this was possible. And after all the team argued the question of whether or not this group could be persuaded to participate in the project was an empirical question and that was all the experiment was about.

3.3 The Hybrid Maize Extension Experiment

After the IDS team persuaded a good number of field extension officers to join the team in the experiment, several meetings were held in which it was resolved that: (1) a hybrid maize adoption campaign involving the least progressive farmers ("laggards") would be initiated on an experimental basis, (2) the participants would be selected on the basis of whether or not they had adopted any of a number of selected high income crop and livestock enterprises that had been introduced in the area for quite some time. These enterprises included: Coffee, tea, pyrethrum, certified potatoes, macadamia nuts, hybrid maize and grade cattle. Those who had not adopted any of these innovations would form the pool out of which participants for the experiment would be recruited; (3) once recruited, these farmers would be invited to attend a 2½ days course at the local FTC on how to grow hybrid maize; (4) after successfully completing the course, the participants would be issued on credit a package consisting of enough hybrid seed, fertilizers and insecticides to plant ½ acre of hybrid maize; (5) after leaving the FTC, participants would form a group of five or more farmers in each sublocation. Each group would meet regularly with members helping each other with the various activities associated with the proper
growing of the newly adopted crop. For further technical assistance, a field extension worker would visit each group at least twice a week; (6) at the end of the season, participants would repay their loans in kind or in cash. Those who may have had a crop failure would have their repayment obligation postponed to the next season but they would still get a loan for that season; (7) money from such repayments would constitute a revolving fund from which participants could continue borrowing at increasing amounts and for more varied activities and still without any security.

With the above agreement, the IDS team, the Ministry of Agriculture team, the Administration (especially chiefs and sub-chiefs), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Nyeri District Co-operative Union, decided to undertake the project as a joint venture. The next thing they was to look for funds. The IDS team and its collaborators approached the government for funds and after several meetings, the Treasury and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) decided to allocate a substantial amount of money for the project. With money having been made available from these two sources, arrangements were made with the FTC to host the courses. AFC and the Union were given the responsibility of procuring and packaging the necessary inputs and the IDS team was given the role of; (1) training the FTC staff in communication skills; (2) supervising the FTC staff as it practiced its newly acquired skills on field extension workers and finally; (3) to help the FTC prepare visual aids and other course materials as well as assisting in the actual teaching of the participating farmers.

For recruitment, special farm-record cards were prepared to be filled for each potential participant in each sublocation by the subchief and the Junior Agricultural Assistant (JAA) attached to the sublocation. Information contained in the farm record cards was to be examined by the IDS team to see whether the sub-chief and the JAA had clearly understood the selection criteria.

The training in communication skills for the FTC staff was accomplished through a one week intensive course at the Adult Studies Centre.
at Kikuyu. The course was conducted jointly by members of the IDS team and staff of the Institute of Adult Studies (IAS). After the course, the staff of the FTC returned and practiced their newly acquired skills on JAAs.

3.4 The Courses

Having completed all the preliminary arrangements for the experiment, the following courses were arranged:

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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>24th - 26th May 1977</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>29th - 30th May 1977</td>
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<td>5th - 7th June 1977</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>8th - 10th June 1977</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>12th - 14th June 1977</td>
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All the above courses took place as planned. Each course had the stipulated number of participants. At the end of each course, all the farmers took the package of inputs and they all planted i.e. adopted hybrid maize. With proper follow-up by extension workers, the majority of farmers were able to successfully grow a good first crop of hybrid maize. Average yields achieved were around 8 bags (shelled) per ½ acre - equivalent to 16 bags per acre. This yields were not particularly high since in the Uasin Gishu District, large scale farmers were getting up to 30 bags per acre. But given the fact that the national average yield then was only 5 bags per acre and given the fact that this was a first attempt by these farmers, it was a commendable achievement.

On loan repayment, the project at first achieved a rate of repayment of up to 80%. This again was commendable given the fact many experts on small scale farmer credit schemes had concluded that farmers could not repay such insecured loans. This rate of repayment was also commendable on another count: while the project was achieving a rate of repayment of
up to 80%, AFC was achieving around 75% loan repayment on secured farm credit. Unfortunately, later in the project, the repayment rates started dropping when the administration and AFC personnel started losing enthusiasm on loan collection. Indeed, after the IDS team pulled out of the project in the middle of 1973, the whole project started stagnating and was finally discontinued sometimes in 1975.

IV Lessons Learned

Several lessons emerge from this experiment: (1) rural people are potentially willing and able to participate in developmental programmes and projects as long as clear economic (and preferably individual) benefits can be shown to accrue to the participants; (2) even the very poor people - the laggards - can participate if invited and if serious bottlenecks that prevent them from improving their economic performance are identified, diagnosed and ultimately removed. In other words, poor people in rural Kenya and elsewhere in Africa especially, are not yet fatalistic. They have hopes and they still retain the belief that they can still better their lots if opportunities are made available to them; (3) a good number of poor people-farmers as well as traders in the rural areas are willing to repay small short term loans even when such loans are unsecured by either movable or immovable assets such as title deeds to their holdings; (4) finally, the teams involved in this project came out convinced that one of the only ways of achieving popular participation in development is through persuading people to adopt modern income and employment generating innovations. Such innovations, will force their adoptors to start participating in such activities as the buying of farm inputs, selling of farm products, etc. Later, after participation in such activities is achieved, you can expect these people to start taking keen interest in other socio-economic and political activities of their communities and societies in as much as these activities impinge on the outcomes of their primarily economic activities. They will want to know for example, government pricing and marketing policies, something about the farm labour market, something about what kind of representative they should have in parliament and not surprisingly, they
may even want to know the latest news about Brazil’s coffee industry!

In other words, participation in modern primary economic activities opens a whole field of need for participation in other activities and current events. In addition, if participation in the various primary economic activities is broadly based, then participation in other spheres of life can be expected to be equitable since the first type of participation offers everyone the means for participating elsewhere. In an increasingly monetised economy, the basis for meaningful and popular participation in any activity is money. Consequently, participation in primary economic activities is the surest way of putting this medium of exchange in the hands of the masses and with this medium, participation in social and political affairs of society becomes more or less automatic.
FOOTNOTES


4. Rogers, E.M. op. cit. p. 225

5. McNamara, R.S. op. cit.


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McNamara, R.S. "Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank". Nairobi, IMF. 1973.


1. Introduction

It is certain that the patterns of decision making among territorial units of society play critical roles in development policy and in processes of social change and transformation. This situation of certainty, however, has led to a growing consensus that responsive planning and effective implementation of rural development programmes require high level of local initiative and participation by rural folks through their local government systems, political organisations, cooperative societies, farming unions and other forms of organised social structures. This paper will focus on local government as a possible system for organising rural population and providing structures and linkages through which participation, local initiative and mobilisation function. The discussion will focus on the present system of local government in the Sudan. The paper will attempt to evaluate and explain success and failures of local government in the country as regards participation in decision making in economic development issues and policies. Although the present system of rural government in the Sudan is only eight years old and the situation is rather fluid and can hardly be described as settled, the appreciation of the outcome can be quite useful in understanding the forces which have influenced the present level of achievement. Similarly, it is hoped that this attempt will instigate more concern among
researchers so as to develop yardsticks and methods for measuring participation and levels of local government efficiency required in the process of rural development and growth.

The first part of this paper will present a summary for the rural situation in the Sudan and will introduce some measures suggested for solving rural problems. The second part will focus on the functioning of local government in the Sudan. The discussion in part two can hardly be described as exhaustive; it aims at analysing some features related to rural participation through local government.

II The Rural Problem in the Sudan

The strategies and major objectives for developing rural areas in the Sudan have been continuously changing, reflecting change in government and prevailing ideologies. Before independence in 1956, the British Colonial administration was mostly concerned with the development of basic infrastructure such as rails for military and strategic functions but, later on, these basic structures became important in achieving an export economy. Cotton (mostly from irrigated settlement schemes) and gum Arabic became the two major Sudanese exports. Because of emphasis on cotton for supplying British manufacturers and breaking the dependence on American and Egyptian supplies, cotton became the major cash crop in the Gezira, the White Nile and the Blue Nile pump schemes, the Gash, the Baraka, the Nuba mountains and in Equatoria.

During the Second World War and in the mid-forties, the agricultural policy started to shift towards more food production. In the Northern Province vegetables, fruits, legumes and grains were encouraged, and indeed the change from steam to diesel pumps had drastic effects in the expansion of irrigated areas all over the Nile basin. Most of the development of irrigated agriculture was in the hands of the Government and the private sector. The colonial administration established a number of schemes along the White Nile and the basis of partnerships with tenants
- a system which was very similar to the Gezira arrangements. Other irrigated schemes were developed in the Northern Province on the basis of water rents and charges. In addition to government, the private sector (mostly religious leaders, politicians and urban based businessmen) was encouraged by Government policies and cotton prices in the 1950's to expand irrigated cotton agriculture along the Blue and White Niles. Government and private sector efforts were mostly commercial and as a result social development was ignored.

Similarly, mechanised dry farming for the purpose of producing food crops started to expand from the mid-1940's. By the early 1950's the Government withdrew as a developer and the whole future of this sector was left entirely to the private sector until the late 1960's. Again the emphasis on commercial returns hindered social development on the rich clay plains where mechanised dry farming has been practised.

Another important component of rural strategies in the Sudan was the establishment of settlement schemes. The Gezira, the Gash, the Zandei and the Nuba Mountains. Cotton growing areas were essentially based on settlement. Apart from the Gezira, other settlement experiments were hardly planned properly. Latent administrative objectives influenced the Gash, the Zandei and the Nuba Mountains experiments. Similarly, the emphasis on creating permanent settlements led to serious negligence of the human factors and social development as well.

Between 1956 and 1969 the same policies of expanding irrigated cotton agriculture, along the major rivers, and mechanised dry farming on the clay plains continued. Settlement policy continued as well; the Managil and Khashm el Girba were developed during this period. Apart from settlement schemes, the policy was essentially based on providing limited social services whenever possible and extending water supply in non-riverine areas. Because of import substitute policy, new crops were introduced and sugar cane, wheat and groundnuts began to assume importance in the rural economy.
By 1970, the rural situation started to play an important role in Government decisions. The over-riding issue was the building up of political support in rural areas for adopted socialist urban ideologies which have prevailed since 1969. The increase in awareness about rural problems led to expanding the co-operative movement, introducing a new local government Act, establishing new political organisations at village level, creating a rural development finance corporation within the Sudan Development Corporation, emphasising the rural sector in the new Six Years Plan (1977/78-1982/83) and preparing many regional studies and plans for rural problem areas.

III Consequences of Government Policies on Rural Areas

Government concern with levels of aggregate investment and rate of growth of aggregate output led to poor distribution of economic welfare and growth. The Programmes of Development 1946-1956, the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71, the Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75 and the Phased Programme of Action 1972, were mostly concerned with fitting projects under national objectives. Many of the projects were conceived at the national level which in many cases, failed to fit local conditions. Not only that but there was a general lack of a clear approach when dealing with non-riverine areas. High potential, available information, experience and revenue needs have led to the concentration of development along the major rivers and in particular in the central eastern Sudan. In the process of development, the Khartoum-Gezira axis emerged as the national core where most of the industrial and agricultural production is generated. Further more, this situation led to heavy concentration of social development which has made the region more attractive for further growth and development at the expense of other rural areas in the Sudan.

This disparity in development is not unique to the Sudan and exists at varying degrees in other African situations. What makes the rural situation in the Sudan rather serious is: the size of the country; the variations in rural resources and potential; the cultural ethnic
heterogeneity; the virtual stagnation of rural economies and even the
deterioration and decline of certain areas such as the semi-arid region
and the Gash Delta. Furthermore, the dominance of pastoral nomadism in
the rural Sudan complicates the development efforts in rural areas.

IV Institutions Concerned with Rural Development

Rural Development in the Sudan is handicapped by a general
lack of co-ordination among the various Government bodies and institutions.
All social service and production ministries have rural concerns, but un-
fortunately co-ordination is absent and not only that, internal co-ordin-
ation is lacking in the activities of ministries. Major ministries such
as the Ministry of Agriculture has focused services on scheme areas which
constitute a very small portion of rural Sudan. In addition such scheme
areas have developed their own social development institutions which are
supported by revenue from local production. The Social Development Depart-
ment in the Gezira is a good case in point.

New ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Development and
the Ministry of Co-operation, are progressively becoming significant in
rural development in the Sudan. The former Ministry is basically focusing
on processes and is slightly concerned about production. The latter
Ministry is providing financial support and organisation to the co-operative
movement in the Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the co-operative move-
ment in rural Sudan goes back to the early 1930's and that the Government
had passed several Acts in 1948, 1968 and 1976 to organise and encourage
the movement. Certainly there are examples of success of co-operative efforts
in rural Sudan, particularly in irrigation activity and production, but the
movement is far from achieving its major objectives as it suffers from
lack of finance, supervisory cadre and non-conducive feelings and mental
attitudes of rural folks. For example, agricultural co-operative declined
in number by 11.1% between 1970 and 1975. Membership declined from 80,000
to 65,000 in the same period and this was accompanied by a drop in capital
investments.
In addition to ministries there are other government agencies which handle rural development in the Sudan. For example, the Water Development Corporation is responsible for providing water into rural Sudan. However, its rural development section has been recently added to the administration of Natural Resources in the Ministry of Agriculture. This action prepares social and economic studies on rural areas and is involved in what is known as the development of pilot projects (these are usually small production schemes).

In addition to Government, many private, local and international agencies have vested interests in rural development in the Sudan. Similarly, the Sudan Socialist Union (the only political organisation in the country) has its Rural Development Committees which are organised from the village to the national levels. These committees have achieved very little. In addition to all this, local government councils are beginning to be more concerned with rural development.

V Local Government and Rural Participation

In 1971 the Government passed the Peoples Local Government Act with several objectives, but most importantly to create channels for mass participation in decision making. Furthermore, local councils have the right to prepare their own projects and plans and to seek local or other resources for implementation. Under that Act, new provinces were created to bring Government close to people and under decentralisation provinces began semi-autonomous.

Certainly the 1971 Act is a great improvement on the 1951 Local Government Act and other previous enactments as far as goals and objectives are concerned. Before 1935, local chiefs and District Commissioners were the unchallenged administrators of rural Sudan. But, as a result of several Acts between 1935 and 1937, towns began to have their elected councils and gradually rural areas followed suit. By 1951 local government councils were elected in most districts in the Sudan. The leadership of
These councils were in the hands of the traditional elite and tribal chiefs. Furthermore, the councils closely followed the tribal boundaries and homelands. The previous system which was based on elected bodies at district level, was in full agreement with political ideologies before 1971. Chiefs and traditional elite who provided leadership in these councils were leaders and supporters of liberal democratic parties before 1969, when the present Government took office. However, they failed to operate smoothly under a centralised system of government and the presence of District Commissioners, even after independence and the passing of the Province Administration Act of 1961 which did away with the District Commissioners in most of the country. The councils were mostly concerned with providing social services and, in fact, the council's local revenue determined its ability and freedom to act.

VI Local Government Act 1971

The 1971 Act has opened the door for local people from the village upwards to the province level to participate in decision making through their elected bodies. Because of the Act it is an accepted assumption that people must have a say in their local affairs, particularly in development matters. The Act provides for each province to have District Councils, which are made up of Rural and Urban Councils (see Diagram p.165).

VII Conclusions

From this brief discussion, it is evident that lack of balanced rural regional development in the Sudan has been brought about by economic policies which led to concentration of investments on favourable areas. This situation led to the emergence of east-central Sudan as the most developed area in the country where most of the commercial production is generated. This situation has been recognised as politically dangerous as present policies and market forces lead to more divergence in growth and therefore to political agitation and instability and poor distribution of resources under regional pressure groups. Furthermore, it has been recog-
nised that what has been learned from rural development, so far, cannot be applied to non-riverine lands where environmental and cultural set-ups are essentially different from those prevailing in east-central Sudan.

In recent times, there has been a growing political support for action in rural areas. As a result, many government agencies began to emphasise rural development as a top priority. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of objectives, approach and co-ordination. Sector service approach is still a dominant feature and is greatly coloured by urban concepts and priorities in most cases.

To solve these problems and to open the door for mass participation, the Government passed the 1971 Peoples' Local Government Act. Although it is rather difficult to measure levels of participation achieved under the Act, people are beginning to take initiative and concern about their local matters. Since yardsticks for measuring successful levels of participation have not been applied, from observation one is tempted to suggest that mobilisation and sharing of power at local levels were below the declared objectives of the Act. Whether the Act is too advanced for Sudanese local conditions or that there is no agreement between prevailing urban political ideology and local aspirations remains to be investigated.

Similarly, lower levels of participation can be explained by the fact that the Act has become more of an administrative-political framework and, therefore, undermining the economic functions and objectives. Again to insert economic functions, a strong commitment and successful formation of economic organisations at local levels are important conditions.

Further, the weak financial position of many provinces interferes with decentralisation processes. When local choices are determined at central levels, the system becomes less responsive to local desires and objectives and eventually becomes inflexible and less adaptable to local needs. It is quite possible that such a situation reduces levels of participation as many local attempts are frustrated by central control.
Bibliography


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IMPEDEMENTS TO SUSTAINED PEASANT PARTICIPATION
IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

by

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1. Introduction

The question of what causes sustained development process has invited a battery of ideas, some of them very novel indeed, but what remains a menacing fact is that many parts of the world still remain stagnant, trapped in the vicious glue of poverty and deprivation. The rural communities of many developing countries and some developed countries seem to have been handy victims of this vicious glue.

In this paper I intend to look at the causes that have hampered sustained peasant participation in the development process in the less developed countries especially in Africa. Many of these ideas may not be news to members of the workshop since this area has been trampled upon a lot by 'experts', but I may succeed in making some sufficient provocative statements to provide a basis for constructive discussion. Rather than trying to engage in restrictive definitions of such term as 'peasantry', 'development', etc. I prefer that the widest latitude be given to the meanings of these terms. I shall begin by briefly sketching the issues which have been raised in relation to the peasantry and development generally, then I shall elaborate on some of the impediments to peasant participation in the development process, and lastly I shall wind up with the summary and concluding remarks.
The peasantry are the most numerous social group in all organised states that have rested on traditional forms of agriculture; and they are also the most ignored group in the organization, management and running of those states. They have usually been regarded as 'givens' in the development equation, and not as one of the variables to be actively investigated. It is only recently that interest in the possibility of activating the peasants and turning them into dynamic development variables has gathered momentum. This interest took a political turn because the quiet, passive peasant is already aware of the modern world - far more than we realise and he is impatient to gain his share. It is also because of the economics of large numbers; the peasants are just too numerous and are becoming too politicised to be ignored.

Two schools of thought can be distilled from the mass of literature accumulated over two centuries on peasants and the development process. One is that the peasant as a socio-politico-economic class can never sustain a revolution, will never be a vehicle of development and is doomed to live from hand to mouth by scratching the earth, constantly being threatened with prospects of annihilation through starvation. It was therefore a waste of effort, time and resources to try to save them from the predicament. The other school of thought expresses the contrary view: that the peasant can be revolutionary and reacts very positively to development incentives.

Among the earlier proponents of the first view were Marx-Engels who held that the peasants were 'sacks of potatoes' and that peasantry life was 'rural idiocy'; that it would be wrong for socialist parties to support measures designed to aid peasant agriculture because this would serve only to prolong artificially the existence of a stratum which was economically outmoded, socially backward and politically conservative. In the final analysis they maintained that the peasantry as a class was in the process of disappearing and were foredoomed to be replaced by large scale agriculture.
Recent decades have witnessed the development of a new and dramatically different Marxist evaluation of the political possibilities of the peasantry in reference to Far East and Latin America. The revolutionaries there found it difficult to sustain a revolutionary movement based on the city in countries which were largely rural. They shifted their emphasis and declared that the road to power was through the rural masses. The discontented peasantry were organised into a politically conscious people's army which proceeded to create the new China, Cuba and other countries. Phenomenal developments have taken place in these countries, thanks to the politicised peasantry. Those developments in these countries have exploded the myth that although peasant uprisings have been marked by fury, desperation and brutality, the upper class had always been able to contain the situation by striking back ruthlessly and decisively deploying their unlimited resources and vast military experiences.

As I read through recent literature the idea that the peasantry in Africa are in a type of steady equilibrium and that attempts to move them from this equilibrium have generally been futile still seeps through many of the writings. In this equilibrium, the state of the arts and preferences and motives for holding and acquiring agricultural factors as sources of income streams have remained approximately constant for a long time. This view is well expressed in a statement made by V. Musakanya, a former governor of the Bank of Zambia:

"The rural areas have human material neither to pursue nor to sustain a development effort, and such development as is created has only temporary effect as it depends largely on urban manpower (!) and materials. Thus rural development efforts are not only expensive but from the outset doomed to minimum return."

The crux of the matter is why have the peasants tended to remain in this equilibrium which makes them slow or non-starters in the development race?
III Impediments to Sustained Peasant Participation in the Development Process

The peasants have been slow or non-starters in the development process through no fault of their own but mainly because of overwhelming forces external to themselves. The socio-economic system operating in the rural areas is often hostile to the objectives of rural development, serving to reinforce rural poverty and to frustrate efforts of the poor to move up. Therefore to design effective programs dealing with poverty calls for a clear understanding of the system which perpetuates poverty.

3.1 New Ideas

Although development and modernity is a permanent dimension of any culture, the current view of development and modernity promulgated by development agents in African countries is an accretion of imported elements of mainly western culture and way of life. As Sainju said, "In any developing country, development is a process of creative destruction. In other words we have to destroy traditional schools of thought and organisations in the process of creating new organisations." So at the outset the would be indigenous development process of the peasant was nabbed in the bud by colonialism and in its place, foreign elements were introduced thereby alienating whole groups of a people. Now, the first step in the acceptance of change leading to the adoption of new techniques of production is to involve the community in the selection, design, construction and implementation of rural development programs. It takes a very long time to convince people to change their age old ways of life and adopt new foreign ones, leave alone popularising them. My first submission is that the colonialists and those who replaced them had vilified the traditional values, the peasants have not been given sufficient time not only to recover from the cultural shock but also to absorb the new culture and be willing to participate in its advancement because "there is no substitute for the peoples own participation and hard work for achieving permanent
In other words the development agents have been too impatient and have not given enough time for new ideas and innovations to be accepted and assimilated by the people.

The pre-requisite for popular participation by the people in a new activity are roughly (a) that people must know the new activity, (b) they must believe that the new activity enhances their welfare function or is better than former activities in fulfilling a given objective, (c) they should believe that it is desirable to ensure the success of the activity and lastly, (f) there must be ways and means to carry out the activity. With respect to these points I want to reiterate that the development agents have given the peasants neither the time nor the knowledge, nor the means to enable them to participate in their type of development process. We must therefore find satisfactory answers to the following questions in order to have any hope of bringing the peasant into the development net:

1) How much knowledge or information will convince a peasant to participate in a new development activity?

2) How long is it necessary to prop up the peasant so that left alone after that he would perpetuate or even improve on the new development activity introduced?

3) How much resources will he need initially and thereafter and where will the resources come from in order to enable the peasant carryout the activity?

These questions are not new but the answers to them have not been satisfactory. Question one is to those asked by Wolf: "Who is it that will speak to the peasant to violent political action? - - - - What circumstances and what sets of people will prove propitious to the establishment of such communication?". Question three has generated thoughts which led to the setting up of such programs like 'minimum package programs' and 'intensive package programs' in Ethiopia, Republic of
Korea and other countries. These ideas are of course the bastard children of the "critical minimum effort" development theory.

The unpalatable facts are that developing countries are littered with skeletons of many rural development projects. Secondly, after the initial development stimulated by the growth of export of cash crops, the peasants have generally settled to a type of low level income equilibrium or actually deteriorated as the international commodity market situation for those cash crops changed catastrophically. I demand answers to the three questions and explanations to these phenomena from this workshop.

How far could these questions be answered by the new and growing body of knowledge in Institution Building? (see also appendix one on Key Institution Building Concepts.)

2.3 Colonialism and Colonial Hangover

For the last 400 years the European powers have been moulding the economies and peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America to their own needs. They encouraged these economies to throw off self sufficiency they once had in the productive sense and socially and instead enticed and compelled them to orientate their economies in quite a different direction - that of permanent dependence.

The colonial rule greatly distorted the indigenous agricultural system. In many parts of the world the peasants were forced off the best lands and driven to the hillsides to cultivate rocky soils and swamps to cultivate malaria and bilharzia infected lands. In Central America the Indians were forced to the hillsides to leave fertile flat lands to grow sugar and other crops for exports. In Honduras a lot of northern fertile valley floors have been forcefully bought by international food companies, often to raise cattle for the United States pet food market. The peasants moved up the dangerous valley slopes so that in 1975,
over 3,000 Hondurians were killed in the torrential rains which stripped the hillsides of their soil and caused disastrous floods. In Lesotho the peasants were forced to the barren hills to leave flat land for white settler farmers. In Kenya, the Kikuyu were forced from the fertile "white highlands" and made landless labourers in their own ancestral land. In Swaziland the Partitions and Proclamation of 1907 gave the Swazi people only one third of the country whilst two thirds was allocated to the concessionaires - the white farmers. After independence, the unfair system lived on because a powerful minority of indigenous people wished to maintain it.

Indigenous agricultural development was quickly suffocated. In 1890 a British agriculturist in India wrote: "Nowhere would one find better knowledge of soils or ingenuity than one finds in Indian agriculture .... rotation .... mixed crops .... I have never seen a more perfect picture of cultivation." Soon that picture quickly disappeared and India became a net importer of food. Swaziland was self-sufficient in food until 1894, but by early 1900 the majority of the peasants were forced to buy food from the trader because two thirds of their best land had been robbed. Joseph Thompson the Scottish explorer had this to say about Kikuyu agriculture in 1887: "At this high region drought is unknown and astonishing fertility is everywhere seen .... enormous quantities of sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, sugarcane, Indian corn .... extremely fat sheep and goats abound ...." As we have already noted, the Kikuyu were driven off their land and fenced by the white settlers. Also Harry Johnston another explorer had this to say about Chaga irrigation on the Kilimanjaro: "It is in their husbandry that Wachaga most excel. The wonderful skill with which they irrigate their terraced hillsides by tiny tunnels of water diverted from the main stream shows a considerable advancement in agriculture ...."

Traditional production gave way to other forms of production because as John Stuart Mill said of West Indies: "They cannot be regarded
as countries. They are the places where the English find it convenient to carry on production of sugar and a few other tropical commodities. So in Uganda emphasis on production of food changed to cotton; in Tanzania millet changed to sisal; in Ghana yams changed to cocoa; in Benin food changed to palm oil; in Gambia rice changed to peanuts; and in Liberia food changed to rubber. Before colonialism, Africa and indeed all other countries were self-sufficient in food but because the colonies needed other things the peasants had to grow cash crops for exports through force and taxes on land houses and cattle. This made developing countries net importers of food. By 1770 the West Indies were importing grain, beans, fish and vegetables thereby becoming very vulnerable. When supplies stopped during the American war of independence, 15,000 died of famine in Jamaica alone. Even Sir Arthur Lewis, a traditional neoclassical economist noted that "For the last 80 years the tropical countries have put practically all their agricultural research and extension funds and efforts into trying to raise the productivity of export crops like cocoa, tea, or rubber and virtually no effort into food productivity.... From their point of view, this effort was wholly misdirected...." Through the redirection of effort away from food production, the colonisers created the greatest dependence on international capitalism of all inadequacy of food. A U.S. official is quoted to have said that "increasing grain shortage could give 'Washington.... vital life and death power over the fate of the multitudes of the needy". The colonialists also established large plantations which they managed themselves and some of which have been taken over by indigenous urban elites. Workers for these plantations came from communities whose land had been taken away or from reserves too small to produce enough food. These plantations made the already powerful more powerful and helped to create the great disparities in land ownership we see today in the less developed countries. Colonialism strangled the indigenous industrial revolution. In India where before the British rule there had been a thriving textile
industry, the British introduced a system of tariffs and taxes in order to encourage its liquidation and increase exports of British goods to India. In East Africa numerous examples of flourishing indigenous industries can be found in the records of early explorers, e.g. the Kisii potters, salt making in Uvinza which was on the trade route from Tabora to Ujiji, Lungu cotton spinners and Samia iron mongers. In Uganda the potters, brewers, weavers, iron mongers and other industrialists were systematically made redundant: chinaware replaced earthen and woodware; plastic and paper bags replaced baskets; beer, whisky, brandy and gin replaced Kongo, Mwenge, Kwete, Mulamba and Enguli. In Botswana the Government had this to say: "There has also been a decline in traditional industries. Well established modern manufacturers in Southern Africa and elsewhere have flooded the local stores with mass produced goods providing overwhelming competition. Traditional craftsmen have been steadily deprived over the years of their local markets and have ceased production". The products of the rural industry have now been left as a preserve for the very limited tourist market. Many of the articles which may not necessarily be better than the replaced rural products had to be imported.

Colonialism bastardised our culture and administered cultural shocks to the people. The rural people lost their sense of direction and have found it more difficult to recover from these shocks because the peasantry in some quarters are considered as "the stronghold of religion, the seat of traditional values and supporters of the monarchy" and as "a conservative class whose attachment to the land and to the integrated village and local community and to the family precludes ready acceptance of social change let alone revolution".

In Southern Africa colonialism made masses and masses of peasants (over 500,000) economic refugees from Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Angola and forced them to work for meagre wages in mines in Azania to create value added there.

All in all we can say that colonialism deprived many peasants of their birth rights such as land and self determination and wiped out any
hope of indigenous agricultural and industrial revolution, redirected whole economies towards permanent dependence on international capitalism, totally demoralised the countryside and completely alienated the peasants. So materially, socially and politically the rural people were very poor starters in the development race as a result of colonialism and its offshoots.

The colonial hangover is a situation where the colonial set up is perpetuated even after political independence of many countries:

i) Societies in these countries through increased interaction with the west and the adoption of western ideas and practices began to undergo a fundamental process of change akin to the western model.

ii) They cannot stop growing and selling cash crops in order to concentrate on food production because they need the foreign exchange it brings to pay past debts and buy luxury imports for the urban dwellers.

iii) They cannot drastically alter the system and prefer to keep the status quo because the few powerful elites who are in a position to bring about these changes stand to lose by that exercise.

iv) The people spear-headed by the urban elites are permanently biased against their traditional values, culture and way of life so that whatever is indigenous is undesirable and whatever is modern (western) must be carbon copied. A Masai who had been introduced to western ways of life declared, "I HAVE TURNED MY BACK ON THE OLD DEADLY WAY OF LIFE!"

v) There is a permanent institution to which we entrust our children for indoctrination from very early tender ages whose objectives, aims, materials, means and disciples have not radically changed from the colonial days - the educational system at home and abroad where they go for their M.A.s, Ph.D.s study tours etc.
vi) The centra-periphery relations (subject of our next section) continues between former colonial masters and colonies because the colonies failed to alter trade relations and relative bargaining strength in trade negotiations: they have always been in a weaker bargaining position until the lucky oil producers discovered their power.

vii) In Southern Africa it created a situation where the supply of cheap labour to the South African mines in still continuing from the peripheral countries.

viii) Most of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific countries were brought into the European Economic Community trade net through the Lome Convention.


3.3 Centra-Periphery Relations and the Trade Trap

The centre-periphery relations develop when there is trade between unequal partners. This phenomenon has occurred internationally when the less developed countries traded and still trade with the industrialised countries; and has also occurred within the nation when regions traded with each other and more specifically when the urban areas traded with the rural areas. I will not bore you by talking too much about the international centre-periphery relations 30. Since we are not directly concerned with it here, so it will suffice to give a skeleton view.

3.3.1 International Centre-Periphery Relations

In summary when we have international centre-periphery relations, economic activities: growth of incomes, employment and social welfare tend to congregate in the centre — the industrialised countries, at the expense of the periphery; and the position tend to worsen as trade continues 31. This situation comes about because:
Most developing countries rely on selling their crops and minerals overseas which makes them highly dependent on world prices for these goods.

Most developing countries depend on a single commodity for their foreign exchange which makes them highly vulnerable, (Table 1).

Over the years the income from developing country's exports has gone down and the cost of manufactures has gone up: In 1960 in the Banana Republics, three tons of bananas were enough to buy a tractor; in 1970 it took eleven tons for a tractor.

Few of the crops from the less developed countries are really essential: when the price of coffee, tea and cocoa rises, they just drink less; that is the price elasticity of demand for these commodities is very high and demand can be drastically reduced by a small rise in price. For the commodities that have been essential substitutes have been found thereby bringing a shift in world trade towards oil producing countries.

Primary export production does not contain enough dynamic demand potential to transform the economy and does not generate backward and forward linkages.

People make more money out of the crops and minerals at the processing stage in the industrial countries. The less developed countries cannot process their commodities because of tariffs and trade barriers put up by the developed countries.

Aid, unless given in grant form is a form of trade for exploitation. Most aid is military anyway which has no relevance to economic development except in that it is for killing people.
(Is this an acceptable shortcut that you merely silence those clamouring for more?) Others are used to import complicated machinery (white elephants) and spend on salaries of foreign experts who provide technical answers with little relevance to the small farmers, tenants and the landless labourers. So the international centre-periphery relations makes the less developed country get a very small cake relative to its efforts through unfair trade. In the following section, among other things, we shall see how this minute cake is divided between the urban and rural dwellers.

3.3.2. Rural-Urban Relations

The bourgeois economists after working statistical relationships between development and industrialisation, recommended to the less developed countries that they must industrialise now and the peasant was the direct victim of this policy.

The governments which are dominated by urban and industrial interests now follow a well recognised method of transferring wealth from the rural to the urban sector by:

- Controlling the food prices,
- giving tariff protection to inefficient industries,
- subsidising foreign exchange for industrial use,
- giving tax holidays to industries.

The net and deliberate result of this is to turn the terms of trade against rural development and effectuate massive transfer of resources to the urban areas.

The rural dwellers were and are stillcrippingly taxed when they sell cash crops for exports through graduated taxes, export taxes, reserve funds (which are never refunded), and maintaining a large and expensive
army of marketing personnel. So that in Uganda the farmer hardly got
20% of the price his cotton and coffee were fetching on the world
market (34). To compound the exploitation almost all the foreign
exchange earned by the rural areas was used to provide economic and
social infrastructure in the urban areas, buy luxury consumer commodities
for urban dwellers, build up large industrial complexes like the
former Uganda Development Corporation; build up instruments of
repression like army, police and prisons; and expatriate the rest
abroad in payment of debts, interests dividends, profits, and safe
deposits. Very little of this money found its way to the peasants.

Government development expenditure and public spending in general
has always been skewed in favour of urban projects. Despite recent
declarations by many governments to give priority for rural development,
(35) what is actually happening is that "the rural areas get the
promises and priority but the urban areas get the resources". (36)

In the rural areas, it is the rich who in many cases have urban
connections that get favoured treatment. In fact I am bold enough to state
that the real poor have never got any meaningful assistance to make them
other international organisations. Of course the organisations in
most cases channel their contribution through the urban based governments.

Whatever little money gets into the hands of the peasant is quickly
siphoned away to the towns to create multiplier effects there because
"there is nothing the peasants can buy with their money in the rural areas."
All rural industries are dead, or doing nothing.

The educational system is among the most successful institutions
in exploiting the peasants because:

a) It takes away the peasants most able sons and daughters who
would have been engines of growth in the rural areas.
b) After the peasant has sunk enormous capital (all his savings, borrowings and taxes) in relation to his resources on the child, he then proceeds to the urban areas with all the resources embedded in him to work there and create multiplier effects with his expenditure there. He goes to the urban areas because "there is nothing for him to do in the rural areas".

c) After the educated child has acquired the three Ps (Power, Pomp and Prestige) from his education, he then goes back and expropriates land from the peasants and he is the one eligible to receive government assistance because he is a 'progressive farmer' and is less of an investment risk. That peasant's son now joins the club of absentee landlords residing in the urban areas.

d) The educational system preaches urban culture and alienates the educated people against their culture, people, homes and even themselves in case the aspirations created by education are not realised. When I was at school teachers emphasised the statement that "You are the future leaders of this great country", and I knew that the current leaders of the great country live in towns, and that I could not possibly be leader when I am unemployed and cannot even feed myself and that I could not even lead the villagers because their ways were now totally alien to me.

In summary, the peasants, tenants share-croppers and landless labourers have been caught up in a trade trap which makes it next to impossible to participate in the development process. First there is the huge trap set by international capitalism which engulfs the whole poor country and "milks it without feeding it", and then there is the internal trap set by urban biased governments and indigenous elites who ensure that almost every cent and potentially productive human resource is transferred to the urban areas very quickly.
3.4 Disasters: Natural and Man-made

3.4.1. Natural Disasters

Natural disasters are caused mainly by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, tidal bore, floods and droughts. Other minor disasters are caused by diseases, soil erosion, leaching, continuous struggle between conservation and degradation of soil resources, and continuous intensive heat which encourage disease, reduces the pace of human and animal activity and causes rapid deterioration of the soils. There is no doubt that these disasters are a great impediment to the development process. The net result of any disaster is to wipe out some or all the efforts that have so far been made in agriculture and whoever is concerned has to start a new.

Between 1965 and 1976, 1.6 million people died and 474 million were seriously affected following disasters; and in 1976 alone, 26 major disasters were reported affecting 20.7 million people. Nearly all the major tragedies (95%) appear to occur in the developing world with increasing regularity. (39) Table 2 shows some of the recent disasters in some developing countries. Column 8 shows that although these were single tragedies, the number of people seriously affected range from 0.2% to 50% of the total population of those countries.

In these disasters it is the very poor who come out worst hit because they have badly sited houses (on steep hillsides, flood plains or river estuaries); wrongly built houses (poor building materials no foundations); no reserves (or money, food and credit); lack of influence (government insensitive to give signs of distress); and little communication (inaccessible rural areas) (40).
Botswana has had constant and almost regular instances of one type of disaster — droughts, for a long time. It is my submission that droughts is one of the major impediments to peasant participation in sustained development in Botswana. A study of the constraints on agricultural development in Botswana reported that "Farming in Botswana is dependent on a capricious climate. Most households consider rainfall to be the main constraint to production, and it is the most important and controlling influence". (41) Appendix 2 gives estimates of the probable incidence of drought in six regions of Botswana and Appendix 3 gives a historical sketch of the incidence of droughts in Botswana between 1889 - and 1970. These two documents plus the fact that Botswana has had a long history with World Food Aid Program (42) should make clear what I mean. The effect of droughts on livestock industry are: no calves are born, there is a 50-75% cattle population decrease, all loans in the livestock sector are written off, there is a permanent damage to range, exports of meat is negligible and there is a panic sale of cattle so that the price received is driven below production costs. (43) It is the poor man’s cow (which embodies a lifetime saving) that usually dies first because he cannot afford artificial watering of cattle through the use of private boreholes. Since droughts are regular, the poor man’s efforts are regularly wiped out.

3.4.2. Man-made Disasters

Man-made disasters consist mainly of wars, inappropriate economic policies and an accentuation of natural disaster.

Firstly, between 1958 and 1970 there were 24 successful coups in 13 African countries and there were 12 major attempted but unsuccessful coups. Since then there have been many more including Uganda (1971), Ghana (1972), Madagascar (1972), Dahomey (1972), Rwanda (1973), Upper Volta (1974), Niger (1974), Chad (1975), Nigeria (1975) and Burundi (1976). (44).
Secondly considerable violence has characterised threats to the governments of African nations by disaffected communal or ethnic groupings e.g. Zaire (Katanga), Nigeria (Biafra), Sudan (Southern Sudan), Ethiopia (Eritrea), Uganda (Buganda), Zambia (Lumpa) and Burundi (Batuai).

Thirdly there has also been significant irredentism in which ethnic groups have sought reunification across arbitrarily imposed boundaries by the colonialists e.g. Ewe (Ghana and Togo), Kongo (Zaire, Congo and Angola) Somali (Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia). (45).

Lastly the wars of liberation has caused considerable amount of deaths and wholesome movement of peoples, e.g. Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Azania and Zimbabwe.

Who will dispute the fact that wars, threats of wars and political instability affects the peasant most? It is his son who must go, fight and die and he himself might be forced to flee on foot from place to place he has sunk all his capital, empty handed, to other parts of the country or even across national borders to become a refugee. In Africa there is an estimated refugee population of between 1.1 and 3 million. (46).

Inappropriate economic policies and an accentuation of natural disasters can be summed up in one word: SAHEL. (47).

3.5. Other Factors

The Law - The law may hinder or help modernisation and equipment of the countryside but it is notoriously slow in adjusting itself to technical development. The law determines and regulates the appropriations and disposal of various factors of production and the distribution of the society's output. (48) It, for example, determines the relationships between the peasant and the landlord, money-lender,
urban elite, trader, banker, and government generally. It is my submission that the law and other institutional arrangements disfavour the peasant in their allocative and regulatory functions.

I have been looking at the problem at the macro level and even at that level I shall not attempt to exhaust all the impediments. At the micro level the list of impediments could be a kilometer long and since anybody's list could be as good if not better than mine depending on experience, I prefer to leave this field to our individual experiences.

4. Summary and Concluding Remarks

In summary, the points raised in this paper are as follows:

That the peasant is in a type of low level income equilibrium and attempts to move him from this state have generally been futile.

That development as promulgated by the development agents in less developed countries is new and alien to the peasant of those countries and the peasant has not been given enough information, time and resources to enable him participate in the new development process.

That materially, socially and politically the rural people were very poor or non-starters in the development race because of colonialism and its offshoots.

That the peasant has been caught up in a trade trap which makes it difficult for him to participate in the development process: first there is the huge trap set by international capitalism which engulfs the whole poor country and "milks it without feeding it," and secondly there is the internal trap set by the urban biased governments and indigenous elites which ensures that almost every cent and potentially very productive human resource is transferred to the urban areas.
That disaster, natural or man-made, have the effect of wiping out part or all of the development efforts so far made by the peasant and he has the task of beginning a new after every disaster (if he is still alive).

That the law and other institutional arrangements disfavour the peasant in their allocative and regulatory functions.

And lastly that looking at the problem at the micro level, the obstacles facing the individual peasant are just too numerous for us to engage in the futile exercise of enumerating them.

Building a modern society is not a routine process in which all stages are known and all contingencies anticipated. One should expect mistakes, frustrations, disappointments, anxiety, conflict etc. The development process involves the introduction and acceptance of numerous changes of innovations in the modernising society. Many of these changes are technological in the physical as well as social sense. Many of such changes which seem technical and rational to the foreign agent or expert and even to the domestic leaders may however be perceived by the people as damaging or threatening to their material interest, their occupational or social status, familiar relationships and well entrenched habits.

Innovations or changes will occur with less resistance when people come to realise that they are no longer or may soon not be getting what will satisfy them out of the current environment. They are now ready to experiment with new rules, i.e. they need CRISIS. Secondly, necessity will cancel the deterrent effect of uncertainty and make a man decide his priorities. To jerk the peasant out of his equilibrium, we need to present him with a crisis. Question: What type of crises shall we use?
To overcome the fundamental problem of the tenants, share-croppers, landless labourers, we should look into the possibility of land reform and redistribution. Landlordism as an institution must be liquidated. Secondly in many African countries there are still vast areas of virgin land. For those countries, they should look into the possibility of population movement.

Growth retarding laws and institutions must be removed. In some countries this can only be done through a revolution. Ways and means should be found to accomplish this without a blood bath.

To cushion disaster effects ways and means should be found to improve disaster preparedness in disaster prone areas. In Botswana, although rain is unevenly distributed through the year, they have sufficient rainfall in some parts of the country. Ways and means should be found to store water and ensure water supply in the dry seasons.

To disentangle the peasant from the net of international capitalism and urban domination peasants should be encouraged to concentrate on food production first, so that the 40 out of 48 subsaharan countries importing food begin to feed themselves forthwith. In addition ways and means must be found in which rural income is spent in rural areas. All leakages of rural income and government rural expenditure must be stopped now.

Lastly the peasantry must be politicised so that they become more aware of, and strive to get their inalienable rights themselves.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Export as a Percentage of Total Exports 1966-68 (Average Over the Three Year Period)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Morrison D.C., Black Africa: A Comparative Hand Book

(p. 142, Table 13.2)
APPENDIX 1. KEY INSTITUTION BUILDINGS CONCEPTS

1. Leadership
   1.1. Internal functional characteristics
       1.1.1. competence
       1.1.2. commitment
       1.1.3. style
       1.1.4. tactics
       1.1.5. continuity
   1.2. External functional Characteristics
       1.2.1. linkage management
       1.2.2. style
       1.2.3. tactics
       1.2.4. doctrine manipulation

2. Doctrine
   2.1. Internal Themes
       2.1.1. themes directed towards staff members
       2.1.2. themes directed towards students
   2.2. External Themes (directed towards external environment)
       2.2.1. identity themes
       2.2.2. purpose themes (goals)
       2.2.3. program themes (ways and means)
       2.2.4. service themes
       2.2.5. progress themes (change and growth)

3. Programs
   3.1. Internal Programs
       3.1.1. teaching programs
       3.1.2. research programs
3.13 innovative programs
3.14 evaluative programs
3.15 service programs

3.2. External Programs
3.21 extension programs
3.22 service programs

4. Resources
4.1. Internal Resources
4.2. external Resources

5. Internal Structure
5.1. Design of Organisation
5.2. Delegation of Authority
5.3. Division of labour
5.4. Staff Orientation
5.5. Staff Requirements
5.6. Staff Development
5.7. Staff Evaluation
5.8. Performance Rewards.

6. Linkage Variables
6.1. Enabling Linkages
6.2. Normative Linkages
6.3. Functional Linkages
6.4. Diffuse Linkages

(appendix B.PF 140-149)
APPENDIX 2. ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABLE INCIDENCE OF DROUGHT IN SIX REGIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Severe</th>
<th>Disastrous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>( P \leq .50 )</td>
<td>( \leq .22 )</td>
<td>( \leq .02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } \geq 2 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 5 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 50 \text{ years} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahalapye</td>
<td>( P \leq .05 )</td>
<td>( \leq .22 )</td>
<td>( \leq .02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } \geq 2 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 5 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 50 \text{ years} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francistown</td>
<td>( P \geq .50 )</td>
<td>( \geq .23 )</td>
<td>( \geq .02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } &lt; 2 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } &lt; 4 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } &lt; \text{years} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maun</td>
<td>( P \leq .07 )</td>
<td>( \leq .03 )</td>
<td>Negl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } \geq 16 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 33 \text{ years} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanzi</td>
<td>( P \leq .09 )</td>
<td>( \leq .04 )</td>
<td>Negl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } \geq 6 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 25 \text{ years} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsabong</td>
<td>( P \leq .16 )</td>
<td>( \leq .09 )</td>
<td>( \leq .02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F \text{ 1 in } \geq 6 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 11 \text{ years} )</td>
<td>( 1 \text{ in } \geq 50 \text{ years} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Symbols:**
- \( P \) = Probability
- \( F \) = Frequency i.e. once in every \( x \) years
- \( \geq \) = at most
- \( \leq \) = at least
- Negl. = Negligible

**Source:** Stephen Sandford: Dealing with drought and livestock in Botswana O.D.I. London May 1977, (p.17, table 3.1)
APPENDIX 3. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE INCIDENCE OF DROUGHT IN BOTSWANA 1890 - 1970

1890 - 1892 A drought affected the mealie crop throughout the territory in the 1891-92 season.

1892 - 1893 Crops were considered to have failed throughout the season due to drought and the ravages of locusts.

1894 - 1895 The 1894 grain crop was a complete failure due to a severe drought and the ravages of locusts.

1896 - 1897 Rinderpest and drought followed in quick succession, and left thousands destitute. In the southern Protectorate (now in South Africa) 95% of all cattle were lost. A similar situation existed in the Northern Protectorate (now Botswana).

1898 - 1901 No reports.

1907 - 1908 There was an almost total absence of autumn rains.

1911 - 1912 The rains arrived very late and were then inadequate. Intense heat scorched the pasture land and vegetation.

1912 - 1913 Severe drought conditions now prevailed.

1913 - 1914 The subsistence crop of maize and millet failed due to drought.

1915 - 1916 The drought continued to be severe with crops a failure in most places.

1916 - 1917 Subsistence crops continued to be a failure almost everywhere because of the drought.
A drought during January and February 1922 meant that a shortage of grain would be experienced in the 1922-23 season.

An almost complete failure of crops sent food prices soaring.

Crops already handicapped by the unusually severe and prolonged heat of the year, and by the late and low rainfall, have now been devastated in many districts by locust invasion.

Drought was prevalent in the Francistown, Tuli block Kweneng, Ngwaketsi, Gaborone, Lobatse, Kgalagadi and Ghanzi Districts.

Drought conditions prevailed in many districts, especially affecting cereals.

Unfavourable dry conditions in some parts of the protectorate affected both crops and cattle.

Drought over most of the territory led to crop failures only about one-quarter of the normal crop being reaped.

Crop yields fell to well below normal because of sparse rains, and famine conditions prevailed in many parts of the Territory.

The worst drought in living memory occurred which, added to a bad outbreak of foot and mouth disease, led to poverty and famine in most areas. The Administration undertook relief measures for both Europeans and Africans.

A drought developed from the end of March which caused stock losses of up to 75% in some cases, and poor harvests.
1938 The area from Francistown to the South of Serowe suffered rain deficiencies which depleted harvests.

1939 - 1945 No reports.

1947 Drought conditions prevailed over most of the territory. There was an almost complete crop failure and heavy mortality among livestock.

1949 Poor rains affected grazing because of the accumulation of cattle in limited grazing areas due to the prevalence of foot and mouth disease. Crops were affected all over the territory.

1952 Drought conditions in the south reduced crop production and led to a deterioration of grazing facilities.

1957 Drought conditions in Ghanzi and Ngamiland districts necessitated famine relief.

1959 A general lack of rain led to a poor crop season in all but the central Eastern part of the Territory. Drought conditions prevailed in many areas.

1960 Severe drought conditions prevailed over much of the territory by mid-winter. There was great mortality among livestock and low crop yields were experienced.

1961 - 1962 A severe and prolonged drought was experienced over the territory.

1963 The severe drought continued.

1964 This was the third severe drought year in succession. Farmers were unable to take advantage of the early rains because their oxen were so weak.

1965 The drought continued.

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VILLAGE SETTLEMENTS AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION FOR
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

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University of Dar es Salaam

1. Introduction:

Village settlement and popular participation have been closely associated with rural development in Tanzania. Simply defined village settlements are grouping of peasant dwellings together with their surrounding agricultural land held together by identifiable socio-economic organizations. On the other hand, popular participation is a process of interaction between the government, public service and the people through established institutions. It is often discussed in the context of the planning process and of plan implementation. Thus viewed popular in rural development can best take place in the context of village settlements. Rural development entails the efficient mobilisation of human and land resources in order to increase production and raise the basic material and social well being of all citizens.

The aim of this paper is to assess briefly Tanzania's efforts and experiences at popular participation for rural development. When assessing popular participation political scientists normally consider the theoretical issues of the planning process and the institutions through which plans can be implemented. The view of this paper however is that such an assessment should focus also on the involvement of the majority of the people in practical implementation throughout the national space. It is not possible in such a short paper to cover all
the issues of popular participation in rural development. The discussion will therefore focus on the development of village settlements as a means of achieving popular participation in rural development.

II Form of Popular Participation in Tanzania

Under colonial rule peasant popular participation was extremely limited. Colonial governments viewed African rural development as a process whereby peasants produced, in addition to subsistence, cash crops and raw materials for the metropoles. There were no formal institutions for popular participation. Contact between the government and the peasantry took the form of bye-laws and advice from agricultural extension officers. Peasants were not involved in the planning process or in making decisions on the kinds of crops grown. Participation was limited to implementing agricultural decisions made by the colonial administration. The welfare of the peasants was not a factor in the colonial agricultural policy, because colonial governments aimed at maximum agricultural productivity largely for the external market. Those areas with high production potential were utilized for cash crop production while the rest of the country was largely neglected. This resulted in relative rural underdevelopment of the neglected areas. However, in a few instances, voluntary marketing cooperative societies were formed by progressive peasants, for example the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) and the Victoria Federation. Within such societies limited popular participation was possible in agricultural production.

The acceptance of popular participation as a tool for rural development can be traced back to 1962 when the Independent national government initiated rural settlement schemes and created development committees at village, district and regional levels. The task of the committees was to draw up local development plans and to mobilize people to participate in their implementation, mainly in the form of
self-help schemes. Many rural settlement schemes were also initiated. These schemes called for voluntary participation in community development projects such as building and making of village roads, bridges, wells, schools, dispensaries, health centres, communal farms and cooperative shops. The public service was brought closer to the people through the appointment of political and administrative leaders at the district and regional levels (Area and Regional Commissioners).

However, although there was a lot of self-help activity under the community development schemes between 1962 and 1967, popular participation remained low mainly because:

a) There was no coordination between different institutions at the local level. Each institution received independent directives from the centre in Dar es Salaam.

b) Local institutions had little financial resources to sustain their self-help efforts.

c) District and regional bureaucrats and technocrats often usurped participatory functions of local development committees and cooperative societies.

Since 1967 when a socialist programme (The Arusha Declaration) was first adopted in Tanzania, focus on development emphasized rural development, particularly raising the welfare of the majority of the citizens who live in rural areas. Rural development was conceived in terms of self-reliance through local initiative in planning and mobilising of local resources within organized communal settlements (Ujamaa villages). A series of measures were undertaken to achieve this goal. A regional Development Fund was set up in 1967 to stimulate local initiative and popular participation through the development committees. The Fund was intended to be used for locally chosen projects which were of a development nature. In 1968 the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning was established, among other things, to improve
regional planning. In the following year, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development was set up with an Ujamaa department to coordinate the establishment of Ujamaa villages in the country. Other measures included the initiating of Regional plans; setting up Ujamaa planning teams in each region; and making agricultural training, Ujamaa oriented. All these efforts focused on the Ujamaa villages as the main institution for popular participation and mobilization.

The 1972 Decentralization reform ("more power to the people") came as a logical follow up to these developments. It aimed at strengthening local institutions of participation as well as improving performance of Regional Administration. Under the reform local implementation teams were given financial and decision-making autonomy within defined limits. About 40% of central government development budget was allocated to the regions to be spent on regional projects. District and Regional directorates were set up with corresponding development committees and councils. Another major step in ensuring popular participation at village level was the passing of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act in 1975. The Act provided for the demarcation and registration of villages which had elected village governments. The village was given the power to draw its own development plans and implement them. Such a village acquired legal ownership of land within its boundaries. In addition the village was allowed to raise loans and exact levies, buy and sell village produce, and control its labour force. Further decentralization was initiated in 1977 by increasing the involvement of technical personnel in the wards and villages and creating posts of village managers.

III The Implementation of Popular Participation in Tanzania

The above outline shows the clarity of policy and the government's genuine desire to achieve maximum popular participation possible in the rural areas. In this section a review of the implementation experience of these policies through village settlements is presented in a chrono-
logical sequence with the objective of assessing the extent to which popular participation has been practiced.

Under traditional settlements in Tanzania, popular participation in rural development was limited to family units which lived in scattered homesteads practising sedentary or shifting cultivation or nomadic pastoralism. The colonial governments did not change this pattern of organization and settlement although a few settlement schemes were initiated in the late 1950s. With independence the national government of settlement schemes in the post-independence period was to regroup the rural population into village settlements with the specific aim of increasing agricultural output through the "improvement and transformation approaches." Settlement schemes were concentrated in a few areas and were initially not intended to cover the whole country. Two basic types of settlements evolved during this period: Supervised settlement schemes, and voluntary settlement schemes (Table 1).

Supervised settlement schemes, were begun in 1954 during the colonial period. The central government exercised direct control over the schemes and after independence these schemes were managed by the department of settlement agency in the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development. In practice these settlements took up a large percentage of development resources and devoted them to a small number of people. The schemes were highly capitalized and aimed at providing capital, machinery, housing and social services such as schools, dispensaries, roads and piped water on a subsidized basis. For example it was planned that each village scheme was to have 250 families at a cost of £150,000. It was proposed to settle 500,000 people by 1969 on such schemes at a total cost of £12 million or 13½% of the total development budget. There was a very low degree of popular participation and decision-making on these schemes and because the returns on these very large investments were small, the whole programme was discontinued.
The voluntary farming settlements (started in 1959) on the other hand involved voluntary coming together of people who received external prompting, advice or supervision over their productive functions. The rational of this type of settlement was the pooling of resources by voluntary participants for mutual material benefit rather than for the fulfilment of predetermined government targets. We can distinguish between cooperative schemes and spontaneous nation-building schemes such as those started by Ruvuma Development Agency and TYL (Table 1). About 400 cooperative sisal farms and "coconut and cattle" schemes were started. However, by 1967 only a few of these survived. Members of the schemes retained individual farms and their commitment to the cooperative farms was minimal. Many other voluntary settlement schemes were started in answer to TANU's call to build the nation. There were over 500 TYL schemes which started on an ad hoc basis and as a result of migration to new areas. Production was on an individual basis and there were very few shared institutions such as in irrigation and domestic water supply. Many of these settlements had a brief existence and were discontinued after 1966. Unlike the supervised settlement schemes both the cooperative and TYL voluntary schemes had a basis for participation. Nevertheless they lacked internal binding organization such as planning or management committee and has a low degree of commitment to the cooperative activities from members. The only example of success of the voluntary schemes are 15 settlement communities associated with the Ruvuma Development Association. These settlements were organized on the principle of popular participation and had a high degree of self-reliance. Each community elected its own manager and management committee which was responsible to the members in their day to day running of the community's activities. They achieved great efficiency through division of labour and specialization (eg. cultivation of a wide range of crops, tending of cattle, spinning and weaving, brick-making, flour milling, production of timber and provision of social services such as water and schools).
The villages settlement experience up to 1966 involved no more than 100,000 people out of a national population of about 11 million people. Thus popular participation even in terms of involvement in rural development was limited and not broad based. Rural development was narrowly conceived in terms of increasing output of mainly export crops without transforming the material well-being of the majority of Tanzanians. Capitalist models of planning, such as the regional planning model, emphasized use of capital and technology to obtain optimal results from a few potentially rich areas and ignored a large part of the country where immediate returns were not forthcoming.

From 1967 when the Arusha Declaration was adopted, popular participation received serious attention under the programme of rural development through Ujamaa villages. This process of collectivization initially involved voluntary living together, working together and equitable sharing of output. It was envisaged that labour productivity would increase through specialization, division of labour and collective effort. Collectivization also aimed at bringing people together in order to provide basic social services to the largest number. Another objective of Ujamaa villagization was to achieve economies of scale in purchasing, marketing, provision of services and mechanization. Finally Ujamaa villages were expected to transform the rural social environment into more prosperous self-reliant and self determining communities where there would be no exploitation and no conspicuous income differentials. Through these villages socio-political and economic mobilization would be promoted in order to sustain the socialist revolution spelt out in the Arusha Declaration.

Each Village was supposed to have an elected chairman secretary, village council and village committees, and constitute a village assembly. These were the instruments of participation in planning, decision making and implementation at the village level. However the formation of Ujamaa villages took various forms: Some were formed
spontaneously by voluntary collectivization as in the case of the Ruvuma Development Association, while others were induced by the government through "operations" which involved an element of coercion. Operations such as in Dodoma and Kigoma Regions took place in the early 1970's because first, it has felt that progress in the establishment of Ujamaa villages till then had been too slow, and second, these areas are economically backward and needed government aid (especially in social services) which could not effectively be provided as the population was extremely scattered. Other Ujamaa villages were formed through special circumstance. For example Ujamaa villagization in the Ruvuji District was accomplished in a very short period when the Rufiji flooded large areas of its valley and necessitated the government to evacuate the entire population into villages on higher ground. In Ruvuma and Mtwara Regions a large number of Ujamaa villages was formed during the war of liberation in Mozambique.

Generally, throughout the country many Ujamaa villages were formed during the "operations" period, 1970 to 1974 (Table 2 and 3). It is evident from these tables that the numbers of peasants living in Ujamaa villages varied greatly from region to region. The majority of Ujamaa villages in Tanzania started with the collective clearing of new land, hence it was not surprising that most of them are in the economically less developed, sparsely populated parts of the country such as Dodoma, Kigoma, Mtwara and Singida. The low participation in Ujamaa villagization in West Lake, Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Mbeya and Morogoro Regions is accounted for by the fact that these are the traditional cash crop producing areas with high population density and land scarcity. These areas had little opportunity to participate in forming new villages on the basis of moving to adjacent new areas. Furthermore, collectivization of land with permanent crops proved unworkable. It was only in the marginal low lands of these Regions that few Ujamaa village were formed.

Up to 1974 there was a great diversity in the kinds of villages established. Most villages were no more than groupings of people with
## Table II
**Progress of Villagization 1970 - 1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF VILLAGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arusha</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coast</td>
<td>46,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dodoma</td>
<td>26,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Iringa</td>
<td>11,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kigoma</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Lindi</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mara</td>
<td>24,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mbeya</td>
<td>32,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Morogoro</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mtwara</td>
<td>43,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mwanza</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Rukwa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ruvuma</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Shinyanga</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Singida</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Tabora</td>
<td>16,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Tanga</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. West Lake</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 271,200 1,973,862 2,420,362 9,140,733 12,764,325

**Source:** Prime Minister's Office, 1976

*(Maendeleo ya Ujamaa na Ushirika Tanzania)*
## Table II

### Progress of Villagization 1970 - 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arusha</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dar es Salaam</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dodoma</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Iringa</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kigoma</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kilimanjaro</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>8. Lindi</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mara</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mbeya</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Morogoro</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mtwara</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Rukwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ruvuma</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Shinyanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Singida</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Tabora</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Tanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. West Lake</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>6,944</td>
<td>7,658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Prime Minister's Office Dodoma, 1976

(Maendeleo ya Ujamaa na Ushirika Tanzania)
few communal activities, and agriculture continued largely on individual holdings. The procedures for implementing Ujamaa villagization failed to deal with variety of environmental and socio-economic problems which were inherited from the colonial period. Therefore Ujamaa villages as envisaged did not emerge. Although the number of people living in villages and participating in communal activities increased greatly from less than 100,000 in 1966 to 2.5 million in 1974, the level of popular participation in implementing rural development programmes was below that envisaged by the government. There was no significant increase in agricultural output during this period and the standard of living in rural areas in general did not change radically. Further institutional reforms were required. Thus the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act provided for a systematic progression of all villages from initial registration under village governments, through communal ownership, to full socialist Ujamaa villages. This did not necessarily involve moving people from one area to another. By the end of 1976 the first stage of demarcating and registering of villages in the whole country had been completed thus providing the basis for lasting, broad-based popular participation in rural development for the whole country.

IV Conclusion:

The paper has traced the development of village settlement, as a vehicle for popular participation through time. It would appear from a study of the stated objectives and institutions created that the approach to rural development in Tanzania emphasized popular participation. However, when it comes to practice and degree of popular participation has been rather low. This can be explained partly by the fact that the planning models adopted since the First Five year Plan (1964-69) have been conceived by capitalist economists. These models do not emphasize popular participation; rather they emphasize the planning process and optimal results, and vest the management responsibility in experts. Moreover, many institutions and policy reform
statements were created in such a rapid succession that none of them was given the chance to operate fully before it was superceded by another (For example, 1967 Ujamaa villages; 1970 operations; 1972 Decentralization; 1974 Development villages; 1975 Villages and Ujamaa villages Act; 1977 Village managers). This makes it difficult to evaluate the appropriateness and weaknesses of each reform and even more difficult to assess the extent to which each reform achieved stated objectives. However, the frequency with which reforms have been introduced is itself an indication of their weaknesses: generally, the reforms were not comprehensive enough, and did not always take into consideration the factors that could hinder their effective implementation. For example, Ujamaa villages were initially intended to be spontaneous and voluntary communal settlements but after a short experience it was evident that response was poor and the types of Ujamaa villages deviated greatly from the socialist ideal.

In her effort to achieve popular participation in rural development Tanzania has succeeded in creating participatory institutions at all administrative levels. However despite the existence of these institutions popular participation has not been widespread, the main problem is that in the implementation stage, technical, financial, and human resources have not always been adequate and in many instances where such scarce resources have been available they have not been fully utilized.
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I  Introduction:

The aim of the session was to assess to what extent the conference had done justice to the conference theme.

a) Did the papers address themselves to the theme?
b) What were the salient issues?
c) What were the main research items for the future?
d) What were the main methodological issues?

II  Issues Raised in General Discussion

a) What is the subject matter of Social Science and how can the subject matter be formulated in research or rural development? Two Schools of thought were evident in the seminar viz. the Marxist School and the bourgeois social science school, the latter manifesting itself in structural functionalism.

b) The juxtaposition of the two schools suggests that in the next conference we should have strong theoretical papers from both marxist and bourgeois perspectives in order to see which school would raise the most challenging questions.

c) The papers for the next conference should therefore be discussable.

d) What kind of rural transformation do we want? Only after this question can we raise the issue of participation.

e) It was suggested that the papers should have been confined to one issue concerning rural transformation. This would have made the discussion even more productive.

f) It was argued that, on the other hand, too much concretization of the issues might rob a future seminar of its richness and variety, in addition to creating organisational problems.

g) It was suggested that the topic for the next seminar should be "The Possibilities for Socialist Transformation in Africa". It was suggested that may be the topic should be narrowed down to focus on "Agriculture" since this is the central activity in the rural areas.
h) Satisfaction was expressed on the overal seminar. It had generated a lot of discussion. It was regretted that the Tanzanians were absent as their presence would have greatly enriched the discussion.

i) On the issue of theoretical vs. empirical papers, it was suggested that we should be careful not to make any future seminar too theoretical and abstract, at the expense of empirical research. Rather, an attempt should be made to apply the two epistemologies to empirical situations.

j) It was suggested that the next conference should focus on the majority of the rural people, i.e. the peasantry, and that the papers should have assigned topics.

k) The topic for the workshop was not clearly defined. This had been done deliberately to give room for manoeuvrability. However, in the next conference it was suggested that at least 2 papers could address themselves to the theoretical/methodological issues.
I Agenda
1. Minutes of the Nazareth Meeting
2. Matters arising
3. Topic for next meeting
4. Election of Committee of Conveners
5. A.O.B.

(i) The minutes of the Nazareth Meeting were approved after a brief opening by the Chairman.

II Matters Arising.

a) Publication of the proceedings of the Nazareth Conference.

It had been agreed at Nazareth that the host committee should try to arrange for the publication of the proceedings of the conference. Dr. Nqussey Ayele was called upon to report.

In his report, he pointed out three basic problems: (a) Authors of papers who were expected to hand in revised papers did not do so. (b) The Arusha conference was a continuation of the same theme as at Nazareth. Therefore it appeared more appropriate to publish the best out of the two meetings. (c) The question of finance. This was related to (b) that it would make better economic and intellectual sense to publish the best out of the two meetings. Otherwise the publication of proceedings would be expensive and disjointed.
It was agreed that (a) Only the best articles from the two conferences be considered for publication instead of publishing all the proceedings. (b) Relevant papers to the theme in question but outside the proceedings can be included in the publication. (c) Editorial Committee be set up.

(b) Editorial Committee.

A three member committee was agreed upon and the following were elected: Nagussey Ayele, Mutahaba and Okoth-Ogendo.

(c) Submission of revised or New Papers:

It was agreed that the authors should take note of the comments made on the papers during the discussions and should make the necessary revisions. New or revised papers should reach the editorial committee at the latest by 31st July 1977. It is after this date that the committee will be in a position to decide finally which of the submitted papers will be published.

(d) Collaboration in Research

As one of the original objectives, collaboration in research has not been realised, it was reported. The Nazareth meeting had talked about the same issue (see p3 of the Nazareth meeting Nos b,c, & d). Further suggestions should be given to the Committee of Convenors as to the policy that should be followed. The group expected a comprehensive report from the Convenors at the next gathering.

III Topic for Next Conference.

After discussing general suggestions the Working session agreed on PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT as the theme of the next conference which will be held in Kenya. The time and place were left to the host committee just as the composition of the host committee was left open.
IV  

Election of the Committee of Conveners:

The following were elected on to the committee.

- Okoth-Ogendo (Chairman)
- Nagussey Ayele (Ethiopia)
- Migot-Adholla (Kenya (also Chairman of the host committee for the next conference))
- J. Bakwesiga (Uganda)
- Mutahaba (Tanzania)
- Ollawa (Zambia)
- Wanji (Botswana)

V  

A.O.B.

a) Since some of the rapporteur's reports appeared to be incorrect accounts of what some people had said, it was agreed that they should be amended. Those affected should spear head the process.

b) As a guide to the next conference it was suggested that some papers should specifically address themselves to theoretical issues.

c) A vote of thanks was moved by Dr. A Beyene to the Arusha local committee for having organised a very successful conference. The quality of the papers had improved greatly and it was hoped this would improve even further. He also noted that the group had greatly expanded in terms of members of delegates and countries represented, Dr. Beyene welcomed Dr. C. Cottingham who had come from the US to attend the conference. The financial support from the Ford Foundation and the presence of Dr. E. Winans were greatly appreciated. Thanks also went to the Management Institute for the services it provided to make the conference a success.
d) The final point of the meeting was made by Dr. Mutahaba. He revealed to the meeting that the Management Institute was going to undertake on behalf of the group, to search for other sources of funding other than the Ford Foundation. This was in accord with the spirit of the Nazareth meeting where it was agreed that a diversification of sources of funds should be undertaken.

There being no other business the meeting ended at about 4 o'clock.

Approved for Issue

CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE OF CONVENORS

Approved by Business Meeting of 7th EASSRCG

CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE OF CONVENORS.
AGENDA FOR BUSINESS MEETING OF THE EASSRCG, MARCH 29TH 1978

1. Approval of Minutes of the 6th Meeting at Arusha.
2. Matters Arising.
3. Theme, Location and Organisational Arrangements for next meeting.
4. Criteria for invitation of participants.
5. Election of Committee of Convenors.
6. A.O.B.
MINUTES OF THE 7TH EASSRCG, HELD ON MARCH 29TH
WESTWOOD PARK HOTEL, NAIROBI

Session Chairman  -  H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo
Session Rapporteur  -  S.E. Migot-Adholla

Agenda

I  AGENDA FOR BUSINESS MEETING OF 7TH EASSRCG, MARCH 29TH 1978

1. Approval of Minutes of the 6th Meeting at Arusha
2. Matters Arising.
3. Theme, location and organisational Arrangements for next meeting.
4. Criteria for invitation of participants.
5. Election of Committee of Convenors.
6. A.O.B.

Minutes of the 6th Meeting were approved after some brief comments by the Chairman.

II  Matters Arising

Dr. G.R. Mutahaba made the following comments in relation to the work of the editorial committee:-

a) Since communication from the authors of paper submitted at both Nazareth and Arusha was not satisfactory it was decided in December 1977 that the editorial committee would deal with them as they were.

b) 23 papers were selected for inclusion in a volume to be entitled Approaches to Rural Development in Eastern Africa. The authors of the selected papers were to submit revised versions of the papers to the editors by
March 15th. So far response for the authors has been slow but it is hoped that all the manuscripts will be ready by June 1978.

c) Because of the likelihood of earlier publication the editors would have preferred Oxford, Longman or Heinemann, but as a matter of policy, IDRC who had indicated an interest in subsidising publication costs, would only operate through an indigenous publishing house. However, no final decision about this had been taken.

III Theme and Venue of 1979 Workshop.

After considerable discussion the topic for the next meeting was decided by simple majority vote: RURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EASTERN AFRICA. Because of financial constrains it was decided that the meeting in 1979 would be held in Tanzania, the specific venue to be determined by the chairman of the Host Committee: Dr. G.R. Mutahaba, whose contact address is E.A.C. Management Institute, P.O. Box 3030 Arusha, Tanzania.

IV Criteria for Participation

It was observed by Migot-Adholla that the criteria for participation in the EASSRG Workshops was rather ambiguous, and that there was need for such criteria to be clarified. It was however generally felt that such flexibility was indeed a strength. The major unifying factor was that participants were engaged in teaching and research on subjects relevant to rural development. It was agreed that greater effort should be made to identify and invite women scholars in the region.

V Committee of Convenors

The following were elected to the committee

H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo  — Chairman
Nagussey Ayale  — Ethiopia
**Migot-Adholla**  
**Kenya**  
**G.R. Mutahaba**  
**Tanzania (also Chairman of Host Committee for next meeting)**  
**E.O. Ochieng**  
**Botswana**  
**S.A. ElArifi**  
**Sudan**  
**M. Sefali**  
**Lesotho**

To be appointed by Chairman in consultation with the relevant institutions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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**VI A.O.B.**

Dr. T.B. Kabwegyere moved a vote of thanks to Dr. S.E. Migot-Adholla for having organized a very successful meeting. Dr. Migot-Adholla in accepting the vote of thanks observed that because the meeting was held during the Easter Weekend when all public offices were closed it had not been possible to make alternative arrangements to enable participants from Zambia and Tanzania, who had faced some hitches before departure to arrive in Nairobi before the close of the workshop.

There being no other business the meeting ended at about 2 p.m.

Approved for Issue:

[Signature]

Chairman of Committee of Convenors.
WORKSHOP ON POPULAR PARTICIPATION
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

WESTWOOD PARK HOTEL, KAREN

FINAL PROGRAMME

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<tr>
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<th>Arrival of Participants and Registration.</th>
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<td><strong>MONDAY 27th March</strong></td>
<td>Approval of Final Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900 - 0930</td>
<td>Official Opening by Prof. W.M. Senga, Director Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0930 - 1000</td>
<td>Tea Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000 - 1030</td>
<td>Participants Read Papers</td>
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<td>1030 - 1200</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<td>1230 - 1400</td>
<td>Session I: The Concept of Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1400 - 1500</td>
<td>Papers by:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migot-Adholla and Kabwegyere: Participation and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banugire: Rural Transformation Theory and the Concept of Participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Katorobo: Models of Participation in Rural Development in Botswana.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the Chair: Njuguna-Njepethe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Discussant: Salih A ElArifi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rapporteur: Achola O. Pala</td>
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<tr>
<td>1530 - 1600</td>
<td>Tea Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1600 - 1730</td>
<td>Session I. Continues.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TUESDAY, 28th March</th>
<th>Session II Participation and Rural Development in Lesotho</th>
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<tr>
<td>0900 - 1030</td>
<td>Papers by: M. Sefali: 'Strategies for Rural Development in Africa: A Case Study of Lesotho'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E.M. Sebatane: Labour Migration and Agricultural Development. The Case of Lesotho.

In the Chair: S.E. Migot-Adholla
Discussant: F. Chege
Rapporteur: B.A. Godana

1030 - 1100 - Tea Break
1100 - 1230 - Session III Participation and Rural Development in Kenya.
Papers by:
N. Ng’ethe: 'Harambee and Development Participation: Notes on an Illusive Ideology'

In the Chair: E.O. Ochieng.
Discussant: J. Katorobo
Rapporteur: H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo

Papers by:
B.A. Godana: 'Some Aspects of Livestock Development in North-Eastern Province of Kenya'
J. Mbula: Participation of Youth in Rural Development.

In the Chair: E.V. Winans
Discussant: T.B. Kabwegeyre
Rapporteur: P. Anyang-Nyongo

Papers by:
Fred E. Chege: Experience with attempts to create mechanisms for Popular Participation in Rural Development in Kenya: The Tetu Pilot Extension Project.

1530 - 1600 - Tea Break
WEDNESDAY 29th March
0900 - 1030  -  Session V Participation and Rural Development in the Sudan.

Paper by:  S.A. ElArifi 'Local Government and Mass Participation in Rural Development in the Sudan.'

In the Chair:  J. Mbula
Discussant:  H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo
Rapporteur:  E.M. Sebatane.

1030 - 1100  -  Session VI Participation and Rural Development in Botswana.

Paper by:  E.O. Ochieng 'Impediments to Sustained Peasant Participation in the Development Process.'

In the Chair:  M. Sefali
Discussant:  P. Anyang-Nyongo
Rapporteur:  F. Chege

1100 - 1230  -  Tea Break

1230 - 1800  -  Business Meeting
In the Chair:  H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo
Rapporteur:  S.E. Migot-Adholla

THURSDAY 30th March
0900 - 1030  -  Reception at the University of Nairobi - Refectory.

1030         -  CHECK - OUT.
WORKSHOP ON POPULAR PARTICIPATION
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

March 26 - 29, 1978

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